Just as we’ve done with De rerum natura and Kyriai Doxai, we are publishing a study guide and compilation of commentaries on the various portions of Epicurus’ Epistle to Menoeceus for the benefit of students. There are several online versions of Epicurus’ Epistle to Menoeceus:

Twentiers.com version (paraphrased for clarity, with Laertian portion numbers and multiple notes on translation)

The Wikisource

Peter St. Andre’s Monadnock translation (with Greek Original)

Don Boozer’s Comprehensive Translation and Commentary (includes many useful links)

Initial Exhortation

Epicurus to Menoeceus, greeting.

122. Let no one be slow to seek wisdom when he is young nor weary in the search thereof when he is grown old. For no age is too early or too late for the health of the soul. And to say that the season for studying philosophy has not yet come, or that it is past and gone, is like saying that the season for happiness is not yet or that it is now no more. Therefore, both old and young ought to seek wisdom, the former in order that, as age comes over him, he may be young in good things because of the grace of what has been, and the latter in order that, while he is young, he may at the same time be old, because he has no fear of the things which are to come. So we must exercise ourselves in the things which bring happiness, since, if that be present, we have everything, and, if that be absent, all our actions are directed toward attaining it.

123. Those things which without ceasing I have declared unto thee, those do, and exercise thyself therein, holding them to be the elements of a beautiful life.

Don Boozer meleta: In this portion, Boozer points out that Epicurus invites Menoeceus to both practice (πρᾶττε) and study (μελέτα) this epitome. As in Kyria Doxa 25, Epicurus is seeking to help the student avoid apraxia (the problem of impracticality of philosophy) by encouraging a connection between theory and praxis.

Also, notice that both his and St. Andre’s translations accentuate the aesthetic aspect of the “beautiful life” whereas other translations render “kalon” as living “nobly” or “correctly”, all of which are accurate but fail to capture the aesthetic nuance of the original, to which our English word cannot do justice. In the original, beauty and righteousness are both implied.

Nate Bartman meleta: The line “τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπάρχειν ὥραν” literally translates to something like “the ‘Beginning-to-Love-Wisdom’ time”. This translator takes a poetic liberty in translating “the ‘Beginning-to-Love-Wisdom’ time” as “the Spring of Philosophy“, due to Epicurus’ employment of ἄωρος (meaning “unripe“) and πάρωρος (meaning “too ripe“) in the previous clause (reinforcing natural imagery).

On the Gods

First believe that God is a living being immortal and blessed, according to the notion of a god indicated by the common sense of mankind; and so believing, thou shalt not affirm of him aught that is foreign to his immortality or that agrees not with blessedness, but shalt believe about him whatever may uphold both his blessedness and his immortality. For verily there are gods, and the knowledge of them is manifest; but they are not such as the multitude believe, seeing that men do not steadfastly maintain the notions they form respecting them. Not the man who denies the gods worshipped by the multitude, but he who affirms of the gods what the multitude believes about them is truly impious.

124. For the utterances of the multitude about the gods are not true preconceptions but false assumptions; hence it is that the greatest evils happen to the wicked and the greatest blessings happen to the good from the hand of the gods, seeing that they are always favourable to their own good qualities and take pleasure in men like unto themselves, but reject as alien whatever is not of their kind.

Don Boozer meleta: In this portion, Boozer delves into the words makarion (blissful, ever-happy) and aftharton (incorruptible, indestructible), which are the two non-negotiable traits of the makaria zoa (bliss-beings, or blissful animals–the Epicurean term for the gods). Of special interest is how aftharton is not exactly the same as athanatos (immortal). This has led some Epicureans to argue that the gods are not immortal, merely incorruptible. Boozer says:

A “god” is “incorruptible” or “not able to be corrupted or to decay.” They are unaffected by the vicissitudes of fortune, unaffected by anger or gratitude. To me, this is an intriguing perspective and gives a possible reason why Epicurus made the decision to use ἄφθαρτον and not an alternative that evokes the “eternal in time” connotation like ἀθάνατος. From my perspective, this argument is a strong one and deserves some study and thought.

Boozer translates ἀποφάσεις as “the decisions, rulings, verdicts, judgements, resolutions” (of the masses concerning the gods).. He also gives an explanation of prolepsis (anticipation, preconception). You can also find it explained in my epitome of the canon. Concerning hypolepseis, he says:

It’s interesting to consider the relation of προλήψεις (prolēpseis) to ὑπολήψεις (hypolepseis). We looked at the official definition of prolepsis above. Hypolepsis is defined by LSJ as “assumption, notion; hasty judgement, prejudice, suspicion; etc.” So, the prolepseis are in place before one starts formulating concepts. Hypo υπό has many definitions, but applicable ones here are “under, beneath; in small degree or gradual.”

The hypolepsis is formulated by only taking hold (the literal meaning of λήψις) of something in a small degree, by, let’s say, “under-grasping” the idea. I take that to mean you’ve given it little cognitive, rational thought. It’s a hasty judgement; whereas the prolepseis give rise to concepts. They’re a building block pre-existent prior to taking hold of something.

Peter St. Andre Meleta: This is a puzzling sentence. Some translators understand it as applying to “the gods” from the previous sentence, with the sense that the gods would not interfere in human affairs because they don’t care about (“consider as alien”) mortal creatures who are so different from themselves. Other translators understand it as applying to “most people” from the previous sentence, with the sense that most people assume that immortal beings so different from themselves must want to interfere in human affairs. I lean toward the former interpretation.

Nate Bartman Meleta: Note Epicurus’ employment of words for deity in the singular (θεὸν and θεοῦ meaning “a god” or “of a god“, in the plural (θεοὶ, θεοὺς, and θεοῖς meaning “gods” or “deities“), and in the singular, masculine αὐτὸν (meaning “him“). In this paragraph, Epicurus recognizes a variety of compatible, theological positions, including classical polytheism (worship of many deities), kathenotheism (worship of one deity at-a-time), henotheism (worship of one while recognizing others), and monolatry (exclusive worship of one deity among others).

Jack Gedney Meleta: Goal of Philosophy and Nature of the Gods

On Death

Accustom thyself to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and evil imply sentience, and death is the privation of all sentience; therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding to life an illimitable time, but by taking away the yearning after immortality.

125. For life has no terrors for him who has thoroughly apprehended that there are no terrors for him in ceasing to live. Foolish, therefore, is the man who says that he fears death, not because it will pain when it comes, but because it pains in the prospect. Whatsoever causes no annoyance when it is present, causes only a groundless pain in the expectation. Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not. It is nothing, then, either to the living or to the dead, for with the living it is not and the dead exist no longer. But in the world, at one time men shun death as the greatest of all evils, and at another time choose it as a respite from the evils in life.

126. The wise man does not deprecate life nor does he fear the cessation of life. The thought of life is no offence to him, nor is the cessation of life regarded as an evil. And even as men choose of food not merely and simply the larger portion, but the more pleasant, so the wise seek to enjoy the time which is most pleasant and not merely that which is longest. And he who admonishes the young to live well and the old to make a good end speaks foolishly, not merely because of the desirableness of life, but because the same exercise at once teaches to live well and to die well. Much worse is he who says that it were good not to be born, but when once one is born to pass with all speed through the gates of Hades.

127. For if he truly believes this, why does he not depart from life? It were easy for him to do so, if once he were firmly convinced. If he speaks only in mockery, his words are foolishness, for those who hear believe him not.

Jack Gedney Meleta: Death is nothing to us

The Future

We must remember that the future is neither wholly ours nor wholly not ours, so that neither must we count upon it as quite certain to come nor despair of it as quite certain not to come.

A Smooth Contentment: On Future Causes of Pleasures

Hierarchy of Desires

We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live.

128. He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquility of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a blessed life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look for anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. When we are pained because of the absence of pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel the need of pleasure.

Don Boozer meleta: I would contend that those “necessary for life itself” are those essentials at the base of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs: food, water, shelter, sleep, air, etc. Again, clothing and shelter would seem to fall into this category.

Ataraxia is a widespread term in both popular and academic writings on Epicurus’s philosophy. Ataraxia and aponia, translated as “tranquility” and “freedom from pain,” respectively, are sometimes held up as the only “goal” or only “Good” of Epicurus’s philosophy, The two are referenced together only (to the best of my knowledge) in the (in)famous lines about katastematic and kinetic pleasures. Ataraxia and aponia are given as examples of one kind of pleasure (katastematic), and χαρά “joy” and ευφροσύνη “mirth, merriment” are given as examples of the other kind (kinetic). Consider another instance of αταραξία in Fragment 519: “The greatest fruit of justice is serenity.” (δικαιοσύνης καρπὸς μέγιστος ἀταραξία.) In parsing αταραξία itself, it’s helpful to consider the opposite of αταραξία: ταραχή meaning “trouble, disorder, confusion.” So, αταραξία conveys “without trouble, without disorder, without confusion.”

See Principal Doctrines 26, 29 and 30

Pleasure as the Guide of Life

Wherefore we call pleasure the alpha and omega of a blessed life.

129. Pleasure is our first and kindred good. It is the starting-point of every choice and of every aversion, and to it we come back, inasmuch as we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing. And since pleasure is our first and native good, for that reason we do not choose every pleasure whatsoever, but ofttimes pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them. And ofttimes we consider pains superior to pleasures when submission to the pains for a long time brings us as a consequence a greater pleasure. While therefore all pleasure because it is naturally akin to us is good, not all pleasure is choice-worthy, just as all pain is an evil and yet not all pain is to be shunned.

130. It is, however, by measuring one against another, and by looking at the conveniences and inconveniences, that all these matters must be judged. Sometimes we treat the good as an evil, and the evil, on the contrary, as a good.

Nate Bartman Meleta: ΣΥΜΦΥΤΟΝ or σύμφυτον (súmphūton) meaning “congenital“, “innate“, “nature“, “grown-together“, “thickly wooded” may refer to the herb “comfrey“— from the Latin conferveo meaning “to boil together“, “to grow together” or “to heal“. This flowering herb (symphytum officinale of the genus Symphytum and the family Boraginaceae) has been historically used for medicinal purposes. According to Christiane Staiger, comfrey is demonstrated (via topical treatment) to treat “pain, inflammation and swelling of muscles and joints in degenerative arthritis, acute myalgia in the back, sprains, contusions and strains after sports injuries and accidents, also in children aged 3 or 4 and over.” Further, “The therapeutic properties of comfrey are based on its anti-inflammatory and analgesic effects. Comfrey also stimulates granulation and tissue regeneration.” However, it also “contains chemicals called pyrrolizidine alkaloids (PAs), which can cause severe liver damage.” In choosing to describe Pleasure as σύμφυτον (súmphūton) rather than repeating συγγενικὸν (syngenikòn), Epicurus creates a linguistic comparison between pleasure as being “innate” or “hereditary” versus pleasure as being “healing” and “pain-reducing“.

ΣYMMETPHΣIΣ or συμμέτρησις (symmétrēsis) refers to the “measuring by comparison” between choice and avoidance. (This is the Greek word for what we call hedonic calculus).

Epicurus explicitly states that ἡδονὴν τέλος ὑπάρχειν (hèdonēn télos hypárkhein) that “pleasure is the goal” of life.

Don Boozer meleta: αἵρεσιν, the accusative of αἵρεσῐς (hairesis), means “choice, selection.” Interestingly, it is also the source of the English word “heresy” so prevalent in the history of religion. By the time the Christians were ascendant, that “ai” was moving from being pronounced something like “eye” to something like “eh” so we get a pronunciation of αἵρεσῐς more like <heresis>, eventually giving us our English word. Consider that the very act of “making a choice” not sanctioned by the predominant religion was punishable, often by
death. φυγὴν, the accusative of φυγή, means “flight, retreat, escape.” So, it’s not just that we make choices and “avoidances,” the traditional formula for this phrase. That has always seemed too timid to me. We either choose a course of action, or, if we determine it is too full of painful consequences, we flee or retreat from it. In fact, we escape from it to safety, to some safe harbor. That gives our decisions a sense of urgency lacking in the milquetoast word “avoid” as if we’re stepping around a puddle.

… A short digression is now in order to examine that phrase ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος “the foundation and fulfillment, the beginning and end.” Often, this is simply translated as “the beginning and the end” as if there’s a starting line and a finish line. This is much deeper than that, although the running of a race could be one metaphor that could used.

ᾰ̓ρχή carries the meaning of beginning, origin, foundation, the farthest point. It even took on the meaning of “the corners of a sheet” by the time the New Testament was being written (Acts 10:11). It also had the connotation of the “beginning of power” residing in a ruler, the “most important person” in a kingdom. It carries the idea of a foundational element or first principle. The alpha (first letter of the Greek alphabet) to τέλος’s omega (the last letter of the Greek alphabet) which is how Hicks translated them.

τέλος (telos) carries the meaning of endings, the goal, completion, maturity, result, fulfillment, consummation. Where αρχή is the foundation, τέλος is the highest point. The definition of τέλος in LSJ is extensive!

Commentary on Innate Pleasure: “Syggenis Hedone” as a Salvific Doctrine

Comparing Syggenis Hedone and Buddha-garbha: Exploring the parallels and issues of transmission

 Jack Gedney Meleta: Pleasure is the beginning and end of a blessed life

Autarchy

Again, we regard independence of outward things as a great good, not so as in all cases to use little, but so as to be contented with little if we have not much, being honestly persuaded that they have the sweetest enjoyment of luxury who stand least in need of it, and that whatever is natural is easily procured and only the vain and worthless hard to win. Plain fare gives as much pleasure as a costly diet, when once the pain of want has been removed,

131. while bread and water confer the highest possible pleasure when they are brought to hungry lips. To habituate one’s self, therefore, to simple and inexpensive diet supplies all that is needful for health, and enables a man to meet the necessary requirements of life without shrinking, and it places us in a better condition when we approach at intervals a costly fare and renders us fearless of fortune.

Then when we say the goal is pleasure, we are not counting the pleasures of the debauched and those lying sick with enjoyment, and those who, not knowing and not acknowledging or having barely received advantage from considering, but rather seeking neither suffering throughout the body nor grieving throughout the soul.

132. For it’s neither drinking and following festivals nor taking advantage of servants and women nor an expensive multitude of fish nor of however much else fills an extravagant table that makes life pleasant, but sober calculation and examining the cause of each choice and avoidance, and expelling the masses’ doctrines, from out of these the greatest confusion overtakes our souls.

Prudence

But of all of these things, the original and the greatest good is Prudence, because even of “beloved-wisdom” more valuable becomes “practical-wisdom”, from out of it all the other virtues come forth, teaching us that one cannot live pleasantly unless living correctly, prudently, and justly; and that one cannot live correctly, prudently, and justly without living pleasantly; for the virtues coalesce with living pleasantly, and living pleasantly is inseparable from them.

Don Boozer meleta: φρόνησις (phronēsis) is defined in LSJ as “practical wisdom.” In the immediate context of the Letter, we can refer back to that trait or faculty that expels opinions that bring confusion and trouble the mind. In fact, it’s the “foundation” and “greatest good” for accomplishing this. It allows us to make choices and rejections that will lead to pleasure. The idea of practical wisdom, wisdom put to practical ends, is consistent with Epicurus’s ideas that philosophy should be practical in moving one toward a more pleasurable life and that one is responsible for one’s own choices and rejections. In Principal Doctrine 5, Epicurus also cites “practical wisdom” as one of the three traits of a pleasurable life.

Jack Gedney Meleta: Simple living and prudence

Ideal Person

133. Who, then, is superior in thy judgement to such a man? He holds a holy belief concerning the gods, and is altogether free from the fear of death. He has diligently considered the end fixed by nature, and understands how easily the limit of good things can be reached and attained, and how either the duration or the intensity of evils is but slight. Destiny, which some introduce as sovereign over all things, he laughs to scorn, affirming rather that some things happen of necessity, others by chance, others through our own agency. For he sees that necessity destroys responsibility and that chance or fortune is inconstant; whereas our own actions are free, and it is to them that praise and blame naturally attach.

Nate Bartman Meleta: The phrase τὸ […] ἀδέσποτον (tò […] ádéspoton) is an accusative phrase, from á- (“not“) + δεσπότης (despótēs, “master“, “ruler“, “lord“) + “-τος” (-tos, rendering a verbal adjective), meaning “masterless” (against Lord Necessity), “unruled” by Lady Luck. “Ungovernable“.

Don Boozer meleta: ἐπιλελογισμένου (epilelogismenou) has the literal sense of applying one’s reason (logismos) onto (epi-) a problem to be solved.

See also: Enargeia and Epilogismos

Peter St. Andre Meleta: The verb παρακολουθεῖν has special meaning in the works of Aristotle, who uses it to denote the inseparable connection between logical ideas, between genus and species, between cause and effect, and the like (see Categories 8a33, Posterior Analytics 99a17, Topics 125b28 and 131b9, Metaphysics 1054a14, etc.). Here Epicurus uses the same word to note the close tie between praise and blame on the one hand and that which is within the power of an individual to achieve.

Independence from Fate

134. It were better, indeed, to accept the legends of the gods than to bow beneath that yoke of destiny which the natural philosophers have imposed. The one holds out some faint hope that we may escape if we honor the gods, while the necessity of the naturalists is deaf to all entreaties.

Nor does he hold chance to be a god, as the world in general does, for in the acts of a god there is no disorder; nor to be a cause, though an uncertain one, for he believes that no good or evil is dispensed by chance to men so as to make life blessed, though it supplies the starting-point of great good and great evil.

135. He believes that the misfortune of the wise is better than the prosperity of the fool. It is better, in short, that what is well judged in action should not owe its successful issue to the aid of chance.

Meleta on Principal Doctrine 16: Metrodorus the Mystes

Jack Gedney Meleta: Fate, Fortune and Living like a God

Meleta Portion

Exercise thyself in these and kindred precepts day and night, both by thyself and with him who is like unto thee; then never, either in waking or in dream, wilt thou be disturbed, but wilt live as a god among men. For man loses all semblance of mortality by living in the midst of immortal blessings.

Meléta: Epicurus’ Instructions for Students, Part I; and Part II

Upar and Onar: On Correct and Incorrect Activity and Rest

Peter St. Andre Meleta: In Vatican Saying #78, Epicurus says that friendship is an immortal good (whereas wisdom is a merely mortal good); it is unclear what other goods Epicurus considers to be immortal.

Further Reading:

“The Dude’s Letter to Menoeceus” by Nate Bartman and Oliver Benjamin (2020)

Epicuro rétor: Análisis retórico de la Carta a Meneceo – “Epicurus the rhetor: a rhetorical analysis of the Letter to Menoeceus”, a thesis (in Spanish) by Jocelyn Pantoja