ΚΥΡΙΑΙ ΔΟΞΑΙ

KEY DOCTRINES

OF

EPICURUS

ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΟΣ

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KEY DOCTRINES

OF

EPICURUS

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"Meditate therefore by day and by night upon these precepts and upon the others that go with these, whether by yourself or in the company of another like yourself, and never will your soul be in turmoil either sleeping or waking but you will be living like a god among men, for in no wise does a man resemble a mortal creature who lives among immortal blessings."

Epicurus, *Epistle to Menoikeus*

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KEY DOCTRINES

ATTIC GREEK
EDITED BY:

HERMANN USENER (1887)
AND GRAZIANO ARRIGHETTI (1960)

ENGLISH
TRANSLATIONS BY:

CHARLES DUKE YONGE (1853)
WILLIAM WALLACE (1880)
ROBERT DREW HICKS (1910)
CYRIL BAILEY (1926)
NORMAN W. DE WITT (1954)
R. M. GEER (1964)
A. A. LONG &
D. N. SEDLEY (1987)
EUGENE O' CONNOR (1993)
BRAD INWOOD &
LLOYD P. GERSON (1994)
ERIK ANDERSON (2004)
ODYSSEUS MAKRIDIS (2005)
PETER SAINT-ANDRE (2008)
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Text Primary Source: Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*, Book X.
Cover Artwork: Henri Matisse, *Le Bonheur de Vivre* or *"The Joy of Life"*, 1906.

This compilation contains over a dozen translations of Epicurus' ΚΥΡΙΑΙ ΔΟΞΑΙ (*Kúriai Dóxai*), his "Key Doctrines" to living a good life, variously translated as "Fundamental Maxims", "Fundamental Articles", "Sovran Maxims", "Golden Maxims", "Principal Doctrines", "Authorized Doctrines", "Leading Doctrines", and "Chief Maxims".

English translators include Charles Duke Yonge (1853), William Wallace (1880), Robert Drew Hicks (1910, 1925), Cyril Bailey (1926), Norman W. De Witt (1954), R. M. Geer (1964), A. A. Long &, D. N. Sedley (1987), Eugene O'Connor (1993) Brad Inwood & Lloyd P. Gerson (1994), Erik Anderson (2004), Odysseus Makridis (2005), Peter Saint-Andre (2008), George K. Strodach (2012), Pamela Mensch (2018), and Stephen White (2021).

The ancient Greek text was rendered according to Herman Usener's *Epicurea* (1887), with brief annotations by Graziano Arrighetti as published in *Opere: Epicuro* (1972).

The glossary contains etymological information provided by the *English-Greek Dictionary: A Vocabulary of the Attic Language*. Each definition was transcribed according to the translations of each author (often without regard for verb tense or inflection).

For further reading:

Epicurus and His Philosophy by Norman W. De Witt (1954)
St. Paul and Epicurus by Norman W. De Witt (1954)
Epicurus: Letters, Principal Doctrines, and Vatican Sayings by R. M. Geer (1964)
The Hellenistic Philosophers by A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley (1987)
The Essential Epicurus by Eugene O'Connor (1993)
The Epicurus Reader by Brad Inwood and Lloyd Gerson (1994)
Letters and Sayings of Epicurus by Odysseus Makridis (2005)
The Art of Happiness by George Strodach and Daniel Klein (2012)
Tending the Epicurean Garden by Hiram Crespo (2014)
Lives of Eminent Philosophers by Pamela Mensch (2018)
Lives of Eminent Philosophers: An Edited Translation by Stephen White (2021)

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Dear Stranger,

Your *Best Life* is an existence of uninterruptible satisfaction. Never let fear disrupt your *Best Life*. Remember, pleasure peaks when your pain has been relieved. All pain is temporary, and the worst pain is the most brief.

Living a full life requires sense, dignity, and decency. Make choices based on their consequences, not ideology. Know that *fame* is no guarantee of your *Best Life*.

Keep pleasure as your goal, even though pleasurable *things* sometimes cause pain. Things are "good" when they relieve pain and "evil" when they increase pain. Ignorance of "good" and "evil" leads to even more pain; knowing that *pleasure is good* dispels fear.

Defense against others is pointless if you live in fear of the unknown. Real security means *knowledge, discretion,* and *privacy,* not *wealth* and power. The best things in life are free; luxuries always come with added stress. Minimize the impact of "bad luck" by making wise decisions. Be honest to enjoy your freest life; cheating leads to angst.

Physical pleasure is *painlessness*; mental pleasure is *fearlessness*. There is no greater joy than pure pleasure. The *Good Life* is available to everyone, no matter how long they live. There is no need to compete for happiness; Nature provides it abundantly.

Reconcile your opinions with evidence. If you doubt your eyes, you'll never be able to see clearly. Listen carefully, but don't believe everything you hear.

Always make decisions with your *Best Life* in mind. Rest assured, wants are easier to forget than *needs*; needs are easier to satisfy. Friendship is our greatest source of pleasure, and *also,* our greatest source of security. Some desires are *needs*, some, wants, and some, unhealthy *obsessions*. Commit to healthy priorities to live your *Best Life*.

Justice is just a *natural peace*. Anything incapable of peace is incapable of justice. Universal laws are not real; only *natural peace* is real. Therefore, violating the law is not evil; what *is* evil is the pain of spending your life looking over your shoulder. Violating the peace of nature, however, is always unjust. Even so, justice is not the same for everyone. Violating the law *can* be just, when the law, *itself* becomes unjust.

At your best, form genuine friendships and spread cheer. At your worst, avoid making enemies. Cultivate a true circle of loved ones to help you live your *Best Life*.

May you cultivate true happiness,
Nate

1

ΤΟ <u>ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΝ</u> ΚΑΙ <u>ΑΦΘΑΡΤΟΝ</u> ΟΥΤΕ ΑΥΤΟ <u>ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ</u> ΕΧΕΙ
ΟΥΤΕ ΑΛΛΩι <u>ΠΑΡΕΧΕΙ</u>· ΩΣΤΕ ΟΥΤΕ <u>ΟΡΓΑΙΣ</u> ΟΥΤΕ <u>ΧΑΡΙΣΙ</u>
<u>ΣΥΝΕΧΕΤΑΙ</u>· ΕΝ <u>ΑΣΘΕΝΕΙ</u> ΓΑΡ <u>ΠΑΝ</u> ΤΟ <u>ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ</u>.

"That which is happy and imperishable, neither has trouble itself, nor does it cause it to anything; so that it is not subject to feelings of either anger or gratitude; for these feelings only exist in what is weak." Yonge (1853)

"The blessed and incorruptible has no toil or trouble of its own, and causes none to others. It is not subject either to anger or favour." Wallace, *Epicureanism* 110 (1880)

"A blessed and eternal being has no trouble itself and brings no trouble upon any other being; hence it is exempt from movements of anger and favour, for every such movement implies weakness." Hicks (1910)

"A happy and eternal being has no trouble himself and brings no trouble upon any other being ; hence he is exempt from movements of anger and partiality, for every such movement implies weakness." Hicks (1925)

"The blessed and immortal nature knows no trouble itself nor causes trouble to any other, so that it is never constrained by anger or favour. For all such things exist only in the weak." Bailey (1926)

"The blissful and incorruptible being neither knows trouble itself nor occasions trouble to another, and is consequently immune to either anger or gratitude, for all such emotions reside in a weak creature." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 252 (1954)

"The blessed and incorruptible being neither knows tribulation itself nor occasions it to another; it is consequently immune to feelings of either anger or gratitude, for all such emotion signifies a weak creature." De Witt, *St. Paul and Epicurus* 187 (1954)

"That which is blessed and immortal is not troubled itself, nor does it cause trouble to another. As a result, it is not affected by anger or favor, for these belong to weakness." Geer (1964)

"That which is blessed and imperishable neither suffers nor inflicts trouble, and therefore is affected neither by anger nor by favour. For all such things are marks of weakness." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 140 (1987)

"The blessed and immortal is itself free from trouble nor does it cause trouble for anyone else; therefore, it is not constrained either by anger or by favor. For such sentiments exist only in the weak." O'Connor (1993)

" What is blessed and indestructible has no trouble itself nor does it give trouble to anyone else, so that it is not affected by feelings of anger or gratitude. For all such things are a sign of weakness." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"A blessed and imperishable being neither has trouble itself nor does it cause trouble for anyone else; therefore, it does not experience feelings of anger or indebtedness, for such feelings signify weakness." Anderson (2004)

"That which is blessed and indestructible has no affairs of its own to attend to; nor does it inflict any trouble on others. So, it is agitated neither by ire nor by partiality. For all such are to be found in that which lacks power." Makridis (2005)

"That which is blissful and immortal has no troubles itself, nor does it cause trouble for others, so that it is not affected by anger or gratitude (for all such things come about through weakness)." Saint-Andre (2008)

"The blessed and indestructible being of the divine has no concerns of its own, nor does it make trouble for others. It is not affected by feelings of anger or benevolence, because these are found where there is a lack of strength." Strodach (2012)

"The blessed and immortal has no troubles himself and causes none for anyone else; hence he has nothing to do with resentments and partisanship; for all such impulses are a sign of weakness." Mensch (2018)

"What is in bliss and imperishable neither has troubles itself nor causes any for others, so it experiences no feelings of either anger or gratitude; for everything of that sort indicates weakness." White (2021)

II (2)

Ο ΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ ΟΥΔΕΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΗΜΑΣ· ΤΟ ΓΑΡ ΔΙΑΛΥΘΕΝ ΑΝΑΙΣΘΗΤΕΙ ΤΟ Δ' ΑΝΑΙΣΘΗΤΟΥΝ ΟΥΔΕΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΗΜΑΣ.

"Death is nothing to us; for that which is dissolved is devoid of sensation, and that which is devoid of sensation is nothing to us." Yonge (1853)

"Death is nothing to us. That into which dissolution brings us has no feeling or consciousness, and what has no consciousness is nothing to us." Wallace, *Epicureanism* 110 (1880)

"Death is nothing to us; for the body, when it has been resolved into its elements, has no feeling, and that which has no feeling is nothing to us." Hicks (1910)

"Death is nothing to us; for that which is dissolved is without sensation; and that which lacks sensation is nothing to us." Bailey (1926)

"Death is nothing to us, because dissolution means unconsciousness and unconsciousness is nothing to us." De Witt, *St. Paul and Epicurus* 187 (1954)

"Death is nothing to us; for what has been dissolved has no sensation, and what has no sensation is nothing to us." Geer (1964)

"Death is nothing to us. For what has been dispersed has no sensation. And what has no sensation is nothing to us." O'Connor (1993)

"Death is nothing to us. For what has been dissolved has no sense-experience, and what has no sense-experience is nothing to us." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"Death is nothing to us, because a body that has been dispersed into elements experiences no sensations, and the absence of sensation is nothing to us." Anderson (2004)

"Death is nothing to us. Because, what has been dissolved has no sense perception; and, according to us, what has no sense perception is nothing to worry about." Makridis (2005)

"Death is nothing to us; for what has disintegrated lacks awareness, and what lacks awareness is nothing to us." Saint-Andre (2008)

"Death means nothing to us, because that which has been broken down into atoms has no sensation and that which has no sensation is no concern of ours." Strodach (2012)

"Death is nothing to us. For what has been dissolved has no feeling; and what has no feeling is nothing to us." Mensch (2018)

"Death is nothing to us; for what has been dissolved has no perception, and what has no perception is nothing to us." White (2021)

III (3)

ΟΡΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΜΕΓΕΘΟΥΣ ΤΩΝ ΗΔΟΝΩΝ Η ΠΑΝΤΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΑΛΓΟΥΝΤΟΣ ΥΠΕΞΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ. ΟΠΟΥ Δ' ΑΝ ΤΟ ΗΔΟΜΕΝΟΝ ΕΝΗι ΚΑΘ' ΟΝ ΑΝ ΧΡΟΝΟΝ Ηι ΟΥΚ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΟ ΑΛΓΟΥΝ Η ΛΥΠΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ Η ΤΟ ΣΥΝΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΝ.

"The limit of great pleasures is the removal of everything which can give pain. And where pleasure is, as long as it lasts, that which gives pain, or that which feels pain, or both of them, are absent." Yonge (1853)

"The magnitude of pleasures is limited by the removal of all pain. Wherever there is pleasure, so long as it is present, there is no pain either of body or of mind or both." Hicks (1910)

"The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain. When pleasure is present, so long as it is uninterrupted, there is no pain either of body or of mind or of both together." Hicks (1925)

"The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body nor of mind, nor of both at once." Bailey (1926)

"The removal of all pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. And wherever the experience of pleasure is present, so long as it prevails, there is no pain or distress or a combination of them." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 226, 241 (1954)

"The removal of all that causes pain marks the boundary of pleasure. Wherever pleasure is present and as long as it continues, there is neither suffering nor grieving nor both togethers." Geer (1964)

"The removal of all pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, pain or distress or their combination is absent." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 115 (1987)

"The limit of the extent of pleasure is the removal of all pain. Wherever pleasure is present, for however long a time, there can be no pain or grief, or both of these." O'Connor (1993)

"The removal of all feeling of pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever a pleasurable feeling is present, for as long as it is present, there is neither a feeling of pain nor a feeling of distress, nor both together." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"Pleasure reaches its maximum limit at the removal of all sources of pain. When such pleasure is present, for as long as it lasts, there is no cause of physical nor mental pain present – nor of both together." Anderson (2004)

"Pleasure has its <upper> limit in the removal of everything that produces pain. For, wherever that which produces pleasure resides, for as long as it abides, there can be nothing that produces pain, grief, or both." Makridis (2005)

"The limit of enjoyment is the removal of all pains. Wherever and for however long pleasure is present, there is neither bodily pain nor mental distress." Saint-Andre (2008)

"The quantitative limit of pleasure is the elimination of all feelings of pain. Wherever the pleasurable state exists, there is neither bodily pain nor mental pain nor both together, so long as the state continues." Strodach (2012)

"The limit of pleasure is reached with the removal of all pain. Whenever pleasure is present, and for however long, there is neither pain nor grief nor any combination of the two." Mensch (2018)

"The limit to the magnitude of pleasures is the elimination of everything painful; and wherever there is pleasant feeling, so long as it lasts, there is no painful feeling or sorrow, or both together." White (2021)

IV (4)

ΟΥ ΧΡΟΝΙΖΕΙ ΤΟ ΑΛΓΟΥΝ ΣΥΝΕΧΩΣ ΕΝ ΤΗ ΣΑΡΚΙ ΑΛΛΑ ΤΟ ΜΕΝ ΑΚΡΟΝ ΤΟΝ ΕΛΑΧΙΣΤΟΝ ΧΡΟΝΟΝ ΠΑΡΕΣΤΙ ΤΟ ΔΕ ΜΟΝΟΝ ΥΠΕΡΤΕΙΝΟΝ ΤΟ ΗΔΟΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΣΑΡΚΑ ΟΥ ΠΟΛΛΑΣ ΗΜΕΡΑΣ ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙ· ΑΙ ΔΕ ΠΟΛΥΧΡΟΝΙΟΙ ΤΩΝ ΑΡΡΩΣΤΙΩΝ ΠΛΕΟΝΑΖΟΝ ΕΧΟΥΣΙ ΤΟ ΗΔΟΜΕΝΟΝ ΕΝ ΤΗ ΣΑΡΚΙ Η ΠΕΡ ΤΟ ΑΛΓΟΥΝ.

"Pain does not abide continuously in the flesh, but in its extremity it is present only a very short time. That pain which only just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh, does not last many days. But long diseases have in them more that is pleasant than painful to the flesh." Yonge (1853)

"Continuous pain does not last long in the flesh, and pain, if extreme, is present a very short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the flesh does not occur for many days together. Illnesses of long duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh." Hicks (1910)

"Continuous pain does not last long in the flesh ; on the contrary, pain, if extreme, is present a very short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the flesh does not last for many days together. Illnesses of long duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh." Hicks (1925)

"Pain does not last continuously in the flesh, but the acutest pain is there for a very short time, and even that which just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh does not continue for many days at once. But chronic illnesses permit a predominance of pleasure over pain in the flesh." Bailey (1926)

"Pain does not prevail continuously in the flesh but the peak of it is present for the briefest interval, and the pain that barely exceeds the pleasure in the flesh is not with us many days, while protracted illnesses have an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 244 (1954)

"Continuous bodily suffering does not last long. Intense pain is very brief, and even pain that barely outweighs physical pleasure does not last many days. Long illnesses permit physical pleasures that are greater than the pain." Geer (1964)

"Pain does not last continuously in the flesh: when acute it is there for a very short time, while the pain which just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh does not persist for many days; and chronic illnesses contain an excess of pleasure in the flesh over pain." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 115 (1987)

"Pain does not dwell continuously in the flesh. Extreme pain is present but a very brief time, and that which barely exceeds bodily pleasure continues no more than a few days. But chronic illness allows greater pleasure than pain in the flesh. " O'Connor (1993)

"The feeling of pain does not linger continuously in the flesh; rather, the sharpest is present for the shortest time, while what merely exceeds the feeling of pleasure in the flesh lasts only a few days. And diseases which last a long time involve feelings of pleasure which exceed feelings of pain." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"Continuous physical pain does not last long. Instead, extreme pain lasts only a very short time, and even less-extreme pain does not last for many days at once. Even protracted diseases allow periods of physical comfort that exceed feelings of pain." Anderson (2004)

"What produces pain does not remain constantly in the body over a long period of time; it is rather that the maximal pain persists for the least span of time, and even that bodily pain which barely exceeds pleasure does not continue to happen for many days <in a row.> And, indeed, chronic illnesses themselves have an excess of what produces bodily pleasure over what is productive of pain." Makridis (2005)

"Pain does not last continuously in the flesh; instead, the sharpest pain lasts the shortest time, a pain that exceeds bodily pleasure lasts only a few days, and diseases that last a long time involve delights that exceed their pains." Saint-Andre (2008)

"Bodily pain does not last continuously. The peak is present for a very brief period, and pains that barely exceed the state of bodily pleasure do not continue for many days. On the other hand, protracted illnesses show a balance of bodily pleasure over pain." Strodach (2012)

"Pain does not last long in the flesh; in fact, extreme pain is present for the briefest time, while that which hardly outweighs pleasure does not last for many days. And illnesses that are prolonged may even afford the flesh more pleasure than pain." Mensch (2018)

"Pain does not continue for long in the flesh. Rather, the most intense pain lasts the shortest time; any pain that exceeds pleasant feeling in the flesh does not last many days; and lengthy infirmities have more pleasant feeling in the flesh than pain." White (2021)

V (5)

ΟΥΚ ΕΣΤΙΝ <u>ΗΔΕΩΣ</u> <u>ΖΗΝ</u> ΑΝΕΥ ΤΟΥ <u>ΦΡΟΝΙΜΩΣ</u> ΚΑΙ <u>ΚΑΛΩΣ</u>
ΚΑΙ <u>ΔΙΚΑΙΩΣ</u> <ΟΥΔΕ <u>ΦΡΟΝΙΜΩΣ</u> ΚΑΙ <u>ΚΑΛΩΣ</u> ΚΑΙ <u>ΔΙΚΑΙΩΣ</u>>
ΑΝΕΥ ΤΟΥ <u>ΗΔΕΩΣ</u>· ΟΤΩι Δ' ΕΝ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΜΗ <u>ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙ</u> ΟΙΟΝ
<u>ΖΗΝ</u> <u>ΦΡΟΝΙΜΩΣ</u> ΚΑΙ <u>ΚΑΛΩΣ</u> ΚΑΙ <u>ΔΙΚΑΙΩΣ</u> <u>ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙ</u> ΟΥΧ
ΕΣΤΙ ΤΟΥΤΟΝ <u>ΗΔΕΩΣ</u> <u>ΖΗΝ</u>.

"It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently, and honourably, and justly; nor to live prudently, and honourably, and justly, without living pleasantly. But to whom it does not happen to live prudently, honourably, and justly cannot possibly live pleasantly." Yonge (1853)

"It is impossible to live pleasantly without living wisely, and well, and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and well, and justly, without living pleasantly." Wallace, Epicureanism 155 (1880)

"It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man does not live wisely, though he lives well and justly, it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life." Hicks (1910)

"It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man is not able to live wisely, though he lives well and justly, it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life." Hicks (1925)

"It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honourably and justly, [nor again to live a life of prudence, honour, and justice] without living pleasantly. And the man who does not possess the pleasant life, is not living prudently and honourably and justly, [and the man who does not possess the virtuous life], cannot possibly live pleasantly." Bailey (1926)

"It is impossible to live pleasurably without living according to reason, honor and justice, nor to live according to reason, honor, and justice without living pleasurably...." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 184, 246 (1954)

"It is impossible to live pleasantly without living prudently, well, and justly, (and to live prudently, well, and justly) without living pleasantly. Even though a man live well and justly, it is not possible for him to live pleasantly if he lacks that from which stems the prudent life." Geer (1964)

"It is impossible to live a pleasantly without living prudently, well, and justly, nor is it possible to live prudently, well, and justly without living pleasantly. The man for whom this latter condition is impossible cannot live prudently, well, or justly; he for whom the former is impossible, cannot live pleasantly." O'Connor (1993)

"It is impossible to live pleasantly without living prudently, honourably, and justly and impossible to live prudently, honourably, and justly without living pleasantly. And whoever lacks this cannot live pleasantly." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"It is impossible to live pleasantly without living wisely and honorably and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and honorably and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking (when, for instance, one is not able to live wisely, though he lives honorably and justly) it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life." Anderson (2004)

"It is impossible to lead a pleasant life without leading a life that is prudent, proper, and just. Nor is it possible to live a life that is prudent, proper, and just without living a life that is pleasant. Whoever lacks <any one of> the above <elements of a good and pleasant life> cannot have a good life." Makridis (2005)

"It is not possible to live joyously without also living wisely and beautifully and rightly, nor to live wisely and beautifully and rightly without living joyously; and whoever lacks this cannot live joyously." Saint-Andre (2008)

"It is impossible to live the pleasant life without also living sensibly, nobly, and justly, and conversely it is impossible to live sensibly, nobly, and justly without living pleasantly. A person who does not have a pleasant life is not living sensibly, nobly, and justly, and conversely the person who does not have these virtues cannot live pleasantly." Strodach (2012)

"It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently, honorably, and justly; nor can one live prudently, honorably, and justly without living pleasantly. Nor is it possible for the man who does not live prudently, though he may live honorably and justly, to live pleasantly." Mensch (2018)

"It is not possible to live pleasantly without living wisely, honorably, and justly, <nor wisely, honorably, and justly> without living pleasantly; and for anyone who does not have that, {does not live wisely, honorably, and justly, does not have,} it is not possible for him to live pleasantly." White (2021)

VI (6)

ΕΝΕΚΑ ΤΟΥ <u>ΘΑΡΡΕΙΝ</u> ΕΞ <u>ΑΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ</u> ΗΝ ΚΑΤΑ <u>ΦΥΣΙΝ</u>
[<u>ΑΡΧΗΣ</u> ΚΑΙ <u>ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΑΣ</u>]* <u>ΑΓΑΘΟΝ</u> ΕΞ ΩΝ ΑΝ ΠΟΤΕ ΤΟΥΤΟ
ΟΙΟΣ Τ᾽ Η <u>ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ</u>.

Arrighetti

"For the sake of feeling confidence and security with regard to men, anything in nature is good, if it provides the means to achieve this." Yonge (1853)

"As far as concerns protection from other men, any means of procuring this was a natural good." Hicks (1910)

"In order to obtain security from other men any means whatsoever of procuring this was a natural good." Hicks (1925)

"To secure protection from men anything is a natural good, by which you may be able to attain this end." Bailey (1926)

"As for the assurance of safety from the attacks of men, by virtue of the nature of political dominion and kingly power this is a good thing, no matter by whose aid one is able to procure it." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 79 (1954)

"Political rule and kingly power being what they are, it is a good thing to feel secure in human relations no matter through whose agency one is able to attain this." De Witt, *St. Paul and Epicurus* 187 (1954)

"Any device whatever by which one frees himself from the fear of others is a natural good." Geer (1964)

"Whatever you can provide yourself with to secure protection from men is a natural good." O'Connor (1993)

"The natural good of public office and kingship is for the sake of getting confidence from [other] men, [at least] from those from whom one is able to provide this." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"That natural benefit of kingship and high office is (and only is) the degree to which they provide security from other men." Anderson (2004)

"This <human ability to lead a good life> originally became possible by nature and for the sake of imparting courage in human beings <who were then living in a pre-social condition.> And this is the natural origin and principle on which all authority—be it even kingship—is based. And it is from the same <natural propensities> that a human being is able also to arrange a good and pleasant life." Makridis (2005)

"It is a natural benefit of leadership and kingship to take courage from other men (or at least from the sort of men who can give one courage)." Saint-Andre (2008)

"Any means by which it is possible to procure freedom from fearing other men is a natural good." Strodach (2012)

"In order that men might not fear one another, there was a natural benefit to be had from government and kingship, provided that they are able to bring about this result." Mensch (2018)

"There was some natural good in leadership and kingship for the purpose of establishing mutual confidence among people, any time someone is thereby able to do so." White (2021)

VII (7)

ΕΝΔΟΞΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΠΕΡΙΒΛΕΠΤΟΙ ΤΙΝΕΣ ΕΒΟΥΛΗΘΗΣΑΝ
ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΕΞ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑΝ ΟΥΤΩ
ΝΟΜΙΖΟΝΤΕΣ ΠΕΡΙΠΟΙΗΣΕΣΘΑΙ ΩΣΤΕ ΕΙ ΜΕΝ ΑΣΦΑΛΗΣ Ο
ΤΩΝ ΤΟΙΟΥΤΩΝ ΒΙΟΣ ΑΠΕΛΑΒΟΝ ΤΟ ΤΗΣ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ·
ΕΙ ΔΕ ΜΗ ΑΣΦΑΛΗΣ ΟΥΚ ΕΧΟΥΣΙΝ ΟΥ ΕΝΕΚΑ ΕΞ ΑΡΧΗΣ
ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟ ΤΗΣ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ ΟΙΚΕΙΟΝ ΩΡΕΧΘΗΣΑΝ.

"Some men have wished to be eminent and powerful, thinking that so they would secure safety as far as men are concerned. So that if the life of such men is safe, they have attained to the nature of good; but if it is not safe, then they have failed in obtaining that for the sake of which they originally desired power according to the order of nature." Yonge (1853)

"It was not because sovereignty and dominion were intrinsically good that men sought for fame and glory in society, but in order to fence themselves round from their men." Wallace, *Epicureanism* 158 (1880)

"Some men sought to become famous and renowned, thinking that thus they would make themselves secure against their fellow-men. If, then, the life of such persons really was secure, they attained natural good; if, however, it was insecure, they have not attained the end which by nature's own promptings they originally sought." Hicks (1910)

"Some men have sought to become famous and renowned, thinking that thus they would make themselves secure against their fellow-men. If, then, the life of such persons really was secure, they attained natural good ; if, however, it was insecure, they have not attained the end which by nature's own prompting they originally sought." Hicks (1925)

"Some men wished to become famous and conspicuous thinking that they would thus win for themselves safety from other men. Wherefore if the life of such men is safe, they have obtained the good which nature craves; but if it is not safe, they do not possess that for which they strove at the first by the instinct of nature." Bailey (1926)

"Some men have chosen to become celebrities and to be in the public eye, thinking thus to achieve security from the attacks of men. Consequently, if the lives of such men are safe, they have reaped the end of Nature, but if their lives are not safe, they lack that for the sake of which at the outset they reached out by the instinct of Nature. " De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 189 (1954)

"Some men wish to gain reputation and to be in the public eye, thinking by this means to win security from the attacks of men. Consequently, if the lives of these men are safe they have achieved the end ordained by Nature; if, on the contrary, their lives are not safe they lack that for which at the outset they reached out in obedience to an instinct of Nature." De Witt, *St. Paul and Epicurus* 187 (1954)

"Some, thinking thus to make themselves safe from men, wished to become famous and renowned. They won a natural good if they made their lives secure; but if their lives were not secure, they did not have that for which, following the rule of nature, they first sought." Geer (1964)

"Certain people wanted to become famous and admired, thinking that they would thus acquire security from other men. Consequently, if such people's life was secure, they did obtain nature's good; but if it was not secure, they are not in possession of the objective which they originally sought after on the basis of nature's affinity." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 126 (1987)

"Some men wished to become esteemed and admired by everyone, thinking that in this way they would procure for themselves safety from others. Therefore, if the life of such men is safe, they have received the good that comes from nature. If it is not safe, they do not have that for which they struggled at first by natural instinct." O'Connor (1993)

"Some men want to become famous and respected, believing that this is the way to acquire security against [other] men. Thus if the life of such men is secure, they acquire the natural good; but if it is not secure, they do not have that for the sake of which they strove from the beginning according to what is naturally congenial." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"Some seek fame and status, thinking that they could thereby protect themselves against other men. If their lives really are secure, then they have attained a natural good; if, however, they're insecure, they still lack what they originally sought by natural instinct." Anderson (2004)

"Some have wished to become famous and enviable, thinking that they would in this way procure for themselves security from other human beings. In that case: if their life is secure, they have indeed enjoyed what is the good by nature; if, however, they are not safe, they still lack that naturally familiar good for the sake of which our appetites have striven from the very first stirrings of human nature and in accordance with natural principles." Makridis (2005)

"Some people want to be well esteemed and widely admired, believing that in this way they will be safe from others; if the life of such people is secure then they have gained its natural benefit, but if not then they have not gained what they sought from the beginning in accordance with what is naturally appropriate." Saint-Andre (2008)

"Some men have desired to gain reputation and to be well regarded, thinking in this way to gain protection from other people. If the lives of such men are secure, they have acquired a natural blessing; but if they are not, they do not possess what they originally reached for by natural instinct." Strodach (2012)

"Some have longed to become famous and celebrated, thinking that they would thereby obtain security against other men. If the lives of such persons were secure, they attained what is naturally good; but if insecure, they did not attain the object that they were originally prompted by nature to seek." Mensch (2018)

"Some people wanted to become famous and admired, supposing they would in this way achieve security from other people. Hence, if the life of such people is secure, they obtained their nature's good; but if it is not secure, they do not have the goal they initially desired in the way congenial to their nature." White (2021)

VIII (8)

*ΟΥΔΕΜΙΑ <u>ΗΔΟΝΗ</u> ΚΑΘ' ΕΑΥΤΗΝ <u>ΚΑΚΟΝ</u>· ΑΛΛΑ ΤΑ ΤΙΝΩΝ
<u>ΗΔΟΝΩΝ</u> <u>ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΑ</u> <u>ΠΟΛΛΑΠΛΑΣΙΟΥΣ</u> ΕΠΙΦΕΡΕΙ ΤΑΣ
<u>ΟΧΛΗΣΕΙΣ</u> ΤΩΝ <u>ΗΔΟΝΩΝ</u>.*

"No pleasure is intrinsically bad: but the effective causes of some pleasures bring with them a great many perturbations of pleasure." Yonge (1853)

"No pleasure is evil in itself, but the objects productive of certain pleasures may lead to annoyances many times greater than the pleasure." Wallace, *Epicureanism* 150 (1880)

"No pleasure is in itself evil, but the things which produce certain pleasures entail annoyances many times greater than the pleasures themselves." Hicks (1910)

"No pleasure is in itself evil, but the things which produce certain pleasures entail annoyances many times greater than the pleasures themselves." Hicks (1925)

"No pleasure is a bad thing in itself: but the means which produce some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures." Bailey (1926)

"No pleasure is evil in itself but the practices productive of certain pleasures bring troubles in their train that by many times outweigh the pleasures themselves." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 235 (1954)

"No pleasure is evil it itself; but the means by which certain pleasures are gained bring pains many times greater than the pleasures." Geer (1964)

"No pleasure is something bad *per se*: but the causes of some pleasures produce stresses many times greater than the pleasures" Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 115 (1987)

"No pleasure is evil in itself; but the means of obtaining some pleasures bring in their wake troubles many times greater than the pleasures." O'Connor (1993)

"No pleasure is a bad thing in itself. But the things which produce certain pleasures bring troubles many times greater than the pleasures." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"No pleasure is a bad thing in itself, but some pleasures are only obtainable at the cost of excessive troubles." Anderson (2004)

"No pleasure is a morally bad thing in itself. But the agents that produce certain pleasures bring about vexations that outnumber the pleasures themselves." Makridis (2005)

"No pleasure is bad in itself; but the means of paying for some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves." Saint-Andre (2008)

"No pleasure is bad in itself. But the things that make for pleasure in certain cases entail disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves." Strodach (2012)

"No pleasure is intrinsically bad; but the means of producing certain pleasures may entail annoyances many times greater than the pleasures themselves." Mensch (2018)

"No pleasure is in itself anything bad; but some pleasures are produced by things that bring along troubles many times greater than those pleasures." White (2021)

IX (9)

ΕΙ <u>ΚΑΤΕΠΥΚΝΟΥΤΟ</u> ΠΑΣΑ <u>ΗΔΟΝΗ</u> ΚΑΙ <u>ΧΡΟΝΩι</u> ΚΑΙ ΠΕΡΙ <u>ΟΛΟΝ</u> ΤΟ <u>ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ</u> <u>ΥΠΗΡΧΕΝ</u> Η ΤΑ <u>ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΑ</u> ΜΕΡΗ ΤΗΣ <u>ΦΥΣΕΩΣ</u> ΟΥΚ ΑΝ ΠΟΤΕ <u>ΔΙΕΦΕΡΟΝ</u> <u>ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ</u> ΑΙ <u>ΗΔΟΝΑΙ</u>.

"If every pleasure were condensed, if one may so say, and if each lasted long, and affected the whole body, or the essential parts of it, then there would be no difference between one pleasure and another." Yonge (1853)

"If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation, if this had gone on not only in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, the principal parts of man's nature, there would not have been any difference between one pleasure and another as, in fact, there now is." Hicks (1910)

"If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation,—if this had gone on not only by recurrence in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, over the principal parts of man's nature, there would never have been any difference between one pleasure and another, as in fact there is." Hicks (1925)

"If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another." Bailey (1926)

"If every pleasure were alike condensed in duration and associated with the whole organism or the dominant parts of it, pleasures would never differ from one another." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 235 (1954)

"If every pleasure were cumulative, and if this were the case both in time and in regard to the whole or the most important parts of our nature, then pleasures would not differ from each other." Geer (1964)

"If every pleasure were condensed in <location> and duration and distributed all over the structure or the dominant parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 115 (1987)

"If every pleasure were condensed and existed for a long time throughout the entire organism or its most important parts, pleasures would never differ from one another." O'Connor (1993)

"If every pleasure were condensed and were present, both in time and in the whole compound [body and soul] or in the most important parts of our nature, then pleasures would never differ from one another." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"If every pleasure could be prolonged to endure in both body or mind, pleasures would never differ from one another." Anderson (2004)

"If all pleasures could be added together consecutively with respect to space and duration, and across the entire span over which they had all existed, or at least across the principal parts of human nature <which are naturally susceptible to pleasures:> then, pleasures would not be different from each other in any respect." Makridis (2005)

"If every pleasure were condensed and were present at the same time and in the whole of one's nature or its primary parts, then the pleasures would never differ from one another." Saint-Andre (2008)

"If all pleasures could be compressed in time and intensity, and were characteristic of the whole man or his more important aspects, the various pleasures would not differ from each other." Strodach (2012)

"If all pleasure were condensed in space and time, and pervaded the whole aggregate, or the most important parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ, one from another." Mensch (2018)

"If every pleasure were concentrated in place and time and affected our whole aggregate or the most important parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another." White (2021)

X (10)

ΕΙ ΤΑ <u>ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΑ</u> ΤΩΝ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥΣ <u>ΑΣΩΤΟΥΣ</u> <u>ΗΔΟΝΩΝ</u> ΕΛΥΕ ΤΟΥΣ <u>ΦΟΒΟΥΣ</u> ΤΗΣ <u>ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑΣ</u> ΤΟΥΣ ΤΕ ΠΕΡΙ <u>ΜΕΤΕΩΡΩΝ</u> ΚΑΙ <u>ΘΑΝΑΤΟΥ</u> ΚΑΙ <u>ΑΛΓΗΔΟΝΩΝ</u> ΕΤΙ ΤΕ ΤΟ <u>ΠΕΡΑΣ</u> ΤΩΝ ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ [ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ <u>ΑΛΓΗΔΟΝΩΝ</u>]* ΕΔΙΔΑΣΚΕΝ ΟΥΚ ΑΝ ΠΟΤΕ <u>ΕΙΧΟΜΕΝ</u> Ο ΤΙ <u>ΜΕΜΨΑΙΜΕΘΑ</u> ΑΥΤΟΙΣ <u>ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΘΕΝ</u> <u>ΕΚΠΛΗΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΙΣ</u> ΤΩΝ <u>ΗΔΟΝΩΝ</u> ΚΑΙ <u>ΟΥΔΑΜΟΘΕΝ</u> ΟΥΤΕ ΤΟ <u>ΑΛΓΟΥΝ</u> ΟΥΤΕ ΤΟ <u>ΛΥΠΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ</u> <u>ΕΧΟΥΣΙΝ</u> Ο ΠΕΡ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΟ <u>ΚΑΚΟΝ</u>.

*Arrighetti

"If those things which make the pleasures of debauched men, put an end to the fears of the mind, and to those which arise about the heavenly bodies, and death, and pain; and if they taught us what ought to be the limit of our desires, we should have no pretense for blaming those who wholly devote themselves to pleasure, and who never feel any pain or grief (which is the chief evil) from any quarter." Yonge (1853)

"If the objects which are productive of pleasures to profligate persons really freed them from fears of the mind—the fears, I mean, inspired by celestial and atmospheric phenomena, the fear of death, the fear of pain—if, further, they taught them to limit their desires, we should not have any reason to censure such persons, for they would then be filled with pleasure to overflowing on all sides and would be exempt from all pain, whether of body or mind, that is, from all evil." Hicks (1910)

"If the things that produce the pleasures of profligates could dispel the fears of the mind about the phenomena of the sky and death and its pains, and also teach the limits of desires <and of pains>, we should never have cause to blame them: for they would be filling themselves full with pleasures from every source and never have pain of body or mind, which is the evil of life." Bailey (1926)

"If the practices productive of the pleasures of profligates dispelled the fears of the mind about celestial things and death and pains and also taught the limit of the desires, we should never have fault to find with profligates, enjoying pleasures to the full from all quarters, and suffering neither pain nor distress from any quarter, wherein the evil lies." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 235 (1954)

"If the things that produce the pleasures of the dissolute were able to drive away from their minds their fears about what is above them and about death and pain, and to teach them the limit of desires, we would have no reason to find them the limit of desires, we would have no reason to find fault with the dissolute; for they would fill themselves with pleasure from every source and would be free from pain and sorrow, which are evil." Geer (1964)

"If the causes of the pleasures of the dissipated released mental fears concerning celestial phenomena and death and distress, and in addition taught the limit of desires, we should never have any reason to reproach them [i.e. the dissipated], since they would be satisfying themselves with pleasures from all directions and would never have pain or distress, which constitutes the bad." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 115 (1987)

"If the things that beget pleasure in dissolute individuals could dispel their minds' fears about the heavens, death, and pain, and could still teach them the limits of desires, we would have no grounds for finding fault with the dissolute, since they would be filling themselves with pleasures from every source and in no way suffering from pain or grief, which are evil." O'Connor (1993)

"If the things which produce the pleasures of profligate men dissolved the intellect's fears about the phenomena of the heavens and about death and pains and, moreover, if they taught us the limit of our desires, then we would not have reason to criticize them, since they would be filled with pleasures from every source and would contain no feeling of pain or distress from any source—and that is what is bad." Inwood (1994)

"If the things which debauched men find pleasurable put an end to all fears (such as concerns about the heavenly bodies, death, and pain) and if they revealed how we ought to limit our desires, we would have no reason to reproach them, for they would be fulfilled with pleasures from every source while experiencing no pain, neither in mind nor body, which is the chief evil of life." Anderson (2004)

"If those elements that are productive of the pleasures of the debauched released them from the mental apprehensions aroused by natural phenomena, fear of death, and <obsessive anticipation of> pain; if, in addition, they formed their characters in such a way that they knew when to set a limit to their desires, we would then never have anything to censure them about: indeed, they would then be fully actualizing all the pleasures and in no way would they have either what is painful or what is productive of grief in them—and it is this latter condition <which they would be avoiding> that is morally bad." Makridis (2005)

"If the things that produce the delights of those who are decadent washed away the mind's fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering, and furthermore if they taught us the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no complaints against them, since they would be filled with every joy and would contain not a single pain or distress (and that's what is bad)." Saint-Andre (2008)

"If the things that produce the debauchee's pleasures dissolved the mind's fears regarding the heavenly bodies, death, and pain and also told us how to limit our desires, we would never have any reason to find fault with such people, because they would be glutting themselves with every sort of pleasure and never suffer physical or mental pain, which is the real evil." Strodach (2012)

"If the objects that afforded pleasure to profligate men actually freed them from mental fears, namely those that relate to celestial phenomena and death and pain, and also taught them to limit their desires, we would never have any occasion to find fault with such men, since they would then be filled with pleasures from all sides and would be free of all pain and grief—that is, of all that is bad." Mensch (2018)

"If the things that produce the pleasures of the dissolute released our minds from fear of celestial things and death and pain, and if they taught us the limit of desire, then we would have nothing to reproach in them, since they would then be replete with pleasures from every source and devoid of pain or sorrow from any source, which are precisely what is bad." White (2021)

XI (11)

ΕΙ <u>ΜΗΘΕΝ</u> ΗΜΑΣ ΑΙ ΤΩΝ <u>ΜΕΤΕΩΡΩΝ</u> <u>ΥΠΟΨΙΑΙ</u> <u>ΗΝΩΧΛΟΥΝ</u>
ΚΑΙ ΑΙ ΠΕΡΙ <u>ΘΑΝΑΤΟΥ</u> ΜΗ ΠΟΤΕ ΠΡΟΣ ΗΜΑΣ Η, ΤΙ ΕΤΙ ΤΕ ΤΟ
ΜΗ <u>ΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ</u> ΤΟΥΣ <u>ΟΡΟΥΣ</u> ΤΩΝ <u>ΑΛΓΗΔΟΝΩΝ</u> ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ
<u>ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ</u> ΟΥΚ ΑΝ <u>ΠΡΟΣΕΔΕΟΜΕΘΑ</u> <u>ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ</u>.

"If apprehensions relating to the heavenly bodies did not disturb us, and if the terrors of death have no concern with us, and if we had the courage to contemplate the boundaries of pain and of the desires, we should have no need of physiological studies." Yonge (1853)

"If we had never been molested by alarms at celestial and atmospheric phenomena, nor by the misgiving that death somehow affects us, nor by neglect of the proper limits of pains and desires, we should have had no need to study natural science." Hicks (1910)

"If we were not troubled by our suspicions of the phenomena of the sky and about death, fearing that it concerns us, and also by our failure to grasp the limits of pains and desires, we should have no need of natural science." Bailey (1926)

"If our dread of the phenomena above us, our fear lest death concern us, and our inability to discern the limits of pains and desires were not vexations to us, we would have no need of the natural sciences." Geer (1964)

"Were we not upset by the worries that celestial phenomena and death might matter to us, and also by failure to appreciate the limits of pains and desires, we would have no need for natural philosophy." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 155 (1987)

"If apprehensions about the heavens and our fear lest death concern us, as well as our failure to realize the limits of pains and desires, did not bother us, we would have no need of natural science." O'Connor (1993)

"If our suspicions about heavenly phenomena and about death did not trouble us at all and were never anything to us, and, moreover, if not knowing the limits of pains and desires did not trouble us, then we would have no need of natural science." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"If we were never troubled by how phenomena in the sky or death might concern us, or by our failures to grasp the limits of pains and desires, we would have no need to study nature." Anderson (2004)

"If we were never perturbed by frightful second-guessing of natural phenomena and death; if, adding to the above, we were never <beset by> failure to comprehend the proper limits of pains and pleasures: then, we would have no need of natural science." Makridis (2005)

"If our suspicions about astronomical phenomena and about death were nothing to us and troubled us not at all, and if this were also the case regarding our ignorance about the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no need for studying what is natural." Saint-Andre (2008)

"We would have no need for natural science unless we were worried by apprehensiveness regarding the heavenly bodies, by anxiety about the meaning of death, and also by our failure to understand the limitations of pain and desire." Strodach (2012)

"If we were not harassed by apprehensions caused by celestial phenomena and by the fear that death somehow affects us, and by our failure to comprehend the limits of pains and desires, we would have no need for natural science." Mensch (2018)

"If no worries about celestial things troubled us at all, or any about death possibly mattering for us, or again if we did not understand the boundaries of pain and desire, we would have no more need for the study of nature." White (2021)

XII (12)

ΟΥΚ ΗΝ ΤΟ <u>ΦΟΒΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ</u> <u>ΛΥΕΙΝ</u> ΥΠΕΡ ΤΩΝ <u>ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΩΝ</u> ΜΗ <u>ΚΑΤΕΙΔΟΤΑ</u> ΤΙΣ Η ΤΟΥ <u>ΣΥΜΠΑΝΤΟΣ</u> <u>ΦΥΣΙΣ</u> ΑΛΛ <u>ΥΠΟΠΤΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΝ</u> ΤΙ ΤΩΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟΥΣ <u>ΜΥΘΟΥΣ</u>· ΩΣΤΕ ΟΥΚ ΗΝ ΑΝΕΥ <u>ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ</u> <u>ΑΚΕΡΑΙΟΥΣ</u> ΤΑΣ <u>ΗΔΟΝΑΣ</u> <u>ΑΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ</u>.

"It would not be possible for a person to banish all fear about those things which are called most essential, unless he knew what is the nature of the universe, or if he had any idea that the fables told about it could be true; and therefore a person cannot enjoy unmixed pleasure without physiological knowledge." Yonge (1853)

"It would be impossible to banish fear on matters of the highest importance if a man did not know the nature of the whole universe but lived in dread of what the legends tell us. Hence, without the study of nature there was no enjoyment of unmixed pleasures." Hicks (1910)

"It would be impossible to banish fear on matters of the highest importance, if a man did not know the nature of the whole universe, but lived in dread of what the legends tell us. Hence without the study of nature there was no enjoyment of unmixed pleasures." Hicks (1925)

"A man cannot dispel his fear about the most important matters if he does not know what is the nature of the universe but suspects the truth of some mythical story. So that without natural science it is not possible to attain our pleasures unalloyed." Bailey (1926)

"It is impossible for men to dispel the fear concerning things of supreme importance not understanding the nature of the whole universe but suspecting there may be some truth in the stories related in the myths. Consequently it is impossible without the knowledge of Nature to enjoy the pleasures unalloyed." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 305 (1954)

"It is not possible for one to rid himself of his fears about the most important things if he does not understand the nature of the universe but dreads some of the things he has learned in the myths. Therefore, it is not possible to gain unmixed happiness without natural science." Geer (1964)

"There is no way to dispel the fear about matters of supreme importance, for someone who does not know what the nature of the universe is but retains some of the fears based on mythology. Hence without natural philosophy there is no way of securing the purity of our pleasures." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 155 (1987)

"It is impossible for anyone to dispel his fear over the most important matters, if he does not know what is the nature of the universe but instead suspects something that happens in myth. Therefore, it is impossible to obtain unmitigated pleasure without natural science." O'Connor (1993)

"It is impossible for someone ignorant about the nature of the universe but still suspicious about the subjects of the myths to dissolve his feelings of fear about the most important matters. So it is impossible to receive unmixed pleasures without knowing natural science." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"One cannot rid himself of his primal fears if he does not understand the nature of the universe but instead suspects the truth of some mythical story. So without the study of nature, there can be no enjoyment of pure pleasure." Anderson (2004)

"It is impossible to be released from fear about the most important things for one who, not having adequate knowledge as to what the nature of the whole is, is trying to second-guess this or that in accordance with the <traditional> fairy tales. Hence, it is impossible to enjoy the pleasures in full unless one has studied natural science."
Makridis (2005)

"It is impossible for someone who is completely ignorant about nature to wash away his fears about the most important matters if he retains some suspicions about the myths. So it is impossible to experience undiluted enjoyment without studying what is natural."
Saint-Andre (2008)

"It is impossible to get rid of our anxieties about essentials if we do not understand the nature of the universe and are apprehensive about some of the theological accounts. Hence it is impossible to enjoy our pleasures unadulterated without natural science."
Strodach (2012)

"It would not be possible to dispel fear about the most important matters if a man did not know the nature of the universe, but lived in dread of what the myths describe. Hence, it would be impossible without the study of nature to enjoy unmixed pleasures."
Mensch (2018)

"There was no way to release someone from fear about the most important things if he does not know the nature of the entirety [sc. universe] and if he is worried about any of the tales sung of old; and so there was no way to obtain unmixed pleasures without studying nature." White (2021)

XIII (13)

ΟΥΘΕΝ ΟΦΕΛΟΣ ΗΝ ΤΗΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥΣ ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑΝ ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΑΝΩΘΕΝ ΥΠΟΠΤΩΝ ΚΑΘΕΣΤΩΤΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΥΠΟ ΓΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΠΛΩΣ ΤΩΝ ΕΝ ΤΙ ΑΠΕΙΡΩι.

"It would be no good for a man to secure himself safety as far as men are concerned, while in a state of apprehension as to all the heavenly bodies, and those under the earth, and in short, all those in the infinite." Yonge (1853)

"There would be no advantage in providing security against our fellow-men so long as we were alarmed by occurrences over our heads or beneath the earth, or in general by whatever happens in the infinite void." Hicks (1910)

"There would be no advantage in providing security against our fellow-men, so long as we were alarmed by occurrences over our heads or beneath the earth or in general by whatever happens in the boundless universe." Hicks (1925)

"There is no profit in securing protection in relation to men, if things above and things beneath the earth and indeed all in the boundless universe remain matters of suspicion." Bailey (1926)

"Nothing is gained by building up the feeling of security in our relations with men if the things above our heads and those beneath the earth and in general those in the unseen are matters of suspicion." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 305 (1954)

"It is of no avail to have established security in human relations if things above and in the earth beneath and those in the infinite universe in general are viewed with uncertainty." De Witt, *St. Paul and Epicurus* 188 (1954)

"It is of no avail to prepare security against other men while things above us and beneath the earth and in the whole infinite universe in general are still dreaded." Geer (1964)

"There is no benefit in creating security with respect to men while retaining worries about things up above, things beneath the earth, and generally things in the infinite." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 155 (1987)

"There is no benefit in securing protection from men if things above and beneath the earth and indeed all the limitless universe are made matters for suspicion." O'Connor (1993)

"It is useless to obtain security from men while the things above and below the earth and, generally, the things in the unbounded remained as objects of suspicion." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"One gains nothing by securing protection from other men if he still has apprehensions about things above and beneath the earth and throughout the infinite universe." Anderson (2004)

"There is generally no benefit in procuring safety and protection from other human beings when one lives constantly in frightful conjecture about what is over our heads and those that are under the earth and those that simply are, without qualification, in boundless space." Makridis (2005)

"It is useless to be safe from other people while retaining suspicions about what is above and below the earth and in general about the infinite unknown." Saint-Andre (2008)

"There is no advantage in gaining security with regard to other people if phenomena occurring above and beneath the earth—in a word, everything in the infinite universe—are objects of anxiety." Strodach (2012)

"It would be useless to obtain security against our fellow men while things above and below the earth, and in the unlimited in general, continued to terrify us." Mensch (2018)

"It was useless to establish security on a human level so long as things in the sky or below the earth and in general anything in the limitless [sc. universe] were a source of worry." White (2021)

XIV (14)

ΤΗΣ <u>ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑΣ</u> ΤΗΣ ΕΞ <u>ΑΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ</u> ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΗΣ ΜΕΧΡΙ ΤΙΝΟΣ <u>ΔΥΝΑΜΕΙ</u> ΤΙΝΙ <u>ΕΞΕΡΕΙΣΤΙΚΗ</u>ι ΚΑΙ <u>ΕΥΠΟΡΙΑ</u>ι <u>ΕΙΛΙΚΡΙΝΕΣΤΑΤΗ</u> ΓΙΝΕΤΑΙ Η ΕΚ ΤΗΣ <u>ΗΣΥΧΙΑΣ</u> ΚΑΙ <u>ΕΚΧΩΡΗΣΕΩΣ</u> ΤΩΝ <u>ΠΟΛΛΩΝ</u> <u>ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑ</u>.

"Irresistible power and great wealth may, up to a certain point, give us security as far as men are concerned; but the security of men in general depends upon the tranquillity of their souls, and their freedom from ambition." Yonge (1853)

"When safety on the side of man has been tolerably secured, it is by quiet and by withdrawing from the multitude that the most complete tranquility is to be found." Wallace, *Epicureanism* 163 (1880)

"When tolerable security against our fellow-men is attained, then on a basis of power arises most genuine bliss, to wit, the security of a private life withdrawn from the multitude." Hicks (1910)

"When tolerable security against our fellow-men is attained, then on a basis of power sufficient to afford support and of material prosperity arises in most genuine form the security of a quiet private life withdrawn from the multitude." Hicks (1925)

"The most unalloyed source of protection from men, which is secured to some extent by a certain force of expulsion, is in fact the immunity which results from a quiet life and the retirement from the world." Bailey (1926)

"Although safety from the attacks of men has been secured to a certain degree by dynastic protection and abundance of means, that which comes of the retired life and withdrawal from the multitude is the most unalloyed." De Witt, *Epicurus and His*

Philosophy 189 (1954)

"Even though security from the injuries of men may have been established to a certain degree by dynastic protection, the most unalloyed feeling of security is to be found in the retired life and withdrawal from the multitude." De Witt, *St. Paul and Epicurus* 188 (1954)

"When reasonable security from men has been attained, then the security that comes from peace of mind and withdrawal from the crowd is present, sufficient in strength and most unmixed in well-being." Geer (1964)

"The most perfect means of securing safety from men, which arises, to some extent, from a certain power to expel, is the assurance that comes from quietude and withdrawal from the world." O'Connor (1993)

"The purest security is that which comes from a quiet life and withdrawal from the many, although a certain degree of security from other men does come by means of the power to repel [attacks] and by means of prosperity." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"Supreme power and great wealth may, to some degree, protect us from other men; but security in general depends upon peace of mind and social detachment." Anderson (2004)

"Although safety from human beings may be secured, up to a point, by means of bountiful resources and power that can exempt one from <some risks;> yet, the most genuine safety comes from leading a tranquil private life and keeping aloof from the masses." Makridis (2005)

"Although some measure of safety from other people is based in the power to fight them off and in abundant wealth, the purest security comes from solitude and breaking away from the herd." Saint-Andre (2008)

"The simplest means of procuring protection from other men (which is gained to a certain extent by deterrent force) is the security of quiet solitude and withdrawal from the mass of people." Strodach (2012)

"While some degree of security from other men can be attained on the basis of stable power and material prosperity, the purest security comes from tranquillity and from a life withdrawn from the many." Mensch (2018)

"Although security on a human level is achieved up to a point by a power to resist and by prosperity, the security afforded by inner peace and withdrawing from the crowd is the purest." White (2021)

XV (15)

Ο ΤΗΣ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ ΠΛΟΥΤΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΩΡΙΣΤΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΕΥΠΟΡΙΣΤΟΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ Ο ΔΕ ΤΩΝ ΚΕΝΩΝ ΔΟΞΩΝ ΕΙΣ ΑΠΕΙΡΟΝ ΕΚΠΙΠΤΕΙ.

"The riches of nature are defined and easily procurable; but vain desires are insatiable." Yonge (1853)

"Riches, according to nature, are of limited extent, and can easily be procured; but the wealth craved after by vain fancies knows neither end nor limit." Wallace, *Epicureanism* 146 (188)

"Nature's wealth has its bounds and is easy to procure, but the wealth of vain fancies recedes to an infinite distance." Hicks (1910)

"Nature's wealth at once has its bounds and is easy to procure; but the wealth of vain fancies recedes to an infinite distance." Hicks (1925)

"The wealth demanded by nature is both limited and easily procured; that demanded by idle imaginings stretches on to infinity." Bailey (1926)

"Natural wealth is limited and easily obtained; the wealth defined by vain fancies is always beyond reach." Geer (1964)

"Nature's wealth is limited and easily obtained; the riches of idle fancies go on forever" O'Connor (1993)

"Natural wealth is both limited and easy to acquire. But wealth [as defined by] groundless opinions extends without limit." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"Natural wealth is both limited and easily obtained, but vanity is insatiable." Anderson (2004)

"The bounty of nature is not only easy to extract as a resource; it also has its own limits set <by nature> <so that one cannot run into excess insofar as he is attuned to nature;> but the opulence of hollow fancies plunges precipitously into a space that has no limits." Makridis (2005)

"Natural wealth is both limited and easy to acquire, but the riches incited by groundless opinion have no end." Saint-Andre (2008)

"Nature's wealth is restricted and easily won, while that of empty convention runs on to infinity." Strodach (2012)

"Nature's wealth is both limited and easy to procure; but the wealth of groundless opinions vanishes into thin air." Mensch (2018)

"Nature's wealth is both well-defined and readily obtained; but the wealth founded on empty beliefs is endlessly elusive." White (2021)

XVI (16)

ΒΡΑΧΕΑ ΣΟΦΩι ΤΥΧΗ ΠΑΡΕΜΠΙΠΤΕΙ ΤΑ ΔΕ ΜΕΓΙΣΤΑ ΚΑΙ ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΑ Ο ΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ ΔΙΩιΚΗΚΕ [ΚΑΙ]* ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟΝ ΣΥΝΕΧΗ ΧΡΟΝΟΝ ΤΟΥ ΒΙΟΥ [ΔΙΟΙΚΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΟΙΚΗΣΕΙ]*.

Arrighetti

"The wise man is but little favoured by fortune; but his reason procures him the greatest and most valuable goods, and these he does enjoy, and will enjoy the whole of his life." Yonge (1853)

"Fortune but slightly crosses the wise man's path; his greatest and highest interests are directed by reason throughout the course of life." Hicks (1910)

"Fortune but seldom interferes with the wise man; his greatest and highest interests have been, are, and will be, directed by reason throughout the course of his life." Hicks (1925)

"In but few things chance hinders a wise man, but the greatest and most important matters reason has ordained and throughout the whole period of life does and will ordain." Bailey (1926)

"Fortune plays but little part in the life of a wise man and the things that are of most value and consequence are subject to arrangement by rational planning, and throughout the whole extent of life are subject and will be subject to it." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 177-178 (1954)

"Fortune seldom troubles the wise man. Reason has controlled his greatest and most important affairs, controls them throughout his life, and will continue to control them." Geer (1964)

"In a few instances does chance intrude upon the wise man, but reason has administered his greatest and most important affairs, and will continue to do so throughout his whole life." O'Connor (1993)

"Chance has a small impact on the wise man, while reasoning has arranged for, is arranging for, and will arrange for the greatest and most important matters throughout the whole of his life." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"Chance has little effect upon the wise man, for his greatest and highest interests are directed by reason throughout the course of life." Anderson (2004)

"The wise are rarely infringed by chance; the matters that are most significant and decisive have been, are, and always will be governed by reason throughout the entire span of a wise person's life." Makridis (2005)

"Chance steals only a bit into the life of a wise person: for throughout the complete span of his life the greatest and most important matters have been, are, and will be directed by the power of reason." Saint-Andre (2008)

"Bad luck strikes the sophisticated man in a few cases, but reason has directed the big, essential things, and for the duration of life it is and will be the guide." Strodach (2012)

"Fortune impinges but little on a wise man; reason has directed his greatest and most important pursuits; these it directs and will continue to direct over the course of his life." Mensch (2018)

"Fortune has little impact on the wise; their reasoning has already arranged the greatest and most important matters, and it does so and will continue to do so throughout their lifetime." White (2021)

XVII (17)

Ο ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ ΑΤΑΡΑΚΤΟΤΑΤΟΣ Ο Δ' ΑΔΙΚΟΣ ΠΛΕΙΣΤΗΣ ΤΑΡΑΧΗΣ ΓΗΜΩΝ.

"The just man is the freest of all men from disquietude; but the unjust man is a perpetual prey to it." Yonge (1853)

"The just man enjoys the greatest peace of mind, while the unjust is full of the utmost disquietude." Hicks (1925)

"The just man is most free from trouble, the unjust most full of trouble." Bailey (1926)

"The just man is least disturbed; the unjust man is filled with the greatest turmoil." Geer (1964)

"The just <life> is most free from disturbance, but the unjust life is full of the greatest disturbance." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 125 (1987)

"The just man is the most free of perturbation, while the unjust man is full of the greatest disturbance." O'Connor (1993)

"The just life is most free from disturbance, but the unjust life is full of the greatest disturbance." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"The just man is the freest of anyone from anxiety; but the unjust man is perpetually haunted by it." Anderson (2004)

"The just person is the most imperturbable; but the unjust is filled with ample distress." Makridis (2005)

"One who acts aright is utterly steady and serene, whereas one who goes astray is full of trouble and confusion." Saint-Andre (2008)

"The just man is the least disturbed by passion, the unjust man the most highly disturbed." Strodach (2012)

"The just man is utterly imperturbable, while the unjust is full of the utmost perturbation." Mensch (2018)

"The just one has the very least turmoil, but the unjust one teems with the very most." White (2021)

XVIII (18)

ΟΥΚ ΕΠΑΥΞΕΤΑΙ ΕΝ ΤΗι ΣΑΡΚΙ Η ΗΔΟΝΗ ΕΠΕΙΔΑΝ ΑΠΑΞ ΤΟ ΚΑΤ' ΕΝΔΕΙΑΝ ΑΛΓΟΥΝ ΕΞΑΙΡΕΘΗι ΑΛΛΑ ΜΟΝΟΝ ΠΟΙΚΙΛΛΕΤΑΙ. ΤΗΣ ΔΕ ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑΣ ΤΟ ΠΕΡΑΣ ΤΟ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΗΔΟΝΗΝ ΑΠΕΓΕΝΝΗΣΕΝ Η ΤΕ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΕΚΛΟΓΙΣΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΟΜΟΓΕΝΩΝ ΤΟΥΤΟΙΣ ΟΣΑ ΤΟΥΣ ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΥΣ ΦΟΒΟΥΣ ΠΑΡΕΣΚΕΥΑΖΕ ΤΗι ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑι.

"Pleasure in the flesh is not increased, when once the pain arising from want is removed; it is only diversified. The most perfect happiness of the soul depends on these reflections, and on opinions of a similar character on all those questions which cause the greatest alarm to the mind." Yonge (1853)

"Pleasure in the flesh admits no increase when once the pain of want has been removed; after that it only admits of variation. The limit of pleasure in the mind is obtained by calculating the pleasures themselves and the contrary pains, which cause the mind the greatest alarms." Hicks (1910)

"Pleasure in the flesh admits no increase when once the pain of want has been removed; after that it only admits of variation. The limit of pleasure in the mind, however, is reached when we reflect on the things themselves and their congeners which cause the mind the greatest alarms." Hicks (1925)

"The pleasure in the flesh is not increased when once the pain due to want is removed, but is only varied: and the limit as regards pleasure in the mind is begotten by the reasoned understanding of these very pleasures and of the emotions akin to them, which used to cause the greatest fear to the mind." Bailey (1926)

"When once the pain arising from deficiency has been removed, the pleasure in the flesh admits no further augmentation, but only of variation: and similarly the limit of the pleasure of the mind is reached, when the causes of our principal mental fears have been removed." Wallace, *Epicureanism* 144 (1880)

"The pleasure in the flesh is incapable of increase when once the pain arising from need has been removed but is merely embellished. As for the mind, its limit of pleasure is begotten by reasoning out these very problems and those akin to these, all that once created the worst fears for the mind." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 227-228 (1954)

"When once the pain caused by need has been removed, bodily pleasure will not be increased in amount but only varied in quality. The mind attains its utmost pleasure in reflecting on the very things that used to cause the greatest mental fears and on things like them." Geer (1964)

"The pleasure in the flesh does not increase when once the pain of need has been removed, but it is only varied. And the limit of pleasure in the mind is produced by rationalizing those very things and their congeners which used to present the mind with its greatest fears." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 115 (1987)

"The pleasure in the flesh will not be increased when once the pain resulting from want is taken away, but only varied. The limit of understanding as regards pleasure is obtained by a reflection on these same pleasures and the sensations akin to them, which used to furnish the mind with its greatest fears." O'Connor (1993)

"As soon as the feeling of pain produced by want is removed, pleasure in the flesh will not increase but is only varied. But the limit of mental pleasures is produced by a reasoning out of these very pleasures [of the flesh] and of the things related to these, which used to cause the greatest fears in the intellect." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"When pain arising from need has been removed, bodily pleasure cannot increase – it merely varies. But the limit of mental pleasure is reached after we reflect upon these bodily pleasures and the related mental distress prior to fulfillment." Anderson (2004)

"Bodily pleasure cannot increase anymore once all the pain produced by need has been removed, even if this happened for the first time; <after that point, additional> pleasure can only <accrue from> variation. But the limit of the pleasure produced by mental pursuits is generally attained by means of reflecting on all those things, and on others kindred to the things, which furnish the mind with the greatest frights." Makridis (2005)

"As soon as the pain produced by the lack of something is removed, pleasure in the flesh is not increased but only embellished. Yet the limit of enjoyment in the mind is produced by thinking through these very things and similar things, which once provoked the greatest fears in the mind." Saint-Andre (2008)

"Bodily pleasure is not enlarged once the pains brought on by need have been done away with; it is only diversified. And the limit of mental pleasure is established by rational reflection on pleasures themselves and those kindred emotions that once instilled extreme fear in human minds." Strodach (2012)

"Fleshly pleasure does not increase once the pain of want has been removed; it merely diversifies. But the limit of mental pleasure is reached when one reflects on these very realities, and others of the same kind, which afflict the mind with its worst fears." Mensch (2018)

"Pleasure does not increase in the flesh once any pain caused by need is removed; it only adds variety. As for thought, the very limit of its pleasure is a result of the appraisal of these very things and all the related things that formerly caused our thought the greatest fears." White (2021)

XIX (19)

Ο ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ ΧΡΟΝΟΣ ΙΣΗΝ ΕΧΕΙ ΤΗΝ ΗΔΟΝΗΝ ΚΑΙ Ο ΠΕΠΕΡΑΣΜΕΝΟΣ ΕΑΝ ΤΙΣ ΑΥΤΗΣ ΤΑ ΠΕΡΑΤΑ ΚΑΤΑΜΕΤΡΗΣΗι ΤΩι ΛΟΓΙΣΜΩι.

"Infinite and finite time both have equal pleasure, if any one measures its limits by reason." Yonge (1853)

"Infinite time and finite time hold an equal amount of pleasure, if we measure the limits of that pleasure by reason." Hicks (1910)

"Unlimited time and limited time afford an equal amount of pleasure, if we measure the limits of that pleasure by reason." Hicks (1925)

"Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures by reason the limits of pleasure." Bailey (1926)

"Infinite time and finite time are characterized by equal pleasure, if one measures the limits of pleasure by reason." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 229 (1954)

"Time that is unlimited and time that is limited afford equal pleasure if one measures pleasure's extent by reason." Geer (1964)

"Infinite time and finite time contain equal pleasure, if one measures the limits of pleasure by reasoning." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 150 (1987)

"Infinite time contains the same amount of pleasure as finite time, if one measures the limits of pleasure by reason." O'Connor (1993)

"Unlimited time and limited time contain equal [amounts of] pleasure, if one measures its limits by reasoning." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"Infinite and finite time afford equal pleasure, if one measures its limits by reason." Anderson (2004)

"Time without limit affords the same amount of pleasure as does limited time—if one measures the limits of pleasure precisely and by using reasoned judgment." Makridis (2005)

"Finite time and infinite time contain the same amount of joy, if its limits are measured out through reasoning." Saint-Andre (2008)

"Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than does finite time, if one determines the limits of pleasure rationally." Strodach (2012)

"Limited and unlimited time furnish an equal amount of pleasure if the limits of pleasure are measured by reason." Mensch (2018)

"Endless time and a limited time afford equal pleasure, if you measure out the limits of pleasure by reasoning." White (2021)

XX (20)

Η ΜΕΝ <u>ΣΑΡΞ</u> <u>ΑΠΕΛΑΒΕ</u> ΤΑ <u>ΠΕΡΑΤΑ</u> ΤΗΣ <u>ΗΔΟΝΗΣ</u> <u>ΑΠΕΙΡΑ</u>
ΚΑΙ <u>ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ</u> ΑΥΤΗΝ ΧΡΟΝΟΣ ΑΡΕΣΚΟΙ ΑΝ· Η ΔΕ <u>ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ</u>
ΤΟΥ ΤΗΣ <u>ΣΑΡΚΟΣ</u> <u>ΤΕΛΟΥΣ</u> ΚΑΙ <u>ΠΕΡΑΤΟΣ</u> <u>ΛΑΒΟΥΣΑ</u> ΤΟΝ
<u>ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΝ</u> ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΥΠΕΡ ΤΟΥ <u>ΑΙΩΝΟΣ</u> <u>ΦΟΒΟΥΣ</u>
<u>ΕΚΛΥΣΑΣΑ</u> ΤΟΝ <u>ΠΑΝΤΕΛΗ</u> ΒΙΟΝ <u>ΠΑΡΕΣΚΕΥΑΣΕ</u> ΚΑΙ
<u>ΟΥΘΕΝ</u> ΕΤΙ ΤΟΥ <u>ΑΠΕΙΡΟΥ</u> ΧΡΟΝΟΥ <u>ΠΡΟΣΕΔΕΗΘΗ</u>· <ΟΥ>
ΜΗΝ ΑΛΛ' ΟΥΤΕ <u>ΕΦΥΓΕ</u> ΤΗΝ <u>ΗΔΟΝΗΝ</u> ΟΥΔ <u>ΗΝΙΚΑ</u> ΤΗΝ
<u>ΕΞΑΓΩΓΗΝ</u> ΕΚ ΤΟΥ <u>ΖΗΝ</u> ΤΑ <u>ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ</u> <u>ΠΑΡΕΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΝ</u>
ΩΣ <u>ΕΛΛΕΙΠΟΥΣΑ</u> ΤΙ ΤΟΥ <u>ΑΡΙΣΤΟΥ</u> <u>ΒΙΟΥ</u> <u>ΚΑΤΕΣΤΡΕΨΕΝ</u>.

"The flesh sets no limits to pleasure, and therefore it yearns for an eternity of time. But reason, enabling us to conceive the end and dissolution of the body, and liberating us from the fears relative to eternity, procures for us all the happiness of which life is capable, so completely that we have no further occasion to include eternity in our desires. In this disposition of mind, man is happy even when his troubles engage him to quit life; and to die thus, is for him only to interrupt a life of happiness." Yonge (1853)

"[T]he flesh takes the limits of pleasure to be endless, and an endless time would be needed to provide it; but the mind, having learned the limit and the end of the flesh, and having cast away fears about the distant future, has made for us life perfect and adequate, and we no longer need infinite time. And yet it has not been an exile from pleasure, and when the time comes to depart from life, it closes with no sense of having fallen short of felicity." Wallace, *Epicureanism* 149 (1880)

"The flesh assumes the limits of pleasure to be infinite, and only infinite time would satisfy it. But the mind, grasping in thought what the end and limit of the flesh is, and banishing the terrors of futurity, procures a complete and perfect life and has no longer any need of infinite time. Nevertheless, it does not shun pleasure, and even in the

hour of death, when ushered out of existence by circumstances, the mind does not fail to enjoy the best life." Hicks (1910)

"The flesh receives as unlimited the limits of pleasure; and to provide it requires unlimited time. But the mind, grasping in thought what the end and limit of the flesh is, and banishing the terrors of futurity, procures a complete and perfect life, and has no longer any need of unlimited time. Nevertheless it does not shun pleasure, and even in the hour of death, when ushered out of existence by circumstances, the mind does not lack enjoyment of the best life." Hicks (1925)

"The flesh perceives the limits of pleasure as unlimited and unlimited time is required to supply it. But the mind, having attained a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good of the flesh and its limits and having dissipated the fears concerning the time to come, supplies us with the complete life, and we have no further need of infinite time: but neither does the mind shun pleasure, nor, when circumstances begin to bring about the departure from life, does it approach its end as though it fell short in any way of the best life." Bailey (1926)

"It is the flesh that finds the limits of pleasure boundless and infinite time would have been required to furnish it, but the intelligence, taking into the calculation the end and limit of the flesh and dispelling the fears about eternity, renders the whole life is perfect." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 225 (1954)

"The flesh believes that pleasure is limitless and that it requires unlimited time; but the mind, understanding the end and limit of the flesh and ridding itself of fears of the future, secures a complete life and has no longer any need for unlimited time. It does not, however, avoid pleasure; and when circumstances bring on the end of life, it does not depart as if it still lacked any portion of the good life." Geer (1964)

"The flesh places the limits of pleasure at infinity, and needs an infinite time to bring it about. But the intellect, by making a rational calculation of the end and the limit which

govern the flesh, and by dispelling the fears about eternity, brings about the complete life, so that we no longer need the infinite time. But neither does it shun pleasure, nor even when circumstances bring about our departure from life does it suppose, as it perishes, that it has in any way fallen short of the best life." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 150 (1987)

"The flesh considers the limits of pleasure to be boundless, and only infinite time makes it possible. But the mind, having gained a reasonable understanding of the end and limit of the flesh, and having expelled fears about eternity furnishes the complete life, and we no longer has any need for time without end. But the mind does not flee from pleasure nor, when circumstances bring about the departure from life, does it take its leave as though falling short somehow of the best life." O'Connor (1993)

"The flesh took the limits of pleasure to be unlimited, and [only] an unlimited time would have provided it. But the intellect, reasoning out the goal and limit of the flesh and dissolving the fears of eternity, provided us with the perfect way of life and had no further need of unlimited time. But it [the intellect] did not flee pleasure, and even when circumstances caused an exit from life it did not die as though it were lacking any aspect of the best life." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"Bodily pleasure seems unlimited, and to provide it would require unlimited time. But the mind, recognizing the limits of the body, and dismissing apprehensions about eternity, furnishes a complete and optimal life, so we no longer have any need of unlimited time. Nevertheless, the mind does not shun pleasure; moreover, when the end of life approaches, it does not feel remorse, as if it fell short in any way from living the best life possible." Anderson (2004)

"The body picks out the end points of pleasure as lying beyond any limit, and marks the time needed to procure this <pleasure> as being unlimited. But the mind, grasping the final goal and terminating limits of the body by means of comprehending judgment, and obliterating the dread of an eternal afterlife, makes possible a life that reaches all

goals within itself and has no need whatever of infinite time. But it should not <be thought> that the mind flees from pleasure—not even at that moment when circumstances bring about the extraction from this life—or that it destroys the pleasures as if they were unworthy of the best life." Makridis (2005)

"The flesh assumes that the limits of joy are infinite, and that infinite joy can be produced only through infinite time. But the mind, thinking through the goal and limits of the flesh and dissolving fears about eternity, produces a complete way of life and therefore has no need of infinite time; yet the mind does not flee from joy, nor when events cause it to exit from life does it look back as if it has missed any aspect of the best life." Saint-Andre (2008)

"The body takes the limits of pleasure to be infinite, and infinite time would provide such pleasure. But the mind has provided us with the complete life by a rational examination of the body's goal and limitations and by dispelling our fears about a life after death; and so we no longer need unlimited time. On the other hand, it does not avoid pleasure, nor, when conditions occasion our departure from life, does it come to the end in a manner that would suggest that it had fallen short in any way of the best possible existence." Strodach (2012)

"The flesh receives the limits of pleasure as if they were unlimited; and an unlimited time is required to provide it. But the mind, grasping in thought the end and limit of the flesh, and ridding itself of fears of eternity, fashions a perfect life and no longer requires unlimited time. Yet it does not avoid pleasure; and even when circumstances bring life to an end, it dies having missed nothing of the best life." Mensch (2018)

"The flesh assumed the limits of pleasure were endless, which an endless time provided. But thought, by making an appraisal of the end and limit for the flesh, and by dissolving fears about an afterlife, provided the perfect life, and we no longer have any need for endless time. Yet neither did thought spurn pleasure, nor when the situation provided an exit from life, did it depart in any way deprived of the best life." White (2021)

XXI (21)

Ο ΤΑ <u>ΠΕΡΑΤΑ</u> ΤΟΥ <u>ΒΙΟΥ</u> <u>ΚΑΤΕΙΔΩΣ</u> ΟΙΔΕΝ ΩΣ <u>ΕΥΠΟΡΙΣΤΟΝ</u>
ΕΣΤΙ ΤΟ <ΤΟ> <u>ΑΛΓΟΥΝ</u> ΚΑΤ' ΕΝΔΕΙΑΝ <u>ΕΞΑΙΡΟΥΝ</u> ΚΑΙ ΤΟ
ΤΟΝ <u>ΟΛΟΝ</u> <u>ΒΙΟΝ</u> <u>ΠΑΝΤΕΛΗ</u> <u>ΚΑΘΙΣΤΑΝ</u>· ΩΣΤΕ <u>ΟΥΔΕΝ</u>
<u>ΠΡΟΣΔΕΙΤΑΙ</u> <u>ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΩΝ</u> <u>ΑΓΩΝΑΣ</u> <u>ΚΕΚΤΗΜΕΝΩΝ</u> .

"He who is acquainted with the limits of life knows that that which removes the pain which arises from want and which makes the whole of life perfect, is easily procurable; so that he has no need of those things which can only be attained with trouble." Yonge (1853)

"He who has understood the limits of life, knows how easy to get is all that takes away the pain of want, and all that is required to make our life perfect at every point. In this way he has no need of anything which implies a contest." Wallace, *Epicureanism* 146-147 (1880)

"He who understands the limits of life knows how easy it is to procure enough to remove the pain of want and make the whole of life complete and perfect. Hence he has no longer any need of things which are not to be won save by conflict and struggle." Hicks (1910)

"He who understands the limits of life knows how easy it is to procure enough to remove the pain of want and make the whole of life complete and perfect. Hence he has no longer any need of things which are not to be won save by labour and conflict." Hicks (1925)

"He who has learned the limits of life knows that that which removes the pain due to want and makes the whole of life complete is easy to obtain; so that there is no need of actions which involve competition." Bailey (1926)

"The man who has discerned the limited needs of life is aware how easy of procurement is that which removes the pain arising from want and renders the whole life perfect, so that he feels no need of adding things that involve competition." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 186 (1954)

"The man who discerns the narrow limits of life's needs will understand how easy it is to procure what removes the discomfort arising from want, so that he feels no necessity of engaging in activities that involve competition." De Witt, *St. Paul and Epicurus* 72 (1954)

"The man who understands the limits of living knows that it is easy to obtain that which removes the pain caused by want and that which perfects the whole life. Therefore, he has no need of things that involve struggle." Geer (1964)

"He who knows the limits of life knows how easy it is to obtain that which removes pain caused by want and that which makes the whole of life complete. He therefore has no need for competitive involvements." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 150 (1987)

"He who understands the limits of life knows how easy it is to remove the pain that results from want and to make one's whole life complete. As a result, he does not need actions that bring strife in their wake." O'Connor (1993)

"He who has learned the limits of life knows that it is easy to provide that which removes the feeling of pain owing to want and make one's whole life perfect. So there's no need for things which involve struggle." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"He who understands the limits of life knows that things which remove pain arising from need are easy to obtain, and furnish a complete and optimal life. Thus he no longer needs things that are troublesome to attain." Anderson (2004)

"He who knows well the limits of living also knows that to remove pain caused by need is easy—resources for that are not lacking—so that one's entire life can be rendered complete and replete with all possible purposes. It follows that there is no need whatever of things unless they are won by noble struggle." Makridis (2005)

"One who perceives the limits of life knows how easy it is to expel the pain produced by a lack of something and to make one's entire life complete; so that there is no need for the things that are achieved through struggle." Saint-Andre (2008)

"One who understands the limits o f the good life knows that what eliminates the pains brought on by need and what makes the whole of life perfect is easily obtained, so that there is no need for enterprises that entail the struggle for success." Strodach (2012)

"The man who has discerned the limits of life knows how easy it is to procure what is needed to remove the pain of want and make his whole life perfect; he therefore needs none of the things that cannot be acquired without a struggle." Mensch (2018)

"The one who understands the limits of life knows that what removes pains caused by need and also what makes the whole life entirely complete are easily obtained; so he has no further need for any endeavors involving struggles." White (2021)

XXII (22)

ΤΟ <u>ΥΦΕΣΤΗΚΟΣ</u> ΔΕΙ <u>ΤΕΛΟΣ</u> <u>ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ</u> ΚΑΙ <u>ΠΑΣΑΝ</u>
ΤΗΝ <u>ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑΝ</u> ΕΦ ΗΝ ΤΑ <u>ΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΑ</u> <u>ΑΝΑΓΟΜΕΝ</u>· ΕΙ
ΔΕ ΜΗ <u>ΠΑΝΤΑ</u> <u>ΑΚΡΙΣΙΑΣ</u> ΚΑΙ <u>ΤΑΡΑΧΗΣ</u> ΕΣΤΑΙ <u>ΜΕΣΤΑ</u>.

"But as to the ultimate aim, we ought to consider it with all the clearness and evidence which we refer to whatever we think and believe; otherwise, all things will be full of confusion and uncertainty of judgment." Yonge (1853)

"We must take into account as the end all that really exists and all clear evidence of sense to which we refer our opinions; for otherwise everything will be full of uncertainty and confusion." Hicks (1910)

"We must take into account as the end all that really exists and all clear evidence of sense to which we refer our opinions; for otherwise everything will be full of uncertainty and confusion." Hicks (1925)

"We must consider both the real purpose and all the evidence of direct perception, to which we always refer the conclusions of opinion; otherwise, all will be full of doubt and confusion." Bailey (1926)

"We must take into our reckoning the established telos of all manifest evidence, to which we refer our judgments; otherwise all life will be filled with indecision and unrest." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 152 (1954)

"It is necessary to take into account the real purpose of knowledge and all the evidence of that clear perception to which we refer our opinions. If we do not, all will be full of bad judgment and confusion." Geer (1964)

"We must take into account both the underlying purpose and all the evidence of clear perception, to which we refer our opinions. Otherwise, everything will be filled with confusion and indecision." O'Connor (1993)

"One must reason about the real goal and every clear fact, to which we refer mere opinions. If not, everything will be full of indecision and disturbance." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"We must consider the ultimate goal to be real, and reconcile our opinions with sensory experience; otherwise, life will be full of confusion and disturbance." Anderson (2004)

"When all is said and done, we need to take into account what kinds of things exist in the universe and every vivid and clear sense perception, to which we must refer opinions; if we fail to do so, everything will be full of gullibility and confusion." Makridis (2005)

"You must reflect on the fundamental goal and everything that is clear, to which opinions are referred; if you do not, all will be full of trouble and confusion." Saint-Andre (2008)

"It is necessary to take into account both the actual goal of life and the whole body of clear and distinct precepts to which we refer our judgments. If we fail to do this, everything will be in disorder and confusion." Strodach (2012)

"We must reason about the true goal and about all the evidence to which we refer our opinions; for otherwise everything will be full of confusion and disorder." Mensch (2018)

"We must appraise the established end, and all the manifest evidence to which we refer all we believe; otherwise, everything will be full of indecision and turmoil." White (2021)

XXIII (23)

EI ΜΑΧΗι ΠΑΣΑΙΣ ΤΑΙΣ ΑΙΣΘΗΣΕΣΙΝ ΟΥΧ ΕΞΕΙΣ ΟΥΔ ΑΣ ΑΝ ΦΗιΣ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΔΙΕΨΕΥΣΘΑΙ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΙ ΠΟΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ ΤΗΝ ΑΓΩΓΗΝ ΚΡΙΝΗιΣ.

"If you resist all the senses, you will not even have anything left to which you can refer, or by which you may be able to judge of the falsehood of the senses which you condemn." Yonge (1853)

"If you fight against all your sensations you will have no standard to which to refer, and thus no means of judging even those sensations which you pronounce false." Hicks (1910)

"If you fight against all your sensations, you will have no standard to which to refer, and thus no means of judging even those judgements which you pronounce false." Hicks (1925)

"If you fight against all sensations, you will have no standard by which to judge even those of them which you say are false." Bailey (1926)

"If you are going to make war on all the sensations, you will not even have a standard by reference to which you shall judge those of them which you say are deceptive." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 140-141 (1954)

"If you struggle against all your sensations, you will have no standard of comparison by which to measure even the sensations you judge false." Geer (1964)

"If you fight against all sensations, you will not have a standard against which to judge even those of them you say are mistaken." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 80 (1987)

"If you do battle with all your sensations, you will be unable to form a standard for judging even which of them you judge to be false." O'Connor (1993)

"If you quarrel with all your sense-perceptions you will have nothing to refer to in judging even those sense-perceptions which you claim are false." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"If you argue against all your sensations, you will then have no criterion to declare any of them false." Anderson (2004)

"If you wage battle against all the sensations, <not only will you lose those you are directly fighting against but, also> you won't even have those sensations left, by reference to which alone you could claim to have won your case." Makridis (2005)

"If you fight against all your perceptions, you will have nothing to refer to in judging those which you declare to be false." Saint-Andre (2008)

"If you reject all sensations, you will not have any point of reference by which to judge even the ones you claim are false." Strodach (2012)

"If you fight against all your sensations, you will not have a standard by which to judge the ones that you claim are false." Mensch (2018)

"If you battle against all sense-perceptions, you will not have any basis for assessing even those you claim are false." White (2021)

XXIV (24)

EI TIN ΕΚΒΑΛΕΙΣ ΑΠΛΩΣ ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΝ ΚΑΙ ΜΗ ΔΙΑΙΡΗΣΕΙΣ ΤΟ
ΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΠΑΡΟΝ ΗΔΗ
ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΑ ΠΑΘΗ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΣΑΝ
ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΗΝ ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗΝ ΤΗΣ ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑΣ ΣΥΝΤΑΡΑΞΕΙΣ
ΚΑΙ ΤΑΣ ΛΟΙΠΑΣ ΑΙΣΘΗΣΕΙΣ ΤΗι ΜΑΤΑΙΩι ΔΟΞΗι ΩΣΤΕ ΤΟ
ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ ΑΠΑΝ ΕΚΒΑΛΕΙΣ· ΕΙ ΔΕ ΒΕΒΑΙΩΣΕΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ
ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΟΝ ΑΠΑΝ ΕΝ ΤΑΙΣ ΔΟΞΑΣΤΙΚΑΙΣ ΕΝΝΟΙΑΙΣ ΚΑΙ
ΤΟ ΜΗ ΤΗΝ ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΝ ΟΥΚ ΕΚΛΕΙΨΕΙΣ ΤΟ
ΔΙΕΨΕΥΣΜΕΝΟΝ ΩΣΤ ΑΝΗιΡΗΚΩΣ ΕΣΗι ΠΑΣΑΝ
ΑΜΦΙΣΒΗΤΗΣΙΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΣΑΝ ΚΡΙΣΙΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΡΘΩΣ Η ΜΗ
ΟΡΘΩΣ.

"If you simply discard a sense, and do not distinguish between the different elements of the judgment, so as to know on the one hand, the opinion which goes beyond the actual sensation, or, on the other, the actual and immediate notion, the affections, and all the conceptions of the mind which arise from the observable representation; you will be imputing trouble into the other senses, and destroying in that quarter every species of criterion. But if you allow equal authority to the ideas, which being only an opinion, require to be verified, and to those which bear about them an immediate certainty, you will not escape error; for you will be confounding doubtful opinions with those which are not doubtful, and true judgments with those of a different character." Yonge (1853)

"If you reject absolutely any single sensation without stopping to discriminate between that which is matter of opinion and awaits further confirmation and that which is already present, whether in sensation or in feeling or in any mental apprehension, you will throw into confusion even the rest of your sensations by your groundless belief, so as to reject the truth altogether. If you hastily affirm as true all that awaits confirmation in ideas based on opinion, as well as that which does not, you will not escape error, as

you will be taking sides in every question involving truth and error." Hicks (1910)

"If you reject absolutely any single sensation without stopping to discriminate with respect to that which awaits confirmation between matter of opinion and that which is already present, whether in sensation or in feelings or in any presentative perception of the mind, you will throw into confusion even the rest of your sensations by your groundless belief and so you will be rejecting the standard of truth altogether. If in your ideas based upon opinion you hastily affirm as true all that awaits confirmation as well as that which does not, you will not escape error, as you will be maintaining complete ambiguity whenever it is a case of judging between right and wrong opinion." Hicks (1925)

"If you reject any single sensation and fail to distinguish between the conclusion of opinion as to the appearance awaiting confirmation and that which is actually given by the sensation or feeling, or each intuitive apprehension of the mind, you will confound all other sensations as well with the same groundless opinion, so that you will reject every standard of judgments. And if among the mental images created by your opinions you affirm both that which awaits confirmation and that which does not, you will not escape error, since you will have preserved the whole cause of doubt in every judgment between what is right and what is wrong." Bailey (1926)

"If you reject any sensations, and if you fail to distinguish between conjecture based upon that which awaits confirmation and evidence given by the senses, by the feelings, and by the mental examinations of confirmed concepts, you will confuse the other sensations with unfounded conjecture and thus destroy the whole basis for judgment. If among all opinions you accept as equally valid both those that await confirmation and those that have been confirmed, you will not free yourself from error, since you will have preserved all the uncertainty about every judgment of what is true and what is not true." Geer (1964)

"(1) If you are going to reject any sensation absolutely, and not distinguish opinions reliant on evidence yet awaited from what is already present through sensation, through feelings, and through every focusing of thought into an impression, you will confound all your other sensations with empty opinion and consequently reject the criterion in its entirety. (2) And if you are going to treat as established both all the evidence yet awaited in your conjectural conceptions, and that which has failed to <earn> attestation, you will not exclude falsehood, so that you will have removed all debate and all discrimination between correct and incorrect." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers 87* (1987)

"If you reject any sensation that you do not distinguish between the opinion based on what awaits confirmation and evidence already available based on the senses, the feelings, and every intuitive faculty of the mind, you will send the remaining sensations into a turmoil with your foolish opinions, thus driving out every standard for judging. And if, among the perceptions based on opinion, you affirm both that which awaits confirmation and that which does not, you will fail to escape from error, since you will have retained every ground for dispute in judgment concerning right and wrong." O'Connor (1993)

"If you reject unqualifiedly any sense-perception and do not distinguish the opinion about what awaits confirmation, and what is already present in the sense-perception, and the feelings, and every application of the intellect to presentations, you will also disturb the rest of your sense-perceptions with your pointless opinion; as a result you will reject every criterion. If, on the other hand, in your conceptions formed by opinion, you affirm everything that awaits confirmation as well as what does not, you will not avoid falsehood, so that you will be in the position of maintaining every disputable point in every decision about what is and is not correct." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"If you arbitrarily reject any one sensory experience and fail to differentiate between an opinion awaiting confirmation and what is already perceived by the senses, feelings, and every intuitive faculty of mind, you will impute trouble to all other sensory

experiences, thereby rejecting every criterion. And if you concurrently affirm what awaits confirmation as well as actual sensory experience, you will still blunder, because you will foster equal reasons to doubt the truth and falsehood of everything." Anderson (2004)

"If you expel each and every sensation without qualification, and fail to draw <fitting> distinctions applying to what is opined <about sensations> as between what is present already and what is anticipated; or if you fail to draw distinctions applying to what is opined <about sensations> as to whether such opinions are according to sense perception, the passions, or some other imaginary twist of mind: you will, then, confound also the rest of your sensations <in addition to the ones you are trying to expel directly> because of this ineffective way of judging, so that you will also have expelled all criteria for judging what is true and what is false." Makridis (2005)

"If you reject a perception outright and do not distinguish between your opinion about what will happen after, what came before, your feelings, and all the layers of imagination involved in your thoughts, then you will throw your other perceptions into confusion because of your trifling opinions; as a result, you will reject the very criterion of truth. And if when forming concepts from your opinions you treat as confirmed everything that will happen and what you do not witness thereafter, then you will not avoid what is false, so that you will remove all argument and all judgment about what is and is not correct." Saint-Andre (2008)

"If you summarily rule out any single sensation and do not make a distinction between the element of belief that is superimposed on a percept that awaits verification and what is actually present in sensation or in the feelings or some percept of the mind itself, you will cast doubt on all other sensations by your unfounded interpretation and consequently abandon all the criteria of truth. On the other hand, in cases of interpreted data, if you accept as true those that need verification as well as those that do not, you will still be in error, since the whole question at issue in every judgment of what is true or not true will be left intact." Strodach (2012)

"If you reject any sensation absolutely, and do not distinguish between an opinion that awaits confirmation and a present reality (whether of sensation, feeling, or perception), you will also throw your other sensations into confusion with your groundless belief, and in doing so will be rejecting altogether the criterion. But if, when assessing opinions, you affirm as true everything that awaits confirmation as well as that which does not, <. . .> you will not escape error; for you will be preserving complete uncertainty in every judgment between right and wrong opinion." Mensch (2018)

"If you're going to reject any particular sense-perception outright and not distinguish beliefs about anything deferred from what is already present in sense-perception or feelings or any presentational application of thought, then you're going to throw the rest of your sense-perceptions into turmoil too by this pointless belief, an you'll end up rejecting every standard. On the other hand, if you're going to affirm not only whatever is deferred in your concepts and beliefs but also what <has> no attestation, then you will not evade falsehood, and you will find yourself upholding every challenge on every decision about what is correct or incorrect." White (2021)

XXV (25)

ΕΙ ΜΗ ΠΑΡΑ <u>ΠΑΝΤΑ</u> <u>ΚΑΙΡΟΝ</u> <u>ΕΠΑΝΟΙΣΕΙΣ</u> <u>ΕΚΑΣΤΟΝ</u> ΤΩΝ <u>ΠΡΑΤΤΟΜΕΝΩΝ</u> ΕΠΙ ΤΟ <u>ΤΕΛΟΣ</u> ΤΗΣ <u>ΦΥΣΕΩΣ</u> ΑΛΛΑ <u>ΠΡΟΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΕΨΕΙΣ</u> ΕΙΤΕ <u>ΦΥΓΗΝ</u> ΕΙ ΤΕ <u>ΔΙΩΞΙΝ</u> <u>ΠΟΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ</u> ΕΙΣ ΑΛΛΟ ΤΙ ΟΥΚ ΕΣΟΝΤΑΙ ΣΟΙ ΤΟΙΣ <u>ΛΟΓΟΙΣ</u> ΑΙ <u>ΠΡΑΞΕΙΣ</u> <u>ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΟΙ</u>.

"If, on every occasion, we do not refer every one of our actions to the chief end of nature, if we turn aside from that to seek or avoid some other object, there will be a want of agreement between our words and our actions." Yonge (1853)

"If you do not on every separate occasion refer each of your actions to the chief end of nature, but if instead of this in the act of choice or avoidance you swerve aside to some other end, your acts will not be consistent with your theories." Hicks (1910)

"If you do not on every separate occasion refer each of your actions to the end prescribed by nature, but instead of this in the act of choice or avoidance swerve aside to some other end, your acts will not be consistent with your theories." Hicks (1925)

"If on each occasion instead of referring your actions to the end of nature, you turn to some other nearer standard when you are making a choice or an avoidance, your actions will not be consistent with your principles." Bailey (1926)

"If you do not at all times refer each of your actions to the natural end, but fall short of this and turn aside to something else in choosing and avoiding, your deeds will not agree with your words." Geer (1964)

"If you fail to refer each of your actions on every occasion to nature's end, and stop short at something else in choosing or avoiding, your actions will not be consequential upon your theories." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 116 (1987)

"If you do not on every occasion refer each of your actions to the end ordained by nature, but instead stop short at something else when considering whether to go after something or avoid it, your actions will not be in keeping with the principles you profess." O'Connor (1993)

"If you do not, on every occasion, refer each of your actions to the goal of nature, but instead turn prematurely to some other [criterion] in avoiding or pursuing [things], your actions will not be consistent with your reasoning." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"If you do not reconcile your behavior with the goal of nature, but instead use some other criterion in matters of choice and avoidance, then there will be a conflict between theory and practice." Anderson (2004)

 "If you don't judge every one of your actions by reference to the end and goal dictated by nature, in accordance also with the proper natural timing for each action, but, instead, second guessing <nature,> you veer off ahead of time attempting either to pursue or to flee <goals,> then your acts will not be turning out to be consistent with your rationalizations." Makridis (2005)

"If at all critical times you do not connect each of your actions to the natural goal of life, but instead turn too soon to some other kind of goal in thinking whether to avoid or pursue something, then your thoughts and your actions will not be in harmony." Saint-Andre (2008)

"If at any time you fail to refer each of your acts to nature's standard, and turn off instead in some other direction when making a choice to avoid or pursue, your actions will not be consistent with your creed." Strodach (2012)

"If on every occasion you do not refer each of your actions to the goal of nature, but instead divert your attention in the act of choice or avoidance toward something else, your actions will not accord with your theories." Mensch (2018)

"If you're not on every occasion referring each thing you do back to our nature's end, and if you're instead of proceeding directly to something else when you make a decision to avoid or pursue something, then your actions will not be consistent with your reasons." White (2021)

XXVI (26)

ΤΩΝ <u>ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ</u> ΟΣΑΙ ΜΗ ΕΠ <u>ΑΛΓΟΥΝ</u> <u>ΕΠΑΝΑΓΟΥΣΙΝ</u> ΕΑΝ
ΜΗ <u>ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΩΣΙΝ</u> ΟΥΚ ΕΙΣΙΝ <u>ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΑΙ</u> ΑΛΛ'
<u>ΕΥΔΙΑΧΥΤΟΝ</u> ΤΗΝ ΟΡΕΞΙΝ ΕΧΟΥΣΙΝ ΟΤΑΝ <u>ΔΥΣΠΟΡΙΣΤΩΝ</u>
<ℎ> Η <u>ΒΛΑΒΗΣ</u> <u>ΑΠΕΡΓΑΣΤΙΚΑΙ</u> <u>ΔΟΞΩΣΙΝ</u> ΕΙΝΑΙ.

"All desires that lead to no pain when they remain ungratified are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of, when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm." Yonge (1853)

"Some desires lead to no pain when they remain ungratified. All such desires are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm." Hicks (1910)

"All such desires as lead to no pain when they remain ungratified are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of, when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm." Hicks (1925)

"Of desires, all that do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary, but involve a craving which is easily dispelled, when the object is hard to procure or they seem likely to produce harm." Bailey (1926)

"Those desires that do not bring pain if they are not satisfied are not necessary; and they are easily thrust aside whenever to satisfy them appears difficult or likely to cause injury." Geer (1964)

"Those desires that do not lead to pain, if they are not fulfilled, are not necessary. They involve a longing that is easily dispelled, whenever it is difficult to fulfill the desires or they appear likely to lead to harm." O'Connor (1993)

"The desires which do not bring a feeling of pain when not fulfilled are not necessary; but the desire for them is easy to dispel when they seem to be hard to achieve or to produce harm." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"All desires which create no pain when unfulfilled are not necessary; such desires may easily be dispelled when they are seen as difficult to fulfill or likely to produce harm." Anderson (2004)

"Of desires, those which do not bring one to pain if they remain unfulfilled are not necessary; such desires are actually accompanied by appetites that are easily defused: indeed, <this is evidently what happens> when it is thought difficult to find the means to satisfy <unnecessary desires> or when the desires themselves are thought to be productive of harm." Makridis (2005)

"The desires that do not bring pain when they go unfulfilled are not necessary; indeed they are easy to reject if they are hard to achieve or if they seem to produce harm." Saint-Andre (2008)

"All desires that do not lead to physical pain if not satisfied are unnecessary, and involve cravings that are easily resolved when they appear to entail harm or when the object of desire is hard to get." Strodach (2012)

"All desires that do not lead to pain when unfulfilled are unnecessary, and such cravings are easily dissolved when the desired objects are hard to procure or are thought to do harm." Mensch (2018)

"Any desires that do not lead to bodily pain if they are not fulfilled are not necessary; rather, the motivation they supply is readily dispelled whenever we believe they are difficult to satisfy or liable to result in harm." White (2021)

XXVII (27)

ΩΝ Η <u>ΣΟΦΙΑ</u> <u>ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΤΑΙ</u> ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΛΟΥ <u>ΒΙΟΥ</u> <u>ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΤΗΤΑ</u> ΠΟΛΥ <u>ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΝ</u> ΕΣΤΙΝ Η ΤΗΣ <u>ΦΙΛΙΑΣ</u> <u>ΚΤΗΣΙΣ.</u>

"Of all the things which wisdom provides for the happiness of the whole life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship." Yonge (1853)

"Of all the things which wisdom procures for the happiness of life as a whole, by far the greatest is the acquisition of friendship." Wallace, *Epicureanism* 164 (1880)

"Of all the means which are procured by wisdom to ensure happiness throughout the whole of life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friends." Hicks (1925)

"Of all the things which wisdom acquires to produce the blessedness of the complete life, far the greatest is the possession of friendship." Bailey (1926)

"Of all the preparations that wisdom makes for the blessedness of the perfect life by far the most precious is the acquisition of friendship." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 190 (1954)

"Of all the preparations which wisdom makes for the blessedness of the complete life by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 308 (1954)

"Of all the preparations that wisdom makes for the blessedness of the perfect life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship." De Witt, *St. Paul and Epicurus,* 188 (1954)

"Of the things that wisdom prepares for insuring lifelong happiness, by far the greatest is the possession of friends." Geer (1964)

"Of the things wisdom acquires for the blessedness of life as a whole, far the greatest is the possession of friendship." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 126 (1987)

"Of all the things which wisdom provides for living one's entire life in happiness, the greatest by far is the possession of friendship." O'Connor (1993)

"Of the things which wisdom provides for the blessedness of one's whole life, by far the greatest is the possession of friendship." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"Of all things that wisdom provides for living one's entire life in happiness, the greatest by far is the possession of friendship." Anderson (2004)

"Of all those things by means of which wisdom can procure blessed bliss to last for an entire life, by far the greatest is the acquisition of friends." Makridis (2005)

"Of all the things that wisdom provides for the complete happiness of one's entire life, by far the greatest is friendship." Saint-Andre (2008)

"Of all the things that wisdom provides for the happiness of the whole man, by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship." Strodach (2012)

"Of the things wisdom contributes to happiness over the course of one's life, the greatest by far is friendship." Mensch (2018)

"Of all that wisdom provides for a whole life of bliss, by far the greatest is the possession of friendship." White (2021)

XXVIII (28)

Η ΑΥΤΗ <u>ΓΝΩΜΗ</u> <u>ΘΑΡΡΕΙΝ</u> ΤΕ <u>ΕΠΟΙΗΣΕΝ</u> <u>ΥΠΕΡ ΤΟΥ</u> <u>ΜΗΘΕΝ</u> <u>ΑΙΩΝΙΟΝ</u> ΕΙΝΑΙ <u>ΔΕΙΝΟΝ</u> <u>ΜΗΔΕ ΠΟΛΥΧΡΟΝΙΟΝ</u> ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΕΝ ΑΥΤΟΙΣ ΤΟΙΣ <u>ΩΡΙΣΜΕΝΟΙΣ</u> <u>ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑΝ</u> <u>ΦΙΛΙΑΣ</u> <u>ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ</u> <u>ΚΑΤΕΙΔΕ</u> <u>ΣΥΝΤΕΛΟΥΜΕΝΗΝ</u>.

"The same opinion encourages man to trust that no evil will be everlasting, or even of long duration; as it sees that, in the space of life allotted to us, the protection of friendship is most sure and trustworthy." Yonge (1853)

"The same conviction, which inspires confidence that nothing we have to fear is eternal or even of long duration, also enables us to see that even in our limited life nothing enhances our security so much as friendship." Hicks (1910)

"The same conviction which inspires confidence that nothing we have to fear is eternal or even of long duration, also enables us to see that even in our limited conditions of life nothing enhances our security so much as friendship." Hicks (1925)

"The same conviction which has given us confidence that there is nothing terrible that lasts for ever or even for long, has also seen the protection of friendship most fully completed in the limited evils of this life." Bailey (1926)

"The same argument that assures us of nothing terrible lasting forever or even very long discerns the protection furnished by friendship in this brief life of ours as being the most dependable of all." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 293-294 (1954)

"The same conviction that makes us feel confident of nothing terrible being either eternal or even of long duration discerns the assurance of safety within the narrow limits of this life itself as being most perfectly effected by friendship." De Witt, St. Paul

and Epicurus 188 (1954)

"The same wisdom that permits us to be confident that no evil is eternal or even of long duration also recognizes that in our limited state the security that can be most perfectly gained is that of friendship." Geer (1964)

"Confidence that nothing terrible lasts for ever or even for a long time is produced by the same judgement that also achieves the insight that friendship's security within those very limitations is perfectly complete." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 126 (1987)

"The same knowledge that makes one confident that nothing dreadful is eternal or long-lasting, also recognizes in the face of these limited evils the security afforded by friendship." O'Connor (1993)

"The same understanding produces confidence about there being nothing terrible which is eternal or [even] long-lasting and has also realized that security amid even these limited [bad things] is most easily achieved through friendship." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"The same conviction which inspires confidence that nothing terrible lasts forever, or even for long, also enables us to see that in the midst of life's limited evils, nothing enhances our security so much as friendship." Anderson (2004)

"The same (judgment) which enables us to wax confident in contemplating that no dreadful thing is eternal, or even of long duration, also knows well that, in these our constrained circumstances, security depends on having friends more than on anything else." Makridis (2005)

"The same judgment produces confidence that dreadful things are not everlasting, and that security amidst the limited number of dreadful things is most easily achieved through friendship." Saint-Andre (2008)

"It is the same judgment that has made us feel confident that nothing fearful is of long duration or everlasting, and that has seen personal security during our limited span of life most nearly perfected by friendship." Strodach (2012)

"The same attitude that inspires confidence that nothing we dread is eternal or even long-lasting also enables us to see that even in our limited conditions of life nothing affords us greater security than friendship." Mensch (2018)

"The same insight that made us confident that nothing terrible is either everlasting or long-lasting also noticed security within these boundaries resulting especially in friendship." White (2021)

XXIX (29)

ΤΩΝ ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ ΑΙ ΜΕΝ ΕΙΣΙ ΦΥΣΙΚΑΙ <ΚΑΙ ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΑΙ· ΑΙ
ΔΕ ΦΥΣΙΚΑΙ> ΚΑΙ ΟΥΚ ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΑΙ ΑΙ ΔΕ ΟΥΤΕ ΦΥΣΙΚΑΙ
ΟΥΤΕ ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΑΙ ΑΛΛΑ ΠΑΡΑ ΚΕΝΗΝ ΔΟΞΑΝ ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΑΙ.

"Of the desires, some are natural and necessary, some natural, but not necessary, and some are neither natural nor necessary, but owe their existence to vain opinions." Yonge (1853)

"Of our desires, some are natural and necessary; others are natural, but not necessary; others, again, are neither natural nor necessary, but are due to groundless opinion." Hicks (1910)

"Of our desires some are natural and necessary; others are natural, but not necessary; others, again, are neither natural nor necessary, but are due to illusory opinion." Hicks (1925)

"Among desires some are natural (and necessary, some natural) but not necessary, and others neither natural nor necessary, but due to idle imagination. " Bailey (1926)

"Of the desires some are natural and necessary; some are natural but not necessary; and others are neither natural nor necessary." De Witt, *St. Paul and Epicurus* 18 (1954)

"Of the desires, some are natural (and necessary; some are natural) but not necessary; and others are neither natural nor necessary but arise from empty opinion." Geer (1964)

"Of the desires some are natural and necessary while others are natural but unnecessary. And there are desires that are neither natural nor necessary but arise from idle opinion." O'Connor (1993)

"Of desires, some are natural and necessary, some natural and not necessary, and some neither natural nor necessary but occurring as a result of a groundless opinion." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"Among desires some are natural and necessary, some natural but not necessary, and others neither natural nor necessary, but due to baseless opinion." Anderson (2004)

"Of desires, some are natural and (necessary; some are natural and) not necessary; some are neither natural nor necessary and are only created by empty belief." Makridis (2005)

"Among desires, some are natural and necessary, some are natural and unnecessary, and some are unnatural and unnecessary (arising instead from groundless opinion)." Saint-Andre (2008)

"Some desires are (1) natural and necessary, others (2) natural but not necessary, still others (3) neither natural nor necessary but generated by senseless whims." Strodach (2012)

"Some of our desires are natural and necessary; others are natural but unnecessary; still others are neither natural nor necessary, but arise from unwarranted opinion." Mensch (2018)

"Some desires are natural and <necessary, some natural and> unnecessary, and some neither natural or necessary, arising instead from empty belief." White (2021)

XXX (30)

ΕΝ ΑΙΣ ΤΩΝ <u>ΦΥΣΙΚΩΝ</u> <u>ΕΠΙΘΜΙΩΝ</u> ΜΗ ΕΠ <u>ΑΛΓΟΥΝ</u> ΔΕ
<u>ΕΠΑΝΑΓΟΥΣΩΝ</u> ΕΑΝ ΜΗ <u>ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΣΘΩΣΙΝ</u> ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙ Η
<u>ΣΠΟΥΔΗ</u> <u>ΣΥΝΤΟΝΟΣ</u> ΠΑΡΑ <u>ΚΕΝΗΝ</u> <u>ΔΟΞΑΝ</u> ΑΥΤΑΙ
<u>ΓΙΝΟΝΤΑΙ</u> ΚΑΙ ΟΥ ΠΑΡΑ ΤΗΝ ΕΑΥΤΩΝ <u>ΦΥΣΙΝ</u> ΟΥ
<u>ΔΙΑΧΕΟΝΤΑΙ</u> ΑΛΛΑ ΠΑΡΑ ΤΗΝ ΤΟΥ <u>ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥ</u>
<u>ΚΕΝΟΔΟΞΙΑΝ</u>.

"When those natural desires, which do not lead to pain if they are not satisfied, are violent and insistent, it is a proof that there is an admixture of vain opinion in them; for then energy does not arise from their own nature, but from the vain opinions of men." Yonge (1853)

"Some natural desires, again, entail no pain when not gratified, though the objects are vehemently pursued. These desires also are due to groundless opinion, and when they are not got rid of, it is not because of their own nature, but because of the man's groundless opinion." Hicks (1910)

"Those natural desires which entail no pain when not gratified, though their objects are vehemently pursued, are also due to illusory opinion; and when they are not got rid of, it is not because of their own nature, but because of the man's illusory opinion." Hicks (1925)

"Wherever in the case of desires which are physical, but do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not fulfilled, the effort is intense, such pleasures are due to idle imagination, and it is not owing to their own nature that they fail to be dispelled, but owing to the empty imaginings of the man." Bailey (1926)

"Among the bodily desires, those rest on empty opinion that are eagerly pursued although if unsatisfied they bring no pain. That they are not got rid of is because of man's empty opinion, not because of their own nature." Geer (1964)

"Whenever intense passion is present in natural desires which do not lead to pain if they are unfulfilled, these have their origin in empty opinion; and the reason for their persistence is not their own nature but the empty opinion of the person." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 115 (1987)

"If there is intense striving after those physical desires that do not lead to pain if unfulfilled, this is because they arise from idle opinion; they fail to be dispelled, not because of their own nature but because of the vain fancies of humankind." O'Connor (1993)

"Among natural desires, those which do not lead to a feeling of pain if not fulfilled and about which there is an intense effort, these are produced by a groundless opinion and they fail to be dissolved not because of their own nature but because of the groundless opinions of mankind." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"Those natural desires which create no pain when unfulfilled, though pursued with an intense effort, are also due to baseless opinion; and if they are not dispelled, it is not because of their own nature, but because of human vanity." Anderson (2004)

"Certain natural desires, which do not reduce one to pain if they are not satisfied, have, nevertheless, a commensurate inherent need for satisfaction. Such desires are born, indeed, of empty belief: the reason they are not defused is not to be traced to their intrinsic nature but to the person's vacuity." Makridis (2005)

"Among natural desires, those that do not bring pain when unfulfilled and that require intense exertion arise from groundless opinion; and such desires fail to be stamped out not by nature but because of the groundless opinions of humankind." Saint-Andre

(2008)

"If interest is intense in the case of those natural desires that do not lead to physical pain when they are not satisfied, then such desires are generated by idle fancy, and it is not because of their own nature that they are not dissipated but because of the person's own senseless whims." Strodach (2012)

"Natural desires that afford no pain if they are not indulged, though they are eagerly pursued, arise from groundless opinion; and when they are not dispelled it is not because of their own nature but because of the man's groundless opinion." Mensch (2018)

"Among natural desires that do not lead to bodily pain if they are not fulfilled, those that possess sustained intensity arise from empty belief, and their persistence is due not to their own nature but rather to the person's empty belief." White (2021)

XXXI (31)

TO THΣ <u>ΦΥΣΕΩΣ</u> <u>ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ</u> ΕΣΤΙ <u>ΣΥΜΒΟΛΟΝ</u> ΤΟΥ <u>ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝΤΟΣ</u> ΕΙΣ ΤΟ ΜΗ <u>ΒΛΑΠΤΕΙΝ</u> <u>ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ</u> <u>ΜΗΔΕ</u> <u>ΒΛΑΠΤΕΣΘΑΙ</u>.

"Natural justice is a covenant of what is suitable for leading men to avoid injuring on another, and being injured." Yonge (1853)

"Natural justice is a contract of expedience, so as to prevent on man doing harm to another." Wallace, *Epicureanism* 162 (1880)

"Natural justice is a contract of expediency, to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another." Hicks (1910)

"Natural justice is a symbol or expression of expediency, to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another." Hicks (1925)

"The justice which arises from nature is a pledge of mutual advantage to restrain men from harming one another and save them from being harmed." Bailey (1926)

"The justice of Nature is a covenant of advantage to the end that men shall not injure one another nor be injured." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 147 (1954)

"Natural justice is a compact resulting from expediency by which men seek to prevent one man from injuring others and to protect him from being injured by them." Geer (1964)

"Nature's justice is a guarantee of utility with a view to not harming one another and not being harmed." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 125 (1987)

"Natural justice is a pledge guaranteeing mutual advantage, to prevent one from harming others and to keep oneself from being harmed." O'Connor (1993)

"The justice of nature is a pledge of reciprocal usefulness, [i.e.,] neither to harm one another nor be harmed." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"Natural justice is the advantage conferred by mutual agreements not to inflict nor allow harm." Anderson (2004)

"Natural justice is an expression of the <natural> interest <everyone has> and consists in both: a) not causing harm to others, and b) not suffering harm for oneself." Makridis (2005)

"Natural justice is a covenant for mutual benefit, to not harm one another or be harmed." Saint-Andre (2008)

"The justice that seeks nature's goal is a utilitarian pledge of men not to harm each other or be harmed." Strodach (2012)

"Natural justice is a pledge of the advantage associated with preventing men from harming or being harmed by one another." Mensch (2018)

"Nature's justice is a token [or pledge] of something that promotes not harming one another or being harmed." White (2021)

XXXII (32)

ΟΣΑ ΤΩΝ <u>ΖΩιΩΝ</u> ΜΗ <u>ΕΔΥΝΑΤΟ</u> <u>ΣΥΝΘΗΚΑΣ</u> <u>ΠΟΙΕΙΣΘΑΙ</u> ΤΑΣ ΥΠΕΡ ΤΟΥ ΜΗ <u>ΒΛΑΠΤΕΙΝ</u> <u>ΑΛΛΑ</u> <u>ΜΗΔΕ</u> <u>ΒΛΑΠΤΕΣΘΑΙ</u> ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑΥΤΑ <u>ΟΥΘΕΝ</u> ΗΝ <u>ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ</u> ΟΥΔΕ <u>ΑΔΙΚΟΝ</u>· ΩΣΑΥΤΩΣ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ <u>ΕΘΝΩΝ</u> ΟΣΑ ΜΗ <u>ΕΔΥΝΑΤΟ</u> Η ΜΗ <u>ΕΒΟΥΛΕΤΟ</u> ΤΑΣ <u>ΣΥΝΘΗΚΑΣ</u> <u>ΠΟΙΕΙΣΘΑΙ</u> ΤΑΣ ΥΠΕΡ ΤΟΥ ΜΗ <u>ΒΛΑΠΤΕΙΝ</u> <u>ΜΗΔΕ</u> <u>ΒΛΑΠΤΕΣΘΑΙ</u>.

"Those animals which are unable to enter into an argument of this nature, or to guard against doing or sustaining mutual injury, have no such thing as justice or injustice. And the case is the same with those nations, the members of which are either unwilling or unable to enter into a covenant to respect their mutual interests." Yonge (1853)

"Those animals which were incapable of forming an agreement to end that they neither might injure nor be injured are without either justice or injustice. Similarly, those tribes which could not or would not form a covenant to the same end are in a like predicament." Wallace, *Epicureanism* 162 (1880)

"Those animals which were incapable of making compacts with one another, to the end that they might neither inflict nor suffer harm, are without either justice or injustice. Similarly those tribes which either could not or would not form mutual covenants to the same end are in the like case." Hicks (1910)

"Those animals which are incapable of making covenants with one another, to the end that they may neither inflict nor suffer harm, are without either justice or injustice. And those tribes which either could not or would not form mutual covenants to the same end are in like case." Hicks (1925)

"For all living things which have not been able to make compacts not to harm one another or be harmed, nothing ever is either just or unjust; and likewise too for all tribes of men which have been unable or unwilling to make compacts not to harm or be harmed." Bailey (1926)

"To all animate creatures that have been unable to make the covenants about not injuring one another or being injured nothing is just nor unjust either; this statement holds equally true for all human races that have been unable or unwilling to make the covenant about not injuring or being injured." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 295 (1954)

"There is no such thing as justice or injustice among those beasts that cannot make agreements not to injure or be injured. This is also true of those tribes that are unable or unwilling to make agreements not to injure or be injured." Geer (1964)

"Nothing is just or unjust in relation to those creatures which were unable to make contracts over not harming one another and not being harmed: so too with all peoples which were unable or unwilling to make contracts over not harming and not being harmed." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 125 (1987)

"For those living creatures that are unable to form compacts not to harm or harm others or to be harmed, there is neither justice nor injustice. It is the same for all tribes of men unable or unwilling to form compacts not to do harm or to be harmed." O'Connor (1993)

"There was no justice or injustice with respect to all those animals which were unable to make pacts about neither harming one another nor being harmed. Similarly, [there was no justice or injustice] for all those nations which were unable or unwilling to make pacts about neither harming one another nor being harmed." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"For all living creatures incapable of making agreements not to harm one another, nothing is ever just or unjust; and so it is likewise for all tribes of men which have been unable or unwilling to make such agreements." Anderson (2004)

"Some animals are incapable of entering into compacts that agree not to inflict harm in order to avoid suffering harm: in the cases of such animals neither moral right nor moral wrong can be said to apply. Similarly, there are communities which are either incapable or unwilling to make treaties that undertake not to inflict harm in order to avoid suffering harm: <in the cases of such communities, the concepts of moral right and moral wrong cannot be said to apply either.>" Makridis (2005)

"With regard to those animals that do not have the power of making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed, there is neither justice nor injustice; similarly for those peoples who have neither the power nor the desire of making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed." Saint-Andre (2008)

"Nothing is either just or unjust in the eyes of those animals that have been unable to make agreements not to harm each other or be harmed. The same is true of those peoples who are unable or unwilling to make covenants not to be harm or be harmed." Strodach (2012)

"Those animals incapable of making agreements with one another, that they may neither inflict nor suffer harm, are without justice or injustice. The same is true of peoples who are unable or unwilling to make such agreements." Mensch (2018)

"There was nothing just or unjust regarding any animals that were unable to make agreements not to harm others or be harmed; and likewise among any culture that were unable or unwilling to make agreements not to harm or be harmed." White (2021)

XXXIII (33)

ΟΥΚ ΗΝ ΤΙ ΚΑΘ' ΕΑΥΤΟ <u>ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗ</u> ΑΛΛ' ΕΝ ΤΑΙΣ ΜΕΤ <u>ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ</u> <u>ΣΥΣΤΡΟΦΑΙΣ</u> ΚΑΘ' <u>ΟΠΗΛΙΚΟΥΣ</u> ΔΗ ΠΟΤΕ ΑΕΙ ΤΟΠΟΥΣ <u>ΣΥΝΘΗΚΗ</u> ΤΙΣ ΥΠΕΡ ΤΟΥ ΜΗ <u>ΒΛΑΠΤΕΙΝ</u> Η <u>ΒΛΑΠΤΕΣΘΑΙ</u>.

"Justice has no independent existence; it results from mutual contracts, and establishes itself wherever there is a mutual engagement to guard against doing or sustaining mutual injury." Yonge (1853)

"There is no such thing as an intrinsic or abstract justice." Wallace, *Epicureanism* 162 (1880)

"There never was an absolute justice, but only a convention made in mutual intercourse, in whatever region, from time to time, providing against the infliction or suffering of harm." Hicks (1910)

"There never was an absolute justice, but only an agreement made in reciprocal intercourse in whatever localities now and again from time to time, providing against the infliction or suffering of harm." Hicks (1925)

"Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another in any place whatever and at any time is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed." Bailey (1926)

"There is no such thing as justice in the abstract; it is merely a compact between men in their various relations with each other, in whatever circumstances they may be, that they will neither injure nor be injured." Geer (1964)

"Justice was never anything per se, but a contract, regularly arising at some place or other in people's dealings with one another, over not harming or being harmed." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 125 (1987)

"There is no such thing as 'justice in itself'; it is, rather, always a certain compact made during men's dealings with one another in different places, not to do harm or to be harmed." O'Connor (1993)

"Justice was not a thing in its own right, but [exists] in mutual dealings in whatever places there [is] a pact about neither harming one another nor being harmed." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"Absolute justice does not exist. There are only mutual agreements among men, made at various times and places, not to inflict nor allow harm." Anderson (2004)

"Abstract justice in itself does not exist. Justice rather <comes into being only> in instances of reciprocal intercourse, applies specifically to this or that place <and time,> and consists in a covenanted agreement to refrain from inflicting harm for the sake of not having harm inflicted on oneself." Makridis (2005)

"Justice does not exist in itself; instead, it is always a compact to not harm one another or be harmed, which is agreed upon by those who gather together at some time and place." Saint-Andre (2008)

"Justice was never an entity in itself. It is a kind of agreement not to harm or be harmed, made when men associate with each other at any time and in communities of any size whatsoever." Strodach (2012)

"Justice was not something in itself but existed in mutual relations wherever and whenever there was an agreement that provided against the inflicting or suffering of harm." Mensch (2018)

"Justice was not anything in its own right, but rather a kind of agreement not to harm or be harmed in our dealings with one another within areas of whatever size they may be."
White (2021)

XXXIV (34)

Η ΑΔΙΚΙΑ ΟΥ ΚΑΘ' ΕΑΥΤΗΝ ΚΑΚΟΝ ΑΛΛ' ΕΝ ΤΩι ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΥΠΟΨΙΑΝ ΦΟΒΩι ΕΙ ΜΗ ΛΗΣΕΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΥΠΕΡ ΤΩΝ ΤΟΙΟΥΤΩΝ ΕΦΕΣΤΗΚΟΤΑΣ ΚΟΛΑΣΤΑΣ.

"Injustice is not intrinsically bad; it has this character only because there is joined with it a fear of not escaping those who are appointed to punish actions of this character." Yonge (1853)

"Injustice is not in itself a bad thing: but only in the fear arising from anxiety on the part of the wrong-doer that he will not always escape punishment." Wallace, *Epicureanism* 162 (1880)

"Injustice is not in itself an evil, but only in its consequence, viz., the terror which is excited by apprehension that those appointed to punish such offenses will discover the injustice." Hicks (1910)

"Injustice is not in itself an evil, but only in its consequence, viz. the terror which is excited by apprehension that those appointed to punish such offences will discover the injustice." Hicks (1925)

"Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which attaches to the apprehension of being unable to escape those appointed to punish such actions." Bailey (1926)

"Wrong-doing is not an evil in and by itself; the evil lies in the uneasy feeling, amounting to fear, that he will not escape detection by those appointed for the punishment of such offenses." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 153 (1954)

"Injustice is not an evil in and by itself but the evil lies in the fear arising out of the uncertainty that he will not escape detection by those appointed for the punishment of such offenses." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 296 (1954)

"Violating the law is not an evil in itself but the evil lies in the uneasy feeling, of the nature of fear, that he may not escape detection by those appointed for the punishment of such offenses." De Witt, *St. Paul and Epicurus*, 122 (1954)

"Injustice is not evil in itself, but only in the fear and apprehension that one will not escape those who have been set up to punish the offense." Geer (1964)

"Injustice is something bad not per se in the fear that arises from the suspicion that one will not escape the notice of those who have the authority to punish such things." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 125 (1987)

"Injustice is not in itself an evil, but only in its consequence, but in the fear and apprehension that one will not escape from those appointed to punish such actions." O'Connor (1993)

"Injustice is not a bad thing in its own right, but [only] because of the fear produced by the suspicion that one will not escape the notice of those assigned to punish such actions." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the accompanying fear of being unable to escape those assigned to punish unjust acts." Anderson (2004)

"Injustice is not a moral evil in itself: what is bad about injustice consists in the wearying apprehension that one might fail to escape detection by those who mete out punishments." Makridis (2005)

"Injustice is not bad in itself, but only because of the fear caused by a suspicion that

you will not avoid those who are appointed to punish wrongdoing." Saint-Andre (2008)

"Injustice is not an evil in itself. Its evil lies in the anxious fear that you will not elude those who have authority to punish such misdeeds." Strodach (2012)

"Injustice is not bad in itself, but only because of the terror aroused by the suspicion that it will be detected by its punishers." Mensch (2018)

"Injustice is a bad thing not in its own right but rather on account of the fear in worrying about being found out by those assigned to punish such things." White (2021)

XXXV (35)

ΟΥΚ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΟΝ <u>ΛΑΘΡΑι</u> ΤΙ <u>ΚΙΝΟΥΝΤΑ</u> ΩΝ <u>ΣΥΝΕΘΕΝΤΟ</u> ΠΡΟΣ <u>ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ</u> ΕΙΣ ΤΟ ΜΗ <u>ΒΛΑΠΤΕΙΝ</u> ΜΗΔΕ <u>ΒΛΑΠΤΕΣΘΑΙ</u> <u>ΠΙΣΤΕΥΕΙΝ</u> ΟΤΙ <u>ΛΗΣΕΙ</u> ΚΑΝ <u>ΜΥΡΙΑΚΙΣ</u> ΕΠΙ ΤΟΥ <u>ΠΑΡΟΝΤΟΣ</u> <u>ΛΑΘΑΝΗι</u>· ΜΕΧΡΙ ΓΑΡ <u>ΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΟΦΗΣ</u> <u>ΑΔΗΛΟΝ</u> ΕΙ ΚΑΙ <u>ΛΗΣΕΙ</u>.

"It is not possible for a man who secretly does anything in contravention of the agreement which men have made with one another, to guard against doing, or sustaining mutual injury, to believe that he shall always escape notice, even if he has escaped notice already ten thousand times; for till his death, it is uncertain whether he will not be detected." Yonge (1853)

"It is impossible for the man who secretly violates any article of the social compact to feel confident that he will remain undiscovered, even if he has already escaped ten thousand times; for until his death he is never sure he will not be detected." Hicks (1910)

"It is impossible for the man who secretly violates any article of the social compact to feel confident that he will remain undiscovered, even if he has already escaped ten thousand times; for right on to the end of his life he is never sure he will not be detected." Hicks (1925)

"It is not possible for one who acts in secret contravention of the terms of the compact not to harm or be harmed, to be confident that he will escape detection, even if at present he escapes a thousand times. For up to the time of death it cannot be certain that he will indeed escape." Bailey (1926)

"It is impossible for the man who does one of those things which they have covenanted with one another not to do, in order to avoid injuring and being injured, to be confident he will escape, even though for the moment he shall escape numberless times, for till the end it will be uncertain if he will really escape." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 297 (1954)

"If a man has secretly violated any of the terms of the mutual compact not to injure or be injured, he cannot feel confident that he will be undetected in the future even if he has escaped ten thousand times in the past; for until his death it will remain uncertain whether he will escape." Geer (1964)

"No one who secretly infringes any of the terms of a mutual contract made with a view to not harming and not being harmed can be confident that he will escape detection even if he does so countless times. For right up to his death it is unclear whether he will actually escape." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 125 (1987)

"It is impossible for the one who commits some act in secret violation of the compacts made among men not to do harm or to be harmed, to remain confident that he will escape notice, even if for the present he escapes detection a thousand times. For right up to the day of his death, it remains unclear whether he will escape detection." O'Connor (1993)

"It is impossible for someone who secretly does something which men agreed [not to do] in order to avoid harming one another or being harmed to be confident that he will escape detection, even if in current circumstances he escapes detection ten thousand times. For until his death it will be uncertain whether he will continue to escape detection." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"It is not possible for one who secretly violates the provisos of the agreement not to inflict nor allow harm to be confident that he won't get caught, even if he has gotten away with it a thousand times before. For up until the time of death, there is no certainty that he will indeed escape detection." Anderson (2004)

"And it is not possible for someone to be confident that he will not be detected if one has acted surreptitiously in violating any one of the provisions of the social contract, which consists in <an agreement> to refrain from harming for the sake of avoiding harm for oneself; not even if one has escaped detection a myriad times until the present: for even to the moment of one's final demise, there can be no sure sign or assurance that one will continue to escape detection." Makridis (2005)

"It is impossible to be confident that you will escape detection when secretly doing something contrary to an agreement to not harm one another or be harmed, even if currently you do so countless times; for until your death you will be uncertain that you have escaped detection." Saint-Andre (2008)

"It is impossible for a person who underhandedly breaks the agreement not to harm or be harmed to feel sure that he will escape punishment, even though he manages to do so time after time; for up to the very end of his life he cannot be sure that he will actually escape." Strodach (2012)

"It is not possible for the man who secretly violates the compact to prevent the inflicting or suffering of harm to feel sure that he will escape notice, even if he has already escaped ten thousand times. For right to the end it is not clear whether he will escape." Mensch (2018)

"When someone secretly violates a mutual agreement not to harm or be harmed, it is not possible for him to be sure he won't be found out, even if he is not found out a thousand times so far; for up until his demise it is unsure whether he will eventually be found out." White (2021)

XXXVI (36)

KATA MEN <TO> <u>KOINON</u> <u>ΠΑΣΙ</u> ΤΟ <u>ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ</u> ΤΟ ΑΥΤΟ
<u>ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝ</u> ΓΑΡ ΤΙ ΗΝ ΕΝ ΤΗι ΠΡΟΣ <u>ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ</u> <u>ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑι</u>·
ΚΑΤΑ ΔΕ ΤΟ <u>ΙΔΙΟΝ</u> <u>ΧΩΡΑΣ</u> ΚΑΙ ΟΣΩΝ ΔΗ ΠΟΤΕ <u>ΑΙΤΙΩΝ</u> ΟΥ
<u>ΠΑΣΙ</u> <u>ΣΥΝΕΠΕΤΑΙ</u> ΤΟ ΑΥΤΟ <u>ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ</u> ΕΙΝΑΙ.

"In a general point of view, justice is the same thing to every one; for there is something advantageous in mutual society. Nevertheless, the difference of place, and diverse other circumstances, make justice vary." Yonge (1853)

"Taken generally, justice is the same for all, but in its application to particular cases of territory or the like, it varies under different circumstances." Hicks (1910)

"Taken generally, justice is the same for all, to wit, something found expedient in mutual intercourse; but in its application to particular cases of locality or conditions of whatever kind, it varies under different circumstances." Hicks (1925)

"In its general aspect justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another: but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country or any other circumstances the same things does not turn out to be just for all." Bailey (1926)

"So far as the universal concept is concerned, Justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of advantage in the life they share with one another, but in respect of the particulars of place and all affecting circumstances whatsoever it does not follow that the same thing is just for all." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 296 (1954)

"In general, justice is the same for all, a thing found useful by men in their relations with each other; but it does not follow that it is the same for all in each individual place and circumstance." Geer (1964)

"Taken generally, justice is the same for all, since it is something useful in people's social relationships. But in the light of what is peculiar to a region and to the whole range of determinants, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 125 (1987)

"Broadly considered, justice is the same for all, because it is a kind of mutual benefit in men's interactions with one another. But in individual countries and circumstances, justice turns out not to be the same for all." O'Connor (1993)

"In general outline justice is the same for everyone; for it was something useful in mutual associations. But with respect to the peculiarities of a region or of other [relevant] causes, it does not follow that the same thing is just for everyone." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"Justice is essentially the same for all peoples insofar as it benefits human interaction. But the details of how justice is applied in particular countries or circumstances may vary." Anderson (2004)

"Generally speaking, justice is one and the same for all: i.e., justice is something or other that is to one's interest in mutual intercourse. But, speaking on a case-by-case basis, justice is not the same for all as it depends on <specific> regions and factors." Makridis (2005)

"In general, justice is the same for all: what is mutually advantageous among companions. But with respect to the particulars of a place or other causes, it does not follow that the same thing is just for all." Saint-Andre (2008)

"In its general meaning, justice is the same for all because of its utility in the relations of men to each other, but in its specific application to countries and various other circumstances it does not follow that the same thing is just for all." Strodach (2012)

"In general, justice is the same for everyone, namely something that facilitates mutual intercourse; but in light of the peculiarities of a region and all sorts of other causes, it does not follow that the same thing is just for everyone." Mensch (2018)

"In general, what is just is the same for all: it was something that promotes relations within a community. But by differences in territory and any number of other causes, the same thing does not turn out just for all." White (2021)

XXXVII (37)

ΤΟ ΜΕΝ <u>ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ</u> ΟΤΙ <u>ΣΥΜΦΕΡΕΙ</u> ΕΝ ΤΑΙΣ ΧΡΕΙΑΙΣ ΤΗΣ ΠΡΟΣ <u>ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ</u> <u>ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑΣ</u> ΕΧΕΙ ΤΟΝ ΤΟΥ <u>ΔΙΚΑΙΟΥ</u> <u>ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡΑ</u> ΕΑΝ ΤΕ ΤΟ ΑΥΤΟ <u>ΠΑΣΙ</u> <u>ΓΕΝΗΤΑΙ</u> ΕΑΝ ΤΕ ΜΗ ΤΟ ΑΥΤΟ· ΕΑΝ ΔΕ <u>ΝΟΜΟΝ</u> ΘΗΤΑΙ ΤΙΣ ΜΗ <u>ΑΠΟΒΑΙΝΗͺ</u> ΔΕ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟ <u>ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝ</u> ΤΗΣ ΠΡΟΣ <u>ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ</u> <u>ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑΣ</u> <u>ΟΥΚΕΤΙ</u> ΤΟΥΤΟ ΤΗΝ ΤΟΥ <u>ΔΙΚΑΙΟΥ</u> <u>ΦΥΣΙΝ</u> ΕΧΕΙ· ΚΑΝ <u>ΜΕΤΑΠΙΠΤΗͺ</u> ΤΟ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟ <u>ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ</u> <u>ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝ</u> <u>ΧΡΟΝΟΝ</u> ΔΕ ΤΙΝΑ ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ <u>ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΝ</u> <u>ΕΝΑΡΜΟΤΤΗͺ</u> ΟΥΔΕΝ ΗΤΤΟΝ ΕΚΕΙΝΟΝ ΤΟΝ <u>ΧΡΟΝΟΝ</u> ΗΝ <u>ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ</u> ΤΟΙΣ ΜΗ <u>ΦΩΝΑΙΣ</u> <u>ΚΕΝΑΙΣ</u> ΕΑΥΤΟΥΣ <u>ΣΥΝΤΑΡΑΤΤΟΥΣΙΝ</u> ΑΛΛ' ΕΙΣ ΤΑ <u>ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ</u> <u>ΒΛΕΠΟΥΣΙΝ</u>.

"From the moment that a thing declared just by the law is generally recognized as useful for the mutual relations of men, it becomes really just, whether it is universally regarded as such or not. But if, on the contrary, a thing established by law is not really useful for social relations, then it is not just; and if that which was just, inasmuch as it was useful, loses this character, after having been for some time considered so, it is not less true that during that time it was really just, at least for those who do not perplex themselves about vain words, but who prefer in every case, examining and judging for themselves." Yonge (1853)

"Whatever in conventional law is attested to be expedient in the needs arising out of mutual intercourse is by its nature just, whether the same for all or not, and in case any law is made and does not prove suitable to the expediency of mutual intercourse, then this is no longer just. And should the expediency which is expressed by the law vary and only for a time correspond with the notion of justice, nevertheless, for the time being, it was just, so long as we do not trouble ourselves about empty terms but look broadly at facts." Hicks (1910)

"Among the things accounted just by conventional law, whatever in the needs of mutual intercourse is attested to be expedient, is thereby stamped as just, whether or not it be the same for all; and in case any law is made and does not prove suitable to the expediencies of mutual intercourse, then this is no longer just. And should the expediency which is expressed by the law vary and only for a time correspond with the prior conception, nevertheless for the time being it was just, so long as we do not trouble ourselves about empty words, but look simply at the facts." Hicks (1925)

"Among some actions which are sanctioned as just by law, that which is proved on examination to be of advantage in the requirements of men's dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice, whether it is the same for all or not. But if a man makes a law and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men's dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice. And if the advantage in the matter of justice shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the general concept, it is none the less just for that period in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds but look to the actual facts." Bailey (1926)

"Among the things commonly held just, that which has proved itself useful in men's mutual relationship has the stamp of justice whether or not it be the same for all; if anyone makes a law and it does not prove useful in men's relationships with each other, it is no longer just in its essence. If, however, the law's usefulness in the matter of justice should change and it should meet men's expectations only for a short time, nonetheless during that short time it was just in the eyes of those who look simply at facts and do not confuse themselves with empty words." Geer (1964)

"What is legally deemed to be just has its existence in the domain of justice whenever it is attested to be useful in the requirements of social relationships, whether or not it turns out to be the same for all. But if someone makes a law and it does not happen to accord with the utility of social relationships, it no longer has the nature of justice. And even if what is useful in the sphere of justice changes but fits the preconception for

some time, it was no less just throughout that time for those who do not confuse themselves with empty utterances but simply look at the facts." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 125 (1987)

"Among the measures regarded as just, that which is proven to be beneficial in the business of men's dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice whether it is the same for all or not. If someone makes a law which does not result in advantage for men's dealings with each other, it no longer has the nature of justice. Even if advantage in the matter of justice is variable but nonetheless conforms for a certain length of time to the common notion people have of it, no less for that period is it just in the opinion of those who do not confuse themselves with words but look straight at the facts." O'Connor (1993)

"Of actions believed to be just, that whose usefulness in circumstances of mutual associations is supported by the testimony [of experience] has the attribute of serving as just whether it is the same for everyone or not. And if someone passes a law and it does not turn out to be in accord with what is useful in mutual associations, this no longer possesses the nature of justice. And if what is useful in the sense of being just changes, but for a while fits our basic grasp [of justice], nevertheless it was just for that length of time, [at least] for those who do not disturb themselves with empty words but simply look to the facts." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"Among actions legally recognized as just, that which is confirmed by experience as mutually beneficial has the virtue of justice, whether it is the same for all peoples or not. But if a law is made which results in no such advantage, then it no longer carries the hallmark of justice. And if something that used to be mutually beneficial changes, though for some time it conformed to our concept of justice, it is still true that it really was just during that time – at least for those who do not fret about technicalities and instead prefer to examine and judge each case for themselves." Anderson (2004)

"Among those things that are conventionally accepted as just, whatever is universally acknowledged to be conducive to the purpose of maintaining civic society is necessarily adjudged to be a patently just thing, whether it is the same for all people or not. But if one stipulates something as the law even though it is at cross purposes with the interest of maintaining civic society—such an ordinance does not partake of natural justice in any way. In addition, if and to the extent that the interests which are in accordance with natural justice prove variable, so that concepts of justice can remain harmonious with natural interests only for a certain period of time: we must say that such concepts of justice <though short lived> are no less just within their corresponding frames of time." Makridis (2005)

"Among things that are thought to be just, that which has been witnessed to bring mutual advantage among companions has the nature of justice, whether or not it is the same for everyone. But if someone legislates something whose results are not in accord with what brings mutual advantage among companions, then it does not have the nature of justice. And if what brings advantage according to justice changes, but for some time fits our basic grasp of justice, then for that time it is just, at least to the person who is not confused by empty prattle but instead looks to the facts." Saint-Andre (2008)

"In the case of actions that are legally regarded as just, those that are of tested utility in meeting the needs of human society have the hallmark of justice, whether they turn out to be equally just in all cases or not. On the other hand, if somebody lays down a law and it does not prove to be of advantage in human relations, then such a law no longer has the true character of justice. And even if the element of utility should undergo a change after harmonizing for a time with the conception of justice, the law was still just during that period, in the judgment of those who are not confused by meaningless words but who look at the actualities." Strodach (2012)

"That which has been considered just by convention because it benefits our mutual intercourse is therefore stamped as just, whether or not it is so in all instances; and if a law is made and does not prove beneficial to our intercourse, then it is no longer just.

And if what the law considers expedient changes, and only corresponds for a time to the preconception, it was nonetheless just for that time, if we do not trouble ourselves about empty forms but simply examine the facts." Mensch (2018)

"If established norms of justice are attested to promote the mutual interactions of a community, then it has the status of justice, whether it is the same for everyone or not the same. But if someone establishes a law and the result does not promote the community's relations, then it no longer has the nature of justice. And if what does promote justice changes, then as long as it did align with the preconception [sc. of justice] for a time, it was no less just during that period of time, provided people do not get confused by distracting themselves with empty expressions and instead look at the actual facts." White (2021)

XXXVIII (38)

ΕΝΘΑ ΜΗ <u>ΚΑΙΝΩΝ</u> <u>ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΩΝ</u> ΤΩΝ <u>ΠΕΡΙΕΣΤΩΤΩΝ</u>
<u>ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΩΝ</u> <u>ΑΝΕΦΑΝΗ</u> ΜΗ <u>ΑΡΜΟΤΤΟΝΤΑ</u> ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ
<u>ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΝ</u> ΤΑ <u>ΝΟΜΙΣΘΕΝΤΑ</u> <u>ΔΙΚΑΙΑ</u> ΕΠ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΕΡΓΩΝ
ΟΥΚ ΗΝ ΤΑΥΤΑ <u>ΔΙΚΑΙΑ</u>· ΕΝΘΑ ΔΕ <u>ΚΑΙΝΩΝ</u> <u>ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΩΝ</u>
ΤΩΝ <u>ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΩΝ</u> ΟΥΚΕΤΙ <u>ΣΥΝΕΦΕΡΕ</u> ΤΑ ΑΥΤΑ <u>ΔΙΚΑΙΑ</u>
<u>ΚΕΙΜΕΝΑ</u> ΕΝΤΑΥΘΑ ΔΗ ΤΟΤΕ ΜΕΝ ΗΝ <u>ΔΙΚΑΙΑ</u> ΟΤΕ
<u>ΣΥΝΕΦΕΡΕΝ</u> ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΠΡΟΣ <u>ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ</u> <u>ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑΝ</u> ΤΩΝ
<u>ΣΥΜΠΟΛΙΤΕΥΟΜΕΝΩΝ</u> ΥΣΤΕΡΟΝ Δ ΟΥΚ ΗΝ ΕΤΙ <u>ΔΙΚΑΙΑ</u> ΟΤΕ
ΜΗ <u>ΣΥΝΕΦΕΡΕΝ</u>.

"When, without any fresh circumstances arising a thing which has been declared just in practice does not agree with the impressions of reason, that is a proof that the thing was not really just. In the same way, when in consequence of new circumstances, a thing which has been pronounced just does not any longer appear to agree with utility, the thing which was just, inasmuch as it was useful to the social relations and intercourse of mankind, ceases to be just the moment when it ceases to be useful." Yonge (1853)

"Where without any change in circumstances the conventional laws when judged by their consequences were seen not to correspond with the notion of justice, such laws were not really just; but wherever the laws have ceased to be expedient in consequence of a change in circumstances, in that case the laws were for the time being just, when they were expedient for the mutual intercourse of the citizens, and ceased subsequently to be just when they ceased to be expedient." Hicks (1910)

"Where without any change in circumstances the conventional laws, when judged by their consequences, were seen not to correspond with the notion of justice, such laws were not really just ; but wherever the laws have ceased to be expedient in consequence of a change in circumstances, in that case the laws were for the time being

just when they were expedient for the mutual intercourse of the citizens, and subsequently ceased to be just when they ceased to be expedient." Hicks (1929)

"Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered just, have been shown not to accord with the general concept in actual practice, then they are not just. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which were sanctioned as just no longer lead to advantage, there they were just at the time when they were of advantage for the dealings of fellow-citizens with one another, but subsequently they are no longer just, when no longer advantage." Bailey (1926)

"If, although no new circumstances have arisen, those things that were commonly held just in these matters did not in their actual effects correspond with that conception, they were not just. Whenever, as a result of new circumstances, the same things that had been regarded as just were no longer useful, they were just at the time when they were useful for the relations of citizens to each other; but afterwards, when they were no longer useful, they were no longer just." Geer (1964)

"Where actions that were considered just are shown not to fit the concept (of justice) in actual practice—provided circumstances are not altered—they are not just. But where, once events have changed, the same actions once held to just are no longer advantageous, they were just at the time when they brought advantage to citizens' dealings with one another; but later they were no longer just, when they brought no advantage." O'Connor (1993)

"If objective circumstances have not changed and things believed to be just have been shown in actual practice not to be in accord with our basic grasp [of justice], then those things were not just. And if objective circumstances do change and the same things which had been just turn out to be no longer useful, then those things were just as long as they were useful for mutual associations of fellow citizens; but later, when they were not useful, they were no longer just." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"Where, without any change in circumstances, things held to be just by law are revealed to be in conflict with the essence of justice, such laws were never really just. But wherever or whenever laws have ceased to be advantageous because of a change in circumstances, in that case or time the laws were just when they benefited human interaction, and ceased to be just only when they were no longer beneficial." Anderson (2004)

"<This is what we must say> if we are not to perturb ourselves with hollow words but rather take our bearings from the truth about human affairs. In those instances, in which, without any new developments arising, it becomes evident that the accepted concepts of justice are not, after all, in harmony with concrete interests or exertions of human effort: we must, in such cases, admit that those concepts of justice have had nothing to do with justice to begin with. But, in those instances, in which novel developments make it disadvantageous to preserve the same <concepts of> justice: in such cases, we must say that the concepts of justice were true in the past, for as long as they were conducive to the mutual association of fellow citizens, but, subsequently, when they were no longer advantageous, they were no longer just to adhere to." Makridis (2005)

"When circumstances have not changed and things that were thought to be just are shown to not be in accord with our basic grasp of justice, then those things were not just. But when circumstances do change and things that were just are no longer useful, then those things were just while they brought mutual advantage among companions sharing the same community; but when later they did not bring advantage, then they were not just." Saint-Andre (2008)

"In cases where the surrounding conditions are not new and where laws regarded as just have been shown to be inconsistent with the conception of justice in their actual workings, such laws are unjust. Again, in cases where the circumstances are new and where the same laws, once deemed to be just, are no longer serviceable, the laws in this case were just as long as they were useful to the community of citizens, but later when they were no longer useful they became unjust." Strodach (2012)

"Where without any change in circumstances the conventional laws were seen not to accord with the preconception when judged by their consequences, such laws were not just. But whenever, in changed circumstances, the existing laws have ceased to be expedient, then they were just when they benefited the mutual intercourse of fellow citizens, but were no longer just later on when they ceased to be expedient." Mensch (2018)

"Where, even without any change in circumstances, it became obvious from actual practice that the established norms of justice did not align with the preconception [sc. of justice], then they were not just. But where the situation did change and the same norms established as just no longer promoted [sc. what they had previously: the community's interactions], then in that case they were just for so long as they did promote the community of fellow citizens in their interactions, and later they were no longer just when they no longer promoted that." White (2021)

XXXIX (39)

Ο ΤΟ ΜΗ <u>ΘΑΡΡΟΥΝ</u> ΑΠΟ ΤΩΝ <u>ΕΞΩΘΕΝ</u> <u>ΑΡΙΣΤΑ</u>
<u>ΣΥΣΤΗΣΑΜΕΝΟΣ</u> ΟΥΤΟΣ ΤΑ ΜΕΝ <u>ΔΥΝΑΤΑ</u> <u>ΟΜΟΦΥΛΑ</u>
<u>ΚΑΤΕΣΚΕΥΑΣΑΤΟ</u> ΤΑ ΔΕ ΜΗ <u>ΔΥΝΑΤΑ</u> ΟΥΚ <u>ΑΛΛΟΦΥΛΑ</u> ΓΕ·
ΟΣΑ ΔΕ <u>ΜΗΔΕ</u> ΤΟΥΤΟ <u>ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ</u> ΗΝ <u>ΑΝΕΠΙΜΕΙΚΤΟΣ</u>
<u>ΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ</u> ΚΑΙ <u>ΕΞΗΡΕΙΣΑΤΟ</u> ΟΣΑ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ <u>ΛΥΣΙΤΕΛΗ</u>
<u>ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ</u>.

"He who desires to live tranquilly without having anything to fear from other men, ought to make himself friends; those whom he cannot make friends of, he should, at least avoid rendering enemies; and if that is not in his power, he should, as far as possible, avoid all intercourse with them, and keep them aloof, as far as it is for his interest to do so." Yonge (1853)

"He who best insured safety from external foes made into one nation all the folk capable of uniting together, and those incapable of such union he assuredly did not treat as aliens; if there were any whom he could not even on such terms incorporate, he excluded them from intercourse whenever this suited with his own interests." Hicks (1910)

"He who best knew how to meet fear of external foes made into one family all the creatures he could; and those he could not, he at any rate did not treat as aliens ; and where he found even this impossible, he avoided all intercourse, and, so far as was expedient, kept them at a distance." Hicks (1925)

"The man who has best ordered the element of disquiet arising from external circumstances has made those things that he could akin to himself and the rest at least not alien: but with all to which he could not do even this, he has refrained from mixing, and has expelled from his life all which it was of advantage to treat thus." Bailey (1926)

"That man has best forestalled the feeling of insecurity from outside who makes relations friendly where possible, where impossible, at least neutral, and where even this is impossible, avoids contacts, and in all cases where it pays to do so arranges for dynastic support." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 309 (1954)

"That man has best established the feeling of security from external hazards who has made his relationships friendly wherever possible; where this has been impossible has made them at least not unfriendly; and wherever even this has been impossible avoids contacts; and wherever it paid him to do so has arranged dynastic protection." De Witt, *St. Paul and Epicurus* 188 (1954)

"He who has best controlled his lack of confidence in the face of external forces has, as far as possible, treated these externals as akin to himself or, when that was impossible, at least as not alien. Where he was not able to do even this, he kept to himself and avoided whatever it was best to avoid." Geer (1964)

"The man who has best settled the feeling of disquiet that comes from external circumstances is he who has made those things he can of the same kin as himself; and what he cannot, at least not alien. Whatever he cannot do even this to he avoids all contact with, and banishes whatever is advantageous to treat in this way." O'Connor (1993)

"The man who has made the best arrangements for the confidence about external threats is he who has made the manageable things akin to himself, and has at least made the unmanageable things not alien to himself. But he avoided all contact with things for which not even this could be managed and he drove out of his life everything which it profited him to drive out." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"He who desires to live in tranquility with nothing to fear from other men ought to make friends. Those of whom he cannot make friends, he should at least avoid rendering enemies; and if that is not in his power, he should, as much as possible, avoid all dealings with them, and keep them aloof, insofar as it is in his interest to do so." Anderson (2004)

"He who was fittingly constituted in such a way that he could not face up to external dangers prepared a family made up of as many kindred beings as he was able to bring together; or, those he could not bring together, he related to as if they were not, at any rate, members of a different species. And with those beings, which he was altogether unable <either to bring into a family or to relate to in any way,> he did not mingle at all and, to the extent that it was to his benefit to do so, he had nothing to do with them." Makridis (2005)

"The person who has put together the best means for confidence about external threats is one who has become familiar with what is possible and at least not unfamiliar with what is not possible, but who has not mixed with things where even this could not be managed and who has driven away anything that is not advantageous." Saint-Andre (2008)

"The person who is the most successful in controlling the disturbing elements that come from the outside world has assimilated to himself what he could, and what he could not assimilate he has at least not alienated. Where he could not do even this, he has dissociated himself or eliminated all that it was expedient to treat in this way." Strodach (2012)

"He who could best address fear of external threats forged a community of all the creatures he could; but those he could not include he did not treat as enemies; and if even this could not be managed, he avoided all contact and drove away every creature it was expedient to drive away." Mensch (2018)

"The one who was best prepared not to put confidence in external support had what he was able to do all on his own side and what he was unable to do was at least not on any opposing side; and as for anything he was unable to handle even that way, he shunned it, and he stoutly resisted anything it served him to do so." White (2021)

XL (40)

ΟΣΟΙ ΤΗΝ <u>ΔΥΝΑΜΙΝ</u> ΕΣΧΟΝ ΤΟΥ ΤΟ <u>ΘΑΡΡΕΙΝ</u> <u>ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ</u> ΕΚ ΤΩΝ <u>ΟΜΟΡΡΟΥΝΤΩΝ</u> <u>ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΣΑΣΘΑΙ</u> ΟΥΤΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΕΒΙΩΣΑΝ ΜΕΤ' ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ ΗΔΙΣΤΑ ΤΟ ΒΕΒΑΙΟΤΑΤΟΝ ΠΙΣΤΩΜΑ ΕΧΟΝΤΕΣ ΚΑΙ <u>ΠΛΗΡΕΣΤΑΤΗΝ</u> ΟΙΚΕΙΟΤΗΤΑ ΑΠΟΛΑΒΟΝΤΕΣ ΟΥΚ <u>ΩΔΥΡΑΝΤΟ</u> ΩΣ ΠΡΟΣ <u>ΕΛΕΟΝ</u> ΤΗΝ ΤΟΥ <u>ΤΕΛΕΥΤΗΣΑΝΤΟΣ</u> <u>ΠΡΟΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΟΦΗΝ</u>.

"The happiest men are they who have arrived at the point of having nothing to fear from those who surround them. Such men live with one another most agreeably, having the firmest grounds of confidence in one another, enjoying the advantages of friendship in all their fullness, and not lamenting as a pitiable circumstance, the premature death of their friends." Yonge (1853)

"Those who could best insure the confidence that they would be safe from their neighbours, being thus in possession of the surest guarantee, passed the most agreeable life in each other's society, and their enjoyment of the fullest intimacy was such that, if one of them died before his time, the survivors did not lament his death as if it called for pity." Hicks (1910)

"Those who were best able to provide themselves with the means of security against their neighbours, being thus in possession of the surest guarantee, passed the most agreeable life in each other's society; and their enjoyment of the fullest intimacy was such that, if one of them died before his time, the survivors did not lament his death as if it called for commiseration." Hicks (1925)

"As many as possess the power to procure complete immunity from their neighbours, these also live most pleasantly with one another, since they have the most certain pledge of security, and after they have enjoyed the fullest intimacy, they do not lament the previous departure of a dead friend, as though he were to be pitied." Bailey (1926)

"All those who have best succeeded in building up the ability to feel secure from the attacks of those around them have lived the happiest lives with one another, as having the firmest faith." De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* 304 (1954)

"Those who were best able to prepare security for themselves in relation to their neighbors lived most pleasantly with their neighbors since they had the most perfect assurance; and enjoying the most complete intimacy, they did not lament the death of one who died before his time as if it were an occasion for sorrow." Geer (1964)

"Those who had the power to eliminate all fear of their neighbours lived together accordingly in the most pleasurable way, through having the firmest pledge of security, and after enjoying the fullest intimacy, they did not grieve over someone's untimely death as if it called for commiseration." Long, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* 126 (1987)

"Those who possess the power of securing themselves completely from their neighbors, live most happily with one another, since they have this constant assurance. And after partaking of the fullest intimacy, they do not mourn a friend who dies before they do, as though they were need for pity." O'Connor (1993)

"All those who had the power to acquire the greatest confidence from [the threats posed by] their neighbours also thereby lived together most pleasantly with the surest guarantee; and since they enjoyed the fullest sense of belonging they did not grieve the early death of the departed, as though it called for pity." Inwood & Gerson (1994)

"The happiest men are those who enjoy the condition of having nothing to fear from those who surround them. Such men live among one another most agreeably, having the firmest grounds for confidence in one another, enjoying the benefits of friendship in all their fullness, and they do not mourn a friend who dies before they do, as if there was a need for pity." Anderson (2004)

"Those who had the greatest ability to prepare defenses against their neighbors, so they could face up to them, were the ones who lived with each most pleasantly—since they had the most certain guarantee <that they were in no danger in any respect.> And, given that they had once enjoyed the most complete intimacy, they would not lament or cry for mercy if one suffered a premature demise." Makridis (2005)

"All those who have the power to obtain the greatest confidence from their neighbors also live with each other most enjoyably in the most steadfast trust; and experiencing the strongest fellowship they do not lament as pitiful the untimely end of those who pass away." Saint-Andre (2008)

"All who have the capacity to gain security, especially from those who live around them, live a most agreeable life together, since they have the firm assurance of friendship; and after enjoying their comradeship to the full they do not bewail the early demise of a departed friend as if it were a pitiable thing." Strodach (2012)

"All who could best obtain security against their neighbors, and thereby possessed the surest guarantee, lived most pleasantly with one another; and since they enjoyed the fullest intimacy they did not lament, as something to be pitied, the death of a member of their circle who predeceased them." Mensch (2018)

"All who acquired the ability to provide themselves the most reliable confidence in their neighbors thereby lived together most pleasantly, most secure in [their] mutual trust, and by forming the closest affiliation they never mourned in sorrow over anyone's untimely demise." White (2021)

GLOSSARY

I

APHTHARTON - ΑΦΘΑΡΤΟΝ - ἄφθαρτον - /ˈaːpʰ.tʰar.ton/ - the genitive plural inflection of αφθαρτός (*aphthartós*) from ἀ- (*a-*, "non-") + φθείρω (*phtheîrō*, "destroy", "waste", "ruin", "spoil", corrupt", "miscarry") + -τός (-*tós*, adjectival suffix) meaning "**imperishable**", "eternal", "immortal", "incorruptible", "indestructible", "imperturbable".

According to Epicurus' ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΜΑΤΑ (stoikheiōmata, "Twelve Elementary Propositions"), only particles and space are eternal; all other objects are subject to the forces of dissolution. "[A]mong bodies some are compounds, and others those of which compounds are formed [...] these latter are indivisible and unalterable" (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus). Within this context, ΑΦΘΑΡΤΟΝ (áphtharton) does not indicate an entity "that has no beginning", but one "who has become un-ending".

ASTHENEI - ΑΣΘΕΝΕΙ - ἀσθενεῖ - /aːstʰe.ˈneɪ/ - from ἀ- (*a-*, "un-") + σθένος (*sthénos*, "strength") + -ής (-*ḗs*, adjective suffix) meaning "**weak**", "lacking strength".

"Nature is weak toward evil, not toward good: because it is saved by pleasures, but destroyed by pains." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 37)

KHARISI - ΧΑΡΙΣΙ - χάρισι - /ˈkʰa.riːsiː/ - the dative plural inflection of χάρις (*kháris*) from χαίρω (*khaîrō*, "rejoice", "take pleasure in", "delight") meaning "gratitude", "**favour**", "partiality", "partisanship", "indebtedness", "benevolence", "care".

ΧΑΡΙΣΙ (khárisi) is loaned to the Septuagint (the first translation of the Hebrew Bible) to express "the LORD's grace". As described by the Septuagint, the LORD graces some tribes and punishes others, providing an example of a partisan, perterbable, and therefore "weak" being that does not fit the natural preconception of "blessedness".

MAKARION - ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΝ - μακάριον - /ma.ˈka.riːon/ - the genitive plural inflection of μακάριος (*makários*, "fortunate") meaning "happy", "**blessed**", "blissful", "pleasureful".

"[R]efer all choice and avoidance to health of the body and (the soul's) freedom from disturbance [...] this is the aim of the life of blessedness. For it is to obtain this end that we always act, namely, to avoid pain and fear. […] And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus).

ORGAIS - ΟΡΓΑΙΣ - ὀργαῖς - /or.ˈgaɪs/ - the plural dative inflection of ὀργή (*orgḗ*, "natural impulse", "temperament", "disposition", "mood", "wrath", "passion") meaning "**anger**", "ire", "resentment". *Note the characterizations of Enlil, Zeus, Jupiter, Yahweh, Jehovah, Allāh, etc.*

"[F]or trouble and care and anger and kindness are not consistent with a life of blessedness, but these things come to pass where there is weakness and fear and dependence on neighbors." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)

PAN - ΠΑΝ - πᾶν - /ˈ**pan**/ - a singular inflection of πᾶς (pâs, "the whole", "consisting", "composed wholly") meaning "these", "every", "**all**", "such", "the universe".

"The nature of all existing things is bodies and space." (Epicurus, Fragment 14)

PAREKHEI - ΠΑΡΕΧΕΙ - παρέχει - /pa.ˈ**re**.kʰeɪ/ - an inflection of παρέχω (parékhō, "hand over") from παρα- (para-, "beside") + ἔχω (ékhō, "I have") meaning "**causes**", "occasions".

"[T]o assign a single cause for these occurrences, when phenomena demand several explanations, is madness, and is quite wrongly practiced by persons who are partisans of the foolish notions of astrology, by which they give futile explanations of the causes of certain occurrences, and all the time do not by any means free the divine nature from the burden of responsibilities." (Epicurus' Epistle to Pythocles).

PRAGMATA - ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ - πράγματα - /ˈ**prag**.ma.ta/ - a plural inflection of πρᾶγμα (prágma, "deed", "act", "practice", "occurrence", "matter", "affair", "thing of importance", "concrete reality") meaning "**troubles**", "annoyances", "bad things", "painful consequences".

Twice elsewhere (KD20, KD37) Epicurus employs the word ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ (prágmata) to describe "actual facts, not illusory opinions" instead of "troubles" or "annoyances".

SYNEKHETAI - ΣΥΝΕΧΕΤΑΙ - συνέχεται - /syˈ**ne**.kʰe.taɪ/ - from συνέχω (sunékhō, "to hold or keep together", "secure", "confine", "enclose", "compass", "keep from dispersing") meaning "sticks together", "keep together in friendship", "**constrained**".

TOIOUTON - ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ - τοιούτου - /toɪ.ˈ**u**ːton/ - the genitive singular inflection of τοιοῦτος (toioútos) from τοῖος (toîos, "of this sort") + οὗτος (hoûtos, "this") meaning "**such**".

II (2)

ANAISTHETEI - ΑΝΑΙΣΘΗΤΕΙ - ἀναισθητεῖ - /aːnaɪs.tʰɛːˈ**teɪ**/ - related to ἀναίσθητος (anaîsthetos, "insensate", "unfeeling")from ἀν- (àn-, "without") + αισθητός (aisthetós, "perceptibility", "sensibility") meaning "**devoid of sensation**", "unconsciousness", "no sense-experience", "absence of sensation", "lacks awareness", "no feeling", "no perception".

The related word ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ (aîsthēsis) refers the faculty of sensation whereby "certain particles [are] carried off from the object of suitable size to stir this sense-organ" (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus). ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ is one of three, principle sources of knowledge in Epicurean epistemology, the other two sources of knowledge being ΠΑΘΗ (páthe, "feeling") and ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ (prólepsis, "anticipation").

ANAISTHETOUN - ΑΝΑΙΣΘΗΤΟΥΝ - ἀναισθητοῦν - /aːnaɪs.tʰɛːˈ**tuːn**/ - related to ἀναίσθητος (anaîsthetos, "insensate", "unfeeling") from ἀν- (àn-, "without") + αισθητός (aisthetós, "perceptibility", "sensibility") meaning "**devoid of sensation**", "unconsciousness", "no sense-experience", "absence of sensation", "lacks awareness", "no perception".

DIALYTHEN - ΔΙΑΛΥΘΕΝ - διαλυθὲν - /diːa.ly.ˈtʰen/ - from διαλύω (*dialūō*) from δια- (*dia-*, "through") + λυθὲν (*luthén*), the third-person, plural, aorist, passive indicative inflection of λύω (*lúō*, adjectival suffix) meaning "loosened", "released", "**dissolved**", "destroyed", "dispersed", "disintegrated", "broken down into atoms".

> *"When the whole body is destroyed, it no longer possesses sensation, because the soul is dissolved and no longer has the same powers and motions. For whenever the body holding the soul is no longer able to confine and contain it, we cannot think of the soul as still experiencing sensation, since it would no longer have the use of the appropriate mechanisms." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus).*

OUDEN - ΟΥΔΕΝ - οὐδὲν - /uːˈdɛːn/ - an inflection of οὐδείς (*oúdeis*, "no one", "nobody", "none", "no") from οὐδέ (*oudé*, "and not", "not even") + εἷς (*heîs*, "one") meaning "**nothing**".

> *"First of all […] nothing is created out of that which does not exist: for if it were, everything would be created out of everything …." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)*

THANATOS - ΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ - θάνατος - /ˈtʰa.na.tos/ - from θνήσκω (*thnéiskō*, "I die", "to be killed") meaning "**death**", that which comes when we are no longer present.

> *"Excessive pain will send you to death." (Epicurus, Fragment 65)*

III (3)

ALGOUN - ΑΛΓΟΥΝ - ἀλγοῦν - /aːlˈguːn/ the present contracted neuter infinitive participle ἄλγος (*álgos*, "**pain**"), meaning "suffering", "illness", "hardship".

> *"All bodily suffering is easy to disregard: for that which causes acute pain has short duration, and that which endures long in the flesh causes but mild pain." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 4; KD4)*

ALGOUNTOS - ΑΛΓΟΥΝΤΟΣ - αλγοῦντος - /aːlˈguːn.tos/ - from ἄλγος (*álgos*, "pain") meaning "**everything painful**", "all things painful", "all pains".

HEDOMENON - ΗΔΟΜΕΝΟΝ - ἡδόμενον - /hɛːˈdom.en.on/ - the passive participle of ἥδομαι (*hédomai*, "to be pleased") meaning fleshly "**pleasure**", "physical enjoyment".

> *"We call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)*

HEDONON - ΗΔΟΝΩΝ - ἡδονῶν - /hɛːdon.ˈɔːn/ - the genitive plural form of ἡδονὴ (*hedoné*, "enjoyment", "pleasure", "satisfaction", "delight") meaning "**pleasures**" or "delights".

"For it is then that we have need of pleasure, when we feel pain owing to the absence of pleasure; (but when we do not feel pain), we no longer need pleasure." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

HYPEXAIRESIS - ΗΥΠΕΞΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ - ὑπεξαίρεσις - /hyːpek.ˈsaɪ.re.siːs/ - from + ἐξαίρεσις (*exaîresis*, "purgation") meaning "**removal**", "elimination".

"That which creates insuperable joy is the complete removal of a great evil." (Epicurus, Fragment 61)

KHRONON - ΧΡΟΝΟΝ - χρόνον - /ˈkʰron.on/ - accusative singular inflection of χρόνος (*khrónos*) meaning "time period", "a **time**", "for a while".

LYPOUMENON - ΛΥΠΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ - λυπούμενον - /lyːˈpuːme.non/ - the present, passive infinitive of λῡπέω (*lupéō*, "to cause pain", "to distress", "to grieve") meaning "pain", "distress", "**sadness**", and "grief", specifically, "psychological *pain*".

"The wise man will not be subject to grief." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 8)

MEGETHOUS - ΜΕΓΕΘΟΥΣ - μεγέθους - /me.ˈge.tʰuːs/ - from μεγέθος (*megéthos*, "size") meaning "great", "**magnitude**", "loudness", "quantitative limit", "maximum", "upper limit", "total power", the "full measurement of greatness", "100%".

"The greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 77)

PANTOS - ΠΑΝΤΟΣ - παντός - /pan.ˈtos/ - a genitive singular inflection of πᾶς (pâs), "the whole", "consisting", "composed wholly") meaning "**everything**", "all".

"… those whose mind is in an evil state are always poor in everything and in their greed are plunged into capricious desires." (Epicurus, Fragment 68)

SYNAMPHOTERON - ΣΥΝΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΝ - συναμφότερον - /syːnam.ˈpʰot.er.on/ - an inflection of συναμφότεροι (*sunamphóteroi*, "both together") meaning "**both**", "combination".

"Wherefore both when young and old a man must study philosophy, that as he grows old he may be young in blessings through the grateful recollection of what has been, and that in youth he may be old as well, since he will know no fear of what is to come." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

IV (4)

AKRON - ΑΚΡΟΝ - ἄκρον - /ˈaːkron/ - an inflection of ἄκρος (*ákros*) meaning "**extreme**", "acutest", "peak", "intense", "sharpest", highest", "mountain top", "end".

"[B]read and water produce the highest pleasure, when one who needs them puts them to his lips." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

ALGOUN - ΑΛΓΟΥΝ - ἀλγοῦν - /aːl.**ˈguː**n/ - the present contracted neuter infinitive participle of ἄλγος (*álgos*), meaning "**pain**", "suffering", "illness", "hardship".

> "[Let the divine nature] be preserved free from burdensome duties and in entire blessedness." (Epicurus' Epistle to Pythocles)

ARROSTION - ΑΡΡΩΣΤΙΩΝ - ἀρρωστιῶν - /aːrːɔːsti.**ˈɔː**n/ - an inflection of ἀρρωστία (*arrostía*) meaning "disease", "**illness**", "infirmities", "malady", "sickness".

EKHOUSI - ΕΧΟΥΣΙ - ἔχουσι - /**ˈe**ːkuːsiː/ - the third-person plural present active indicative inflection of ἔχω (*ékhō*, "possess", "keep") meaning "**have**", "permit", "contain".

ELAKHISTON - ΕΛΑΧΙΣΤΟΝ - ἐλάχιστον - /eˈ**la**.kʰiːston/ - the accusative, masculine singular form of ἐλάχιστος (*elákhistos*, "smallest") meaning "least", "**shortest**", "fewest".

HEDOMENON - ΗΔΟΜΕΝΟΝ - ἡδόμενον - /heːˈ**dom**.en.on/ - the passive participle of ἥδομαι (*hedomai*, "to be pleased") meaning "**pleasure**", comfort", "delights".

> "[W]e call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

HEMERAS - ΗΜΕΡΑΣ - ἡμέρας - /hɛːˈ**me**.ras/ - an inflection of ἡμέρα (*heméra*) meaning "**day**", "state", "time of life".

> "Forgetting the good that has been, he has become old this very day." (VS 19)

HYPERTEINON - ΥΠΕΡΤΕΙΝΟΝ - ὑπερτεῖνον - /hyːper.ˈ**teɪ**.non/ - related to ὑπερτείνω (*hyperteîno*, "stretch", "lay above", "strain", "go beyond") meaning "**exceeds**", "outweighs".

KHRONIZEI - ΧΡΟΝΙΖΕΙ - χρονίζει - /kʰro.ˈ**ni**ːzeɪ/ - related to the word χρονίζω (*khronízō*, "spend time", "persevere", "prolonged", "delayed") meaning "**continuous**", "constant".

> "For the flow of atoms from the surface of bodies is continuous, yet it cannot be detected by any lessening in the size of the object …." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)

KHRONON - ΧΡΟΝΟΝ - χρόνον - /ˈ**kʰron**.on/ - accusative singular inflection of χρόνος (*khrónos*) meaning "time period", "a **time**", "for a while".

MONON - ΜΟΝΟΝ - μόνον - /ˈ**mon**.on/ - the adverbial accusative inflection of μόνος (*mónos*) meaning "only just", "**barely**", "just", "merely", "only", "hardly"

PLEONAZON - ΠΛΕΟΝΑΖΟΝ - πλεονάζον - /ple.on.ˈ**az**.on/ - related to πλεονάζω (*pleonázō*, "to be more", "superfluous", "go beyond") meaning "**excess**", "predominance".

"Frugality too has a limit, and the man who disregards it is like him who errs through excess." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 63)

POLLAS - ΠΟΛΛΑΣ - πολλὰς - /pol:'**as**/ - feminine accusative plural of πολὺς (*polús*) meaning "much", "**many**", "often", "might", "great", "strong".

POLYKHRONIOI - ΠΟΛΥΧΡΟΝΙΟΙ - πολυχρόνιοι - /po.ly:'**kʰron**.i:oi/ from πολυ- (*poly-*, "many") + χρόνος (*khrónos*, "time") + -ιος (*-ios*) meaning "of olden time", "ancient", "long-lasting", "long-protracted", "**long-standing**", "long-lived".

SARKA - ΣΑΡΚΑ - σάρκα - /'**sar**.ka/ - the accusative singular form of σάρξ (*sarks*, "skin", "body", "meat", "pulp") meaning "**flesh**", describing the physical nature of pleasure.

SARKI - ΣΑΡΚΙ - σαρκὶ - /'sar.'**ki**:/ - the dative singular inflection of σάρξ (*sarks*, "skin", "body", "meat", "pulp") meaning "**flesh**", describing the physical nature of pleasure.

"The flesh cries out to be saved from hunger, thirst, and cold. For if a man possess this safety and hope to possess it, he might rival even Zeus in happiness." (VS 33)

SYMBAINEI - ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙ - συμβαίνει - /sy:m.'**baɪ**.neɪ/ - the third-person singular present inflection of συμβαίνω (*symbaîno*, "come together", "meet") meaning "**together**", "at once".

SYNEKHOS - ΣΥΝΕΧΩΣ - συνεχῶς - /sy:ne.'**kʰɔ**:s/ - derived, singular adverb of συνεχής (*sunekhḗs*, "constant", "continuous", "sustained"); "without interruption", "**continuously**".

"And the atoms move continuously for all time, some of them falling straight down, others swerving, and others recoiling from their collisions." (Epistle to Herodotus)

V (5)

DIKAIOS - ΔΙΚΑΙΩΣ - δικαίως - /di:'**kaɪ**.ɔ:s/ - derived, singular adverb of δίκαιος (*díkaios*, "observant", "righteous", "lawful") meaning to live "**justly**", "decently", "agreeably".

"The love of money, if unjustly gained, is impious, and, if justly gained, is shameful; for it is unseemly to be parsimonious even with justice on one's side." (Vatican Saying 43)

HEDEOS - ΗΔΕΩΣ - ἡδέως - /hɛ:'**de**.ɔ:s/ - derived, singular adverb of ἡδύς (*hedós*, "pleasant", "glad") meaning that which lives "joyously", "**pleasantly**", "gladly".

HYPARKHEI - ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙ - ὑπάρχει - /hy:'**par**.kʰeɪ/ - the third-person singular present inflection of the the verb ὑπάρχω (*hupárkhō*, "to begin") from ὕπο- (*húpo-*, "under") + ἄρχω (*árkhō*, "to begin") meaning "origin" or "**beginning**".

KALOS - ΚΑΛΩΣ - καλῶς - /ka.'**lɔ**:s/- derived, singular adverb of καλός (*kalós*, "beautiful", "noble") meaning "honourably", "**well**", "properly", "rightly", "thoroughly", "deservedly".

"The noble soul occupies itself with wisdom and friendship; of these the one is a mortal good, the other immortal." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 78)

PHRONIMOS - ΦΡΟΝΙΜΩΣ - φρονίμως - /pʰro.ˈniːmɔːs/ - derived, singular adverb of φρόνησῐς (*phrónimos*, "prudence", "practical wisdom") meaning "sensibly" or "**prudently**".

"[T]he greatest good is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy: for from prudence are sprung all the other virtues, and it teaches us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honourably and justly, (nor, again, to live a life of prudence, honour, and justice) without living pleasantly. For the virtues are by nature bound up with the pleasant life, and the pleasant life is inseparable from them." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

ZEN - ΖΗΝ - ζῆν - /ˈdzεːn/ - the present, active infinitive of ζάω (*záō*, "to live") , from the proto-Hellenic *ďőwō*, meaning "**live**", "lives", "living".

"Praise from others must come unasked, and we must concern ourselves with the healing of our own lives." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 64)

VI (6)

AGATHON - ΑΓΑΘΟΝ - ἀγαθόν - /a.ga.ˈtʰon/ - singular accusative inflection of ἀγαθός (*agathós*, "good", "brave", "noble", "moral", "fortunate") meaning "**good**".

"I do not know how I can conceive the good, if I withdraw the pleasures of taste, withdraw the pleasures of love, withdraw the pleasures of hearing, and withdraw the pleasurable emotions caused by the sight of a beautiful form." (Fragment 10)

ANTHROPON - ΑΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ - ἀνθρώπων - /aːnˈtʰrɔːpɔːn/ - the genitive plural of ἄνθρωπος (*ánthropos*, "human being", "person") meaning "men", "humanity", "**people**".

ARKHES - ΑΡΧΗΣ - ἀρχῆς - /ar.ˈkʰεːs/ - the singular, genitive declension of ἀρχή (*arkhḗ*, "beginning", "dominion", "authority") meaning the "**natural origin**".

"We call pleasure the beginning […] of the blessed life […] the first good innate in us […] we begin every act of choice and avoidance [...] using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

BASILEIAS - ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΑΣ - βασιλείας - /ba.si.ˈleɪ.as/ - the genitive, singular inflection of βασιλεία (*basileîa*, "kingdom", "dominion", "monarchy") from βασιλεύς (*basileús*, "king") + -ίᾱ (*-íā*, abstract noun suffix) meaning "**kingship**".

"The wise man will not become a tyrant. […] The wise man will appease an absolute ruler when occasion requires. (Epicurus, Wise Man Sayings 15, 33)

PARASKEUAZESTHAI - ΠΑΡΑΣΣΕΥΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ - παρασκευάζεσθαι - /pa.ra.skeu̯.ˈaz.es.tʰaɪ/ - an inflection of παρασκευάζω (*paraskeuázō*, "get ready", "prepare") meaning "**provides**", "procures", "arrange", "establish".

>   *"[T]he void can neither act nor be acted upon, but only provides opportunity of motion through itself to bodies." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)*

PHYSIN - ΦΥΣΙΝ - φύσιν - /ˈpʰyːsiːn/ - a singular, nominative of φύω (*phúō*, "grow") + -σῐς (*-sis*) meaning "**nature**", "origin", "birth", "quality", "property".

THARREIN - ΘΑΡΡΕΙΝ - θαρρεῖν - /tʰarːˈeɪn/ - the present active infinitive of θαρρέω (*tharréō*, "I dare", "I am of courage") from θάρσος (*thársos*, "courage") + -έω (*-éō*, denominal suffix) meaning "feel secure", "feeling confident", "**confidence**", "assurance of safety".

>   *"The wise man that courage is a quality that does not come by nature, but by a consideration of what is to one's advantage." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 40)*

VII (7)

AGATHON - ΑΓΑΘΟΝ - ἀγαθόν - /aːgaˈtʰon/ - singular accusative inflection of ἀγαθός (*agathós*, "good", "brave", "noble", "moral", "fortunate") meaning a natural "**good**".

>   *"I do not know how I can conceive the good, if I withdraw the pleasures of taste, withdraw the pleasures of love, withdraw the pleasures of hearing, and withdraw the pleasurable emotions caused by the sight of a beautiful form." (Fragment 10)*

ANTHROPON - ΑΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ - ἀνθρώπων - /aːnˈtʰrɔːpɔːn/ - the genitive plural of ἄνθρωπος (*ánthropos*, "human being", "person") meaning "men", "humanity", "**people**".

APELABON - ΑΠΕΛΑΒΟΝ - ἀπέλαβον - /aːˈpe.la.bon/ - related to ἀπολαμβάνω (*apolambánō*, "take", "receive", "regain", "recover") meaning "**attained**", "obtained", "reaped", "achieved", "made", "received".

>   *"When once a man has attained wisdom he no longer has any contrary tendency to it, nor does he willingly pretend that he has. He will be more deeply moved by feelings than others, but this will not prove to be an obstacle to wisdom." (Wise Man Saying 2)*

ARKHES - ΑΡΧΗΣ - ἀρχῆς - /aːrˈkʰɛːs/ - the genitive singular of ἀρχή (*arkhé*, "origin", "beginning") from ἄρχω (*árkhō*, "to begin") meaning "**originally**" or "at first".

>   *"Dreams have no divine character nor any prophetic force, but they originate from the influx of images." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 24)*

ASPHALEIAN - ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑΝ - ἀσφάλειαν - /aːsˈpʰa.leɪ.an/ - from ἀσφαλής (*asphallés*, "immovable", "steadfast", "unshaken", "unfailing", "trusty") from ἀ- (*a-*, "un-") + σφάλλω (*sphállō*, "to overthrow") + -ής (*-ḗs*) meaning "**security**", "surety", "certainty".

"Against all else it is possible to provide security, but as against death all of us mortals alike dwell in an unfortified city." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 39)

ASPHALES - ΑΣΦΑΛΗΣ - ἀσφαλὴς - /aːspʰaˈlɛːs/ - from ἀσφαλής (*asphallḗs*, "immovable", "steadfast", "unshaken", "unfailing", "trusty") from ἀ- (*a-*, "un-") + σφᾰλλω (*sphállō*, "to overthrow") + -ής (*-ḗs*) meaning that which is "**safe**" and "**secure**".

"And when [pleasure] is once secured for us, all the tempest of the soul is dispersed, since the living creature has not to wander as though in search of something that is missing, and to look for some other thing by which he can fulfil the good of the soul and the good of the body" (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

BIOS - ΒΙΟΣ - βίος - /ˈbiːos/ - the singular nominative of βίος (*bíos*) meaning "**life**", *not* a "life form", *but rather*, a "*mode* of life", "*manner* of living", "lifetime", "livelihood".

"We are born once and cannot be born twice, but for all time must be no more. But you, who are not master of tomorrow, postpone your happiness. Life is wasted in procrastination and each one of us dies without allowing himself leisure." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 14)

EBOULETHESAN - ΕΒΟΥΛΗΘΗΣΑΝ - ἐβουλήθησαν - /eːbuˈlɛːtʰɛːsan/ - the third-person aorist plural passive indicative inflection of βούλομαι (*boúlomai*, "will", "wish", "object of desire", "prefer") meaning "**wished**", "sought", "chosen", "wanted", "desired", "longed".

"We should not spoil what we have by desiring what we do not have, but remember that what we have too was the gift of fortune." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 35)

EKHOUSIN - ΕΧΟΥΣΙΝ - ἔχουσιν - /ˈeːkʰuːsiːn/ - the third-person plural present active indicative inflection of ἔχω (*ékhō*) meaning "**possess**", obtain", "attain", "have", "gain".

"[A]toms do not possess any of the qualities belonging to perceptible things [...] For every quality changes; but the atoms do not change at all, since there must needs be something which remains solid and indissoluble at the dissolution of compounds, which can cause changes ...." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)

ENDOXOI - ΕΝΔΟΞΟΙ - ἔνδοξοι - /ˈen.dok.soɪ/ - an inflection of ἔνδοξος (*éndoksos*, "held in esteem," "honour", or "high repute", "notable", "generally approved", "glorious", "conspicuously", "resting on opinion") meaning "**famous**", "celebrity", "esteemed".

"We value our characters as something peculiar to ourselves, whether they are good and we are esteemed by men or not, so ought we value the characters of others, if they are well-disposed to us." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 15)

GENESTHAI - ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ - γενέσθαι - /ge.ˈnes.tʰai/ - the aorist middle infinitive inflection of γίγνομαι (*gígnomai*, "to come into being") meaning "to be", "**to become**".

NOMIZONTES - ΝΟΜΙΖΟΝΤΕΣ - νομίζοντες - /no.'**mi**:zon.tes/ - the masculine nominative/vocative plural inflection of νομίζων (*nomízōn*, "use customarily", "practice") meaning "**thinking**", "believing", "supposing".

OIKEION - ΟΙΚΕΙΟΝ - οἰκεῖον - /oɪ.'**keɪ**.on/ - from οἰκεῖος (*oikéïos*, "in the house", "at home", "domestic", "private", "personal") meaning "order", "[one's] **own promptings**", "instinct", "rule", "principle", "affinity".

> *"Most beautiful too is the sight of those near and dear to us, when our original kinship makes us of one mind; for such sight is great incitement to this end." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 61)*

OREKHTHESAN - ΟΡΕΧΘΗΣΑΝ - ὠρέχθησαν - /o:'**rek**ʰ.tʰɛ:san/ - from ὀρέγω (*orégō*, "I stretch") meaning "**desired**", "sought" "strove", "reached out".

PERIBLEPTOI - ΠΕΡΙΒΛΕΠΤΟΙ - περίβλεπτοί - /pe.'**ri**:blep.toɪ/ - an inflection of περίβλεπτος (*peribleptos*, "looked at from all sides") meaning "powerful", "renowned", "conspicuous", "in the public eye", "**admired**", "respected", "enviable", "celebrated".

> *"I spit upon the beautiful and those who vainly admire it, when it does not produce any pleasure." (Epicurus, Fragment 79)*

PERIPOIESESTHAI - ΠΕΡΙΠΟΙΗΣΕΣΘΑΙ - περιποιήσεσθαι - /pe.ri:poɪ.'**ɛ:s**.es.tʰaɪ/ - the middle, future infinitive of περιποιέω (*peripoiéo*, "cause to remain over and above", "to keep save", "preserve", "procure"), from περι- (*peri-*, "about", "around") + ποιέω (*poiéō*, "to create", "to produce"), meaning "**make secure**", "achieve security", "gain protection".

> *"There is no advantage to obtaining protection from other men so long as we are alarmed by events above or below the earth or in general by whatever happens in the boundless universe. (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 72; KD13)*

PHYSEOS - ΦΥΣΕΩΣ - φύσεως - /'**p**ʰ**y**:se.ɔ:s/ - the singular genitive form of φύσις (*phúsis*, "origin", "birth", "nature", "quality", "property", "form", "shape") meaning "**natural**".

TOIOUTON - ΤΟΙΟΥΤΩΝ - τοιούτων - /toɪ.'**u**:tɔ:n/ - an inflection of τοιοῦτος (*toioútos*) from τοῖος (*toîos*, "of this sort") + οὗτος (*hoûtos*, "this") meaning "**such**", "these [things]."

VIII (8)

EPIPHEREI - ΕΠΙΦΕΡΕΙ - ἐπιφέρει - /e:pi:'**p**ʰ**e**.reɪ/ - related to ἐπιφέρω (*epiphérō*, "place upon", "put", "lay", "inflict") meaning "**bring**", "entail", "produce".

> *"And so plain savours bring us a pleasure equal to a luxurious diet, when all the pain due to want is removed; and bread and water produce the highest pleasure, when one who needs them puts them to his lips." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)*

HEDONE - ΗΔΟΝΗ - ἡδονὴ - /hɛːdon.'ɛː/ - related to the root ἡδύς (*hedús*, "pleasant", "welcome", "suave", "sweet") meaning "enjoyment", "**pleasure**", "satisfaction", "delight".

> *"Beauty and virtue and the like are to be honored, if they give pleasure; but if they do not give pleasure, we must bid them farewell." (Epicurus, Fragment 12)*

HEDONON - ΗΔΟΝΩΝ - ἡδονῶν - /hɛːdon.'ɔːn/ - the genitive plural inflection of ἡδονὴ (*hedoné*, "enjoyment", "pleasure", "satisfaction") meaning "**pleasures**" or "delights".

> *"Freedom from trouble in the mind and from pain in the body are static pleasures, but joy and exultation are considered as active pleasures involving motion." (Fragment 1)*

KAKON - ΚΑΚΟΝ - κακόν - /ka.'kon/ - the singular accusative inflection of κακός (*kakós*, "worthless", "useless", "injurious", "wretched", "unhappy") meaning "**bad**" or "evil", *possibly* connected with the Proto-Indo-European root *kakka- ("to defecate", "to shit").

> *"[E]very pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided. Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)*

OKHLESEIS - ΟΧΛΗΣΕΙΣ - οχλήσεις - /okʰ.'lɛːseɪs/ - a plural of ὄχλησις (*ókhlesis*) meaning "nuisances", "**disturbances**", "perturbations", "annoyances", "troubles", or "vexations".

> *"The disturbance of the soul cannot be ended nor true joy created either by the possession of the greatest wealth or by honor and respect in the eyes of the mob or by anything else that is associated with or caused by unlimited desire." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 81)*

OUDEMIA - ΟΥΔΕΜΙΑ - οὐδεμία - /uːde.'miːa/ - a feminine singular inflection of οὐδείς (*oudeîs*) meaning "not one", "no one", "nothing", "none", "**no**".

> *"Let no one when young delay to study philosophy, nor when he is old grow weary of his study. For no one can come too early or too late to secure the health of his soul." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)*

POIETIKA - ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΑ - ποιητικὰ - /pɔɪ.ɛːti.'ka/ - the singular, nominative feminine inflection of ποιητικός (*poietikós*, "creative", "productive", "inventive", "poetic"), meaning "[**those things that] make**" or "[those things that] produce".

> *"We must then meditate on the things that make our happiness seeing that when that is with us we have all, but when it is absent we do all to win it." (Epistle to Menoikeus)*

POLLAPLASIOUS - ΠΟΛΛΑΠΛΑΣΙΟΥΣ - πολλαπλασίους - /polːap.la.'siːuːs/ - related to πολλαπλάσιος (*pollaplásios*) meaning "**many times greater**".

"And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

IX (9)

ALLELON - ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ - ἀλλήλων - /aːlˈɛːlɔːn/ - from the word ἄλλος (*állos*, "another", "one besides", "else", "other", "the rest") meaning "**one from another**."

ATHROISMA - ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ - ἄθροισμα - /ˈaːtʰroɪs.ma/ - related to ἄθροισμα (*áthroisma*, "a gathering", "assemblage of atoms") meaning "**body**", "frame", "all over".

"[Y]ou must consider that the soul is a body of fine particles distributed throughout the whole structure …." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)

DIEPHERON - ΔΙΕΦΕΡΟΝ - διέφερον - /diːˈe.pʰe.ron/ - a first-person plural imperfect active indicative inflection of διαφέρω (*diaphérō*, "carry") meaning "**differ**".

HEDONAI - ΗΔΟΝΑΙ - ἡδοναί - /hɛːdon.ˈaɪ/ - related to ἡδύς (*hedús*, "sweet") meaning "**pleasures**", "delights", "enjoyments", *things* that provide the feeling of pleasure.

"I summon you to continuous pleasures and not to vain and empty virtues which have but a desperate hope for rewards." (Epicurus, Fragment 23)

HEDONE - ΗΔΟΝΗ - ἡδονὴ - /hɛːdon.ˈɛː/ - related to the root ἡδύς (*hedús*, "pleasant", "welcome", "suave", "sweet") meaning "enjoyment", "**pleasure**", "satisfaction", "delight".

"When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we [mean] freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

HOLON - ΟΛΟΝ - ὅλον - /ˈho.lon/ - an inflection of ὅλος (*hólos*) from the Proto-Indo-European *solh₂wós* meaning "**whole**".

"Even if the wise man should lose his eyesight, he will not end his whole life, as he says in the same book." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 17)

HYPERKHEN - ΥΠΗΡΧΕΝ - ὑπῆρχεν - /hyːˈpɛːr.kʰen/ - related to ὑπάρχω (*hypárkhō*, "to begin") from ὕπο- (*hupo-*, "under") + ἄρχω (*árkhō*, "to begin") meaning "was", "**were**".

KATEPUKNOUTO - ΚΑΤΕΠΥΚΝΟΥΤΟ - κατεπυκνοῦτο - /ka.te.pyːk.ˈnuːto/ - related to καταπυκνόω (*katapuknóō*, "stud thickly", "compress") meaning "**condensed**", "capable of accumulation", "intensified", "cumulative", "prolonged", "added together consecutively", compressed in time and intensity", "concentrated"

KHRONOI - ΧΡΟΝΩι - χρόνῳ - /ˈkʰron.ɔːi̯/ - an inflection of χρόνος (*khrónos*) meaning "lasted", "gone on", "**duration**", "time", "prolonged", "entire span".

KURIOTATA - ΚΥΡΙΟΤΑΤΑ - κυριώτατα - /ky:ri:'ɔ:ta.ta/ - from κῦριος (*kúrios*, "having authority over", "with power of", "sovereign", "principal") + τατος (-*tatos*, "greatest", "most", "best") meaning "essential", "principal", "dominant, **most important**", "primary".

> ΚΥΡΙΟΤΑΤΑ (*kuriótata*) *is derived from the same root as* ΚΥΡΙΑΙ (*kúriai*), *from Epicurus'* ΚΥΡΙΑΙ ΔΟΞΑΙ (*Kúriai Dóxai*), *the* "*key*", "*authorized*", "*principal*", "*fundamental*", "*authoritative*", "*peculiar*", "*masterful*", "*established*", "*sovereign*", "*leading*", "*master*", "*sovran*", "*golden*", "*chief*", *or* "*main*" *doctrines*).

PHYSEOS - ΦΥΣΕΩΣ - φύσεως - /'pʰy:se.ɔ:s/ - the singular genitive form of φύσις (*phúsis*, "origin", "birth", "nature", "quality", "property", "form", "shape") meaning "**natural**".

X (10)

ALGEDONON - ΑΛΓΕΔΟΝΩΝ - ἀλγηδόνων - /a:l.gɛ:'don.ɔ:n/ - plural form of αλγηδόνα (*algedóna*, "pain", "aching") meaning "**pain**", "distress".

> "*The occurrence of certain bodily pains assists us in guarding against others like them.*" (*Epicurus, Vatican Saying 73*)

ALGOUN - ΑΛΓΟΥΝ - ἀλγοῦν - /a:l.'gu:n/ - the present contracted neuter infinitive participle ἄλγος (*álgos*) meaning "**pain** [of the body]", "suffering", "illness", "hardship".

> "*Excessive pain will send you to death.*" (*Epicurus, Fragment 65*)

ASOTOUS - ΑΣΟΤΟΥΣ - ἀσώτους - /a:'sɔ:tu:s/ - the accusative masculine plural inflection of ἄσωτος (*ásōtos*, "abandoned") from ἀ- (a-, "not") + σώζω (*sṓizō*, "save") meaning "condemned", "debauched", "dissolute", "**profligate**".

> "*[W]e do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality [...] but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind.*" (*Epistle to Menoikeus*)

DIANOIAS - ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑΣ - διανοίας - /di:a.'noɪ.as/ - an inflection of διάνοια (*diánoia*, "thought", "intention", "purpose", "spirit", "heart", "thinking faculty", "intelligence", "understanding", "intellect"), from δια- (*dia-*, "through") + νόος (*nóos*, "mind", "sense"") + -ια (-*ia*, the noun suffix), "meaning "the **mind**" or "mental apprehensions".

> "*[I]t is [...] sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choice and avoidance, and banishing mere opinions [which produces a pleasant life].*" (*Epistle to Menoikeus*)

EDIDASKEN - ΕΔΙΔΑΣΚΕΝ - ἐδίδασκεν - /e:'di:das.ken/ - related to διδάσκω (*didásko*, "instruct", "indicate", "explain") meaning "**teach**", "taught", "told".

> "*The wise man will teach things that are definite, rather than doubtful musings.* (*Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 15*)

EIKHOMEN - EIXOMEN - εἴχομεν - /ˈeɪ.kʰom.en/ - first-person plural imperfect active indicative of ἔχω (*ékhō*) meaning "**possess**", obtain", "attain", "have", "gain".

> *"[A]toms do not possess any of the qualities belonging to perceptible things [...] For every quality changes; but the atoms do not change at all ...." (Epistle to Herodotus)*

EKHOUSIN - EXOYΣIN - ἔχουσιν - /ˈe:kʰu:si:n/ - the third-person plural present active indicative inflection of ἔχω (*ékhō*) meaning "**possess**", obtain", "attain", "have", "gain".

EKPLEROUMENOIS - EKΠΛΗΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΙΣ - ἐκπληρουμένοις - /e:k.plɛ:ru:ˈme.noɪs/ - from ἐκ- (*ek-* "out", "away", "off") + πληρούντως (*plēroúntōs*, "completely", "exactly") meaning "overflowing", "**wholly**", "fully", "filled", "satisfied".

EPITHYMION - ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ - ἐπιθυμιῶν - /e:pi:tʰy:mi:ˈɔ:n/ - the genitive plural inflection of επιθυμία (*epithumía*, "desire", "yearning", "appetite", "wish", "longing") meaning "passion", "striving", "interest", "**desires**".

> *"Every desire must be confronted by this question: what will happen to me if the object of my desire is accomplished and what if it is not?" (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 72)*

HEDONON - ΗΔΟΝΩΝ - ἡδονῶν - /hɛ:don.ˈɔ:n/ - the genitive plural inflection of ἡδονὴ (*hedoné*, "enjoyment", "pleasure", "satisfaction") meaning "**pleasures**" or "delights".

> *"[N]ot every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)*

KAKON - KAKON - κακόν - /ka.ˈkon/ - the singular accusative form of κακός (*kakós*, "worthless", "useless", "injurious", "wretched", "unhappy") meaning "**bad**", "evil"; *possibly* connected with the Proto-Indo-European root **kakka-* ("to defecate", "to shit").

> *"[E]very pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided. [...] we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)*

LYPOUMENON - ΛΥΠΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ - λυπούμενον - /ly:ˈpu:.me.non/ - the present, passive infinitive of λῡπέω (*lupéō*, "to cause pain", "to distress", "to grieve") meaning "pain", "distress", "**sadness**", and "grief", specifically, "psychological pain".

> *"The wise man will not be subject to grief." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 8)*

MEMPSAIMETHA - ΜΕΜΦΑΙΜΕΘΑ - μεμψαίμεθα – /memp.ˈsaɪ.me.tʰa/ - related to μέμφομαι (*mémpsomai*) meaning "**blame**", "censure", "find fault".

> *"Let us not blame the flesh as the cause of great evils, nor blame fate for our distresses." (Epicurus, Fragment 63)*

METEORON - ΜΕΤΕΩΡΩΝ - μετεώρων - /me.te.ˈɔː.rɔːn/ - nominative plural of μετέωρος (*metéōros*, "raised from the ground,") from μετά (*metá*, "beyond") + ἀείρω (*aeîrō*, "I lift up, raise") meaning "the heavens", "celestial and atmospheric phenomena", "astronomical phenomena", "heavenly bodies", "phenomena of the sky", "**what is above**".

> *"For in the case of all celestial phenomena this process of investigation must never be abandoned – for if one is in opposition to clear-seen facts, he can never have his part in true peace of mind." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)*

OUDAMOTHEN - ΟΥΔΑΜΟΘΕΝ - οὐδαμόθεν - /uː.da.ˈmo.tʰen/ - meaning "from no place", "from no side", "**from any quarter**", "from everywhere".

> *"[F]lee at full speed from every form of culture." (Epicurus, Fragment 33)*

PANTAKHOTHEN - ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΘΕΝ - πανταχόθεν - /pan.ta.ˈkʰo.tʰen/ - meaning "from all sides", "**from all quarters**", "from every side", "in every way".

> *"Hail is produced both by a powerful congelation, when certain windy bodies form together from all sides and split up." (Epicurus' Epistle to Pythocles)*

PERAS - ΠΕΡΑΣ - πέρας - /ˈpe.ras/ - related to the word πείρω (*peîrō*, "to pierce, to run through"), περάω (*peráō*, "to drive right through"), or πέρα (*péra*), meaning "end", "**limit**", "boundary", "extremity", "perfection", "at length", "at last".

> *"For that which is bounded has an extreme point …." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)*

PHOBOUS - ΦΟΒΟΥΣ - φόβους - /ˈpʰo.buːs/ - the accusative plural form of φόβος (*phóbos*, "fear", "terror", "alarm", "fright", "panic", "reverence") meaning "**the fears**".

> *Phobos ("fear") is the name of the larger of Mars' two moons, the other being Deimos ("dread"), both of which are named for the twin sons of Ares. Phobos is the root of the English suffixes "-phobia", "-phobe", like "Hellenophobia" or "fear of Greek".*

POIETIKA - ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΑ - ποιητικὰ - /pɔi.e.tiˈka/ - the singular, nominative feminine inflection of ποιητικός (*poietikós*, "creative", "productive", "inventive", "poetic"), meaning "**[those things that] make**" or "[those things that] produce".

> *"We must then meditate on the things that make our happiness, seeing that when that is with us we have all, but when it is absent we do all to win it." (Epistle to Menoikeus)*

THANATON - ΘΑΝΑΤΟΝ - θανάτον - /tʰa.ˈnaː.ton/ - the accusative singular form of θάνατος (*thánatos*) meaning "**death**", that which exists when we are no longer present.

> *"Against all else it is possible to provide security, but as against death all of us mortals alike dwell in an unfortified city." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 31)*

XI (11)

ALGEDONON - ΑΛΓΗΔΟΝΩΝ - ἀλγηδόνων - /aːl.ge.ˈ**don**.ɔːn/ - a plural inflection of ἀλγηδόνα (*algedóna*, "pain", "aching", "grief", "sorrow", "sadness") meaning "**pains**".

ENOKHLOUN - ΗΝΩΧΛΟΥΝ - ἠνώχλουν - /hɛː.ˈ**nɔ**ːkʰuːn/ - related to ἐνοχλέω (*enokhléō*) from ἐν (*en-*, "in", "on", "at") + ὄχλος (*okhlos*, "mob", "riot") meaning "disturb", "molest", "**trouble**", "upset", "concern", "perturb", "worry".

> *"Through love of true philosophy, every troublesome and disturbing desire is ended."*
> *(Epicurus, Fragment 66)*

EPITHYMION - ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ - ἐπιθυμιῶν - /eːpi.ˈ**tʰy**ːmiːɔːn/ - the genitive plural inflection of ἐπιθυμία (*epithumía*, "desire", "yearning", "appetite", "wish", "longing") meaning "passion", "striving", "interest", "**desires**".

> *"Unhappiness comes either through fear or through vain and unbridled desire: but if a man curbs these, he can win for himself the blessedness of wisdom."* (Fragment 74)

HYPOPSIAI - ΥΠΟΨΙΑΙ - ὑποψίαι - /hyːpop.ˈ**si**ːaɪ/ - meaning "**apprehensions**", "alarms", "suspicions", "worries", "ill-feelings", "glimpses".

KATANOEIN - ΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ - κατανοεῖν - /ka.ta.no.ˈ**eɪn**/ - the present, active infinitive of κατανοέω (*katanoéō*), from κατα- (*kata-*, "back", "against", "down") + νοέω (*noéō*, "perceive", "observe", "watch", "learn", "know") meaning "to **study**", "contemplate".

> *"Let no one when young delay to study philosophy, nor when he is old grow weary of his study. For no one can come too early or too late to secure the health of his soul. [...] We must then meditate on the things that make our happiness, seeing that when that is with us we have all, but when it is absent we do all to win it."* (Epistle to Menoikeus)

METEORON - ΜΕΤΕΩΡΩΝ - μετεώρων - /me.te.ˈ**ɔ**ːrɔːn/ - nominative plural of μετέωρος (*metéōros*, "raised from the ground,") from μετά (*metá*, "beyond") + ἀείρω (*aeîrō*, "I lift up, raise") meaning "the heavens", "celestial and atmospheric phenomena", "astronomical phenomena", "heavenly bodies", "phenomena of the sky", "**what is above**".

> *"[B]y learning the true causes of celestial phenomena and all other occurrences that come to pass from time to time, we shall free ourselves from all which produces the utmost fear in other men."* (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)

METHEN - ΜΗΘΕΝ - μηθὲν - /mɛː.ˈ**tʰen**/ - related to μηδείς (*medeîs*, "not one") from μηδέ (*mēdé*, "and not") + εἷς (*heîs*, "one") meaning "**no** [thing]", "nothing"

> *"So that as it has no extreme point, it has no limit; and as it has no limit, it must be boundless and not bounded."* (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)

OROUS - ΟΡΟΥΣ - ὅρους - /'**o**ːruːs/ - the genitive singular inflection of ὄρος (*óros*, "mountain", "hill", "canton", "parish", "desert") meaning "**boundaries**", "limits".

PHYSIOLOGIAS - ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ - φυσιολογίας - /pʰyːsiːo.log.'**i**ːas/ - the genitive singular inflection of φυσιολογία (*physiología*) from φύσις (*phúsis*, "nature") + λόγος (*lógos*, "word") meaning "physiological knowledge", "natural science", "**the study of nature**". Eventually, *Physiology* came to mean "the study of organisms" versus *Physics*.

> "*The study of nature does not make men productive of boasting or bragging nor apt to display that culture which is the object of rivalry with the many, but high-spirited and self-sufficient, taking pride in the good things of their own minds and not of their circumstances.*" (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 45)

PROSEDEOMETHA - ΠΡΟΣΕΔΕΟΜΕΘΑ - προσεδεόμεθα - /pros.ed.e.'**om**.etʰ.a/ - related to προσδέω (*prosdéō*, "bind on", "need beside") meaning "**to have need**".

> "*We have need of pleasure when we suffer pain because of pleasure's absence; but when we are not feeling such pain we have no need of pleasure. For the pleasure which arises from nature does not produce wickedness ….*" (Epicurus, Fragment 60)

THANATOU - ΘΑΝΑΤΟΥ - θανάτου - /tʰa.'**na**.tuː/ - the genitive singular form of θανάτου (*thanátos*) meaning "**death**", that which comes when we are no longer present:

> "*Some men throughout their lives spend their time gathering together the means of life, for they do not see that the draught swallowed by all of us at birth is a draught of death.*" (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 30)

XII (12)

AKERAIOUS - ΑΚΕΡΑΙΟΥΣ - ἀκεραίους - /aːke'**raɪ**.uːs/ - the masculine, accusative plural inflection of ἀκεραίους (*akeraîous*) meaning "unmixed", "unalloyed", "purity", "unmitigated", "**pure**", "in full", "undiluted", "unadulterated".

APOLAMBANEIN - ΑΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ - ἀπολαμβάνειν - /aːpo.lam.'**ban**.eɪn/ - related to ἀπολαμβάνω (*apolambánō*, "take", "receive", "learn", "take apart") meaning "enjoy", "**enjoyment**", "attain", "gain", "securing", "obtain", "receive".

HEDONAS - ΗΔΟΝΑΣ - ἡδονάς - /hɛː.don'**a**ːs/ - an inflection of ἡδονὴ (*hedoné*, "a pleasure", "a delight", "an enjoyment") meaning "**pleasure**" or "delight".

> "*[W]e call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good.*" (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

HYPOPTEUOMENON - ΥΠΟΠΤΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΝ - ὑποπτευόμενόν - /hyːpop.ˈteu̯.om.en.non/ - from ὑποψία (*hupopsía*) meaning "**suspicions**", "apprehension", "[nature of] fear".

> *"For if we pay attention to these, we shall rightly trace the causes whence arose our mental disturbance and fear, and, by learning the true causes of celestial phenomena and all other occurrences that come to pass from time to time, we shall free ourselves from all which produces the utmost fear in other men." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)*

KATEIDOTA - ΚΑΤΕΙΔΟΤΑ - κατειδότα - /ka.teɪ.ˈdo.ta/ - related to κάτοιδα (*kátoida*, "to know well", "recognize") meaning "**know**", "understand", "have adequate knowledge".

> *"It is impossible for someone to dispel his fears about the most important matters if he does not know the Nature of the universe but still gives some credence to myths. So without the study of Nature there is no enjoyment of pure pleasure." (VS 49; KD12)*

KURIOTATON - ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΩΝ - κυριωτάτων - /kyːriːɔːˈtaːtɔːn/ an inflection of κύριος (*kúrios*, "sovereign", "lord", "master", "authority") meaning "most essential", "**most important**", "primary", "essential", "highest importance", "supreme importance".

> *ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΩΝ (kuriotátōn) is derived from the same root as ΚΥΡΙΑΙ (kúriai), from Epicurus' ΚΥΡΙΑΙ ΔΟΞΑΙ (Kúriai Dóxai), the "key", "authorized", "principal", "fundamental", "authoritative", "peculiar", "masterful", "established", "sovereign", "leading", "master", "sovran", "golden", "chief", or "main" doctrines).*

LYEIN - ΛΥΕΙΝ - λύειν - /ˈlyːeɪn/ - the present active infinitive of λύω (*lúō*, "to cut off", "separate", "free") meaning "banish", "**dispel**", "rid", "dissolve", "release", "wash away".

MYTHOUS - ΜΥΘΟΥΣ - μύθους - /ˈmyːtʰuːs/ - the accusative plural of μῦθος (*múthos*, "word", "speech", "advice", "counsel") meaning "myth" or "**myths**".

> *"[F]ollow the lead of phenomena: for our life has not now any place for irrational belief and groundless imaginings [...] when one accepts one theory and rejects another, which harmonizes as well with the phenomenon, it is obvious that he altogether leaves the path of scientific inquiry and has recourse to myth." (Epicurus' Epistle to Pythocles)*

PHOBOUMENON - ΦΟΒΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ - φοβούμενον - /pʰo.ˈbuː.me.non/ - inflection of φοβούμενος (*phoboúmenos*) meaning "**fears**", "all fears", "suspicion", "anxieties".

> *"[P]ersons who have perceived all this, but yet do not know what are the natures of these things and what are the essential causes, are still in fear" (Epistle to Herodotus).*

PHYSIOLOGIAS - ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ - φυσιολογίας - /pʰyːsiːo.log.ˈiːas/ - the genitive singular inflection of φυσιολογία (*phusiología*) from φύσις (*phúsis*, "nature") + λόγος (*lógos*, "word") meaning "physiological knowledge", "natural science", "**the study of nature**". Eventually, *Physiology* came to mean "the study of organisms" versus *Physics*.

"[I] urge upon others the constant occupation in the investigation of nature, and find my own peace chiefly in a life so occupied ...." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)

PHYSIS - ΦΥΣΙΣ - φύσις - /ˈpʰyːsiːs/ - from φὔω (*phúō*, "grow") + -σῖς (*-sis*) meaning "origin", "birth", **"nature"**, "quality", "form", "shape', or "physics".

SYMPANTOS - ΣΥΜΠΑΝΤΟΣ - σύμπαντος - /ˈsyːm.pan.tos/ - the genitive singular form of σύμπαν (*súmpan*) meaning the **"whole of"** or the "universe".

"Furthermore, the universe always was such as it is now, and always will be the same. For there is nothing into which it changes: for outside the universe there is nothing which could come into it and bring about the change. Moreover, the universe is bodies and space [...] the universe is boundless." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)

XIII (13)

ANOTHEN - ΑΝΩΘΕΝ - ἄνωθεν - /ˈaːnɔːtʰen/ - from ἄνω (*ánō*, "upwards", "above", "high up") + -θεν (*-then*, adverbial suffix) meaning **"all the heavenly bodies"**, "occurrences over our heads", "things above the earth", "things high up", "in the sky".

ANTHROPOUS - ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥΣ - ἀνθρώπους - /aːnˈtʰrɔːpuːs/ - the accusative plural inflection of ἄνθρωπος (*ánthropos*) meaning "man", "fellow-men", "humans", **"people"**.

APEIROI - ΑΠΕΙΡΩι - ἀπείρῳ - /aːˈpeɪrɔːi̯/ - the dative singular inflection of ἄπειρος (*ápeiros*) from ἀ- (*a-*, "not") + πεῖρα (*peîra*, "trial, attempt") meaning **"infinite"**, "boundless", "limitless", "unbounded", "unlimited".

APLOS - ΑΠΛΩΣ - ἁπλῶς - /aːpˈlɔːs/ - an adverb related to απλός (aplos, "plain", "simple", "single") meaning "in short", "in general", **"generally"**, "without qualification".

"It is not the stomach that is insatiable, as is generally said, but the false opinion that the stomach needs an unlimited amount to fill it." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 59)

ASPHALEIAN - ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑΝ - ἀσφάλειαν - /aːsˈpʰa.leɪ.an/ - from ἀσφαλής (*asphalḗs*, "immovable", "steadfast", "unshaken", "unfailing", "trusty") from ἀ- (*a-*, "un-") + σφάλλω (*sphállō*, "to overthrow") + -ής (*-ḗs*) meaning **"security"**, "surety", "certainty".

HYPOPTON - ΥΠΟΠΤΩΝ - ὑπόπτων - /hyːˈpop.tɔːn/ - from υποψία (*húpopsía*) meaning "suspicion", "jealously", "fearing", "state of apprehension", "[to feel] **alarmed**".

"Most men fear frugality and through their fear are led to actions most likely to produce fear." (Epicurus, Fragment 71)

KATHESTOTON - ΚΑΘΕΣΤΩΤΩΝ - καθεστώτων - /ka.tʰesˈtɔːtɔːn/ - related to the word καθίστημι (*kathístēmi*, "bring down") meaning **"beneath the earth"**, "below", "under".

OPHELOS - ΟΦΕΛΟΣ - ὄφελος - /ˈoːpʰe.los/ - from the Proto-Hellenic *opélos meaning "good", "**advantage**", "profit", "gain", "avail", "use", "furtherance", "help.

OUTHEN - ΟΥΘΕΝ - οὐθὲν - /ˈuːtʰen/ - related to οὐδείς (*oudeîs*) from οὐδέ (*oudé*, "and not, not even") + εἷς (*heîs*, "one") meaning "**no**", "nothing", "not".

> "*Nothing is sufficient for him to whom what is sufficient seems too little.*" (VS 66)

PARASKEUAZESTHAI - ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ - παρασκευάζεσθαι - /pa.ra.skeu̯.ˈaz.es.thaɪ/ - an inflection of παρασκευάζω (*paraskeuázō*, "get ready", "prepare") meaning "**provides**", "procuring", "arrange", "establish".

XIV (14)

ANTHROPON - ΑΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ - ἀνθρώπων - /aːn.ˈtʰrɔːpɔːn/ - the genitive plural of ἄνθρωπος (*ánthropos*, "human being", "person") meaning "humanity", "**people**".

ASPHALEIA - ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑ - ἀσφάλεια - /aːs.ˈpʰaːleɪa/ - related to ἀσφαλής (*asphalḗs*), ἀ- (*a-*, "un-") + σφάλλω (*sphállō*, "to make fall", "overthrow") + -ής (*-ḗs*) meaning "**security**", "immunity", "assurance", "safety", "steadfastness".

> "*The first measure of security is to watch over one's youth and to guard against what makes havoc of all by means of maddening desires.*" (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 80)

ASPHALEIAS - ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑΣ - ἀσφαλείας - /aːs.pʰa.ˈleɪːas/ - an inflection of ἀσφάλεια (*aspháleia*) meaning "**security**", "protection", "safety".

DYNAMEI - ΔΥΝΑΜΕΙ - δυνάμει - /dyˈnaːmeɪː/ - an inflection of δύναμις (*dúnamis*, "might", "strength", "means", "authority", "faculty") from δὔνᾰμαι (*dúnamai*, "I am able", "strong enough") meaning "**power**", "protection".

> "*Happiness and blessedness do not correlate with abundance of riches, exalted positions, or offices or power ….*" (Epicurus, Fragment 85)

EILIKRINESTATE - ΕΙΛΙΚΡΙΝΕΣΤΑΤΗ - εἰλικρινεστάτη - /eɪː.li.kriː.nes.ˈta.tɛː/ - from εἰλικρινής (*eilikrinḗs*, "sincere", "frank") meaning "great", "**abundant**", "bountiful".

> "*Poverty, when measured by the natural purpose of life, is great wealth, but unlimited wealth is great poverty.*" (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 25)

EKKHORESEOS - ΕΚΧΩΡΗΣΕΩΣ - ἐκχωρήσεως - /ek.kʰɔːˈrɛːse.ɔːs/ - an inflection of ἐκχώρησις (*ekhóresis*, "going out") from ἐκ (*ék-*, "from", "out of") χώρησις (*khóresis*, "going", "proceeding", "chorus") meaning "**withdrawal**", "retirement".

EXEREISTIKEI - ΕΞΕΡΕΙΣΤΙΚΗι - ἐξερειστικῇ - /eːk.ser.eis.ti.ˈkɛːi̯/ - related to ἐξερειστικός (*exereistikós*, "resistant", "tense") meaning "fight", "**resist**", "expel", "exempt".

"The wise man will resist fortune." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 23)

EUPORIAI - ΕΥΠΟΡΙΑι - εὐπορία - /eu̯.po.ˈriːa.i̯/ - the singular dative inflection of εὐπορία (*eúporia*) meaning "**wealth**", "means", "resources".

"A free life cannot acquire many possessions, because this is not easy to do without servility to mobs or monarchs, yet it possesses all things in unfailing abundance; and if by chance it obtains many possessions, it is easy to distribute them so as to win the gratitude of neighbors." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 67)

GENOMENES - ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΗΣ - γενομένης - /ge.no.ˈme.nɛːs/ - the feminine genitive singular of γενόμενος (*genómenos*) from γίγνομαι (*gígnomai*, "to become") meaning "give", "**attained**", "secured", "procured", "achieved".

GINETAI - ΓΙΝΕΤΑΙ - γίνεται - /ˈgiː.ne.tai̯/ - the third-person singular present mediopassive indicative inflection of γίγνομαι (*gígnomai*, "to come into being") meaning "**arises**".

HESYKHIAS - ΗΣΥΧΙΑΣ - ἡσυχίας - /hɛːsyˈkʰi.as/ a plural inflection of ἡσυχία (*hésykhia*) from ἥσυχος (*hésukhos*, "quiet") + -ῐᾱ (-*íā*), meaning "peace", "**tranquility**", "silence", "quiet".

The root of ΗΣΥΧΙΑΣ (hesykhías) is the same as that of ἡσυχασμός (hesúkhasmos, "hesychasm"), a mystical tradition of contemplative prayer practiced in the Orthodox Catholic Church. Inspired by Jesus' injunction in Matthew 6:6 to "go into your room and shut the door", hesychasm *is a process of retiring inward by withdrawing from the senses (NRSV). Within an Epicurean context,* hesykhías *refers to the peace and security found in a retired life, removed from the frenzy of the masses.*

POLLON - ΠΟΛΛΩΝ - πολλῶν - /polˈɔːn/ - the genitive plural of πολύς (*polús*, "many", "much") meaning "the multitude", "the crowd", "**the masses**", "the world", "the herd".

"I never desired to please the rabble. What pleased them, I did not learn; and what I knew was far removed from their understanding." (Epicurus, Fragment 43)

XV (15)

APEIRON - ΑΠΕΙΡΟΝ - ἄπειρον - /ˈaːpei̯.ron/ - the genitive plural of ἄπειρος (*ápeiros*, "without trial or experience", "ignorant") meaning "boundless", "unlimited", "**infinite**".

The Ionian naturalist Anaximander (6th-century BCE) postulated that ΑΠΕΙΡΟΝ (ápeiron) was the ΑΡΧΗ (arkhé, "origin", "beginning"), a non-elemental substance from which all opposites are generated, inspired by Hesiod's ΧΑΟΣ (kháos, the primordial substance in ancient Greek myth). Epicurus re-contextualizes ΑΠΕΙΡΟΝ within the framework of an endless universe."[T]he infinite is boundless both in the number of the bodies and in the extent of the void." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)

DOXON - ΔΟΞΩΝ - δοξῶν - /dok.ˈsɔːn/ - the genitive plural inflection of δοξῶν (*doxōn*) meaning "expectations", "**opinions**", "judgments", "beliefs"; *authorized as* Doxai.

> *"[T]hey are brought to this pass not by reasoned opinion, but rather by some irrational presentiment …." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)*

EKPIPTEI - ΕΚΠΙΠΤΕΙ - ἐκπίπτει - /ek.ˈpiːp.teɪ/ - from ἐκ- (*ek-*, "off", "out", "away") + πίπτω (*píptō*, "fall", "throw down") meaning "going on [forever]", "beyond reach", "infinite", "without limit", "**insatiable**".

> *Elsewhere, Epicurus employs the term ΕΚΠΙΠΤΕΙ (ekpíptei) to describe the "falling" of a meteor. Other ancient authors used it to describe "being cast ashore" or "suffering [a] shipwreck", an appropriate, albeit coincidental connotation given the shipwreck Epicurus suffered off the coast of Lampsacus. Philodemus later uses the metaphor of a fair-weathered bay, distanced from stormy seas to describe the pleasant life.*

EUPORISTOS - ΕΥΠΟΡΙΣΤΟΣ - εὐπόριστός - /eṳːpɔːriːˈstoːs/ - an inflection of εὐπορία (*eūporía*) meaning "**easy to acquire**", "wealthy", "abundant", "plenty", "feasible".

> *"The wealth required by Nature is limited and is easy to procure; but the wealth required by vain ideals extends to infinity." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 8; <u>KD15</u>)*

HORISTAI - ΩΡΙΣΤΑΙ - ὥρισται - /ˈhɔːriːstaɪ/ - from ὅρος (*hóros*, "boundary, border") + -ίζω (*-ízō*) meaning "determine", "divide", "**limit**", "separate from", "mark out by boundary".

KENON - ΚΕΝΩΝ - κενῶν - /ke.ˈnoːn/ - the genitive plural of κενό (*keno*) meaning "vacuum", "void", "**emptiness**", "groundless", "vanity", "extra-terrestrial space". Epicurus describes *to pân* ("the all") as being composed of *atoma kai kenon* ("atoms and **void**").

> *"For it is impossible to conceive of anything being incorporeal except the void, and the void can neither act nor be acted upon. The only attribute of the void is that it allows bodies to move through its empty space." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)*

PHYSEOS - ΦΥΣΕΩΣ - φύσεως - /ˈpʰyːse.ɔːs/ - the singular genitive form of φύσις (*phúsis*, "origin", "birth", "nature", "quality", "property", "form", "shape") meaning "**Nature**".

PLOUTOS - ΠΛΟΥΤΟΣ - πλοῦτος - /ˈpluːtos/ - from the root word πλέω (*pléō*, "to sail [by sea]", "float") meaning "**wealth**", "riches", "bounty", "treasure".

> *"Poverty, when measured by the natural purpose of life, is great wealth, but unlimited wealth is great poverty." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 25)*

<u>XVI</u> (16)

BIOU - ΒΙΟΥ - βίου - /ˈbiːuː/ - the genitive singular inflection of βίος (*bíos*) meaning "**life**", *not* a "life form", *but rather*, a "*mode* of life", a "*manner* of living", "lifetime", "livelihood".

"[T]he wise man neither seeks to escape life nor fears the cessation of life, for neither does life offend him nor does the absence of life seem to be any evil." (Epistle to Menoikeus)

BRAKHEA - ΒΡΑΧΕΑ - βραχέα - /bra.ˈkʰe.a/ - an inflection of βραχύς (*brakhús*, "short", "small") meaning "little", "slightly", "seldom", "**few**", "rarely", "a bit".

"Nothing satisfies the man who is not satisfied with a little." (Fragment 69)

DIOIKEI - ΔΙΟΙΚΕΙ - διοικεῖ - /diːoιˈkeι/ - related to the word διοικέω (*dioikéō*, "keep house", "administer", "run", "manage", "exercise authority") meaning "**is arranging**", "directed", "ordained", "controls", "governed".

DIOIKEKE - ΔΙΩιΚΗΚΕ - διῴκηκε - /diːˈɔːiːkɛːke/ - related to the word διοικέω (*dioikéō*, "administer", "run", "keep house", "manage", "exercise authority") meaning "**has arranged**", "directed", "ordained", "controls", "governed".

DIOIKESEI - ΔΙΟΙΚΗΣΕΙ - διοικήσει - /diːoιˈkɛːsei/ - an inflection of the word διοικήσει (*dioikeséi*, meaning "housekeeping", "internal administration") meaning "**will arrange**", "directed", "ordained", "controls", "governed".

KHRONON - ΧΡΟΝΟΝ - χρόνον - /ˈkʰron.on/ - the accusative singular inflection of χρόνος (*khrónos*) meaning "time period", "a **time**", "for a while".

KURIOTATA - ΚΥΡΙΟΤΑΤΑ - κυριώτατα - /kyːriːˈɔːta.ta/ - from κῦριος (*kúrios*, "having authority over", "with power of", "sovereign", "principal") + τατος (-*tatos*, "greatest", "most", "best") meaning "essential", "principal", "dominant, "**most important**", "primary".

> ΚΥΡΙΟΤΑΤΑ (kuriótata) *is derived from the same root as* ΚΥΡΙΑΙ (kúriai), *from Epicurus'* ΚΥΡΙΑΙ ΔΟΞΑΙ (Kúriai Dóxai), *the "key", "authorized", "principal", "fundamental", "authoritative", "peculiar", "masterful", "established", "sovereign", "leading", "master", "sovran", "golden", "chief", or "main" doctrines).*

LOGISMOS - ΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ - λογισμὸς - /lo.giːˈsmoːs/ - from λογίζομαι (*logízomai*, "I calculate") + -μός (-*mós*, verbal noun suffix) meaning "**reason**", "rational planning", "calculation", "computation", "reflection", "thought", "measurement".

"Injuries are done among men either because of hatred, envy, or contempt, all which the wise man overcomes by reason." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 1)

MEGISTA - ΜΕΓΙΣΤΑ - μέγιστα - /ˈme.giːsta/ - from μέγας (*mégas*, "big", "great") + -ιστος (-*istos*, superlative suffix) meaning the "**greatest**".

PAREMPIPTEI - PAREMPIPTEI - παρεμπίπτει - /pa.rem.ˈpiːp.tei/ - related to παρεμπίπτω (parempiptō, "to fall in by the way", "to creep") meaning "favoured", "crosses", "interferes", "hinders", "plays", "troubles", "intrude", "impact", "**affects**", "infringes", "steals", "strikes".

SOPHOI - ΣΟΦΩι - σοφῶ - /so.ˈpʰɔːi̯/ - a dative singular inflection of σοφός (*sophós*) meaning "**the wise**", "clever", "skillful", "cunning", "intelligent", "prudent".

"[The wise person] will be more deeply moved by feeling than others, but this will not prove to be an obstacle to wisdom […] shows gratitude […] will not entangle [themselves] in the affairs of the state […] will be fond of the countryside […] will also, if he is in need, earn money, but only by his wisdom […] will be the same whether asleep or awake. […] holds that all faults are not of equal gravity."
                                        (Epicurus, Wise Man Sayings 2, 5, 14, 22, 30, 36, 38)

SYNEKHE - ΣΥΝΕΧΗ - συνεχῆ - /syːne.ˈkʰɛː/ - from συνεχής (*sunekhḗs*) and συνέχω (*sunékhō*, "to hold, to keep together") meaning "**continuous**" and "**constant**".

"I summon you to continuous pleasures and not to vain and empty virtues which have but a desperate hope for rewards." (Epicurus, Fragment 23)

TYKHE - ΤΥΧΗ - τύχη - /ˈtyːkʰɛː/ - a singular nominative noun, from the Proto-Indo-European *dʰewgʰ* ("to produce") meaning "act", "necessity", "fate", "fortune", "providence", "**chance**", "success", "destiny", or "an agent or cause beyond human control".

"The wise [person] laughs at the idea of 'Fate', which some set up as the mistress of all things, because the wise [person] understands that while some things do happen by chance, most things happen due to our own actions. The wise [person] sees that Fate or Necessity cannot exist if men are truly free, and [they] also sees that Fortune is not in constant control of the lives of [people]. But the wise [person] sees that our actions are free, and because they are free, our actions are our own responsibility, and we deserve either blame or praise for them. […] He therefore thinks it better to be unfortunate in reasonable action than to prosper in unreason. For it is better in a man's actions that what is well chosen (should fail, rather than that what is ill chosen) should be successful owing to chance." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

<u>XVII</u> (17)

ADIKOS - ΑΔΙΚΟΣ - ἄδικος - /ˈaːdiːkos/ - from ἀ- (*a-*, "without", negative prefix) + δίκη (*díkē*, "justice") + -ος (-*os*, adjective forming suffix) meaning "**unjust**", "wrong", "immoral".

ATARAKTOTATOS - ΑΤΑΡΑΚΤΟΤΑΤΟΣ - ἀταρακτότατος - /aːta.rak.ˈto.ta.tos/ - related to ἀταραξία (*ataraxía*) from ἀ- (*a-*, "not") + ταράσσω (*tarássō*, "trouble, disturb") + -ἰᾱ (-*íā*, *noun suffix*) meaning "free from disquietude", "**free from trouble**", "free from perturbation", "free from disturbance", "peace of mind", "**imperturbable**", "steady and serene".

"The man who is serene causes no disturbance to himself or to another." (VS 79; <u>KD1</u>)

DIKAIOS - ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ - δίκαιος - /ˈdiːkaɪːos/ - an adjective from δῐκη (*díkē*, "custom, right") + -ῐος (-*ios*, adjective suffix) meaning "**just**", "observant", "orderly", "righteous", "lawful".

GEMON - ΓΕΜΟΝ - γήμων - /'**gɛ**ːmɔːn/ - a word of unknown attestation referring to being "perpetual prey to it", being "**full of**", "perpetually haunted", or "filled with".

"It is better for you to be free of fear lying upon a bed of straw, than to have a golden couch and a lavish table and be full of trouble." (Epicurus, Fragment 48)

PLEISTES - ΠΛΕΙΣΤΗΣ - πλείστης - /'**pleɪ**.stɛːs/ - the feminine genitive singular inflection of πλεῖστος (*pleîstos*) meaning "**most**", "greatest", "largest".

"The greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 77)

TARAKHES - ΤΑΡΑΧΗΣ - ταραχῆς - /ta.ra.'**kʰɛ**ːs/ - the singular genitive inflection of ταραχή (*tarakhé*, "disorder", "disturbance", "confusion") meaning "**turmoil**", "disturbance", "confusion", "anxiety", "distress", "haunted", related to ἀταραξία (*ataraxía*) from ἀ- (*a-*, "not") + ταράσσω (*tarássō*, "trouble, disturb") + -ῐᾰ (*-íā, noun suffix*).

The natural goal of life ΗΔΟΝΕ (hedoné, "pleasure") requires both ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ (ataraxía, "the absence of psychological suffering") and ΑΠΟΝΙΑ (aponía, "the absence of physical pain"). Mental tranquility, by itself, cannot guarantee a life of ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ (eudaimonía, "happiness") if one cannot satisfy the needs of the body and protect it from injury; likewise, physical comfort, by itself, is inadequate to dispel the fears of the mind. As the poet Juvenal wrote, ORANDVM EST UT SIT MENS SANA IN CORPORE SANO, "you should pray for a healthy mind in a healthy body."

XVIII (18)

ALGOUN - ΑΛΓΟΥΝ - ἀλγοῦν - /aːl.'**gu**ːn/ the present contracted neuter infinitive participle ἄλγος (*álgos*, "pain"), meaning "suffering", "illness", "hardship", "physical **pain**".

"Nature is weak toward evil, not toward good: because it is saved by pleasures, but destroyed by pains." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 37)

APEGENNESEN - ΑΠΕΓΕΝΝΗΣΕΝ - ἀπεγέννησεν - /aːpe.'**gen**ːɛːsen/ - related to the word ἀπογεννάω (*apogennáō*, "produce") meaning "obtained", "**reached**", "begotten".

DIANOIAI - ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑι - διανοίᾳ - /diːa.'**noɪ**.aːi̯/ - the dative singular inflection of διάνοια (*diánoia*, "thought", "intention", "purpose", "spirit", "heart", "thinking faculty", "intelligence", understanding", "intellect"), from δια- (*dia-*, "through") + νόος (*nóos*, "mind", "sense"") + -ια (*-ia*, the noun suffix) meaning "the **mind**", "the intellect".

DIANOIAS - ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑΣ - διανοίας - /diːa.'**noɪ**.as/ - an inflection of διάνοια (*diánoia*, "thought", "intention", "purpose", "spirit", "heart", "thinking faculty", "intelligence", "understanding", "intellect"), from δια- (*dia-*, "through") + νόος (*nóos*, "mind", "sense"") + -ια (*-ia*, the noun suffix), "meaning "reflections", "calculating", "understanding", "**reasoning**", "rationalizing", "mental pursuits", "rational reflection."

"[I]t is […] sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choice and avoidance, and banishing mere opinions [which produces a pleasant life]." (Epistle to Menoikeus)

EKLOGISIS - ΕΚΛΟΓΙΣΙΣ - ἐκλόγισις - /eːk.ˈlo.ɡiːsiːs/ - related to the word ἐκλογή (*eklogé*, "picking out", "choice", "selection", "balancing") meaning "**reflecting**", "calculating", "understanding", "reasoning", "rationalizing", "thinking", "appraisal".

"We must heal our misfortunes by the grateful recollection of what has been and by the recognition that it is impossible to undo that which has been done." (Vatican Saying 55)

ENDEIAN - ΕΝΔΕΙΑΝ - ἔνδειαν - /ˈen.deɪ.an/ - the accusative singular declension of ἔνδεια (*éndeia*, "lack", "deficiency", "poverty") meaning "a **need**".

"We must not pretend to study philosophy, but study it in reality, for it is not the appearance of health that we need, but real health." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 54)

EPAUXETAI - ΕΠΑΥΞΕΤΑΙ - ἐπαύξεται - /eːˈpau̯k.se.taɪ/ - related to ἐπαυξάνω (*epauxánō*) meaning "**increase**", "enlarge", "grow", "augment".

"[G]row accustomed therefore to simple and not luxurious diet gives us health to the full, and makes a man alert for the needful employments of life." (Epistle to Menoikeus)

EPEIDAN - ΕΠΕΙΔΑΝ - ἐπειδὰν - /eːpaɪ.ˈdan/ - meaning "**when**", "once".

"[W]hen it is time for me to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who vainly cling to it, I will leave life crying aloud a glorious triumph-song that I have lived well." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 47)

EXAIRETHEI - ΕΞΑΙΡΕΘΗι - ἐξαιρεθῇ - /ek.saɪ.re.ˈtʰɛːi̯/ - from ἐξ- (*ex-*, "off", "cut from") + αἱρέω (*hairéō*, "to take", "grasp", "seize", "win") meaning "**removed**", "taken out", "accepted", "reserved", "destroyed", "brought to an end".

"I never desired to please the rabble. What pleased them, I did not learn; and what I knew was far removed from their understanding." (Epicurus, Fragment 43)

HEDONE - ΗΔΟΝΗ - ἡδονὴ - /hɛːdon.ˈɛː/ - related to the root ἡδύς (*hedús*, "pleasant", "welcome", "suave", "sweet") meaning "enjoyment", "**pleasure**", "satisfaction", "delight".

"[W]e call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

HEDONEN - ΗΔΟΝΗΝ - ἡδονὴν - /hɛːdon.ˈɛːn/ - the accusative singular form of ἡδονή (*hedonḗ*) meaning "**pleasure**", "enjoyment", "delight", "satisfaction of desire".

HOMOGENON - ΟΜΟΓΕΝΩΝ - ὁμογενῶν - /hom.og.e.ˈnɔːn/ - from ὁμός (*homós*, "same") + -γενής (*-genḗs*, "of a certain condition") meaning "similar character", "things themselves", "akin to them", "like them", "congeners", "related to these", **"kindred"**, "similar things".

MEGISTOUS - ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΥΣ - μεγίστους - /me.ˈgiːstuːs/ - the accusative plural masculine, absolute superlative of μεγάλος (*megálos*, "big", "great") meaning **"greatest"**, "worst".

MONON - MONON - μόνον - /ˈmon.on/ - the adverbial accusative inflection of μόνος (*mónos*) meaning "only just", "barely", "just", "merely", **"only"**, "hardly"

PARESKEUAZE - ΠΑΡΕΣΚΕΥΑΖΕ - παρεσκεύαζε - /pa.res.ˈkeu̯.a.ze/ - an inflection of παρασκευάζω (*paraskeuázō*, "get ready", "prepare", "provide", "procure", "contrive") meaning "cause", "created", "furnish", **"provoke"**, "instill".

> *"A man who causes fear cannot be free from fear." (Epicurus, Fragment 84)*

PERAS - ΠΕΡΑΣ - πέρας - /ˈpe.ras/ - related to the word πείρω (*peîrō*, "to pierce, to run through"), περάω (*peráō*, "to drive right through"), or πέρα (*péra*), meaning "end", **"limit"**, "boundary", "extremity", "perfection", "at length", "at last".

> *"It is not the stomach that is insatiable, as is generally said, but the false opinion that the stomach needs an unlimited amount to fill it." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 59)*

PHOBOUS - ΦΟΒΟΥΣ - φόβους - /ˈpʰob.uːs/ - the accusative plural inflection of φόβος (*phóbos*, "fear", "terror", "alarm", "fright", "panic", "reverence") meaning **"the fears"**.

> *Phobos ("fear") is the name of the larger of Mars' two moons, the other being Deimos ("dread"), both of which are named for the twin sons of Ares. Phobos is the root of the English suffixes "-phobia", "-phobe", like "Hellenophobia" or "Fear of Greek".*

POIKILLETAI - ΠΟΙΚΙΛΛΕΤΑΙ - ποικίλλεται - /poi.ˈkiːl.e.tai/ - an inflection of ποικίλλω (*poikíllō*, "to work in various colors", "embroider", "embellish", "adorn"), derived from ποικίλος (*poikílos*, "multi-colored", "spotted", "dappled", "painted", "complicated") meaning **"diversified"**, "varied", "embellished".

> *"The ungrateful greed of the soul makes the creature everlastingly desire varieties of in its lifestyle." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 69)*

SARKI - ΣΑΡΚΙ - σαρκὶ - /sar.ˈkiː/ - the dative singular inflection of σάρξ (*sarks*, "skin", "body", "meat", "pulp") meaning **"flesh"**, describing the *physical* nature of pleasure.

> *"You tell me that the stimulus of the flesh makes you too prone to the pleasures of love. Provided that you do not break the laws or good customs and do not distress any of your neighbors or do harm to your body or squander your pittance, you may indulge your inclination as you please." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 51)*

XIX (19)

APEIROS - ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ - ἄπειρος - /'**a**ːpeɪ.ros/ - from ἀ- (*a-*, "not") + πεῖρα (*peîra*, "trial, attempt") meaning "**infinite**", "unlimited", "endless".

HEDONEN - ΗΔΟΝΗΝ - ἡδονὴν - /hεːdon.'**ε**ː**n**/ - the accusative singular form of ἡδονή (*hedonḗ*) meaning "**pleasure**", "enjoyment", "delight", "satisfaction of desire".

> *"[W]e call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)*

KATAMETRESEI - ΚΑΤΑΜΕΤΡΗΣΗι - καταμετρήσῃ - /ka.ta.me.'**tr**εːseːi/ - an inflection of καταμετρέω (*katametréō*) meaning "**measure**", "measured".

> *"[W]e must consider these least indivisible points as boundary-marks, providing in themselves as primary units the measure of size for the atoms both for the smaller and the greater, in our contemplation …." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)*

KHRONOS - ΧΡΟΝΟΣ - χρόνος - /'**kʰron**.os/ - from the Proto-Indo-European **(s)ker-* meaning "**time**", "for a while", "an interval", "lifetime", "age", "season".

LOGISMOI - ΛΟΓΙΣΜΩι - λογισμῷ - /lo.gi:'**smɔ**ːi̯/ - the vocative, dual inflection of λογισμός (*logismós*, "calculation") meaning "reason", "**reasoning**", "reasoned judgment".

> *"[I]t is not continuous drinkings and revelings, nor the satisfaction of lusts, nor the enjoyment of fish and other luxuries of the wealthy table, which produce a pleasant life, but sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choice and avoidance, and banishing mere opinions, to which are due the greatest disturbance of the spirit." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)*

PEPERASMENOS - ΠΕΠΕΡΑΣΜΕΝΟΣ - πεπερασμένος - /pe.pe.ras.'**me**.nos/ - derived from περασμένος (*perasménos*, "the past") meaning "**finite.**"

PERATA - ΠΕΡΑΤΑ - πέρατα - /'**pe**.ra.ta/ - a plural inflection of πέρας (*péras*) meaning "endings", "goals", "**limits**", "extremities".

XX (20)

AIONOS - ΑΙΩΝΟΣ - αἰῶνος - /aɪ.'**ɔ**ːnos/ the singular genitive form of αἰών (*aión*, "lifetime", "generation", "eon", "epoch", "age") meaning "**eternity**".

APEIRA - ΑΠΕΙΡΑ - ἄπειρα - /'**a**ːpeɪ.ra/ - the plural neuter form of ἄπειρος (*ápeiros*) meaning "**unlimited**", "infinite", "boundless", "infinity".

"And most of all give yourself up to the study of the beginnings and of infinity and of the things akin to them, and also of the criteria of truth and of the feelings, and of the purpose for which we reason out these things." (Epicurus' Epistle to Pythocles)

APEIROS - ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ - ἄπειρος - /ˈaːpeɪ.ros/ - from ἀ- (*a-*, "not") + πεῖρα (*peîra*, "trial, attempt") meaning "eternity", "**infinite**", "unlimited".

APEIROU - ΑΠΕΙΡΟΥ - ἀπείρου - /aːˈpeɪ.ruː/ - the genitive singular inflection of ἄπειρο (*ápeiro*) meaning ""eternity", "**infinite**", "unlimited".

APELABE - ΑΠΕΛΑΒΕ - ἀπέλαβε - /aːˈpe.la.be/ - related to the word ἀπολαμβάνω (*apolambáno*, "take", "receive") meaning "sets", "assumes", "receives", "perceives", "finds", "believes", "place", "considers", "seems", "picks", "**takes**".

ARESKOI - ΑΡΕΣΚΟΙ - ἀρέσκοι - /aːˈres.koɪ/ - an inflection of ἀρέσκω (*aréskō*, "make good", "make amends", "appease") meaning "yearns", "satisfy", "requires", "required", "needs", "makes it possible", "provided", "needed", "can be produced", "**provide**".

ARISTOU - ΑΡΙΣΤΟΥ - ἀρίστου - /aːˈriːstuː/ - the singular genitive form of ἄριστος (*áristos*, "best", "noble") meaning the "**best** [life]", "most excellent", "first-rate".

"It is not the young man who should be thought happy, but the old man who has lived a good life. […] the old man has come to anchor in old age as though in port, and the good things for which before he hardly hoped he has brought into safe harbor in his grateful recollections." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 17)

BION - ΒΙΟΝ - βίον - /ˈbiːon/ - the singular accusative of βίος (*bíos*) meaning "**life**", *not* a "life form", *but rather*, a "*mode* of life", a "*manner* of living", "lifetime", "livelihood".

"We are born once and cannot be born twice, but for all time must be no more. But you, who are not master of tomorrow, postpone your happiness. Life is wasted in procrastination and each one of us dies without allowing himself leisure." (VS 14)

BIOU - ΒΙΟΥ - βίου - /ˈbiːuː/ - the singular genitive inflection of βίος (*bíos*) meaning "**life**", *not* a "life form", *but rather*, a "*mode* of life", a "*manner* of living", "lifetime", "livelihood".

DIANOIAI - ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑι - διανοία - /diːaˈnoɪ.aːi̯/ - the dative singular inflection of διάνοια (*diánoia*, "thought", "intention", "purpose", "spirit", "heart", "thinking faculty", "intelligence", "understanding", "intellect"), from δια- (*dia-*, "through") + νόος (*nóos*, "mind", "sense"") + -ια (*-ia*, the noun suffix), meaning "the **mind**", "the intellect".

EKLYSASA - ΕΚΛΥΣΑΣΑ - ἐκλύσασα - /eːkˈlyːsa.sa/ - related to ἐκλύω (*eklúō*, "lose", "release", "set free") meaning "liberating", "**banishing**", "having dissipated", "dispelling", "ridding", "expelled", "dissolving", "dismissing", "terminating".

"It is impossible for someone to dispel his fears about the most important matters if he does not know the Nature of the universe but still gives some credence to myths. So without the study of Nature there is no enjoyment of pure pleasure." (VS 9; <u>KD12</u>)

ELLEIPOUSA - ΕΛΛΕΙΠΟΥΣΑ - ἐλλείπουσά - /eːlˈεɪ.puːsa/ - related to the word ἐλλείπω (*elleîpō*, "leave out", "fall short") from ἐν (*en*, "in") + λείπω (*leîpō*, "to leave") meaning "fail", "lacking", **"fallen short"**, "falling short", "missed", "deprived".

ENIKA - ΗΝΙΚΑ - ἡνίκα - /eːˈniːka/ - meaning "at which time", "even in", "when circumstance bring about", **"even when"**, "when", "when events".

"The man who has attained the natural end of the human race will be equally good, even when no one else is present." (Epicurus, Fragment 83)

EPHYGE - ΕΦΥΓΕ - ἔφυγε - /ˈeːpʰy.ge/ - related to φεύγω (*pheúgō*, "flee", "take flight", "be in exile") meaning **"shun"**, "avoid", "flee", "spurn".

"Launch your boat, oh blessed youth, and flee at full speed from every form of culture." (Epicurus, Fragment 33)

EPILOGISMON - ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΝ - ἐπιλογισμὸν - /eːpiːlo.giˈsmon/ - from ἐπί (*epí-*, "on", "upon") + λογισμός (*logismós*, meaning "grasping in thought", "reasoned understanding", "rational deliberation", **"calculation"**, "recognizing", "examination", "appraisal".

"Now if one refers all these reasonings [...] he will see that they are sufficiently embraced in these general formulae to enable him to work out with certainty on this basis the details of the system as well." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

EXAGOGEN - ΕΞΑΓΩΓΗΝ - ἐξαγωγὴν - /ek.sa.gɔːˈgɛːn/ - from ἐξ- (*éx-*, "out of", "from") + ἀγωγή (*agogḗ*, "transportation", "taking away") meaning "death", **"departure"**, "exit".

HEDONEN - ΗΔΟΝΗΝ - ἡδονὴν - /heːdonˈɛːn/ - the accusative singular inflection of ἡδονή (*hedonḗ*) meaning **"pleasure"**, "enjoyment", "delight", "satisfaction of desire".

"[W]e call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

HEDONES - ΗΔΟΝΗΣ - ἡδονῆς - /heːdonˈɛːs/ - the genitive singular inflection of ηδονή (*hedonḗ*, "pleasure") meaning **"pleasure"**, "delights", or "enjoyment".

KATESTREPSEN - ΚΑΤΕΣΤΡΕΨΕΝ - κατέστρεψεν - /kaˈtes.trep.sen/ - from the root words κατα- (*kata-*, "back", "downwards", "against", "fully", "completely") and στρέφω (*stréphō*, "to twist" or "turn") meaning "over-turned", "over-thrown", **"destroyed"**.

KHRONOS - ΧΡΟΝΟΣ - χρόνος - /'kʰron.os/ - from the Proto-Indo-European *(s)ker- meaning "**time**", "for a while", "an interval", "lifetime", "age", "season".

KHRONOU - ΧΡΟΝΟΥ - χρόνου - /'kʰron.uː/ - the genitive singular inflection of χρόνος (*khrónos*) meaning "**time**", "time period", "lifetime", "delay".

LABOUSA - ΛΑΒΟΥΣΑ - λαβοῦσα - /la.'buːsa/ - the feminine nominative/vocative singular inflection of λᾰβών (*labṓn*, "take", "grab", "seize") meaning "enabling", "**grasping**", "having attained", "taking", "understanding", "having gained", "recognizing".

OUTHEN - ΟΥΘΕΝ - οὐθὲν - /'uːtʰen/ - related to οὐδείς (*oudeîs*) from οὐδέ (*oudé*, "and not, not even") + εἷς (*heîs*, "one") meaning "**no**", "nothing", "not".

> *"So that as it has no extreme point, it has no limit; and as it has no limit, it must be boundless and not bounded." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)*

PANTELE - ΠΑΝΤΕΛΗ - παντελῆ - /pan.te.'lɛː/ - an inflection of παντελής (*pantelés*) from παν (*pan*, "all") + τελῆ (*telé*, "end", "goal") meaning "**complete**", "perfect", "optimal".

> *"The wise man holds that there are two types of happiness – complete happiness, such as belongs to a god, which admits of no increase, and lesser happiness, which can be increased or decreased." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 42)*

PARESKEUASE - ΠΑΡΕΣΚΕΥΑΣΕ - παρεσκεύασε - /pa.re.'skeu̯.a.se/ - an inflection of παρασκευάζω (*paraskeuázō*, "prepare", "provide", "secure") meaning "finds", "believes", "places", "**brings about**", "receives", "assumes", "grasps".

PARESKEUASEN - ΠΑΡΕΣΚΕΥΑΣΕΝ - παρεσκεύασεν - /pa.re.'skeu̯.as.en/ - an inflection of παρασκευάζω (*paraskeuázō*, "prepare") meaning "procures", "takes", "secures", "**brings about**", "provides", "make an appraisal".

PARESKEUAZEN - ΠΑΡΕΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΝ - παρεσκεύαζεν - /pa.re.'skeu̯.az.en/ - an inflection of παρασκευάζω (*paraskeuázō*, "prepare", "provide", "secure") meaning "renders", "bring on", "**bring about**", "fashions".

PERATA - ΠΕΡΑΤΑ - πέρατα - /'pe.ra.ta/ - a plural inflection of πέρας (*péras*) meaning "endings", "goals", "**limits**", "extremities".

> *"Unlimited time and limited time afford an equal amount of pleasure, if we measure the limits of that pleasure by reason." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 22, KD19)*

PERATOS - ΠΕΡΑΤΟΣ - πέρατος - /'pe.ra.tos/ - the genitive singular inflection of πέρας (*péras*, "end", "goal", "extremity") used to indicated the "**limits**" of pleasure.

PHOBOUS - ΦΟΒΟΥΣ - φόβους - /'pʰo.buːs/ - the accusative plural inflection of φόβος (*phóbos*, "fear", "terror", "alarm", "fright", "panic", "reverence") meaning "**the fears**".

Phobos *("fear")* is the name of the larger of Mars' two moons, the other being Deimos *("dread")*, both of which are named for the twin sons of Ares. Phobos *is the root of the English suffixes "*-phobia*", "*-phobe*", like "*Hellenophobia*" or "*Fear of Greek*".*

PRAGMATA - ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ - πράγματα - /ˈprag.ma.ta/ - the plural inflection of πρᾶγμα (*prágma*, "deed", "act", "practice", "occurrence", "matter", "affair", "thing of importance", "concrete reality") meaning "actualities", the "**facts**", the "case".

> *"For in the case of all celestial phenomena this process of investigation must never be abandoned – for if one is in opposition to clear-seen facts, he can never have his part in true peace of mind." (Epicurus' Epistle to Pythocles)*

PROSEDEʹETHE - ΠΡΟΣΕΔΕΗΘΗ - προσεδεήθη - /pros.e.de.ˈɛːtʰɛː/ - related to προσδέω (*prosdéō*, "to bind on", "to need besides") meaning "**need**", "requires".

SARKOS - ΣΑΡΚΟΣ - σαρκὸς - /sar.ˈkos/ - the genitive singular inflection of σάρξ (*sárks*, "flesh") meaning "[of the] flesh", "skin", "**body**", "portions of meat", "physical" or "natural".

SARKS - ΣΑΡΞ - σὰρξ - /ˈsarks/ - meaning "**flesh**", "body", "skin", "portions" or "pieces of meat", "membrane", inner", "physical", "natural order".

> *"The flesh cries out to be saved from hunger, thirst, and cold. For if a man possess this safety and hope to possess it, he might rival even Zeus in happiness." (VS 33)*

TELOUS - ΤΕΛΟΥΣ - τέλους - /ˈte.luːs/ - the genitive singular inflection of τέλος (*télos*, "completion", "maturity", "fulfillment") meaning the "end", "result" or "**goal**" of life.

> *"For it is to obtain this end that we always act, namely, to avoid pain and fear. [...] when we do not feel pain, we no longer need pleasure. And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)*

ZEN - ΖΗΝ - ζῆν - /ˈdzɛːn/ - the present, active infinitive of ζάω (*záō*, "to live") , from the proto-Hellenic *dṓwō*, meaning "life".

> *"[A] right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)*

XXI (21)

AGONAS - ΑΓΩΝΑΣ - ἀγῶνας - /aːˈgɔːnas/ - the accusative plural of ἀγών (*agōn*) meaning "a gathering" or "a place of contest", "competition", "labour", "**struggle**", "trouble".

> *"[Let the divine nature] be preserved free from burdensome duties and in entire blessedness." (Epicurus' Epistle to Pythocles)*

ALGOUN - ΑΛΓΟΥΝ - ἀλγοῦν - /aːl.ˈguːn/ - the present contracted neuter infinitive participle ἄλγος (*álgos*) meaning "**pain**", "suffering", "illness", "hardship".

"Excessive pain will send you to death." (Epicurus, Fragment 65)

BION - BION - βίον - /ˈbiːon/ - the singular accusative of βίος (*bíos*) meaning "**life**", *not* a "life form", *but rather*, a "*mode* of life", "*manner* of living", "lifetime", "livelihood".

"We are born once and cannot be born twice, but for all time must be no more. But you, who are not master of tomorrow, postpone your happiness. Life is wasted in procrastination and each one of us dies without allowing himself leisure." (VS 14)

ENDEIAN - ΕΝΔΕΙΑΝ - ἔνδειαν - /ˈen.deɪ.an/ - the accusative singular declension of ἔνδεια (*éndeia*, "lack", "deficiency", "poverty") meaning "a **need**".

"We must not pretend to study philosophy, but study it in reality, for it is not the appearance of health that we need, but real health." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 54)

EUPORISTON - ΕΥΠΟΡΙΣΤΟΝ - εὐπόριστόν - /eṵ.po.ri.ˈston/ - an inflection of εὐπορία (*eūporía*) meaning "**easy to procure**", "obtain", "provide".

"A free life cannot acquire many possessions, because this is not easy to do without servility to mobs or monarchs, yet it possesses all things in unfailing abundance; and if by chance it obtains many possessions, it is easy to distribute them so as to win the gratitude of neighbors." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 67).

EXAIROUN - ΕΧΑΙΡΟΥΝ - ἐξαιροῦν - /eːk.saɪ.ˈruːn/ - an inflection of εξαίρω (*exaîrō*, "to life up", "rise", "arouse") meaning "**arise**", "arises".

"[I]t is not possible that such great varieties of things should arise from the same atomic shapes, if they are limited in number." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)

HOLON - ΟΛΟΝ - ὅλον - /ˈho.lon/ - an inflection of ὅλος (*hólos*) from the Proto-Indo-European **solh₂wós* meaning "**whole**".

"Even if the wise man should lose his eyesight he will not end his whole life, as he says in the same book [on Lives]." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 17)

KATEIDOS - ΚΑΤΕΙΔΟΣ - κατειδὼς - /ka.teɪ.ˈdɔːs/ - related to κάτοιδα (*kátoida*, "to know well", "recognize") meaning "learns", "discerns", "**knows**".

"The wise man when he has accommodated himself to straits knows better how to give than to receive, so great is the treasure of self-sufficiency which he has discovered." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 44)

KATHISTAN - ΚΑΘΙΣΤΑΝ - καθιστάν - /ka.tʰiːˈstan/ - an inflection of καθίστημι (*kathístēmi*, "bring down", "set in order") meaning "**make**", "furnish", "render".

> *"[T]he wise man will not make elegant speeches." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 10)*

KEKTEMENON - ΚΕΚΤΗΜΕΝΩΝ - κεκτημένων - /kek.tɛːˈme.nɔːn/ - singular perfect passive indicative inflection of κτάομαι (*ktáomai*, "to get", "obtain", "acquire", "gain", "win", "bring on oneself") meaning "**obtained**", "won", "saved".

OIDEN - ΟΙΔΕΝ - οἶδεν - /ˈɔɪ.den/ - the third-person singular perfect active indicative of οἶδα (*oîda*) meaning "**knows**", "is aware", "will understand".

> *"All these things [...] bear in mind; for thus you will escape in most things from superstition and will be enabled to understand ...." (Epistle to Pythocles)*

OUDEN - ΟΥΔΕΝ - οὐδὲν - /uːˈden/ - neuter singular form of οὐδείς (*oúdeis*, "no one", "nobody", "none", "nothing", "no") as in "**no things**".

PANTELE - ΠΑΝΤΕΛΗ - παντελῆ - /pan.te.ˈlɛː/ - an inflection of παντελής (*pantelés*) from παν (*pan*, "all") + τελῆ (*telé*, "end", "goal") meaning "**complete**", "perfect", "optimal".

> *"The wise man holds that there are two types of happiness – complete happiness, such as belongs to a god, which admits of no increase, and lesser happiness, which can be increased or decreased." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 42)*

PERATA - ΠΕΡΑΤΑ - πέρατα - /ˈpe.ra.ta/ - a plural inflection of πέρας (*peras*) meaning "endings", "goals", "**limits**", "extremities".

PRAGMATON - ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΩΝ - πραγμάτων - /prag.ˈma.tɔːn/ - the genitive plural form of πρᾶγμα (*prágma*, "I do") meaning "**things**" as in "**things** won by competition".

PROSDEITAI - ΠΡΟΣΔΕΙΤΑΙ - προσδεῖται - /pros.ˈdeɪ.taɪ/ - related to προσδέω (*prosdéō*, "bind on", "need beside") meaning "**need**", "necessity".

> *"We must not pretend to study philosophy, but study it in reality, for it is not the appearance of health that we need, but real health." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 54)*

XXII (22)

AKRISIAS - ΑΚΡΙΣΙΑΣ - ἀκρισίας - /aːkri.ˈsiːas/ - the genitive singular of ακρισία (*akrisía*, "want of distinctness", "lack of judgment", "bad choice", "undecided character") meaning "uncertainty", "**doubt**", "indecision", "bad judgment", "gullibility".

ANAGOMEN - ΑΝΑΓΟΜΕΝ - ἀνάγομεν - /aːˈna.gom.en/ - an inflection of ἀνάγομεν (*anágō*) from ἄνᾰ- (*ana-*, "up") + ἄγω (*ágō*, "to lead") meaning "**refer**", "reconcile".

"The beginning and the root of all good is the pleasure of the stomach; even wisdom and culture must be referred to this." (Epicurus, Fragment 59)

DOXAZOMENA - ΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΑ - δοξαζόμενα - /dok.sa**'dzo**:me.na/ - meaning "what we think and believe", "**opinions**", "judgment" sharing the same root δοξα (*doxa*) as in *Doxai*.

"[T]hey are brought to this pass not by reasoned opinion, but rather by some irrational presentiment, and therefore, as they do not know the limits of pain, they suffer a disturbance equally great or even more extensive than if they had reached this belief by opinion." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)

ENARGEIAN - ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑΝ - ἐνάργειαν - /e.**'nar**.geɪ.an/ - an inflection of ἐνάργεια (*enárgeia*, "clearness", "distinctness", "vividness") meaning "**clear evidence**", "direct perception", "manifest evidence", "clear fact", "vivid and clear sense perception".

"For in the case of all celestial phenomena this process of investigation must never be abandoned – for if one is in opposition to clear-seen facts, he can never have his part in true peace of mind." (Epicurus' Epistle to Pythocles)

EPILOGIZESTHAI - ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ - ἐπιλογίζεσθαι - /e:pi:log.**'i**:dzes.tʰaɪ/ - from ἐπί (*epí-*, "on", "upon") + λογισμός (*logismós*, "calculation") meaning "**consider**", "take into account", "take into [our] reckoning", "reason", "reflect".

"We must heal our misfortunes by the grateful recollection of what has been and by the recognition that it is impossible to undo that which has been done." (VS 55)

HYPHESTEKOS - ΥΦΕΣΤΗΚΟΣ - ὑφεστηκὸς - /hy:pʰes.tɛ:**'kos**/ - related to ὑφίστημι (*hyphístēmi*, "to place", "to submit", "to promise") meaning "ought", "**must**", "necessary".

MESTA - ΜΕΣΤΑ - μεστά - /me.s**'ta**/ - the plural neuter inflection of μεστός (*mestós*, "full", "laden with") meaning "full", "**filled with**".

PANTA - ΠΑΝΤΑ - πάντα - /**'pan**.ta/ - a plural inflection of πᾶς (*pás*, "all", "every", "whole") meaning "absolutely all", "**everything**".

"Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil …." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

PASAN - ΠΑΣΑΝ - πᾶσαν - /**'pas**.an/ - the singular feminine accusative inflection of πᾶς (*pás*, "all", "every", "whole") meaning "absolutely all", "**everything**".

TARAKHES - ΤΑΡΑΧΗΣ - ταραχῆς - /ta.ra.**'kʰɛ**:s/ - singular genitive form of ταραχή (*tarakhḗ*, "disorder", "disturbance", "confusion") meaning "turmoil", "disturbance", "**confusion**", "anxiety", "distress", "haunted", related to ἀταραξία (*ataraxía*) from ἀ- (*a-*, "not") + ταράσσω (*tarássō*, "trouble, disturb") + -ῐᾱ (*-íā, noun suffix*).

The natural goal of life ΗΔΟΝΕ (hedoné, *"pleasure"*) *requires both* ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ (ataraxía, *"the absence of psychological suffering"*) *and* ΑΠΟΝΙΑ (aponía, *"the absence of physical pain"*). *Mental tranquility, by itself, cannot guarantee a life of* ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ (eudaimonía, *"happiness"*) *if one cannot satisfy the needs of the body and protect it from injury; likewise, physical comfort, by itself, is inadequate to dispel the fears of the mind. As the poet Juvenal wrote,* ORANDVM EST UT SIT MENS SANA IN CORPORE SANO, *"you should pray for a healthy mind in a healthy body."*

TELOS - ΤΕΛΟΣ - τέλος - /ˈte.los/ - meaning "end", "coming to pass", "performance", "consummation", "fulfillment", "execution", "result", or "**goal**" of a process.

"For it is to obtain this end that we always act, namely, to avoid pain and fear. […] when we do not feel pain, we no longer need pleasure. And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

XXIII (23)

AGOGEN - ΑΓΩΓΗΝ - ἀγωγὴν - /aːgɔːˈgɛːn/ - the singular, accusative form of ἀγωγή (agogḗ, "carrying away", "freight", "carriage") meaning "**leading [you] to**".

AISTHESESIN - ΑΙΣΘΗΣΕΣΙΝ - αἰσθήσεσιν - /aisˈtʰɛːse.siːn/ - from αἰσθάνομαι (aisthánomai, "to perceive") + -σῖς (-sis) meaning "**sensation**", "perception", or "discernment".

ΑΙΣΘΗΣΕΙΣ (aisthésin) *refers the faculty of sensation whereby "certain particles [are] carried off from the object of suitable size to stir this sense-organ" (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus). Sensation is one of three, principle sources of knowledge in Epicurean epistemology, the other two sources of knowledge being* ΠΑΘΗ (páthe, *"feeling"*) *and* ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ (prólepsis, *"preconception" or "anticipation"*).

DIEPSEUSTHAI - ΔΙΕΨΕΥΣΘΑΙ - διεψεῦσθαι - /diːepˈseus.tʰaɪ/ - from διαψεύδω (diapseúdō, "to deceive utterly", "deny", "disclaim", "cheat") meaning "**falsehood**".

HEXEIS - ΕΞΕΙΣ - ἕξεις - /ˈhek.seɪs/ - the second-person singular future active indicative inflection of ἔχω (ékhō, "possess", "keep") meaning "**will have**", "will be able".

KRINEIS - ΚΡΙΝΗιΣ - κρίνης - /ˈkriːnɛi̯s/ - from κρίνω (krínō, "to separate", "divide" "part", "distinguish","arrange", "investigate") meaning "**judge**", "condemn", "criticize".

"And besides we must keep all our investigations in accord with our sensations, and in particular with the immediate apprehensions whether of the mind or of any one of the instruments of judgment, and likewise in accord with the feelings existing in us, in order that we may have indications whereby we may judge both the problem of sense perception and the unseen." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)

MAKHEI - ΜΑΧΗι - μαχῇ - /maˈkʰɛːi̯/ - the dative singular inflection of μᾰχη (mákhē, "combat") meaning "**fight**", "struggle", "make war", "battle", "quarrel", "argue", "reject".

"But those who assume one cause fight against the evidence of phenomena and fail to ask whether it is possible for men to make such observations." (Epistle to Pythocles)

PASAIS - ΠΑΣΑΙΣ - πάσαις - /ˈpas.aɪs/ - a plural feminine inflection of πᾶς (*pás*, "all", "every", "each", "full") meaning "**the whole**".

PHEIS - ΦΗιΣ - φῇς - /ˈpʰɛːɪːs/ - the second-person singular present indicative active inflection oof φημΐ (*phēmí*, "say", "affirm", "assert") meaning "you claim", "you condemn", "**you pronounce**", "you say", "you judge", "you declare".

POIOUMENON - ΠΟΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ - ποιούμενον - /poɪ.ˈuːme.non/ - an inflection of ποιούμενος (*poioumenos*), the present mediopassive participle of ποιέω (*poiéō*) meaning "make", "create", "produce", "cause") meaning "**makes**".

<u>XXIV</u> (24)

AISTHESEIS - ΑΙΣΘΗΣΕΙΣ - αἰσθήσεις - /aɪs.ˈtʰɛːseɪs/ - from αἰσθάνομαι (*aisthánomai*, "to perceive") + -σῐς (-*sis*) meaning "**sensations**", "perceptions", or "discernments".

"[T]he soul possesses the chief cause of sensation …." (Epistle to Herodotus)

AISTHESESIN - ΑΙΣΘΗΣΕΣΙΝ - αἰσθήσεσιν - /aɪs.ˈtʰɛːse.siːn/ - from αἰσθάνομαι (*aisthánomai*, "perceive") + -σῐς (-*sis*) meaning "**sensation**", "perception", or "discernment".

ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΝ (aisthésin*) refers to the sensing of those "certain particles carried off from the object of suitable size to stir this sense-organ" (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus). Sensation is one of three, principle sources of knowledge in Epicurean epistemology, the other two are ΠΑΘΗ (páthe, "feeling") and ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ (prólepsis, "anticipation").*

AMPHISBETESIN - ΑΜΦΙΣΒΗΤΗΣΙΝ - ἀμφισβήτησιν - /aːm.pʰiːs.ˈbɛːtɛːsiːn/ - meaning "a dispute", "controversy", "debate", "question", "claim", "**doubt**".

"The wise man will teach things that are definite, rather than doubtful musings." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 35)

BEBAIOSEIS - ΒΕΒΑΙΟΣΕΙΣ - βεβαιώσεις - /be.baɪ.ˈɔːseɪs/ - the second-person singular future active indicative of βεβαιόω (*bebaióō*, "confirm", "assure", "secure") "**accept**", "affirm".

"[W]hen one accepts one theory and rejects another, which harmonizes as well with the phenomenon, it is obvious that he altogether leaves the path of scientific inquiry and has recourse to myth." (Epicurus' Epistle to Pythocles)

DIAIRESEIS - ΔΙΑΙΡΕΣΕΙΣ - διαιρήσεις - /diːaɪ.ˈrɛːseɪs/ - from the word διαιρέω (*diairéo*, "to take one from another", "to cleave in twain", "to divide in parts") meaning "distinguish", "discriminate", "**differentiate**", "make a distinction".

"[W]e must [...] distinguish those things whose production in several ways is not contradicted by phenomena on earth." (Epistle to Pythocles)

DIANOIAS - ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑΣ - διανοίας - /diːa.ˈnoɪ.as/ - an inflection of διάνοια (*diánoia*, "thought", "intention", "purpose", "spirit", "heart", "thinking faculty", "intelligence", "understanding", "intellect"), from δια- (*dia-*, "through") + νόος (*nóos*, "mind", "sense"") + -ια (*-ia*, the noun suffix) meaning "the **mind**", "mental", "intuitive", "intellect", "thoughts".

"[I]t is […] sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choice and avoidance, and banishing mere opinions [which produces a pleasant life]." (Epistle to Menoikeus)

DIEPSEUSMENON - ΔΙΕΨΕΥΣΜΕΝΟΝ - διεψευσμένον - /diːep.seұs.ˈmen.on/ - from διαψεύδω (*diapseúdō*, "to deceive", "deny") meaning "**error**", "falsehood", "blunder".

"Now falsehood and error always lie in the addition of opinion with regard to what is waiting to be confirmed or not contradicted, and then is not confirmed or is contradicted." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)

DOXASTIKAIS - ΔΟΞΑΣΤΙΚΑΙΣ - δοξαστικαῖς - /dok.sas.tiˈkaɪs/ - an inflection of δοξαστικός (*doxastikós*, "forming opinions", "conjecturing") meaning "based on opinion", "formed by opinion", "**conjectural**", "interpreted".

DOXAZOMENON - ΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ - δοξαζόμενον - /dok.sad.ˈzom.en.on/ - meaning "**matter of opinion**", "belief", sharing the same root δοξα (*doksa*) as does *Doxai*.

"And [the gods] are not such as the many believe them to be: for indeed [the masses] do not consistently represent [the gods] as they believe them to be. And the impious man is not he who popularly denies the gods of the many, but he who attaches to the gods the beliefs of the many. For the statements of the many about the gods are not conceptions derived from sensation, but false suppositions" (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

DOXEI - ΔΟΞΗι - δόξη - /ˈdok.sɛːiː/ - the dative singular inflection of δόξα (*dóxa*, "expectation", "opinion", "judgment") like δόξαι (*dóxai*) meaning "**belief**".

"[T]hey are brought to this pass not by reasoned opinion, but rather by some irrational presentiment …." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)

EKBALEIS - ΕΚΒΑΛΕΙΣ - ἐκβαλεῖς - /eːk.bal.ˈeɪs/ - an inflection of ἐκβάλλω (*ekbállō*, "break open", "throw out") from ἐκ- (*ek-*, "out") + βάλλω (*bállō*, "to throw") meaning "destroying", "rejecting", "reject", "destroy", "driving out", "expelled", "**abandon**".

EKLEIPSEIS - ΕΚΛΕΙΨΕΙΣ - ἐκλείψεις - /ek.ˈleɪp.seɪs/ - a plural inflection of ἔκλειψις (*ékleipsis*, "abandonment") from ἐκλείπω (*ekleîpō*, "leave out", "abandon") + -σις (*-sis, abstract noun suffix*) meaning "**escape**", "free yourself", "exclude", "avoid", "evade".

"We must free ourselves from the prison of public education and politics." (VS 58)

ENNOIAIS - ΕΝΝΟΙΑΙΣ - ἐννοίαις - /eːnˈoɪ.aɪs/ - the plural dative inflection of ἔννοια (*énnoia*, "thought", "consideration") meaning "conceptions", "apprehension", "conceptions"

EPIBOLEN - ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗΝ - ἐπιβολὴν - /e.piˈbol.ɛːn/ - from ἐπί (*epi-*, "on", "upon") + βολή (*bolḗ*, "throw", "wound", "stroke", "cast", "quick glances", "bolts", "beams") meaning "**conceptions**", "apprehension", "perception", "application", "examination", "impression", "presentations", "anticipations", "twist [of the mind]","percept".

> *"And every image which we obtain by an act of apprehension on the part of the mind or of the sense-organs, whether of shape or of properties, this image is the shape or the properties of the concrete object, and is produced by the constant repetition of the image or the impression it has left." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)*

EPIMARTYRESIN - ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΝ - ἐπιμαρτύρησιν - /e.piːmarˈtyːrɛːsiːn/ - from ἐπί (*epi-*, "on", "upon") + μαρτύρησιν (*martúresin*, "evidence") meaning "**testimony**". *This root of this word* μάρτυς (mártus, "to witness") *is the source of our modern word "martyr(s)".*

> *"[T]he universe is bodies and space: for that bodies exist, sense itself witnesses in the experience of all men, and in accordance with the evidence of sense we must of necessity judge of the imperceptible by reasoning, as I have already said." (Epistle to Herodotus)*

KRISIN - ΚΡΙΣΙΝ - κρίσιν - /ˈkriːsiːn/ - the accusative singular inflection of κρίσις (*krísis*, "I decide) meaning "determination", "**judgment**", "discrimination", "doubt".

> *"[P]ay attention to internal feelings and to external sensations in general and in particular, according as the subject is general or particular, and to every immediate intuition in accordance with each of the standards of judgment." (Epistle to Herodotus)*

KRITERION - ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ - κριτήριον - /kriːˈtɛːriːon/ - from κριτήρ (*kritḗr*, "interpreter") + -ĭον (*-ion*), from κρῑνω (*krīnō*, "I discern, judge") meaning "**criterion**" or "standard".

> *"[W]e must keep all our investigations in accord with our sensations, and in particular with the immediate apprehensions whether of the mind or of any one of the instruments of judgment, and likewise in accord with the feelings existing in us, in order that we may have indications whereby we may judge both the problem of sense perception and the unseen." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)*

LOIPAS - ΛΟΙΠΑΣ - λοιπὰς - /loɪˈpas/ - related to the word λοιπός (*loipós*) from λείπω (*leîpō*, "to leave", "remain") meaning "**the rest**", "the remaining".

> *"[S]omething permanent is to remain behind at the dissolution of compounds: they are completely solid in nature, and can by no means be dissolved in any part […] the first beginnings are indivisible corporeal existences" (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)*

MATAIOI - ΜΑΤΑΙΩι - ματαίω - /ma.ˈtaɪ.ɔːi̯/ - an inflection of μάταιος (*mátaios*, "*vain*", "*idle*", "*frivolous*", "*futile*") from μάτη (*máte*, "fault", "folly") meaning "groundless", "**empty**", "baseless", "foolish", "pointless", "trifling", "unfounded".

> "*For we must not conduct scientific investigation by means of empty assumptions and arbitrary principles, but follow the lead of phenomena: for our life has not now any place for irrational belief and groundless imaginings, but we must live free from trouble.*" (*Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus*)

ORTHOS - ΟΡΘΩΣ - ὀρθῶς - /or.ˈtʰɔːs/ - from ὀρθός (*orthós*, "straight", "correct", "upright", "standing") + -ως (*-ōs*, adverbial suffix) meaning "**correctly**", "precisely".

> "*The wise man is the only person who can converse correctly about music and poetry, but he will not himself compose poems.*" (*Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 28*)

PASAN - ΠΑΣΑΝ - πᾶσαν - /ˈpas.an/ - the singular feminine, accusative form of πᾶς (*pás*, "every", "whole") meaning "**all**, "any", "each".

PATHE - ΠΑΘΗ - πάθη - /ˈpa.tʰeː/ - from πάσχω (*páskhō*, "to undergo", "experience", "suffer", "feel") meaning "affectations", "**feelings**", "passions".

> "*[F]rom pleasure we begin every act [...] using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good*" (*Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus*). ΠΑΘΗ (*páthe*) *is the faculty that allows us to judge an experience as being pleasurable or painful. Feeling is one of three sources of true knowledge in Epicurean epistemology, the other two are* ΑΙΣΘΗΣΕΙΣ (*aisthéseis, "sensation"*) *and* ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ (*prólepsis, "preconception"*).

PHANTASTIKEN - ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΗΝ - φανταστικὴν - /pʰan.tas.ti.ˈkɛːn/ - related to the word φανταστικός (*phantastikós*, "able to produce the appearance") from φαντάζω (*phantázō*, "to show") + ικός (*-ikós*, adjective stem) meaning "**presentative**", "intuitive", "mental examinations", "imaginary" "layers of imagination", "presentational".

> *Epicurus' placement of the phrase* ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΗΝ ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗΝ ΤΗΣ ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑΣ *(phantastikén epibolén tés dianoías) indicates a connection with* ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ *(prólepsis). The repetitive rhetorical structure of the sentence indicates that Epicurus was expressing three equal ideas, those being the three* ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ *(kritérion) of knowledge,* [1] *aisthésis,* [2] *páthe, and* [3] *prólepsis.*

PROSMENON - ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΟΝ - προσμένον - /pros.ˈme.non/ - related to the word προσμένω (*prosméno*, "to bide", "wait", "remain") meaning "**awaits**", "awaiting".

SYNTARAXEIS - ΣΥΝΤΑΡΑΞΕΙΣ - συνταράξεις - /syːn.ta.ˈrak.seɪs/ - related to the word συντάραξις (*syntáraxis*) meaning "imputing trouble", "throw into confusion", "confound", "**confuse**", "send into turmoil", "disturb", "impute trouble".

> "*[W]e must live free from trouble.*" (*Epicurus' Epistle to Pythocles*)

XXV (25)

AKOLOUTHOI - ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΟΙ - ἀκόλουθοι - /aːˈkol.uːtʰoɪ/ - the nominative and vocative plural inflections of ἀκόλουθος (*akólouthos*, "in conformity with", "in accordance with", "analogically", "consequent") meaning "agreement", "harmony", **"accord"**, "consistent".

> *"[W]e must keep all our investigations in accord with our sensations […] and likewise in accord with the feelings existing in us." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)*

DIOXIN - ΔΙΩΞΙΝ - δίωξιν - /ˈdiːɔːk.siːn/ - from διώκω (*diṓkō*, "to run", "pursue", "drive", "chase") meaning to "seek", "choose", or **"pursue"**, versus φυγὴν (*phygén*, "avoid").

> *"No one when he sees evil deliberately chooses it, but is enticed by it as being good in comparison with a greater evil and so pursues it." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 16)*

EPANOISEIS - ΕΠΑΝΟΙΣΕΙΣ - ἐπανοίσεις - /eːpaˈnoɪ.seɪs/ - related to επαναφέρω (*epanaphérō*, "to throw back upon") meaning **"refer"**, "reconcile", "reference", "connect".

> *"[W]e must grasp the ideas attached to words, in order that we may be able to refer to them and so to judge the inferences of opinion or problems of investigation or reflection so that we may not either leave everything uncertain …." (Epistle to Herodotus)*

HEKASTON - ΕΚΑΣΤΟΝ - ἕκαστον - /ˈheːkas.ton/ - an inflection of the word ἕκᾰστος (*hékastos*) meaning **"each"**.

> *"And so in each shape the atoms are quite infinite in number, but their differences of shape are not quite infinite, but only incomprehensible in number." (Epistle to Herodotus)*

KAIRON - ΚΑΙΡΟΝ - καιρὸν - /kaɪˈron/ - the accusative singular inflection of καιρός (*kairós*, "measure", "proportion") meaning an **"occasion"**, a "time".

> *"[W]e must form our judgment on all these mattersFor the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)*

LOGOIS - ΛΟΓΟΙΣ - λόγοις - /ˈlog.oɪs/ - the dative plural inflection of λόγος (*lógos*, "word", "speech", "story", "computation", "reckoning", "account") meaning "words", **"theories"**, "principles", "reasons", "rationalizations", "thoughts", "creed".

> *"But when one accepts one theory and rejects another, which harmonizes as well with the phenomenon, it is obvious that he altogether leaves the path of scientific inquiry and has recourse to myth." (Epicurus' Epistle to Pythocles)*

PANTA - ΠΑΝΤΑ - πάντα - /ˈpan.ta/ - a plural inflection of πᾶς (*pás*, "all", "whole") meaning **"every"**.

"Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil …." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

PHYGEN - ΦΥΓΗΝ - φυγὴν - /pʰyː'gɛːn/ - the accusative singular inflection of of φυγή (*phugḗ*, "flight", "retreat", "escape") meaning "**avoid**", versus δίωξιν (*diṓxin*, "pursue").

"[W]e do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

PHYSEOS - ΦΥΣΕΩΣ - φύσεως - /'pʰyːse.ɔːs/ - the singular genitive form of φύσις (*phúsis*, "origin", "birth", "nature", "quality", "property", "form", "shape") meaning "**natural**".

POIOUMENOS - ΠΟΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ - ποιούμενος - /poɪ.'uːm.en.os/ - the present mediopassive participle of ποιέω (*poiéō*, "make", "produce", "create", "invent") meaning "attempting", "**making**", "thinking", "proceeding".

PRATTOMENON - ΠΡΑΤΤΟΜΕΝΩΝ - πραττομένων - /pratːo.'me.non/ - related to πράσσω (*prássō*, "pass through", "achieve") meaning "**action**".

"[I]t is better in a man's actions that what is well chosen (should fail, rather than that what is ill chosen) should be successful owing to chance." (Epistle to Menoikeus)

PRAXEIS - ΠΡΑΞΕΙΣ - πράξεις - /'prak.seɪs/ - a plural inflection of πράξη (*práxe*, "act", "deed") meaning "**actions**" or "deeds" as opposed to empty words.

"[I]t better to be unfortunate in reasonable action than to prosper in unreason. For it is better in a man's actions that what is well chosen (should fail, rather than that what is ill chosen) should be successful owing to chance." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

PROKATASTREPSEIS - ΠΡΟΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΕΨΕΙΣ **-** προκαταστρέψεις - /pro.ka.tas.'trep.seis/ - related to προκαταστρέφω (*prokatastréphō*, "subdue", "overthrow beforehand", "die first", "stop short"*) meaning "**turn**", "swerve", "veer", "divert".

"And the atoms move continuously for all time, some of them falling straight down, others swerving, and others recoiling from their collisions." (Epistle to Herodotus)

TELOS - ΤΕΛΟΣ - τέλος - /'te.los/ - meaning "end", "coming to pass", "performance", "consummation", "fulfillment", "execution", "result", or "**goal**" of a process.

"For it is to obtain this end that we always act, namely, to avoid pain and fear. And when this is once secured for us, all the tempest of the soul is dispersed since the living creature has not to wander […] And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

XXVI (26)

ALGOUN - ΑΛΓΟΥΝ - ἀλγοῦν - /aːl.ˈguːn/ the present contracted neuter infinitive participle ἄλγος (álgos, "pain"), meaning "suffering", "illness", "hardship", "**physical** pain".

> "Nature is weak toward evil, not toward good: because it is saved by pleasures, but destroyed by pains." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 37)

ANAGKAIAI - ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΑΙ - ἀναγκαῖαι - /aːnag.ˈkaɪ.jaɪ/ - the singular feminine form of ἀναγκαῖος (anagkaîos) from ἀνάγκη (anánkē, "necessity") + -ιος (-ios) meaning "**necessary**".

> The man who says that all things come to pass by necessity cannot criticize one who denies that all things come to pass by necessity: for he admits that this too happens of necessity." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 40)

APERGASTIKAI - ΑΠΕΡΓΑΣΤΙΚΑΙ - ἀπεργαστικαὶ - /aːper.ˈgas.tiːkaɪ/ - related to ἀπεργαστικός (apergastikós, "fit for finishing") meaning "**produce**", "cause", "lead to".

> "It is better to endure particular pains which produce greater satisfactions that we may enjoy. It is well to abstain from particular pleasures which produce more severe pains so that we may not suffer them." (Epicurus, Fragment 62)

BLABES - ΒΛΑΒΗΣ - βλάβης - /ˈbla.bɛːs/ - the genitive singular inflection of βλάβη (blábi), "hurt", "damage") meaning "**harm**", "injury".

> "Let us utterly drive from us our bad habits as if they were evil men who have long done us great harm." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 46)

DOXOSIN - ΔΟΞΩΣΙΝ - δόξωσιν - /ˈdok.sɔːsiːn/ - related to δοκέω (dokéo, "expect", "form an opinion") sharing the same root δοξα (doksa) as Doxai (as in the Kuriai Doxai), meaning "thing desired", "unnecessary desires", "**object of desire**", "desired objects".

> "You tell me that the stimulus of the flesh makes you too prone to the pleasures of love. Provided that you do not break the laws or good customs and do not distress any of your neighbors or do harm to your body or squander your pittance, you may indulge your inclination as you please …." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 51)

DYSPORISTON - ΔΥΣΠΟΡΙΣΤΩΝ - δυσπορίστων - /dyːspo.ˈriːstɔːn/ - the genitive plural inflection of δυσπόριστος (duspóristos, "gotten with much labor", "hard to come by" or "procure") meaning "**difficult to procure**", "hard to acquire".

> "[A]ll that is natural is easy to be obtained, but that which is superfluous is hard. […] And so plain savours bring us a pleasure equalto a luxurious diet, when all the pain due to want is removed; bread and water produce the highest pleasure, when one who needs them puts them to his lips." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

EKHOUSIN - ΕΧΟΥΣΙΝ - ἔχουσιν - /'eːkʰuːsiːn/ - the third-person plural present active indicative inflection of ἔχω (*ékhō*) meaning "**possess**", obtain", "attain", "have", "gain".

> "[A]toms do not possess any of the qualities belonging to perceptible things [...] For every quality changes; but the atoms do not change at all ...." (Epistle to Herodotus)

EPANAGOUSIN - ΕΠΑΝΑΓΟΥΣΙΝ - ἐπανάγουσιν - /eːpa.ˈna.guːsiːn/ - related to ἐπανάγω (*epanágō*, "stir up", "excite") meaning "**lead**", "bring", "create".

EPITHYMION - ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ - ἐπιθυμιῶν - /eːpiːˈtʰyːmiːɔːn/ - the genitive plural inflection of επιθυμία (*epithumía*, "desire", "yearning", "appetite", "wish", "longing") meaning "passion", "striving", "interest", "**desires**".

> "Every desire must be confronted by this question: what will happen to me if the object of my desire is accomplished and what if it is not?" (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 72)

EUDIAKHUTON - ΕΥΥΙΑΧΥΤΟΝ - εὐδιάχυτον - /eu.di.ˈa.kʰyːton/ - from the word εὐδιάχυτος (*eudiákhutos*, "easily diffused", "easily relieved") meaning "easily got rid of", "easily dispelled", "easily thrust aside", "easily diffused", "**easily dissolved**".

OREXIN - ΟΡΕΞΙΝ - ὄρεξιν - /'oːrek.siːn/ - an inflection of ὄρεξις (*órexis*) from ὀρέγω (*orégō*, "I stretch") + -σῐς (-*sis*) meaning "the thing **desired**", "the craved object".

> "Remove sight, association, and contact, and the passion of love is at an end." (VS 18)

SYMPLEROSIN - ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΩΣΙΝ - συμπληρῶσιν - /syːm.plɛːˈrɔːsiːn/ - from συν- (*syn-*, "with", "together") + πληρόω (*pleróō*, "to fill", "to full", "to finish", "to complete", "to fulfill") meaning "gratified", "**fulfilled**", "satisfied".

> "We must not violate nature, but obey her; and we shall obey her if we fulfil those desires that are necessary, and also those that are natural but bring no harm to us, but we must sternly reject those that are harmful." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 21)

XXVII (27)

BION - ΒΙΟΝ - βίον - /'biːon/ - the singular accusative of βίος (*bíos*) meaning "**life**", *not* a "life form", *but rather*, a "*mode* of life", "*manner* of living", "lifetime", "livelihood".

> "We are born once and cannot be born twice, but for all time must be no more. But you, who are not master of tomorrow, postpone your happiness. Life is wasted in procrastination and each one of us dies without allowing himself leisure." (VS 14)

KTESIS - ΚΤΗΣΙΣ - κτῆσις - /'ktɛːsiːs/ - from κτάομαι (*ktáomai*, "to acquire", "to gain") + -σις (-*sis*, noun suffix) meaning "acquisition", "**possession**".

> "The wise man will not [...] become a beggar." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 16)

MAKARIOTETA - ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΤΗΤΑ - μακαριότητα - /ma.ka.ri:'**o**:tɛ:ta/ - from μακάριον (*mákarion*, "blessed") meaning "happiness", "**blessedness**", "bliss".

"[T]he health of the body and (the soul's) freedom from disturbance [...] is the aim of the life of blessedness […] to avoid pain and fear. […] And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

MEGISTON - ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΝ - μέγιστόν - /me:gi:'**ston**/ - adverbial form of μέγιστος from μέγας (*mégas*, "big", "great") + -ιστος (*-istos*, adjective suffix) meaning "most important", "most precious", "[*by far the*] **greatest**".

PARASKEUAZETAI - ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΤΑΙ - παρασκευάζεται - /par.as.keu̯.'**az**.e.tai̯/ - related to παρασκευάζω (*paraskeuázō*, "prepare") meaning "**provides**", "procured".

"The wise man will […] provide for the future." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 21)

PHILIAS - ΦΙΛΙΑΣ - φιλίας - /pʰi:'**li**:a:s/ - the genitive singular of φιλία (*philía*) meaning "**friendship**", "love", "affection", "fondness", and "companionship".

"Friendship dances around the world bidding us all to awaken to the recognition of happiness. […] The wise man feels no more pain when being tortured himself than when his friend tortured. […] On occasion a man will die for his friend, for if he betrays his friend, his whole life will be confounded by distrust and completely upset."
(Epicurus, Vatican Sayings 52, 56, 57)

"The wise man will be willing even to die for a friend." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 37)

SOPHIA - ΣΟΦΙΑ - σοφία - /so.'**pʰi**:a/ - from σοφός (*sophós*, "skilled in handcrafts", "clever") + -ῐᾱ (*-íā*) meaning "skill", "cleverness", "knowledge" or, *usually*, "**wisdom**".

"[The wise person] will be more deeply moved by feeling than others, but this will not prove to be an obstacle to wisdom […] shows gratitude […] will not entangle [themselves] in the affairs of the state […] will be fond of the countryside […] will also, if he is in need, earn money, but only by his wisdom […] will be the same whether asleep or awake. […] holds that all faults are not of equal gravity."
(Epicurus, Wise Man Sayings 2, 5, 14, 22, 30, 36, 38)

XXVIII (28)

AIONION - ΑΙΩΝΙΟΝ - αἰώνιον - /ai̯.'**ɔ**:ni:on/ - from αἰών (*aiōn*, "age, eon") + -ιος (*-ios*, adjective suffix) meaning "**long-lasting**", "perpetual", "eternal", "everlasting".

"[T]hey are always expecting or imagining some everlasting misery, such as is depicted in legends …." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)

ASPHALEIAN - ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑΝ - ἀσφάλειαν - /aːs.ˈpʰa.leɪ.an/ - from ἀσφαλής (*asphallḗs*, "immovable", "steadfast", "unshaken", "unfailing", "trusty") from ἀ- (*a-*, "un-") + σφάλλω (*sphállō*, "to overthrow") + -ής (*-ḗs*) meaning "**security**", "surety", "certainty".

> *"The wise man will show a regard for his reputation to such an extent as to avoid being despised." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 25)*

DEINON - ΔΕΙΝΟΝ - δεινὸν - /deɪ.ˈnon/ - accusative singular masculine of δεινός (*deinós*, "horrible", "fearful", "astounding") meaning "**terrible**".

> *"[T]here is nothing terrible in life for the man who has truly comprehended that there is nothing terrible in not living." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)*

EPOIESEN - ΕΠΟΙΗΣΕΝ - ἐποίησεν - /eː.ˈpoɪ.ɛː.sen/ - the third-person singular aorist active indicative of ποιέω (*poiéō*, "create", "produce") meaning "**encourages**", "inspires", "has given", "assures", "permits", "produces", "recognizes", "enables".

GNOME - ΓΝΩΜΗ - γνώμη - /ˈgnɔːmɛː/ - from the root γνω- (*gnó-*) related to γιγνώσκω (*gignṓskō*, "to know") + -μη (*-mē*) meaning "opinion", "conviction", "argument", "wisdom", "**judgment**", "knowledge", "understanding", "attitude", "insight". Compare with γνῶσις (*gnṓsis*, "seeking to know", "inquiry", "investigation", "recognizing", "decision").

> *The 4th-century archbishop of Constantinople Ἰωάννης ὁ Χρυσόστομος or John Chrysostom "the golden-mouthed" appropriated a number of concepts from pre-Christian psychagogy. The Early Church Father recycled the term γνώμη (gnóme) to describe the "well-disposed **mindset**" for which the Christian deity searches in humans. For Epicureans, the value of a γνώμη lies not in the favor granted by a deity, but in the pleasure that results from advancing a functional understanding of the natural world.*

HORISMENOIS - ΩΡΙΣΜΕΝΟΙΣ - ὡρισμένοις - /hɔːriːsˈme.noɪs/ - related to ὁρίζω (*orízō*, "divide", "separate") meaning "**discerns**", "recognizes", "notices", "sees".

> *"We must heal our misfortunes by the grateful recollection of what has been and by the recognition that it is impossible to undo that which has been done." (VS 55)*

KATEIDE - ΚΑΤΕΙΔΕ - κατεῖδε - /ka.ˈteɪ.de/ - related to κάτοιδα (*kátoida*, "to know well", "recognize") meaning "learns", "discerns", "**knows**".

MALISTA - ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ - μάλιστα - /ˈma.liːsta/ - a superlative of μάλα (*mála*, "very"), from μάλα + -ιστα (*-ista*, superlative adverb suffix) meaning "**greater**", "especially", "more than".

> *"[T]he things which produce certain pleasures entail disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves. (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 50, KD8)*

MEDE - ΜΗΔΕ - μηδὲ - /mɛːˈde/ - from μή (*mḗ*, "not") + δέ (*dé*, "and, but") meaning "and not", "but not", "nor", "not even", "not either", "**not**".

"One wise man is not wiser than another." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 29)

METHEN - ΜΗΘΕΝ - μηθὲν - /mɛː'tʰen/ - related to μηδείς (*medeîs*, "not one") from μηδέ (*mēdé*, "and not") + εἷς (*heîs*, "one") meaning "**no** [thing]", "nothing"

"So that as it has no extreme point, it has no limit; and as it has no limit, it must be boundless and not bounded." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)

PHILIAS - ΦΙΛΙΑΣ - φιλίας - /pʰiː'liːaːs/ - the genitive singular inflection of φιλία (*philía*) meaning "**friendship**", "love", "affection", "fondness", "companionship".

"Friendship dances around the world bidding us all to awaken to the recognition of happiness. [...] The wise man feels no more pain when being tortured himself than when his friend tortured. [...] On occasion a man will die for his friend, for if he betrays his friend, his whole life will be confounded by distrust and completely upset."
                                                                        (Epicurus, Vatican Sayings 52, 56, 57)

"The wise man will be willing even to die for a friend." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 37)

POLYKHRONION - ΠΟΛΥΧΡΟΝΙΟΝ - πολυχρόνιον - /po.ly'kʰron.iː.on/ - from πολύς (*polús*) + χρόνος (*khrónos*) meaning "of long duration", "for a long time", "**long-lasting**".

SYNTELOUMENEN - SYNTELOYMHNEN - συντελουμένην - /syːn.te.lu'men.ɛːn/ - related to συντελέω (*sunteléō*, "to bring to an end") meaning "affords", "**achieves**", "gained".

"Unlimited time and limited time afford an equal amount of pleasure, if we measure the limits of that pleasure by reason." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 22; KD19)

THARREIN - ΘΑΡΡΕΙΝ - θαρρεῖν - /tʰarː'eɪn/ - the present active infinitive of θαρρέω (*tharréō*, "I dare", "I am of courage") from θάρσος (*thársos*, "courage") + -έω (*-éō*, denominal suffix) meaning "feel secure", "feeling confident", "**confidence**", "assurance of safety".

"It is not so much our friends' help that helps us as it is the confidence of their help." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 34)

XXIX (29)

ANAGKAIAI - ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΑΙ - ἀναγκαῖαι - /aː.nag.'kaɪ.jaɪ/ - the singular feminine inflection of ἀναγκαῖος (*anagkaîos*, "**necessary**") from ἀνάγκη (*anánkē*, "necessity") + -ιος (*-ios*).

"Thanks be to blessed Nature because she has made what is necessary easy to supply, and what is not easy unnecessary." (Epicurus, Fragment 67)

DOXAN - ΔΟΞΑΝ - δόξαν - /'dok.san/ - the accusative singular of δόξα (*dóxa*) meaning "expectation", "**opinion**", "judgment", "belief", "imagination", "whim".

"I would prefer to speak openly and like an oracle to give answers serviceable to all mankind, even though no one should understand me, rather than to conform to popular opinions and so win the praise freely scattered by the mob." (Vatican Saying 29)

EPITHYMION - ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ - ἐπιθυμιῶν - /eːpiːˈtʰyːmiːɔːn/ genitive plural declension of επιθυμία (*epithumía*, "desire", "yearning", "wish") meaning "**desires**".

"[T]hose whose mind is in an evil state are always poor in everything and in their greed are plunged into capricious desires." (Epicurus, Fragment 58)

GINOMENAI - ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΑΙ - γινόμεναι - /ˈgiːno.me.naɪ/ - related to γίγνομαι (*gígnomai*, "to come into being") meaning "**arise**", "arising from", "owing to".

"[T]he pleasure which arises from nature does not produce wickedness, but rather the longing connected with vain fancies." (Epicurus, Fragment 60)

KENEN - ΚΕΝΗΝ - κενὴν - /ke.ˈnɛːn/ the singular feminine,accusative of κενός (*kenós*) meaning "**empty**", "vain", "fruitless", "exhausted", "void", and "destitute". The word κενὴν (*kenén*) describes an epistemological analogue to the physical "void" of κενῶν (*kenón*).

"Vain is the word of a philosopher which does not heal any suffering of man. For just as there is no profit in medicine if it does not expel the diseases of the body, so there is no profit in philosophy either, if it does not expel the suffering of the mind." (Fragment 54)

PHYSIKAI - ΦΥΣΙΚΑΙ - φυσικαὶ - /pʰyːsiˈkaɪ/ - an inflection of φυσικός (*phusikós*, "nature") meaning "**natural**" or "physical".

<u>XXX</u> (30)

ALGOUN - ΑΛΓΟΥΝ - ἀλγοῦν - /aːl.ˈguːn/ the present contracted neuter infinitive participle ἄλγος (*álgos*, "pain"), meaning "suffering", "illness", "hardship", "physical **pain**".

"[Let the divine nature] be preserved free from burdensome duties and in entire blessedness." (Epicurus' Epistle to Pythocles)

ANTHROPOU - ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥ - ἀνθρώπου - /aːn.ˈtʰrɔːpuː/ - the genitive singular form of ἄνθρωπος (*ánthropos*) "human being", "people" "man", "**humanity**", "mankind".

DIAKHEONTAI - ΔΙΑΧΕΟΝΤΑΙ - διαχέονται - /diːa.ˈkʰe.on.taɪ/ - an inflection of διαχέω (*diakhéō*, "to pour different ways", "disperse", "confound", "run through") meaning "**dispelled**", "dissolved", "defused", "stamped out", "dissipated"

"Moreover, if the whole structure is dissolved, the soul is dispersed and no longer has the same powers nor performs its movements, so that it does not possess sensation either." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)

DOXAN - ΔΟΞΑΝ - δόξαν - /'**dok**.san/ - the accusative singular of δόξα (*dóxa*) from which δόξαι (*doxai*, "doctrines") is derived (as in the *Kuriai Doxai* or "Key Doctrines" of Epicurus), meaning "expectation", "**opinion**", "judgment", and "belief".

"[I] would prefer to speak openly and like an oracle to give answers serviceable to all mankind, even though no one should understand me, rather than to conform to popular opinions and so win the praise freely scattered by the mob." (Vatican Saying 29)

EPANAGOUSON - ΕΠΑΝΑΓΟΥΣΩΝ - ἐπαναγουσῶν - /e:pa.na.gu:'**sɔ**:n/ - related to ἐπανάγω (*epanágo*, "to stir up") meaning "satisfied", "gratified", "fulfilled", "**indulged**".

"The wise man will never indulge in drunkenness …." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 13)

EPITHYMION - ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ - ἐπιθυμιῶν - /e:pi:'**tʰy**:mi:ɔ:n/- the genitive plural inflection of επιθυμία (*epithumía*, "desire", "yearning", "appetite", "wish", "longing") meaning "passion", "striving", "interest", "**desires**".

"Through love of true philosophy, every troublesome and disturbing desire is ended." (Epicurus, Fragment 66)

GINONTAI - ΓΙΝΟΝΤΑΙ - γίνονται - /'**gi**:non.taɪ/ - related to γίγνομαι (*gígnomai*, "to come into being", "be born", "be produced") meaning "**arise**", "arising from", "owing to".

HYPARKHEI - ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙ - υπάρχει - /hy:'**par**.kʰeɪ/ - the third-person singular present inflection of the the verb υπάρχω (*hupárkhō*, "to begin") from Ὗπο- (*húpo-*, "under") + ἄρχω (*árkhō*, "to begin") meaning "origin" or "**beginning**".

"We must try to make the end of the journey better than the beginning, as long as we are journeying; but when we come to the end, we must be happy and content." (VS 48)

KENEN - ΚΕΝΗΝ - κενὴν - /ke.'**nɛ**:n/ the singular, feminine, accusative of κενός (*kenós*) meaning "**empty**", "vain", "fruitless", "exhausted", "void", and "destitute". The word κενὴν (*kenén*) describes an epistemological analogue to the physical "void" of κενῶν (*kenón*).

"For that which gives no trouble when it comes is but an empty pain in anticipation" (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

KENODOXIAN - ΚΕΝΟΔΟΞΙΑΝ - κενοδοξίαν - /ke.no.dok.'**si**:an/ - from κενὴν (*kenén*) and δόξαν (*dóxan*) meaning "liability to vain imagination", "vanity", "**vain opinions**", "groundless", "illusory", "vain fancies", "empty imaginings", "beliefs", "senseless whims".

"For we must not conduct scientific investigation by means of empty assumptions and arbitrary principles, but follow the lead of phenomena: for our life has not now any place for irrational belief and groundless imaginings, but we must live free from trouble." (Epicurus' Epistle to Pythocles)

PHYSIKON - ΦΥΣΙΚΩΝ - φυσικῶν - /pʰyːsiˈkɔːn/ - the genitive plural form of φυσικός (*phusikós*, "natural", "physical") describing "**natural**" desires.

PHYSIN - ΦΥΣΙΝ - φύσιν - /ˈpʰyːsiːn/ - a singular, nominative form of φὔω (*phúō*, "grow") + -σῖς (-*sis*) meaning "**nature**", "origin", "birth", "quality", "property".

SPOUDE - ΣΠΟΥΔΗ - σπουδὴ - /spuːˈdɛː/ - from σπεύδω (*speúdō*, "to make haste") + -η (-*ē*, verbal stem) meaning "insistent", "**pursued**", "effort", "fulfilled", "exertion", "satisfied".

SYNTELESTHOSIN - ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΣΘΩΣΙΝ - συντελεσθῶσιν - /syːn.te.les.ˈtʰɔːsiːn/ - from συντελέω (*suntléo*, "bring to an end", "complete", "finish", "perpetrate", "celebrate", "hold", "contribute") meaning "satisfied", "gratified", "**fulfilled**", "indulged".

> *"That which creates insuperable joy is the complete removal of a great evil. And this is the nature of good , if one can once grasp it rightly and then hold by it, rather than walking about tediously babbling about the good." (Epicurus, Fragment 61)*

SYNTONOS - ΣΥΝΤΟΝΟΣ - σὺντονος - /ˈsyːn.to.nos/ - meaning "strained tight", "**intense**", "impetuous", "eager", "jerking", "violent", "vehement", "severe", "earnest".

<u>XXXI</u> (31)

BLAPTEIN - ΒΛΑΠΤΕΙΝ - βλάπτειν - /ˈblap.teɪn/ - from βλάπτω (*bláptō*, "to disable", "hinder") meaning "to **harm**" or "to cause harm".

BLAPTESTHAI - ΒΛΑΠΤΕΣΘΑΙ - βλάπτεσθαι - /ˈblap.tes.tʰaɪ/ - from βλάπτω (*bláptō*, "to disable", "hinder") meaning "to suffer **harm**" or "**to be harmed**".

DIKAION - ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ - δίκαιόν - /diːkaɪˈon/ - singular inflection of δίκαιος (*díkaios*, "observant", "righteous", "balanced") meaning the "**justice**" of nature.

> *"The greatest fruit of justice is peace of mind." (Epicurus, Fragment 80)*

MEDE - ΜΗΔΕ - μηδὲ - /mɛːˈde/ - from μή (*mḗ*, "not") + δέ (*dé*, "and, but") meaning "and not", "but not", "nor", "not even", "not either", "**not**".

> *"Will the wise man do things that laws forbid, knowing that he will not be found out? A simple answer is not easy to find." (Epicurus, Fragment 2)*

PHYSEOS - ΦΥΣΕΩΣ - φύσεως - /ˈpʰyːse.ɔːs/ - the singular genitive inflection of φύσις (*phúsis*, "origin", "birth", "nature", "quality", "property", "form") meaning "**Nature**".

SYMBOLON - ΣΥΜΒΟΛΟΝ - σύμβολον - /ˈsyːm.bo.lon/ - from σὺν- (*sun-*, "with, together") + βάλλω (*bállō*, "I throw, put") meaning "covenant", "contract", "symbol", "expression", "pledge", "compact", "guarantee", "**agreement**".

"The wise man holds that friendship is first brought about due to practical need, just as we sow the earth for crops, but it is formed and maintained by means of a community of life among those who find mutual pleasure in it." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 41)

SYMPHERONTOS - ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝΤΟΣ - συμφέροντος - /sy:m.ˈpʰer.on.tos/ - singular genitive form of συμφέρον (*symphéron*) meaning "what is suitable", "expediency", "utility", "advantage", "usefulness", "**interest**", "benefit", "utilitarian".

XXXII (32)

ADIKON - ΑΔΙΚΟΝ - ἄδικον - /ˈa:di:kon/ - singular form of ἄδικος (*ádikos*) for "**unjust**", "wrong", "unrighteousness", "obstinate", "unmanageable", "unreasonable".

ALLA - ΑΛΛΑ - ἄλλα - /ˈa:l:a/ - an inflection of ἀλλήλων (*allḗlon*, "reciprocally", "mutually") meaning "together", "**each other**".

"The rainbow is [...] a peculiar union of light and air, which can produce the special qualities of these colours whether all together or separately ...." (Epistle to Pythocles)

BLAPTEIN - ΒΛΑΠΤΕΙΝ - βλάπτειν - /ˈblap.teɪn/ - from βλάπτω (*bláptō*, "to disable", "hinder", "hinder", "distract", "damage", "hurt") meaning "to **harm**" or "to cause harm".

BLAPTESTHAI - ΒΛΑΠΤΕΣΘΑΙ - βλάπτεσθαι - /ˈblap.tes.tʰaɪ/ - from βλάπτω (*bláptō*, "to disable", "hinder", "distract", "damage", "hurt") meaning "**to be harmed**".

DIKAION - ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ - δίκαιόν - /di:kaɪ.ˈon/ - singular inflection of δίκαιος (*díkaios*, "observant", "righteous", "balanced") meaning the "**justice**" of nature.

"The greatest fruit of justice is peace of mind." (Epicurus, Fragment 80)

EBOULETO - ΕΒΟΥΛΕΤΟ - ἐβούλετο - /e:ˈbu:le.to/ - the third-person singular imperfect passive indicative inflection of βούλομαι (*boúlomai*) meaning "**willing**", "would".

"The wise man will be willing even to die for a friend." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 37)

EDYNATO - EDYNATO - ἐδύνατο - /e:ˈdy:na.to/ - the third-person singular imperfect mediopassive indicative of δὕνᾰμαι (*dúnamai*, "to be able") meaning "**able**", "could".

ETHNON - ΕΘΝΩΝ - ἐθνῶν - /e:tʰ.ˈnɔ:n/ - the genitive plural inflection of ἔθνος (*éthnos*, "company", "band", "class", "caste", "sex") from ἔθω (*éthō*, "I am accustomed", "to become wont") meaning "nation", "tribe", "race", "**community**", "people".

"[Friendship] is formed and maintained by means of a community of life among those who find mutual pleasure in it." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 41)

MEDE - ΜΗΔΕ - μηδὲ - /mε:'**de**/ - from μή (*mḗ*, "not") + δέ (*dé*, "and, but") meaning "and not", "but not", "nor", "not even", "not either", "**not**".

"One wise man is not wiser than another." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 29)

OUTHEN - ΟΥΘΕΝ - οὐθὲν - /'**u**:tʰen/ - related to οὐδείς (*oudeîs*) from οὐδέ (*oudé*, "and not, not even") + εἷς (*heîs*, "one") meaning "**no**", "nothing", "not".

"[T]here is no necessity to live under the control of necessity." (Vatican Saying 9)

POIEISTHAI - ΠΟΙΕΙΣΘΑΙ - ποιεῖσθαι - /poɪ.'**eɪs**.tʰaɪ/ - the present mediopassive infinitive of ποιέω (*poiéō*, "to make") meaning "enter", "form", "**make**".

SYNTHEKAS - ΣΥΝΘΗΚΑΣ - συνθήκας - /sy:n.'**tʰɛ**:kas/ - the accusative plural inflection of συνθήκη (*súnthḗke*, "compounding", "convention", "compact") from σὺντίθημι (*suntíthēmi*, "to place or put together") meaning "covenant", "compacts", "**agreements**", "treaties".

"Laws are made for the sake of the wise, not to prevent them from inflicting wrong but to secure them from suffering it." (Epicurus, Fragment 81)

ZOION - ΖΩιΩΝ - ζῴων - /'**dzɔ**:i̯.ɔ:n/ - the genitive plural inflection of ζῷον (*zoíon*, "beast", "figure", "image", "form", "sign") meaning "**animals**", "living things", "animate creatures", "creatures", "living creatures" (*like* dogs, humans, *and, especially*, gods).

"Furthermore, we must believe that in all worlds there are living creatures and plants and other things we see in this world …." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)

XXXIII (33)

ALLELON - ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ - ἀλλήλων - /a:l:'**ɛ**:lɔ:n/ - from the word ἄλλος (*állos*, "another", "one besides", "else", "other", "the rest") meaning "**mutual**", "reciprocal".

"The wise man holds that friendship is first brought about due to practical need, just as we sow the earth for crops, but it is formed and maintained by means of a community of life among those who find mutual pleasure in it." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 41)

BLAPTEIN - ΒΛΑΠΤΕΙΝ - βλάπτειν - /'**blap**.teɪn/ - from βλάπτω (*bláptō*, "to disable", "hinder") meaning "to **harm**" or "to cause harm".

BLAPTESTHAI - ΒΛΑΠΤΕΣΘΑΙ - βλάπτεσθαι - /'**blap**.tes.tʰaɪ/ - from βλάπτω (*bláptō*, "to disable", "hinder") meaning "to suffer **harm**" or "**to be harmed**".

DIKAIOSYNE - ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗ - δικαιοσύνη - /di:kaɪ.o.'**sy**:nε:/ - from δίκαιος (*díkaios*, "observant", "equal", "lawful", "just") + -σὐνη (*-súnē*, abstract noun suffix) meaning "righteousness", "**justice**", specifically "abstract justice" or "absolute justice".

"Will the wise man do things that laws forbid, knowing that he will not be found out? A simple answer is not easy to find." (Epicurus, Fragment 2)

OPELIKOUS - ΟΠΗΛΙΚΟΥΣ - ὁπηλίκους - /oːpɛˈliːkuːs/ - related to the word ὁπηλίκος (*opelíkos*, "however big") meaning "**whatever**", "whenever", "any", "some".

"[W]hatever portions of the soul may perish [...] if the soul continues to exist at all, it will retain sensation." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)

SYNTHEKE - ΣΥΝΘΗΚΗ - συνθήκη - /syːnˈtʰɛːkɛː/ - an inflection of συνθήκη (*synthḗke*, "compounding", "convention", "compact") from σῠντῐθημῐ (*suntíthēmi*, "to place or put together") meaning a "**treaty**", "accord", or "agreement".

SYSTROPHAIS - ΣΥΣΤΡΟΦΑΙΣ - συστροφαῖς - /syːstroˈpʰaɪs/ - related to the word συστροφή (*systrophé*, "twisting together", "condensation", "density", "collection", "gathering") meaning "contracts", "intercourse", "**dealings**", "agreements", "relations".

"Among the things held to be just by law, whatever is proved to be of advantage in men's dealings has the stamp of justice whether or not it be the same for all …." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 13; KD37)

XXXIV (34)

ADIKIA - ΑΔΙΚΙΑ - ἀδικία - /aːdiːˈkiːa/ - from ἄδῐκος (*ádikos*, "unjust, wrong") + -ῐᾱ (-*íā*, abstract noun suffix) meaning "**injustice**", "iniquity".

"The just man is most free from disturbance, while the unjust is full of the utmost disturbance." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 12; KD17)

EPHESTEKOTAS - ΕΦΕΣΤΗΚΟΤΑΣ – ἐφεστηκότας - /eːpʰes.te.ˈko.tas/ - related to ἐφίστημι (*ephístemi*, "set upon", "set in charge of", "establish") meaning "**appointed**".

HYPOPSIAN - ΥΠΟΠΣΙΑΝ - ὑποψίαν - /hyːpop.ˈsiːan/ - from υποψία (*hypopsía*) meaning "**suspicion**", "apprehension", "fear".

"Let nothing be done in your life which will cause you fear if it becomes known to your neighbor." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 70)

KAKON - ΚΑΚΟΝ - κακόν - /ka.ˈkon/ - the singular accusative inflection of κακός (*kakós*, "worthless", "useless", "injurious", "wretched", "unhappy") meaning "**bad**" or "evil", *possibly* connected with the Proto-Indo-European root *kakka- ("to defecate", "to shit").

"[E]very pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided. […] we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

KOLASTAS - ΚΟΛΑΣΤΑΣ - κολαστάς - /ko.las.'tas/- related to κολαστής (*kolastés*, "chastiser", "punisher") meaning "**those who punish**".

LESEI - ΛΗΣΕΙ - λήσει - /'lɛːseɪ/ - the future third-person singular active indicative inflection of the word λανθάνω (*lantháno*) meaning "to **escape**", "escaping".

> ΛΑΝΘΑΝΩ (lanthánō) *shares the same root as the Epicurean maxim* **ΛΑΘΕ BIΩΣΑΣ** (*láthe biósas*) *meaning "Live in anonymity" (Epicurus, Fragment 86).* ΛΑΘΕ (*láthe, "[you] hide!"*) *is the second-person singular aorist active imperative inflection of* ΛΑΘΑΝΩ (*lanthánō, "[to] escape notice"*); BIΩΣΑΣ ιώσας (*biósas, "having lived"*) *is an inflection of the word* ΒΙΟΣ (*bíos, "life"*).

PHOBOI - ΦΟΒΩι - φόβῳ - /'pʰo.bɔːiː/ - the dative singular inflection of φόβος (*phóbos*, "panic, "flight", "doubt", "dread", "terror",) meaning "**fear**".

> *"The wise man will not object to go to the courts of law." (Wise Man Saying 17)*

TOIOUTON - ΤΟΙΟΥΤΩΝ - τοιούτων - /toɪ.'uːtɔːn/ - an inflection of τοιοῦτος (*toioútos*) from τοῖος (*toîos*, "of this sort") + οὗτος (*hoûtos*, "this") meaning "**such**", "these [things]."

XXXV (35)

ADELON - ΑΔΗΛΟΝ - ἄδηλον - /'aːdɛːlon/ - a singular inflection of ἄδηλος (*ádelos*, "invisible") meaning "**uncertain**", "unclear", "unsure".

ALLELOUS - ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ - ἀλλήλους - /aːl.'ɛːluːs/ - the accusative plural masculine inflection of ἀλλήλων (*allélon*, "reciprocally", "mutually") meaning "**together**".

> *"The rainbow is [...] a peculiar union of light and air, which can produce the special qualities of these colours whether all together or separately ...." (Epistle to Pythocles)*

BLAPTEIN - ΒΛΑΠΤΕΙΝ - βλάπτειν - /'blap.teɪn/ - from βλάπτω (*bláptō*, "to disable", "hinder") meaning "to **harm**" or "to cause harm".

BLAPTESTHAI - ΒΛΑΠΤΕΣΘΑΙ - βλάπτεσθαι - /'blap.tes.tʰaɪ/ - from βλάπτω (*bláptō*, "to disable", "hinder") meaning "to **suffer** harm" or "**to be harmed**".

KATASTROPHES - ΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΟΦΗΣ - καταστροφῆς - /ka.tas.tro.'pʰɛːs/ - the singular genitive inflection of καταστροφή (*katastrophḗ*, "overturning", "subjugation", "reduction") meaning "death", "**demise**" (*directly related to the modern English word "catastrophe"*).

> *"Some men throughout their lives spend their time gathering together the means of life, for they do not see that the draught swallowed by all of us at birth is a draught of death." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 30)*

KINOUNTA - KINOYNTA - κινοῦντα - /ki.ˈ**nu**ːn.ta/ - related to κινέω (kinéō, "set in motion", "move", "disturb") meaning "**violates**", "infringes", "breaks".

> *"We must not violate nature, but obey her; and we shall obey her if we fulfil those desires that are necessary, and also those that are natural but bring no harm to us, but we must sternly reject those that are harmful." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 21)*

LATHANEI - ΛΑΘΑΝΗι - λαθάνη - /la.ˈ**tha**.ne.iː/ - from the root of λανθάνω (lanthánō, "to escape notice") meaning "**escaped**" or "escapes".

> *"Even if they are able to escape punishment, it is impossible to win security by escaping: and so the fear of the future which always presses upon them does not suffer them to be happy or to be free from anxiety in the present." (Fragment 82)*

LATHRAI - ΛΑΘΡΑι - λάθρα - /ˈ**lat**ʰ.ra.iː/ - from the root of λανθάνω (lanthánō, "to escape notice") meaning "undiscovered", "**secretly**", "covertly", "by stealth", "unbeknownst to".

LESEI - ΛΗΣΕΙ - λήσει - /ˈ**lɛ**ːsei/ - the future third-person singular active indicative inflection of the word λανθάνω (lantháno) meaning "to **escape**", "escaping".

> *ΛΑΝΘΑΝΩ (lanthánō) shares the same root as the Epicurean maxim* **ΛΑΘΕ BIΩΣΑΣ** *(láthe biósas) meaning "Live in anonymity" (Epicurus, Fragment 86). ΛΑΘΕ (láthe, "[you] hide!") is the second-person singular aorist active imperative inflection of ΛΑΘΑΝΩ (lanthánō, "[to] escape notice"); BIΩΣΑΣ βιώσας (biósas, "having lived") is an inflection of the word BIOΣ (bíos, "life").*

MEDE - ΜΗΔΕ - μηδὲ - /mɛ.ˈ**de**/ - from μή (mḗ, "not") + δέ (dé, "and, but") meaning "and not", "but not", "nor", "not even", "not either", "**not**".

> *"One wise man is not wiser than another." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 29)*

MYRIAKIS - ΜΥΡΙΑΚΙΣ - μυριάκις - /myːri.ˈ**a**.ki·s/ - meaning "**ten thousand times**", "a thousand times", "numberless", "countless", "myriad", "time after time".

PARONTOS - ΠΑΡΟΝΤΟΣ - παρόντος - /pa.ˈ**ron**.tos/ - related to πἄρειμῐ (páreimi, "to be present") meaning "**at present**", "for the moment".

PISTEUEIN - ΠΙΣΤΕΥΕΙΝ - πιστεύειν - /piː.ˈ**steu̯**.eɪn/ - present active infinitive of πιστεύω (pisteúō, "to have faith", "to entrust") meaning "to believe", "**to feel confident**".

> *"It is hard for an evil-doer to escape detection, but to be confident that he will continue to escape detection indefinitely is impossible." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 7)*

SYNETHENTO - ΣΥΝΕΘΕΝΤΟ - συνέθεντο - /sy.ˈ**ne**.tʰen.to/ - the third-person aorist plural middle indicative inflection of συντίθημι (syntíthēmi) from συν- (sun-, "co-", "with") + τίθημι (títhēmi, "put", "pay", "deposit") meaning "**agreed**", "agreement", "compact", "contract".

XXXVI (36)

AITION - ΑΙΤΙΩΝ - αίτιων - /ˈaɪ.ti.oːn/ - the genitive plural masculine, feminine and neuter inflections of αίτιος (*aîtios*, "culpible", "responsible") meaning "**depends**".

ALLELOUS - ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ - ἀλλήλους - /aːlˈɛːluːs/ - the accusative plural masculine inflection of ἀλλήλων (*allḗlon*, "reciprocally", "mutually") meaning "**together**".

> *"The rainbow is caused by light shining from the sun on to watery atmosphere [...] a peculiar union of light and air, which can produce the special qualities of these colours whether all together or separately …." (Epicurus' Epistle to Pythocles)*

DIKAION - ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ - δίκαιόν - /diːkaɪˈon/ - a singular inflection of δίκαιος (*díkaios*, "observant", "righteous", "balanced") meaning the "**justice**" of nature.

> *"The greatest fruit of justice is peace of mind." (Epicurus, Fragment 80)*

IDION - ΙΔΙΟΝ - ἴδιον - /ˈiːdiːon/ - the singular inflection of ἴδιος (*ídios*, "personal", "private", "distinct") meaning a "**particular**", "individual", *instead of a universal*.

KHORAS - ΧΩΡΑΣ - χώρας - /ˈkʰɔːras/ - an inflection of χώρα (*khóra*, "location", "place", "spot", "land") meaning an individual "**country**".

> *"The wise man will be fond of the countryside." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 22)*

KOINON - ΚΟΙΝΟΝ - κοινον - /kɔɪˈnɔːn/ - an inflection of κοινός (*koinós*, "common", "public", "general", "state", "ordinary") meaning "**the same**".

KOINONIA - ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑι - κοινωνία - /kɔɪ.nɔːˈniːa.i̯/ - an inflection of κοινός (*koinós*, "common", "public", "general") meaning "social relationships", "mutual dealings", "communion", "**association**", "partnership", "society", "fellowship", "intercourse".

> *"He is no friend who is continually asking for help, nor he who never associates help with friendship. For the former barters kindly feeling for a practical return and the latter destroys the hope of good in the future." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 39)*

PASI - ΠΑΣΙ - πᾶσι - /ˈpa.siː/ - the dative plural masculine/neuter inflection of πᾶς (pâs) meaning "**all**", "each", "every", "whole", "any".

> *"Injuries are done among men either because of hatred, envy, or contempt, all which the wise man overcomes by reason." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 1)*

SYMPHERON - ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝ - συμφέρον - /syːmˈpʰer.on/ - the present active masculine participle of συμφέρω (*symphérō*, "to bring together") from συν- (*syn-*, "with") + φέρω (*phérō*, "to bring, carry") meaning "**advantageous**", "expedient", "useful", "beneficial".

SYNEPETAI - ΣΥΝΕΠΕΤΑΙ - συνέπεται - /syˈ**ne**.pe.taɪ/ - from the word συνέπομαι (*synépomai*, "follow along with", "accompany") meaning "**follow**", "turn out".

XXXVII (37)

ALLELOUS - ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ - ἀλλήλους - /aːlˈ**ɛ**ːluːs/ - the accusative plural masculine inflection of ἀλλήλων (*allḗlon*, "reciprocally", "mutually") meaning "mutual", "**together**".

APOBAINEI - ΑΡΟΒΑΙΝΗι - ἀποβαίνη - /aːpoˈ**baɪ**.neːi/ - an inflection of ἀποβαίνω (*apobaînō*, "disembark", "depart") meaning "**prove** to be", "turn out to be".

BLEPOUSIN - ΒΛΕΠΟΥΣΙΝ - βλέπουσιν - /ˈ**blep**.uːsi:n/ - related to βλέπω (*blépō*, "look at", "see", "perceive", "behold") meaning "**look**", "examine".

> *"And every image which we obtain by an act of apprehension on the part of the mind or of the sense-organs, whether of shape or of properties, this image is the shape or the properties of the concrete object, and is produced by the constant repetition of the image or the impression it has left."* (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)

DIKAION - ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ - δίκαιόν - /diːkaɪˈ**on**/ - a singular inflection of δίκαιος (*díkaios*, "observant", "righteous", "balanced") meaning the "**justice**" of nature.

> *"The greatest fruit of justice is peace of mind."* (Epicurus, Fragment 80)

DIKAIOU - ΔΙΚΑΙΟΥ - δικαίου - /diːˈ**kaɪ**.uː/ - the genitive singular infelction of δίκαιος (*díkaios*, "observant", "righteous", "balanced") meaning "**justice**" in general.

> *"The greatest fruit of justice is peace of mind."* (Epicurus, Fragment 80)

EKAINON - ΕΚΑΙΝΟΝ - ἐκεῖνον - /eːˈ**keɪ**.non/ - the masculine accusative singular inflection of ἐκεῖνος (ekeînos, "the person there", "the ideal world", "in that case", "at that place") meaning "that [*period*]", "**for a certain length**", "during that [*time*]", "for that [*time*]".

ENARMOTTEI - ΕΝΑΡΜΟΤΤΗι - ἐναρμόττη - /ɛːnarˈ**mot**ːɛːi/ - related to ἐναρμόζω (*enarmozō*,, "fit", "insert", "adapt") meaning "accord", "**harmonizes**".

> *"But when one accepts one theory and rejects another, which harmonizes as well with the phenomenon, it is obvious that he altogether leaves the path of scientific inquiry and has recourse to myth."* (Epicurus' Epistle to Pythocles)

EPIMARTYROUMENON - ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ – ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον - /eːpiːmar.ty.ˈ**ru**ːme.non/ - from ἐπῐ (*epí*, "on", "upon") + μᾰρτῠρέω (*marturéō*, "testify", "bare witness") meaning "**recognized**", "attested", "accounted", "sanctioned", "held", "deemed", "regarded", "believed", "accepted", "thought", "considered".

GENETAI - ΓΕΝΗΤΑΙ - γένηται - /ˈge.nɛːtaɪ/ - the third-person singular aorist middle subjunctive inflection of γίγνομαι (gígnomai, "come into being", "be born", "happen") meaning "**established**", "is made", "makes", "passes", "stipulates", "legislates".

KENAIS - ΚΕΝΑΙΣ - κεναῖς - /ken.ˈaɪs/ - the dative plural feminine inflection of κενός (kenós, "void") meaning "**empty**", "vain", "meaningless".

> *"For we must not conduct scientific investigation by means of empty assumptions and arbitrary principles, but follow the lead of phenomena" (Epistle to Pythocles)*

KHARAKTERA - ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡΑ - χαρακτῆρα - /ˈkʰa.rak.ˈtɛːra/ - related to χαρακτήρ (kharaktḗr, "a mark engraved", "graving tool", "die", "figures", "letters", "symbols") meaning "character", "**stamp**", "guarantee", "domain", "attribute", "patent", "hallmark", "status".

KHREIAIS - ΧΡΕΙΑΙΣ - χρείαις - /ˈkʰreɪ.aɪs/ - a plural inflection of χρεία (khreîa, "need", "want", "use", "advantage", "service") meaning natural "**needs**".

> *"[W]e have need of pleasure, when we feel pain owing to the absence of pleasure; (but when we do not feel pain), we no longer need pleasure." (Epistle to Menoikeus)*

KHRONON - ΧΡΟΝΟΝ - χρόνον - /ˈkʰron.on/ - the accusative singular inflection of χρόνος (khrónos) meaning "time period", "**time**", "for a while".

KOINONIAS - ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑΣ - κοινωνίας - /koɪ.nɔːˈniːas/ - the genitive singular inflection of κοινωνία (koinonía, "community", "society") meaning "**association**".

METAPIPTEI - ΜΕΤΑΠΙΠΤΗι - μεταπίπτῃ - /me.ta.ˈpiː.p.tɛːi̯/ - related to μεταπίπτω (metapíptō, "to fall differently", "to undergo a change") meaning "**changes**".

> *"For every quality changes; but the atoms do not change at all, since there must needs be something which remains solid and indissoluble at the dissolution of compounds, which can cause changes …." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)*

NOMON - ΝΟΜΟΝ - νόμον - /ˈnom.on/ - the accusative singular inflection of νόμος (nómos, "custom", "law", "statute", "ordinance") meaning "in practice", "conventional", "commonly held", " "held by law", "accepted", "**established norms**".

> *"Provided that you do not break the laws or good customs and do not distress any of your neighbors or do harm to your body or squander your pittance, you may indulge your inclination as you please." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 51)*

OUDEN - ΟΥΔΕΝ - οὐδὲν - /uːˈdɛːn/ - a singular neuter form of οὐδείς (oúdeis, "no one", "nobody", "none", "nothing", "no") as in "**nothing**" to us.

> *"We must envy no one, for the good do not deserve envy and the bad, the more they prosper, the more they injure themselves." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 53)*

OUKETI - ΟΥΚΕΤΙ - οὐκέτι - /uːˈke.tiː/ - from οὐκ (*ouk*, "not") + ἔτι (*éti*, "yet, longer") meaning "no more", **"no longer"**, "no further", "not now".

> *"[W]hen we do not feel pain [...] we no longer need pleasure." (Epistle to Menoikeus)*

PASI - ΠΑΣΙ - πᾶσι - /ˈpa.siː/ - the dative plural masculine/neuter inflection of πᾶς (*pâs*) meaning **"all"**, "each", "every", "whole", "any".

> *"Injuries are done among men either because of hatred, envy, or contempt, all which the wise man overcomes by reason." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 1)*

PHONAIS - ΦΩΝΑΙΣ - φωναῖς - /pʰɔːˈnaɪs/ - the dative plural inflection of φωνή (*phōné*) meaning "sounds", "speech", **"words"**, "terms", "utterances", "prattle", "forms".

> *"[W]e must grasp the ideas attached to words, in order that we may be able to refer to them and so to judge the inferences of opinion or problems of investigation or reflection, so that we may not either leave everything uncertain and go on explaining to infinity or use words devoid of meaning." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)*

PHYSIN - ΦΥΣΙΝ - φύσιν - /ˈpʰyːsiːn/ - a singular, nominative of φὐω (*phúō*, "grow") + -σῐς (*-sis*) meaning **"nature"**, "origin", "birth", "quality", "property".

PRAGMATA - ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ - πράγματα - /ˈprag.ma.ta/ - a plural inflection of πρᾶγμα (*prágma*, "deed", "act", "practice", "occurrence", "matter", "affair", "thing of importance", "concrete reality") meaning "actualities", the **"facts"**, the "case" (*not* "vain words", "empty terms" , "empty sounds", "meaningless words", or "empty forms").

> *"[I]f one is in opposition to clear-seen facts, he can never have his part in true peace of mind." (Epicurus' Epistle to Pythocles)*

PROLEPSIS - ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ - πρόληψις - /ˈprol.ɛp.siːs/ - from προλαμβάνω (*prolambánō*, "anticipate") + -σῐς (*-sis*) meaning **"preconception"**, "anticipation", "common notion", "general concept", "prior conception", "basic grasp", "mental image", "scheme".

> ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ (prólepsis) *refers the natural "conceptions derived from sensation" that anticipate the dynamics of future experiences. Preconception is one of three, principle sources of knowledge in Epicurean epistemology, the other two sources of knowledge being* ΠΑΘΗ (páthe, *"feeling") and* ΑΙΣΘΗΣΕΙΣ (aîsthēsis,*"sensation").*

SYMPHEREI - ΣΥΜΦΕΡΕΙ - συμφέρει - /syːm.ˈpʰe.reɪ/ - a singular active indicative inflection of συμφέρω (*sumphérō*, "to bring together") from συν- (*sun-*, "with") + φέρω (*phérō*, "to bring", "carry") meaning **"useful"**, "true", "expedient", "beneficial", "conducive".

> *"[B]y a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters ...." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)*

SYMPHERON - ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝ - συμφέρον - /syːmˈpʰer.on/ - the present active masculine participle of συμφέρω (*symphérō*, "to bring together") from συν- (*syn-*, "with") + φέρω (*phérō*, "to bring, carry") meaning "**useful**", "true", "expedient", "beneficial", "conducive".

SYNTARATTOUSIN - ΣΥΝΤΑΡΑΤΤΟΥΣΙΝ - συνταράττουσιν - /syːn.ta.ˈratːuːsiːn/ - related to συνταράσσω (*syntarásso*, "to throw all together into confusion") meaning "perplex", "**trouble**", "confound", "confuse", "disturb", "fret".

"On occasion a man will die for his friend, for if he betrays his friend, his whole life will be confounded by distrust and completely upset." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 57)

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ALLELOUS - ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ - ἀλλήλους - /aːlːˈɛːluːs/ - accusative plural masculine of ἀλλήλων (*allḗlon*, "reciprocally", "mutually") meaning "**together**".

"The rainbow is caused by light shining from the sun on to watery atmosphere [...] a peculiar union of light and air, which can produce the special qualities of these colours whether all together or separately …." (Epicurus' Epistle to Pythocles)

ANEPHANE - ΑΝΕΦΑΝΗ - ἀνεφάνη - /aːne.ˈpʰa.ne/ - an inflection of ἀναφαίνω (*anaphaînō*, "to make to give light", "make to blaze up") meaning "declared", "seen", "shown", "**revealed**", "becomes evident".

DIKAIA - ΔΙΚΑΙΑ - δίκαια - /ˈdiːkai.a/ - from δίκαιος (*díkaios*, "observant") from δῐκη (*díkē*, "custom, right") + -ῐος (*-ios*, adjective suffix) meaning "fairness", "**justice**".

"The greatest fruit of justice is peace of mind." (Epicurus, Fragment 80)

GENOMENON - ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΩΝ - γενομένων - /ge.no.ˈme.nɔːn/ - a genitive plural inflection of γενόμενος (*genómenos*) from γίγνομαι (*gígnomai*, "to become") meaning "**circumstances**", "developments", "conditions", "situation".

"Moreover, we must suppose that human nature too was taught and constrained to do many things of every kind merely by circumstances." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)

HARMOTTONTA - ΑΡΜΟΤΤΟΝΤΑ - ἀρμόττοντα - /har.ˈmotːon.ta/ - meaning "**fit**", "to be in agreement with", "appropriate", "coherent", "in accord", "consistent", "harmonious".

"The wise man will marry and have children [...] but only in accord with the circumstances of his life." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 12)

KAINON - ΚΑΙΝΩΝ - καινῶν - /kai.ˈnɔːn/ - the genitive plural inflection of καινός (*kainós*) meaning "**new**", "novel", "recent", "fresh", "strange", "surprising", "without precedent" (*from the Proto-Indo-European* *ken-, *"to arise", "begin"*).

"Nothing new happens in the universe, as compared to the infinite span of time that has already passed." (Epicurus, Fragment 55)

KEIMENA - ΚΕΙΜΕΝΑ - κείμενα - /ˈkeɪ.me.na/ - an inflection of κεῖμαι (keîmai, "lie down", "situate", "fit", "to place in position", "posited", "assumed") meaning "pronounced", "sanctioned", "regarded", "held", "deemed", "**established**".

"[W]e must do our best to keep this doctrine in mind, in order that on the one hand the standards of judgment dependent on the clear visions may not be undermined, and on the other error may not be as firmly established as truth …." (Epistle to Herodotus)

KOINONIAN - ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑΝ - κοινωνίαν - /koi.nɔːˈniːan/ - genitive singular inflection of κοινωνία (koinonía, "community", "society") meaning "communion", "**association**", "partnership", "society", "fellowship", "joint-ownership", "intercourse", "alms".

"The wise man when he has accommodated himself to straits knows better how to give than to receive, so great is the treasure of self-sufficiency which he has discovered." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 44)

NOMISTHENTA - ΝΟΜΙΣΤΗΕΝΤΑ - νομισθέντα - /no.miːsˈtʰen.ta/ - related to νομίζω (nomízō, "use customarily", "practice", "enact", "believe") meaning "pronounced", "sanctioned", "regarded", "**held**", "deemed", "established".

"Provided that you do not break the laws or good customs and do not distress any of your neighbors or do harm to your body or squander your pittance, you may indulge your inclination as you please." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 51)

OUKETI - ΟΥΚΕΤΙ - οὐκέτι - /uːˈke.tiː/ - from οὐκ (ouk, "not") + ἔτι (éti, "yet, longer") meaning "no more", "**no longer**", "no further", "not now".

"[W]hen we do not feel pain [...] we no longer need pleasure." (Epistle to Menoikeus)

PERIESTOTON - ΠΕΡΙΕΣΤΩΤΩΝ - περιεστώτων - /pe.ri.esˈtɔːtɔːn/ - from περί (perí, "around", "about", "near") + ἐστί (estí, "to be") meaning "**in actual** [practice]".

PRAGMATON - ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΩΝ - πραγμάτων - /pragˈma.tɔːn/ - the genitive plural form of πρᾶγμα (prágma, "I do") meaning "things", "**conventions**", "[in] practice".

"The things which I used unceasingly to commend to you, these do and practice, considering them to be the first principles of the good life." (Epistle to Menoikeus)

PROLEPSIN - ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΝ - πρόληψιν - /ˈprol.ɛːp.siːn/ - from προλαμβάνω (prolambánō, "anticipate") + -σῖς (-sis) meaning "**preconception**", "anticipation", "impressions", "basic grasp", "conceptions", "general notions", "mental pictures", "schemas".

ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΝ (prólepsin) *refers the natural "conceptions derived from sensation". Preconception is one of three sources of knowledge in Epicurean epistemology, the other two being* ΠΑΘΗ (páthe, *"feeling") and* ΑΙΣΘΗΣΕΙΣ (aîsthēsis,*"sensation").*

SYMPOLITEUOMENON - ΣΥΜΠΟΛΙΤΕΥΟΜΕΝΩΝ - συμπολιτευομένων - /syːm.po.liː teu̯.o.ˈmen.on/ - related to the word συμπολιτεύω (*sympoliteúio,* "to live as fellow citizens", "members of one state") meaning "mutual intercourse of mankind", "citizens' dealings with one another", **"mutual association of fellow citizens"**, "community of citizens".

"The wise man holds that friendship […] is formed and maintained by means of a community of life among those who find mutual pleasure in it." (Wise Man Saying 41)

SYNEPHERE - ΣΥΝΕΦΕΡΕ - συνέφερε - /syːˈne.pʰe.re/ - the third-person, active imperfect singular inflection of συμφέρω (*sumphérō,* "bring together", "collect") meaning **"advantageous"**, "expedient", "useful", from συν- (*syn-,* "with") + φέρω (*phérō,* "to bring").

"[B]y a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)

SYNEPHEREN - ΣΥΝΕΦΕΡΕΝ - συνέφερεν - /syːˈne.pʰe.ren/ - the third-person, indicative imperfect singular inflection of συμφέρω (*symphérō,* "bring together", "collect") meaning **"advantage"**, "expedient", "useful", from συν- (*sun-,* "with") + φέρω (*phérō,* "to bring").

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ALLOPHYLA - ΑΛΛΑΦΥΛΑ - ἀλλόφυλά - /aːlˈo.pʰyːlaː/ - plural declension of ἀλλόφυλος (*allóphulos*) from ἄλλος (*állos,* "different") + φῦλον (*phúlon,* "type") meaning **"different group"**, "race", "stock", "kin", "sex", "religion", "tribe", "country", "ethnicity", "foreign".

"[M]en's natures according to their different nationalities had their own peculiar feelings and received their peculiar impressions, and so each in their own way emitted air formed into shape by each of these feelings and impressions, according to the differences made in the different nations …." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)

ANEPIMEIKTOS - ΑΝΕΠΙΜΕΙΚΤΟΣ - ἀνεπίμεικτος - /aːne.ˈpiːmeɪk.tos/ - meaning "exclude", "refrain", **"avoid"**, "drive out", "dissociate", "shun".

"[S]uperstition must be excluded, as it will, if one successfully follows the lead of seen phenomena to gain indications about the invisible." (Epicurus' Epistle to Pythocles)

ARISTA - ΑΡΙΣΤΑ - ἄριστα - /ˈaːriːsta/ - a superlative inflection of ἀγαθός (*agathós,* "good", "noble") meaning **"best"**, "noblest", "most successful", "fittingly constituted".

"Let us utterly drive from us our bad habits as if they were evil men who have long done us great harm." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 46)

DYNATA - ΔΥΝΑΤΑ - δυνατὰ - /dyːna.ˈta/ - an inflection of δυνατὸς (*dunatós*, "strong", "mighty", able") meaning "**what is possible**", "what can be done".

DYNATOS - ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ - δυνατὸς - /dyːna.ˈtos/ - from δύναμαι (*dúnamai*, "to be able") + -τος (-*tos*, verbal adjective suffix) meaning "strong", "mighty", "**able**", "powerful".

EGENETO - ΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ - ἐγένετο - /eːˈge.ne.to/ - an inflection of γίγνομαι (*gígnomai*, "to come into being", "be present", "engage") meaning "**intercourse**", "mixing", "contact".

EXORISATO - ΕΞΩΡΙΣΑΤΟ - ἐξωρίσατο - /ek.sɔːˈriːsa.to/ - from ἐξωριάζω (*exōriázō*, "leave out", "neglect") meaning "keep aloof", "distance", "exclude", "expel", "**avoid**", "banish".

> *"Do not avoid conferring small favors: for then you will likewise seem to be open to conferring great things." (Epicurus, Fragment 51)*

EXOTHEN - ΕΞΩΘΕΝ - ἔξωθεν - /ˈek.sɔːtʰen/ - from ἔξω (*exo-*) meaning "from without", "abroad", "outside", "foreign", "besides", "apart from", "**external**".

> *"[I]t is when something enters us from external objects that we not only see but think of their shapes." (Epicurus' Epistle to Herodotus)*

HOMOPHYLA - ΟΜΟΦΥΛΑ - ὁμόφυλα - /ho.ˈmo.pʰyːla/ - a plural inflection of ὁμόφυλος (*omóphulos*) from ὁμός (*homós*, "same") + φῦλον (*phúlon*) meaning "**same** race", "stock", "kin", "sex", "religion", "tribe", "country", "ethnicity".

KATESKEUASATO - ΚΑΤΕΣΚΕΥΑΣΑΤΟ - κατεσκευάσατο - /ka.tes.keu̯.ˈa.sa.to/ - related to κᾰτᾰσκευᾰζω (*kataskeuázō*, "equip", "furnish", "build") meaning "**make**", "unite".

LYSITELE - ΛΥΣΙΤΕΛΗ - λυσιτελῆ - /lyːsi.te.ˈlɛː/ - derivation of the word λύω (*lúō*, "to loosen") related to λῡσῐτελέω (*lūsiteléō*, "to bring gain", "to profit") meaning " interest", "expedience", "**advantage**", "profit", "benefit".

> *"Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters." (Epicurus' Epistle to Menoikeus)*

MEDE - ΜΗΔΕ - μηδὲ - /mɛːˈde/ - from μή (*mḗ*, "not") + δέ (*dé*, "and, but") meaning "and not", "but not", "nor", "not even", "not either", "**not**".

> *"One wise man is not wiser than another." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 29)*

PRATTEIN - ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ - πράττειν - /ˈpratːeɪn/ - related to the word πράσσω (*prássō*, "pass through", "experience", "achieve", "effect", "accomplish") meaning "**to do so**".

SYSTESAMENOS - ΣΥΣΤΗΣΑΜΕΝΟΣ - συστησάμενος - /syːstɛːˈsa.me.nos/ - related to the word συνίστημι (*synístemi*, "to combine") meaning "**make friends**", "unite together", "treat akin to oneself", "prepared a family", "forged a community [of all the creatures]".

"[F]riendship is first brought about due to practical need, just as we sow the earth for crops, but it is formed and maintained by means of a community of life among those who find mutual pleasure in it." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 41)

THARROUN - ΘΑΡΡΟΥΝ - θαρροῦν - /tʰar.'**uːn**/ - an inflection of θαρρέω (*tharréō*, "I dare", "I am of courage") from θάρσος (*thársos*, "courage") + -έω (-*éō*, denominal suffix) meaning "feel secure", "feeling confident", "**confidence**", "assurance of safety".

"The wise man holds that courage is a quality that does not come by nature, but by a consideration of what is to one's advantage." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 40)

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ALLELON - ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ - ἀλλήλων - /aːl.'**ɛ**ːlɔːn/ - from the word ἄλλος (*állos*, "another", "one besides", "else", "other", "the rest") meaning "**together**", "one another".

"The rainbow is [...] a peculiar union of light and air, which can produce the special qualities of these colours whether all together or separately ...." (Epistle to Pythocles)

APOLABONTES - ΑΠΟΛΑΒΟΝΤΕΣ - ἀπολαβόντες - /aːpo.la.'**bon**.tes/ - related to the word ἀπολαμβάνω (*apolambáno*, "take", "receive") meaning "**enjoying**".

"In all other occupations the fruit comes painfully after completion, but in philosophy pleasure goes hand in hand with knowledge; for enjoyment does not follow comprehension, but comprehension and enjoyment are simultaneous." (VS 27)

BEBAIOTATON - ΒΕΒΑΙΟΤΑΤΟΝ - βεβαιότατον - /be.baɪ.'**ot**.a.ton/ - from βέβαιος (*bébaios*, "firm", "steady", "steadfast", "durable", "sure", "certain", "security") meaning "most secure", "firmest", "surest", "**most certain**", "most perfect", "constant".

DYNAMIN - ΔΥΝΑΜΙΝ - δύναμιν - /'**dy**ːna.miːn/ - the accusative singular inflection of δύναμις (*dúnamis*) meaning "power", "might", "skill", "**ability**", "force", "strength".

EBIOSAN - ΕΒΙΩΣΑΝ - ἐβίωσαν - /eː'**bi**ːɔːsan/ - the aorist active indicative third-person plural inflection of βιόω (*bióō*, "to live") meaning "[such people] **live**".

EKHONTES - ΕΧΟΝΤΕΣ - ἔχοντες - /'**e**ːkʰon.tes/ - a plural masculine inflection of ἔχων (*ékhōn*, "possess") meaning "having", "**possessing**".

ELEON - ΕΛΕΟΝ - ἔλεον - /'**e**ːle.on/ - the accusative singular inflection of ἐλεός (*eleós*) from ἐλελεῦ (*eleleû*, "woe!", "alas!", *onomatopoeic*) meaning "**pity**", "commiseration", "sorrow".

"Let us show our feeling for our lost friends not by lamentation but by meditation." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 66)

HEDISTA - ΗΔΙΣΤΑ - ἥδιστα - /ˈhɛːdiːsta/ - from ἡδύς (*hedós*, "pleasant", "welcome", "pleased", "glad") meaning "agreeably", "enjoyably", "**pleasantly**".

HOMORROUNTON - ΟΜΟΡΡΟΥΝΤΩΝ - ὁμορρούντων - /hom.orˈuːn.tɔːn/ - from ὁμός (*homós*, "same") + ὅρος (*hóros*, "border"), related to ὁμορροέω (*homorroéō*, "rise together with" *like the signs of the zodiac*), meaning "those who surround them", "**neighbors**".

> *"Let nothing be done in your life which will cause you fear if it becomes known to your neighbor." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 70)*

MALISTA - ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ - μάλιστα - /ˈmal.iːsta/ - the superlative of μάλα (*mála*, "very"), from μάλα + -ιστα (*-ista*, superlative adverb suffix) meaning "**most**".

> *"He who least needs tomorrow, will most gladly greet tomorrow." (Fragment 78)*

ODURANTO - ΟΔΥΡΑΝΤΟ - ὠδύραντο - /ɔːˈdyːran.to/ - a plural inflection of ὠδύραντο (*ōdúranto*) meaning "**lament**", "bewail", "mourn", "grieve", "cry for mercy".

> *"The wise man will not mourn the death of his friends." (Wise Man Saying 24)*

OIKEIOTETA - ΟΙΚΕΙΟΤΗΤΑ - οἰκειότητα - /oi.keiˈo.tɛːta/ - from οἰκειότης (*oikeiótēs*) meaning "**intimacy**", "familiarity", "kin", "friendship", "fellowship", "sense of belonging".

> *"Most beautiful too is the sight of those near and dear to us, when our original kinship makes us of one mind; for such sight is great incitement to this end." (Epicurus, Vatican Saying 61)*

PARASKEUASASTHAI - ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΣΑΣΘΑΙ - παρασκευάσασθαι - /pa.ras.keu̯ˈas.as.tʰai/ - an inflection of παρασκευάζω (*paraskeuázō*, "procure") meaning "arrive at the point of", "insure", "**provide**", "possess", "prepare".

> *"[T]he void can neither act nor be acted upon, but only provides opportunity of motion through itself to bodies." (Epistle to Herodotus)*

PISTOMA - ΠΙΣΤΩΜΑ - πίστωμα - /ˈpiːstɔːma/ - meaning "confidence", "conviction", "guarantee", "pledge", "faith", "**assurance**", "warrant", "confirmation".

PLERESTATEN - ΠΛΗΡΕΣΤΑΤΗΝ - πληρεστάτην - /plɛːresˈta.tɛːn/ - from πλήρης (*pléres*, "full of", "satisfied") meaning "the most complete", "firmest", "**fullest**".

> *"The stable condition of well-being in the body and the sure hope of its continuance holds the fullest and surest joy for those who can rightly calculate it." (Fragment 11)*

PROKATASTROPHEN - ΠΡΟΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΟΦΗΝ - προκαταστροφήν - /pro.ka.taˈstro.pʰɛːn/ - from προ- (*pro-*, "before") + καταστροφή (*katastrophé*, "overturning", "subjugation", "reduction") meaning "**premature death**", "premature demise".

"Sweet is the memory of a deceased friend." (Epicurus, Fragment 50)

TELEUTESANTOS - ΤΕΛΕΥΤΕΣΑΝΤΟΣ - τελευτήσαντος - /te.leu.ˈtɛːsan.tos/ - related to τελευτάω (*teleutáō*, "bring to pass", "accomplish") meaning "**dies**".

"We are born once and cannot be born twice, but for all time must be no more. But you, who are not master of tomorrow, postpone your happiness. Life is wasted in procrastination and each one of us dies without allowing himself leisure." (VS 14)

THARREIN - ΘΑΡΡΕΙΝ - θαρρεῖν - /tʰarːˈeɪn/ - the present active infinitive of θαρρέω (*tharréō*, "I dare", "I am of courage") from θάρσος (*thársos*, "courage") + -έω (*-éō*, denominal suffix) meaning "feel secure", "feeling confident", "**confidence**", "assurance of safety".

"The wise [person] holds that courage is a quality that does not come by nature, but by a consideration of what is to one's advantage." (Epicurus, Wise Man Saying 40)

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