Author Archives: Hiram

About Hiram

Hiram is an author from the north side of Chicago who has written for The Humanist, Infidels, Occupy, and many other publications. He blogs at The Autarkist and is the author of Tending the Epicurean Garden (Humanist Press, 2014), How to Live a Good Life (Penguin Random House, 2020) and Epicurus of Samos – His Philosophy and Life: All the principal Classical texts Compiled and Introduced by Hiram Crespo (Ukemi Audiobooks, 2020). He earned a BA in Interdisciplinary Studies from NEIU.

Happy Twentieth: On “Love Your Neighbor”

Happy Twentieth to all the disciples of Epicurus! Psyche Magazine published an essay titled Sprinkle a little ancient philosophy into your daily routines, and the Ad Navseam podcast published an episode titled The Whole Enchilada: Epicureanism and Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura. Unfortunately, midway through the episode the authors cast doubt on whether Epicureans can be good citizens–never mind the historian Diogenes Laertius’ testimony about the character of Epicurus. To balance this, I would invite the student to read John Thrasher’s essay on Epicurean contractarianism.

This month, the latest episode of the Newstalk podcast “Talking History” is titled “Epicurus: a Life”. Several scholars were interviewed.

Love Your Neighbor

One of the teachers of the law came and heard them debating. Noticing that Jesus had given them a good answer, he asked him, “Of all the commandments, which is the most important?”

“The most important one,” answered Jesus, “is this: ‘Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God, the Lord is one. Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind and with all your strength. ’The second is this: ‘Love your neighbor as yourself.’ There is no commandment greater than these.”

– Jesus the Nazarene, in The Gospel according to Mark 12:28-31

Having been raised in a Christian household has made me aware of both the utility and the futility of Christian ethos–whether we delve into the details, or stick to the basics. Christianity provides a formative ethical framework for almost all of my family members and a large portion of the society I live in. Even after people leave Christianity behind, or stop taking most of its claims seriously, many still consider themselves Christian Humanists and frequently still unquestioningly accept the wisdom of “Love your neighbor“. Not wanting to embrace it or dismiss it without careful consideration, I decided to take a second look at the second of the two Christian commandments through the lens of my Epicurean ethical framework to see if “Love your neighbor” still works.

I believe that Epicurus would argue that a commandment to love God is a bit strange: if one is commanded to love someone, is it love or is it fear? Can sentient beings be ORDERED to feel an emotion? Furthermore, the Principal Doctrines on justice recognize the personal sovereignty of the individual, and so we do not have “commandments”, only doctrines and adages.

So the first Christian commandment is irrelevant to us, but I believe the second commandment is not only sound, but also that Epicurus and most of the Epicurean Guides might argue that it’s generally advantageous to love our neighbors–maybe not as much as we love ourselves, but we can still argue that it’s advantageous to let our brain brew its oxytocin and endorphin rush for them. I believe that they would argue this from the perspective of the safety and the advantages it brings, rather than merely virtue-signal around the teaching, as a sign of respect for the intelligence of their pupils. In fact, Lucretius, in De Rerum Natura 5:1015-27 includes compassion for the weak among the foundational cultural traits of human societies listed in Liber Qvintvs:

Then, too, did neighbours ‘gin to league as friends,
Eager to wrong no more or suffer wrong,
And urged for children and the womankind
Mercy, of fathers, whilst with cries and gestures
They stammered hints how meet it was that all
Should have compassion on the weak.

But first, let us clarify what the second Christian commandment says and what it doesn’t say. “Love your neighbor”, on its face, does not mean that we should love everyone everywhere and always. No one has the attention span or time to love everyone. It’s naturally impossible to love everyone. Love, if it’s true, if the word has any real meaning, is a time-consuming pleasure. Two individuals must have wholesome exchanges and get to know each other with some level of depth, which takes some time. They must take time to communicate, and to demonstrate care with concrete tokens of friendship.

Notice that the word chosen in English to translate the Gospel teaching is “neighbor”–which in its prolepsis implies physical proximity. In Spanish, the word chosen is “prójimo”, which is related to words like proximity and also implies nearness. Our friend Nathan adds:

Within the ancient Hebrew context of Leviticus, ‘neighbor’ does not refer to ‘humanity’, it only refers to ‘other members of our tribe’. The full quotation from Leviticus is important for context: “You shall not take vengeance or bear a grudge against any of your people, but you shall love your neighbor as yourself: I am the Lord.” (19:18 NRSV)

PD’s 27 and 39-40 argue for the benefits of loving our neighbors and keeping them near. The Doctrines seem to argue that it’s advantageous to love those who are in our proximity, for the sake of our safety and happiness. Although PD 39 is often used to justify the exclusion from our circles of people who bring trouble or conflict, it starts by spelling out the following ideal scenario:

The man who best knows how to meet external threats makes into one family all the creatures he can. – Principal Doctrine 39

Other issues we must discuss are the feasibility argument and the argument for a complete ethical education. We don’t know to what extent it’s possible to TRULY love all of our neighbors. It’s impractical for a community to set up a rule in its social contract that is impossible to follow, however, it’s not irrational to expect an agreement of harmlessness (rather than love) from relative strangers. While the Christian commandment is noble, it potentially imposes and breeds hypocrisy, whereas the Epicurean conception of justice founded on an agreement to neither harm nor be harmed is much more realistic and practical.

That is the feasibility argument. The argument for a complete ethical education, on the other hand, says: while a commandment by a god to love him makes that god sound narcissistic, and while his commanding us to love others sounds authoritarian, Epicurus’ approach of expounding arguments for the advantages and benefits of befriending and loving our neighbors constitutes a more complete ethical education, and appeals to both our self-interest and our prudence. Most importantly, it does not produce false reasons to love our neighbors, and respects the intelligence and autarchy of the practitioner of philosophy.

Some enemies of Epicurean philosophy have argued that Epicureans would not make good citizens, or have concern for others outside of their immediate circle, however:

  1. Epicurus took care of orphans: he adopted and provided for the daughter of his best friend Metrodorus when she was orphaned. She must have been very young when Metro died, as he died eight years prior to Epicurus’ death and, as of the writing of his final will, Epicurus had not yet made arrangements for her to get married. Therefore, Epicurus had assumed responsibility for her and helped to raise her into adulthood
  2. Epicurus taught his friends how to live properly and pleasantly: he had a concrete and useful curriculum that provided an ethical and philosophical education for both young and old in his community which specifically contributed to their happiness and to living correctly
  3. The practice of friendship (philía) was a central aspect of the teaching mission. Each friend furnishes a concrete instance of loving our neighbor
  4. Epicurus fed the people every month in a feast: his Kepos functioned like what we would think of today as a communal non-profit organization. The welcome sign at the gate in the garden said “_STRANGER_, here you do well to tarry”. Since strangers were welcome in the garden, this means that Epicurus fed strangers, which sounds like near-universal charity

Epicurus, I would argue, was an exemplary citizen by any measure who sought to make into one tribe all the creatures that he was able to befriend. When asking about this subject in our FB group, one of the group members Shahab had this to say:

I think showing affection toward a neighbor makes you feel more safe beside them. Nothing is guaranteed, as men wish more harm upon each other. In any case, your neighbor may be a religious, a superstitious family, or they may be from people working for the government (as in authoritarian regimes). In these cases you wouldn’t feel safe if you don’t show them friendly feelings, or once upon a time, inviting them for a party where they can find, at least, Epicurean friendly attitude, reassuring for a healthy happy life. Malevolent neighbors can sabotage your reputation, making you feel unsafe in the neighborhood. So, as long as it benefits an Epicurean, showing a well-calculated love and friendliness toward one’s neighbor is, to me, a wise thing to do.

Not everyone considers “Love your neighbor” as being useful. Jason says:

PD 39 sums it up for me. Enroll everyone possible into the social contract. Benevolence meets benevolence. If they cannot or will not keep the contract, avoid them and their disturbance. If they cannot be avoided, expel them. The English word love is too much of a catch-all term for all of the varieties of positive feeling I experience to apply it universally to all sentients.

The biochemistry of my brain responds differently to different people and circumstances. Putting all those feelings under one word makes for vague speech, something Christianity, out of all the Abrahamic faiths, excels in. It is precisely that vagueness that makes it incompatible with Epicurean philosophy.

Nathan also says:

“He who best knew how to meet fear of external foes made into one family all the creatures he could; and those he could not, he at any rate did not treat as aliens; and where he found even this impossible, he avoided all association, and, so far as was useful, kept them at a distance” (Principal Doctrine 39).

I invite everyone to heed scientific research, get vaccinated, and wear a mask. To those who are unable to get vaccinated, I understand and encourage safe practices. To those who take unnecessary risks, I’ll avoid like the plague.

To answer your original question: no, Epicurus would not have endorsed (Love thy neighbor), because that proposition is justified by devotional worship of a Creator and does not consider any negative consequences of unconditional love.

From PD 39, and from the above discussion, we conclude that he wisdom of setting boundaries must be balanced with making into one tribe everyone we can … and it’s up to each one of us to determine the extent of each.

Therefore, I believe Epicurus loved his neighbors just as well or better than any good Christian, because he demonstrated life-long love for those who were near him (and taught them by example how to love each other) not with naive, religious idealisms but with concrete tokens of benefits, and for the right reasons.

The Epicureans on Abortion

The abduction over the years of very religiously conservative judges into the Supreme Court of the US–seven of the nine Justices are Catholic and many are religious and conservative at a time when over a third of millennials identify as “nones–, and the recent events in Texas (where restrictions to legalized abortion inspired by particular interpretations of Christianity are now being imposed in a manner that is difficult to challenge) are scary for many of us who have for years feared the ongoing encroachment of Dominionist ideology and theocracy in America, both in the public square and in our private lives. Recently, we discussed the issue of abortion from an Epicurean perspective. I wanted to get the opinions of several of the members of the Garden of Epicurus FaceBook group, to ensure that my opinion is not the only one being expressed here and that the discussion remained as objective as possible. Below is the (edited) dialogue we had concerning abortion as an ethical problem from an Epicurean perspective.

Hiram. Concerning the Texas abortion law: do others see good Epicurean arguments for / against? I’m curious to see what others make of this.

My first instinct is to acknowledge that unborn babies, particularly in the first few weeks, are just “goo in a petri dish” (to cite comedian Bill Maher). They lack the neural complexity for sentience, and so are not yet human beings from the Epicurean perspective (Epicurus’ Principal Doctrine 2 ties living to sentience). A certain amount of neural complexity is needed to produce the actual experience of being human.

My second reaction is that forced motherhood creates more unwanted children (and, in the case of incense or rape, particularly when the mother is herself a child, compounds the trauma), and these unwanted children later go on to contribute significantly to virtually all the statistics of societal dysfunction. It also keeps families in poverty if they’re not prepared for the huge responsibilities of another child (it costs $ 250,000 to raise a child in the US outside of the cycles of poverty)

Jason. PD38 says it all, for me.

When circumstances have not changed and things that were thought to be just are shown to not be in accord with our basic grasp of justice, then those things were not just. But when circumstances do change and things that were just are no longer useful, then those things were just while they brought mutual advantage among companions sharing the same community; but when later they did not bring advantage, then they were not just.

We’re not the same community. This is a religious community trying to impose their values on people who are not in their community. It’s fundamentally unjust on the face of it.

If they want to virtue signal they can do so voluntarily. It ceases to be virtuous when the behavior is forced. Their own actions aren’t in alignment with their religious doctrine. Choice and avoidance is as important a part of Christianity as it is in Epicurean philosophy.

Hiram. The accusation of virtue signaling reminds me of our third Scholarch Polystratus, who argued that when people pursue virtue but fail to study nature, their virtue comes to nothing and degenerates into superstition and arrogance (fanaticism). And so true virtue is impossible without it being rooted in the physics. In this case, the neural complexity of the newborn child is what renders it sentient enough to eventually feel pain and pleasure, which is what dignifies a soul in our ethics. But Christians do not care about that. They magically attribute even “personhood” to an undeveloped fetus without considering its neural complexity.

Going back to our discussions on slavery, this policy is an instance of denial of consent: people who did not participate in articulating the terms of a particular “social contract” are being forced into it against their will (and in the case of forced motherhood, this also includes the unwanted child who is brought forcefully into the world against the will of parents, who may later also abuse or neglect the unwanted child).

Doug. The debate would likely seem bizarre to an ancient Greek Pagan. They practiced infanticide. The father had several days after the birth to decide whether the child should be allowed to live. If he thought so, then there was a ceremony to welcome the child into the family.

What does the Bible say about Abortion?

Jason. The debate is bizarre to everyone outside of the noisome group making it the center of their politics. It isn’t even in alignment with their own other anti-regulatory beliefs.

Eileen. Abortion bans are about a Christian belief in ensoulment at the point of conception, but I’m not clear on Epicurus’s stand on this. I do know that abortion was by turns tolerated and vilified in the ancient world, its fortunes seeming to rise and fall with society’s perceptions of their population status at any given time.

Ilkka. We must also remember that these are the same people who oppose factual sex education and easy availability of contraception. The actual methods of preventing abortions … An Epicurean might answer that legislation that is motivated by superstition is automatically unjust.

Beryl. There is something for me here about abortion or “killing one’s own whilst in the womb“ which seems strikingly unfriendly to human life. That said it’s also extremely unfriendly to legislate for fully adult people how they can use their own bodies.

Whilst science tells us when a fetus may be human and religion tells us when a human fetus has a soul, hedonic calculus tells us clearly that knowing that unprotected sex–despite the pleasure–can cause untold suffering of the life created if brought into poverty, servitude, or life situations that cause early infant death, is itself a hostile unfriendly act. Where are the legislators taxing men named and proven by DNA tests as progenitors of offspring that may suffer hardships in life?

So on one hand one could say that the Texas legislators are preventing suffering by preventing late abortion. This though when examined further is a lie since the legislation will overwhelmingly affect poor women, especially minority women, and their unwanted children who may have entire lives suffering psychologically from the impact of poverty. Essentially the ruling is a hostile act and unfriendly towards both women and their unborn children whilst masquerading as the opposite. This level of hypocrisy needs to be avoided and be unsupported as toxic anti-woman and -child rhetoric. This legislation further does not look at the true causation of maternal and infant suffering–namely poverty, and neither does it address issues such as free contraception access which could decrease suffering overall. So if happiness is to be the greatest good, legislation which harms women and children is not Epicurean, nor is is compatible with the concept of friendliness.

From my own experience as a mother and as a witness to folk who have undergone these surgeries, the love of our own children brings great happiness and is an immortal good, as remembrance of times past being the most delicious memories. Even early morning feeds are remembered fondly. From talking to folk who have opted for the path of abortion there is deep sadness for some and poverty, lack of love for the partner, youth of the mother, or illness, along with in ability to self-reflect and manage desires, are amongst the reasons that unwanted pregnancies arise. A friendly act would be to fund contraception, teach folk about consent, educate our young on respect for human life, and how we conduct ourselves, especially when desire pulls us in directions that can cause harm to others. The spotlight needs to be put equally on men and women as co-creators of human life, and as such equally responsible for the suffering they inflict on their unwanted children.

Marcus. They often say that science is amoral and morality is a separate field all together. Here is an example where science is very relevant to morality. At what point of its development does the fetus experience pain? How can we tell if the fetus is viable? Does it represent a health risk to the mother? Etc. Only science can bring any resemblance of an answer to these questions. Or at the very least, bring us to a place where we can start any reflection on these subjects. For a more scientifically-minded contribution to the debate, here is an article from Carl Sagan and Ann Druyan.

The Doctrine of Immortal Goods

“For people lose all appearance of mortality by living in the midst of immortal goods (athanatoi agathoi).” – Epicurus in his Epistle to Menoeceus

“I’ll think of you as an immortal, and you think of us as immortals!” – Epicurus, to Colotes

As we continue our deliberations about the meleta portion of the Epistle to Menoeceus (about which I’ve already written two essays here and here), the concept of “immortal goods” has come up for deepening.

Furthermore, the passage links the immortal goods to the “surroundings” or “ambience” of someone who is living a godlike lifestyle. This is because the life state of each sentient being is contextual to its environment. What are the surroundings of one who lives like an immortal?

Friends as Immortal Goods

The first and least controversial item that belongs in the official list of immortal goods is our friends. We know this with certainty because:

The noble soul occupies itself with wisdom and friendship; of these the one is a mortal good, the other immortal. – Epicurean Saying 78

VS 78 says that friendship is immortal, and wisdom is not. Therefore, in our sources, friends are the only thing that are clearly included among the “immortal goods” mentioned in the Epistle to Menoeceus, and each one of our true friends may therefore serve as a case study to better understand the doctrine of immortal goods.

So following this interpretation, we live like gods if we are surrounded by our friends, each of whom is an immortal good, and we should treat our Epicurean true friends as immortal goods–so long as we remember them with gratitude, they ARE part of us and, in some way, immortal.

Worthy of Immortal Life

The idea of “Athanatoi agathoi” is expressed differently in De rerum Natura. Rather than say there are eternal goods, Lucretius mentions that some things are or aren’t “worthy of immortality“, attaching an “immortal quality” to the worth or value of the thing it describes, as if there was a transcendental quality that makes some things have more value than others.

Philodemus also laments that people give worship to things that are not at all “worthy of immortality and blessedness”. It’s clear that, to the Epicurean Guides throughout history, the Doctrine of Immortal Goods has served as an invitation to deliberate about what things are worthy of immortality, and to deliberate about values. What do you think is worthy of immortality?

If each one of our true friends is, to us, either “worthy of immortal life” or an immortal good (“athanatois agathois“), and if we wish to place before our eyes the ways in which our truest friends are immortal, we should consider what makes them our closest friends. What advantages and pleasures do we share with them? The two undeniable attributes of the Epicurean gods in our writings are invulnerability and bliss: how do our friends contribute to this?

The Pleasures and Fearlessness of the Gods

When I asked about possible interpretations of “athanatoi agathoi” in the Garden group on FB, one of the members (Beryl) said: “I saw this phrase as pertaining to the letter as a whole as meaning (that) when one has rooted out fear of death then it’s as if one is immortal. When one has understanding of nature, one can simply (be) satisfied so as to enjoy life with no suffering as if one is immortal. When one has retired from the hurley-burley of the throng or understands one’s true reasons for involvement, one’s mind is peaceful even amongst storms like an immortal being. I thought the important word is appearance. Folk are still mortal, however, releasing fear and creating an ease full path for satisfying one’s necessary needs gives the peace of mind of an immortal.”

So in this interpretation of “immortal goods”, it’s the mental state and the existential achievement of calm and tranquil abiding that gives mortals the appearance of godliness.

The Theory of Pleasant Remembrance

In Epicurean ethics, visualization (the “placing before the eyes” exercise) and the use of happy memories (the “pleasant remembrance” exercise) are useful ethical practices. The full theory behind them is beyond the scope of this essay, but it is clear that memory plays an important part in how we practice them.

One way to unpack why true friends are considered “immortal” is to think that they are sources of ongoing bliss and pleasure, at least for as long as we remain grateful and remember them. In fact, any object of enjoyment that we practice “pleasant remembrance” with is, to some extent, experienced as immortal or undying.

Experiences and friends around whom we have built pleasant memories are, by definition, memorable, and since the pleasure continues for as long as we are grateful, they are in some way “immortal goods”.

Once we have carried out the exercise of placing before our eyes our friends and the ways in which they are immortal, we may consider other possibly immortal goods–for instance, the Doctrines of true philosophy, or the Four Sisters mentioned in PD 5. Reasons to include them among the “immortal goods” have been sufficiently expounded in our reasonings and video about PD 5. They are important points of reference in our ethics, and in our expectations of each other and our social contract–and since the LM mentions that these “immortal goods” must be a feature of our surroundings, and it’s hard to imagine a godlike lifestyle without them, The Four Sisters (Pleasure, Nobility, Justice, Prudence) must also be “athanatoi agathoi“.

If we apply this criterion of “memorability” to the immortal goods, we must also recognize that practices that produce blissful or pleasant states (even if not anchored in a past memory) can also be counted among the immortal goods if they have a similar transcendental quality as our remembered pleasures. I would argue that anything that helps us to feel fresh pleasures without fail (whether it is yoga, exercise, laughter practice, etc.) can also be counted among our immortal goods for a long as the enjoyment persists.

If Wisdom Dies …

We must also consider why wisdom (sophia) is mortal–but not phronesis (“practical wisdom”)–while friendship is immortal, as per VS 78. If Wisdom dies, if she’s not immortal, this is an interesting philosophical statement.

It may be that the statement that Wisdom is mortal is meant to diminish our sense of pride in our intellectual achievement, and to cure the pedantry that is often part of how other schools practice philosophy.

Might it also be that knowledge (or wisdom) does not produce the memorable feeling of pleasure that friends and salient experiences produce? Maybe this refers to cognitive decay: our brain’s abilities decay as we age, so that wisdom is seen to fade. If the first is the case, then the “memorable” criterion for things that are “immortal goods”, or at least “worthy of immortality”, is accurate.

Furthermore, we must consider Lucretius’ passage that calls the Doctrines of Epicurus “golden, and worthy of immortal life” in light of these considerations. It seems like he, at least, considered the words of true philosophy (epitomized in Epicurus’ Doctrines) to be among the immortal goods, incarnations or instances of phronesis (practical wisdom).

Memorable Experiences and our Hedonic Regimen

If memorable experiences are what characterizes immortal goods, then we may survey what memorable experiences we carry in our souls, so as to cultivate them. If it is true friends, then we may seek them out. If it’s the virtues mentioned in PD 5, then we may seek to find orientation in our choices and avoidances so as to ensure the presence of those virtues in our environment.

What goods do we consider worthy of immortality? How do we gain a godlike appearance, or create a godlike lifestyle and godlike surroundings? And, finally, how can we plan our life so as to live surrounded by immortal goods? These are some of the questions that may help us to gain clarity concerning the “athanatoi agathoi“. Of course, these considerations are meant to bear on our choices and rejections, so that we may swerve in the direction of these immortal goods.

Epicurus’ Instructions on Meleta, Part II

The following is a continuation of the essay Meléta: Epicurus’ Instructions for Students. Please read them in order for maximum benefit.

During our last Eikas meeting, we discussed the Meléta portion of Epicurus’ Epistle to Menoeceus, with is found towards the end of the letter and contains instructions for his true and sincere disciples, and some theory to help us understand what the final outcome of our practice should be. One of our SoFE members lamented his being unable to attend the meeting, and so for his benefit (and that of other students of EP), I am posting some of the notes from our discussion.

Both Private Learning and Communal Transmission

In the previous essay, we learned that there are two fields of practice. In our last Twentieth discussion, we brainstormed some ideas for what constitutes Meléta:

  • “Meleta by oneself” (introspection), which includes things like repetition, memorization, inner work on our character usually meant to remove bad habits and form new ones, (this can include journaling), and being informed by the Doctrines while carrying out our choices and avoidances, and
  • “Meleta with others of like mind” (philía, or Epicurean friendship), which involves studying together, practicing friendship, kindly giving and accepting frank criticism, practicing suavity and clear speech, teaching and collaborating and creating educational content together, observing Eikas with other Epicureans, carrying out autarchy projects, piety projects, and other experiments by which we may have pragmatic encounters with the Doctrines, looking at case studies for the Doctrines, and other ways to deliberate together.

This second field of Meléta creates an oral tradition, and opportunities for direct, interpersonal transmission of the philosophy. This is not an accidental feature: I believe this is essential, and that it helps to make philosophy tangible and to keep it relevant for practitioners.

After several years of practice, it’s clear to me that this second field of praxis contains an intangible curriculum of human values that is not found in the texts, and can only be acquired through the process of having Epicurean friends who are invested in our happiness and have noble expectations of us. When Epicurus says that we must practice both by ourselves and with others, he is giving us the additional social, intellectual challenges that come from friendship, and which contribute greatly to our moral development, and provide necessary checks and balances in our practice.

“Imeras kai Nuktos”: the Case for a Morning Practice and an Evening Practice

Epicurus is making a promise (that we will not be disturbed whether waking or sleeping), but if we read it within its context, we see that it’s contingent on carrying out proper Meléta. The practice must include both fields (introspection and friendship), as well as either a constant practice (one possible reading of “day and night”), or two separate instances of daily and nightly practice (imeras kai nuktos).

The portion “whether waking or sleeping” (úpar out ónar) seems to indicate that there are two types of perturbations that philosophy helps us to overcome, otherwise why would the Hegemon speak specifically of not being perturbed either while awake or while sleeping? We discussed how this might indicate the recognition of the existence of the unconscious / subconscious part of the psyche.

Waking perturbations could be interpreted as the conscious ones, which we are aware of and we can argue with / against in order to transform our habits of thinking or acting. It may be that we are aware of our tiredness or laziness, of our excessive cravings for food or some other pleasure, of some irrational fear, or maybe we’re deeply aware of some other aspect of our daily disposition that perturbs our happiness.

Epicurus’ mention of perturbations while we sleep may indicate the unconscious ones that we are not fully aware of due to lack of introspective and philosophical hygiene, or perhaps dormant ones. Ignored or repressed feelings of guilt often perturb people and keep them up at night. Epicurus does mention that some of our dispositions, tendencies, or habits are like germs or seeds in his “On Moral Development”. By using these words he is recognizing that we carry certain unrealized potentials within us that, under certain conditions, may become realized. These may be part of what the Hegemon calls our “initial constitution” (genetic, physical and/or natural), or “seeds” acquired through upbringing. As we mature and develop morally, Epicurus teaches that we are in charge of transforming the content of our character, and even the physical structure of our psyche … but we cannot do that if we do not become aware of what these “seeds” are that keep us up at night. Here, we must carry out psychotherapy, introspection, expose ourselves to parrhesia (the frankness of our friends), or figure out other techniques to uncover and treat these perturbations. Epicurean philosophy requires its disciples to manage their mental health diligently so as to be–as Epicurus says–“armed for happiness”.

If we place before our eyes what a morning practice and an evening practice look like, immediately it becomes clear that most people who have morning rituals are attempting to prepare for the day ahead, and most people who have evening rituals are preparing for sleep. ES 11 helps to clarify the utility of both imeras meléta (a day practice) and nuktos meléta (a night practice).

For most people, to be quiet is to be numb and to be active is to be frenzied. – Epicurean Saying 11

Here, ἡσυχάζον ναρκᾷ (hesuchason narka) uses a form of the word used in Principal Doctrine 14 (hesuchía) for the technique of “retreating from the crowd”, which can be done alone or with friends … but could also refer to preparing for bed. Here, (since we are not “most people”, and they are other-ized in this Saying) the Founders of our tradition (for ES is a post-Epicurus compilation) are saying that this Epicurean art of retreat involves real and sober pleasures, not numbness or narcotic-like states (narka). Similarly, the words κινούμενον λυττᾷ (kinóumenon lytta) set the standard for the utility of a morning practice: just as rest should not be numb, similarly we should prepare for our day so that activity or productivity will be pleasant, and not frenzied or mindless. The first word here reminds me of kinetic, or active, pleasures, while the practice of retreating for the evening reminds me of katastematic, or calm, pleasures.

Epicurean Saying 41 elaborates further on what repetition and memorization looks like if the practice is constant or daily, or while we are working (managing our household and business). Some students dismiss practices of repetition or anything that feels like chanting, but this is in my view a mistake. Many insights in the Doctrines remain unexplored if we arrogantly dismiss them, thinking we already know them. We must not dismiss the actual practice of repeating and memorizing the Doctrines, because there are habitual patterns in our subconscious that require treatment, and also associations in our mind with certain ideas that are unanalyzed or that we may remain unaware of. Using the technique of offa, as described in ES 41, requires that we utter the words of true philosophy out loud (fonás afientas), and produces an instant encounter with the Doctrine that allows the mind to seek out whatever subconscious associations and pragmatic repercussions the words bring up in our minds.

Epicurus taught that the words of true philosophy are medicines (pharmakos). Studying and assimilating the Doctrines constitutes the taking of some dose of these Doctrines so that they may bring health to the soul (psyche).

“Diataraxthesi”: Perturbations

Let us now put aside the possibility of different kinds of perturbations while waking or sleeping, and let us look at the prolepsis of the word used. The first definition of this word “diataraxi” (to which “diataraxthesi” points) is “anxiety, mental uneasiness“. The second one I found was “a deviation of a system or process from its regular or normal state or path, caused by an outside influence“. Some of the synonyms are: disturbance, perturbation, maze, agitation, riot, turmoil, scrimmage.

Similar Things: our Expanding Discourse

The words “similar things” (τούτοις συγγενῆ, toutois syggeni) open the door to the expansion of meléta beyond the words of Epicurus, so long as the object of our study qualifies as things that are “similar” to the contents of the Epistle to Menoeceus. This is where we can bring into our studies many case studies and intellectuals from our own tradition, or even from other traditions, so long as the ethical framework for meléta is Epicurean. We see that during the days of Diogenes of Sidon and Philodemus, the Epicureans were commenting on many works by philosophers like Theophrastus (Peri Oikonomias) and others who were well known in their day. This is how new arguments were able to emerge to defend against attacks from the other schools, and it’s how we adapt philosophy to new and highly particular situations.

It is up to us to determine what falls under “similar things” for the purposes of meléta. My theory is that the matters being studied should be approached with epilogismos (that is, we must apply empirical methods, as per Principal Doctrine 24) and should be beneficial to our happiness (Principal Doctrine 28). We must apply the canon and derive utility from the practice of philosophy. If we speculate endlessly and pointlessly, neglect the study of nature, and/or make ourselves miserable instead of happy by how we practice philosophy, this is clearly not meléta.

Gods Among Men: an Epicurean Transhumanism?

If we carry out meléta in the way Epicurus advises, and take the recommended doses of philosophy’s medicine, we will start living like immortals and we will be surrounded by “athanatois agathois” (immortal goods). This doctrine of immortal goods deserves further elaboration, since these goods are the necessary features of the ambience, environment or context within which we live like immortals. If a person lives like a god among mortals, there have to be god-like inner states (of varied pleasures) as well as a god-like field of action because, in Epicureanism, all things are relational and contextual. There is one other instance where an immortal goods are mentioned, and it refers to philía (holy friendships).

The noble soul is devoted most of all to wisdom and to friendship — one a mortal good, the other immortal. – Epicurean Saying 78

This is probably because friendships help us to build memories, and that which is memorable stays with us over the long-term, providing us with happy memories, thoughts, and feelings as frequently as we revisit these memories. If we cultivate a grateful disposition, we can strengthen and extend these grateful memories. What other things in our lives carry a similar power to help us abide in pleasure easily? These things could serve as considerations for our exploration of the Doctrine of Immortal Goods.

It is up to us to determine how we can best live like immortals based on Epicurean teachings. This is where Epicurean theology serves ethical purposes. Epicurus invites us to place before our eyes the Gods so that they may serve as images and carriers of our destiny, our happiness, our healthy soul, and our future self. This is because we are invited to carry out our choices and avoidances so that we live like gods among mortals; our life-state and the goods we surround ourselves with are a conscious imitation of the gods. Our practice is an attempt to sculpt ourselves in their image. By setting up the gods as our ethical models, Epicurus is calling us to a transcendental life-state, lifestyle and environment.

Let us look at the specific qualities that Epicurus says we must attribute to the gods: he says we may believe anything about them so long as it does not contradict their blessedness and their immortality. This involves invulnerability (autarchy) and ever-blissful states.

During our Eikas meeting, we speculated: “Can this be interpreted as a transhumanist manifesto?“, however we did not have time to delve into this question in enough depth. Transhumanism is a worldview that calls for the enhancement of human beings in order to advance a longer life-span, together with the enjoyment of health, and a variety of mental and physical enhancements. However, since any modern or future transhumanist  technologies were not in existence when Epicurus wrote his Epistle to Menoeceus, these questions–while interesting and worthy of further consideration–are not immediately relevant to meléta and its benefits.

We therefore assume that the first Epicureans proved to themselves and to each other that it was, indeed, possible to live transcendentally, like a god among mortals, regardless of the current or future state of science. Through meléta, we train ourselves to do the same.

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Liber Qvintvs

Oh luckless human kind, to grant the gods such powers, and top them off with bitter fury! – Liber Qvintvs, 1194-1195

This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is lucretius_de_rerum_natura.jpgI’ve had the pleasure of reading Copley’s translation of De Rerum natura (On the Nature of Things) at least twice now. I’m not the first one to notice that DRN is as much about the ethics as it is about the physics, as both are connected in Epicurean philosophy. I’ve also noticed that the Fifth Book of DRN is the most complete extant compendium of ancient Epicurean anthropology that we have.

The main ethical goal of the Liber Qvintvs is to replace the inherited ancient myths about the gods handing down laws, language, writing, weapons, arts, crafts, and other “gifts of civilization” with non-supernatural explanations for all these phenomena based on the study of nature. Ancient people used to believe that Dionysus gave us wine cultivation, Athena gave us the arts and crafts, Hermes gave us language and writing, Urania gave us astronomy, etc. Today, many still believe that the tribal god of the Jews gave us all the languages (via the Babel myth) and that he created all things … but since we see that nothing comes from nothing, there is no need for a Creator of all matter.

That this process of replacing myth with natural theories concerning the “gifts of civilization” is the over-arching theme of Liber Qvintvs is evidenced by how it ends, as if summarizing: “Thus, step by step, time lays each fact before us, and reason lifts it to the coasts of light; for men saw one thing clarify another till civilization reached its highest peak“. Here, Lucretius seems to be saying that we become properly civilized by dismissing supernatural explanations for phenomena and learning, through the study of nature, about the way things work.

Earth the All-Mother is also our common tomb: she gives, but takes away, and grows again. – Liber Qvintvs, 259-260

In Liber Qvintvs, Lucretius beautifully exemplifies how we may use the Epicurean canonin order to investigate questions in the realm of culture and anthropology. The most interesting case study for this is the origin of language (1028-1090). Of course, we can not go back in time and observe how it emerged, so here we are forced to apply the Epicurean method of inferring by analogy about the non-evident based on the evident. Since the last Twentieth message was about how we use the canon, I wish to point out how Lucretius applies this method of inference by analogy to the origin of language. The passage begins by stating what the theory says: that there is no teleology. Instead, nature first randomly produces certain faculties in our bodies, some of which then prove to be advantageous, and then later culture and artifice perfect the use of these faculties. A curious insight is provided here:

All creatures sense their powers and how to use them. – Liber Qvintvs, 1033

This deserves further elaboration elsewhere, as it is profoundly intuitive and insightful, but for now let us focus on the issue of language. Lucretius points to a few signs from nature in his investigation of the origins of language. Citing examples from many species (calves who attack with their yet-to-develop horns, lion’s kittens who play with their claws and fangs in order to hone their skills, tiny birds who flutter their wings), Lucretius argues that we see that human children use gestures to point at what they see, which seems to demonstrate a natural instinct to communicate. He ridicules the idea that one single person in remote antiquity (to the ancients, a God like Hermes or Thoth) could invent all the words of an entire language, since communication requires more than one person who must all understand and use words with an agreed-upon meaning.

Lucretius cites how various species make different noises to effectively communicate at a rudimentary level according to necessity. Hounds bear their teeth as a threat, lick their pups to comfort them, and cry when in pain. A stallion squeals, his nostril gapes, when he is in his prime. Birds make different noises when they fight over food or battle their prey. Having cited these concrete examples, and citing feeling as a guide of sentient beings, Lucretius then infers (by analogy) that

if varied feelings, then, force animals, dumb though they are, to utter varied cries, how much more likely that in those days men could use one and another term for different things.

And in this manner, Lucretius exemplifies how we apply our canonical methods of reasoning by analogy (here, inferring about the non-evident based on that which is evident) in the realm of anthropology. Furthermore, Liber Qvintvs includes a natural explanation of the origin of friendship and compassion for the weak and vulnerable in our communities, insightful thoughts on the origin of government, and in one sci-fi passage it even describes a war that involves great beasts in the innumerable worlds. He describes the origins of religion and the arts, as well as the beginning of the historical era (the writing down of events). The origins of music are described in a beautiful passage about the “people of the forest” (silvestre genus) who are the “children of the Earth” (terrigenarum)–perhaps the first-ever example of Epicurean primitivism.

We find assistance for interpreting the Golden Words passage, where Lucretius praises the words of true philosophy, epitomized by Epicurus’ doctrines, and names them “golden, and most worthy of eternal life“. In a passage on the evolution of metalworking (line 1280), Lucretius compares gold favorably to iron, saying that while iron exacerbated the problem of warfare, men increase daily their search for gold, praise it and grant it honor beyond belief. We must assume that this, too, is the attitude we should have towards the Golden Words of true philosophy. He seems to be saying: look for gold, not iron–which is to say, perhaps, “make love, not war“, or maybe “seek pleasure and prosperity, not conflict” but he says this without ignoring the nuances. Lucretius does not idealize gold, and in fact he warns people about incessant desires for more, about greed as the “dark side” of this choice of wealth over violence / gold over iron. He also recognizes that the tools made from iron are useful in farming and technology.

People in antiquity believed that all these “civilizing gifts” or decrees were handed down by the gods at the dawn of creation. Some cultures, like the Sumerians, had very elaborate and politically interesting myths concerning the Més (the “divine decrees” by which the gods civilized humans), control over which was ludicrously fought over by gods from different cities according to Sumerian myth. In Liber Qvintvs, Lucretius demystifies each Mé, revealing each to be the natural product of culture and nature taking their course. He proved that Athena did not give us olives (or law, or philosophy, or weaving), that Dionysus did not give us wine, that Aristos did not give us cheese-making, etc. It is mortals who have fashioned the Més, and since (like the laws of human society) they are not divine but natural, these techniques, practices, or wisdom-traditions can be perfected or updated over long spans of many generations … and, most importantly, they do not serve gods. They serve mortals.

Overall, although DRN has many inspiring and moving passages, Liber Qvintvs is my favorite of the six books of De rerum natura, a treasure-trove of wisdom, an intellectual feast. If you do not have time to read the entire work, I recommend that you focus only on Liber Qvintvs so as to get a feel for why Lucretius (together with his Hegemon, Epicurus) is such an essential foundational figure in Western thought.

Further Reading:

On the Nature of Things: Book 5 (57 BC) by Lucretius, read by Jade Vine

Philodemus, On Anger (Writings from the Greco-roman World)

On the Nature of Things

PD 20: a Six-Part Doctrine

In recent months, a few of the members of the Society of Epicurus have been systematically studying all the Principal Doctrines of Epicurus as part of a process of gaining a concise understanding of all the pragmatic repercussions of each one. This has been a very gratifying process, and has created many new insights into the tradition.

When one systematically studies the PDs, the flow of the Doctrines becomes evident, as does the fact that they are the conclusions of long discussions among the founders which were found to be the most advantageous teachings for our happiness. Epicurus was saying: “If you don’t have time to study my 300 scrolls, at least study these 40 short Doctrines and be happy!”.

The first four (the Tetrapharmakos) are of great cosmological and ethical importance for the individual. The social Doctrines (on friendship, justice, and on the establishment of a “society of friends”) are towards the end. In between them, we find portions on the philosophy and ethics of science (PDs 10-13), on autarchy (PDs 15-16), the canonics (PDs 22-25), and the portion I am presenting today deals with the mental disciplines of pleasure (PDs 18-21). Principal Doctrine 20 in specific is a six-part formula, and although we’ve studied it before, I’d like to focus here on each one of the six parts of the Doctrine separately in order to extract new insights.

The flesh receives as unlimited, the limits of pleasure; and to provide it requires unlimited time. But the mind, intellectually grasping what the end and limit of the flesh is, and banishing the terrors of the future, procures a complete and perfect life, and we no longer have need of unlimited time. Nevertheless the mind does not shun pleasure, and even when circumstances make death imminent, the mind does not lack enjoyment of the best life.

Epicurus’ instructions in our study of his Doctrines revolve around repetition and memorization. Due to the length of this Doctrine, repeating and memorizing may be a bit more daunting than is the case with other Doctrines. Let us therefore divide the Doctrine into six portions, so that we can more carefully repeat, memorize, and carefully study each assertion, and compare it to other sources, until we fully assimilate all the cognitive and pragmatic repercussions of the Doctrine.

  1. The flesh receives as unlimited, the limits of pleasure.
  2. To provide this pleasure requires unlimited time.
  3. The mind, intellectually grasping what the end and limit of the flesh is, procures a complete and perfect life.
  4. The mind, banishing the terrors of the future, procures a complete and perfect life, and we no longer have need of unlimited time.
  5. The mind does not shun pleasure.
  6. Even when circumstances make death imminent, the mind does not lack enjoyment of the best life.

The Flesh Lacks Self-Control and Discipline

The first two statements are not saying that pleasure in the flesh is bad: only that the flesh does not have a means to discern their limits. Epicurean Saying 37, which seems to associate pleasant states with vitality and health, reiterates this:

Nature is weak in the face of what is bad, not what is good; for it is kept whole by pleasures and broken down by pains.

Among other things, the 20th Doctrine is a cure for limitless desires of the flesh: that is part of its medicine. The first statement says that the flesh does not know discipline: only the mind does, thanks to the faculty of reason. The second one says that this could potentially result in being assaulted by an infinite number of desires. We see that an existential problem is being framed in terms of the distinction between the flesh and the mind, their different natures, and their different powers. As with all the Doctrines, we must understand this clearly in order to carry out our choices and rejections prudently.

The Mind Must Discipline the Flesh

I divided 3 and 4 into two sentences, although originally they were one, because there are two assertions being made. These assertions are tied to the preceding PDs 18-19: the Baseline Doctrine and the Doctrine that stresses the limits of pleasure in time. If you study them with attention, you will see that PD’s 18 through 21 “give a sermon” together and seem to have been compiled as the authoritative conclusions of a single ethical discussion, the point of which was to say that the mind is responsible for securing a stable life of pleasure.

What are these Doctrines saying together? PD 18 and the third portion of PD 20, together, explain that the mind is able to grasp the limits of the flesh, which are mentioned in PD 18. The mind is able to directly observe, with full enargeia or immediacy, that as soon as the belly is somewhat full, there are no more pangs of hunger. It is able to apprehend that we do not experience pain when we neglect sexual passion, that it is not necessary, and that we can be content without it. While the flesh is unconscious and unable to apprehend these natural limits, the mind is aware and capable.

Similarly, PD 19, and the fourth statement of PD 20, together teach the superiority of reason over time, and how the mind is able to choose and reject how to reason about the past and future in such a way as to experience pleasure, and procure “a complete and perfect life“, a content and satisfied life that lacks nothing, that needs nothing. The point here is that we must think correctly about the past and future, rather than avoid thinking about them or think only of the present (as the Cyrenaics recommended). This is done by pleasant expectation and grateful recollection, two practices that Epicurus encouraged. PD 21 will complete these considerations, empowering us to question the amount of effort or sacrifice we dedicate to needless pleasures.

The Mind Must be Made an Ally

The fifth assertion, on its own, is of profound significance. It reminds me of Vatican Saying 21’s assertion that “We must not violate nature, but obey her“, or in some translations “We must not force nature, but gently persuade her“. This is essential to help us understand Epicurean ethics. If the mind does not shun pleasure, this means–again–that the mind is an ally in our practice of philosophy and in our pursuit of happiness; that our approach should be gentle; and that we do not have to fight against it, but work with it.

In cases where people have bad habits or insatiable desires that produce unwanted consequences and no longer passes hedonic calculus, they are often able to find a higher or healthier pleasure. When I found that coffee was harmful to my health, I opted for yerba maté, a herbal drink with stimulating properties that does not give me jitters. Similarly, the current globalized market furnishes a near infinite variety of culinary products that are guilt-free, fat-free, gluten-free, alcohol-free, fair trade, etc. This allows opportunities for moral agents to avoid feeling like we are punishing ourselves whenever we attempt to make healthier or more prudent choices. The thing to keep in mind is that there is usually a healthier pleasure available.

The final assertion reminds me of research on NDE’s (near-death experiences), which shows that, as soon as the brain realizes that we are dying and that it’s not getting the oxygen it needs, the brain immediately starts releasing blissful hormones. The body has the wisdom to die pleasantly. Epicurus’ manner of death is the prime example of this, but there may be other empirical sources of data by which we can glean further insights into the sixth assertion of this Doctrine. One that comes to mind involves the studies of meditating monks who are able to control their body’s temperature and to reach blissful states of mind at will. While the first skill may only be useful in cold environments, the second skill–if gained–is useful as a daily practice, and constitutes a pragmatic encounter with this Doctrine of great educational value. One way to practice PD 20 is by nurturing contemplative practices that reliably lead to blissful states.

The main intention of this final assertion is to show an extreme example of how the mind, once made an ally in our pursuit of pleasure, is indeed a reliable source of happiness (and of confident expectation of continued happiness). But in order for the mind to play the ethical role it’s supposed to play for an Epicurean, it must be kept healthy, ethically educated, and disciplined.

The flesh is unconscious; the mind is not. Protecting our mental health and cultivating disciplines of mental pleasure helps us to manage the quality of our sentience.

Laughter as a Philosophical Practice

At the same time we must laugh and philosophize, do our household duties and manage our business, and never cease proclaiming the sayings of the true philosophy. – ES 41

Recently, a fellow SoFE member cited this saying to me, stressing that we MUST laugh, that it is an order, not a suggestion. This was in the context of a discussion on how, of all the attributes that a person needs in order to be able to profit from the study of philosophy, the person’s attitude or disposition (diathesis) is surprisingly more important than many other attributes. Yes, we want students of philosophy to be knowledgeable, and ideally happy, but even if they’re beginners with little more to offer, so long as they have a good disposition, slowly they will profit, learn, and become happy with the use of the tools that philosophy gives. If they have the wrong attitude, they will not profit.

Epicurus expressed this by saying that his Doctrines are not for everyone, but only for those who are “armed for happiness“. We are left to determine what it means to be armed, or prepared, for happiness. It seems to imply that a certain attitudinal training, or the cultivation of healthy and happy dispositions, is required. Later Epicureans (like Philodemus of Gadara and Diogenes of Oenoanda) also stressed the importance of diathesis in their writing, with Diogenes stressing that our dispositions are under our control.

But why must laughter be part of our practice of philosophy, and part of our art of living (techné biou)? Laughter is a concrete instance of pleasure, manifesting and asserting itself as sound vibration, as tremor and movement in the body and mind, making itself concrete. Some specific object of our attention produces a concrete joy. Our disposition or attitude can not be known by others, except if it produces concrete instances of pleasure, the signs of which are laughter and other behaviors. If we cultivate a certain disposition, if we are armed for happiness, there have to be “fruits”, signs, observable expressions of this in our behavior: our willingness to laugh at ourselves and at events, an ease of enjoying simple things, our gratefulness, etc.

Furthermore, the cultivation of a sunny disposition creates a positive feedback loop or virtuous cycle. Studies suggest that just as people who are always angry, look mad and ugly, similarly people who are happy and confident are also more attractive. Laughing makes us radiant, and is contagious.

The Laughing Philosophers

It makes sense that laughter should be one of the basic philosophical exercises in our school. Epicureans fall within the lineage of the laughing philosophers, which begins with Democritus–the inventor of atomism–who was called the “laughing philosopher” because he made cheerfulness his cardinal virtue, and because he laughed frequently at the folly of human nature. I delve a bit more into the relation between laughter and materialism in this essay about the history and utility of comedy.

Friederich Nietzsche, in Thus Spake Zarathustra, elevated laughter to the status of a holy practice.

Laughter is holy. All good things laugh. – Nietzsche

But he went further. You see, Nietzsche specifically chose the prophet Asho Zartosht as the mouthpiece for his own philosophy for a reason. (I am using the Persian name in order to differentiate the historical Zartosht from Nietzsche’s Zarathustra). It may surprise some that the Iranian prophet Zarathustra himself was a laughing philosopher: there’s a legend that says that he was born laughing. The first monotheistic prophet appears at the dawn of recorded history, is pre-Abrahamic, and therefore not yet tainted with the asceticism or with the Platonist hatred for the world that we would see in later “prophets”, and which would find its most sick expression in figures like the “prophet” Mani–who blended Platonism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism into what seems like a mishmash of world-hating ideas.

In contrast, the Persian philosopher and moral reformer Zartosht was not at all a world-denying philosopher. He said: “Happy is the one who brings happiness to others“, and one of the main mantras of Zorostrianism (the Ashem Vohu) equates Asha (righteousness, truth, or justice) with Ushta (pleasure, happiness). Ushta (happiness), then, became the sign that righteousness was being properly honored and practiced in the world. This reminds us a bit of Epicurus’ Principal Doctrine 5.

Nietzsche chose Zartosht as his spokesperson because he considered him a worthy philosophical enemy, one whose ideas could still be reformed and useful. Like Zartosht, Nietzsche conceived of a cosmic battle–but not between “good” and “evil”. Nietzsche’s Neo-Zoroastrian battle is a battle between Laughter (light, lightening up, dancing, leaping) and the Spirit of Gravity, which pulls us down and represents a regressive instinct. Nietzsche’s “Ahriman” (“evil” “spirit”) is recognized for its inability to laugh.

I should only believe in a God that would know how to dance. And when I saw my devil, I found him serious, thorough, profound, solemn: he was the spirit of gravity. Through him all things fall. Not by wrath, but by laughter, do we slay. Come, let us slay the spirit of gravity!

When Asho Zartosht spoke of “spirits”, the word he actually used was Mainyu. This translates into “mentality”, or “disposition”. Spenta Mainyu translates as something like “Progressive, or Constructive Mentality”, while Anghra Mainyu is “Regressive, or Harmful Mentality”. Another name for Anghra is Aka Mainyu (the “Sick, or Evil, Mindset”). Asho Zartosht taught that these two basic dispositions are “twins” congenital to human nature, born together in our souls, and the more we “feed” them, or “sacrifice” to each, the more they strengthen. He taught that we co-create our worlds through these two basic mentalities by our choices and rejections of concrete thoughts, words, and deeds.

However, as his philosophy evolved within the context of its religious trappings, these “Mainyu” became mystified. Spenta Mainyu evolved into the Christian Holy Spirit, while Anghra Mainyu evolved into the Devil. People adopted an obscure and superstitious interpretation of them, moving away from the original psychological insights.

As Epicureans, we reject the mythologized and absolute understanding of Regressive and Progressive Mentality as two cosmic forces. Instead, we may look at our choices and rejections in terms of what type of mentality is behind each impulse we feel, perhaps by naming them “the better” and “the worse” mentalities at the time–since our cosmological model is not absolute, but always relative or relational. This would help us to practice paying closer attention to our choices and avoidances, and to our dispositions, cultivating the healthier ones (which are advantageous for our happiness), and rejecting the sick ones (which are harmful to our happiness).

Laughter as a Practice

I’ve written an introductory set of considerations for how to practice Epicurean Saying 41, which is the most overt call for laughter as a philosophical practice in our extant Epicurean writings.

Laughter yoga has demonstrated effectiveness in reducing pain and is used in therapeutic settings with cancer patientsUltimately, it is up to us as individuals to choose to develop a regular practice of laughter, and to incorporate it in concrete ways into our hedonic regimen. This can be as simple as a weekly gathering of family or friends, a funny movie, or a formal session of laughter practice.

Life is not serious: only graveyards are serious“. – Atheist Indian guru Osho, in his sermon against the repression of laughter

Further Reading:

6 Reasons Why Laughter Is the Best Medicine 

Short Laughter Yoga Ted Talk

In Memory of a Laughing Philosopher

Comedy as an Ideological Weapon