This paper was originally published on Academia.edu. The paper, itself has been adapted from a larger publication on ancient Epicurean piety. It has been edited and re-formatted for academic presentation. For additional commentary, see “Holy Shit: The Elements of Epicurean Psychedelia” published by the Society of Friends of Epicurus.
Epíkouros advances a developed theology in his treatises Περὶ Ὁσιότητος (Perì Hosiótētos, “On Piety”), Περὶ Θεῶν (Perí Theôn, “On Gods”), Περὶ Φύσεως (Perì Phýseōs, “On Nature”), and his distinguished “Letter on Happiness” προς Μενοικεα (pròs Menoikéa, “to Menoikeus”). In these compositions, the Gargettian encourages the veneration of “the divine nature” while upholding the validity of atomic physics and underscoring the emptiness of supernatural myths. Therein, the Sage of the Garden conducts a survey of religious history, provides an evaluation of the efficacy of rites and rituals, and reflects upon the genesis of the profound mental impressions that have inspired centuries of pious devotion. While some of these works have been lost, Epíkouros’ ideas have been preserved by Philódēmos in his similarly-named works “On Piety” and “On Gods”, as well as Metródōros’ Περὶ Μεταβολής (Perì Metabolês, “On Change”), and a work by Demḗtrios of Lakōnía entitled Περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ Μορφῆς (Perì toû Theoû Morphēs, “On the Form of a God”) within which “god” is deconstructed.
Epíkouros, Metródōros, Philódēmos, Dēmḗtrios, and other atomistic philosophers contextualize both spiritual activities like (piety and prayer) and religious notions (like blessedness and divinity) within the framework of an intelligible reality, existing as a continuum of moving bodies. Consequently, piety is presented as a function of neuropsychologyand theology is evaluated as a feature of anthropology. Human animals cultivate wisdom upon a κανών (kanṓn) or “standard” of knowledge, a philosophical foundation that grounds truth in nature. As Diogénēs records, the criteria of knowledge includes “the [αἰσθήσεις or aisthḗseis] sensations and [προλήψεις or prolḗpseis] preconceptions and that of [πάθη or pắthē] feeling” (Laértios 10.31). Sensation triggers feeling and gradually conditions preconceptions — each preconception is a “memory of the appearances” received “repeatedly from abroad”, impressed by “the imprint of the sensations” (Ibid. 10.33). Far from being a supernatural revelation, the preconception of “blessedness” that defines “god”, like “justice” has been informed by daily occurrences. The gods, themselves are conceptual representations conditioned by memory. “Piety” is a consequence of psychology and “prayer” is a psychiatric practice. The θεία φύσις (theía phýsis) “divine nature” is a common expression of παντελῆ εὐδαιμονίαν (pantelḗ eudaimonían) “absolute happiness” (10.116). “Heaven” exists in the form of the μετακόσμιος (metakósmios 10.89) a boundless void containing countless κόσμοι (kósmoi). The “heavenly” homes of the gods exist as inferences within the colorful confines of the human mind.
Epíkouros explains that the divine nature (of “the gods”) is conditioned by the mental προλήψις (prolēpsis) “impression” of μακαριότητα (makariótēta) “blessedness” described by Philódēmos as τελείαν εὐδαιμονίαν (teleían eùdaimonían) “perfect happiness” (On Piety, Col. 13.7-8, 353-354). “The gods” of Epíkouros are primarily θεωρητούς (theōrētoús 10.62, 10.135) “observed” or “contemplated” as φαντασίαν τῇ διανοίᾳ (phantasían tḗi dianoíai) “visualizations” or “appearances [in] the mind” (Laértios 10.50). Epíkouros affirms that the gods μὲν εἰσιν (mèn eísin 10.123) “truly exist” yet are only “seen” or “reached” through an act of λόγῳ (lógoi) “contemplation”, “consideration”, “reasoning”, “reckoning”, or “logical accounting” (10.62, 10.139). He observes that the mental φαντάσματα (phantásmata) or “appearances” of the gods arise ἐκ τῆς συνεχοῦς ἐπιρρύσεως (èk tḗs synekhoús èpirrū́seōs) “from a continuous stream” τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων (tṓn homoíōn eidṓlōn) “of similar” or “compatible images” that physically impress upon the soul. The impressions coalesce together through a process of ὑπερβάσεως (hyperbáseōs) “transposition” (On Piety, Col. 12.9, 324-5). The transposed formations have been ἀποτετελεσμένωι (ápotetelesménōi) “rendered” to human souls in human forms, immortal projections of mortal intellects, visualizations of perfectly-happy, perpetually-healthy people.
Having reviewed the psychiatric evidence of memory against the criteria of knowledge (embodied by the natural kanṓn), Epíkouros explains that the functional “coherence” or “resemblance” between internal φαντάσματα (phantásmata) “appearances” and external οὖσί (ousí) “beings” (or τοῖς οὖσί “reality” 10.51) requires that an initial impulse complete a sequence of successive impacts, ultimately yielding a perception in the mind, “since we could not have sought the investigation if we had not first perceived it” (Ibid., 10.33). A sensible τύπος (týpos) “impression” initiates a perceptual relay through various pathways in the soul — the sense organs are stimulated by ἁφή (aphḗ, “touch”), acoustic ῥεύμᾰτᾰ (rheúmata, “currents”), olfactory ὄγκοι (ónkoi, “hooklets”), and visual είδωλα (eídōla, “images”), all “impinging [upon] us [as] a result of both the colorful realities” to produce “a harmonious magnitude of related morphologies”. The μαχυμερέστερον (makhymerésteron) “marching army of particles” (Dēmḗtrios, On the Form of a God 21) enter “the face or the mind” […] yielding an appearance and an [affective] sympathy as a result of the observing” (Laértios 10.49-50). Thus, the mortal appearances we see during the day inspire the divine icons we envision at night.
Epíkouros “alone first founded the idea of the existence of the Gods on the impression which nature herself hath made on the minds of all men” (Cicero, On the Nature of Gods 26). He asks, “what nation, what people are there, who have not, without any learning, a natural idea, or prenotion, of a Deity?” The realization that isolated peoples developed parallel, mythic complexes became noticeably evident after Aléxandros III of Makedonía connected the intellectual culture of the Mediterranean with the Indian subcontinent, triggering a cross-cultural dissemination of wisdom literature. According to the Gargettian, prior to the historical development of these mythic narratives and institutionalized rituals, prehistoric humans organically conceived of deities as sublime psychological icons encountered during dreams and contemplations (On Nature 12). The Pyrrhonian skeptic Séxtos Empeirikós preserves Epíkouros’ historical thesis: “The origin of the thought that god exists came from appearances in dreams” that were conditioned by “the phenomena of the world” (Against the Mathematicians 9.45-46). The earliest humans who conceived of these notions assumed “the object of thought as a thing perceived in relation to a solid body […] understanding perception that can be grasped by corporeal sensation, which they also knew to be derived from a physical entity [i.e. nature]” (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 15.8-18). Yet, far from being prophetic symbols θεόπεμπτος (theópemptos) “sent by the gods” (Diogénēs of Oìnóanda, Fr. 9, Col. 6), “the gods”, themselves exist as symbolic representations, composed from reproducible “stream[s] of similar images” that have been apprehended from a variety of natural inspirations (Laértios 10.139).
Prehistoric peoples’ perception of “the divine nature” and their visualizations of “divine” beings created lasting impressions upon the history of human civilization. Human devotees created conventions to celebrate the symbols of their insights. Traditions were cultivated and pious practice flourished, as did dramatic myths and misunderstandings.Eventually, “self-important theologians” and deluded priests diluted beliefs about the divine and perverted piety with a fog of fear (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 86A 1-2). “God” himself was assigned disturbing duties and became enlisted in the service of religious autocrats. Contrary to the chilling myths championed by “self-important theologians”, the blessed and incorruptible nature has no need to direct the production of the human drama. Epíkouros teaches that “it is foolish to ask of the gods that which we can supply for ourselves” (Vatican Saying 65). The true benefits of worship are enjoyed by worshippers, not by the fantastic objects of human obeisance. People conceive of gods as being kind, confident, and self-reliant; in emulating these virtues, people perfect their own pleasure. “Anyone who has these things […] can rival the gods for happiness”, despite their inability to fulfill prayers, subdue nature, and prevent death (Vatican Saying 33). Philódēmos exhorts students to “imitate their blessedness insofar as mortals can” and “endeavor most of all to make themselves harmless to everyone as far as is within their power; and second to make themselves so noble” (On Piety Col. 71.16-19, 23-29). Functional knowledge of piety and theology is integral to cleansing oneself of the turmoil that is symptomatic of magical thinking.
The Epicurean presentation of divinity contextualizes “the gods” as fantastic, mental entities that can be inspired passively through the indiscriminate mechanism of sensation, either “from abroad” through the trigger of touch, as when one views an idol, or internally, “in respect of slumbers” when the mind dreams freely, least encumbered by daily disturbances, and organically repurposes memories of remarkable figures before then augmenting them into deathless idols. “Gods” can also be summoned intentionally, through a directed act of contemplation, involving τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας (tinàs épibolàs tḗs dianoías) “some applications of the intellect”, like μνήμην (mnḗmēn, “memory”). Dēmḗtrios of Lakōnía reiterates that the representations of “the gods” in the mind are triggered “both as those memories manifest” through recollection, “and also” by the physical impulse of “pre-existing [bodies] that, upon [striking] the mind, produce constructive cognition”, as when one observes a icon (Dēmḗtrios, On the Form of a God 12). Because of this, mental representations of religious figures can be summoned through meditation as readily as when gazing upon the mass of a physical icon. In prayer, the supplicant manually retrieves an “apparent” image of blessedness, previously been stored in memory, having been initially sublimated in the imagination. Visual γνῶσις (gnṓsis, “knowledge”) of “the gods” has been ἐναργὴς (énargēs) “apparent”, “evident” or “manifest” (Laértios 10.123) for millennia — the fields of the Earth are filled with statues, votives, frescoes, mosaics, murals, metalwork, jewelry, pottery, and architecture that glorify “the divine nature”. Each civilization peppers its conception of divinity with fresh colors, shapes, and stories, just as each culture ritualizes a contemplative path to care for the health of the soul. In doing so, each group creates a cultural matrix into which subsequent generations are psychologically enmeshed — prior to the widespread proliferation of supernatural soap operas, the first peoples contemplated a raw form of divinity, unsullied by mythic adulterants.
To further isolate the genesis of the unadulterated notion of “god”, Epíkouros traces the crumbs of cognition to their sources in nature. In the case of divine entities, the Sage observes that divine representations have been conditioned by memories of the human animal combined with the congenital preconception of blessedness. When a supplicant prays, meditates, concentrates, reflects, or, generally applies directed focus toward the stored, mental expression of blessedness, they generate a internal image “as if” the practitioner were literally ἐν εἰκόνι (én eìkóni) “in the presence” of an external “representation”, “portrait”, or “icon”. As with the memories of “brightness”, “loudness”, “softness”, and “sweetness”, the characteristics of the gods have been conditioned by images and inspirations received from abroad — those images (like the form of a human body) and inspirations (like peak happiness) become amalgamated in the mind by an intellectual act of transfusion. As with other preconceptions, like χρόνος (khrónos) “time” and δίκαιος (díkaios) “justice”, the mental prototype of “god” functions as an organizing principle or “ruler” against which individual examples can be evaluated — any alleged divinity that punishes, terrorizes, rages, suffers, or fears neither meets the definitions of “blessed” nor “incorruptible”, and cannot by definition be identified as “god”. Epíkouros exhorts Menoikeus to “believe anything about” the image of god “that is able to preserve” that form’s conceptual “incorruptibility and blessedness” (Laértios 10.123). So long as an expression of divinity coheres with the preconception of blessedness, it can truly be called “a god”. Thus, an endless collection of divinities might be perceived, unique to each person, supported by the infinity of particles that constitute both the heavens and the heavenly forms of the mind.
The heavenly form of a “god” appears to the human mind as does any other, mundane formation, as τὸ ὄν (tò ón) “a being” or “an entity” (Philódēmos, On Piety Col. 66A, Line 11). According to Epíkouros, each “entity” can be conceived of as an individual ἑνότης (henótēs, Col. 13.12) “unity” or “union” composed of many other mental particles that coalesce together to form representational σύγκρισεις (sýnkriseis) “compounds” in the mind (Col. 12.11). As Metródōros writes, each ἑνότητα ἰδιότροπον (henótēta idiótropon) “distinctive unity” also exists as a “compound made up of things that do not exist as numerically distinct” (On Change, preserved by Philódēmos in On Piety, Col. 4.13-15). Epíkouros further clarifies that “unified entities” in the mind can exhibit one of two constitutions — some “entities” of the mind “are perfected out of [1] the same elements and others are constituted from [2] similar elements” (On God, preserved by Philódēmos in On Piety Col. 8.14-17) The φύσεις (phýseis) “natures” or “constitutions” of all of these “unified entities” are therein grouped according to the origin of their birth, either from [1] a single source, or having coalesced from [2] multiple sources ἐξ ὑπερβάσεως τῶν (èx hyperbáseōs tôn) “as a result of transposition” during the traversal μεταξύ (metazù) “between” the source and the mind (Ibid., Col.12.8-9). If the mental form of an entity is composed of particles that only originate from [1] a single source, Epíkouros says that they are all αὐτή (autḗ) “the same” in constitution — “the same” form is one that reflects a numerically-singular entity in one’s environment. By contrast, Epíkouros says that appearances composed of particles coming from [2] multiple sources are only superficiallyὁμοία (homoía, Col. 12.6) “similar” because they are only related insofar as their composition as arrays of εἴδωλα (eídola). Besides their shared form as bundles of images, the conceptual amalgamations of “the gods” have been stitched together from a variety of environmental inspirations.
To demonstrate this constitution, one might visualize a dog. This visualized animal is a mental representation. It was previously impressed upon the mind when dog-particles travelled from a dog (or image of a dog) through the air. The visual impulse that impacts the eye triggers an internal cascade that yields the mental form of an animal. The resulting dog-form is a bundle of distinct particles that correspond κατ’ ἀριθμόν (kat’ arithmón, Col. 12.10) “in number” to the measurable proportions of [1] “that same”, furry creature in reality. This representation is composed of particles whose φύσεις (phýseis) “origins” are all αὐτή (autḗ) “the same” — the memory of this “dog” was apprehended “without contamination” from the particles of other, distinct objects (Philodemos, On Gods III, Col. 8). The generative flow of images reflects the activity of the original body, and a dog is not confused for another form (e.g. when dog-forms coalesce with human-forms in our imagination, we picture werewolves).
By contrast, one might visualize a god. Like the dog-form, the god-form is a mental image of an animal. Like the dog-form, the god-form is also apprehended by the intellect. Like the dog-form, the god-form, too was initially triggered by impulses “received from abroad”. However, unlike the mental aggregate that constitutes one’s impression of a “dog”, one’s impression of a “god” is a ὑπέρβασις (hypérbasis), a “superimposition” of at least two different bodies of εἴδωλα (eídola) that are only superficially ὁμοία (homoía) “similar” insofar as their material composition as pictures in the mind. Therein, the compound nature of these images enables their being ἄφθαρτον “indestructible”. By comparison, after the death of a dog and the end of that dog’s eídola, the dog’s form can only be retrieved from memory — we are left with the impressions that a mortal creature gave us of itself during its limited lifespan. The forms of the gods, however, are not at risk of dissolution because they do not have a single source that is subject to death — the sources of the god-forms are unending, undying, and limitless, the infinite soup of particles that is constantly boiling before our very souls. In this regard, “the form of god” is neither [1] a simple body (like a particle), nor a regular compound (like a dog), but is a sort of [2] irregular compound. No compound is a simple body (i.e. a particle), and all compounds are combinations of simple bodies, but unlike the regular compound that is a dog-form, the god-form is not composed of particles that are κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν (kat’ árithmòn) “numerically-identical” to their source. Rather, the form of “a god” is composed of particles that are καθ᾽ ὁμοείδειαν (kath’ hòmoeídeian) “similar in consistency” such that they can become enlaced to imagine new forms. The image of “god” is formed when the image of a human is conjoined in the mind withthe concept of perfect happiness and the projection of deathlessness. As preserved by Diogénes, Epíkouros explains οὓς μὲν (oús mèn) “on one hand” the forms of the gods appear to be κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν ὑφεστῶτας (kat’ árithmòn hyphestṓtas) “subsisting by number”, as though each “unified entity” corresponds with a single, external body, “but” οὓς δὲ (oús mèn) “on the other hand” the gods” are formed καθ᾽ ὁμοείδειαν (kath’ hòmoeídeian) from multiple, external sources due to their existence “as a similitude” of images that constitute “a common appearance” (10.139).
In the case of the specific characteristics of “the gods”, human minds tend to render the human visualization of perfection ἀνθρωποειδῶς (anthrōpoeidṓs) “human-like” (Ibid.) or ἀνθρωπόμορφον (anthrōpómorphon) “human-shaped” (Dēmḗtrios, On the Form of a God 14-16). Granted, “the gods”, as mental projections of humanity, are not “to be considered as bodies of any solidity […] but as images, perceived by similitude and transition” (Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 28). “We do not find the calculation” so writes Demḗtrios, “that any other shape” besides that “of the human” could qualify as a blessed and incorruptible being.” He explains that the gods “are granted to be perfectly happy; and nobody can be happy without virtue, nor can virtue exist where reason is not; and reason can reside in none but the human form”. Philódēmos writes that “we have to infer” their behaviors “from the appearances” made “manifest” to the mind; thus, we visualize god “as a living being” (Philódēmos, On Gods III, Col. 10):
One must [imagine] with Hermarchus that the gods draw in breath and exhale it, for without this, again, we cannot conceive them as such living beings as we have already called them, as neither can one conceive of fish without need in addition of water, nor birds [without additional need] of wings for their flight through the air; for such [living beings] are not better conceived [without their environment] .
Philódēmos further reflects on the conceived environments of the gods:
[E]very nature has a different location suitable to it. To some it is water, to others air and earth. In one case for animals in another for plants and the like. But especially for the gods there has to (be a suitable location), due to the fact that, while all the others have their permanence for a certain time only, the gods have it for eternity. During this time they must not encounter even the slightest cause of nuisance… (On Gods III, Col. 8).
Apollódōros the scholarch infers that “the dwellings” of the fearless gods, unruffled by ferocious winds and falling stars “have to be far away from the forces in our world” (Ibid., Col. 9). He stipulates that the security of these “locations” may not be preserved as a result of “distance” so much as a result of physical disengagement “from the hindering factors that clash against each other”. Epíkouros concurs that “it is possible for their nature to exist even with many troubles surrounding it” (On Piety, Col. 3.3-7). For “even if the things which generate” divine images were “as far away as anyone could wish”, the mundane images of people stored in memory would still combine with the preconception of “blessedness” and form the image of gods who “appear” to “transcend” any amount of “intervening distance” (Philódēmos, On Gods III, Col. 9). Memory, itself “transcends” the perils of our perishable plasma through a perpetual replenishment of minute, mental motes, “having changed each time for producing a thought” (On the Form of a God 12). Dēmḗtrios explains that “the memories people retain of” visual impressions were first “received as children” (Ibid., 11), and despite decades of disruption, those representations can be reproduced continuously. Through contemplation, a supplicant summons a memory of blessedness and transforms the mind into a holy menagerie, capable of hosting a variety of divine forms. After extensive consideration, Apollódōros concludes that the “dwellings” of “the gods” must be constructed “from some of their” own, finely-grained “elements”, repurposed through an act of contemplation (On Gods III, Col. 10).
Philódēmos further supposes that beings who inhabit the sublime territory of the pure mind possess “perception and pleasure”, as well as “an excellent disposition of things which endure” (On Piety, Col. 5). Accordingly, these projections exhibit the same preferences as their human projectors, finding recognizable pleasure in the activity of being rational animals:
…we must claim that the gods use both voice and conversation to one another; for we will not conceive them as the more happy or the more indissoluble, [Hermarchus] says, by their neither speaking, nor conversing with each other, but resembling human beings that cannot speak; for since we really do employ voice, all of us who are not disabled persons, it is even the height of foolishness that the gods should either be disabled, or not resemble us in this point, since neither men nor gods can create utterances in any other way. And particularly since for good men, the sharing of discourse with men like them showers down on them indescribably pleasure. And by Zeus one must suppose the gods possess the Hellenic language or one not far from it, and that their voices in expressing rationalist are clearest…(Philódēmos, On Gods III, Col. 13)
Humans picture “the gods” to be perpetually-happy people, ceaselessly-savoring the pleasures of friendship, “for it is not possible for them to maintain their community as a species without any social intercourse” (Philódēmos, On Gods, Fr. 87). Unburdened by the undue responsibilities of celestial governance, astral adjudication, and cosmic corrections, the holy inhabitants of the mind seem wholly self-reliant. Perfectly prudent, they appear to privilege the preservation of their own peace above impractical obligations. As ζῷον (zōîon 10.123) living figures, they are expected to respirate; as social figures, they are imagined to converse; as rational figures, they are understood to reflect; as blessed figures, they are acclaimed to live without fear, imperishable paragons of human perfection. The human-shaped deities appear to sustain a peak state of pure pleasure, that which cannot be heightened by excess.
Demḗtrios cautions that, “when we say in fact the God is human-shaped” we should note that God is not actuallyhuman (On the Form of a God 15). In On the Nature of the Gods, Cicero’s character Velleius concurs that god “is not body, but something like body” nor “does it contain any blood, but something like blood” (28). Like the concepts of “justice” and “time”, the concept of “god” is not “attached” to an external body, “except [in the case] of calculation, wherefore we interweave” thoughts in the mill of the mind from subtle threads of memory (Laértios 10.72). Velleius admits, “these distinctions were more acutely devised and more artfully expressed by Epicurus than any common capacity can comprehend”. The gods are, nonetheless “real”, “unified entities” as reproducible appearances in the mind.
In an effort to “realize” his own spiritual “fulfillment”, Philódēmos further scrutinizes the images of these “beings surpassing [ὑπερβαλλουσῶν or hyperballousōn] in power [δυνἀμει or dynámei] and excellence [σπουδαιότητι or spoudaiótēti]”, who equally “excel [ὑπερέχον or hyperékhon] in sovereignty [ἡγεμονίαν or hegemonían]” and infers the following:
… that of all existing things, [the divine nature] is the best [ἄριστον or áriston] and most holy [σεμνότατον or semnótaton, “dignified” or “revered”], most worthy of emulation [ἄξιοζηλωτότατον or áxiozēlōtótaton, “enviable”], having dominion over all good things [πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν κυριευόντα or pántōn tōn agathṓn kurieúonta], unburdened by affairs [πραγμάτευτον or pragmáteuton], and exalted [ὑψηλόν or hypsēlon, “sublime” or “proud”] and great-minded [μεγαλόφρονα or megalóphrona, “noble” or “generous”] and great-spirited μεγαλόψυχον or megalópsykhon, “magnanimous”] and ritually pure [ἅγιον or hágion, “sacred”] and purest [ἅγιοτατον or àgiōtaton, “holiest”] and propitious[ῑ̔́λεων or hī́leōn, “blameless”]. Therefore they say that they alone strive after the greatest form of piety and that they hold […] the purest views as regards the ineffable [ἄφραστον or áphraston, “inexpressible” or “marvelous”] pre-eminence [ὑπεροχήν or hyperokhēn, “superiority”] of the strength[ἰσχύος or ìskhúos, “power”] and perfection [τελειότητος or teleiótētos, “completeness”] of the divine[toû theíou] […] [Epíkouros] advises not to think [God] bad-tempered (as he is thought), for example, by the poets. (On Piety, Col. 45.2-30).
Lucretius observes that CAELESTI SVMVS OMNES SEMINE ORIVNDI “we have all come from heavenly seed” (De Rerum Natura 2.991). The pieces of reality that comprise our bodies are the same pieces that comprise the stars and the memories in our minds. Cosmic firstlings fall from the “heavens” and amalgamate upon this world, contributing to the body of the terrestrial aggregate. Nature repurposes these elements for the benefit of evolution — many of the “heavenly” particles become recycled into the motes of the mind, which are then reconstituted into the “heavenly” forms of “the gods”. Summarily, all particles travel through the heavens and can become repurposed into the “heavenly” bodies of divine idols. So long as mortals exist to engage in the enterprise of story-telling, immortals can exist in perpetuity.
The Epicurean philosophers confidently affirm that no “god” attended the inauguration of the Earth — no supernatural supervisors were present to oversee the development of the early cosmos. The existence of a human god did not precede the existence of a human animal. Prior to the emergence of the human being, the human body had yet to exist — “the god” had yet to be conceived. It was only after humans evolved, formed friendships, shared memories, and suffered loss that prehistoric peoples internalized their experiences, dreamed of deathlessness, and projected their inspirations as sublime, psychological icons, providing guidance and inspiration to generations of people. So long as human beings continue to dream, human egos will continue to project their ideals upon the walls of the mind, constructing holy heroes and righteous role models that embody their ideals; so too will people continue to manufacture tragic myths. While these forms of blessedness can be continuously reproduced, many fall into disuse as the masses champion tragic heroes who contradict the basic definition of perfection that “god” implies.
The primary concern of Epicurean theology is to protect the conceptual blessedness and incorruptibility of the “divine nature” from “contamination […] lest they become mixed up with” terrestrial troubles “to the detriment of their imperishability” (On God III, Col. 9). For Epíkouros, any fearful “contamination” poured upon the form of blessedness mutates the pure notion into a chimera (like a centaur or gorgon), a tragic antagonist in dramatic fiction. Accordingly, as the conceit of a medusa sublimates the notions of “woman” and “snakes”, so, too does the notion of a demiurgesublimate “god” with “artist” — prior to the laborious ingenuity of creative hands, no “creator” could be contrived. Likewise, the notion of LORD conjoins “god” with “king” — here again, prior to the phenomenon of “kings” lordingover subjects, no conception of a LORD could have existed. Similarly, understanding “god” to be “The Father” requires the believer to have been born within a species that observes the “male parent” to play a role in child-rearing — without this context, “The Father” is meaningless.
Compared with the chimeric myths of the masses, the pure conception of “blessedness” or “complete happiness” (e.g. impassivity, tranquility, cheerfulness, and delight) corresponds precisely with the natural standard that the word “god” implies. As humans employ the preconception of “time” to evaluate the duration of events, and, similarly employ the preconception of “justice” to evaluate the commensurability of relationships, so too do humans employ the preconception of “god” to evaluate ethical priorities and set behavioral goals.
While many imagine “god” as a “real animal” with “common” features that subsists beyond the walls of the world, this assumption leads to contradictions (Dēmḗtrios 16). [ I ] First, extreme isolation from the nutritive “forces of the world that produce things subject to generation and dissolution” would inhibit any inhabitant’s access to natural necessities. It would severely challenge any entity “resembling a human being” from being able to sufficiently replenish its losses and preserve its perfections (Philódēmos, On Gods III, Col. 9). The “happiness” promised “beyond Zeus” is expressed as “the cry of the flesh [that] neither hungers, nor does it thirst, nor does it shiver” (Vatican Saying 33). Consequently, a “living being”, “breathing in and out” that is restricted from the “forces of generation” that supply air and shed light would suffer the same impairments as a “disabled person” whose disposition restricts their ability to acquire breath and behold the “the sight of sweet motions” (Laértios 10.6). Philódēmos cautions that it is “the height of foolishness” to suppose “that the gods should either be disabled, or not resemble us in this point” (On Gods III, Col. 13). [II] Secondly, the notion of a pre-human, human-shaped entity contradicts Epíkouros’ description of cosmic evolution. Naturally, the pig cannot precede the piglet, and the human form cannot precede the emergence of the human animal. The memory of a human body cannot precede the body of a human being remembered. “Thus, each name follows [what] is visible […]For one must perceive the [external] form before the preconception” (Laértios 10.33). [III] Thirdly, the bodies of external gods could not be “evident” if they were truly unobservable. Dēmḗtrios explains that “the thinnest-particles”, such as those which constitute the mind, are too fine to “truly constitute” visual “perception” (On the Form of a God21). He further affirms that “nothing diaphanous [is] sensible” (Ibid., 22). Therefore, if knowledge of external god-bodies has yet “to be confirmed or to be contradicted” through direct apprehension due to their imperceptibility, then external gods could never be “manifest” to the mind (Laértios 10.51). Yet Epíkouros affirms that “knowledge of them” is “evident” as internal projections of blessedness (Ep. Men. 10.123). [IV] Finally, the mode of subsistence of non-terrestrial entities, though “human-like” would present hazards to any terrestrial animals attempting to emulate their lifestyles. The στοιχειώμaτa (stoikheiṓmata, “elementary principles” 10.36) affirm that the compounds of the Earth have been conditioned by local forces — non-terrestrial entities lack exposure to those forces that condition which sensations are pleasurable and painful, and for which animals. Thus, human animals incur great risk in attempting to emulate the behavior of entities that only superficially resemble the human-form. By contrast, Philódēmos encourages us to “imitate” the “blessedness” of recognizable idols, not to ritualize the idiosyncratic lifestyle of an alien (On Piety, Col. 71.16-17).
Ultimately, these speculative examples of divinity, proposed to exist, independent of the human mind, are unnecessary to contextualize religious practice and to justify a defense of spirituality. In the continuum of the mind, prayer has phenomenal power and piety has purpose. Dēmḗtrios concludes “that even by means of contemplation”, as streams of superimposed images in the mind, each “deity” physically “possesses a substance” and wields influence (On the Form of a God 15). Though Philódēmos concedes that “no one has been prolific in finding convincing demonstrations for the existence of” independent “gods” with “human-shaped” bodies, he “nevertheless” recognizes “all humans, with the exception of some” to “worship them […] as do we” (On Piety, Col. 23.13-21). “Apparent indeed is this knowledge” (Laértios 10.123).
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