PD 6: On Methods of Exegesis

Over the last few weeks, I have been publishing essays expounding the Principal Doctrines. It has been a very enjoyable intellectual exercise. I’ve learned that it’s an error to take the PD’s for granted and to think that we know everything there is to know about them. In the process of writing these essays, I have been considering the various methods of exegesis that are available to us, and what method(s) might be the most useful for each PD.

The Contextual Method

My main method has been to try to reconstruct or discern (based on the text) what discussions or conversations took place among the founders, that led to these statements being established as authoritative conclusions of the Garden. I’m calling this the method of contextualization.

Clearly, the founders meant for the 40 Principal Doctrines to stand separate from the rest of the textual evidence we have. They are meant to be the forty most important ideas that a student must either revere or study (or both). By what line of thinking, by what arguments, did these 40 conclusions attain their superior status? I began to evaluate this in my study of PDs 24 and 28, on the utility of dogmatism.

The Literal Method

Another method of exegesis (that is, interpretation) is to stick to the literal translation of the text. If we know the original Greek language, we may focus on the anticipation–the initial empirical attestation and conception of each word–in order to deconstruct each PD word-for-word, and glean clarity. These two methods are not mutually exclusive, and are both useful and necessary. 

We know from sermons given by Epicurus–like the one Against empty words–that the founders were very adamant on using clear, concise language. They went as far as coining new terms when conventional language failed, as attested again by their own theory of the evolution of language. So there was no frivolous expression in the PD’s … but then there’s PD 6.

This is a case where the literal reconstruction and the anticipation of each word is necessary because the choice of words in the original was apparently so awkward, so specific, and attempted to be so clear, that most modern readers get lost in translation. So I had to contact a member of the Society of Friends of Epicurus who knows Greek, Panos, who helped me to get a grasp of what the words actually mean. Here is the original:

ἕνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ανθρώπων ἦν κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας ἀγαθόν, ἐξ ὧν ἄν ποτε τοῦτο οἷός τʼᾖ παρασκευάζεσθαι.

This was translated by Hicks as:

In order to obtain security from other people any means whatever of procuring this was a natural good.

It’s not clear to me why he used the past tense (“was a natural good”). If that’s in the original, it may mean that the original doctrine was meant to justify some event or action taken in the past. The Church of Epicurus translation says:

The natural good of public office and kingship is for the sake of getting confidence from [other] men, [at least] from those from whom one is able to provide this.

In this translation, we can appreciate the common interpretation of the PD as justifying ANY form of government that procures security. We could also interpret it as meaning that security is one of (but not the only) the reasons or purposes for setting up a form of government. And the Peter St. Andre translation says:

It is a natural benefit of leadership and kingship to take courage from other men (or at least from the sort of men who can give one courage).

Security, confidence, and courage all mean different things in English. The Epicuros site in modern Greek language has a version of the PD’s, the sixth of which Panos translates from modern Greek as:

With the goal of acquiring security against people, there was (always) the natural good of dominance and of kingship, through which (someone) could sometimes achieve this.

According to Panos,

I get a kinda opposite meaning of what I see in other translations. But it’s a pretty hard sentence to accurately translate …

Because of being afraid of people is right by the nature of authority and dominion, from which things (authority and dominion) if ever be able to prepare (against).

So basically the idea I get is:

It’s right to be prepared against people, just in case, because of oppression and authority.

… It does not say “it’s ok to use oppression and authority” as some translations I saw.

So the PD does not justify violence (which would go against the doctrines on justice based on avoiding mutual harm and seeking mutual benefit), or the overthrow of government (which would be out of line with the non-political nature of our ethics). Here is how Panos breaks down the words:

ἕνεκα: on account of (/regarding // because of)

τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ανθρώπων: the (tharrein)* from people
–*Tharrein: this word can mean either (a) to be afraid of, or (b) to take courage from!

ἦν κατὰ φύσιν: it was by nature (/quality)

ἀρχῆς: of authority

καὶ βασιλείας: and of dominion (/kingship)

ἀγαθόν, : good (morally good)

ἐξ ὧν : from which (genitive plural)

ἄν ποτε : at some time (/if ever)

τοῦτο: that thing (accusative sing.)

οἷός τʼᾖ : he is able (γʹ ενικ. υποτ. Ενεργ. ενεστ. | 3rd sing. subjunctive active present )

παρασκευάζεσθαι. : to be ready (/prepared)

And again:

ἕνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ανθρώπων
because of the (tharrein) from people

ἦν κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας ἀγαθόν
it was morally good by nature of authority and dominion

ἐξ ὧν
from which (plural which: so the which must refer to: “authority and dominion”)

ἄν ποτε τοῦτο
if ever that thing (which thing? τουτο is neutral accusative singular, so it is talking about a singular neutral object. From the words above, the only candidates are αγαθόν, and θαρρείν (tharrein). I think the only word that makes sense is tharrein…)

οἷός τʼᾖ παρασκευάζεσθαι
he is able (to be) prepare(d)
(so this is subjunctive active which is something like: I expect you prepare. It’s really hard to translate exactly but it’s not that important.)

With Panos finally concluding:

So the way I am seeing this:

Because of being afraid of people is right by the nature of authority and dominion, from which things (authority and dominion) if ever be able to prepare (against).

From all that I’ve read, it seems clear to me that the Hicks translation is flawed. It says

In order to obtain security from other people any means whatever of procuring this was a natural good.

Hicks makes an absolute claim that seems out of place in Epicurean philosophy, where all choices and avoidances must be subjected to hedonic calculus. I do not see mention of “any means necessary” in the original, and I suspect this translation may appeal to people with certain military ideas.

I wish to thank Panos for his assistance. The process we see above is the literal method, which seeks to know the initial pre-conception that belongs to each word chosen for this PD, and which assumes and trusts that the founders chose their words very carefully.

PD 6 in Light of Other Surviving Passages

The idea of the PD is that security is a natural and necessary pleasure. This idea is also expressed in the Epistle to Menoeceus, so it seems indigenous and accurate within an Epicurean list of key opinions.

PD 6 appears to justify (limited) (service to a) political power or civic engagement for the sake of safety. Vatican Saying 39 associates friendship with “help in the future”, and links true friendship with safety. Vatican Saying 67 criticizes “servility to mobs and monarchs“, and seems to imply that we get more safety from friends than from politics. Finally, VS 80 posits a (partly) attitudinal definition of security, one that is in the soul and not in the realm of society or politics: 

The first measure of security is to watch over one’s youth and to guard against what makes havoc of all by means of maddening desires.

A young man’s share in deliverance comes from watching over the prime of his life and warding off what will ruin everything through frenzied desires. (Monadnock translation)

VS 80 is a salvific passage. It uses the word “soterías” in the original. Soter means Savior. Epicurus was seen as a Savior by later generations because of his salvific doctrine. PD’s 10-13 also discuss a form of attitudinal safety: by learning a scientific account of the nature of things, we protect ourselves from superstition. PD 14 concludes this discussion:

Although some measure of safety from other people is based in the power to fight them off and in abundant wealth, the purest security comes from solitude and breaking away from the herd.

In light of context, PD 6 does not refer to this attitudinal sense of safety in the soul (as PDs 10-14 do), or being safe from limitless desires. It also does not refer to weapons or warfare, or constitute a call to violence. The later Lucretian jeremiad (in Book V) against the propagation of weapons after metal working was discovered, and Philodemus’ advice in On Property Management against taking up a military career, appear to confirm a general lack of affinity for warfare among the ancient Epicureans.

Based on the textual evidence we have seen, we may conclude that the necessary measure of safety for an Epicurean is mainly attained by association with friends and by avoiding certain people (PD 39). I will close with Panos’ suggested translation, and with an invitation to all sincere students to study these texts on their own.

It’s right to be prepared against people, just in case, because of oppression and authority.