Tag Archives: language

Epicurus Was Not an Atomist

Disclaimer: the ideas and opinions presented below are reflective of the author and
may or may not be shared by other members of the Society of Friends of Epicurus.

Epíkouros was not an atomist. (THUD.)

Nor was Dēmókritos. (GASP.)

… now that I have your attention, please excuse the provocative title — forgive my rhetorical provocation, having trespassed against the taxonomical conventions of academic tradition. I seek to provide nuance to your understanding of the teachings of Epíkouros, and to challenge the academic presentation of atomism as it has been so conceived. We will do so by privileging the perspective of a sweaty, 3rd-century Athenian and by providing critical context to supplement our understanding (we being students who are subject to the prejudices of modernity). We have been trained to catch ’em all, programmed to collect facts like cards. Too often, the presentation of philosophy is like a catalogue of products, each designed by a different manufacturer, each reviewed as a consumer flips the pages of a magazine. Yet Epíkouros did not manufacture sensations. He observed nature, and shared clever inferences. He arrived at his conclusions without the benefit of a vast repository of laboratory evidence.

In a nutshell, if you were an Epicurean in the Garden of Epíkouros (c. 3rd-century BCE), you would have had to have waited several thousand years before anyone called you an “atomist” (or ατομιστής). Prior to the Renaissance era, an Epicurean was just a “student of the Garden” or a “follower of Epíkouros”. The word “atomist” was coined by Renaissance minds in Latin, largely by anti-Epicurean thinkers who dismissed Epicurean particle physics as a silly fiction. The closest title I have found was employed by Athenaios in the 3rd-century CE (Deipnosophistaí 5.4) as προφήτας ἀτόμων (prophḗtas atómōn, meaning, literally, “prophets of atomic” particles). Here again, we find “of atoms” in a substantive, adjectival phrase, not as a proper noun. As a result, I wish to present an alternative lexicon that avoids the neologisms of our opponents.

Now, obviously the Hegemon teaches us that observable bodies are composed of atomic “particles” (and void, impressively anticipating the surprising conclusion of Rutherford’s gold foil experiment by over 2,200 years, demonstrating that solid objects are, generally speaking, about 0.01% stuff and 99.99% space). Nonetheless, the distinctions implied by words like “atoms” and “atomism” create slight incongruities that either warp Epíkouros’ description of particles, or else, beg misunderstandings as a result of sleepy translations and clumsy semantics.

What’s in a Name?

Consider the fact that (so far as I have found) history does not document ancient proponents of particle physics as having referred to the “pieces” of reality by the plural noun άτομα (átoma, or “atoms”), nor any declension of the singular noun άτομο (átomo, or “atom”). This root compound “a-” and “témnō” is only ever found as an adjective ἄτομος (átomos, or “uncuttable”). Ancient texts do not record students of particle physics as having identified themselves by the proper noun ατομιστής (atomistḗs, or “atomist”), nor as having codified their doctrines using the word ατομισμός (atomismós, or “atomism”). Epicureans did not see themselves as “atomists” attached to a theory of “atomism”, so much as adherents of the “true philosophy”, which understood the origins of “the real” world to be “atomic”. Of course, please NOTE: we do find the adjectival phrase ὁ ἄτομος (hó átomos, or “the atomic” body) and its various declensions throughout Epicurean texts. This substantive phrasing [article + adjective] implies a noun. Thus, translating hó (“the”) átomos (“atomic”) as “the atom” is not unreasonable, nor inappropriate. Simply, I find it to be incomplete, and potentially-misleading. We miss an opportunity to expand our mental aggregate by reducing the swerving objects of Epicurean physics to mere “atoms”.

Cuttable Uncuttables

As it must seem ironic to students of Greek, the modern world refers to cuttable elements (like uranium) as “uncuttables”. Further complicating things, the Standard Model refers to the truly uncuttable bodies from which “uncuttables” are composed using the Latin prefix “sub-”, thus, framing “sub-atomic” particles as being (ironically) “under the [cuttable] uncuttables”. Historically, we inherit this irony as a vestige of the modern quest to identify the truly “uncuttable” components of nature. Scientists after the Renaissance assigned the atomic compounds they discovered with the allusive title of “atoms” (or “uncuttables”). Yet, as has been (unforgettably) demonstrated for just over eight decades, the modern “uncuttables” are actually, horrifyingly cuttable. Ancient “uncuttables”, however, were truly indivisible, and could not be split.

Of course, this nuance does not, in any way, invalidate ancient atomic theory. Simply put, ancient Epicureans did not imagine “atomic parts” the same way we imagine “hydrogen” and “oxygen” (as opposed to a correctly-named “lepton” which meets the “uncuttable” qualification). Granted, Epíkouros’ speculations were not infallible, and he sometimes assigns particles with an agency that properly belongs to “molecules” (as when he proposes that we are able to “smell” particles (10.53); in fact, we smell collections of particles “enlaced” as chemical “compounds”). Nonetheless, these naturalistic propositions were deeply insightful, and functionally useful prior to the innovations of the 19th and 20th-centuries. Excitingly, modern physics provides modern Epicureans with the necessary, experimental evidence that is required (from the variety of explanations that Epíkouros provides, in accordance with his practice of entertaining multiple explanations prior to experimental confirmation) to eliminate false hypotheses, and to adopt coherent alternatives. No doubt, had the Hegemon (somehow) extended his lifespan (by a few, measly millennia), he would have welcomed the evidence that supports our discoveries, all of which are consistent with his explanation for the non-supernatural origins of reality.

Body-and-Voidism

New followers of the true philosophy may be further mislead by the word “atomism” as Epíkouros, unlike Dēmókritos, rejected the reductive description of nature. Dēmókritos assumes that everything is “just” particles, for “atoms and the vacuum were the beginning of the universe; and that everything else existed only in opinion” (Laértios 9.44). From the Democritean perspective, what “truly” exists are microscopic bodies (and void). As a result, he concludes that we cannot be certain that our perceptions of bodies and their emergent qualities (like “color”) can be considered “true” because the “true” nature of reality (according to Dēmókritos) occurs at the atomic level — only atoms are “real”. Dēmókritos “rejects” emergent “qualities” that arise from atomic interactions: “Of a truth we know nothing, for truth is in a well.” (Ibid., 9.71).

Epíkouros rejects this skepticism. From the Epicurean perspective, what “truly” exists are bodies and void, some of which are visible, enlaced bodies (i.e. “compounds”) and some of which are invisible, simple bodies (i.e. “particles”). Both “compound bodies” and “simple bodies” are “real” (just as compound notions in the mind are physically “real” as images). As Epíkouros writes, “all” of our sensations are reliable. Consequently, even if we are to adopt the “ismizing” of the humanists, it is reasonable to suppose that, simply, “bodyism” (or “matterism”) would be appropriate designations for Epicurean particle physic, so much as “atomism” (which might be understood to implicate Dēmókritos’ teaching that only particles are real). Consider also that either attempt (including my flippant one) at neologizing particle physics yields the further implication that only particles (or bodies) are “real”, yet both Demokritos and Epíkouros agree that, indeed, “void” is also a “real” thing; it is simply “intangible” (Ibid., 10.39-40). Therein, it would be just as appropriate to call particle physicists “Voidists”, since they, unlike their many opponents, recognized the existence of empty space. Others, like Aristotélēs, insist that “nature abhors a vacuum” (Physikḗs 4.8). Technically, it would be reasonable to call Demokritos an “Atom-and-Voidist”, or to call Epíkouros a “Body-and-Voidist”. Practically, of course, these are clumsy and redundant neologisms, because the existence of one seems to imply the other. Nonetheless, be not mislead into thinking that the Sage taught that only atoms exist.

…Like Crumbs-of-Carbon and Water

As Diogénēs records, Epíkouros did not see himself as an ally to the tradition of Dēmókritos (Lives 10.4), and may have only temporarily considered himself as such during his youth (Ploútarkhos, Against Kōlõtēs 3). The Hegemon explicitly rebukes Dēmókritos’ philosophy for having been influenced by the skepticism of Dēmókritos’ teacher, Pýrrhōn, founder of Greek skepticism. For Epíkouros, his rejection of Pýrrhōn’s teachings, along with his necessary (and brilliantly modern) innovation of the παρέγκλισις (parénklesis, or CLINAMEN, “swerve”) places the Garden in a completely different category than the school of Dēmókritos. Grouping the two of them together, as philosophical allies, is a paradigm defended by ancient opponents of the Epicurean tradition and modern academics. So I argue, if, again, we are willing to entertain the anachronistic fantasy of ancient Epicureans adopting the Latin convention of “ismizing”, then Epíkouros would not have seen his physics as being the same “-ism” as Dēmókritos. It is reasonable to entertain the possibility that “sensualism” or “realism” (if someone puts a gun to our head and forces us to employ an “-ism”) are more reflective and complete expressions of Epicurean physics than “atomism”; and while Epíkouros does meet the criterion for our modern definition of an “atomist”, he did not see himself as such. Indeed, he reserved a collection of slurs for Dēmókritos, the so-called “Authority on Nonsense” (Diogénēs Laértios 10.8).

To my fellow Epicureans, I encourage you to challenge the paradigm that ancient philosophers who defended particle physics should be placed in the same category. In fact, their physics differed. (For a thorough comparison on the two physics, please set aside a few hours to read “The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature”, the doctoral dissertation of Karl Marx. In particular, if you have a negative, political opinion of Marx, you may find yourself charmed by his encyclopedic knowledge of ancient, Hellenistic philosophy. Ultimately, he expresses sympathy for Aristotélēs … that is another topic for another essay).

Pieces of Reality

Sure, “atoms” is cool … but what about “seeds”, “grains”, “firstlings”, or “hooklets”? Have you thought about simple “splinters”, “cents” of consciousness, or “motes” of matter? Each of these expressions are employed by Epíkouros in his Epistle to Herodotos as alternative names for the bodies that are popularly identified as “atoms” (orchestrated more colorfully elsewhere). Yet, nowhere in ancient writings does the Hegemon explicitly name particles as “atoms”, only descriptively as uncuttable parts: Epíkouros only employs the adjective ἄτομος (átomos, or “uncuttable”, as in “the uncuttable” pieces of reality). While the substantive phrase ὁ ἄτομος (hó átomos, or “the uncuttable”) implies a noun, it does not provide a noun.

Even then, note that, based on the frequency with which each word is employed in the extant texts, the Hegemon only occasionally refers to the smallest pieces of tangible reality as being “uncuttable”. As many times as Epíkouros describes the fundamental pieces of reality as being “uncuttable”, he equally refers to them as being “countless”, “microscopic”, and “unchanging”. Just as easily as we have coined the contemporary neologism “atom”, we could have, consistent with linguistic conventions, conceived of a “particle” as an “apeiron“ (from ἄπειρος, Laértios 10.41-43, 45 56-57, 60), “micron” (from μικρός, Ibid., 10.59, 61), or “ametableton” (from αμετάβλητος, Ibid., 10.41). Each of these neologisms is as accurate (or inaccurate) as “atom”.

Of historical note, several words that Epíkouros employs when naming the microscopic pieces of reality have been preserved and functionally repurposed, having been enlisted in the service of contemporary physics. Indeed, the ancient words “photon” and “lepton” survived the turbulence of history and became codified into the jargon of modernity. We receive “lepton” from λεπτομερὲς (leptomerès), derived from λεπτός (leptós, or “fine–grained”, “refined”, “subtle”, “minute”) and μέρος (méros, or “part”, “component”, “portion”, “particle”)—meaning “small particles”, “minute motes”, or “fine grains”. A modern “lepton” is a class of particle in the Standard Model that includes the electron. Similarly, we receive “photon” from the ancient Greek φωτός (phōtós, meaning “of light“). This is the particle that carries the electromagnetic force. In both cases, the particles are sub-atomic, and cannot be further divided into parts.

Epíkouros properly names these bits of matter σπερμά (spermá, “seeds”), ᾰ̓ρχαί (ărkhaí, “beginnings” or “firstlings”), σώματα (sṓmata, “bodies”), ὄγκοι (ónkoi, “hooks”), τομαί (tomaí, “splinters”), λεπτομερής (leptomerḗs, “particles” or “fine parts”), λεπτοί (leptoí, “cents”), μόρια (mória, “motes”), and, most often, μέρη (mérē), meaning “parts”, “pieces”, or “particles”.

Uniquely, Epíkouros uses both the plural adjective a-tomoi (or “uncuttable” crumbs) as well as its opposite, τομὴν (tomḗn, Laértios 10.56) meaning “cutting” (as in a “cutting” of wood), or also, a “stump”, “splinter”, or “shedding”. It is employed by Epíkouros as a synonym for the “particles” that comprise creation; it is derived from the verb τέμνω (témnō) meaning “to cut”, “hew”, “butcher” or “sacrifice”. It is also the root of “a-tom”. Herein, Epíkouros employs the image of wood clippings from a tree as an analogy for the minute motes of matter spread through the multiverse. Epíkouros describes particles as “cuttings” that are, themselves, “uncuttable”, so we may just as easily call Epíkouros a “tomist” so much as an “a-tomist”. Here again, Epicurean physics employs analogical reasoning that relies upon visible phenomena. His method does not require abstract vocabulary, only imagery. Primarily, Epíkouros infers that visible phenomena results from invisible beginnings. The “firstlings” of physics are not expressed as contemporary, mathematical objects — the Sage of the Garden calls them “motes” like dust in a beam of sunlight, like “grains” of cereal, like fluffy “hooklets” from dandelions, like “cents” of money, and “splinters” of wood. They are “countless”, “unchanging”, “infinite”, and “microscopic”.

Particles were so much more than merely being “uncuttable”.

The Prejudice of the Enlightment

In addition to these observations, note that Enlightenment-era thinkers like Descartes, Boyle, Newton, and Locke, those who loosely adopted the general notion of particle physics, popularly rejected the Greek designation of “atomist” (as one who accepts the doctrine of “atoms”) in favor of their preferred, Latin term “corpuscularian”, one who studies “corpuscules” (from the Latin CORPVSCVLVM meaning “small body”). This designation was partially made as a defense of piety, partially as a rejection of the “godless” and “immoral” behavior of Libertines (themselves, inspired by Epíkouros), and partially as a means of distinguishing their observations as being unique and unprecedented. The words employed by 17th-century thinkers to refer to particles were loaded with assumptions and prejudices. Many of these thinkers associated “atomism” with other, controversial positions, like “atheism” (despite the fact that all brands of ancient “atomists” rejected atheism). Additionally, the particle physics of some of these thinkers was mechanistic, and conflicted with the non-deterministic spirit of Epicurean ethics.

(For a much more thorough, accurate, and expansive treatment of the context of the debate between “corpuscularianism” and “atomism” as contextualized in the 17th-century, please see the first two chapters of Dr. Catherine Wilson’s book Epicureanism at the Origin of Modernity).

Even in the last few centuries, naturalists, having recognized the coherence of particle physics, have defined and redefined “atomism” according to their own preferences and prejudices, as well as by the misunderstandings they adopted about ancient history, and the social pressures they inherited from the societies that coerced them. On one hand, thinkers like Dēmókritos, Epíkouros, Galileo, Descartes, Boyle, Locke, and Einstein each flirted with general “atomism”; on the other hand, each thinker, more often than not, rejected having their own physics subsumed within the same ismistic grouping as their opponents. They did not necessarily identify as members of the same “-ism”, and often distinguished themselves as philosophical opponents.

In any case, be real and think big about history.

Big Diction Energy

Do not mistake my thesis — I do not mean to suggest that, given modern jargon, as employed by scholars of “philosophy”, Epíkouros should be identified as a “non-atomist”, or as an opponent to ”atomism”. (I recognize that this deconstructive approach risks obfuscation, so forgive me for beleaguering these post-structuralistic points.) Nevertheless, within our fellowship, speaking frankly, I observe that we can be considered “apeironists”, “micronists”, and “ametabletists” just as readily as “atomists”. Concurrently, Epicurean “particles” can be accurately expressed as “apeirons”, “microns”, and “ametabletons”, so much as they are “atoms”.

The ancient Greeks did not practice the convention of “ismizing”, or, as I write, “expressing different systems or processes as ‘-isms’” (see my earlier essay, “On -Isms and Pleasure Wisdom”). Historically, the Ismist paradigm is a result of the widespread adoption of Latin affixation, the ubiquitous “-ISMVS” from the rarely used “-ισμός”. We ismize ideas we detest, (e.g. “Islamism”), we ismize ideas we admire (e.g. “altruism”), and we ismize ancient ideas that never needed ismizing in the first place (e.g. “atomism”). Many of our certainties rest upon assumptions that have been inherited from derivative sources. In this case, our taste for ancient Greece has been spiked by the flavor of Renaissance Latin, yet ancient Epicureans enjoyed a pure draught. As a follower of this tradition, I seek to share the original flavor of the “true philosophy”, and I encourage seekers of knowledge to pursue their goal with the same intent.

Still … if you put a gun to my head … fine, I’ll properly “ismize” Epicurean physics as follows:

BEHOLD! Epíkouros properly defends a theory of somato-kenoism (versus the atomo-kenoism of Dēmókritos). Though, neither system exemplifies strict atomism, since both philosophers also accept the “intangible void” as a “real” part of their physics. Conversely, one might imagine a sort of “Peripatetic Atomist” who both believes that “nature abhors a vacuum”, but also, accepts that the “Five Elements” (including Aether) are made of invisible particles. … chew on that, Ismists.

Still, as always, I recommend against ismizing everyone and everything in the first place. (As a friend suggested, we are students of “Epicurean Philosophy” and not of “Epicureanism“.)

Anyway … Happy Solstice to the friends of the true philosophy!

And blessings to the swerving firstlings.

Your Friend,
EIKADISTES
Keeper of Twentiers.com
Editor of the Hedonicon

Happy Eikas! On Language, Creativity, and Power

Happy Twentieth to Epicureans everywhere. We are grateful to our friend Alan, who devoted many hours of work to the script and video for Parable of the Hunter, which places before the eyes Epicurus’ Principal Doctrine 5. Please watch, like, comment and share the video. We also published Vegetarianism as a Life Choice for Epicureans, based on our discussions in the Garden of Epicurus group.

We also became aware of the We Are All Epicureans Now episode of “Young Heretics”. He’s not Epicurean, and fails to grasp the idea of pleasure as a faculty, but he does invite people to a deeper study of Epicurean ideas.

This Lucretius lecture by David Goodhew, titled ‘Life, love, death and atomic physics’ was quite enjoyable. It focuses on a few particularly brilliant passages by Lucretius, to show his genius and the many layers of art in his poetry.

I’d like to thank my Patreons Anthony Adams, Steve & Carmel, Roberto Kingsley, Tom Samuels, Ron Warrick, and my dear friend Jason, whose support has been a great morale booster and who has been a steady presence in SoFE for many years. If you’d like to support the work I do, please consider a one-time donation or a Patreon subscription.

On Language, Clarity, and Power

In recent weeks, I had the pleasure of reading The Book of Sh_zd_r, a work by a SoFE member (Nathan) who also authored the Dude’s Letter to Menoeceus, which was published back in May of 2020. He’s also an admin in the Epicurean memes for hedonistic beings Facebook group.

“The beauty of our poetries flows from sincerity” – Book of Sh_zd_r

The book is an artist’s manifesto on the use of language for creative self-expression, and a critical evaluation of the many ways in which language and power are intertwined. This, plus the Hermetic-like undercurrent that runs throughout the work (Hermetic as in the tradition of Hermes, the Divine Scribe), was my favorite part of the Book of Sh_zd_r.

The first half of the book is (appropriately) written in a beautiful conlang (constructed language)–an artlang (artistic language) from Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings series, and the second half is in English, but still uses multi-colored fonts and other artistic devices. The Book of Sh_zd_r is a work of art, first and foremost.

The latter part of the book includes some musings on grammar, and historical notes that accentuate the connection between power and language. The use of language as art, and the deconstruction of some of the trappings of language and power, makes the work disruptive and subversive. It reminded me of ideas I encountered while reading Black Orpheus and learning about the Négritude movement:

Sartre argues in Black Orpheus that liberating literature for Africans must be poetic, and that prose can’t be used because the French language evolved elsewhere, is too analytical, and can’t express the Black reality and psyche well. There are also the problems of inherent bias: we see examples of how whiteness is associated with innocence and virtue, while Blackness is associated with brokenness or with crime, with being soiled (so that Sartre says that “As soon as (the Black man) opens his mouth, he accuses himself“). Language is power, and Négritude calls for the wielding of power by these “Black Evangelists” to make the French language theirs and make it express the Black reality–so that Sartre says that “to build his truth, (the Black philosopher-artist) must first destroy others’ truth”.

Relabeling: a Technique of Empowerment

One of the therapeutic practices in Epicurean tradition is that of relabeling (renaming, or re-categorizing). In modern psychotherapy, this is sometimes known as cognitive restructuring, and is used together with other techniques to help people diminish their catastrophic or harmful thinking patterns.

Relabeling is an empowering practice whose power dynamics becomes most obvious when seen in action and placed before the eyes. For instance, Lucretius uses this technique to take back power when passionate love has power over him (or perhaps over some other patient of passionate love). We must imagine that, in the initial stage, the patient would have felt crushed and overpowered by his infatuation with the object of his desire or passion, but through re-labeling said object in many unflattering ways and re-imagining it as ugly, old, dirty, smelly, or with other undesirable attributes, the passion subsides and the patient slowly regains power over his mind, emotions, and states.

That (re-)naming is an act of power is an ancient idea that mystified many ancient peoples. Ancient Egyptians believed that hieroglyphs had magical power because they are “words that stay”, and they divinized the concept of magical words in the deity of magic, Heka (who represents words of power). Later, authors of the Bible attribute the power of naming all the animals and all of nature to Adam, the mythical first member of the human species, so as to say that this linguistic faculty of naming is one of our “superpowers”. But we do not need to be mystified by the power of language, simply to understand it and to employ it for our ethical purposes.

“Leaving the Chorus”: the Doctrine of Hesuchia

Principal Doctrine 14 gives us another layer of commentary on the relationship between language and what Foucault would have called pervasive, or dispersed, power:

Although some measure of safety from other people is based in the power to fight them off and in abundant wealth, the purest security comes from solitude and breaking away from the herd.

Here, Peter St. Andre translates hesuchías (ἡσυχίας) as “solitude” (I may have translated it as “retreat”, since this is the same word used in orthodox Christianity for the tradition of the desert fathers), and he translates exchoréseos (ἐκχωρήσεως) as “breaking away from the herd”. But let us look at the prolepsis of this last word: it implies exiting or leaving (ex-) the chorus.

What is a chorus? A chorus is a group of people who (in theater, or in some event) are all saying the same thing in unison. The implication is that all the members of the chorus think alike, so that “chorus” comes to imply convention and peer pressure, as well as the erasure of the individual and his private ideas. “Exiting the chorus”, in this context, means leaving the power dynamics of societal peer pressure, and not blindly repeating what others are saying–or taking it as truth–until we have chosen and applied the criteria for truth to those propositions. It means thinking for ourselves, rather than being circus seals trained to clap mindlessly as part of the show.

Doxa 14 is the first of three Doctrines that focus on autarchy (15 focuses on economic autarchy, and 16 on existential autarchy). It sets the stage for these other two Doxai by inviting us to separate ourselves from the crowd, and it cites safety as one reason for this. Now, we all have to give up some level of personal sovereignty in most of our relations and in the execution of our responsibilities, but by expressing their invitation to avoid giving up our autarchy in terms of exchoréseos in a Doctrine that introduces autarchy, the founders are inviting us to a more dignified life of self-sufficiency and self-rule by specifically evading the power dynamics that are expressed verbally and collectively, which are represented as “a chorus” (a group of drones that all think and say the same thing).

The “diffused power” in the chorus is expressed via language, and in concrete words. The chorus represents here the degrading loss of our safety and personal sovereignty, and so leaving it is a pre-requirement for our enjoyment of a dignified level of autarchy and for our ability to free our practice of philosophy from the demands of the polis and of mindless collectives. There is a different type of safety in being part of “the herd” (as we see in nature), but this safety is accused as false and degrading by this Doctrine.

Philosophy requires withdrawal from “the crowd” so that we may be able to think for ourselves rather than blindly repeat what people in our social circles are saying (and blindly believing the underlying and expressed premises of whatever they are saying). By virtue of PD 14 being an authorized Doxa, the founders were saying that this act of autarchy, of personal sovereignty, of “exiting the chorus”, is necessary for the practice of philosophy.

But if we are robbed of our power by the collective voice of “the chorus”, this also seems to imply that we retain, regain, and express our power by the willful and skillful use of our individual voices. So I believe this Doctrine means (among other things) to restore our voice (which is to say, our authority) as individuals who enjoy autarchy / personal sovereignty.

Meleta on Definitions

At the Society of Epicurus, we’ve been delving into in-depth meleta (study and deliberation) of the forty Principal Doctrines of Epicurus for months, and deriving great pleasure from the new insights we have gained.

I noticed that when one reads the 40 Principal Doctrines systematically, the very first thing one finds in the very first words of the very first Doctrine is distrust of words. The editors of the Doctrines chose the definition of “gods” (immortal and blissful animals) for the sake of clarity, rather than the word “gods” to convey their meaning.

This is because we sometimes do not trust words as much as their clear definitions.

This issue of mistrusting words is one of the first problems addressed in Epicurus’ Epistle to Herodotus (beginning from Fragment 35 of Book X of Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers), where he instructs his disciples to always clearly define words prior to any philosophical investigation in order to avoid being carried into error by the use of empty words.

The founders sometimes found words that were simply inadequate, and felt the need to reform their expression for the sake of clarity in their study of nature. They had a practice of re-defining words according to the evidence of nature, so that their expression would always be aligned with nature. We know, for instance, that the Epicurean Guide Polyaenus wrote a treatise “On Definitions” which is not extant, and one of the 37 books On Nature by Epicurus is titled “Against the use of empty words“. Here, it is revealed that Metrodorus and Epicurus had been discussing the best rules by which it is possible and advantageous to re-define words, with Epicurus insisting that using common words as they are commonly used is the best policy, although they had gone back and forth over the years on this, and Epicurus in this book admits that his thinking has evolved on the matter. The ancient Guides’ preoccupation with the adequacy of language, and insistence on clarity, was not unique. Two millenia later Wittgenstein (who championed and insisted on clear speech) said:

Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.

The second and third phases in the evolution of language, according to Epicurean anthropology, is where philosophers, inventors, cultural creatives and others coin new words and lead the ongoing process of rationally perfecting the shared language. Wittgenstein says that each language, dialect or jargon is a “game” into which are embedded rules and notions that act as a social contract for the users of the language. We could say much more about this, but we risk going on a tangent, and this deserves a separate discussion.

And here is the intersection between the worries of the Kathegemones (Epicurean Guides) and these considerations concerning the entanglement of language and power: was clarity the only criterion in language reform? Can we identify clear patterns in whatever confusing tendencies were they fighting in their native Greek language? Were they fighting Platonic, or political, webs of power that had gotten entangled in common (koine) Greek language?

To what extent might it be advantageous and practical for modern speakers of English, Spanish, and other languages who practice Epicurean philosophy together to go through a similar process of purging or perfecting our own languages, for the sake of clarity–the only rhetorical requirement we have–and in order to embed and will our own social contract into our jargon?

From the third stage in our doctrine on the evolution of language, we know that the founders believed that philosophers have to be actively engaged in the natural and inevitable process of language evolution, otherwise the vehicle of expression will always be mediocre and the utility of language will be limited. The fact that they established this Doctrine, we imagine, served to justify their linguistic projects, which meant to purge their language game of unwanted traits and steer it in an ethically correct and choice-worthy direction. I imagine they did this, concretely, through a slow and organic editorial process that involved all communication and content, since they were always known to be careful in their expression.

But, did the founders create a basic naming language, a type of conlang (as some modern Epicureans have speculated) made up of a small number of concepts that were unavailable in the culture? Or did the Guides simply coin a few expressions and words? Since language is inherently communitarian and collective, I wonder to what extent they saw these projects as a natural extension of their self-concept as a sect, as an ethically and culturally autonomous philosophical tribe with its own mores.

Did clarity become the only requirement in our rhetorics after failed experiments to communicate efficiently, or was it so from the onset? How did this preoccupation with clear speech evolve? We know that Epicureans were known for their suavity, or sweet speech, as well as their clarity and conciseness, and that this served their ethical purposes. Are there any additional criteria for perfecting our communication?

From reading Epicurus’ insistence (in “Against the use of empty words“) that people should use common words as they are commonly used, we may infer that he believed that some of the other Kathegemones may have previously gone too far in their language-reform experiments. However, it is difficult for us today to gauge exactly the extent to which Epicureans reformed koine Greek.

In our circle, we have for many years discussed the need for taking back words that have been monopolized by Christianity and other Platonized religions and ways of thinking (words like gods, soul, salvation, virtue), and we’ve discussed the inadequacy of some words, and whether we should use Greek terms that are obscure, or words from our own language. When I wrote Tending the Epicurean Garden, my editor insisted that I coin an English translation for katastematic (I ended up coining the term “abiding pleasure” for the book), and to avoid obscure Greek terms in general. Curiously, Epicurus himself might have agreed, since he established clarity as his only rhetorical criterion.

In recent years, there have been efforts from some feminists, and some in the LGBT community and allies, to reform English to make it more gender-neutral and to move away from patriarchal language conventions. Many Churches and synagogues are moving towards gender-neutral language for God. English is a great language for this, since–unlike Semitic and Romance languages–it does not use gendered nouns. These efforts are, to some extent, praise-worthy (and also natural, because language naturally evolves) … but they also reach what some of us may consider ludicrous excesses, and make it seem prudent to be pragmatic and generally conservative in our efforts to perfect our native languages.

Further Reading:
Wittgenstein: A Wonderful Life (1989)
PHILOSOPHY – Ludwig Wittgenstein
The Book of Sh_zd_ar

Liber Qvintvs

Oh luckless human kind, to grant the gods such powers, and top them off with bitter fury! – Liber Qvintvs, 1194-1195

This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is lucretius_de_rerum_natura.jpg I’ve had the pleasure of reading Copley’s translation of De Rerum natura (On the Nature of Things) at least twice now. I’m not the first one to notice that DRN is as much about the ethics as it is about the physics, as both are connected in Epicurean philosophy. I’ve also noticed that the Fifth Book of DRN is the most complete extant compendium of ancient Epicurean anthropology that we have.

The main ethical goal of the Liber Qvintvs is to replace the inherited ancient myths about the gods handing down laws, language, writing, weapons, arts, crafts, and other “gifts of civilization” with non-supernatural explanations for all these phenomena based on the study of nature. Ancient people used to believe that Dionysus gave us wine cultivation, Athena gave us the arts and crafts, Hermes gave us language and writing, Urania gave us astronomy, etc. Today, many still believe that the tribal god of the Jews gave us all the languages (via the Babel myth) and that he created all things … but since we see that nothing comes from nothing, there is no need for a Creator of all matter.

That this process of replacing myth with natural theories concerning the “gifts of civilization” is the over-arching theme of Liber Qvintvs is evidenced by how it ends, as if summarizing: “Thus, step by step, time lays each fact before us, and reason lifts it to the coasts of light; for men saw one thing clarify another till civilization reached its highest peak“. Here, Lucretius seems to be saying that we become properly civilized by dismissing supernatural explanations for phenomena and learning, through the study of nature, about the way things work.

Earth the All-Mother is also our common tomb: she gives, but takes away, and grows again. – Liber Qvintvs, 259-260

In Liber Qvintvs, Lucretius beautifully exemplifies how we may use the Epicurean canonin order to investigate questions in the realm of culture and anthropology. The most interesting case study for this is the origin of language (1028-1090). Of course, we can not go back in time and observe how it emerged, so here we are forced to apply the Epicurean method of inferring by analogy about the non-evident based on the evident. Since the last Twentieth message was about how we use the canon, I wish to point out how Lucretius applies this method of inference by analogy to the origin of language. The passage begins by stating what the theory says: that there is no teleology. Instead, nature first randomly produces certain faculties in our bodies, some of which then prove to be advantageous, and then later culture and artifice perfect the use of these faculties. A curious insight is provided here:

All creatures sense their powers and how to use them. – Liber Qvintvs, 1033

This deserves further elaboration elsewhere, as it is profoundly intuitive and insightful, but for now let us focus on the issue of language. Lucretius points to a few signs from nature in his investigation of the origins of language. Citing examples from many species (calves who attack with their yet-to-develop horns, lion’s kittens who play with their claws and fangs in order to hone their skills, tiny birds who flutter their wings), Lucretius argues that we see that human children use gestures to point at what they see, which seems to demonstrate a natural instinct to communicate. He ridicules the idea that one single person in remote antiquity (to the ancients, a God like Hermes or Thoth) could invent all the words of an entire language, since communication requires more than one person who must all understand and use words with an agreed-upon meaning.

Lucretius cites how various species make different noises to effectively communicate at a rudimentary level according to necessity. Hounds bear their teeth as a threat, lick their pups to comfort them, and cry when in pain. A stallion squeals, his nostril gapes, when he is in his prime. Birds make different noises when they fight over food or battle their prey. Having cited these concrete examples, and citing feeling as a guide of sentient beings, Lucretius then infers (by analogy) that

if varied feelings, then, force animals, dumb though they are, to utter varied cries, how much more likely that in those days men could use one and another term for different things.

And in this manner, Lucretius exemplifies how we apply our canonical methods of reasoning by analogy (here, inferring about the non-evident based on that which is evident) in the realm of anthropology. Furthermore, Liber Qvintvs includes a natural explanation of the origin of friendship and compassion for the weak and vulnerable in our communities, insightful thoughts on the origin of government, and in one sci-fi passage it even describes a war that involves great beasts in the innumerable worlds. He describes the origins of religion and the arts, as well as the beginning of the historical era (the writing down of events). The origins of music are described in a beautiful passage about the “people of the forest” (silvestre genus) who are the “children of the Earth” (terrigenarum)–perhaps the first-ever example of Epicurean primitivism.

We find assistance for interpreting the Golden Words passage, where Lucretius praises the words of true philosophy, epitomized by Epicurus’ doctrines, and names them “golden, and most worthy of eternal life“. In a passage on the evolution of metalworking (line 1280), Lucretius compares gold favorably to iron, saying that while iron exacerbated the problem of warfare, men increase daily their search for gold, praise it and grant it honor beyond belief. We must assume that this, too, is the attitude we should have towards the Golden Words of true philosophy. He seems to be saying: look for gold, not iron–which is to say, perhaps, “make love, not war“, or maybe “seek pleasure and prosperity, not conflict” but he says this without ignoring the nuances. Lucretius does not idealize gold, and in fact he warns people about incessant desires for more, about greed as the “dark side” of this choice of wealth over violence / gold over iron. He also recognizes that the tools made from iron are useful in farming and technology.

People in antiquity believed that all these “civilizing gifts” or decrees were handed down by the gods at the dawn of creation. Some cultures, like the Sumerians, had very elaborate and politically interesting myths concerning the Més (the “divine decrees” by which the gods civilized humans), control over which was ludicrously fought over by gods from different cities according to Sumerian myth. In Liber Qvintvs, Lucretius demystifies each Mé, revealing each to be the natural product of culture and nature taking their course. He proved that Athena did not give us olives (or law, or philosophy, or weaving), that Dionysus did not give us wine, that Aristos did not give us cheese-making, etc. It is mortals who have fashioned the Més, and since (like the laws of human society) they are not divine but natural, these techniques, practices, or wisdom-traditions can be perfected or updated over long spans of many generations … and, most importantly, they do not serve gods. They serve mortals.

Overall, although DRN has many inspiring and moving passages, Liber Qvintvs is my favorite of the six books of De rerum natura, a treasure-trove of wisdom, an intellectual feast. If you do not have time to read the entire work, I recommend that you focus only on Liber Qvintvs so as to get a feel for why Lucretius (together with his Hegemon, Epicurus) is such an essential foundational figure in Western thought.

On the Evolution of Language

The following is a commentary on the essay titled New Evidence for the Epicurean Theory of the Origin of Language: Philodemus, On Poems V, by Jacob Mackey and Epicurus, On nature, Book 28 by David N Sedley.

As we have seen before, the founders of Epicurean philosophy were deeply concerned with the role that language plays in our apprehension of the nature of things. The canonical faculty of prolepsis (anticipations) is tied to the use of language, and its place in the canon implies that language can be a shortcut to recalling things that were at one point empirically available to our other faculties. But language conventions can betray prolepsis, sometimes purposefully, as we see in the case of metaphors.

We are not necessarily against poetry. Philodemus says that poetry gives pleasure through excellence of diction and content. We may say that “mountains vomit clay into rivers”, and by context most people will know that we are speaking metaphorically. But we must never forget the utility of words in their context. This expression is fine when we speak poetically, but in his Epistle to Herodotus, Epicurus starts by saying that words are only useful if their clear meaning is kept in mind.

Epicurus clashed with Dialectitians from Megara. Among them, Diodorus Cronus (who was an extreme conventionalist), said that language isn’t natural. From these facts, we can imagine that Epicurus was arguing against them that language (and other phenomena) do exist and are natural.

Epicurus’ views concerning language evolved. He had begun adopting Metrodorus’ process of using conventional words (rather than the pedantic practice of some philosophers, who are very particular about their choice of obscure language) by the time he wrote On Nature 28:

“I now see, as I did not then, the particular difficulties concerning this class, of having correct names for individual things … as you (Metro) also used in those days to assign names without adapting certain conventional usages, so that you should not make plain the principle that by assigning any name one expresses an opinion, and see and reflect upon the indiscriminate treatment of words and objects.”

We see a distrust of words, and we see their preoccupation with avoiding the addition of opinion when we express ourselves, and a recognition of the great difficulty of this in our choice of words. We know that Lucretius mentions “opinion” as a category that does not belong in the canon. The argument here is that to name something is to express an opinion, which may be true or false. So the addition of opinion is a sign that a definition of a word is non-canonical, has no empirical basis, and is not based on true prolepsis.

In addition to these concerns, Epicurean anthropology recognizes three stages of the evolution of language.

First Stage: Nature teaches words

The founders believed that initially, language started by ananke (necessity) as a reaction to external stimuli. This view is held today by people like linguist Noam Chomsky, who has argued that there exists in the human brain an “inborn universal grammar”. But the ancients didn’t have a scientific field of linguistics. They only had empirical attestations from nature. They likely observed the role that certain calls have in certain communities of monkeys (if they came across them in their travels) or birds, who use calls to warn each other about the presence of predators, for mating, for warning enemies who enter their territory, and for other rudimentary uses. Award-winning studies of human reaction to the noise made by nails on a chalk board seem to indicate that this may an ancestral vestige of primate warning calls:

The authors hypothesized that it was due to predation early in human evolution; the sound bore some resemblances to the alarm call of macaque monkeys, or it may have been similar to the call of some predator. This research won one of the authors, Randolph Blake, an Ig Nobel Prize in 2006.

Second Stage: Reason develops language

So, the initial sounds and grunts made by our ancestors were wild, that is, invented by nature. Later, as humans became civilized, the founders argue that language was developed further by logismos (reason), which refined the first words. Since this stage is distinct from the third stage, I imagine that this stage did not involve an intellectual class, but emerged naturally from the intelligence of average language-users and from the pragmatic necessities of their interactions with each other and their environment.

Third Stage: Reason adds new discoveries

It’s in this final stage that the philosophers of the first Garden believed to be operating when they engaged in the practice of reassigning names. This is a practice that Confucian philosophers have also, interestingly, engaged in for the sake of clarity. It’s possible that this is a widespread practice among the intellectual classes of many cultures, and responds to real, universal problems of sophisticated human communication.

It’s also here that poets get to work on inventing novel ways of utilizing words, and sometimes these innovations end up having great utility, while at other times this creates confusion and obscures speech for the entire community.

Epicurus generally doubts the utility of definitions and insists that people use words as they are used commonly–and yet sometimes (as in Principal Doctrine 1, which uses the definition of the word “gods” rather than the word itself) it’s clear that he trusts the definition more than the word, because the word has been so corrupted by the culture that it’s best to clearly define it in conversation.

To the first Epicureans, the legitimate practice of word-coining was born from utility, rather than for aesthetics. When I wrote Tending the Epicurean Garden, my editor insisted that I avoid using Greek terms that no one was familiar with, and this has been a recurrent problem in the teaching mission of the Society of Friends of Epicurus, and in many of my projects of content-creation for many outlets. Rather than kinetic and katastematic, I had to refer to dynamic and abiding pleasure. Many emerging fields of scientific inquiry, new inventions, and modern media and technology, have also produced the need for many new words. This process of word-coining will never end, for as long as there is human civilization.

Further Reading:
Against the use of empty words

On Nature: Books XXV and XXVIII

Epicurus’ On Nature I-X
Epicurus’ On Nature – Books XI-XIV

Book 25

The work has many long sentences, which makes it hard to follow. I had written a commentary of a commentary on this book (from an English source), but I have re-read the book in French from Les Epicuriens. Here are a few new insights, and key concepts.

DEVELOPED PRODUCT

We see in philosophy and anthropology a contrast between nature and culture, and this is reflected in this book, where Epicurus compares “the original constitution” of an individual versus the “product in the process of development” (his character, which she cultivates), and finally the “developed product”–a fully mature character of someone who understands his “causal responsibility”.

GERMS / SEEDS

Epicurus talks about the “germs” or “seeds” (spermata) that we carry from birth of both wisdom and virtue, as well as ignorance and vices. Epicurus says “at first people act out their seeds, but later, a time comes where the developed product … depends absolutely on us and on our own opinions, which we ourselves have formed“. Our opinions or beliefs are linked to our moral development in this manner.

Epicurus later says “I don’t stop rambling on this point“, referring to how the “permanent attribute” of our character is the same as a sort of seed or germ, and he says that many things we do by contribution of our nature, many we do without its contribution, many where we discipline our nature, and many where we use our nature as guide that “leads us out of our inertia“.

ANTICIPATION OF CAUSAL RESPONSIBILITY

Epicurus says we have an “anticipation of our causal responsibility“, and this has repercussions on praise and blame. Here, he is tying causal responsibility, and morality, to the canonic faculty of anticipation–a faculty by which we are able to apprehend abstractions.

DOCTRINAL DETERMINISM

Epicurus says that if all our views are born of necessity, then no one can change the opponent’s mind. This reminded me of this study, which shows that political ideology may be pre-determined or genetic.

… analyzing their data, the Blocks found a clear set of childhood personality traits that accurately predicted conservatism in adulthood. For instance, at the ages of three and four, the “conservative” preschoolers had been described as “uncomfortable with uncertainty,” as “rigidifying when experiencing duress,” and as “relatively over-controlled.” The girls were “quiet, neat, compliant, fearful and tearful, [and hoped] for help from the adults around.”

Likewise, the Blocks pinpointed another set of childhood traits that were associated with people who became liberals in their mid-twenties. The “liberal” children were more “autonomous, expressive, energetic, and relatively under-controlled.” Liberal girls had higher levels of “self-assertiveness, talkativeness, curiosity, [and] openness in expressing negative feelings.”

CALLING OUT THE OPPONENTS’ EXCHANGE OF NAMES

This is distinct from the problem of empty words that Epicurus addresses elsewhere. Epicurus says that determinists are “merely changing names” when they make moral claims or assign blame / praise, or classify people for their right / wrong thinking. He later says he does not stop re-hashing and restating that what determinists are arguing is nothing more than a mere exchange of words. This reminded me of the rectification of names by Confucius.

Book 28

Other speakers of our language teach us unsuspected, yet true meanings of words, contrary to our common usage. – Epicurus

This book is a polemic against Diodorus Cronus and his school. He was a dialectitian of Megaria (a “man of logic”) who believed space was indivisible and motion was impossible. Epicurus’ goal here was to defend the senses as a source of information about the world. It’s in this context that he refers to words like “attestations” (the testimonies of the senses), etc.

While dialectitians might argue about the way in which things exist and are real based on how language is used to refer to things, the atomists (like Epicurus) were realists. They embraced the physics, the study of nature, and knew that reality existed regardless of how clearly we apprehend it, or how long it takes us to learn about it. Hence, the Epicureans distrusted dialectics, and also the insinuation that, through the use of language, as if by magic, people were able to fundamentally change the nature of things or assert power over reality in any significant manner. In particular, Epicurus was suspicious of philosophers who liked to play with words in order to confuse people, particularly because this often rendered philosophy a useless game.

It is language that must conform to reality, not the other way around. Because of this, the meanings of words tend to be evident to us, as is made clear in one of the introductory paragraphs of the Epistle to Herodotus:

But first of all, Herodotus, before we begin the investigation of our opinions, we must firmly grasp the ideas that are attached to our words, so that we can refer to them as we proceed. Unless we have a firm grasp of the meaning of each word, we leave everything uncertain, and we go on to infinity using empty words that are devoid of meaning. Thus it is essential that we rely on the first mental image associated with each word, without need of explanation, if we are to have a firm standard to which to refer as we proceed in our study. – Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus

The issue of changing names in accordance to nature is addressed here. Epicurus taught that there are words that serve as vehicles for false opinions. He said names should only be changed to more exactly describe objects that are directly perceived, and only observed things can be renamed following this rule. Language must correspond to perception.

Epicurus mentions that the founders wrote a separate treatise on ambiguity, where they discuss transferring words for what is knowable to things in the category of the unknowable. This work is not available for us to study.

One note of interest is that in this book, Epicurus admits the founders’ past errors regarding language misuse, and the evolution of their ideas. Ergo, we must be careful when we study the earlier sources, and we must be careful to date the sources we are studying if at all possible.