Category Archives: epicurus

Literary Updates

Hope you are having a Safe and Happy Eikas! My latest essay is titled Polystratus on the Futility of Pursuing Virtue Without the Study of Nature. Polystratus was the third Scholarch of the Epicurean Garden in Athens. The following literary updates are by our friend Nathan:

The following literary updates from Jack Gedney, who has written Epicurean Ethics: The Primary Sources – What to Read and Recommended TranslationsScholar Spotlight: Tim O’Keefe, as well as a blog series titled Translation Tuesday: Letter to Menoeceus in five parts:

Happy Reading!

No Politics*

NO POLITICS*

N. H. BARTMAN

*unless bailing friends from jail, shielding fugitives from extradition,
subverting property laws, emancipating slaves, empowering migrants,
amplifying female voices, funding monthly outreach programs, financing
stone monuments, patronizing finance ministers, ridiculing popular beliefs,
supporting good legislation, encouraging advantageous policies, distributing…

TABLE OF CONTENTS

· The Fruits of Society — Overview of Epicurean Politics
· Bustle, No Hustle — Politicking and Pólis-Living
· Ticks of the Pólis — The Urban Life of Epíkouros
· No Sleep Til Melítē — The Advantages of Citizenship
· Hiding in Plain Sight — Security By Association
· Live with Security (Not “in Obscurity”)  Láthe Biṓsas and Urbanity
· Law & Order — Hérmarkhos on the Common Defense
· Just Us — Epíkouros on Forming a More Perfect Union
· Strong Opinions — (A Brief History of Epicurean Political Engagement)
· Speaking Frankly — Philódēmos on Free Speech
· Bein’ Real and Breakin’ Balls The Pleasure of Decompressing
· Good Without Governing — Break Glass in Case of Pólis Collapse
· Brave Enough for Politics — The Power of Doing What You Can
· Part of This World — Take Responsibility for Your Thingamabobs

 


NO POLITICS

NOTE: Among all other Hellenistic schools, the Epicurean Garden boasts the greatest conceptual consistency as a philosophy, and the greatest historical consistency as an institution—after all, practical teachings that provide useful knowledge do not require revisions. To ensure that readers are being exposed to ancient source material, and not just the paraphrasing of modern academics, each citation has been studiously documented.

The Fruits of Society

Epíkouros did not mince words:

ΟΥΔE ΠΟΛΙΤΕΥΕΣΘΑΙ
oúde politeúesthai1

Life is best “NOT TO BE POLITICKED”.2 For the sake of living well, lovers of wisdom are exhorted by the Sage to neither “pursue public office”, nor “conduct government”, nor “administer the state”. After all, the “purest security is generated out of the peace and withdrawal from the masses”,3 as also it “is predominately perfected [by] friendship”.4 A life of constant struggle makes it difficult for a person to “take risks for the sake of friendship”.5 Political ambition itself challenges the natural goal of living a sweet life. God would never suffer the stress of office — why should the wise?6

Even so, the Hēgēmṓn recognizes that “some security” can be expected to be “generated out of [mutual association with other] people” so far as concerns a “certain supportive power and [mutual] abundance”.7 Epíkouros never passes an injunction against observing jurisprudence, nor dismisses the benefits of practical legislation. He affirms that the wise “will serve jury duty” and “at [a certain] time [will even be willing] to serve a monarch […] and will gain notoriety in public”.8 Hérmarkhos quips that even the multitude” see an obvious “advantage arising from an association with each other.”9

While “nothing is needed” in terms of things “acquired through competitions” and politicalassemblies”,10 nowheredoes the Sage dismiss the benefits of civic engagement, nor disparage the fruits of mutual association. After all, “it is possible for [the divine] nature to exist even with many troubles surrounding it.”11 The wealth of Naturethatis both defined and obtainable12 includes not only resources and replenishments, but people to call friends, and a place to practice friendship.

ΤΩΝ ΣΥΜΠΟΛΙΤΕΥΟΜEΝΩΝ
tṓn sympoliteuoménōn13

In the case “of those being governed together” or “of those being politically-engaged with one another14 (e.g. neighbors, citizens) the cultivation of mutual associations is foundational to living a good life. Indeed “only as a result of [learning to live with] those [others] can the [good life] possibly hope to be procured”.15 Far from demonizing all pólis-related activities, Epíkouros affirms that any association that cultivates “courage out of [living with other] peopleis, by nature, good”. When it comes to mutual association, the fruits of “political” activity are still sweet.

Bustle, No Hustle

The verb πολιτεύω (politeúō) includes both [1] the activity of “holding public office” and also [2] the general conditions related to “living as a citizen” (in a pólis). Epíkouros questions the practicality the former, but remarks on the utility of the latter. On one hand, he warns against the troubles that come from administering the affairs of the state. On the other, he praises the advantages that come from “being a citizen”, “being governed together”, and “living in a state”. The Hēgēmṓn warns against the troubles that come from living with politics, but defends the benefits of living within polities.

Ticks of the Pólis

Over half of the human population (over 4 billion people) of the 21st-century live in póleis, but this was not always the case. In the ancient world, less than 5% of all human beings lived in urban centers. As a result, pólis-related activities were once much less characteristic of the average human experience. The vast majority of humanity was dispersed across the globe in loose networks of settlements.

Epíkouros, however, was not among them. Nor was his family, nor most of his friends, nor many of his students. In fact, the Sage spent the vast majority of his life within the jurisdiction of a póleis. Raised in the prosperous, maritime hub of Sámos, Epíkouros was conscripted to Athens, the largest pólis in Greece, “City of the Violet Crown”.16 After two years of services, Epíkouros returns to his family in Ionia, who had since moved to rural Kolophṓn — the village presented him with limited, intellectual opportunities, so the Gargettian pursued education in nearby Téōs. Once he finished his education, he launched a career in Mytilḗnē, the largest pólis on the island of Lésbos, until advancing to the hub of Lámpsakos, where he cultivated a devoted following. He then returned to Athens, and founded the Garden. As his moniker suggests, the “Gargettian” was well-acquainted with the ways of the póleis.

History records “the famous Gargettian”17 as having been born on the Ionian island of Sámos, which was a cleruchy or independent colony of Athens at the time. His parents hailed from the Attic dḗmē18 of Gargēttós,19 and, as a result of his family’s political enfranchisement, he was afforded legal privileges as a citizen, such as the privilege to purchase property. Were it not for the fact of his citizenship and the advantage of his lineage, Epíkouros could not have founded The Garden.

Indeed, the Gargettian did not dwell in the wilderness like a locust-eating, doomsday-preaching ascetic.20 To the contrary, he owned a private home in the center of the largest pólis in ancient Greece.

No Sleep Til Melítē

In 306 BCE, after fifteen years off of the coast of Ionia, 35-year-old Epíkouros moves to Athens, largest pólis in Greece (and one of the largest póleis in the Eastern Mediterranean after Syracuse in Sicily and Alexándreia in Egypt). As history records, when given the choice, the Athenian pólis provided the Hēgēmṓn with more utility than the “withdrawal” of isolated settlements. In an era where most people were not living pólis-related lives, the ancient Epicureans chose the pleasures of the pólis. The students of the Garden chose to hold themselves accountable to pólis-related laws, and pay pólis-related taxes, embrace pólis-related ceremonies, celebrate pólis-related holidays, and enjoy pólis-related pleasures. In a world of wilderness, Epicureans aimed to enjoy the privileges of the pólis.

The fact of his citizenship gave Epíkouros the right to make a number of financial acquisitions: he acquired a residence in affluent Melítē,21 a city district in the center of Athens. He also deliberately purchased property between the Dípylon Gate and Plátōn‘s Akadēmía, which he called The Garden. Citizenship afforded him the right to file his Will at the mētrṓion (an administrative office that would facilitate inheritance). The document allocated funds for posthumous holidays, facilitated the successor-guardianship of the children of Metródōros and Polyaīnos (both having sons named Epikoúros), and established a dowry for Metródōros’ daughter. Lastly, it ensured the manumission of four slaves: “I set free Mýs, Nikías, Lýkōn: I likewise grant Little Phaídra [her] freedom.22

These inheritances and emancipations were afforded as a consequence of Epíkouros’ political status as a citizen. These actions were facilitated by the “supportive power” of the Athenian state. The public officials who preserved the archives (at the mētrṓion) ensured that the Hēgemṓn’s wishes were executed according to the conditions of his written will. As a result of his legal agency, his public presence, and his willingness to use the machinery of the pólis,Epíkouros’ best friend, Hérmarkhos, an immigrant who followed him as a child from Mytilḗnē, not only becomes the “hēgemṓn having been left behind”,23 but also becomes the financial manager of the Athenian Garden. The “succession” of the Epicurean school thus “goes on […] and [has hosted] countless of the familiar authorities”. 24

Hiding in Plain Sight

As a matter of practicality, Epíkouros affirms that the wise “will make plans to gain public approval” even if “only so far as to avoid being treated with contempt […] and will gain notoriety in public, but not enthusiastically”.25 Were it not for the practical utility of association, “it [might be] better not to receive public preferment”.26 Yet Philódēmos explains that “philosophers gain the friendship of public men by helping them out of their troubles27 and “those whom they find opposed to them they quickly soften”.28 As his biographer describes, the Sage of the Garden exemplifies this ideal:

Witnesses [revere] this considerable man [and his] unsurpassable goodwill to everyone, both [to those in his] fatherland [who] honored him with bronze statues, and his friends, so many [in] their extent as it would not be possible to measure [them with] whole cities, and all those familiar [with] the dogmatic[wisdom] of his [that enables them] to gain mastery over the [deceitful] sirens [of suffering].29

Defending the friendly disposition of Epíkouros, Diogénēs further celebrates

his unsurpassable kindness […] his gratitude to his progenitors, and his beneficence to his brothers, and his gentleness to his servants […] and that the [servants] philosophized with him […] and on the whole, his philanthropism [was apparent] to everyone, indeed his piety for the gods, and his fond disposition for his fatherland; for [owing to his] hyperbole [for] kindness, he never fastened to politics30

Live with Security (Not “in Obscurity”)

Indeed, the Hēgēmṓn “never fastened to politics” as a profession, nor as a means of income, (nor as a dubious obsession), but certainly, he fastened to the pólis, only leaving Athens “twice or thrice” to visit “friends” in “Ionia”, throughout the latter half of his life (nearly thirty-five, uninterrupted years in the pólis). This may surprise readers familiar with the Sage’s recommendation to “live unknown”.

The phrase λάθε βιώσας31 (láthe biṓsas, meaning “escape notice [‘n’] live!”) is usually translated as “live hidden”, “unnoticed”, “in obscurity”, “in anonymity”, or “live unknown”. Therein, Epíkouros encouraged his friends and followers to cultivate lives of philosophical calm, estranged from egotistical ambitions, indifferent to accolades, immune to the allure of approval, unburdened by popular opinion, unimpressed by affluence, uninspired by opulence, and liberated from vain beliefs about fame. He challenges them to live lives too blissfully unremarkable to appear on the turbulent pages of history. Truly, “there is no method by which one can” reliably “persuade the multitude, either always or in the majority of cases”,32 so politics is an unreliable and often unprofitable career path. To compensate for this condition, success in politics requires either “a lot of money made through unscrupulous means” or “servility to the mob or authority”.33 Neither of those conditions are conducive to happiness.

ΛΑΘΕ ΒΙΩΣΑΣ
láthe34 biṓsas35

This exhortation principally addresses private vulnerabilities (like envy) that lead a person to short-sighted decisions, which then increases overall public insecurity. In the context of a pólis, Epíkouros’ invocation to “live unknown” serves not as a call to the wild, but an affirmation to live a dignified life navigating society gracefully, without attracting unwanted attention. One might “withdraw” from the trends “of the masses” and cultivate emotional “stillness”, intellectual “peace”, and mental “tranquility” without abandoning one’s role as a neighbor and fellow citizen. One need not renounce the pleasant comforts of urban life (where they exist), retreat to a cave, or isolate oneself in the vast desert to find peace. The life of the wise need not be suffered in solitude, not silenced for the sake of virtue. To live in a pólis, it is necessary “to obtain money, and to prevent disfranchisement and exile”.36

Epíkouros was not drawn to the pólis for its troubles and deceptive rhetoric, but by her pleasures. He thus provides students with a set of expectations as concerns the benefits of both justice and law.

Law & Order

In a perfect community (of divinities), “there would be no need of laws”.37 However, within the póleis of the Earth, the wise do not observe all humans to be “capable of surveying and recollecting what is advantageous”. Not all neighbors will exercise neighborly relations, observing “pacts to neither harm nor be harmed”.38 Not all neighbors are willing to observe “the beneficial tendency” of laws, for example, against “readily destroying each other”.39 It is often necessary to defend “against harm from such people”.40 Indeed, for “the sake of achieving a profitable [outcome]”, groups of people “should not indiscriminately destroy each other”.41 It is therefore reasonable to safeguard “the salvation42 of the community with law — simultaneously, the community “works together for the sake of the distinct salvation of each [person]”. Granted, one need not reduce themselves to being a cog in the machine of society, especially “where one[could be] profitable [being] separated”, but one must still review their impact so that they are “not to produce ruinous” conditions for neighbors and fellow citizens.

Observing a social contract, Hérmarkhos insists that “legal institutes” originally “became lawful [not] through violence,” and forced coercion, “but through the consent of those that used them.”43 Certainly, it would be preferable if all humans “would spontaneously avoid such things” that lead to their neighbors’ destruction, yet not everyone can be expected to “do that which is right” in terms “of what is useful” and what is “detrimental”.44 Thus, anticipating inevitable abuses, “legislators ordained, that even involuntary” crime “should not be entirely void of punishment; in order that they might not only afford no pretext for the voluntary imitation of those deeds which were involuntarily performed”.45[H]ence legislators, wishing to restrain that indolence which is injurious to our neighbours” employed the tool of legislation and thereafter “prevented the commission of numerous offences”.46 Hence they endeavored still more firmly to restrain those who readily destroyed each other.47 Then “in attempting to effect this, they introduced those legal institutes which still remain in cities and nations48

By doing so, ancient legislators act toward “advancing the community itself” in terms of developing “the necessary [services in society]” so that “a befitting [community will have been] generated through [the] long [commitment to the aid] of one another.49 Unlike many of their philosophical opponents, the Epicureans provided an evolutionary description of human history, and explained that society developed gradually, over long periods, ultimately guided by the natural benefits of nature.

Then neighbours began to form the bonds of friendship, with a will
Neither to be harmed themselves, nor do another ill,
The safety of babes and womenfolk in one another’s trust,
And indicated by gesturing and grunting it was just
For everyone to have mercy on the weak. Without a doubt
Occasional infractions of the peace would come about,
But the vast majority of people faithfully adhered
To the pact, or else man would already have wholly disappeared;
Instead, the human race has propagated to this day.50

Though trouble is risked when pursuing a political career, that does not mean that legislators are categorically unable to help satisfy the natural needs of a community. By contrast, “thousands of [Greeks] have been useful ambassadors, were prudent in their advice, were not the cause of disaster, did not speak with an eye to gain, and were not convicted of malfeasance in office.”51 They are less concerned with trying “to classify and describe metaphors” instead of trying to give “practical working instructions”.52 In this regard, one canfind reason for pursuing practical rhetoric”. 53

Hermarkhos congratulates the wisdom of early legislators: “For those who introduced things of this kind to the multitude, excelled in wisdom” and demonstrated “a rational consideration of utility”. To prevent violent crimes, they threatened “the dread of the punishment ordained by law” as a “remedy for” those who possess “ignorance of what is beneficial”. For the threat of “punishment forcibly compels such as these to” consider the consequences of being unwilling to “subdue those impulses which lead them to useless actions” and “even now keeps the vulgar in awe, and” contributes to dissuading “them from doing any thing, either publicly or privately, which is not beneficial” to the community.54

[A]ncients legislators […] proclaimed unholy the slaughter of [an innocent] human […due to] one, natural association existing [among] the people, in the name of people, due to the similarity of [their]forms and of [their] souls [] a [murder is] not [going] to contribute towards [easing] the whole tension of life [that needs] to be supported55

Of course, circumstances change. Just laws can become unjust. The machine of politics creates emergent problems of its own that could be avoided by avoiding the pólis in the first place. Mutual human association develop prior to the compounding of society, so justice is natural, and informs our political outlooks. On this topic, of the justness of political relations, Epíkouros has a lot to say.

Just Us

At least half of the 40 Key Doctrines56 of Epíkouros address the conditions that arise from human co-existence. No less than 9 of those Doctrines57 mention “the nature of the just” or “justice” as when “someone establishes a law”.58Regarding the origin and nature of justice, Epíkouros writes (in full):

31The justice of nature is [a] pact [formed out] of a [mutual] profiting towards the [hope] neither to harm one another nor to be harmed. 32As of the animals [with whom] a pact was not able to be drafted in defense of the [hope] to neither harm nor be harmed, before these [pacts existed] nothing was just nor unjust; but in like manner also as [concerns the case] of the tribes [with whom a pact] was not able [to be composed] or [with whom] a pact was not wished to be composed, in [absence] of a [pact] to neither harm nor be harmed [so too was nothing just nor unjust]. 33Justice was not something [real] by itself, but [existed] in the gatherings [of the people] for the sake of one another, by however big [their]assemblies, but at some time, [at a] certain place, always for the sake of a [pact] neither to harm nor to be harmed. 34Injustice [is] not by itself evil, but [what is evil is] in the fear concerning the apprehension[of] whether [one] will not escape [the] notice [of] those punishers [who] have been monitoring in case of such [violations]. 35The one secretly moving [against all] of that (which they agreed [upon] with each other regarding the [pact] neither to harm nor to be harmed) is not [able] to have confidence that they will escape notice, even if ten-thousand-times by aid of the [one] being present they may escape notice; for until a catastrophic end [it will be] unclear if even they will escape detection. 36Concerning, on one hand, that [which is] common [for] all, what [is] just [is generally] the same, for some [natural] profiting was [always] being [generated by living] in a community with one another; concerning, however, what [is] unique [in terms] of place and [in terms] of however long a time [one is affected because] of the[underlying] causes then [what is] just [is] not [for] all [therefore] being followed to be the same. 37What truly is witnessed, that one profits in the service of the community [by providing utility] to one another,[this] possesses the character of the just, even if either the same might be generated [for] all, or even if the same could not [be generated for all]. If then one should pass [a] law, [that] should not result from the profiting of the community between one another, [then] no longer does it possess the nature of the just. And if it may fall from the [mark] concerning a just profiting, [for the] time then [that it] is fitted to the preconception59 of justice, [it is] not at all inferior in that way [at] the time [it] was just [and with reflection] the vain cries themselves may not confound, but look to the facts. 38When not [thought to be just, in the case] of recent [changes] being generated [as a result] of the surrounding affairs [of state], it was revealed not fitting in regard to the preconception60 [of justice against] the [things that] have been considered just in respect of the same matters [that in the past exemplified justice] — it was not [existing except as] those [things considered] just. But when [because] of recent [changes] being generated [out]of the [surrounding] affairs [of state], it was not yet harmonizing [with] the same just proceedings, therein then, at the time, truly, it was just, when [one] was profiting throughout the community with one another [in the case] of those who are politicallyengaged together;61 later then it was still not just, when not profiting together.

As described, regarding “those who are governed together”, Epíkouros expresses concern against both unjust actions, as with “one secretly moving against […] the pact neither to harm nor to be harmed” as well as laws that “no longer possesses the nature of what is just”. He expresses equal concern for those “tribes [with whom a pact] was not able to be composed” and expresses specific concern toward those tribes with whom “pact was not wished to be composed”, anticipating that the wise may need to respond to hostile parties as they would against wild animals. He observes the mutual benefits of society as when “one passes [a] law” that results in “the profiting of the community between one another”, and positively urges that every “one profits in the service of the community [by providing utility] to one another”. Indeed, rather than “not engaging in politics”, Epíkouros urges students to support laws that “possess the mark of justice”. Wise people will respond to unjust laws accordingly, both making “fitting” changes out “of the affairs [of state]”, and observing unjust laws selectively.

These foundational observations (in principle) are echoed throughout the documents that punctuate American history. The Declaration of Independence observes “certain unalienable Rights”, that “among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed”. The Preamble of the U.S. Constitution asserts that “in Order to form a more perfect Union,” the “People” set to “establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity”. In his Gettysburg Address, President Lincoln describes a “government of the people, by the people, for the people”. (World history presents many more examples than those easily accessible to my mind. Certainly, there are complications and nuances to the implementation of these ideals.)

As an animal cannot operate within its environment without making biome-related observations, so too is a human animal unable operate within a pólis without making pólis-related observations. As observers, Epicureans have amassed a breadth of observations within the walls of the póleis.

Strong Opinions

As we know from Philódēmos, “it is not like Epicurus to hesitate to speak the truth”.62 After all, the Epicurean sages “will be opinionated and will not be puzzled.”63 Far from abstaining from political speech, many Epicureans were known for their categorically-political commentary.

Philódēmos outright calls “democracy” the “worst form of government.64 He tutored Julius Caesar’s (then future) wife Calpurnia, and may have shared Cesarean sympathies, as did his close friend, Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus (Calpurnia’s father). These sympathies were shared by prominent Epicureans of 1st-century BCE Rome, including Gaius Trebatius Testa, Gaius Matius, Gaius Vibius Pansa Caetronianus, Lucius Cornelius Balbus, Publius Cornelius Dolabella, and Publius Volumnius Etrapelus. Conversely, a number of the Roman philosophers held positions againstCaesar, as was the case with Marcus Tullius Cicero and his Epicurean associates Aulus Manlius Torquatus, Lucius Manlius Torquatus, Aulus Hirtius, Gaius Cassius Longinus, Gaius Trebianus, Lucius Papirius Paetus, Marcus Fadius Gallus, and Statilius. The descriptions that Cicero catalogues preserve a spectrum of positions, from a dozen, political Epicureans, just prior to the collapse of the Rēs Pūblica.

The Romans, entrenched in their Great Civil War were far from being the only Epicureans of the ancient world who approached the political podium. In 88 BCE an Epicurean65 ambassador to Mithridátēs VI named Aristíōn66 seized the Athenian government and assumed the role of a tyrant:67

Archelaus sent them the sacred treasure of Delos by the hands of Aristion, an Athenian citizen, attended by 2,000 soldiers to guard the money. These soldiers Aristion made use of to make himself master of the country, putting to death immediately some of those who favored the Romans and sending others to Mithridates. And these things he did although he professed to be a philosopher of the school of Epicurus.

Within two years, the Roman general Sulla would conquer Athens and execute Aristíōn. Twenty years, later, a man named Lysías of Tarsós assumes the role of tyrant. Athḗnaios writes:

at Tarsus an Epicurean philosopher […] had become the tyrant of that city, Lysias by name; who having been created by his countrymen Stephanephorus, that is to say, the priest of Heracles, did not lay down his command, but seized on the tyranny. He put on a purple tunic with a white centre, and over that he wore a very superb and costly cloak, and he put on white Lacedaemonian sandals, and assumed also a crown of golden laurel leaves. And he distributed the property of the rich among the poor, and put many to death who did not surrender their property willingly.

Echoing the diversity of opinions held by Epicureans during the Roman Republic, the French Epicureans of the Baroque period68 introduce diverse political commentary into modern, Epicurean literature. They served flavors ranging from monarchism to liberalism to anarchism, united by their common, intellectual descent from the Epicurean Garden, and their shared rejection of the Church.

Early figures, like Michel de Montaigne and François de la Moethe le Vayer advocated “pragmatic” submission to monarchy. Others resisted, like Théophile de Viau and his lover Jacques Vallée Des Barreaux. Some came to question the divine authority of the state like Pierre Gassendi. To these, we add Machiavellian thinkers like Gabriel Naudé, and his friend Gui Patin. Aristocrats hosted salons, like the defiant courtesan Marion Delorme, and her lover Charles de Saint-Évremond, as well as the libertine Ninon de l’Enclos. François VI, Duc de La Rochefoucauld fought in the Fronde against both Cardinal Richelieu and the King’s Musketeers. Physician François Bernier came to revile the political “despotism” that he witnessed in Asia. Among poets, Antoinette Deshoulières shared loyalties with King Louis XIV, while Guillaume Amfrye de Chaulieu resisted royal authority. Jean de la Chapelle, the “father of French epicurean poetry” developed nationalistic propaganda against the Habsburg dynasty, while a series of anti-clerical secularists, including Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Denis Diderot, and Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron d’Holbach influenced minds like John Locke and Thomas Jefferson.

During the American Revolution, an Epicurean physician named Thomas helped organize the Boston Tea Party. His student, an Epicurean officer named Ethan helped found the State of Vermont. Another Epicurean friend of theirs (also named Thomas) gets elected as the 3rd President of the United States. In the 19th-century, an Epicurean feminist named Frances advocated utopian socialism. In the 20th-century, an Epicurean intellectual named Christopher shared critical insights on authoritarianism. In the 21st-century, an Epicurean farmer named José served as the 40th Presidente de la República Oriental del Uruguay. Each of these passionately political figures identified themselves as students of the Garden. “I too am an Epicurean” wrote Thomas Jefferson.69 Christopher Hitchens echoed Jefferson’s statement of purpose.70 Presidente José Mujica affirmed in his “humble way of thinking, that the problem we are facing is political. The Old Thinkers” like “Epicurus […] put it this way: a poor person is not someone who has little but one who needs infinitely more, and more and more.”71

Based on two-thousands years of anecdotes, it seems unrealistic to attempt to purge the pólis-related interests from the human mind, as though the pólis were fundamentally evil. Quite the opposite, the origins of political activity serve to promote the benefits of mutual association. Humans have engaged and re-engaged póleis-related activities for millennia, whether patronizing the Théatro tou Dionýsou, or catching a Broadway matinee. Far better is it for a happy human not to avoid the pólis (as a great pain), but rather, to maximize the natural goods that directly result from pólis-related activities. This means gracefully navigate pólis-related exchanges, rather than eliminating them from our thoughts.

Speaking Frankly

While one is best to “avoid contact” with antagonists and “expel them from thought”, it is not always the case that “these practices prove to be useful”.72 While it might be preferred to eliminate contact with antagonistic personalities, this is not always possible. Citizens must find ways to preserve their peace through compromise. After all, “the harmony that to some is good for others is indifferent”.73

Unlike the Socratic sages who alleged to “know nothing”, Epíkoruos affirms that true sages “will be opinionated.”74 At the same time, the ancient Epicureans criticize Sōkrátēs for having “offended many people and incurred political enmities, from which indeed in time hatred grew”.75 Of course, practicing free speech does not excuse one from the consequences of speaking. Thus, a wise person should “not [get] carried away so as to insult or strut or show contempt [or] do harm”.76 Pick your battles, for “there is no [necessity] to apply frankness in every case.”77 Philódēmos weighs the need to speak frankly against the practical ability of a person to receive criticism, hoping (usually) for them to enjoy the greatest advantage from constructive guidance. He explains that it “is hard work for those who are handling [a topic] by way of an epitome to be precise about every kind”78 since there are so many unique personalities, distinct relationships, and nuanced contexts. (Nonetheless, he attempts to do so).

Philódēmos wonders, “How will he handle those who have become angry toward him because of his frank criticism?79First, remember that “some [do not] perceive their own errors” and “it causes [them] to dis[trust]”,80 being “afflicted with passions that puff one up or generally hinder one”.81 Even so, to address the errors, the “wise person and philosopher speaks frankly” understanding that their criticism “should be administered appropriately”.82 As a result, they “will differ for each […] just as a lad differs from a woman and old men will differ […] and youngsters alike [… and one must admonish] prominent [men] and peoples according to each”.83 He notes that privileged citizens “do not gladly accept others confuting them [because] they believe that many people reproach them out of envy”.84

Some will require “a caring admonishment” instead of “an irony that pleases but pretty much stings” – many will become alienated when stung.85 Thereafter, they “cannot possibly endure [to listen] to [that them] with goodwill.”86Others “have judged it right to speak frankly [to] such people, but [moderately], given that sharp frankness bears a similarity to insult, as if insulting indeed out of ill will.87 Along those lines, one must not say “contemptuous or disparaging things […] in a strained tone”.88For how is he going to hate the one who errs […] when he knows that he himself is not perfect and rem[inds himself that everyone is accustomed to err?]89 Recognizing the profitability of patience, “if someone […] has been slighted, we do not prevent [them] from casting blame” nor assume them to have “been discredited”.90 Yet demanding all deliveries be sweetened attracts “men who are charlatans […] seizing them after some stress and enchanting them with their subtle kindnesses.91

In the case of “those more in need of treatment,” a caring teacher “intensifies [frankness]”. 92[T]he [wise man], being a person-tamer, [probes] the disobedience of a young man who is [arrogant].”93As Philódēmos describes, “they [will employ frankness] aggressively in regard to [laziness and] procrastination.”94 Often, a wise person “speaks frankly because” obstinate persons “made him speak frankly toward them”.95 As he explains, “it is necessary to show him his errors forthrightly and speak of his failings publicly.”96 In these cases, “we shall admonish others with great confidence”.97 For the sake education, one must not censure necessary criticism in the name of softening the proverbial blow, since “to act in secret is necessarily most unfriendly, no doubt. For he who does not report [errors] is clearly covering up these things […] and there will be no advantage”.98 The truth must be presented or else the error will not be corrected and the student will not grow. Provoking the temperament of a student “must be risked [or] otherwise [they]do not pay heed” and may never advance in wisdom.99

To an extent, it is necessary for the student “to endure admonishment graciously”.100 If they “will behave” tyrannically, then rational minds will rightly “hold [them] to be un[beara]ble”,101 as in the case of “some people who make jokes but do not endure others [making jokes at their expense]”.102 Certainly, wise people will adjust their tone to maximize the retention of those with whom they speak, but wise people need to vent like the rest of us, and Epicureans found pleasure in bonding over issues.

Now, if only one person or two or three or four or five or six or any larger number you choose, sir, provided that it is not very large, were in a bad predicament, I should address them individually and do all in my power to give them the best advice. But, as I have said before, the majority of people suffer from a common disease, as in a plague, with their false notions about things, and their number is increasing (for in mutual emulation they catch the disease from one another, like sheep)103

So far as concerns tone, the wise will not “tyrannize”, neither inflating dictatorial fantasies, nor indulging authoritarian ambitions (as Epíkouros writes “in the second book of On Lifestyles”);104 nor will they bark like a cynic”, after all, “one cannot be fearless” and enjoy the fruits of association if “one causes [others to be] fearful”.105In speaking one should not resort to ignoble rhetorical tricks, these have less effect than a straight-forward character”.106 Philódēmos cautions against employing “panegyric” rhetoric to advance an agenda — the wise will neither weaponize “charming speeches107 to manipulate crowds, nor patronize politicians with pageantry “in the fashion of the sophists”.108Philódēmos asks, “How can a natural philosopher become a politician and rhetor?”109 He affirms that “by no means should the philosopher acquire political experience”,110 which simply requires one to study “what pleases the crowd and practicing”.111 In this regard, “politics is the worst foe of friendship”.112 Whereas “everyone who bears goodwill and practices philosophy intelligently and continually […] is great in character and indifferent to fame” and “least of all a politician”.113

Be mindful of what you say — but among true friends, always speak your mind.

Bein’ Real and Breakin’ Balls

While thoughtful speech is recommended when engaging acquaintances, Philódēmos acknowledges that “there is nothing so grand as having one to whom one will say what is in one’s heart” without censoring oneself as if expecting censure, “for our nature strongly desires to reveal to some people what it thinks.”114 Of course, sharing “what is in one’s heart” with the wrong person can “further inflame […] those same men who do not like [them]”. Nonetheless, it is far healthier and more pleasurable to be involved “with one who is pure and loves [you] and […] knows how to treat [you].”115

Philódēmos supposes that “the wise men recognize each other, [and] will be reminded pleasurably by one another […]and they will sting each other with the gentlest of stings and will acknowledge gratitude”.116 Along those lines, a wise person should also be able to take a joke.

Good Without Governing

Ultimately, laws are temporary, conditions are unstable, and legislation is never as robust as inner strength. Even compared against the resources provided by of political agreements, “most valuable of all [is] self-sufficiency”,117 which allows us to “have confidence” when those agreements dissolve and “one might be in want of things”.118 As with every person, every place, and every planet, so, too, will every pólis dissolve. In the absence of law, wise people would still act ethically. For “philosophers do not enter politics, yet they help their native land by teaching the young to obey the laws; nay more, by teaching them to act justly even if there are no laws, and to shun injustice as they would fire.”119

The Epicurean Garden does not require the existence of a stable pólis to secure the good life. Plátōn supposed the best life to be lived within an ideal state ruled by a philosopher king. Aristotélēs described humans as being “political animals”120 that could not flourish without the advancement of political objectives — indeed, Karl Marx preferred Aristotélēs “above all the Ancients”.121 Stoics like the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius approached political office as a philosophical duty, though advising neutrality to “be neither of the green nor of the blue party at the games in the Circus”.122 Epicureans, however, did not evaluate their moral agency as a function their success in the political profession.

Happiness cannot depend upon “great commodities, nor pretentious business, nor authority, nor power, but painlessness and feeling gentleness.”123 After all, Epíkouros affirms to a student that “we must liberate ourselves, out of the prison [built] upon circular [proceedings]124 and political125 [affairs]”.126 He encourages Pythoklḗs to “avoid all programming127 and congratulates Apellḗs on having “committed to philosophy cleanly from every impurity” related to acculturation.128 [L]et us be content”, writes Philódēmos, “to live the quiet life of a philosopher without claiming a share in the ability to manage a city by persuasion”.129 He observes that every “good and honest [person] who confines [their] interest to philosophy alone, and disregards the nonsense of lawyers” and their legislative squabbles “can face boldly all such troubles, yea all powers and the whole world.”130

Not Brave Enough for Politics

The “political podium” is not the only mechanism by which to affect meaningful change in a pólis.

Epíkouros did not ban slavery, but he did free slaves. He did not reform jail, but he did post bail. He did not legalize women’s choices, but he did publish female voices. He did not manage the State, but he did transfer his estate to the management of a disenfranchised migrant, circumventing Athenian inheritance laws; he ensured a permanent asylum for philosophical friends of his garden. He was unmoved to speak in the assembly, but was inspired to write for the benefit of future generations.

He did abide by civic policies, but he did not endorse civil servants. He did encourage friends to fight fate, but he did not instigate pointless debate. He addressed policies without engaging politics, and he accomplished all of these activities without drawing the attention of vindictive authorities.

Part of This World

While we can practice independence from vain desires, we cannot practice independence from reality. While “the greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom”,131 we must remember that even the strongest people cannot be self-sufficient” forever. By definition, mortal life is enriched through fellowship.

[M]oreover, [it is] right to help [also] generations to come (for they too belong to us, though they are still unborn) and, besides, love of humanity prompts us to aid also the foreigners who come here. […]I wished to use this […] to advertise publicly the [medicines] that bring salvation. These medicines we have put [fully] to the test”132

In theologizing about the blessed lifestyles of our divinities, Philódēmos even imagines that “the gods do favors for each other” despite the fact that “each of them is independently capable of providing himself with the most perfect pleasure.”133 The gods are motivated by the good of nature “to maintain their community as a species” through “social intercourse”. So, they “also accept from each other what supplies their other needs, even though they are able to provide these things for themselves, just as we (human beings) sometimes do from those who have the same things (as ourselves).”134

So far as concerns the reality of modern enfranchisement, one can retire from social affairs and limit career ambitions, but one is much less likely to be able to escape their modern context as a citizen, subject to the laws of the territories in which they reside. To the contrary, “we must simultaneously laugh and philosophize and manage a household and administrate the economic affairs”.135 And when it comes to the skepticism and pessimism of the massive political institutions of the modern era, we should remember, “necessity is evil, but there is no necessity to live with necessity.”136


Footnotes

1 οὐδὲ πολιτεύσεσθαι (oúdé politeúsesthai) meaning “not to be politicked” (Laértios 10.119). Politeúsesthai is the present middle/passive infinitive of politeúō meaning “to be politically-involved” with the connotation of wanting “to pursue public office”, wishing “to conduct government”, seeking “to meddle in affairs”, or hoping “to administer the state”.

2 Epíkouros, On Lifestyles (as preserved by Diogénēs Laértios 10.119)

3 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 14 (Ibid., 10.143)

4 Ibid. 28 (Ibid., 10.148)

5 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 28

6 Cicero records μή πολιτεύσεσθαι (mḗ politeúsesthai) that the wise “should not to be politically-involved” (Usener 8).

7 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 14 (Ibid., 10.143)

8 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.120

9 Ibid.

10 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 21 (Ibid., 10.146)

11 Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 3

12 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 15 (Ibid., 10.144)

13 τῶν συμπολιτευομένων (tṓn sympoliteuoménōn) meaning “of those being governed together” or “of those being politically engaged with one another” (Key Doctrine 38). Other translators render “of those living together as citizens” in the form of a present active participle (e.g. “living” as citizens), but the verb is conjugated as the middle/passive participle (e.g. “being politicked”), thus, the middle/passive particle of politeúō means“being governed together”, or “being politically engaged with one another” (Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers10.153).

14 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 38 (Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.153)

15 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 6 (Ibid., 10.141)

16 Pindar, Fragment 76 (c. 5th-century BCE)

17 Cicero, Epistle to Cassius (January 45 BCE) 15.16; also Aelian, Varia Historia 4.13

18 The δῆμοι (dḗmoi) were administrative subdivisions of ancient Athens, similar in scale to modern suburbs or boroughs.

19 “EPÍKOUROS, son of Neoklḗs and Khairestrátē, [was an] Athenian [citizen] of the dḗmē Gargēttós, of the family of the Philaídai, as Mētródōros says in his book On Pedigree.” (Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.1)

20 Contrast against the ascetic John the Baptist from the Second Temple Period (see Matthew 3:4).

21 Μελίτη (Melítē) was an affluent district at the center of ancient Athens, just west of the Acropolis.

22 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.21

23 καταλελειμμένου ἡγεμόνος (kataleleimménou hēgemónos) meaning “of the hēgemṓn having been left behind” (10.20)

24 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.9

25 Ibid., 10.120

26 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 154, fr. XII

27 Ibid., II, 133, fr. IV

28 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 160, XXI-XXV. II, 162, fr. XXVII

29 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.9

30 Ibid., 10.10

31 Usener Fragment 551

32 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 120, fr. XIX

33 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 67

34 Λάθε (2nd-person singular, aorist, active, imperative) of λᾰνθᾰ́νω (lanthánō) meaning “[you] escape notice!”

35 βιώσας (2nd-person singular, aorist, active, imperative) of βιόω (bióō) meaning “[you] live!”

36 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric V

37 Hérmarkhos, Against Empedoklḗs 1.8

38 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 32

39 Hérmarkhos, Against Empedoklḗs 1.7

40 Ibid., 1.10

41 Ibid., 1.9

42 Ibid., 1.10

43 Ibid., 1.8

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid., 1.9

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid., 1.11

48 Ibid.

49 Hérmarkhos, Against Empedoklḗs 1.10

50 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 5.1019-1027; translated by A. E. Stallings.

51 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 224, col. XIX

52 Ibid., I, 171, 2, col. XII

53 Ibid., II, 54, 41

54 Hérmarkhos, Against Empedoklḗs 1.10

55 Ibid., 1.7

56Epíkouros, Key Doctrines 1, 5-7, 13-14, 17, 27-28, 30, 39-40 (including 31-38 on justice)

57Ibid. 17, 31-38

58Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 37

59πρόληψιν (prólepsin) meaning “preconception”, “anticipation”, “definition”, or “common notion”.

60Same note as above [#61]

61The one and only time in extant texts that Epíkouros directly employs the root πολιτευ (politeu) is in reference to the benefits of mutual association in the context of living in an urban environment ruled by law.

62 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II-b

63 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.120

64 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, VII

65 Appianòs of Alexandreús, Mithridatic Wars 6.28

66 Aoiz, Javier and Boeri, Marcelo. Theory and Practice in Epicurean Philosophy 147-148

67 τύραννος (týrannos) meaning “tyrant” or “absolute ruler”, usually with the connotation of a “dictator” or “despot”.

68 For more information, see Epicureans and Atheists in France, 1650-1729 by Alan Charles Kors (2016).

69 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to William Short (31 October 1819).

70 Jules Evans, Philosophy for Life and Other Dangerous Situations: Ancient Philosophy for Modern Problems (91)

71 José Mujica, Human Happiness and the Environment. Rio +20 Summit (20 June 2012, translated by Vero).

72 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 39 (Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.154)

73Epíkoruos, On the Wise (Ibid., 10.120)

74Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.120

75 Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 59

76 Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Col. Ib

77 Ibid., Col. lIb

78 Ibid., Col. Vllb

79 Ibid., Frag. 70

80 Ibid., Frag. 1

81 Ibid., Frag. 66

82 Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Frag. 2

83 Ibid., Col. VIa

84 Ibid., Col. XXIIIa

85 Ibid., Frag. 26

86 Ibid., Frag. 31

87 Ibid., Frag. 60

88 Ibid., Frag. 39

89 Ibid., Frag. 46

90 Ibid., Frag. 35

91 Ibid., Frag. 60

92 Ibid., Frag. 7

93 Ibid., Frag. 87 N

94 Ibid., Col. Va

95 Ibid., Frag. 58

96 Ibid., Frag. 40

97 Ibid., Frag. 45

98 Ibid., Frag. 41

99 Ibid., Frag. 10

100 Ibid., Frag. 36

101 Ibid., Frag. 34

102 Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Col. XVII

103 Diogénēs of Oìnóanda, Fragment 3; translated by M. F. Smith.

104 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.119

105 Epíkouros, Usener Fragment 537

106 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 126, fr. V

107 Ibid., II, 244, col. XLII

108 Ibid., I, 225, fr. I

109 Ibid., VI

110 Ibid., VI

111 Ibid., I-2

112 Ibid., Frag. 19

113 Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, col. Ia-Ib

114 Ibid., Frag. 28

115 Ibid., Frag. 44

116 Ibid., Col. VIIIb

117 Usener 476 – AYTAPKEIA or αὐτάρκεια (aútárkeia) expresses an “autarky”, “self-sufficiency”, or “independence

118 Usener 135a – This fragment was preserved by Stobaîos.

119 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, V, Fragment 13

120 Aristotélēs, Politics, Book I, 1253a

121 Karl Marx claims: “I have always felt a great tenderness for this philosopher [Hērákleitos], whom I prefer above all the Ancients save Aristotle.” (Letter to Ferdinand Lassalle 21 December 1857)

122 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 1.5

123 Usener Fragment 548

124 EΓΚΥΚΛΙΑ or ἐγκύκλια (enkýklia), meaning “cyclical”, “circular”, “recurrent”, “revolving”, or “ordinary” — it refers to both [I] the “gossip” or “daily affairs” that would have been “common to all citizens”, and, elsewhere [II] enkúklia is employed in the context of ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία (énkýklios paideía) an allegedly “‘well-rounded’ education” intended for aristocratic children in an effort to prepare them for civic obligations. In this context, the “rearing”, training”, “education”, and “upbringing“ is criticized by Epíkouros as being a “circular” system of “programming” designed to indoctrinate aristocratic youths with traditional, mythic rhetoric, instilling them with confusion and anxiety.

125 ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΑ or πολιτικὰ (politikà) refers to those conditions related to the pólis (“city”), or else, the troublesome activities that are administrative in nature. Therein, Epíkouros was not issuing a prohibition against civic engagement, which he elsewhere encourages, but was cautioning students against pursuing a career in political office. Holding office, albeit it through democracy or autocracy often relies upon either “a lot of money” made “through an unscrupulous means” or “servility to the mob or authority”, neither of which are conducive to the goal of the good life.

126 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 58

127 Usener Fragment 163

128 Usener Fragment 117

129 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, I, 234, col. IV

130 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 140, fr. XII

131 ελευθερία (eleuthería) has been translated as “freedom”, “liberty”, “manumission”, but also refers to a “license”.

132 Diogénēs of Oìnóanda, Fragment 3; translated by M. F. Smith.

133 Philódēmos, On Gods III 84

134 Ibid., 87

135 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 41

136 Ibid., 9

 


Works Cited

 

Aelian. "Book IV." Varia Historia. Translated by Thomas Stanley, 1665.

Aoiz, Javier and Boeri, Marcelo D. Theory and Practice in Epicurean Philosophy: Security, Justice and Tranquility. Bloomsbury Academic, 2023, 147-148.

Appian. "Mithradatic Wars." Roman History, translated by Horace White, Perseus Digital Library, catalog.perseus.org Aristotle. Politics. Translated by C. D. C. Reeve, Hackett Publishing, 2017.

Armstrong, David. "Epicurean Virtues, Epicurean Friendship: Cicero vs. the Herculaneum Papyri." Epicurus and the Epicurean Traditions, edited by Jeffrey Fish and Kirk R. Sanders, Cambridge University Press, 2011, 126-128.

Aurelius, Marcus. Meditations. Translated by Martin Hammond, Penguin Classics, 2014.

Cicero, Marcus Tullius. Letters to Friends. Edited and translated by D. R. Shackleton Bailey, Harvard University Press, 2001.

Curnow. The Philosophers of the Ancient Worlds: An A-Z Guide. 185 DeWitt, Norman. Epicurus and His Philosophy. Minnesota Press, 342-343 Diogénēs of Oìnóanda. The Epicurean Inscription. Translated by M. F. Smith, Bibliopolis, 1993.

Epíkouros. “Fragments”. Translated by N. H. Bartman, Leaping Pig Publishing, 2026, TWENTIERS.COM/FRAGMENTS.

Epíkouros. “Key Doctrines”. The Hedonicon: The Holy Book of Epicurus, 2023, 1-4. Epíkouros. “Vatican Sayings”. Translated by N. H. Bartman, Leaping Pig Publishing, 2025, TWENTIERS.COM/VATICAN-SAYINGS.

Essler, Holger. "Space and Movement in Philodemus’ De dis 3: an Anti-Aristotelian Account." Space in Hellenistic Philosophy: Critical Studies in Ancient Physics, edited by Graziano Ranocchia et al., De Gruyter, 2014

Evans, Jules. Philosophy for Life and Other Dangerous Situations: Ancient Philosophy for Modern Problems. Rider, 2013, 91.

Hérmarkhos. “Against Empedokles”. Select Works of Porphyry: Containing His Four Books On Abstinence From Animal Food; His Treatise on the Homeric Cave of the Nymphs; and His Auxiliaries to the Perception of Intelligible Natures. Translated by Thomas Taylor, 1823.

Hubbell, Harry M. The Rhetorica of Philodemus. Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1920.

Kors, Alan Charles. Epicureans and Atheists in France, 1650-1729. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Jefferson, Thomas. "Letter to William Short." 31 October 1819. The Papers of Thomas Jefferson: Retirement Series, edited by J. Jefferson Looney et al. (Princeton University Press), vol. 15, pp. 162–65

Jerome. Aspects of the Study of Roman History. 234

Jones, Howard. The Epicurean Tradition. Routledge, 1992.

Laértios, Diogénēs. The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, Book 10: The Life of Epíkouros. Translated by N. H. Bartman, Leaping Pig Publishing, 2025, TWENTIERS.COM/BIOGRAPHY.

Liddell, Henry George, and Robert Scott. A Greek-English Lexicon, revised by Henry Stuart Jones, Clarendon Press, 1940.

Logeion, uchicago.edu.

Loukianós of Samósta. Alexander the False Prophet. Translated by A. M. Harmon, Loeb Classical Library, 1936.

Lucretius. The Nature of Things. Translated by A. E. Stallings, Penguin Classics, 2007.

Marx, Karl. "Marx to Ferdinand Lassalle in Düsseldorf." 21 December 1857. Marx & Engels Collected Works, vol. 40, International Publishers, 1983, 225–227.

Philódēmos. On Frank Criticism. Translated by David Konstan, Society of Biblical Literature, 1980.

Philódēmos. On Gods. 2026, TWENTIERS.COM/ON-GODS Philódēmos. On Property Management. Translated by Tsouna, Society of Biblical Literature, 2013.

Philódēmos. On Piety. Translated by Drik Obink, Clarendon Press, 1996.

Philódēmos. On Rhetoric. Translated by Harry M. Hubble, Conn. Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1920.

Pindar. "Fragment 76." Greek Lyric, Volume IV: Bacchylides, The Epinikia, edited and translated by David A. Campbell, Harvard UP, 1992, p. X

Stewart, Matthew. Nature's God: The Heretical Origins of the American Republic. 2014.

The Holy Bible: New Revised Standard Version. Oxford University Press, 1989 Twentiers: Hogs from the Herd. Leaping Pig Publishing, 2026, TWENTIERS.COM. Usener, Hermann. Epicurea. Lipsiae, 1887.

Wilson, Catherine. Epicureanism at the Origins of Modernity. Clarendon Press, 2008

Superstition Ain’t the Way

N. H. BARTMAN

 

This essay has been translated into classic rock for easier comprehension. Find it here.

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INTRODUCTION: SUPERSTITION AIN’T THE WAY
· TRAMPLED UNDER FOOT

SIDE ONE: PHILOSOPHER’S GARDEN
· TAKE IT EASY
· THE BEST THINGS IN LIFE ARE FREE
· STAYIN’ ALIVE
· MIND GAMES
· HERE COME THE SUN

SIDE TWO: LOSING MY RELIGION
· PEOPLE ARE STRANGE
· BORN UNDER A BAD SIGN
· DREAM ON
· RAMBLE ON
· GREAT GIG IN THE SKY

SIDE THREE: DUST IN THE WIND
· YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT
· ALL THINGS MUST PASS
· DON’T STOP ME NOW
· EVERYBODY HURTS
· DON’T FEAR THE REAPER
· WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM MY FRIENDS
· IN MY LIFE
· IMAGINE
· IN MY TIME OF DYING

SIDE FOUR: THE GRAND ILLUSION
· BLINDED BY THE LIGHT
· MAD WORLD
· GASLIGHTING
· DARK SIDE OF THE MOON
· ABRA-ABRACADABRA
· PARANOID

CONCLUSION: I CAN SEE CLEARLY NOW
· WON’T GET FOOLED AGAIN

 


 

SUPERSTITION AIN’T THE WAY

NOTE: Among all other Hellenistic schools, the Epicurean Garden boasts the greatest conceptual consistency as a philosophy, and the greatest historical consistency as an institution—after all, practical teachings that provide useful knowledge do not require revisions. To ensure that readers have been provided ancient source material, and not just paraphrasing from modern academics, each citation has been studiously documented.

 

INTRODUCTION: TRAMPLED UNDER FOOT

Superstition confounds nature’s goal of “complete happiness”.1 Magical thinking not only obstructs the creative capacity of an individual to achieve their best life2 , but it also challenges the ability of individualsto live as neighbors”.3 Mythic beliefs exacerbate our deepest fears, antagonize the benefits of one another’s fellowship”,4 and “delay the joy5 of the good life.

More than any other personality in the ancient world, Epíkouros championed the “sober calculation6 required to dispel delusion. He provided students with powerful tools to defend against manipulation and mythic deceit. He warns that “if one does not know the whole of nature, but obsesses over the myths”, then one cannot dissolve “the fear over the most important matters.7 However, if one is “rightly following the phenomena” then “the myth departs”.8

The Sage of the Garden explains that “one must study naturepurely, “as the phenomena requires,” without mythic speculations—one must leave “space for the voices of the facts9 in order to “gain a share of genuine tranquility”.10Writing to a student, he affirms that “a life of disorder and empty opinion does not sustain our need, which is moreover, for us to live imperturbably.11 Neither will the wise suffer the deceit of disruptive fictions, nor the duplicity of sanctimonious tyrants. The poet Lucretius orchestrates the Sage’s triumph against “the grinding weight of superstition”:12

Religion, so, is trampled underfoot,
And by his victory we reach the stars
.13

QVARE RELIGIO PEDIBVS SVBIECTA VICISSIM
OPTERITVR NOS EXAEQVAT VICTORIA CAELO.

The Garden epitomizes the “the method of investigation” against “empty opinion”.14 She champions a realistic ethics that applies a practical “measuring by comparison”,15 making “life pleasant” and dispelling “the greatest confusion [that] overtakes our minds”.16 Her founder, consumed “with passion for true philosophy17 saw superstition as sickness—as disease antagonizes the constitution of the flesh, so, too, does “void doctrine18 about reality disturb what is “healthy throughout the soul”.19 As Epíkouros writes, “without a study of nature”, one cannot enjoy “the pure pleasures”.20 One cannot enjoy “tranquility and firm faith21 without “knowledge” to dispel frightening falsehoods.

Assuredly, “when you believe in things that you don’t understand, then you suffer”. As regards “real knowledge”,22 the wise agree, simply speaking, “superstition ain’t the way”.23

SIDE ONE: PHILOSOPHER’S GARDEN

While “taking into account the goal that exists” according to “all of the self-evident facts”,24 Epíkouros observes that “animals, as soon as they are born” naturally suppress “their toil and […] instinctively avoid the pains”.25 Whereas “the feeling of pleasure” is “truly friendly”, so “pain” is innately “hostile”. The Sage observes “in every animal” that “choice and avoidance are distinguished26 by the beacon of pleasure. Since “the primary and innate good27 in animals is “pleasure”, he concludes that the “goal” of the human animal is to secure “the best life28 through the “pursuit [of] pleasure”,29the beginning and ending of living blessedly”.30

The Good31 of pleasure32 to which Epíkouros refers includes both “activities” that excite “joy” and inspire “cheerfulness” as well as the “centered” pleasures of mental “impassiveness” and physical “painlessness”.33 The “kinetic” delights of “action” include “the pleasures of flavor”, “the pleasure of the belly”,34Aphrodisian35 intercourse” (“O thighs for which I justly died!”),36hearing”, “appearances”, “the sight of sweet motions”,37 and the company of “those who share a like-mind”.38The wise”, as Epíkouros writes, “are likely to love the countryside” and “enjoy themselves more than others by theorizing”,39 delighting in “the search for truth”.40 Other pleasures include the serenity of being “just”,41confidence from coexisting with other people”,42 successful “management of one’s possessions”,43 as well as the peace of being “easily satisfied with few possessions”. Everyone is encouraged to pursue pleasure “according to [their] own preference”,44 by the grace of Nature “as does a god”.45

The Hēgemṓn46 adds to his personal list one potlet of cheese”.47 Even those inclined to the unforgiving “podium48 of politics, and those disposed toward the thrill of “Aphrodisia49 are positively encouraged to (responsibly) explore the “change throughout [their] flesh”,50 free from mythic shame, so long as they “neither harm nor be harmed”.51

 

TAKE IT EASY

The pursuit of “absolute happiness52 does not include “the pleasures of the debauched and those lying sick with enjoyment” but only those pleasures that cause “neither suffering throughout the body nor grieving throughout the soul”.53 Nature privileges “pure pleasures”, persuading us to “not in any way prefer the most food but the most delightful”.54 It is not drinking and following festivals, nor taking advantage of subordinates55 and women, nor an expensive multitude of fish or whatever fills an extravagant table that makes life pleasant, but sober calculation” and a consideration of “choice and avoidances.56 Were this not the case, rather, were it the case that “complete happiness57 could be obtained mindlessly, then “there would be no need for the study of nature.” Yet, if one fails to practice proper calculation, “everything will be full of foolishness and of confusion”,58 thus, one must “constantly reference the goal of natural pleasure59 in a realistic context to understand the rewards and “limits of the good life”.60

 

THE BEST THINGS IN LIFE ARE FREE

Epíkouros did not find explicit fault in a “luxurious lifestyle”, so long as it “inherits the natural benefit of the good61 and so far as it notdifficult62 to maintain—however, he did question the value of any such a lifestyle that requires the satisfaction of rare delights, constantly “behold[ing] a change in energy”.63 As the Hēgemṓn recognized, necessary comforts of life (like food, water, and, warmth) are provided by nature in abundance, when compared with unnecessary desires, like acquiring rare pieces of expensive art or dominating political movements, things notoriously difficult to procure. “Thanks [to] the blessed nature”, Epíkouros writes, “that has made the necessities obtainable, but the unobtainable, unnecessary.”64

The Sage concludes that the best life is the “cheapest and simplest life65 required to maintain “equilibrium”.66 He concludes that it is better “to have courage lying upon a bed of straw than to agonize with a gold bed and a costly table.”67 He observes that inexpensive “barley-bread and water deliver the greatest pleasure whenever anyone in need has consumed them”.68 He avoided those “pleasures that come from extravagance”, and cautioned against indulgence, “not because of” the pleasures themselves, “but because of the difficulties that follow them.”69Therefore adapt into a simple and not extravagant lifestyle as it forms an essential part of health,”70 and “spit on what is beautiful and those who vainly worship, when nothing produces pleasure”!71

 

STAYIN’ ALIVE

While “there is elegance in simplicity”, the possibility of living “a pleasant life” is threatened when constantly challenged by severe, physical insecurity, as with malnutrition. Nature is “preserved by pleasures” but “weak to what is evil”,72 thus “all the suffering” caused by the “poverty” of being unable to satisfy the body’s basic living needs must be “removed. The wisest among us will find a way to “be happy” even if “tortured”, as they continue living their best inner-life, but even so, mental “health does involve some care and effort for the body.”73

As Philódēmos writes, “when [health] is absent”, it “causes unspeakably more distress”.74 One need not neglect the health of the body as though it were “vain”, simply for the sake of “virtues”.75 The Sage observes an inseparable link between “the bellow of the flesh” and “the bellow of the soul” because “the whine of the flesh” burdens “the soul; while truly difficult to impede, it is more dangerous for a person day-by-day to disobey the dictation of Nature”.76 Epíkouros goes so far as to define the pleasure “of a god” in terms of physical satisfaction: even a god must prioritize maintaining relief from “the cry of the[ir] flesh”, suffering “neither hunger, nor thirst, nor shiver[ing]77 The wise are warm with pleasure, having dispelled “the Winter of the soul78. “For if the one who possesses the latter can hope to possess this happiness they would contend beyond even Zeus.”79 A mind subsists most soundly “in a healthy body”.80

Epíkouros observes that a healthy lifestyle requires that “we simultaneously laugh and philosophize, and manage a household and administrate the economic affairs and never let go of the language of the forthright philosophy.”81 Philódēmos reasons that we must afford “a leisurely retreat with one’s friends, and a most dignified income”.82 We cannot “gain mastery over the sirens” of suffering “in every physical condition, nor in every cultural context”,83 nor in every location, as with regions that are grossly inhospitable to human existence. A life consumed by constant, physical need due to insecurity challenges everyone’s ability to live happily.

Thus, a wise person benefits by prioritizing the satisfaction of natural needs, whereas a fool “is consumed by procrastination84 and negligence. As the Hēgemṓn writes, nature thrives when “persuaded”, but shrinks when “violated”.85 One must “choose” to satisfy nature by selecting healthy choices, “fulfilling her necessary desires, and not those that cause harm”.86 Indeed, we exercise virtues “not for their own sake,” but “just as medicine, for the sake of health”.87

 

MIND GAMES

While eliminating “suffering throughout the body88 is necessary to cultivate a good life, the health of the body, alone, does not guarantee the soundness of the mind (as with the case of the masses who suffer from “vain beliefs” that fall “into infinity”).89 Even for those with sculpted flesh, blessed with the gift of a healthy constitution, even they may lack “a stout heart that has no fear of death90 and suffer deeply from irrational fears. Epíkouros notes that “great stresses draw [life] short” and that the stress that is excessive will bring on death.”91Without cultivating a stable foundation, psychological suffering, by itself can devastate and otherwise healthy body.

The Epicurean school recognized that “the flesh tossed in a storm only [suffers the] present,” which only lasts so long, “but the mind [suffers] the past, the present, and the future92. Seeing that the most enduring “pains of [the] body are inferior” to the “psychological” torment of the mind, the ancient Epicureans rejoiced that “the greater pleasures are of the mind93. Thus, the resilience of the intellect allows us to manage our pain through the patience, and to relieve inner turmoil with reflection. Without “the continuous activity into [the] study of nature,”94 we risk becoming like “mindless men”,95 susceptible to the influence of fears and the frauds.

Supernatural apprehensions not only disrupt rational discourse, but they also provide despots with a unique point of access to many of those who subscribe to the fables of the poets”.96 The Sage writes, from out of the doctrines” of the multitude, “the greatest confusion overtakes our minds”.97 When this transpires, “everything becomes full of foolishness and of confusion”.98 One wrestles confusion over the unknown and struggles against friends, needlessly fomenting suspicion and distrust against neighbors — “politics is the worse foe of friendship”.99

Of those things that wisdom prepares for a full life of blessedness, by far the most important is the possession of friendship.”100 The confusion introduced by conspiratorial myths aggravates social discord. To avoid becoming an agent of ignorance, one must “not allow empty speech to disturb”, but should “look to the realities.101 Assuredly, the superstitions of the common people do not disturb one who is persuaded” against both “the myths of the gods102 and the death, confident that, beyond the blessing of memory, a person suffer “no existence after death”.103This dually applies to conspiratorial thinking in a modern age, those reductive, mythic hypotheses based upon clueless conjecture. As the Sage writes to a student, above all104

devote yourself to a consideration of the beginnings, and of infinity, and of the related things, further still, we reflect on account of the criteria [of sensation and anticipation] and of feelings, and not those [myths,] for above all, these [considerations must] be contemplated calmly on account of looking into the causes responsible for creation.

HERE COMES THE SUN

Epíkouros observed that one must “remove from oneself, to the extent that it is possible […] the fear of things that are not to be feared105 to receive happiness. One must “step over much of the myth”,106 and “not allow empty speech” about speculations and conspiracies “to disturb” them. One must “look to realities”,107 like observing that death is “unconsciousness108 or “anesthetization”, and that superstitious beliefs are based upon “false assumptions”.109 These realizations “will banish anything irrational110 as when one apprehends supernatural terrors from “the myths”,111 or supposes mortal things to survive mortality, or anticipates pain to exist during an anesthetized state, or fears the “real” existence “bodilessbodies,112which supersede Nature. Lucretius describes the first principle needed to overcome mythic deceit:113

This terror then and darkness of mind must be dispelled
not by the rays of the sun and glittering shafts of day,
but by the aspect and the law of nature;
the warp of whose design we shall begin with this first principle,
nothing is ever gotten out of nothing by divine power.114

Epíkouros teachers that there can be “no receiving the pure pleasures” of life without “a study of nature”. One must commit to dissolving the fear over the most important matters” if one is to overcome the paranoid imaginings “about the myths115 that enshroud the modern world.

 

SIDE TWO: LOSING MY RELIGION

While mythic complexes have provided answers to fears about death, dying, and despair, they have also spread irrational panic. Indeed, greatly has religion been able to persuade [all kinds] of evils.”116 Twenty centuries before Voltaire urged contemporaries to reject “absurdities” lest they lead to “atrocities”,117philosophers from the Epicurean school observed that vain beliefs118 about “the nature of reality119 challenge our ability to make practical decisions and pursue pleasure. “As it happens”, people commonly “neither perceive their own errors nor discern what is advantageous120 and thus,many great evils, concerning many matters occur as result of the worthless assumptions” can be “avoided as a result of the right concepts”. 121

More often, on the contrary, it is Religion122 breeds
Wickedness and that has given rise to wrongful deeds,
As when the leaders of the Greeks, those peerless peers, defiled
The Virgin’s altar with the blood of Agamemnon’s child123

 

PEOPLE ARE STRANGE

People “place themselves in such a situation so as not to take advice from anybody about anything at all” as concerns rational inquiry. Yet ironically, many maintain a “belief that nothing depends on man, but everything is controlled by the god. Then, at any rate they fall into the evils which the lack of forethought tends to inflict“.124 For example, “in times of distress” superstitious minds “turn their thoughts to religion much more earnestly,125 abandoning practical solutions. Then, “because of their apprehension to do nothing against the will of the gods, they fail to act,126 and “sometimes they cast their own cities into evils as well“. Lucretius laments: 

This was what was deplorable and above all
eminently heart-rending: when a person saw themself
enmeshed by the disease, as though they were doomed to death,
losing all spirit they would lie with sorrow-stricken heart,
and with their thoughts turned on death would surrender their life then and there
.127

Epíkouros teaches that “to become truly and unshakably whole”,128one must not pretend to philosophize, but really philosophize”, not pretend to study nature, but really study nature, “for we do not pretend to need health, but in truth [need] health”.129 To pursue “perfect happiness”,130 one must dissect the “false assumptions of the masses about the deities”, death, and desire.131

 

BORN UNDER A BAD SIGN

Epíkouros contends, frankly, that “divination is not real” and “regard[s] the predictions [as] nothing to us”.132 He affirms “that romance is not sent by god133 and rejects “the contrivances of the deplorable astrologers134 as well as the “the vain” and “empty” practice of “astrology”.135 Divinatory practices like astromancy,136 more commonly referred to as “astrology137 eliminate moral agency in human beings, posed as mere puppets of stellar mechanics. Yet a person’s future does not depend on “whether one was born in the Ram or the Twins, or in both the Fishes.”138

To enjoy the good life, a person cannot “become a slave of physical inevitability”, bereft of “the expectation of dignity” that comes with living beautifully. In a world without choice, neither would we be accountable for our injustices, nor responsible for our restraint. Epíkouros writes that “the one who says that everything happens by necessity cannot then bring a charge against the one who says that not everything happens by necessity; for the former affirms the latter happens by necessity.”139 On the other hand, divination requires humans to be puppets of fate.

Even if” an allegedly “divine” prediction turned out to be “real”, a wise person would continue to “regard the predictions [as] nothing to us”.140 “Wisdom does not at all deal by chance”.141 One does not become more proficient at playing the lottery, even if one happens to win the lottery.Consider it is better to calculate well being unlucky than to have irrationally good luck”.142 Otherwise, no learning occurs, no knowledge is gained, and no wisdom is advanced.

Prophecy is unreliable and inconsistent, yet it wields great power to confound those who observe it — hypnotism works, but only on those who believe. Many beliefs exacerbate “fears, largely” because they fail to address the source of their anxiety, aggrandizing “the remaining143 apprehensions. These include “fears about both aerial phenomena144 and unknown “things of the sky”, as with some ufologists, “and beneath the earth and generally in the Infinite”.145

DREAM ON

Writing about the visions we apprehend “in sleep”, Epíkouros concludes that “neither is the divine nature received nor [is] prophetic power” obtained, “but really”, dreams “are generated from an inundation of images.”146Moreover,” the Sage rejects augury and omens: “the signs are generated” as a result of pure “coincidence”; they “are not at all being delivered” by some supernatural force. “[N]o such divine nature commands” these intelligible events.147

RAMBLE ON

Even “more absurd”, concurs the critic Cicero, “are the fables of the poets”.148 Like prophets, they credit transcendental forces for having designed the products of their own, creative labor. “To these idle and ridiculous flights of the poets we may add the prodigious stories invented by the Magi,149 and by the Egyptians” who also entertained dreamy practices like oneiromancy150 along “with the extravagant notions of the multitude”.151 Some, like “the Stoics”, teases Philódēmos, “invent […] peculiar and impossible arguments” based upon their preferred allegories, having “seize[d] upon the mythical inventions of others”.152 In this case, students of the Stoa153 are accused of appropriating the “fables of poets” (like Hómēros and Hēsíodos).154 Later, their Roman descendants inflated the myth of Hēraklḗs (known to them as Hercules), and represented this fictional figure as a divine icon of their program.155

Although “the wise will rightly hold dialogue about” the nuances of “both music and poetry” among themselves, Epíkouros affirms that “they would not expend energy writing about poems”,156 publicly defending one interpretation over another. All such fictions are the products of human creativity. The fictions themselves are derivative of events that otherwise could be studied directly. Philódēmos writes, “I pass over orators and poets and all that kind of trash157 in favor of a study of nature. Lucretius advances brutal criticism against religious superstition:

Let us agree that he can call the earth
Mother of the Gods, on this condition
That he refuses to pollute his mind
With the foul poison of religion.158

As Philódēmos describes, generations (enchanted by the tales of “self-important theologians and poets159 about transcendental “tyrants” with “terrifying” power) came to adopt false histories, thereby injecting a series of distressing expectations into their worldview. Humans gain little benefit in believing that Eve committed the first sin by chewing fruit, or that Pandora unleashed evil by uncorking a jar, or that Zeus sent a deluge to kill the peers of Deucalion, or that the LORD conjured a storm to flood the contemporaries of Noah … or any number of other stories that mislead people toexpect great misfortunes” from the future. Were we to rely upon the “false assumptions of the masses“,160 that include myth into their worldview, it “would accomplish nothing161 but aggravate disturbance. We cannot treat insanity with allegory.

GREAT GIG IN THE SKY

As fears” flourish in the absence of real knowledge about real “phenomena162, Epíkouros distinguishes the “suspicions about death163 as “the most [seemingly] horrible”, since we know, with certainty, that life will end. Treating fear of death with myth fails to address the reality of grief. As one mistakes a placebo for ointment, so the proverbial rash worsens. In failing to face this “perpetual terror”, a superstitious mind suffers, “always expecting some164 fear of loss.

Epíkouros observes that the multitude suffers” and “grieves” predictable inevitabilities as a result of mythic misunderstandings, “which is” as he writes, “the worst evil”.165 The time over which the pain of loss is processed can be drastically lessened by accepting that death is a natural end, and, to those who are dead, death is literally nothing. If a person is to procure “the complete life”, they must “step over” that which is “a myth166 and dissolve their “fears about both […] death167 and the burden of “grief”.168 Otherwise, anguish “screws them out of the best life.”169

SIDE THREE: DUST IN THE WIND

The Epicureans of the Hellenistic world observed that “all people, including those with [a] good […] physique […] became skeletons in a short period of time, and in the end are dissolved into their elementary particles”.170 The stories of “all those who have been and those who will come to be in the world” will be lost “when it has been destroyed” and “no one will be remembered”.171 As each cosmos has “been generated out of the countless” particles, “in turn, each is to be dissolved”,172 including “both animals, and plants, and all the rest being observed”.173 Thus, of all afflictions that plague the peace of the soul, those fears related to death and dying are the most pervasive.

Not even those who are “worshipped and well-liked”, who seem to have “procured safety”, those “pronounced popular174, who command “power”,175 boasting a “brilliant reputation and great wealth176 can secure themselves against death, “since fortune, ruler of all people, is capable of taking [everything] away”.177 Indeed, “we all reside in an unfortified city in relation to death”.178 Practically, “there was no point procuring protection if a person” succumbs to “suspicion of those things from the sky and beneath the earth and generally in the Infinite.”179

YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT

Angst is nothing new. Anguish is ancient—so, too are the principal sources of anxiety, “always intruding180 upon “the pleasures of the mind”.181 Turmoil itself is a feature of mortality. For most of human history, nearly half of all children died before their 10th birthday. To this day, disease holds the highest kill count in history. No political plot has ever been as deadly as tuberculosis. Modernity has only innovated upon anxiety; she did not invent it. The origins of dread precede the disasters of the contemporary era by an epoch — torment itself is prehistoric.

Human populations crashed during the paleolithic period after a series of unstoppable catastrophes and instances of environmental collapse. Until the contemporary period, tooth decay has been a leading cause of mortality. During the Peloponnesian War of the 5th-century BCE, an epidemic decimated over 25% of the Athenian population, including the prominent statesman Pericles. During the reign of Marcus Aurelius, the Antonine Plague killed millions, including the emperor’s adoptive brother (and co-ruler) Lucius Aurelius Verus. During the early medieval period, the Plague of Justinian (that lasted for two centuries), claimed the lives of tens of millions, both affluent and impoverished, famous and anonymous. The classical Maya civilization collapsed during an extended period of drought that instigated an agricultural crisis. Centuries after, the Black Death killed half of Eurasia. In the modern era, HIV/AIDS has claimed at least as many lives as the Black Death. Related, venereal disease has afflicted human relations and complicated human happiness for millennia; despite numerous advancements, over 1 million people contract curable STIs every day;182 in the span of one year, over 350,000 women die from cervical cancer.183 This brief paragraph only hints at the devastation that micro-organisms wreck upon the human body. These “enduring illnesses184 act as agents of death, and are among the greatest antagonists to human history, chief sources of historic anxiety

 

ALL THINGS MUST PASS

Managing fear of death is a key to happiness. “Remember”, urges the Epicurean philosopher Mētródōros, “that everything by nature is subject to death”,185 and while “it might be possible to furnish security against misfortune”, when it comes to death, “every human lives in a city without walls”.186 Truly, “every person, even if they should be stronger than the Giants, is transient in relation to life and death187 since “indiscriminately, we have all been infused with the fatal drug from birth”.188 Thus, “the most significant disturbance [to arise] within the souls [of] human beings is generated by […] perpetual terror”,189 by fearing the loss of friends, the pain of dying, and the state of being dead. This terror arrises “because of” their “being frightened of death”, and as a result, they are “unable to bear” the “burden of misfortune”.190 Death “truly” is the ultimate form of “necessity beyond human control”, thus a constant source of concern.191

 

DON’T STOP ME NOW

Yet while “necessity is evil […] there is no necessity to live with necessity”.192 For “necessity is not accountable, and [we] perceive luck [as] unreliable”.193 Becoming a “slave to physical inevitability” removes any “expectation of dignity”,194 forever “waiting for Godot”.195 Epíkouros affirms that “rarely is a sage disrupted by chance, but the greatest and most important matters are directed by reason throughout their lifetime.”196Luck is unreliable”—at most, “if one receives a paradoxical piece of good luck,” one might be “grateful to circumstances” and count their blessings.197 Otherwise, it would seem that “the whole of life is but a struggle in darkness”.198

 

EVERYBODY HURTS

The 2,100-year-old writings of the Philódēmos catalogue timeless suspicions about death that have historically darkened the mind—people naturally fear “the pains that come from loss199 and “the deprivation of good things200just as they principally threaten our pursuit of pleasure. In the context of being “gripped by illness”,201 like “those with heart disease202 who may become “unconscious in torpor and faintness”, some fear that they may “never again recover”,203 discouraged by “the whole decay from the peaks to old age”.204 Many obsessively dread an “untimely death”,205 condemned “to die young” before they advance their talents,206 enabling “enemies [to] rejoice over them”,207not leaving behind” a legacy208. Others are “distressed at not having left behind children209 so that “the fruits of [their] labors will” be devalued by “unworthy” and “wicked” people.210 Many fear that “parents or children or a spouse […] will be in dire straits on account of their death”.211 Some fear “dying abroad212, while others fear dying alone “on one’s bed […] rather than doing some doughty deed for even future generations to learn about.213 Conversely, others dread getting “killed like cattle in the lines of battle214 or dying “while fighting an enemy215 or fear “death at sea”,216 or “violently as a result of condemnation by a court or ruler”.217 Some “experience suffering at the prospect of not being remembered by anyone”,218 while others are “pained because [they are] going to be reviled”.219 Ineffectually, the masses are [either] fleeing death, sometimes as the greatest evil,” or else, they vainly imagine themselves to “prefer the repose in [Death] to living”.220

 

DON’T FEAR THE REAPER

Epíkouros reassures students that the state ofdeath in no way exists”, since “what has dissolved lacks perception; and that which lacks perception in no way exists for us”.221 Remembering this, students can avoid emotional paralysis when struck by mortality, neither fearing their own cessation, nor fearing the expiration of their loved ones. The Epicurean school denies any possibility that one could experience torment after death, since death is a state of “unconsciousness and non-existence”.222 For indeed, “to the [dead, death is nothing]”.223

This minimizes the misery of dying, reassuring us that “the peak of pain” exists for the absolute “briefest time224necessarily, the most excruciating, physical pains, those that are so severe that they lead to immediate death, are the most brief. By comparison, the rest of the pains, which are not so severe as to result in immanent death, are, by definition, survivable.

Even the superior torment “of the mind225 and “sorrow that weighs upon” the soul “on account of death226 can be slowly relieved with patience, introspection, and reflection. Epíkouros recommends that “we sympathize with the beloved [deceased] not by lamenting, but by reflecting”.227 Survivors find peace through the value of memory, and the therapeutic gratitude that contextualizes the “undying228 good of friendship. “Sweet [is] the memory of a friend who has died,”229 since pleasant remembrance “for those who died before their time had come230 eases the grief of loss.

WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM MY FRIENDS

The devastating pain of grief is significantly relieved by the blessing of friendship. Epíkouros exhorts us all to “be prepared” for death by bringing “together a fellowship of friends231 to support one another through the pain of loss, especially guaranteed losses, those of our mentors, parents, spouses, and every furry friend whom a person has every loved. In forming mutual bonds “with other people”, survivors “live pleasantly among one another keep[ing] steadfast faith”, thereby “engender[ing] the fullest intimacy”,232 sharing love during times of despair, so as to never suffer loss alone.

IN MY LIFE

One manages grief by honoring the memories of the deceased. By practicing gratitude, one reminds oneself of the powerful gift of love that is left after the loss of a loved one. “One must not spoil the present by yearning for the absent; but consider that also these [present] things were once of the [things for which] we wish.”233 Fittingly, it is love, from the memory of ones’ deceased friends that helps one endure sudden loss. Great loss can only come from the loss of a great love, yet no loss can lessen the greatness of the love that outlasts death.

Philódēmos offers consolation to those suffering sudden, unexpected loss, as when a parent loses a child, or a spouse loses their partner, seemingly “falling somewhat short of the best life”.234 Philódēmos asks survivors: “consider it irrational and incredible not if someone dies but if [one] endures for a certain length of time”, for “enduring all the way to old age really [is] a most prodigious thing”.235 Historically, most human lives have ended relatively shortly. Yet no life, no matter how short, need be wasted, nor lived ignobly, nor suffered without dignity. Nature enables living beings to “profit by one day as by eternity”,236 for “unlimited time contains pleasure” that is no less valuable “than that which is limited”.237 Nature’s goal is pleasure, not immortality. As Tolkien wrote, “’All we have to decide is what to do with the time that is given us’”.238

IMAGINE

As regards apprehensions about one’s own death, the Sage provides assurance that the experience of “death in no way exists for us”, given that “what has dissolved lacks perception; and that which lacks perception in no way exists for us”.239 The pain that is so severe that it leads to death is proportionally brief. After the loss of feeling, there can be no feeling of pain—nor can there be pleasure, nor bliss, nor relief; thus, there can be no incentive for suicide.Undoubtedly trivial are the greatest number of motives one might advance toward an exportation from life”.240

Meditating upon the real knowledge that Death is nothing to us creates [for] a mortal an enjoyable life, not [by] adding endless time, but [by] having been dispossessed of the yearning for immortality”.241 Philódēmos explains that in “avoiding a careless death, a person

is industrious because of the consequent doctrine based on the concept of the preservation of one’s goods. And since he does not cut short the long extent of his life, he always begins new activities and friendly attachments. And he attends to his own property as to how to administer it. Also, he reflects on former events in the belief that they may concern him in the future. And he treats with much care as many people as he can, and he is thankful to those who treated him kindly, in particular because he hopes that he will share in some goods with them or that he will receive some benefit by these same people again in the future242

Accepting the finality of mortality highlights the importance of preparing for the inevitable — for example, one can engage the practice of composing a living will (as did Epíkouros) to safeguard the continued happiness of those who survive the deceased, hoping to deter those who would harm them. It ispossible to take precautions243 against a number of potential misfortunes, such as preventing “a lot of indolence regarding financial matters” when it comes to succession and inheritance.244 In his will, Epíkouros ensured that his best friend, Hérmarkhos, a non-Athenian, would logistically inherit the Garden, circumventing typical stipulations by Athenian law. The Hēgemṓn also provisioned a clause to provide students with permanent access to the Garden. He emancipated his servants, and allocated resources for his friends’ children’s education (whose completion he would not have the pleasure of witnessing).

Before he died, the 2nd-century Epicurean Diogénēs of Oìnóanda commissioned a monument to the teachings of Epíkouros. Builders erected an 8-foot-tall, 260-foot wide stone stoa, surrounded by a portico, adorned with statues, etched with Epicurean teachings. It contained a survey of the wisdom of Epíkouros (as summarized by Diogénēs), as well as several Key Doctrines by the Hēgemṓn. Reflecting upon his own, impending death, the elderly Diogénēs writes,

Having already reached the sunset of my life (being almost on the verge of departure from the world on account of old age), I wanted, before being overtaken by death, to compose a [fine] anthem [to celebrate the] fullness [of pleasure] and so to help now those who are well-constituted. […] besides, love of humanity prompts us to aid also the foreigners who come here. Now, since the remedies of the inscription reach a larger number of people, I wished to use this stoa to advertise publicly the [medicines] that bring salvation. These medicines we have put [fully] to the test; for we have dispelled the fears [that grip] us without justification, and, as for pains, those that are groundless we have completely excised, while those that are natural we have reduced to an absolute minimum, making their magnitude minute.245

IN MY TIME OF DYING

When it comes to inevitable “sickness”, a wise person can address their fears of infirmity by planning to prevent becoming “irascible and hard to please and ill-tempered246 when deprived of sense faculties. Such a person “takes the greatest care of [their] health. And feeling confidence against illness and death, [they] endure with strength the therapies that can remove them.”247 By the Hellenistic period, ancient Epicureans had published a variety of scrolls on pain management and psychological health, including the scroll Theories about Disease248. Philódēmos explains that one should cultivate a robust “state of health249 and “be prepared […] from coexisting with other people”—yet when this is no longer possible, Philódēmos recommends that “the right management […] lies in this: in not feeling distressed about what one loses”.250

As the end of life approaches, so writes Philódēmos, one can choose to face death without fear, regret, and worry. The resilience of the intellect allows us to manage peak anxiety through the rejoicing of “the mind upon reliving the memory” of past pleasures. Even at the end of life, when faced with annihilation, “persons of sound mind” can recall their having “enjoyed everything” as “unconsciousness is taking hold of them”, allowing them to “expire […]undauntedly”,251 as “the old one anchors safely in the harbor that is retirement”, after “those good things that were once hoped for were captured” in memory “for safe charity”.252Even on “the day that is the last of life” despite pains “not abating in extremity of their greatness”,253 memories can bless the mind.

For those who pass due to diseases that afflict the mind, even then, bereft of memory, “we will try to make the end more excellent [than] the beginning; we should be taking the path into dawn; yet whenever we go so far as the end, [we should] enjoy ourselves equally.”254 In absence of this peace, confusion exacerbates the pain of dying and the fear of death. The promises of persuasive personalities, who reassure the intellect that we can escape death insults the human soul.

Diogénēs of Oìnóanda adds “as I have said before, the majority of people suffer from a common disease, as in a plague, with their false notions about things, and their number is increasing”.255

SIDE FOUR: THE GRAND ILLUSION

Charlatans thrive in a climate of fear.

Chiefly, swindlers target those vulnerable to mythic persuasion. As “false prophets256 spread myths in the ancient agora, so too do manicured politicians sell sound bites through modern speakers. Grifters, con-artists, and other malignant narcissists have prized and preferred to provoke gullible souls with superstition. They address the “public in the traditional patter of magicians257 as ridiculed by the ancient Epicurean author Loukianós. In an era characterized by disinformation and propaganda, cultivating tools against fraud is critical to living a good life.

 

BLINDED BY THE LIGHT

The FIRST science fiction writer, Loukianós of Samósata lambasted one such fraud who readily discerned that human life is swayed by two great tyrants, hope and fear, and that a man who could use both of these to advantage would speedily enrich himself”.258 The satirist documents an early instance of book-burning, instigated by a petulant zealot who took offense to theEstablished Beliefs” of Epíkouros. As Loukianós writes, the false prophet “greatly feared Epicurus […] seeing in him an opponent and critic of his trickery.”259 They continue:

he brought [the book] into the middle of the market-place, burned it on […] fig-wood just as if he were burning the man in person, and threw the ashes into the sea […] But the scoundrel had no idea what blessings that book creates for its readers and what peace, tranquillity, and freedom it engenders in them, liberating them as it does from terrors and apparitions and portents, from vain hopes and extravagant cravings, developing in them intelligence and truth, and truly purifying their understanding, not with torches and squills and that sort of foolery, but with straight thinking, truthfulness and frankness.260

Loukianós describes in high resolution an instance of trickery wrought by Alexander the False Prophet. In terms of the specific “ruse” the swindler employed, the Epicurean explains:

he contrived an ingenious ruse. Going at night to the foundations of the temple […] where a pool of water had gathered […] he secreted there a goose-egg, previously blown, which contained a snake just born; and after burying it deep in the mud, he went back again. In the morning he ran out into the market-place naked […] he congratulated the city because it was at once to receive the god in visible presence. The assembly […] had come running […] he ran at full speed to the future temple […] he asked for a libation-saucer, and when somebody handed him one, deftly slipped it underneath and brought up […] that egg in which he had immured the god […]. Taking it in his hands, he asserted that at that moment he held Asclepius! They gazed unwaveringly […] when he broke it and received the tiny snake into his hollowed hand, and the crowd saw it moving and twisting about his fingers, they at once raised a shout, welcomed the god, congratulated their city, and began each of them to sate himself greedily with prayers, craving treasures, riches, health, and every other blessing from, him. […] the whole population followed, all full of religious fervour and crazed with expectations.261

Ranking magical thinking among the greatest of evils (and sparing few words for those who perpetuate superstition), the satirist ridicules the “drivelling idiots262 and “thick-witted, uneducated fellows” who became willfully “deluded” by the charlatan’s “ruse”. The false prophet appealed to common expectations and misunderstandings. In doing so, the liar won the crowd.

Loukianós concludes that “the trick stood in need of […] Epicurus himself or Metrodorus, or someone else with a mind as firm as adamant toward such matters, so as to disbelieve and guess the truth”.263 Here again, an intellectual foundation, grounded in the reality of nature is needed to help guard against mythic deceit. By contrast, supernatural religions and mystical cults feed into the practice of myth and manipulation, doing little to relieve fear, and much to increase it.

MAD WORLD

The μῦθοι (mýthoi) or “myths” of the ancient world provided “plaguy scoundrel[s]”, “swindler[s]”,264 and “consummate rascals” (“greatly daring, fully prepared for mischief”,265practising quackery and sorcery”)266 with devious tools to exploit the superstitious sensibilities of those whom Loukianós‘ disparagingly referred to as “‘fat-heads’ and simpletons”.267 This was done to “line [the charlatan’s] purses fairly well at [the] expense268 of genuinely pious, yet tragically misguided believers. Lucretius orchestrates a mythic example — King Agamémnōn sacrifices his daughter Iphigéneia, to ensure that Ártemis would ordain their campaign:

More often, on the contrary, it is Religion269 breeds
Wickedness and that has given rise to wrongful deeds,
As when the leaders of the Greeks, those peerless peers, defiled
The Virgin’s altar with the blood of Agamemnon’s child270

History preserves an extensive list of violations and abuses by allegedly spiritual institutions. Whether sacrificing children (or marrying them), or dominating women, brutalizing neighbors, inciting mass slaughter, enslaving captives, persecuting foreigners, popularizing martyrdom, hosting crusades, organizing inquisitions, burning thinkers, drowning healers, hanging doctors, spinning lies, bombing medics, incinerating protestors …. Reality demonstrates how the agents of religious violence excuse themselves from observing “the nature of what is just”.271

This ancient, historical scheme developed over time. After millennia, myths that were once only shared around campfires were formalized by powers into social institutions. Many of those institutions facilitated the transfer of wealth from disadvantaged citizens to insulated priests. Many engaged in political manipulation by deceiving those politicians who based their process of decision-making on ecstatic visions, and not the study of nature. Many engaged in the abuse of the young, female “oracles” who had been trafficked to the temples. Many others, still, exploited their knowledge of natural events to manipulate their followers and gain influence.

In addition to exploiting with magical thinking, many institutions of religion have intertwined themselves with politics and government, growing empires, spreading propaganda, expanding colonies, stealing territory, justifying genocide, perpetuating slavery, pardoning rape, editing histories, robbing treasuries, defrauding economies, deceiving leaders, enchanting legislators —supernatural institutions and political states are two peas in a pod of power and deception.

Personalities like Charles Manson, Jim Jones, David Koresh, and Marshall Applewhite are not unique to the this era. Joseph Goebbels only innovated upon propaganda, he did not invent it. Leopold II was a mere rookie compared to the seasoned violence of Genghis Khan.

So it seems, people have … always been like this.

GASLIGHTING

The subterranean Ploutonia billowed with the deadly pneuma (or “breath”) of Kérberos, the three-headed, canine guardian of the underworld. The temples were named for their host, Ploútōn (better known as idēs) who ruled the ploútos, the great “wealth” from the substances that rest beneath the Earth’s surface. For mindless beasts and uninitiated supplicants, the mythic fumes of the temples were deadly—only clergy, due to their righteous piety and closeness to divinity had been graced with supernatural protection, inoculating the lethality of the dogs’ fumes.

Topographically, those sanctuaries were constructed above fault lines; their chambers trapped and flatulated volcanic gases. After centuries of habitation, some residents noticed—some vents triggered intoxication; some, convulsions; some, death. Some residents found ways to exploit their neighbors’ ignorance of this natural phenomenon. Strábōn elaborates on the specifics:

…the Plutonium, below a small brow of the mountainous country that lies above it, is an opening of only moderate size, large enough to admit a man, but it reaches a considerable depth, and it is enclosed by a quadrilateral handrail, about half a plethrum in circumference, and this space is full of a vapour so misty and dense that one can scarcely see the ground. Now to those who approach the handrail anywhere round the enclosure the air is harmless, since the outside is free from that vapor in calm weather, for the vapor then stays inside the enclosure, but any animal that passes inside meets instant death. At any rate, bulls that are led into it fall and are dragged out dead; and I threw in sparrows and they immediately breathed their last and fell. But the Galli, who are eunuchs, pass inside with such impunity that they even approach the opening, bend over it, and descend into it to a certain depth.272

To Strábōn, the ruse was obvious: the eunuch priests “hold their breath as much as they can”  so as to mechanically avoid ingesting toxic fumes until they have risen above them.273 The priests understood that some, lethal vapor must pool at the bottom of the cavern. Pliny the Elder records that “there is a place which kills all those who enter it. And the same takes place at Hierapolis in Asia, where no one can enter with safety, except the priest of the great Mother of the Gods.”275 In the center of this invisible, vaporous pool stood a raised landform from which a cleric spoke. Supplicants would encircle the stage like a captive audience. The theatre would proceed: a bull would be lead before the congregation into the breath of Kérberos. The terrific power of the underworld would then kill the unobservant beast. The devout priest, protected from the lethal vapors  would rise to the center, thus, demonstrating their power over death.

(As a supplement to this description .. and brief tangent … note that the institution to which we refer as “religion”, and the art to which we refer to as “theatre” were once indistinguishable. A fundamental function of ancient, stage-focused, stadium-seated theatre was to facilitate religion. Similarly, modern, stage-focused, stadium-seated religion employs theatre as a tool.)

By the Hellenistic period, rational minds penetrated the clerics’ contrivance. Many reasoned that the air we breathe must be made of several kinds of vapors that do not uniformly mix. Some rise, and some fall. “In other places there are prophetic caves, where those who are intoxicated with the vapour [that] rises from them predict future event”.274 Rising vapors (like the sweet-smelling, trance-inducing ethylene gas) flooded the sanctums of the oracles and induced visions. Falling vapors (like carbon dioxide) pooled at the bottom of the “Gates of Hell” in the “Holy City” of Hierápolis. Those vapors were suffocating. In small doses, hydrocarbon gases (like ethylene) could trigger visions. In higher doses, oracles could seize and convulse. In the highest doses, die.

The ancient Greek clergy’s abuse of their neighbors’ fears and ignorance of natural phenomena reflects a pattern found throughout human history. Ancient priests misrepresented to their neighbors discernible, predictable phenomena and staged (literally) theatrical performances for the purpose of impressing the reality of their manipulative cult. This was not the first, nor the last time in history when clever figures in positions of power weaponized knowledge by exploiting the ignorance of others. Fifteen centuries later, a Genoan, sailing on behalf of the Spanish crown employed a similar ruse as did those ancient priests. This time, however, it was not the flatulence of the Earth, but rather, the dance of the sky — in this case, a lunar eclipse …

 

DARK SIDE OF THE MOON

Prior to February 29th 1504, Christopher Columbus faced an extremely precarious situation — he had been marooned for a year. All four caravels loaned to him by the Crown lay in ruin. Dozens were dead. Half the crew mutinied. To his despair (as many of his peers back home expected), Columbus’ final expedition, afforded to him with great reluctance, failed.

Only four years earlier, royal commissioner Francisco de Bobadilla delivered Columbus to the Crown in chains, having imprisoned him over tyranny and abuse of the Taíno people. Stripped of titles and authority, Columbus was afforded by King Ferdinand one, final opportunity. Yet again, far from of accomplishing his goal, Columbus was broke, stranded, and faced starvation.

As history records, the “Admiral” had brought a particular book with him: in particular, Columbus carried a recently-published copy of Alamach Perpetuus Cuius Radix est Annum by Abraham Zacuth, astronomer of the Portuguese court of King Don Manuel. “It was this very book that Columbus used to predict the eclipse of the moon which so terrified the [Taíno] in Jamaica that they became obedient to him, and furnished his party food.”276 This was the context in which Columbus extorted the indigenous people of Jamaica, who lacked appropriateknowledge about the meteoric”,277 and were susceptible to the manipulation of superstition. In this case, Columbus, aware that a lunar eclipse was immanent, convinced the Taíno people that the moon would be destroyed if the Taíno did not provide him with provisions. Columbus’ son, Ferdinand Columbus recorded the entire manipulation. He writes of …

the eclipse beginning at the rising of the moon, and augmenting as she ascended, the Indians took heed and were so frightened that with great howling and lamentation they came running from every direction to the ships, laden with provisions, praying the Admiral to intercede by all means with God on their behalf; that he might not visit his wrath upon them, promising for the future diligently to furnish all they stood in need of. To this the Admiral replied that he wished to converse somewhat with God, and retired while the eclipse lasted, they all the while crying out to him to aid them. And when the Admiral observed that the totality of the eclipse was finished and that the moon would soon shine forth, he issued from his cabin, saying that he had supplicated his God and made prayers for them, and had promised Him in their names that henceforth they would be good and use the Christians well, fetching them provisions na necessary things … From that time forward they always took care to provide what they had need278

The ruse worked. Columbus received his provisions, and survived until rescue. The Taíno population was exploited. Today, American citizens champion Columbus, having been raised on textbooks that never mention the Taíno nor the crimes of European explorers“.

Within decades of his arrival, ninety percent of the Taíno population was killed. Tens-of-thousands were murdered. An unknown many committed suicide. These deaths are partially indicative of the failure of religious institutions in correcting the abuses that occur as a direct result of exploiting knowledge and ignorance — in this instance, the Taíno were not the only targets of manipulation: the famous venture to the “New World” was not only an economic enterprise, but, notably, a religious mission, sanctioned by the Church. The religious mission benefitted from the fealty of monarchs, and encouraged the expansion of a colonial empire.

Mythic ambitions were stoked. Irrational fears were instigated. Narratives were established. Hopes were inflated. Fears were exploited. Devious personalities with selfish agendas descended upon the fearful like vultures, as also happened in Imperial Russia.

 

ABRA-ABRACADABRA

Alix, the Tsarina of the Romanov dynasty was enchanted by Rasputin upon their first meeting. “It had not been very difficult for that expert in human faces to see how much she needed him, how tormented she was by the misfortunes that had befall them”.279 At the age of six, she lost sister to diphtheria; her mother succumbed to the same disease one month later. Only three years later, her father, Grand Duke Louis IV died of a heart attack, “the greatest sorrow of her life”.280 For the rest of her days, she would be consumed with overwhelming fears of death.

(… as were easily shared by those over whom her family ruled … but that’s another essay).

She was not alone. Her husband, Tsar Nicholas II equally ached—without an heir, his family’s status was existentially threatened. Yet when their only son was finally born, their dread only increased: Alexei inherited his family’s “curse”. The “long-awaited prince was suffering from a fatal disease inherited […] haemophilia. His fragile blood vessels were unable to withstand the pressure of his blood.” Such cruel irony, Alix had suffered a decade of pregnancies that left her with significant health issues. Succession laws were brutal. She found little relief.

until she meets Rasputin. “Alix, who so wanted to believe in miracles”, “with a face tormented by sleepless nights” found comfort in a wandering monk, an alleged “miracle-worker” who had recently gained popularity among the peasantry. “Nicky” (the Tsar), desperate to provide his son with safety, suspended his disbelief in the traveller after witnessing a “miracle” — the unsuspecting monk eased his son’s suffering, a feat at which his educated doctors failed.

Indeed, seven years prior to the birth of Alexei Romanov, a chemist named Felix Hoffmann synthesized a new form of acetylsalicylic acid that revolutionized medical science. Within several years, Bayer registered this product as “aspirin”. The “wonder drug”281 was immediately implemented throughout the world to relieve pain, reduce fever, and treat disease. The product was so effective, so manageable, so safe, it was used to treat symptoms in children, children like Alexei Romanov, children suffering from chronic bleeding disorders, children being treated with blood-thinners (the very last thing a child with Alexei’s condition needed).

As a странник (strannik) or “wanderer”, Rasputin rejected treating disease with the medical science, so when the Tsar, against the recommendation of his doctors, took the advice of the wanderer and denied his son the “wonder drug”, Alexei’s condition improved. Granted, Rasputin did not understand the functional mechanism by which anticoagulants interacted with the body; what he did recognize was the measurable, psychological power that he now held over the Romanov family. They credited him with preventing the death of their son in whom they had placed all of their hopes and fears. They hoped for him to prevent the deprivation of their pleasures. When Nicholas went to the front in World War I, Alix was left in charge with Rasputin as her personal advisor (wherein he gave predictably terrible advice and abused his authority). Still, the Tsar’s daughters wore pendants with Rasputin’s picture. His presence in their bedroom was sanctioned, despite protests from a nursemaid. After all, he was a Saint.

He was also accepting bribes. He was also negotiating with sexual favors. He was also accused of numerous acts of rape. He was abusing the Russian peoples’ Christian superstitions. He was a functional catalyst for the same revolution that lead to the execution of the very family who looked to him in the first place to prevent death. Ironically, the Romanov family feared death. They feared the weight of insecurity. They gave a sinister personality access to their home, their children, and their minds. They bared their souls to a grifter who convinced them that he could prevent death. Rasputin taught that touching his body healed—indeed, this was his favorite line to use with prostitutes. In this regard, the members of the royal family were used, willingly. By comparison, many of their subjects, increasingly suspicious of authority, disenchanted with both an ineffective monarch and an oppressive church, saw through Rasputin’ mythic ruse.

(These anecdotes fail to capture the full complexity of each, nuanced history — readers are encouraged to pursue their curiosity accordingly — nevertheless, each example provides a clear depiction of the chaos that can result from inflating superstitious beliefs.)

 

PARANOID

Fear of death disrupts rational thinking and consumes the minds of the fearful. A conspirator need only appeal to their target’s fear of death, abuse their misunderstandings about nature, fabricate a false narrative (usually promising deathless rewards), and choreograph a performance that advances a hidden agenda. Examples of this relationship between fear, ignorance, and exploitation are not limited to the dusty pages of history — the modern world of industrialized warfare and mass media provides a variety of devastating examples. For the purposes of this investigation, five instances of irrational thinking and manipulation have been reviewed:

[I] Over 73,000 human beings are currently imprisoned in immigration detention centers across the sometimes-called “Land of the Free”. At least half of those individuals have no criminal records in any capacity, having never threatened the safety of their neighbors. Less than 4,000 of those 73,000 have committed violent crimes. The policy that lead to the imprisonment of well over 69,000 non-violent human beings was enthusiastically supported by over 77 million of their neighbors. This fact further exemplifies a foundational policy of a political group that now dominates every branch of government, at every level of government. The implementation of this policy, of imprisoning 69,000 (and counting) non-violent human beings was largely motivated by fear and fueled by propaganda. Millions were persuaded to believe that unknown strangers threatened them; one man promised to easily release people from this fear. In attempting to rid themselves of fear, the targets of propaganda exacerbate existing tensions. Fear lubricates the machinery of propaganda and exposes the intellect to paranoia.

[II] We find another example of fears stoked by nationalistic myths in the city of Minneapolis, where a population of Somali immigrants, who comprise a statistical minority in city’s metro area, has been demonized as a result of an authoritarian personality’s political agenda. Millions of prejudicial minds allowed this personality to exploit fear and ignorance to their own detriment. Despite the fact that Somali immigrants represent less than 3% of the metro population, millions of otherwise unconcerned Americans have been persuaded to fear them.

The same fears have been irrationally inflated against transgendered peoples (despite comprising less than 1% of a population of over 360 million human beings), and peoples of African ancestry (who have comprised less than 15% of the population for over a century). These political myths distract millions of people from reality by appealing to vain prejudices. Meanwhile, those same minds turn a blind eye to actual existential threats that contradict their mythic worldviews. 

[III] Generations of committed researchers, in nearly every scientific discipline, from nearly every country on the planet, working with decades of analysis, experimentation, and peer review, have conclusively determined that irrevocable changes to the Earth’s biosphere will lead to the displacement of 2 billion human beings and cause the deaths of hundreds of millions more. Unconditionally, these deaths will be the result of environmental mismanagement — despite this, tens of millions of Americans reject the methodical findings of decades of peer-reviewed research. How many Earthlings choose not to prepare for their own futures on their own planet? Despite this very real, very immanent threat, despite documented sea level rises throughout history, contractors continue developing coastal real estate, and the energy grid continues increasing carbon emissions. Short-sighted politicians continue abusing mythic propaganda by manipulating ignorant minds to advance personal agendas.

[IV] These criticisms against fear and ignorance apply even more fully toward the treatment of disease. Millions have been convinced that demonstrably-effective medical treatments are more threatening than deadly diseases. Until the 20th-century, nearly half of all children died before the age of ten from either disease, or conditions resulting from malnutrition. Vaccines changed everything. Indeed, most human parents throughout history have been burdened with witnessing the death of at least one of their own children. Yet, despite radical advances that have largely eliminated the primary antagonists of human history, millions refuse effective medical treatment and question the very vaccines that saved the lives of their ancestors. Recently, millions died from complications related to a pandemic in 2020, and many refused medical treatment (despite initially calling emergency services and demanding to be assigned a bed). Those people are now dead. They are unable to tell us if it was worth it.

[V] No mythic narrative has been as effective (and exploitable) in America as Christianity. Consequently, no political movement presents more of a risk than Christian Nationalism. Ideologically, millions of American Christians have been persuaded (by appeals to fear) to inflate a paranoid belief that their super-majority is being “persecuted”. This belief is maintained despite America boasting the largest Christian population in the history of the human species. Yet more American Christians than ever describe their belief system as being “threatened”. Despite their nationally-dominant, politically-encapsulating, massively-wealthy collection of institutions that boast hundreds of millions of followers across the country (and billions more globally), many in America believe the existence of their tradition is threatened. As a result, millions of fearful minds have thrown their support behind charlatans who care more for profit than piety.

Since ignorance and fear create vulnerabilities for deceitful swindlers, conspiratorial thinking has been exploited by tyrants throughout history to gain the favor of violent mobs and fuel political violence — so, today, does the “Department of War” invoke the mythic language of the Christian apocalypse to empower young Christians to support a “Holy War” against Islamic countries in Asia Minor. Many people without violent records (such as children in uniforms) can be convinced to commit acts of violence as a result of religious myths. When political figures require acts of violence to be committed, they profit by stoking superstitious flames. So long as a population glorifies supernatural belief, they render society susceptible to mythic manipulation. These prejudicial myths not only harm others; they also consternate the intellects of the deluded; a fearful mind disrupts the ability of the intellect to cultivate future security. Vanity allows the intellect to inflate meaningless fears (that Christianity will no longer be the dominant religion in America) while ignoring genuine, existential threats (like agricultural collapse).

When civic decisions are not grounded a shared, natural reality, the vain beliefs of others, informed by delusions, threatens the safety of their neighbors, and the preservation of their own union for the future. “The study-of-nature does not incline one to boast nor [be] contriving of speech nor against the education highly prized by the masses, but both fearless and independent according to one’s own good, [and] not to think highly over the affairs of the [masses].”282

 

I CAN SEE CLEARLY NOW

In an era characterized by propaganda and misinformation, the Epicurean method of investigation arms students with powerful tools against these threats. One’s “considerations” must be based “in a [world] of facts, versus those on a mere rumor”.283 Armed with her unadulterated rejection of magical thinking, the Epicurean school provides stormy souls with an alternative to the lazy skepticism of the contemporary era that is as unhelpful in dispelling ignorance as is the cheap metaphysics sold in bookstores (those metaphysics that have failed to prevent even a single child’s death). Epíkouros provides a method to navigate these confusions, for, “a sufficient method produces [helpful] thoughts about the nature of reality284 and requires nothing more than the devoted study of nature. The Sage grounds true statements with verifiable observations. In the absence of material verification (or falsification), groundless conjectures are easily commandeered to construct fear-based alternatives.

Fundamentally, all “conjectural things are contingent upon sensible” stimuli. Any “opinion” regarding nature can be “either true or false”. Yet in order “to be true, [it] must corroborate or not-contradict; but if not-corroborating or contradicting, [it] happens to be false. Hence, this has introduced285 the need to practice waiting for confirmation, instead of inventing a pseudodoxy”. Compared against a true belief, a pseudodoxyhas gone astray from the” natural reality “being experienced that perpetually exists”.286 In the case of what remains “to be confirmed or to be contradicted, either it will be confirmed” or contradicted.

Often, “some other [persuasive] motion in us”,287 such as the fear of death, “operates for another purpose” besides the “goal of natural pleasure”.288 On these occasions, conspiracies, myths, and superstitions thrive. Self-reflection gets “combined” with some another “creative application289 of the mind, and imbues those who speculate with the confidence to pass “judgment even if [they] were not [capable of] confirming or contradicting” with evidence. Thus “a pseudodoxy is generated.” 290 These “pseudodoxies” are generated by those who fail to acknowledge the reality of their own sensations. “If you contest every single one of the sense perceptions, you can neither judge the outward appearance nor can you affirm which of the sensations you, yourself say are deceptive according to the way in which the criterion operates.”291

 

WON’T GET FOOLED AGAIN

Mythic hopes and conspiratorial apprehensions deeply afflict the mind’s ability to reason. Our 50,000-year-old brain-systems are no less immune to mythic deceit than the 48,000-year-old brain-systems of the ancient Greeks. While many modern persons might dismiss ancient peoples’ apprehensions of volcanoes and lightning, many ancient people would dismiss some modern persons’ insistence that the Earth is flat, a widely-accepted notion by the 2nd-century BCE. Consider that the masses of both antiquity and modernity struggle to appreciate the behavior of CO₂ then the superstitious masses misunderstood CO₂ as the divine breathe of Kérberos; now the masses underestimate the impact of CO₂ on strengthening the observable greenhouse effect. Many more overlook the impacts of pollution, deforestation, and general environmental mismanagement. Tragically, many millions of people, blessed with the health, safety, education, and stability of an advanced economy, nevertheless exacerbate irrational apprehensions toward life-saving vaccines despite being truly blessed by the benefits of modern medicine, far, far too many fail to appreciate the blessing of science. Far too many have been programmed by myth, misunderstanding that material science spares most people from (what is otherwise a nearly universal human experience) suffering the deaths of children; in fact, as history records, nearly half of them. If one has been spared this tragedy, one might thank science.

When decisions that affect others are grounded in a matrix of mythic fears (and not our shared, natural reality) then the vain actions of others, informed by delusions, both threatens the safety of our neighbors and the preservation of their own union for the future. As he writes, “the study-of-nature does not incline one to boast nor [be] contriving of speech nor against the education highly prized by the masses, but both fearless and independent according to one’s own good, [and] not to think highly over the affairs of the [masses].” The tools we have developed to respond to all manner of diseases reinforces the confidence we can have in the Epicurean method. Epíkouros encourages students to choose practically, love peacefully, behave justly, and live fearlessly. This is best achieved by studying nature and cultivating friendship.

When it comes to our own futures, Epicurean history provides brave examples like Mētródōros, undaunted against both disturbances and death”,292 virtuous and awesome”.293 To achieve the goal of nature, the Sage of the Garden asks us to “study these and those things, for yourself, day and night, as with those like yourself, and at no time, neither awake nor in a dream will you be confounded, for no living person surrounded by immortal Good seems like a mortal creature.294 As has been spoken more eloquently elsewhere, “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself.” Here again, “when you believe in things that you don’t understand, then you suffer.”

Superstition ain’t the way.

 


 

1 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.116

2 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 20 (10.145)

3 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 38 (10.153)

4 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 37 (10.152)

5 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 14

6 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.129

7 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 12 (10.143) | Vatican Saying 49

8 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.104

9 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.31; translated by N. H. Bartman

10 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.96

11 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.87

12 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1.63, translated by M. F. Smith (1969)

13 Ibid., 1.78-79, translated by Rolfe Humphries (1968)

14 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.87

15 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.129

16 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.132

17 The fragment  catalogued by Usener as #457 corresponds with a citation from Porphyry (Letter to Marcella 31) and Seneca (Letters to Lucilius 8.7), who writes “PHILOSOPHIAE SERVIAS OPORTET, VT TIBI CONTINGAT VERA LIBERTAS”.

18 Epíkouros, Key Doctrines 29-30 (10.151)

19 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.122

20 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 12 (10.143) | Vatican Saying 49

21 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.85

22 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.124

24 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 22 (10.146)

25 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.137; translated by N. H. Bartman

26 Ibid.,10.34

27 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.129

28 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 20 (10.145)

29 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 25 (10.148)

30 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.128

31 ΤΑΓΑΘΟΝ | τἀγαθὸν (tágathòn) or “The Good” as ἡδονή (hēdonḗ, “pleasure”), the τέλος (télos,) or “goal” of life.

32 Epíkouros, On the Ethical End as cited by Diogénēs Laértios (Lives 10.6)

33 Epíkouros differs from the Kyrēnaíc hedonists, who questioned the benefit of equilibrium.

34 Metródōros’ Epistle to Timokrátēs (Usener fragment 409) is echoed by Athḗnaios (Deipnosophists 7.280A, 12.546F), Cicero (Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso 17.66), and Ploútarkhos (Against Kolṓtēs 2.1108C, 30.1125A).

35 i.e. sexual intercourse, the act of Aphrodite, from which we inherit the word “aphrodisiac”.

36 Philódēmos, Epigram 15, translated by W. R. Paton (1916-18)

38 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 61

39 Epíkouros, “Words on the Wise” 10.120

40 Philódēmos, On Property Management 22.44, translated by Voula Tsouna (2012)

41 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 17 (10.144)

42 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 40 (10.154)

43 Philódēmos, On Property Management 16.36-37

44 Metródōros, Vatican Saying 51 was taken from a fragment from Metródōros to Pythoklḗs

45 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.121; translated by N. H. Bartman

46 Epíkouros was the ἡγεμών (hēgemṓn) meaning “leader”, “guide”, or “founder” of the Garden.

47  Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 10.11

48 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric 4, translated by Harry M. Hubbell (1920)

49 i.e. sexual intercourse, the act of Aphrodite, from which we inherit the word “aphrodisiac”.

50 Metródōros, Vatican Saying 51 was taken from a fragment to Pythoklḗs

51 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 31 (10.151)

52 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.116

53 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.131

54 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.126

55 This can also be translated as “servants” or “boys”, suggesting either a criticism of pederasty or slavery (or both). This may serve as an overall indictment against the objectification and indoctrination of those in subordinate positions.

56 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.132

57 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.116

58 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 23 (10.146)

59 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 25 (10.147)

60 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 21 (10.146)

61 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 7 (10.141)

62 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.130

63 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.136

64 Compare this sentiment contained in Usener fragment 469 to the Epistle to Menoikeús10.130.

65 Dioklḗs, Epitome III as documented by Diogénēs Laértios (Lives 10.10)

66 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers  10.136

67 Note the similarity of Usener fragment 207 with De Rerum Natura 2.34.

68 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.131

70 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.131

72 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 37

73 Philódēmos, On Property Management 13.11-14

75 Usener fragment 116 captures a quotation from Ploútarkhos (Against Kolṓtēs 17.1117A) ↩︎

76 Usener fragment  200 is echoed in Vatican Saying 33

77 Vatican Saying 33 echoes Epíkouros’ recommendation to Menoikeús (10.135)

78 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.128

79 Vatican Saying 33 echoes Epíkouros’ recommendation to Menoikeús (10.135)

80 Juvenal, Saurae IV  10.356

81 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 41

82 Philódēmos, On Property Management 23.14-18, translated by Voula Tsouna (2012)

83 Diogénēs Laértios ,Lives and Opinions 10.9; translated by N. H. Bartman

84 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 14

85 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 21. Compare this paragraph against Epíkouros’ description of desire in the Epistle to Menoikeús: “Then as for the desires one must conclude then [1] the Natural exist, and [2] the Vain, and of the Natural then [3] the Necessary, but only the natural [are needed]; then of the necessary those necessary are [instrumental] to happiness, and to the lack of distress of the body, and to their own living” (Lives 10.127)

86 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.138

87 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.138

88 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.131

89 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 15 (10.144)

90 Juvenal, Saurae IV 10.356

91 The fragment catalogued by Usener (457) corresponds with a citation from Porphyry (Letter to Marcella 31) and Seneca (Letters to Lucilius 8.7) who writes “PHILOSOPHIAE SERVIAS OPORTET, VT TIBI CONTINGAT VERA LIBERTAS”.

92 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.137

95 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 9, translated by Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan (1995)

96 Cicero, De Natura Deorum 1.16, translated by C. D. Yonge (1877)

97 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.132

98 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 23 (10.146)

99 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, fragment 19, translated by Harry M. Hubbell (1920)

100 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 27 (10.148)

101 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 37 (10.152)

102 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.133

103 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric 5

104 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.116

105 Philódēmos, On Property Management 4.23-30, translated by Voula Tsouna (2012)

106 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.116

107 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 37 (10.152)

108 Philódēmos, On Death 24.6-8, translated by W. Benjamin Henry (2009)

109 Philódēmos, On Piety 25.5-6, translated by Dirk Obbink (1996)

110 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.81

111 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.133

112 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.67

113 These lines are repeated four times throughout De Rerum Natura; see 1.146-148, 2.59-61, 3.91-93, and 6.39-41.

114 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1.146-150, translated by H. A. J. Munro (1860)

115 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine12 (10.143) | Vatican Saying 49

116 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1.101, translated by N. H. Bartman, from “TANTVM RELIGIO POTVIT SVADERE MALORVM”.

117 Voltaire warns against the political implications of superstitious belief, writing: “Certainement qui est en droit de vous rendre absurde est en droit de vous rendre injuste” (Questions sur la Miracles 412).

118 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 15 (10.144)

119 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.45

120 Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism 1, translated by David Konstan (1980)

121 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 9, translated by Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan (1995)

122 Other translators employ “superstition” as their preferred translation of RELIGIO. Lucretius, however, uses both RELIGIO and SUPERSTITIO as near synonyms, versus healthy PIETAS.

123 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1.82-85, translated by A. E. Stallings (2007)

124 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 7, translated by Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan (1995)

125 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 3.53-54, translated by H. A. J. Munro (1860)

126 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 8

127 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 6.1230-1234; translated by H. A. J. Munro (1860)

128 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.87

129 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 54

130 Philódēmos, On Piety 13.7-8, translated by Dirk Obbink (1996)

131 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.124

132 Diogénēs Laértios writes that “he also takes everything prophetic as wrong, and as in the Little Epitome, he so affirms, ‘Divination is not real, but even if real,” we should “regard the predictions [as] nothing to us.’” (Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.135)

133 “…so writes Diogénēs” of Tarsós the Epicurean (c. 2nd-century BCE) “in the twelfth” book Epitome of the Ethical Doctrines of Epíkouros” (Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.118).

134 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.93

135 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.113

136 Astromancy, from ἄστρον (ástron, “[sky] glower”) and μαντεία (manteía, “divination”), literally “star-prophecy”.

137 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.113

138 Philódēmos, Epigram 28 (translated by W. R. Paton, 1916-18), there he goes, dissin’ astrology since 69 BCE.

139 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 40

140 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.118; translated by N. H. Bartman

141 Usener fragment 489 echoes the Epistle to Menoikeús 134 and Key Doctrine 16. ↩︎

142 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.135

143 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.81

144 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 10 (10.142)

145 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 13 (10.143)

146 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 24

147 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.115

148 Cicero, De Natura Deorum 1.16, translated by C. D. Yonge (1877)

149 !!! Practitioners of the Mazdayasni religion of Persia are popularly known as Zoroastrians, however, this designation creates a complication (as does referring to “Islam” by the now-obsolete term “Mohammedanism”). Mazdayasna centers around the worship of Ahura Mazda—Zarathustra (Hellenized as “Zōroastrēs”) was merely a prophet of Mazda.

150 Oneiromacy is the practice of allegedly scrying knowledge of future events from dreams.

152 Philódēmos, On Signs and Inferences 38.8-12, translated by by Philip and Estelle de Lacey (1941)

153 The ancient, Athenian Stoics gathered at ἡ ποικίλη στοά (ē poikélē stoá), the “Stoa Poikile” or “Painted Porch”.

155 According to Diogénēs Laértios, “Kleánthēs” the 2nd Stoic scholarch, “was called a second Hēraklḗs” by Zēnṓn, the first scholarch (Laértios 7.170). Seneca writes a tragedy of Hercules, exploring themes like perseverance and fate (Hēraklḗs Raging). Epíktētos makes numerous allusions to Hēraklḗs in Discourses (1.16, 2.16, 3.22, 3.24, 3.26, 4.10).

156 Epíkouros, “Words on the Wise” 10.120

157 Epíkouros, On Anger 31.21-24

158 Other translators employ “superstition” as their preferred translation of RELIGIO. Lucretius, however, uses both RELIGIO and SUPERSTITIO as near synonyms, versus healthy PIETAS.

159 Philódēmos, On Piety 71.1-12, translated by Dirk Obbink (1996)

160 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.124

161 Philódēmos, On Piety 71.1-12

162 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 10 (10.142)

163 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 11 (10.142)

164 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.81

165 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 10 (10.142)

166 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.116

167 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.81

168 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 10 (10.142)

169 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 20 (10.145)

170 Philódēmos, On Death 30.1-5, translated by W. Benjamin Henry (2009)

171 Ibid., 36.25-26

172 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.73

173 Ibid., 10.74

174 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 7 (10.141)

175 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 14 (10.143)

176 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 5, translated by Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan (1995)

177 Philódēmos, On Death 24.35-36

178 Ibid., 32.27

179 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 13 (10.143)

180 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.81

181 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.137; translated by N. H. Bartman

182 Harfouche, et al. “Estimated global and regional incidence and prevalence of herpes simplex virus infections and genital ulcer disease in 2020”. Sexually Transmitted Infections. 2025 May 19, 101, 4, 214-223.

184 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 4 (10.140) | Vatican Saying 3

185 Mētródōros, Vatican Saying 10

186 Mētródōros, Usener fragment 339, translated by N. H. Bartman (2025)

187 Philódēmos, On Death 37.23-25, translated by W. Benjamin Henry (2009)

188 Mētródōros, Vatican Saying 30

189 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.81

190 Philódēmos, On Death 39.6-7

191 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.133

192 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 9

193 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.133

194 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.134

195 Beckett, Samuel. Waiting for Godot. Faber & Faber, 2006.

196 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 16 (10.144)

197 Philódēmos, On Death 38.24

198 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 2.54, translated by Bailey (1910): “OMNIS CVM IN TENEBRIS PRAESERTIM VITA LABORET”

199 Philódēmos, On Death 2.15-16

200 Ibid., 2.10-11

201 Ibid., 2.13-14

202 Ibid., 5.1

203 Ibid., 5.4-6

204 Ibid., 9.4-5

205 Ibid., 12.2

206 Ibid., 13.15

207 Ibid., 20.3-4

208 Ibid., 22.10

209 Ibid., 22.10-11

210 Ibid., 23.7-14

211 Ibid., 25.2-6

212 Ibid., 26.10

213 Ibid., 28.2-4

214 Ibid., 28.37-29.2

215 Ibid., 29

216 Ibid., 32.32-33

217 Ibid., 33.37-34.3

218 Ibid., 35.1-2

219 Ibid., 36.31

220 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.125

221 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 2 (10.139) | Vatican Saying 2

222 Philódēmos, On Death 28.15-16

223 Diogénēs of Oìnóanda, Fragment 73, translated by M. F. Smith

224 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 4 (10.140) | Vatican Saying 3

225 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.137, translated by N. H. Bartman

226 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 10, translated by Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan (1995)

227 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 66

228 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 78 echoes the Epistle to Menoikeús 130

229 Usener fragment 213 corresponds with two, separate attestations, one by Ploútarkhos (It Is Impossible to Live Pleasantly in the Manner of Epíkouros 28.1105D) and one by Seneca (Letters to Lucilius 63.7).

230 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 40 (10.154)

233 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 35

234 Philódēmos, On Death 38.20, translated by W. Benjamin Henry (2009)

235 Ibid., 37.40

236 Ibid., 38.18-19

237 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 19 (10.145) | Vatican Saying 22

238 Tolkien, J. R. R. The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring. George Allen & Unwin, 1954, 60.

239 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 2 (10.139) | Vatican Saying 2

240 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 38

241 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.124

242 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 22, translated by Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan (1995)

243 Philódēmos, On Death 23.13-14, translated by W. Benjamin Henry (2009)

244 Philódēmos, On Property Management 15.10-12, translated by Voula Tsouna (2012)

245 Diogénēs of Oìnóanda,  Fragment 3, translated by M. F. Smith

246 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 10

247 Ibid., 23

248 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.28, translated by N. H. Bartman

249 Philódēmos, On Death 2.12-13, translated by W. Benjamin Henry (2009)

250 Philódēmos, On Property Management 4.23-30

251 Philódēmos, On Death 39.15-24

252 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 17

253 Epíkouros, Epistle to Idomeneus according to Diogénēs (Lives 10.22) or Hérmarkhos according to Cicero.

254 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 48

255 Diogénēs of Oìnóanda, Fragment 3, translated by M. F. Smith

256 Loukianós of Samósta. Alexander the False Prophet 1, translated by A. M. Harmon (1936).

257 Ibid. 7

259 Ibid. 47

261 Ibid. 13-14

262 Ibid. 20

263 Ibid. 17

264 Ibid. 32

265 Ibid. 8

266 Ibid. 6

267 Ibid.. 32

269 Other translators employ “superstition” as their preferred translation of RELIGIO. Lucretius, however, uses both RELIGIO and SUPERSTITIO as near synonyms, versus healthy PIETAS.

270 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1.82-85, translated by A. E. Stallings (2007)

271 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.152, translated by N. H. Bartman

272 Strábōn, Geōgraphiká 3.4.14

274 Pliny the Elder, Naturalis Historia 2.95

277 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.95

279 Radzinsky, Edvard. The Rasputin File. Anchor Books, 2001.

281 Jeffreys, Diarmuid. Aspirin: The Remarkable Story of a Wonder Drug. Bloomsbury, 2005.

282 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 44

283 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.34, translated by N. H. Bartman

284 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.45

285 Ibid. 10.34

286 Ibid. 10.50

287 Ibid. 10.51

288 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 21 (10.146)

289 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.51

291 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 23 (10.146)

292 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.23, translated by N. H. Bartman

293 Usener fragment 387, preserved by Philódēmos reflects a sentiment expressed by Lucretius in De Rerum Natura 6.68.

294 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.135

 


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Philosophy Discussion with Greg Sadler and other Updates

Happy and Safe Eikas to all students of philosophy! Some of our latest literary updates are:

Greg Sadler teaches philosophy in a non-academic setting. On his profile, he says:

I bring philosophy into practice, making complex classic philosophical ideas accessible for a wide audience of professionals, students, and life-long learners.

Greg has done an Epicurus educational series on YouTube. Here is the playlist of all his Epicurus Core Concepts videos. You may also subscribe to him on Substack. He has an online workshop coming up on May 9 that might be of interest to some of our readers: “Studying Philosophy Outside Traditional Academia“.

I recently had the pleasure of discussing philosophy with him for about an hour. Our discussion can be found here.

Happy Eikas of February! Literary and Lecture Updates

I wish you all a Happy and Peaceful Eikas, and a Happy Hegemon Day! A few days ago, the 16th annual Panhellenic Symposium of Epicurean Philosophy was celebrated in Athens. You may find the video here: 16ο ΠΑΝΕΛΛΗΝΙΟ ΣΥΜΠΟΣΙΟ ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΕΙΑΣ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ.The lectures were in Greek, but you are able to see the English or Spanish language captions if you click on Settings (the wheel, at the bottom of the screen) > Subtitles/CC > choose English or any other language.

This Eikas, we celebrate that Society of Friends of Epicurus is now a partner organization with the International Society for Philosophy as a Way of life. ISPWL was founded in 2025 to promote the study, practice, and public dissemination of philosophy understood not merely as a theoretical discipline, but as a way of living and transforming oneself.

Essays by Hiram Crespo:

The Pig in Various Cultures: On Pleasure, the Belly, and Redeeming the Earth is a survey of how the archetype or totem of the pig has been viewed by many cultures.

On the Simultaneity Between Pleasure and Praxis in Epicurean Salvific Theory is a paper I presented as part of Revista Horizonte Independiente’s annual conference in 2025, whose focus was on Hellenistic philosophies.

The Two Anchors was written in celebration of the 13th anniversary of the foundation of the Society of Friends of Epicurus, and discusses the two main stabilizing forces that have allowed us to develop a stable Epicurean practice and a virtual koinonia in the digital era, with so many distractions pulling our attention in so many directions.

Commentary on the Method of Multiple Interpretations elaborates on this aspect of the methodology from the Epicurean canon and how it relates to the physics and the ethics.

The Sculpted Word: a Synopsis and Commentary of a book that contains art critique and history, as well as a detailed evaluation of how ancient sculptures were used by the Epicureans in their passive recruitment, and of the psychological process of conversion to Epicurean philosophy.

Epicurus and Nietzsche on Experimentation: We are Nature Experimenting with Itself is an essay inspired by ideas in Vinod Acharya and Ryan Johnson’s book Nietzsche and Epicurus.

Goddess Spirituality in Lucretius delves into the unique Epicurean-inspired thealogy that we find in Lucretius, who sees the Great Goddess as a vital force that motivates sentient beings through the pleasure faculty.

The Plague of Disinformation: A Warning from the Second Century of Common Era is a quote from the Oenoanda Wall Inscription.

On the Need to Mourn Loved Ones is a moving quote from chapter 10 of Frances Wright’s novel A Few Days in Athens.

Essays by Nathan:

All Particles Go to Heaven: The Form and Formation of the (Epicurean) Gods delves into Epicurus’ materialist theology.

Epicurus Was Not an Atomist, an essay against isms.

We Got Beef: A Disembowelment of the Dialectic, Politics, and Other Organs of Bullshit is a polemic against the misuse of rhetoric.

Other Essays:

We are proud to announce that a fellow member of the Society of Epicurus, Jocelyn Pantoja, published her thesis titled Epicuro rétor: Análisis retórico de la Carta a Meneceo with the Universidad Autónoma de México, where she explores the rhetorical devices used by Epicurus in one of his epistles.

The Morality of Epicurus and its Relation to Contemporary Doctrines is an initial exploration of the work of the 19th-Century French philosopher Jean Marie Guyau, who proposed a post-Darwinian and fully scientific conception of morality.

The essay The Shared Table Builds the Strongest Walls written for the blog titled The House That Epicurus Built, reminds me of the practice of Epicurean hospitality (“theoxenia”) that we find in the message written on the Gate of the Epicurean Garden.

The substack titled Classical Wisdom published a basic introduction to the Tetrapharmakos titled Epicurus and the Pursuit of Happiness.

Epicurus Was Not an Atomist

Disclaimer: the ideas and opinions presented below are reflective of the author and
may or may not be shared by other members of the Society of Friends of Epicurus.

Epíkouros was not an atomist. (THUD.)

Nor was Dēmókritos. (GASP.)

… now that I have your attention, please excuse the provocative title — forgive my rhetorical provocation, having trespassed against the taxonomical conventions of academic tradition. I seek to provide nuance to your understanding of the teachings of Epíkouros, and to challenge the academic presentation of atomism as it has been so conceived. We will do so by privileging the perspective of a sweaty, 3rd-century Athenian and by providing critical context to supplement our understanding (we being students who are subject to the prejudices of modernity). We have been trained to catch ’em all, programmed to collect facts like cards. Too often, the presentation of philosophy is like a catalogue of products, each designed by a different manufacturer, each reviewed as a consumer flips the pages of a magazine. Yet Epíkouros did not manufacture sensations. He observed nature, and shared clever inferences. He arrived at his conclusions without the benefit of a vast repository of laboratory evidence.

In a nutshell, if you were an Epicurean in the Garden of Epíkouros (c. 3rd-century BCE), you would have had to have waited several thousand years before anyone called you an “atomist” (or ατομιστής). Prior to the Renaissance era, an Epicurean was just a “student of the Garden” or a “follower of Epíkouros”. The word “atomist” was coined by Renaissance minds in Latin, largely by anti-Epicurean thinkers who dismissed Epicurean particle physics as a silly fiction. The closest title I have found was employed by Athenaios in the 3rd-century CE (Deipnosophistaí 5.4) as προφήτας ἀτόμων (prophḗtas atómōn, meaning, literally, “prophets of atomic” particles). Here again, we find “of atoms” in a substantive, adjectival phrase, not as a proper noun. As a result, I wish to present an alternative lexicon that avoids the neologisms of our opponents.

Now, obviously the Hegemon teaches us that observable bodies are composed of atomic “particles” (and void, impressively anticipating the surprising conclusion of Rutherford’s gold foil experiment by over 2,200 years, demonstrating that solid objects are, generally speaking, about 0.01% stuff and 99.99% space). Nonetheless, the distinctions implied by words like “atoms” and “atomism” create slight incongruities that either warp Epíkouros’ description of particles, or else, beg misunderstandings as a result of sleepy translations and clumsy semantics. 

What’s in a Name?

Consider the fact that (so far as I have found) history does not document ancient proponents of particle physics as having referred to the “pieces” of reality by the plural noun άτομα (átoma, or “atoms”), nor any declension of the singular noun άτομο (átomo, or “atom”). This root compound “a-” and “témnō” is only ever found as an adjective ἄτομος (átomos, or “uncuttable”). Ancient texts do not record students of particle physics as having identified themselves by the proper noun ατομιστής (atomists, or “atomist”), nor as having codified their doctrines using the word ατομισμός (atomismós, or “atomism”). Epicureans did not see themselves as “atomists” attached to a theory of “atomism”, so much as adherents of the “true philosophy”, which understood the origins of “the real” world to be “atomic”. Of course, please NOTE: we do find the adjectival phrase ὁ ἄτομος (hó átomos, or “the atomic” body) and its various declensions throughout Epicurean texts. This substantive phrasing [article + adjective] implies a noun. Thus, translating   (“the”) átomos (“atomic”) as “the atom” is not unreasonable, nor inappropriate. Simply, I find it to be incomplete, and potentially-misleading. We miss an opportunity to expand our mental aggregate by reducing the swerving objects of Epicurean physics to mere “atoms”.

Cuttable Uncuttables

As it must seem ironic to students of Greek, the modern world refers to cuttable elements (like uranium) as “uncuttables”. Further complicating things, the Standard Model refers to the truly uncuttable bodies from which “uncuttables” are composed using the Latin prefix “sub-”, thus, framing “sub-atomic” particles as being (ironically) “under the [cuttable] uncuttables”. Historically, we inherit this irony as a vestige of the modern quest to identify the truly “uncuttable” components of nature. Scientists after the Renaissance assigned the atomic compounds they discovered with the allusive title of “atoms” (or “uncuttables”). Yet, as has been (unforgettably) demonstrated for just over eight decades, the modern “uncuttables” are actually, horrifyingly cuttable. Ancient “uncuttables”, however, were truly indivisible, and could not be split.

Of course, this nuance does not, in any way, invalidate ancient atomic theory. Simply put, ancient Epicureans did not imagine “atomic parts” the same way we imagine “hydrogen” and “oxygen” (as opposed to a correctly-named “lepton” which meets the “uncuttable” qualification). Granted, Epíkouros’ speculations were not infallible, and he sometimes assigns particles with an agency that properly belongs to “molecules” (as when he proposes that we are able to “smell” particles (10.53); in fact, we smell collections of particles “enlaced” as chemical “compounds”). Nonetheless, these naturalistic  propositions were deeply insightful, and functionally useful prior to the innovations of the 19th and 20th-centuries. Excitingly, modern physics provides modern Epicureans with the necessary, experimental evidence that is required (from the variety of explanations that Epíkouros provides, in accordance with his practice of entertaining multiple explanations prior to experimental confirmation) to eliminate false hypotheses, and to adopt coherent alternatives. No doubt, had the Hegemon (somehow) extended his lifespan (by a few, measly millennia), he would have welcomed the evidence that supports our discoveries, all of which are consistent with his explanation for the non-supernatural origins of reality. 

Body-and-Voidism

New followers of the true philosophy may be further mislead by the word “atomism” as Epíkouros, unlike Dēmókritos, rejected the reductive description of nature. Dēmókritos assumes that everything is “just” particles, for “atoms and the vacuum were the beginning of the universe; and that everything else existed only in opinion” (Laértios 9.44). From the Democritean perspective, what “truly” exists are microscopic bodies (and void). As a result, he concludes that we cannot be certain that our perceptions of bodies and their emergent qualities (like “color”) can be considered “true” because the “true” nature of reality (according to Dēmókritos) occurs at the atomic level — only atoms are “real”. Dēmókritos “rejects” emergent “qualities” that arise from atomic interactions: “Of a truth we know nothing, for truth is in a well.” (Ibid., 9.71).

Epíkouros rejects this skepticism. From the Epicurean perspective, what “truly” exists are bodies and void, some of which are visible, enlaced bodies (i.e. “compounds”) and some of which are invisible, simple bodies (i.e. “particles”). Both “compound bodies” and “simple bodies” are “real” (just as compound notions in the mind are physically “real” as images). As Epíkouros writes, “all” of our sensations are reliable. Consequently, even if we are to adopt the “ismizing” of the humanists, it is reasonable to suppose that, simply, “bodyism” (or “matterism”) would be appropriate designations for Epicurean particle physic, so much as “atomism” (which might be understood to implicate Dēmókritos’ teaching that only particles are real). Consider also that either attempt (including my flippant one) at neologizing particle physics yields the further implication that only particles (or bodies) are “real”, yet both Demokritos and Epíkouros agree that, indeed, “void” is also a “real” thing; it is simply “intangible” (Ibid., 10.39-40). Therein, it would be just as appropriate to call particle physicists “Voidists”, since they, unlike their many opponents, recognized the existence of empty space. Others, like Aristotélēs, insist that “nature abhors a vacuum” (Physikḗs 4.8). Technically, it would be reasonable to call Demokritos an “Atom-and-Voidist”, or to call Epíkouros a “Body-and-Voidist”. Practically, of course, these are clumsy and redundant neologisms, because the existence of one seems to imply the other. Nonetheless, be not mislead into thinking that the Sage taught that only atoms exist.

…Like Crumbs-of-Carbon and Water

As Diogénēs records, Epíkouros did not see himself as an ally to the tradition of Dēmókritos (Lives 10.4), and may have only temporarily considered himself as such during his youth (Ploútarkhos, Against Kōlõtēs 3). The Hegemon explicitly rebukes Dēmókritos’ philosophy for having been influenced by the skepticism of Dēmókritos’ teacher, Pýrrhōn, founder of Greek skepticism. For Epíkouros, his rejection of Pýrrhōn’s teachings, along with his necessary (and brilliantly modern) innovation of the παρέγκλισις (parénklesis, or CLINAMEN, “swerve”) places the Garden in a completely different category than the school of Dēmókritos. Grouping the two of them together, as philosophical allies, is a paradigm defended by ancient opponents of the Epicurean tradition and modern academics. So I argue, if, again, we are willing to entertain the anachronistic fantasy of ancient Epicureans adopting the Latin convention of “ismizing”, then Epíkouros would not have seen his physics as being the same “-ism” as Dēmókritos. It is reasonable to entertain the possibility thatsensualism” or “realism” (if someone puts a gun to our head and forces us to employ an “-ism”) are more reflective and complete expressions of Epicurean physics thanatomism”; and while Epíkouros does meet the criterion for our modern definition of an “atomist”, he did not see himself as such. Indeed, he reserved a collection of slurs for Dēmókritos, the so-called “Authority on Nonsense” (Diogénēs Laértios 10.8).

To my fellow Epicureans, I encourage you to challenge the paradigm that ancient philosophers who defended particle physics should be placed in the same category. In fact, their physics differed. (For a thorough comparison on the two physics, please set aside a few hours to read “The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature”, the doctoral dissertation of Karl Marx. In particular, if you have a negative, political opinion of Marx, you may find yourself charmed by his encyclopedic knowledge of ancient, Hellenistic philosophy. Ultimately, he expresses sympathy for Aristotélēs … that is another topic for another essay).

Pieces of Reality

Sure, “atoms” is cool … but what about “seeds”, “grains”, “firstlings”, or “hooklets”? Have you thought about simplesplinters”, “centsof consciousness, or “motesof matter? Each of these expressions are employed by Epíkouros in his Epistle to Herodotos as alternative names for the bodies that are popularly identified as “atoms” (orchestrated more colorfully elsewhere). Yet, nowhere in ancient writings does the Hegemon explicitly name particles as “atoms”, only descriptively as uncuttable parts: Epíkouros only employs the adjective ἄτομος (átomos, or “uncuttable”, as in “the uncuttable” pieces of reality). While the substantive phrase ὁ ἄτομος (hó átomos, or “the uncuttable”) implies a noun, it does not provide a noun.

Even then, note that, based on the frequency with which each word is employed in the extant texts, the Hegemon only occasionally refers to the smallest pieces of tangible reality as being “uncuttable”. As many times as Epíkouros describes the fundamental pieces of reality as being “uncuttable”, he equally refers to them as being “countless”, “microscopic”, and “unchanging”. Just as easily as we have coined the contemporary neologism “atom”, we could have, consistent with linguistic conventions, conceived of a “particle” as an “apeiron“ (from ἄπειρος, Laértios 10.41-43, 45 56-57, 60), “micron” (from μικρός, Ibid., 10.59, 61), or “ametableton” (from αμετάβλητος, Ibid., 10.41). Each of these neologisms is as accurate (or inaccurate) as “atom”.

Of historical note, several words that Epíkouros employs when naming the microscopic pieces of reality have been preserved and functionally repurposed, having been enlisted in the service of contemporary physics. Indeed, the ancient words “photon” and “lepton” survived the turbulence of history and became codified into the jargon of modernity. We receive “lepton” from λεπτομερὲς (leptomerès), derived from λεπτός (leptós, or “fine–grained”, “refined”, “subtle”, “minute”) and μέρος (méros, or “part”, “component”, “portion”, “particle”)—meaning “small particles”, “minute motes”, or “fine grains”. A modern “lepton” is a class of particle in the Standard Model that includes the electron. Similarly, we receive “photon” from the ancient Greek φωτός (phōtós, meaning “of light“). This is the particle that carries the electromagnetic force. In both cases, the particles are sub-atomic, and cannot be further divided into parts.

Epíkouros properly names these bits of matter σπερμά (spermá, “seeds”), ᾰ̓ρχαί (ărkhaí, “beginnings” or “firstlings”), σώματα (sṓmata, “bodies”), ὄγκοι (ónkoi, “hooks”), τομαί (tomaí, “splinters”), λεπτομερής (leptomerḗs, “particles” or “fine parts”), λεπτοί (leptoí, “cents”), μόρια (mória, “motes”), and, most often, μέρη (mérē), meaning “parts”, “pieces”, or “particles”.

Uniquely, Epíkouros uses both the plural adjective a-tomoi (or “uncuttable” crumbs) as well as its opposite, τομὴν (tomḗn, Laértios 10.56) meaning “cutting” (as in a “cutting” of wood), or also, a “stump”, “splinter”, or “shedding”. It is employed by Epíkouros as a synonym for the “particles” that comprise creation; it is derived from the verb τέμνω (témnō) meaning “to cut”, “hew”, “butcher” or “sacrifice”. It is also the root of “a-tom”. Herein, Epíkouros employs the image of wood clippings from a tree as an analogy for the minute motes of matter spread through the multiverse. Epíkouros describes particles as “cuttings” that are, themselves, “uncuttable”, so we may just as easily call Epíkouros a “tomist” so much as an “a-tomist”. Here again, Epicurean physics employs analogical reasoning that relies upon visible phenomena. His method does not require abstract vocabulary, only imagery. Primarily, Epíkouros infers that visible phenomena results from invisible beginnings. The “firstlings” of physics are not expressed as contemporary, mathematical objects — the Sage of the Garden calls them “motes” like dust in a beam of sunlight, like “grains” of cereal, like fluffy “hooklets” from dandelions, like “cents” of money, and “splinters” of wood. They are “countless”, “unchanging”,  “infinite”, and “microscopic”.

Particles were so much more than merely being “uncuttable”.

The Prejudice of the Enlightment

In addition to these observations, note that Enlightenment-era thinkers like Descartes, Boyle, Newton, and Locke, those who loosely adopted the general notion of particle physics, popularly rejected the Greek designation of “atomist” (as one who accepts the doctrine of “atoms”) in favor of their preferred, Latin term “corpuscularian”, one who studies “corpuscules” (from the Latin CORPVSCVLVM meaning “small body”). This designation was partially made as a defense of piety, partially as a rejection of the “godless” and “immoral” behavior of Libertines (themselves, inspired by Epíkouros), and partially as a means of distinguishing their observations as being unique and unprecedented. The words employed by 17th-century thinkers to refer to particles were loaded with assumptions and prejudices. Many of these thinkers associated “atomism” with other, controversial positions, like “atheism” (despite the fact that all brands of ancient “atomists” rejected atheism). Additionally, the particle physics of some of these thinkers was mechanistic, and conflicted with the non-deterministic spirit of Epicurean ethics.

(For a much more thorough, accurate, and expansive treatment of the context of the debate between “corpuscularianism” and “atomism” as contextualized in the 17th-century, please see the first two chapters of Dr. Catherine Wilson’s book Epicureanism at the Origin of Modernity).

Even in the last few centuries, naturalists, having recognized the coherence of particle physics, have defined and redefined “atomism” according to their own preferences and prejudices, as well as by the misunderstandings they adopted about ancient history, and the social pressures they inherited from the societies that coerced them. On one hand, thinkers like Dēmókritos, Epíkouros, Galileo, Descartes, Boyle, Locke, and Einstein each flirted with general “atomism”; on the other hand, each thinker, more often than not, rejected having their own physics subsumed within the same ismistic grouping as their opponents. They did not necessarily identify as members of the same “-ism”, and often distinguished themselves as philosophical opponents.

In any case, be real and think big about history.

Big Diction Energy

Do not mistake my thesis — I do not mean to suggest that, given modern jargon, as employed by scholars of “philosophy”, Epíkouros should be identified as a “non-atomist”, or as an opponent to ”atomism”. (I recognize that this deconstructive approach risks obfuscation, so forgive me for beleaguering these post-structuralistic points.) Nevertheless, within our fellowship, speaking frankly, I observe that we can be considered “apeironists”, “micronists”, and “ametabletists” just as readily as “atomists”. Concurrently, Epicurean “particles” can be accurately expressed as “apeirons”, “microns”, and “ametabletons”, so much as they are “atoms”.

The ancient Greeks did not practice the convention of “ismizing”, or, as I write, “expressing different systems or processes as ‘-isms’” (see my earlier essay, “On -Isms and Pleasure Wisdom”). Historically, the Ismist paradigm is a result of the widespread adoption of Latin affixation, the ubiquitous “-ISMVS” from the rarely used “-ισμός”. We ismize ideas we detest, (e.g. “Islamism”), we ismize ideas we admire (e.g. “altruism”), and we ismize ancient ideas that never needed ismizing in the first place (e.g. “atomism”). Many of our certainties rest upon assumptions that have been inherited from derivative sources. In this case, our taste for ancient Greece has been spiked by the flavor of Renaissance Latin, yet ancient Epicureans enjoyed a pure draught. As a follower of this tradition, I seek to share the original flavor of the “true philosophy”, and I encourage seekers of knowledge to pursue their goal with the same intent.

Still … if you put a gun to my head … fine, I’ll properly “ismize” Epicurean physics as follows:

BEHOLD! Epíkouros properly defends a theory of somato-kenoism (versus the atomo-kenoism of Dēmókritos). Though, neither system exemplifies strict atomism, since both philosophers also accept the “intangible void” as a “real” part of their physics. Conversely, one might imagine a sort of “Peripatetic Atomist” who both believes that “nature abhors a vacuum”, but also, accepts that the “Five Elements” (including Aether) are made of invisible particles. … chew on that, Ismists.

Still, as always, I recommend against ismizing everyone and everything in the first place. (As a friend suggested, we are students of “Epicurean Philosophy” and not of “Epicureanism“.)

Anyway … Happy Solstice to the friends of the true philosophy!

And blessings to the swerving firstlings.

Your Friend,
EIKADISTES
Keeper of Twentiers.com
Editor of the Hedonicon

On the Simultaneity Between Pleasure and Praxis in Epicurean Salvific Theory

Happy Solstice to all students of Epicurean philosophy! Back in the summer, I had the pleasure of participating in Revista Horizonte Independiente’s annual conference, where I presented the paper De la simultaneidad entre el placer y la práctica en la teoría salvífica epicúrea (On the simultaneity between pleasure and practice in Epicurean salvific theory) as part of this annual conference’s focus on Hellenistic philosophies. In the essay, I explore Vatican Sayings 27 and 41 and the doctrine of innate pleasure to shed light on some features of the Epicurean salvific theory.

The video of the presentation is in Spanish, as is the published essay, but you may use google translate or the bing translator to read it. The interviewer was a dear friend, Estiven Valencia, who has in the past presented and promoted Epicurean ideas in Colombia–where RHI is published–with a strong focus on the intersection between Epicurean practice and politics:

Other SoFE Literary Updates:

Other Literary Updates:

 

All Particles Go to Heaven: The Form and Formation of the (Epicurean) Gods

This paper was originally published on Academia.edu. The paper, itself has been adapted from a larger publication on ancient Epicurean piety. It has been edited and re-formatted for academic presentation. For additional commentary, see “Holy Shit: The Elements of Epicurean Psychedelia” published by the Society of Friends of Epicurus

Epíkouros advances a developed theology in his treatises Περὶ σιότητος (Perì Hosiótētos, “On Piety”), Περ Θεν (Perí Theôn, “On Gods”), Περὶ Φύσεως (Perì Phýseōs, “On Nature”), and his distinguished “Letter on Happiness” προς Μενοικεα (pròs Menoikéa, “to Menoikeus”). In these compositions, the Gargettian encourages the veneration of “the divine nature” while upholding the validity of atomic physics and underscoring the emptiness of supernatural myths. Therein, the Sage of the Garden conducts a survey of religious history, provides an evaluation of the efficacy of rites and rituals, and reflects upon the genesis of the profound mental impressions that have inspired centuries of pious devotion. While some of these works have been lost, Epíkouros’ ideas have been preserved by Philódēmos in his similarly-named works “On Piety” and “On Gods”, as well as Metródōros’ Περ Μεταβολής (Perì Metabolês, “On Change”), and a work by Demḗtrios of Lakōnía entitled Περ το Θεο Μορφς (Perì toû Theoû Morphēs, “On the Form of a God”) within which “god” is deconstructed.

Epíkouros, Metródōros, Philódēmos, Dēmḗtrios, and other atomistic philosophers contextualize both spiritual activities like (piety and prayer) and religious notions (like blessedness and divinity) within the framework of an intelligible reality, existing as a continuum of moving bodies. Consequently, piety is presented as a function of neuropsychologyand theology is evaluated as a feature of anthropology. Human animals cultivate wisdom upon a κανών (kanṓn) or “standard” of knowledge, a philosophical foundation that grounds truth in nature. As Diogénēs records, the criteria of knowledge includes “the [αἰσθήσεις or aisthḗseis] sensations and [προλήψεις or prolḗpseis] preconceptions and that of [πάθη or pắthē] feeling” (Laértios 10.31). Sensation triggers feeling and gradually conditions preconceptions — each preconception is a “memory of the appearances” received “repeatedly from abroad”, impressed by “the imprint of the sensations” (Ibid. 10.33). Far from being a supernatural revelation, the preconception of “blessedness” that defines “god”, like “justice” has been informed by daily occurrences. The gods, themselves are conceptual representations conditioned by memory. “Piety” is a consequence of psychology and “prayer” is a psychiatric practice. The θεία φύσις (theía phýsis) “divine nature” is a common expression of παντελῆ εὐδαιμονίαν (pantelḗ eudaimonían) “absolute happiness” (10.116). “Heaven” exists in the form of the μετακόσμιος (metakósmios 10.89) a boundless void containing countless κόσμοι (kósmoi). The “heavenly” homes of the gods exist as inferences within the colorful confines of the human mind.

Epíkouros explains that the divine nature (of “the gods”) is conditioned by the mental προλήψις (prolēpsis) “impression” of μακαριότητα (makariótēta) “blessedness” described by Philódēmos as τελείαν εδαιμονίαν (teleían eùdaimonían) “perfect happiness” (On Piety, Col. 13.7-8, 353-354). “The gods” of Epíkouros are primarily θεωρητούς (theōrētoús 10.62, 10.135) “observed” or “contemplated” as φαντασίαν τ διανοί (phantasían tḗi dianoíai) “visualizations” or “appearances [in] the mind” (Laértios 10.50). Epíkouros affirms that the gods μὲν εἰσιν (mèn eísin 10.123) “truly exist” yet are only “seen” or “reached” through an act of λόγῳ (lógoi) “contemplation”, “consideration”, “reasoning”, “reckoning”, or “logical accounting” (10.62, 10.139). He observes that the mental φαντάσματα (phantásmata) or “appearances” of the gods arise κ τς συνεχος πιρρύσεως (èk ts synekhoús èpirrū́seōs) “from a continuous stream” τν μοίων εδώλων (tn homoíōn eidṓlōn) “of similar” or “compatible images” that physically impress upon the soul. The impressions coalesce together through a process of ὑπερβάσεως (hyperbáseōs) “transposition” (On Piety, Col. 12.9, 324-5). The transposed formations have been ποτετελεσμένωι (ápotetelesménōi) “rendered” to human souls in human forms, immortal projections of mortal intellects, visualizations of perfectly-happy, perpetually-healthy people.

Having reviewed the psychiatric evidence of memory against the criteria of knowledge (embodied by the natural kanṓn), Epíkouros explains that the functional “coherence” or “resemblance” between internal φαντάσματα (phantásmata) “appearances” and external οσί (ousí) “beings” (or τοῖς οὖσί “reality” 10.51) requires that an initial impulse complete a sequence of successive impacts, ultimately yielding a perception in the mind, “since we could not have sought the investigation if we had not first perceived it” (Ibid., 10.33). A sensible τύπος (týpos) “impression” initiates a perceptual relay through various pathways in the soul — the sense organs are stimulated by ἁφή (aphḗ, “touch”), acoustic ῥεύμᾰτᾰ (rheúmata, “currents”), olfactory ὄγκοι (ónkoi, “hooklets”), and visual είδωλα (eídōla, “images”), all “impinging [upon] us [as] a result of both the colorful realities” to produce “a harmonious magnitude of related morphologies”. The μαχυμερέστερον (makhymerésteron) “marching army of particles” (Dēmḗtrios, On the Form of a God 21) enter “the face or the mind” […] yielding an appearance and an [affective] sympathy as a result of the observing” (Laértios 10.49-50). Thus, the mortal appearances we see during the day inspire the divine icons we envision at night.

Epíkouros “alone first founded the idea of the existence of the Gods on the impression which nature herself hath made on the minds of all men” (Cicero, On the Nature of Gods 26). He asks, “what nation, what people are there, who have not, without any learning, a natural idea, or prenotion, of a Deity?” The realization that isolated peoples developed parallel, mythic complexes became noticeably evident after Aléxandros III of Makedonía connected the intellectual culture of the Mediterranean with the Indian subcontinent, triggering a cross-cultural dissemination of wisdom literature. According to the Gargettian, prior to the historical development of these mythic narratives and institutionalized rituals, prehistoric humans organically conceived of deities as sublime psychological icons encountered during dreams and contemplations (On Nature 12). The Pyrrhonian skeptic Séxtos Empeirikós preserves Epíkouros’ historical thesis: “The origin of the thought that god exists came from appearances in dreams” that were conditioned by “the phenomena of the world” (Against the Mathematicians 9.45-46). The earliest humans who conceived of these notions assumed “the object of thought as a thing perceived in relation to a solid body […] understanding perception that can be grasped by corporeal sensation, which they also knew to be derived from a physical entity [i.e. nature]” (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 15.8-18). Yet, far from being prophetic symbols θεόπεμπτος (theópemptos) sent by the gods” (Diogénēs of Oìnóanda, Fr. 9, Col. 6), “the gods”, themselves exist as symbolic representations, composed from reproducible “stream[s] of similar images” that have been apprehended from a variety of natural inspirations (Laértios 10.139).

Prehistoric peoples’ perception of “the divine nature” and their visualizations of “divine” beings created lasting impressions upon the history of human civilization. Human devotees created conventions to celebrate the symbols of their insights. Traditions were cultivated and pious practice flourished, as did dramatic myths and misunderstandings.Eventually, “self-important theologians” and deluded priests diluted beliefs about the divine and perverted piety with a fog of fear (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 86A 1-2). “God” himself was assigned disturbing duties and became enlisted in the service of religious autocrats. Contrary to the chilling myths championed by “self-important theologians”, the blessed and incorruptible nature has no need to direct the production of the human drama. Epíkouros teaches that “it is foolish to ask of the gods that which we can supply for ourselves” (Vatican Saying 65). The true benefits of worship are enjoyed by worshippers, not by the fantastic objects of human obeisance. People conceive of gods as being kind, confident, and self-reliant; in emulating these virtues, people perfect their own pleasure. “Anyone who has these things […] can rival the gods for happiness”, despite their inability to fulfill prayers, subdue nature, and prevent death (Vatican Saying 33). Philódēmos exhorts students to “imitate their blessedness insofar as mortals can” and “endeavor most of all to make themselves harmless to everyone as far as is within their power; and second to make themselves so noble” (On Piety Col. 71.16-19, 23-29). Functional knowledge of piety and theology is integral to cleansing oneself of the turmoil that is symptomatic of magical thinking.

The Epicurean presentation of divinity contextualizes “the gods” as fantastic, mental entities that can be inspired passively through the indiscriminate mechanism of sensation, either “from abroad” through the trigger of touch, as when one views an idol, or internally, “in respect of slumbers” when the mind dreams freely, least encumbered by daily disturbances, and organically repurposes memories of remarkable figures before then augmenting them into deathless idols. “Gods” can also be summoned intentionally, through a directed act of contemplation, involving τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας (tinàs épibolàs tḗs dianoías) “some applications of the intellect”, like μνήμην (mnḗmēn, “memory”). Dēmḗtrios of Lakōnía reiterates that the representations of “the gods” in the mind are triggered both as those memories manifest” through recollection, “and also” by the physical impulse of “pre-existing [bodies] that, upon [striking] the mind, produce constructive cognition”, as when one observes a icon (Dēmḗtrios, On the Form of a God 12). Because of this, mental representations of religious figures can be summoned through meditation as readily as when gazing upon the mass of a physical icon. In prayer, the supplicant manually retrieves an “apparent” image of blessedness, previously been stored in memory, having been initially sublimated in the imagination. Visual γνῶσις (gnṓsis, “knowledge”) of “the gods” has been ἐναργὴς (énargēs) “apparent”, “evident” or “manifest” (Laértios 10.123) for millennia — the fields of the Earth are filled with statues, votives, frescoes, mosaics, murals, metalwork, jewelry, pottery, and architecture that glorify “the divine nature”. Each civilization peppers its conception of divinity with fresh colors, shapes, and stories, just as each culture ritualizes a contemplative path to care for the health of the soul. In doing so, each group creates a cultural matrix into which subsequent generations are psychologically enmeshed — prior to the widespread proliferation of supernatural soap operas, the first peoples contemplated a raw form of divinity, unsullied by mythic adulterants.

To further isolate the genesis of the unadulterated notion of “god”, Epíkouros traces the crumbs of cognition to their sources in nature. In the case of divine entities, the Sage observes that divine representations have been conditioned by memories of the human animal combined with the congenital preconception of blessedness. When a supplicant prays, meditates, concentrates, reflects, or, generally applies directed focus toward the stored, mental expression of blessedness, they generate a internal image “as if” the practitioner were literally ἐν εἰκόνι (én eìkóni) “in the presence” of an external “representation”, “portrait”, or “icon”. As with the memories of “brightness”, “loudness”, “softness”, and “sweetness”, the characteristics of the gods have been conditioned by images and inspirations received from abroad — those images (like the form of a human body) and inspirations (like peak happiness) become amalgamated in the mind by an intellectual act of transfusion. As with other preconceptions, like χρόνος (khrónos) “time” and δίκαιος (díkaios) “justice”, the mental prototype of “god” functions as an organizing principle or “ruler” against which individual examples can be evaluated — any alleged divinity that punishes, terrorizes, rages, suffers, or fears neither meets the definitions of “blessed” nor “incorruptible”, and cannot by definition be identified as “god”. Epíkouros exhorts Menoikeus to “believe anything about” the image of god “that is able to preserve” that form’s conceptual “incorruptibility and blessedness” (Laértios 10.123). So long as an expression of divinity coheres with the preconception of blessedness, it can truly be called “a god”. Thus, an endless collection of divinities might be perceived, unique to each person, supported by the infinity of particles that constitute both the heavens and the heavenly forms of the mind.

The heavenly form of a “god” appears to the human mind as does any other, mundane formation, as τὸ ὄν (tò ón) “a being” or “an entity” (Philódēmos, On Piety Col. 66A, Line 11). According to Epíkouros, each “entity” can be conceived of as an individual ἑνότης (henótēs, Col. 13.12) “unity” or “union” composed of many other mental particles that coalesce together to form representational σύγκρισεις (sýnkriseis) “compounds” in the mind (Col. 12.11). As Metródōros writes, each νότητα διότροπον (henótēta idiótropon) “distinctive unity” also exists as a “compound made up of things that do not exist as numerically distinct” (On Change, preserved by Philódēmos in On Piety, Col. 4.13-15). Epíkouros further clarifies that “unified entities” in the mind can exhibit one of two constitutions — some “entities” of the mind “are perfected out of [1] the same elements and others are constituted from [2] similar elements” (On God, preserved by Philódēmos in On Piety Col. 8.14-17) The φύσεις (phýseis) “natures” or “constitutions” of all of these “unified entities” are therein grouped according to the origin of their birth, either from [1] a single source, or having coalesced from [2] multiple sources ἐξ ὑπερβάσεως τν (èx hyperbáseōs tôn) “as a result of transposition” during the traversal μεταξύ (metazù) “between” the source and the mind (Ibid., Col.12.8-9). If the mental form of an entity is composed of particles that only originate from [1] a single source, Epíkouros says that they are all αὐτή (autḗ) “the same” in constitution — “the same” form is one that reflects a numerically-singular entity in one’s environment. By contrast, Epíkouros says that appearances composed of particles coming from [2] multiple sources are only superficiallyὁμοία (homoía, Col. 12.6) “similar” because they are only related insofar as their composition as arrays of εἴδωλα (eídola). Besides their shared form as bundles of images, the conceptual amalgamations of “the gods” have been stitched together from a variety of environmental inspirations.

To demonstrate this constitution, one might visualize a dog. This visualized animal is a mental representation. It was previously impressed upon the mind when dog-particles travelled from a dog (or image of a dog) through the air. The visual impulse that impacts the eye triggers an internal cascade that yields the mental form of an animal. The resulting dog-form is a bundle of distinct particles that correspond κατ’ ἀριθμόν (kat’ arithmón, Col. 12.10) “in number” to the measurable proportions of [1] “that same”, furry creature in reality. This representation is composed of particles whose φύσεις (phýseis) “origins” are all αὐτή (autḗ) “the same” — the memory of this “dog” was apprehended “without contamination” from the particles of other, distinct objects (Philodemos, On Gods III, Col. 8). The generative flow of images reflects the activity of the original body, and a dog is not confused for another form (e.g. when dog-forms coalesce with human-forms in our imagination, we picture werewolves).

By contrast, one might visualize a god. Like the dog-form, the god-form is a mental image of an animal. Like the dog-form, the god-form is also apprehended by the intellect. Like the dog-form, the god-form, too was initially triggered by impulses “received from abroad”. However, unlike the mental aggregate that constitutes one’s impression of a “dog”, one’s impression of a “god” is a ὑπέρβασις (hypérbasis), a “superimposition” of at least two different bodies of εἴδωλα (eídola) that are only superficially ὁμοία (homoía) “similar” insofar as their material composition as pictures in the mind. Therein, the compound nature of these images enables their being φθαρτον “indestructible”. By comparison, after the death of a dog and the end of that dog’s eídola, the dog’s form can only be retrieved from memory — we are left with the impressions that a mortal creature gave us of itself during its limited lifespan. The forms of the gods, however, are not at risk of dissolution because they do not have a single source that is subject to death — the sources of the god-forms are unending, undying, and limitless, the infinite soup of particles that is constantly boiling before our very souls. In this regard, “the form of god” is neither [1] a simple body (like a particle), nor a regular compound (like a dog), but is a sort of [2] irregular compound. No compound is a simple body (i.e. a particle), and all compounds are combinations of simple bodies, but unlike the regular compound that is a dog-form, the god-form is not composed of particles that are κατ ριθμν (kat’ árithmòn) “numerically-identical” to their source. Rather, the form of “a god” is composed of particles that are καθ μοείδειαν (kath’ hòmoeídeian) “similar in consistency” such that they can become enlaced to imagine new forms. The image of “god” is formed when the image of a human is conjoined in the mind withthe concept of perfect happiness and the projection of deathlessness. As preserved by Diogénes, Epíkouros explains ος μν (oús mèn) “on one hand” the forms of the gods appear to be κατ ριθμν φεσττας (kat’ árithmòn hyphesttas) “subsisting by number”, as though each “unified entity” corresponds with a single, external body, “but” ος δ (oús mèn) “on the other hand” the gods” are formed καθ μοείδειαν (kath’ hòmoeídeian) from multiple, external sources due to their existence “as a similitude” of images that constitute “a common appearance” (10.139).

In the case of the specific characteristics of “the gods”, human minds tend to render the human visualization of perfection νθρωποειδς (anthrōpoeidṓs) “human-like” (Ibid.) or ἀνθρωπόμορφον (anthrōpómorphon) “human-shaped” (Dēmḗtrios, On the Form of a God 14-16). Granted, “the gods”, as mental projections of humanity, are not “to be considered as bodies of any solidity […] but as images, perceived by similitude and transition” (Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 28). “We do not find the calculation” so writes Demḗtrios, “that any other shape” besides that “of the human” could qualify as a blessed and incorruptible being.” He explains that the gods “are granted to be perfectly happy; and nobody can be happy without virtue, nor can virtue exist where reason is not; and reason can reside in none but the human form”. Philódēmos writes that “we have to infer” their behaviors “from the appearances” made “manifest” to the mind; thus, we visualize god “as a living being” (Philódēmos, On Gods III, Col. 10):

One must [imagine] with Hermarchus that the gods draw in breath and exhale it, for without this, again, we cannot conceive them as such living beings as we have already called them, as neither can one conceive of fish without need in addition of water, nor birds [without additional need] of wings for their flight through the air; for such [living beings] are not better conceived [without their environment] .

Philódēmos further reflects on the conceived environments of the gods:

[E]very nature has a different location suitable to it. To some it is water, to others air and earth. In one case for animals in another for plants and the like. But especially for the gods there has to (be a suitable location), due to the fact that, while all the others have their permanence for a certain time only, the gods have it for eternity. During this time they must not encounter even the slightest cause of nuisance… (On Gods III, Col. 8).

Apollódōros the scholarch infers that “the dwellings” of the fearless gods, unruffled by ferocious winds and falling stars “have to be far away from the forces in our world” (Ibid., Col. 9). He stipulates that the security of these “locations” may not be preserved as a result of “distance” so much as a result of physical disengagement “from the hindering factors that clash against each other”. Epíkouros concurs that “it is possible for their nature to exist even with many troubles surrounding it” (On Piety, Col. 3.3-7). For “even if the things which generate” divine images were “as far away as anyone could wish”, the mundane images of people stored in memory would still combine with the preconception of “blessedness” and form the image of gods who “appear” to “transcend” any amount of “intervening distance” (Philódēmos, On Gods III, Col. 9). Memory, itself “transcends” the perils of our perishable plasma through a perpetual replenishment of minute, mental motes, “having changed each time for producing a thought” (On the Form of a God 12). Dēmḗtrios explains that “the memories people retain of” visual impressions were first “received as children” (Ibid., 11), and despite decades of disruption, those representations can be reproduced continuously. Through contemplation, a supplicant summons a memory of blessedness and transforms the mind into a holy menagerie, capable of hosting a variety of divine forms. After extensive consideration, Apollódōros concludes that the “dwellings” of “the gods” must be constructed “from some of their” own, finely-grained “elements”, repurposed through an act of contemplation (On Gods III, Col. 10).

Philódēmos further supposes that beings who inhabit the sublime territory of the pure mind possess “perception and pleasure”, as well as “an excellent disposition of things which endure” (On Piety, Col. 5). Accordingly, these projections exhibit the same preferences as their human projectors, finding recognizable pleasure in the activity of being rational animals:

we must claim that the gods use both voice and conversation to one another; for we will not conceive them as the more happy or the more indissoluble, [Hermarchus] says, by their neither speaking, nor conversing with each other, but resembling human beings that cannot speak; for since we really do employ voice, all of us who are not disabled persons, it is even the height of foolishness that the gods should either be disabled, or not resemble us in this point, since neither men nor gods can create utterances in any other way. And particularly since for good men, the sharing of discourse with men like them showers down on them indescribably pleasure. And by Zeus one must suppose the gods possess the Hellenic language or one not far from it, and that their voices in expressing rationalist are clearest(Philódēmos, On Gods III, Col. 13)

Humans picture “the gods” to be perpetually-happy people, ceaselessly-savoring the pleasures of friendship, “for it is not possible for them to maintain their community as a species without any social intercourse” (Philódēmos, On Gods, Fr. 87). Unburdened by the undue responsibilities of celestial governance, astral adjudication, and cosmic corrections, the holy inhabitants of the mind seem wholly self-reliant. Perfectly prudent, they appear to privilege the preservation of their own peace above impractical obligations. As ζῷον (zōîon 10.123) living figures, they are expected to respirate; as social figures, they are imagined to converse; as rational figures, they are understood to reflect; as blessed figures, they are acclaimed to live without fear, imperishable paragons of human perfection. The human-shaped deities appear to sustain a peak state of pure pleasure, that which cannot be heightened by excess.

Demḗtrios cautions that, “when we say in fact the God is human-shaped” we should note that God is not actuallyhuman (On the Form of a God 15). In On the Nature of the Gods, Cicero’s character Velleius concurs that god “is not body, but something like body” nor “does it contain any blood, but something like blood” (28). Like the concepts of “justice” and “time”, the concept of “god” is not “attached” to an external body, “except [in the case] of calculation, wherefore we interweave” thoughts in the mill of the mind from subtle threads of memory (Laértios 10.72). Velleius admits, “these distinctions were more acutely devised and more artfully expressed by Epicurus than any common capacity can comprehend”. The gods are, nonetheless “real”, “unified entities” as reproducible appearances in the mind.

In an effort to “realize” his own spiritual “fulfillment”, Philódēmos further scrutinizes the images of these “beings surpassing [περβαλλουσν or hyperballousōn] in power [δυνμει or dynámei] and excellence [σπουδαιότητι or spoudaiótēti]”, who equally “excel [περέχον or hyperékhon] in sovereignty [γεμονίαν or hegemonían]” and infers the following:

that of all existing things, [the divine nature] is the best [ριστον or áriston] and most holy [σεμνότατον or semnótaton, “dignified” or “revered”], most worthy of emulation [ξιοζηλωτότατον or áxiozēlōtótaton, “enviable”], having dominion over all good things [πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν κυριευόντα or pántōn tōn agathṓn kurieúonta], unburdened by affairs [πραγμάτευτον or pragmáteuton], and exalted [ψηλόν or hypsēlon, “sublime” or “proud”] and great-minded [μεγαλόφρονα or megalóphrona, “noble” or “generous”] and great-spirited μεγαλόψυχον or megalópsykhon, “magnanimous”] and ritually pure [γιον or hágion, “sacred”] and purest [γιοτατον or àgiōtaton, “holiest”] and propitious[ῑ̔́λεων or hī́leōn, “blameless”]. Therefore they say that they alone strive after the greatest form of piety and that they hold […] the purest views as regards the ineffable [φραστον or áphraston, “inexpressible” or “marvelous”] pre-eminence [περοχήν or hyperokhēn, “superiority”] of the strength[σχύος or ìskhúos, “power”] and perfection [τελειότητος or teleiótētos, “completeness”] of the divine[toû theíou] […] [Epíkouros] advises not to think [God] bad-tempered (as he is thought), for example, by the poets. (On Piety, Col. 45.2-30).

Lucretius observes that CAELESTI SVMVS OMNES SEMINE ORIVNDI “we have all come from heavenly seed” (De Rerum Natura 2.991). The pieces of reality that comprise our bodies are the same pieces that comprise the stars and the memories in our minds. Cosmic firstlings fall from the “heavens” and amalgamate upon this world, contributing to the body of the terrestrial aggregate. Nature repurposes these elements for the benefit of evolution — many of the “heavenly” particles become recycled into the motes of the mind, which are then reconstituted into the “heavenly” forms of “the gods”. Summarily, all particles travel through the heavens and can become repurposed into the “heavenly” bodies of divine idols. So long as mortals exist to engage in the enterprise of story-telling, immortals can exist in perpetuity.

The Epicurean philosophers confidently affirm that no “god” attended the inauguration of the Earth — no supernatural supervisors were present to oversee the development of the early cosmos. The existence of a human god did not precede the existence of a human animal. Prior to the emergence of the human being, the human body had yet to exist — “the god” had yet to be conceived. It was only after humans evolved, formed friendships, shared memories, and suffered loss that prehistoric peoples internalized their experiences, dreamed of deathlessness, and projected their inspirations as sublime, psychological icons, providing guidance and inspiration to generations of people. So long as human beings continue to dream, human egos will continue to project their ideals upon the walls of the mind, constructing holy heroes and righteous role models that embody their ideals; so too will people continue to manufacture tragic myths. While these forms of blessedness can be continuously reproduced, many fall into disuse as the masses champion tragic heroes who contradict the basic definition of perfection that “god” implies.

The primary concern of Epicurean theology is to protect the conceptual blessedness and incorruptibility of the “divine nature” from “contamination […] lest they become mixed up with” terrestrial troubles “to the detriment of their imperishability” (On God III, Col. 9). For Epíkouros, any fearful “contamination” poured upon the form of blessedness mutates the pure notion into a chimera (like a centaur or gorgon), a tragic antagonist in dramatic fiction. Accordingly, as the conceit of a medusa sublimates the notions of “woman” and “snakes”, so, too does the notion of a demiurgesublimate “god” with “artist” — prior to the laborious ingenuity of creative hands, no “creator” could be contrived. Likewise, the notion of LORD conjoins “god” with “king” — here again, prior to the phenomenon of “kings” lordingover subjects, no conception of a LORD could have existed. Similarly, understanding “god” to be “The Father” requires the believer to have been born within a species that observes the “male parent” to play a role in child-rearing — without this context, “The Father” is meaningless.

Compared with the chimeric myths of the masses, the pure conception of “blessedness” or “complete happiness” (e.g. impassivity, tranquility, cheerfulness, and delight) corresponds precisely with the natural standard that the word “god” implies. As humans employ the preconception of “time” to evaluate the duration of events, and, similarly employ the preconception of “justice” to evaluate the commensurability of relationships, so too do humans employ the preconception of “god” to evaluate ethical priorities and set behavioral goals.

While many imagine “god” as a “real animal” with “common” features that subsists beyond the walls of the world, this assumption leads to contradictions (Dēmḗtrios 16). [ I ] First, extreme isolation from the nutritive “forces of the world that produce things subject to generation and dissolution” would inhibit any inhabitant’s access to natural necessities. It would severely challenge any entity “resembling a human being” from being able to sufficiently replenish its losses and preserve its perfections (Philódēmos, On Gods III, Col. 9). The “happiness” promised “beyond Zeus” is expressed as “the cry of the flesh [that] neither hungers, nor does it thirst, nor does it shiver” (Vatican Saying 33). Consequently, a “living being”, “breathing in and out” that is restricted from the “forces of generation” that supply air and shed light would suffer the same impairments as a “disabled person” whose disposition restricts their ability to acquire breath and behold the “the sight of sweet motions” (Laértios 10.6). Philódēmos cautions that it is “the height of foolishness” to suppose “that the gods should either be disabled, or not resemble us in this point” (On Gods III, Col. 13). [II] Secondly, the notion of a pre-human, human-shaped entity contradicts Epíkouros’ description of cosmic evolution. Naturally, the pig cannot precede the piglet, and the human form cannot precede the emergence of the human animal. The memory of a human body cannot precede the body of a human being remembered. “Thus, each name follows [what] is visible […]For one must perceive the [external] form before the preconception” (Laértios 10.33). [III] Thirdly, the bodies of external gods could not be “evident” if they were truly unobservable. Dēmḗtrios explains that “the thinnest-particles”, such as those which constitute the mind, are too fine to “truly constitute” visual “perception” (On the Form of a God21). He further affirms that “nothing diaphanous [is] sensible” (Ibid., 22). Therefore, if knowledge of external god-bodies has yet “to be confirmed or to be contradicted” through direct apprehension due to their imperceptibility, then external gods could never be “manifest” to the mind (Laértios 10.51). Yet Epíkouros affirms that “knowledge of them” is “evident” as internal projections of blessedness (Ep. Men. 10.123). [IV] Finally, the mode of subsistence of non-terrestrial entities, though “human-like” would present hazards to any terrestrial animals attempting to emulate their lifestyles. The στοιχειώμaτa (stoikheiṓmata, “elementary principles” 10.36) affirm that the compounds of the Earth have been conditioned by local forces — non-terrestrial entities lack exposure to those forces that condition which sensations are pleasurable and painful, and for which animals. Thus, human animals incur great risk in attempting to emulate the behavior of entities that only superficially resemble the human-form. By contrast, Philódēmos encourages us to “imitate” the “blessedness” of recognizable idols, not to ritualize the idiosyncratic lifestyle of an alien (On Piety, Col. 71.16-17).

Ultimately, these speculative examples of divinity, proposed to exist, independent of the human mind, are unnecessary to contextualize religious practice and to justify a defense of spirituality. In the continuum of the mind, prayer has phenomenal power and piety has purpose. Dēmḗtrios concludes “that even by means of contemplation”, as streams of superimposed images in the mind, each “deity” physically “possesses a substance” and wields influence (On the Form of a God 15). Though Philódēmos concedes that “no one has been prolific in finding convincing demonstrations for the existence of” independent “gods” with “human-shaped” bodies, he “nevertheless” recognizes “all humans, with the exception of some” to “worship them […] as do we” (On Piety, Col. 23.13-21). “Apparent indeed is this knowledge” (Laértios 10.123).

Works Cited

Armstrong, David. “Epicurean virtues, Epicurean friendship: Cicero vs the Herculaneum papyri” in Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, Cambridge University Press, 2011, 126-8.

Cicero, Marcus, et al. Cicero on the Nature of the Gods. Translated by C. D. Yonge, 1872.

Dēmḗtrios of Lakonía. “On the Form of a God.” Translated by N. H. Bartman, Twentiers, 5 Apr. 2025, https://twentiers.com/form-of-god/ (accessed 14 Nov. 2025).

Diogénēs of Oìnóanda and Smith, Martin Ferguson. Supplement to Diogenes of Oinoanda the Epicurean Inscription. Bibliopolis, 2003.

Empeirikós, Séxtos. Against the Physicists. Against the Ethicists. Translated by R. G. Bury, Harvard University Press, 1953.

Epíkouros, et al. The Hedonicon: The Holy Book of Epicurus. Translated by N. H. Bartman et al., 1st ed., Leaping Pig Publishing, 17 Nov. 2023.

Essler, Holger. “Space and Movement in Philodemus’ De Dis [On Gods] 3: an Anti-Aristotelian Account.” Critical Studies in Ancient Physics, 2014.

Laértios, Diogénēs. “Book 10.” Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Translated by Stephen White, Cambridge University Press, 2021, 411-462.

Laértios, Diogénēs. Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers: Book 10. Translated by Bartman, N. H. in “The Life of Epíkouros: A Translation for Twentiers”, Leaping Pig Publishing, 21 May 2025,www.academia.edu/129436319/The_Life_of_Ep%C3%ADkouros_A_Translation_for_Twentiers (accessed 17 Nov. 2025).

Logeion, University of Chicago, https://logeion.uchicago.edu/, (accessed 17 Nov. 2025).

Lucretius Carus, Titus. The Way Things Are. Translated by Rolfe Humphries, Indiana University Press, 1968, page 80.

Philódēmos of Gádara.On Gods”. Translated by Essler and Armstrong, Twentiers, Leaping Pig Publishing,https://twentiers.com/on-gods/ (accessed 16 Nov. 2025).

Philódēmos of Gádara. On Piety. Translated by Dirk Obbink, Oxford University Press, 1996.

Twentiers.com. Leaping Pig Publishing, https://www.twentiers.com/ (accessed 15 Nov. 2025).

Happy Eikas! On the Past, Present, and Future Causes of Pleasures

I hope all our readers are enjoying a happy and peaceful Eikas! I recently authored a three-part essay series titled On the Past, Present and Future Causes of Pleasures.

Our friend Nate authored:

His page Twentiers.com has added several literary updates:

Montgomery Crowe is a new content creator in the Epicurean blogosphere, and is the author of the blog The House that Epicurus Built. We wish him well with his new platform!

May be an image of text that says 'MLY ራ ۲ ٧ NE JA SHUT SHUTTHEFUCK THE FUCK UP, UP,DONNY!'

This weekend was huge fun for me. My neighbor and brunch buddy invited me to participate with him in the Chicago No Kings march, which ended up being the largest multi-city rally in the history of the US, and where I enjoyed hundreds of memes. One that stuck out for me was this one from The Big Lebowski, the film that gave us The Dude. Coincidentally, on Friday night I watched the movie Tron: Ares. I thought it was okay, sort of like The Matrix but with 80’s aesthetics. One of the highlights of the movie was the appearance of Jeff Bridges, the actor who plays The Dude, in a role similar to one played by the Architect in The Matrix. He wore a white robe, looks much older like a Wise Old Man, and his conversation with the main character delved into philosophical questions on how being a mortal renders life much more valuable than immortality does–which I thought was quite Epicurean.

On Sunday, SoFE members and friends enjoyed an Eikas program focusing on Lucretian Goddess spirituality. More people than usual were in attendance, and in the future I will continue to delve into some of the issues that we discussed this weekend at Eikas. If you wish to join our discussions, you may join the Garden of Epicurus group on FB. If you wish to support my work, you may do so at Substack or Patreon.

Pleasure and Prudence in the Dhammapada

As we strive to maintain a synoptic view of the field of philosophy, so as to neither narrow the scope of our awareness nor limit the expression of our understanding, the Society of Friends of Epicurus pursues a commitment to inter-disciplinary study and cross-cultural analysis. Evaluating of our own beliefs against other wisdom traditions helps contextualize personal practice, and further illuminates a larger spectrum of spirituality. In particular, we have found it profitable to compare and contrast Epicurean Philosophy against the various traditions of बौद्ध धर्म (Buddha Dhamma), the “Law of the Awakened One”, represented to us in English as “Buddhism“. In particular, SoFE has explored the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition as preserved by the famous Lotus Sutra. Other essays include reflections on Nichiren and Japanese Buddhism, as well as an essay on the Epicurean-like tradition of Charvaka, a hedonistic school of Indian materialism that outright rejected reincarnation and dismissed mystical practices.

As a supplement to our explorations on the Mahāyāna traditions, I wish to explore the Indian Theravāda tradition as preserved by an ancient text called the DHAMMAPADA:

“If all of the New Testament had been lost, it has been said, and only the Sermon on the Mount had managed to survive these two thousand years of history, we would still have all that is necessary for following the teachings of Jesus the Christ. The body of Buddhist scripture is much more voluminous than the Bible, but I would not hesitate to make a similar claim: if everything else were lost, we would need nothing more than the Dhammapada to follow the way of the Buddha.” (Eknath Easwaran, The Dhammapada 13).

The ancient धम्मपद (Dhammapada) is a collection of sayings attributed to Siddhartha Gautama, the बौद्ध (Buddha) or “Awakened One”. “Dhammapada means something like ‘the path of dharma’— of truth, of righteousness, of the central law that all of life is one” (Ibid. 14). The Dhammapada, itself is the second book of the Khuddaka Nikāya, the “Minor Collection”, the last of five nikāyas (or “volumes”) of the Sutta Piṭaka, the “Basket of Discourse”, the second of three divisions of the Tipiṭaka, the “Triple Basket”, the scriptural canon of Theravāda (“school of elders”).

The Theravāda school, founded in the 3rd-century BCE and found today in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, represents an earlier tradition that proposed a “Middle Way” between the “Eternalism” of the Brahmin religion that proposes the existence of an eternal आत्मन् (ātman) or “self”, versus the “Annihilationism” of Ajita Kesakambalī’s hedonistic school of Chārvāka (which is much more similar to Epicurean Philosophy). Buddha rejected (almost) all metaphysical propositions and described the true nature of one’s being as anattā, the “non-self”, lacking permanency. All knowledge is validated by two paramana or “proofs”, [1] pratyakṣa or “perception” and [2] anumāna or “inference”. Perception and inference are due to the six āyatana or “sense objects” of sight, sound, odor, taste, touch, and thought.

The criteria Buddha accepted lead him to conclude that reality is a changing, experiential aggregate, composed of [1] the elemental forms (rūpa), solid earth, cohesive water, mobile gas, warm fire, and empty space, [2] sensuous feeling (vedanā), [3] mental cognition (saṃjñā), [4] willful determination (saṅkhāra), and [5] consciousness (vijñāna). Natural patterns are observed, but propositions about them are are dismissed as meaningless speculations. Beings migrate through numerous planes of existence (ascending to heavens and descending to hells). One’s directionality at death reflects their कम्म (kamma) or moral causality. As they refine their kamma or “moral causality”, they get closer to the goal of निब्बान (Nibbāna). The goal of life is Nibbāna the end of दुक्ख (dukkhā) or “suffering” and release from संसार (saṃsāra), the cycle of rebirths caused due to one’s avijjā or “ignorance” of अनिच्चा (anicca) or “impermanence”. To achieve the goal of life, one must follow the Noble Eightfold Path according to the dhamma or “law” taught by Buddha to achieve the “extinguishment” of suffering: [1] Right Resolve, [2] Right Speech, [3] Right Conduct, [4] Right Livelihood, [5] Right Effort [6] Right Mindfulness, [7] Right Meditation, and [8] Right view that death is not the end. There are also a variety of blissful entities called Devas, who inhabit emotional “planes of existence”. Each realm is defined by the disposition of its inhabitant. The devas, themselves, are also working toward the goal of Nibbāna.

By contrast, the younger Mahāyāna school was cultivated by Nāgārjuna (c. 150-250 CE) who developed the highly influential Madhyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy (possibly influenced by Pyrrhonism through the works of Sextus Empiricus; Pyrrhonism, itself, was likely inspired by Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta, the founder of Ajñāna, a competitor of early Buddhism). Many other influential Buddhists helped spread the religion, such as Bodhidharma to China and Padmasambhāva to the Tibetan Plateau. The epistemology of Mahāyāna differs from its predecessor. In this school, all objects lack independent existences. Objects only meaningfully exists within the continuum of the mind. Physical phenomena is dismissed as माया (māyā), “magic” or “illusions”, and the appearance of the natural world is understood to be an ephemeral dream. Reality is fundamentally शून्यता (śūnyatā) or “emptiness”. All things lack a स्वभाव (svabhāva) or “independent nature” (as was used by the atheistic Chārvāka to refer to the physical nature of reality). The only “real” existence is consciousness. The energetic activities of nature are simply objects that exist within the mind, including the “body” and the “self”, which are also just temporary illusions within the continuous citta-santāna or “mindstream”.

A variety of mythic beings inhabit the various realms of existence according to Mahāyāna Buddhists, from gods to hungry ghosts. Heavens are idealized as Pure Lands, each of which is inhabited and ruled by its respective बोधिसत्त (bodhisattva). Buddha is treated as a universal deity, and other “Buddhas” are acknowledged to exist besides Shakyamuni (Gautama Buddha). “Buddhahood” is available to everyone and the achievements of Siddhārtha are not as emphasized as is the Buddha-nature, itself. To achieve Nirvāṇa, one must pursue the altruistic path of the bodhisattva, who works for the benefit of all beings by helping others achieve bodhi or “enlightenment”, and not simply one’s own enlightenment. Thus, the path of the Mahāyāna bodhisattva involves going beyond the Eightfold Path of the arhat to devote themselves toward practicing Buddhism for the benefit of all beings before finally achieving a state of Nirvāṇa. This continuous mission is thought to extend beyond an individual’s life into their future lives.

The Epicurean school overwhelmingly inhabits the opposite end of the philosophical spectrum. Our hedonistic school of indeterministic atomism proposes that reality exists independent of the mind. The universe is made of bodies and void. Bodies are either particles that can neither be created nor destroyed, or compounds that are composed of particles. All compound objects are subject to the forces of dissolution. Both space and the particles that move through it are infinite in number and eternal in time. The mind is a compound structure associated with a living animal, and can be located within the body. All knowledge begins with [1] sensation (aisthesis) caused by the interaction of external particles with our sensory organs. We detect pleasurable or painful [2] feelings (pathē) associated with the various sensations. Through repeated stimulation, we form [3] anticipations (prolepsis) about the patterns of nature.

The Earth, Sun, Moon, planets, and other linked objects comprise a kosmos in a spatially-infinite void with infinite kosmoi. All kosmoi are made of atoms. The seeds of life are everywhere. The gods are perfect figures in the mind, natural forms, imagined as indestructible humanoids, apprehended during dream-states, relative to our natural preconception of “blessedness”. Though, as was the case with the Buddhist schools, our Founder is also romanticized as having been god-like. Unlike the otherworldy goal of the Buddhists, we seek to achieve a godlike state of pure pleasure during our singular life, a disposition of imperturbable joy, free from physical pain and mental anguish. The practice of prudence will lead the wise person to the good life. We achieve such a life by calculating the advantages of every situation based on their possibility to provide stable, long-term pleasure. Actions are judged according to their consequences. There are no “eternal” ethical rules. There are, however, Key Doctrines written by Epíkouros that should be studied in order to minimize pain and maximize the pleasure of the good life.

While many of these positions are mutually-exclusive, the behaviors that compliment each traditions are universal. We find correspondence between a number of Buddhist and Epicurean attitudes: both traditions treat life with a sense of urgency, seek to organize healthy priorities, practice choice and avoidance, privilege the pursuit of knowledge, exercise discipline, and acknowledge the emptiness of political reputation. Both traditions warn against the consequences of greed, and caution against the vanity of power. Both encourage us to emulate role models, cultivate confidence, reject dishonesty, pursue study, exercise virtue, practice peace, reject empty ritual, and care for the health of the mind through contemplation. 

The following passages from the Dhammapada exemplify these SHARED points of agreement:

  1. There are those who do not realize that one day we all must die. But those who do realize this settle their quarrels. We have been born once, twice then we will not exist; it was fated for the eon [beyond] that we will no longer be; but you who are not the master-of-tomorrow delay the rejoicing; then a life is consumed by procrastination, and each one of us dies without leisure.” (Vatican Saying 14)
  1. Those who mistake the unessential to be essential and the essential to be unessential, dwelling in wrong thoughts, never arrive at the essential. No one who perceives what is evil prefers it for themself, but they are seduced by a good when a greater evil itself was pursued.” (Vatican Saying 16)
  1. Those who know the essential to be essential and the unessential to be unessential, dwelling in right thoughts, do arrive at the essential. Therefore adapt into a simple and not extravagant lifestyle as it forms an essential part of health and you will exercise the necessary [things] of life [that] make a person resolute and if you approach extravagant things after intervals it makes us stronger and you procure fearlessness against Luck.” (Epistle to Menoikeus 131)
  1. The foolish and ignorant indulge in heedlessness, but the wise one keeps his heedfulness as his best treasure. …you have taken time to devote yourself to thoughts concerning nature against those that are ignorant and [can now] behold an eon ‘both things as they are, things as they will be, and things before they are’ [as the poets say]” (Metródōros, Vatican Saying 10)A wise [person] combines about the necessities, more knowledge to share than to receive; they have discovered so great a treasure as that of [self-sufficiency].” (Vatican Saying 44)
  1. Just as one upon the summit of a mountain beholds the groundlings, even so when the wise man casts away heedlessness by heedfulness and ascends the high tower of wisdom, this sorrowless sage beholds the sorrowing and foolish multitude. But nothing is more welcome than to hold the lofty and serene positions well fortified by the learning of the wise, from which you may look down upon others and see them wandering all abroad and going astray in their search for the path of life, see the contest among them of intellect, the rivalry of birth, the striving night and day with surpassing effort to struggle up to the summit of power and be masters of the world.” (Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 2.3-13)
  1. Ere long, alas! this body will lie upon the earth, unheeded and lifeless, like a useless log. We have been born once, twice then we will not exist; it was fated for the eon [beyond] that we will no longer be; but you who are not the master-of-tomorrow delay the rejoicing; then a life is consumed by procrastination, and each one of us dies without leisure.” (Vatican Saying 14)
  1. Fools of little wit are enemies unto themselves as they move about doing evil deeds, the fruits of which are bitter. The ungrateful [essence] of the soul produces within a greedy animal an endless [craving] for a lifestyle of varieties.” (Vatican Saying 69)
  1. Ill done is that action of doing which one repents later, and the fruit of which one, weeping, reaps with tears. One cannot escape detection who secretly disturbs the pact one agreed upon with another neither to harm nor to be harmed, nor to trust that one will escape detection, even if ten thousand times the one present escapes detection. For until one’s reduction to nothingness one cannot suppose that one will ever escape detection.” (Key Doctrine 35)
  1. Well done is that action of doing which one repents not later, and the fruit of which one, reaps with delight and happiness. The greatest fruit of justice is tranquility.” (Vatican Saying 80)
  1. The fool seeks undeserved reputation, precedence among monks, authority over monasteries, and honor among householders. The disturbance of the soul cannot be ended nor true joy created either by the possession of the greatest wealth or by honor and respect in the eyes of the mob or by anything else that is associated with or caused by unlimited desire.” (Vatican Saying 81)
  1. Should one find a man who points out faults and who reproves, let him follow usch a wise and sagacious person as one would a guide to hidden treasure. It is always better, and never worse, to cultivate such an association. The worship of the wise is a great good to you who will worship.” (Vatican Saying 32)
  1. Just as a solid rock is not shaken by the storm, even so the wise are not affected by praise or blame. For we practice all of this in order to neither suffer nor dread. When once then this has come to pass because of us, we dispel the whole Storm of the Soul...” (Epistle to Menoikeus 128)
  1. He is indeed virtuous, wise and righteous who neither for his own sake nor for the sake of another (does any wrong), who does not crave for son, wealth, or kingdom, and does not desire success by unjust means. The disturbance of the soul cannot be ended nor true joy created either by the possession of the greatest wealth or by honor and respect in the eyes of the mob or by anything else that is associated with or caused by unlimited desire.” (Vatican Saying 81)
  1. Better than a thousand useless words is one useful word, hearing which one attains peace. Better than a thousand useless verses is one useful verse, hearing which one attains peace. (101-102) One must not pretend to study philosophy, but really study philosophy; for we do not pretend to need health, but in truth [really need] health.” (Vatican Saying 54)
  1. Better it is to live one day virtuous and meditative than to live a hundred years immoral and uncontrolled. “The same time [satisfies] both [in terms] of generation of the greatest good19 and of deliverance [from evil].” (Vatican Saying 42) The sensible person profits from one day they would by eternity.” (Philódēmos, On Death)
  1. Hasten to do good; restrain your mind from evil. He who is slow in doing good, his mind delights in evil. … anyone who is capable of restraint can bring that which is blessed in oneself by having preserved reasoning” (Usener fragment 485; Porphyrious, Letter to Marcella 29)
  1. Just as a trader with a small escort and great wealth would avoid a perilous route, or just as one desiring to live avoids poison, even so should one shun evil. [The] youthful part of [yourself, in regard to its] salvation, guard the [precious] part of life and preserve all of those things that are sullied by the raging desires.” (Vatican Saying 80)
  1. Neither in the sky nor in mid-ocean, nor by entering into mountain clefts, nowhere in the world is there a place where one may escape from the results of evil deeds. One cannot escape detection who secretly disturbs, that pact one agreed upon with another neither to harm nor to be harmed, nor to trust that one will escape detection, even if ten thousand times the one present escapes detection, for until one’s reduction to nothingness one cannot suppose that one will ever escape detection.” (Key Doctrine 35)
  1. Neither in the sky nor in mid-ocean, nor by entering into mountain clefts, nowhere in the world is there a place where one may will not be overcome by death. Some prepare throughout life for the [good] Life [in spite of the drug of death, yet] indiscriminately we have all been infused with the deadly drug from birth.” (Mētródōros, Vatican Saying 30)
  1. One who, while himself seeking happiness, oppresses with violence other beings who also desire happiness, will not attain happiness hereafter. One who, while himself seeking happiness, does not oppress with violence other beings who also desire happiness, will find happiness hereafter. (131-132) One [who is] untroubled, oneself, [is] also, for another, undisruptive.” (Vatican Saying 79)
  1. Neither going about naked, nor matted locks, nor filth, nor fasting, nor lying on the ground, nor smearing oneself with ashes and dust, nor sitting on the heels (in penance) can purify a mortal who has not overcome doubt. There was no point procuring protection from people if a person starts suspicion of those things from the sky and beneath the earth and generally in the Infinite.” (Key Doctrine 13)Impious then is not the one who rejects the deities of the masses, but the one who adheres to the masses’ doctrines about the deities. For [their] assertions are not impression but false assumptions of the masses about the deities.” (Epistle to Menoikeus 123-124)
  1. If one holds oneself dear, one should diligently watch oneself. Let the wise man keep vigil during any of the three watches of the night. [The] youthful part of [yourself, in regard to its] salvation, guard the [precious] part of life and preserve all of those things that are sullied by the raging desires.” (Vatican Saying 80)
  1. Good is it to see the Noble Ones; to live with them is ever blissful. One will always be happy by not encountering fools. The worship of the wise is a great good to you who will worship.” (Vatican Saying 32)
  1. The idler who does not exert himself when he should, who though young and strong is full of sloth, with a mind full of vain thoughts — such an indolent man does not find the path to wisdom. Neither should one who is new [to this world] hesitate to love wisdom, nor should an elder begin to grow tired loving wisdom. For no person is either unripe nor too ripe to be healthy throughout the[ir] soul.” (Epistle to Menoikeus 122)
  1. If by renouncing a lesser happiness one may realize a greater happiness, let the wise man renounce the lesser, having regard for the greater. …sometimes we step over many pleasures, since at such times more difficulties follow us from these; and we consider of the pleasures many pains better, whenever our greater pleasure follows many times these pains we endure.” (Epistle to Menoikeus 129)
  1. Entangled by the bonds of hate, he who seeks his own happiness by inflicting pain on others, is never delivered from hatred. One cannot be fearless [if] one causes [others to be] fearful.” (Usener fragment 537)
  1. [D]isciples of […] ever awaken happily who day and night delight in the practice… (296-301) Therefore, these and those things study for yourself, day and night, and with those like yourself, and at no time neither awake nor in a dream will you be confounded, for no living person surrounded by immortal Good seems like a mortal creature.” (Epistle to Menoikeus 135)
  1. Four mistfotunes befall the reckless man who consorts with another’s wife… (309-310) The wise will not have intercourse with a woman so far as the laws forbid so affirms Diogénēs [of Tarsós] in the Epitome of the Ethical Doctrines of Epíkouros” (Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 10.118)
  1. If for company you find a wise and prudent friend who leads a good life, you should, overcoming all impediments, keep his company joyously and mindfully. Of those things that wisdom prepares for a full life of blessedness, by far the most important is the possession of friendship. The same knowledge that created confidence concerning both the fact that nothing terrible is eternal nor even enduring, and also in the same observations perceives that security is predominately perfected by friendships.” (Key Doctrines 27-28)
  1. Good is virtue until life’s end, good is faith that is steadfast, good is the acquisition of wisdom, and good is the avoidance of evil. For [it is] neither drinking and following festivals nor taking advantage of servants and women nor an expensive multitude of fish nor of however much else fills an extravagant table that makes life pleasant, but sober calculation and examining the cause of each choice and avoidance, and expelling the [masses’] doctrines, from out of these the greatest confusion overtakes our souls.” (Epistle to Menoikeus 132)
  1. One should not despise what one has received, nor envy the gains of others. The monk who envies the gains of others does not attain to meditative absorption. One must not spoil the present by yearning for the absent; but consider that also these [present] things were once of the [things for which] we wish.” (Vatican Saying 35)

While similarities are abundant, we find many passages that exhibit dissimilar attitudes, illustrating conceptual incompatibility between the systems, particularly in each traditions’ position on ethics and death. Theravāda Buddhism recommends a much more restrictive lifestyle than Epíkouros intended, much more reminiscent of the restrictive laws of the biblical books of Deuteronomy and Leviticus. Compared with Epicurean sensualism, Theravāda Buddhism is positively ascetic. Much of the voluminous Tipiṭaka contain lists of rules for monks (भिक्खु or bhikkus) and nuns (भिक्षुणी or bhikkunīs), supposing that the path to wisdom is necessarily monastic (as though a church were to have prescribed the restrictions of the Desert Fathers for everyone seeking God). Theravāda Buddhism presents a strict path of renunciation that involves the displacement of the self from personal affections and attachments.

The first book of the Pāli Canon is a code of conduct for monastics. To note a few rules:

  • Sexual intercourse leads to complete expulsion from the monastic community. (Pārājika 1)
  • Masturbating warrants correction. (Saṅghādisesa 1)
  • Holding hands with another person warrants correction. (Saṅghādisesa 2)
  • Marriage proposals warrant correction. (Saṅghādisesa 5)
  • Huts not built to the Buddha’s design specifications warrant correction. (Saṅghādisesa 6)

Epíkouros presents a very dissimilar approach to spirituality from these sexless Jedi: “We must simultaneously laugh and philosophize, and manage a household and administrate the economic affairs and never let go of the language of the forthright philosophy” (VS 41).

Differences are equally abound between Buddhist and Epicurean views on death (thanatology) and the afterlife (or explicit lack thereof). While both traditions acknowledge the inevitability of death, the Buddhist doctrine of कम्म (kamma) necessitates that an ethical component of the human aggregate survives the dissolution of the rest of the human frame. A moral quality of this component, which is cultivated throughout the life of the previous human aggregate, determines the manner in which this component becomes embodied in its next human form. Epíkouros unequivocally opposes this idea: “We have been born once, twice then we will not exist; it was fated for the eon [beyond] that we will no longer be…” (Vatican Saying 14).

Noticeably, the two traditions provide incompatible depictions of pleasure. The Dhammapada describe काम (kāma) (or “sense pleasure”) in the negative, exclusively linking “pleasure” with a state of recklessness and spiritual abandon in which one acts out of ignorance. Early Buddhists did not (as was also the case with Greek Kyrenaics) recognize “mental impassiveness” as a form of “pleasure”, and, instead, framed physical pleasures as being excessive and indulgent. By contrast, Epíkouros explicitly recognizes pleasure as the goal in life. He further acknowledges that the good life cannot be enjoyed after that life has ended. Pleasure is the happy goal in life, and it is categorically opposed to practices that are ignorant, reckless, and indulgent.

Additionally, each tradition provides noticeably different evaluations of friendship. The Epicurean tradition privileges friendship as a natural and necessary desire, as well the principle means of securing a happy life; conversely, the Buddhist tradition treats interpersonal bonds as unnecessary attachments that inevitably lead to suffering. This interpretation is contextualized within a larger paradigm that views desire as being painful (and thus, undesirable). For the atom prophets, the satisfaction of desires is a necessary practice to be enjoyed as we advance upon the path to wisdom. For Theravada monks, it is necessary to vanquish desire. For the sages of the Garden, the good life cannot be enjoyed without cultivating robust friendships and enjoying the fruits of companionship; for the monks of the forest, the best life is lived in total isolation.

These DIFFERENCES are illustrated with the following passages.

  1. Just as a storm throws down a weak tree, so does Mara overpower the man who lives for the pursuit of pleasures… “…we [Epicureans] say the goal is Pleasure…” (Epistle to Menoikeus 131)
  1. Just as rain does not break through a well-thatched house, so passion never penetrates a well-developed mind. [A wise person] will be more affected by passions, but [this] will not be an impediment toward their wisdom” (Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 10.117)
  1. Do not give way to heedlessness. Do not indulge in sensual pleasures. Only the heedful and meditative attain great happiness. Neither can I, for one, possess what I know to be The Good by diminishing the pleasures of flavor, nor by diminishing the [pleasures] of Aphrodisian [intercourse], nor by diminishing the pleasures of hearing, nor even by diminishing the [pleasures] of appearance as far as the sight of sweet motions.” (Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 10.6)
  1. The Destroyer brings under his sway the person of distracted mind who, insatiate in sense desires, only plucks the flowers (of pleasure). “[W]e say Pleasure is the beginning and ending of living blessedly” (Epistle to Menoikeus 128)
  1. As a bee gathers honey from the flower without inuring its color or fragrance, even so the sage goes on his alms-round in the village. The greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom.” (Vatican Saying 77)
  1. Let none find fault with others; let none see the omissions and comissions of others. But let one see one’s own acts, done and undone. “For all {wise men} both love {their students} alike in accord with the worth of each and see their faults alike” (Philódēmos, On Frankness Col. Mb)
  1. Of all the fragrances — sandal, tagara, blue lotus and jasmine — the fragrance of virtue is the sweetest. “I spit upon pleasures that come from extravagance not because of them, but because of the difficulties that follow them.” (Epíkouros, Usener fragment 181)
  1. The good renounce (attachment for) everything. The virtuous do not prattle with a yearning for pleasures. The wise show no elation or depression when touched by happiness or sorrow. “Furthermore, for the sake of pleasure we choose the virtues, not for their own sake, [but] just as medicine, for the sake of health.” (Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 138) “One must value what is beautiful, and the virtues, and such manners if they produce pleasure; but if they do not produce pleasure, one must bid them farewell” (Usener fragment 70)
  1. But those who act according to the perfectly taught Dhamma will cross the realm of Death, so difficult to cross. The [cessation called] death, in no way [does it exist] for us; for that which has dissolved lacks perception; but what lacks perception in no way [exists] for us.” (Key Doctrine 2)
  1. Giving up sensual pleasures, with no attachment, let the wise man cleanse himself of defilements of the mind. Nevertheless it will always be beneficial to offer friendship just as [it will always be beneficial]  for us to plant seeds in the earth, thus [friendship] itself cultivates those communities that [work together to] perfect the pleasures.” (Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 10.120)
  1. Inspiring are the forests in which worldlings find no pleasure. There the passionless will rejoice, for they seek no sensual pleasures. Great stresses draw [life] short, and such times [provide] no great abundance.” (Usener fragment 447)”The peak of pleasure is the excision of all pain; and wherever pleasure is, for the time that it is, there is neither discomfort, nor distress, nor both” (Key Doctrine 3)
  1. Some are born in the womb; the wicked are born in hell; the devout go to heaven the stainless pass into Nibbana.We have been born once, twice then we will not exist; it was fated for the eon [beyond] that we will no longer be…” (Vatican Saying 14)
  1. … upon dissolution of the body that ignorant man is born in hell.…in the [clutches of ignorance], we were forever expecting some, perpetual terror [waiting for our souls after death], as if also to heed [some persuasive illusion] to the myths.” (Epistle to Herodotos 81)
  1. Easy to do are things that are bad and harmful to oneself. But exceedingly difficult to do are things that are good and beneficial.Thanks [to] the blessed nature that has made the necessities obtainable, but the unobtainable, unnecessary.” (Usener fragment 469)
  1. … The righteous live happily both in this world and the next.And truly also, of the whole amalgamation that is being dissolved, it is being removed [as] the soul is being dispersed and no longer possess the dynamics [of the sensations] themselves, just as [a] sensation has not been procured.” (Epistle to Herodotos 65)
  1. Seek no intimacy with the beloved and also not with the unloved, for not to see the beloved and to see the unloved, both are painful. Therefore hold nothing dear, for separation from the dear is painful. There are no bonds for those who have nothing beloved or unloved. From endearment springs grief, from endearment springs fear. From him who is wholly free from endearment there is no grief, whence then fear? From affection springs grief, from affection springs fear. From him who is wholly free from affection there is no grief, whence then fear? From attachment springs grief, from attachment springs fear. From him who is wholly free from attachment there is no grief, whence then fear? (210-214)And the most beautiful [feeling] is produced by meeting the earliest of those [friends] who share a like-mind and [also that feeling] is produced with great speed [upon meeting the earliest of those friends].” (Vatican Saying 61)
  1. One should give up anger, renounce pride, and overcome all fetters. Suffering never befalls him who clings not to mind and body and is detached. “…one must say that natural [anger] is not an evil, […] it is a good thing to submit to the natural kind of anger.” (Philódēmos, On Anger, Col. 38)
  1. Your life has come to an end now; You are setting forth into the presence of Yama, the king of death. No resting place is there for you on the way, yet you have made no provision for the journey!It might be possible to furnish security against misfortune, but against [that] of death every human lives in a city without walls” (Mētródōros, Vatican Saying 31)
  1. Unchastity is the taint in a woman…“…As long as you neither disregard the laws, nor dismiss those reasonably established customs, nor distress any of the neighbors, nor damage your flesh, nor deplete what is necessary, do as you please according to your own preference…” (Mētródōros, Vatican Saying 51)
  1. Of all the paths the Eightfold Path is the best; of all the truths the Four Noble Truths are the best; of all things passionlessness is the best: of men the Seeing One (the Buddha) is the best. This is the only path; there is none other for the purification of insight. Tread this path, and you will bewilder Mara.” (273-274) I shall abide by the words of Epicurus, according to whom I have chosen to live.” (An Epicurean oath as recorded by Cicero in On the Nature of Good and Evil)
  1. Cut off your affection in the manner of a man plucks with his hand an autumn lotus… Of those things that wisdom prepares for a full life of blessedness, by far the most important is the possession of friendship” (Key Doctrine 27).
  1. A tamed elephant is led into a crowd, and the king mounts a tamed elephant. Best among men is the subdued one who endures abuse.

    Great stresses draw [life] short, and such times [provide] no great abundance. For the stress that is hyperbolic will bring on to death.” (Usener fragments 448 and 457)
  1. Cut off the five, abandon the five, and cultivate the five. The monk who has overcome the five bonds is called one who has crossed the flood. If you contest every single one of the sense perceptions, you can neither judge the outward appearance nor can you affirm which of the sensations you, yourself say are deceptive according to the way in which the criterion operates.” (Key Doctrine 23)
  1. Nothing is better for a holy man than when he holds his mind back from what is endearing. To the extent the intent to harm wears away, to that extent does suffering subside. And the most beautiful [feeling] is produced by meeting the earliest of those [friends] who share a like-mind and [also that feeling] is produced with great speed [upon meeting the earliest of those friends].” (Vatican Saying 61)
  1. Like water on a lotus leaf, or a mustard seed on the point of a needle, he who does not cling to sensual pleasures — him do I call a holy man. Moreover, in the Kanon, Epíkouros is reckoning [that] the criterion of truth is the sensations and preconceptions and that of feeling” (Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 10.31)
  1. He who, having abondoned sensual pleasures, has renounced the household life and become a homeless one has destroyed both sensual desire and continued existence — him do I call a holy man. Nevertheless the wise person will marry and will make children, so Epíkouros [affirms] in Puzzles and On Nature.” (10.119)
  1. He who, casting off human bonds and transcending heavenly ties, is wholly delivered of all bondages — him do I call a holy man. The same knowledge that created confidence concerning both the fact that nothing terrible is eternal nor even enduring, and also in the same observations perceives that security is predominately perfected by friendships.” (Key Doctrine 28)
  1. He who, having case off likes and dilikes, has become tranquil, is rid of the substrata of existence and like a hero has conquered all the worlds — him do i call a holy man.
    “[The wise person] will also be opinionated and will not be puzzled” (10.119)
  1. He who in every way knows the death and rebirth of all beings, and is totally detached, blessed and enlightened — him do I call a holy man. We have been born once, twice then we will not exist; it was fated for the eon [beyond] that we will no longer be; but you who are not the master-of-tomorrow delay the rejoicing; then a life is consumed by procrastination, and each one of us dies without leisure.” (Vatican Saying 14)
  1. He who knows his former births, who sees heaven and hell, who has reached the end of births and attained to the perfection of insight, the sage who has reached the summit of spiritual excellence — him do I call a holy man. There was no dissolving the fear over the most important matters if one does not know the whole of Nature, but who worries about the myths; since without an inquiry-of-origins there was no receiving the pure pleasures.” (Key Doctrine 12)

Though the traditions present conflicting frameworks, the ethical model exemplified by each traditions’ wise person reflects a larger pattern of human piety. As preserved in Chapter Six (“The Wise Person”), the Buddhist arhat and the Epicurean sage share many traits: both are contemplative, steadfast, disciplined, restrained, confident, self-reliant, knowledgable, considerate, patient, and peaceful. They exemplify self-control and exhibit masterful independence from vain desires. They reject wealth and status as unreliable means of achieving happiness. They lead minimalistic lifestyles, and prefer the setting of the natural world.

“Nevertheless the [Epicurean] wise person will marry and will make children”, and pursue pleasure, and feel anger at injustice, and reap the benefits of friendship; by contrast, the Buddhist arhat (in accordance with the example of their founder) abandons their role as a family member, rejects pleasure, and privileges the isolation of a life lived in solitude.

In general, stronger parallels exist between Buddhist ethics and epistemology and the Greek philosophies of Cynicism and Pyrrhonism; the skepticism of Pyrrho, itself, was likely inspired by the philosophy of Ajñana during the Indian campaign. Though an Indian competitor to early Buddhism, Ajñana nevertheless expresses similar attitudes in treating external constructs with suspicion, from Vedic orthodoxy to the possibility of obtaining happiness. “The pessimistic Hēgēsías of Kȳrḗnē, a Kyrenaic, despite his materialism, may also have been influenced by Buddhist missionaries to Kyrene and Alexandria. Each of these philosophers rejected the comfort of external pleasures and treated the proposition of atomism with suspicion.

As is the case with the majority of wisdom traditions originating from the Indian subcontinent, Buddhism shares many of the metaphysical doctrines of the Orphic Mysteries of Greece — those Mysteries heavily influenced Epíkouros’ philosophical opponents, the Pythagoreans and Platonists. The dharmic traditions of India teach that a piece of the human aggregate undergoes a पुनर्भव (punarbhava) or “re-birth” after the dissolution of the human frame; the corresponding goal of life then becomes overcoming the exhausting cycle of re-births. This belief is later echoed by Pythagoras and his teacher Pherekýdes of Syrios, who introduced the idea of μετεμψύχωσις (metempsýkhōsis) or “reincarnation” to Greek philosophy. Plato was heavily inspired by this, and reproduces this narrative as his Myth of Er in the Republicafter his death, Er witnesses the souls of the deceased proceed through a transmigration as they simultaneously lose their memories of the afterlife. These philosophical traditions patronized the Mysteries that mythologized the procession of life and death, the passing of the seasons, and the return of Spring; concurrently, they orchestrate this narrative by inducing a subjective ego death following the ritualistic ingestion of psychedelic chemicals (that helped inspire those Mysteries centuries earlier). The Indian traditions employed methods to induce similar, visionary experiences, thus, again, we see a noticeable contrast against Epicurean mortality.

Nevertheless, each tradition represents a unique expression of a ubiquitous human psychology. We find similarities and dissimilarities anytime we seek coherence between difference expressions of human piety and religious practice. The Epicurean and Theravāda traditions stand in stark contrast when it comes to the behavioral restrictions, evaluating pleasure, managing friendship, and embracing wisdom. At the same time, both traditions share an exercising of virtue, a criticism of popular religion, a commitment to setting healthy priorities, and a devotion to study. The means by which each tradition practices differ, but the behavioral goal of providing a sense of calm to devotees during this life is universally shared.

I hope that this brief evaluation has provided you with useful insight into the larger landscape of human spirituality. May we never become lost the vanity of our own valleys.

(… also, a rather productive thread on this topic can be found on EpicureanFriends. Former Buddhists have weighed-in on the topic, and feedback and personal testimony is very welcome. This essay was produced by a non-Buddhist, and topics contained herein may not be treated with the nuance they deserve. Elsewhere, discussions on this topic are being facilitated by the Society of Friends of Epicurus during monthly Eikas meetings on Discord. Curious minds are always welcome!)

Be well and live earnestly!

Your Friend,
EIKADISTES
Keeper of Twentiers.com
Editor of the Hedonicon