India’s problem turns out to be the world’s problem. The problem’s name is God. – Salman Rushdie
Over the years, I have taken an interest in sister traditions to Epicureanism that have emerged elsewhere: the sumac kawsay philosophy of South America’s indigenous populations, the pleasure-ethics of the Taoist sage Yang Chu, and the Lokayata (aka Charvaka) School of India.
There isn’t much left on the Charvaka tradition–the most concise ancient introduction I found are fifteen statements that comprise the Lokayata chapter of the Sarva-Siddhanta-Sangraha. All that is left of their ancient writings are commentaries by enemies. The book Uniqueness of Carvaka Philosophy in Indian Traditional Thought by Bhupender Heera caught my attention because it promised to fill the information gap, so I have enjoyed reading it, and this is my review of it.
Of their character, although they were greatly maligned by the orthodox, I found this quote which reminded me of (biographer) Laertius’ defense of the character of Epicurus from the attacks of his enemies:
Under the heading “Nastika” Abul Fazl has referred to the good work, judicious administration and welfare schemes that were emphasised by the Charvaka law-makers.
While searching for evidence of a Charvaka movement in India–and trying to discern the extent to which it’s a living, evolving, modern tradition–I came across this Charvaka Manifesto, where we see the beginnings of a (much needed) neo-Charvaka revival in India which is inspired, in great part, in the New Atheism personalities like Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens, and Richard Dawkins. Salman Rushdie is, of course, also among the influences in modern Charvaka, as are the modern political and social realities of India, and (since India is so close to the Islamic world) there is some solidarity with the ex-Muslim movement.
The fervor towards a reform or evolution of the Charvaka Philosophy is inspired, in part, by accusations of being anti-social that go back to over 2,600 years ago, and which parallel the treatment Epicurean philosophy has also often received. Orthodox Hindus consider that there are four aims of life: pleasure (kama), wealth (artha), duty (dharma), and liberation (moksha). Charvakas originally only accepted the first two, and rejected dharma or virtue (which involved upholding the caste system) and moksha (liberation, salvation or redemption is typically interpreted in religious terms). Some modern Charvakas argue that if dharma is only understood as treating others fairly and kindly, then they can accept that; and that they understand death as liberation, or moksha.
The enjoyment of heaven lies in eating delicious food, keeping company of young women, using fine clothes, perfumes, garlands, sandal paste … while moksha is death which is cessation of life-breath … the wise therefore ought not to take pains on account of moksha. A fool wears himself out by penances and fasts. Chastity and other such ordinances are laid down by clever weaklings. — Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha, Verses 9-12
The view that there is a soul separate from the body, which on reaching the other world enjoys rewards, is like the hope to get tasty fruits from the big flower of a tree in the sky. – Prabodhacandrodaya, Act II, Sloka 16
The Sub-Schools
There are two camps within Charvaka: The Dhurta Charvakas deny that the soul exists, while the Susikshita Carvakas say that the soul exists as long as the body lasts. This group is subdivided into the Dehatmavada (soul = body), Indriyatmavada (the soul is the senses), Mano-atmavada (the soul is the mind), and Pranatmavada (the soul is the vital breath). Aviddhakarṇa, Bhavivikta, Kambalasvatara, Purandara and Udbhatabhatta are the five commentators who developed the Charvaka system in various ways.
It would be interesting to evaluate (perhaps in the future with other content) the merits of each sub-school’s potential arguments. That so many different views coexisted among the Charvakas should be a testament to the robust, free-thinking intellectual life that they once had, and reminds us of the many schools that also existed under the umbrella of the Cyrenaics.
Some Terms
The author notes that “there is a huge aversion to the body in Indian thought“. Instead, Charvaka is a world-affirming (pravitti) philosophy, whereas from the Charvaka perspective, ascetic religious philosophies are nivrtti (world-denying). To Charvaka disciples, heaven is pleasure, hell is pain.
The author rejects the nastika (heterodox) classification for Charvaka within Indian philosophical systems, and instead prefers to classify Charvaka as “non-Vedic”. In order to be a heterodox/non-Vedic philosophy, it always and necessarily self-identifies in contrast to whatever is “orthodox” or Vedic. Therefore, I think both labels fail to appreciate the mortal blow on religiosity and the pre-scientific impulse that is Charvaka’s insistence on a canon of sense perception–even if this canon has not yet been perfected, in my view. Charvaka philosophy recognizes pleasure and the senses as guides, but rejects common-sensical methods of inference, and this is one of its main weaknesses–or a main target for potential reform by the Neo-Charvakas. For instance, in page 67 the author makes the argument that materialists can’t assert universal truths, but this is true only for materialists who adhere to the old Charvaka epistemology that rejects methods of inference. Modern scientific materialism is not of this kind, and neither is Epicurean materialism.
On the Need for inference: Consciousness and Matter
Charvaka teaches that “consciousness is born from elements just as seeds of kinva (fermenters) produce intoxicant“. This is a fascinating insight: 2,600 years ago, a group of materialist Indian philosophers compared awareness or consciousness to other biochemical processes (in this case, fermentation). They viewed consciousness as an organic, natural phenomenon, and used a metaphor that would have been at home in De Rerum Natura.
The author of “Uniqueness of Charvaka Philosophy” argues (correctly, in my view) that therefore the Charvakas DO infer by analogy in the case of the above-quoted proverb. He also argues (correctly) that the Charvaka MUST infer, and since inference is not part of their method, this renders their method inconsistent or impossible to practice. This is known as the problem of apraxia. Impracticality.
Conclusion
The author of Uniqueness of Carvaka Philosophy mixes praise with criticism in the book. He constantly acknowledges the “low position” or status of materialism, even as he acknowledges that it was initially the “only” system of philosophy worthy of its name. He apologizes for defending it, and uses terms like “gross” materialism or hedonism. At times, he seems to have acquired many of the biased attitudes he criticizes elsewhere: in page 33, he laments that “we are all Charvaka” today. In page 72, the author argues that the “body can’t cause consciousness”, and seems to endorse supernaturalism. In page 38, he accuses Charvakas of being extremists and entertaining “uncontrolled thoughts breaking loose from all restrictions”. Therefore, the reader of the book should know that the author is not entirely without bias.
Also, the reader should bear in mind that the author’s first language is not English. However, overall, considering the scarcity of material available in English, Uniqueness of Carvaka Philosophy is still a useful resource to get acquainted with the basics of the Charvaka system of philosophy.
Further Reading:
Uniqueness of Carvaka Philosophy in Indian Traditional Thought
The Lokayata chapter of the Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha
Carvaka at HumanisticTexts.org