Principal Doctrines 24 and 28 and the Utility of Conviction

In the days after the publication of this essay, it was announced that James Randi had died. Randi had been a champion of empirical thinking for most of his life, applying this Principal Doctrine (although he was not an Epicurean) to uncover frauds, magicians, and conmen. The Humanist featured an article in celebration of his legacy.

In our discussions of Epicurean philosophy, we sometimes come across people who claim to be Epicureans but fall short of clearly understanding and living many of the Principal Doctrines. As our recent discussions about Thomas Jefferson and his slavery practice demonstrate, there are and have always been bad or uninformed Epicureans out there, as well as arrogant ones who are set in their ways and whom Philodemus would’ve labeled “incurable”, as well as people who have their own intellectual and ideological commitments outside of EP, and we must judge their ideas by their connection to our sources as well as by their potential consequence–as Epicurus advised in his sermon against empty words, where Philodemus said:

Epicurus says that we think empirically concerning the actions based on the results observed from any course of action.

Concerning theories that do not seem to have empirical basis, they can be destroyed if they are false (whether rational or not), either if some other theoretical view based on it is false, or if when we establish a link with the action, this proves to be disadvantageous. If any of these things happen, it will be easy to conclude that theoretical arguments are false.

In the coming months, I will be delving into an in-depth study of various PD’s in order to help students to certify whether an opinion expressed in an online forum really represents an Epicurean doctrine or not. This will also constitute an invitation to a deeper study of the Principal Doctrines, as sometimes those who misrepresent EP will cite secondary, even hostile sources, but ignore the authoritative PD’s, of which Lucian of Samosata–writing in the Second Century of CE–had this to say:

The fellow had no conception of the blessings conferred by that book upon its readers, of the peace, tranquillity, and independence of mind it produces, of the protection it gives against terrors, phantoms, and marvels, vain hopes and inordinate desires, of the judgement and candour that it fosters, or of its true purging of the spirit, not with torches and squills and such rubbish, but with right reason, truth, and frankness.

The Principal Doctrines are the closest thing we have to an Epicurean Gospel. They’re the conclusions of very long conversations that led to authoritative declarations by the founders. As students (and in the absence of all the sources), we should try to imagine the discussions that took place PRIOR to the establishment of the doctrines, so that we may understand the ways in which they are coherent with the entire system. What led the founders to consider these truths to be so important, that they became a dogmatic School and set them up as the 40 authoritative doctrines?

There are two key doctrines I’d like to start with. Principal Doctrine 24 creates the taboo of separating that which awaits confirmation (the non-evident) from that which is clearly present (the evident). I use the word “taboo” because this doctrine includes a clear prohibition against mixing them up. Without this doctrine–which clearly establishes that this is an evidence-based philosophy based on the study of nature–, our dogmatism can not be justified.

If you reject a perception outright and do not distinguish between your opinion about what will happen after, what came before, your feelings, and all the layers of imagination involved in your thoughts, then you will throw your other perceptions into confusion because of your trifling opinions; as a result, you will reject the very criterion of truth. And if when forming concepts from your opinions you treat as confirmed everything that will happen and what you do not witness thereafter, then you will not avoid what is false, so that you will remove all argument and all judgment about what is and is not correct.Principal Doctrine 24

Notice here that “our feelings” (important as they are) are among the things that must be subjected to the checks and balances provided by the evidence of nature.

In Philodemus’ scroll On methods of inference we learn that it’s possible to infer about the non-evident based on the evident, but this applies only to phenomena that are considered similar enough to each other to warrant such inference by analogy. Outside of these (sometimes controversial) cases, the instructions here are to await confirmation (evidence) prior to issuing opinions or judgments. This Principal Doctrine is a precursor to modern scientific inquiry and the transgenerational human project of amassing useful knowledge by strict means of evidence.

So Principal Doctrine 24 is the doctrine of empirical reasoning (epilogismos) and of “awaiting confirmation”, and creates the taboo of separating the evident (that which is clearly present) from the non-evident (that which awaits confirmation). This doctrine justifies Epicurean dogmatism based on nature’s evidence. It is necessary to understand this doctrine prior to understanding PD 28:

The same judgment produces confidence that dreadful things are not everlasting, and that security amidst the limited number of dreadful things is most easily achieved through friendship. – Principal Doctrine 28

Here’s another translation:

The same conviction which inspires confidence that nothing we have to fear is eternal or even of long duration, also enables us to see that even in our limited conditions of life nothing enhances our security so much as friendship.

This doctrine is about friendship and about diminishing our existential fears, but it also specifically addresses our “convictions” or “judgments” as efficient means to acquire a confident expectation that leads to security–which is a mental pleasure, or perhaps at times an alleviation of mental anguish. This belief can be experienced as salvation if we’re ever on the verge of homelessness or danger and our friends come to the rescue, or it can simply create a stable sense of confidence.

Implicit in this doctrine is the view that certain beliefs or convictions are not only true, but are also efficient means to certain important and necessary pleasures. It’s not enough to have friends: one must also KNOW that they will be there in times of need. It’s not enough to have few desires: one must also KNOW, have a conviction, that we need few things to live pleasantly. It’s not enough to not fear death or chronic pain: we must KNOW that mental pleasure can be more potent than pain in the flesh and that death is not experienced by us. This is in line with Principal Doctrine 20, which says that the flesh does not know the limits established by nature for time, body and mind, while the mind can learn these limits, and so is in charge of securing our happiness.

And so dogmatism (the acceptance of certain premises which pass the test of the canon, and the taboo of separating the evident from the non-evident in PD 24) is a necessary feature of the practice of Epicurean ethics, and is necessary for us to abide in constant pleasures insofar as this is possible for mortals.

There’s this idea here that your beliefs should be carefully and empirically chosen, and also that your beliefs should do something for you, contribute to your happiness. Beliefs or doctrines can be tools that the mind uses to safeguard a life of pleasure. After all, the goal of an Epicurean ethical education is to give us confidence in our ability to live pleasantly, which is to say, to be happy.

I wanted to write this essay because I wanted to set a foundation for future exploration of the other Principal Doctrines, always coming back to these points. Peace and Safety!

Reply by Jordan:

Great article, Hiram. As always, I came away with a deeper understanding of EP, so thank you. One question: you write ‘It’s not enough to have few desires: one must also KNOW, have a conviction, that we need few things to live pleasantly.’ How do we, as comfortable Westerners, find out whether we really would be content with only natural and necessary goods? Are there any practices that might help give us a justified confidence that we could?

Reply by Hiram:

The Epicurean method is empirical so only by practicing living simply do we know these limits. If we have great comforts and have no memories to rely on of lacking our basic needs and still living pleasantly, we could diminish them temporarily, perhaps for a week, or once in a lifetime at least, or carry out other experiments, if we are devoted to the intellectual challenge of the Doctrines. Here is how Epicurus did it: he fasted from time to time.