Category Archives: epicurus

Reasonings About Philodemus’ Rhetorica

Rhetoric is the prince of lies. –  Heraclitus

The following reasonings are based on the seven books that comprise Rhetorica by Philodemus, with translation and commentary by Dr. Harry M. Hubbell, which was published in 1920. Rhetorica is not a work of logic or rhetoric per se, but a series of arguments regarding the role and uses of rhetoric. The only reference to logic deals with how the relation between true and false is not the same as between two probabilities, and how it is false inference to apply laws of science to politics. There is also a reference to the canon in the declaration that “experience is our only guide to forecast the future“.

Book I contains an introduction and very general outline of the work, but only fragments of this book remain. It concludes saying:

Those Epicureans are to be censured who assume that sophistic is not an art, and thus run counter to the teachings of Epicurus, Metrodorus and Hermarchus, as we shall show later. Such Epicureans are almost guilty of parricide.

From the onset, we find Philodemus arguing in favor of what he perceived as orthodoxy and claiming legitimacy by tracing his ideas back to the four founders, and even saying that his opponents are nearly killing their parents. It was clear that love and respect for the sages who founded our tradition was deep-seated in the early communities of Epicureans.

Defining an Art

It was also clear that whether or not sophists were considered artists was a serious matter, and that we need to clarify the meaning of art (tekne) and of an artist.

Book II discusses whether rhetoric is an art. Epicureans argued that rhetoric was an art whose end was to persuade in a rhetorical speech, arguing that “in art anyone can excel over a trained person, but not in an exact science (or very rarely)“. An art, therefore, has an end, a purpose, it seeks an achievement.

The philosopher persuades by force of logic, Phyrne by her beauty.

If rhetoric has no method it is not an art … for the essence of art is to accomplish the result always.

Later in Section II, Philodemus defines art saying that it:

  • results from observation
  • accomplishes a result that can’t be attained if one has not studied it
  • is done regularly and not by conjecture (guess, speculation)

This applies to grammar and music. Philodemus argued vehemently that politics is not an art. Art (technique) requires transmission and is acquired through observation and experience.

As in music and grammar so in rhetoric there is a transmission of knowledge from teacher to pupil, and the training is not without method.

In the process of defining tekne, as opposed to our modern conception of art, we sought the help of our friend Brian, who says:

The word “art” is better translated “technique” (in Greek it is “techne”). It almost means “profession”. It was important for a few reasons: one is that the layman effort is sufficient for most tasks … Philodemus does not disparage “techne”, but in fact wishes to separate some jobs that he said really have no “techne” at all.

“SCIENCE/experience” is the “layman” or “amateur” effort, learned by actual contact whereas “ART/techne/profession” is the learned and schooled effort, learned by rules and technical training, not learned by actual contact. The idea is that “some arts can be accomplished partially and reasonably well by those who have not studied the principles of the art” should be read as “the practical exception that proves the rule.”

In the modern interpretation of art, we can observe that it’s distinct from science by being subjective (and concerned with aesthetics), whereas science is objective. Scientific facts may or may not have aesthetic value, they they work effectively and invariably. Rhetors may convince the majority of people of some truth (or lie), and still be considered great artists, or thought to have great technique. When doctors cure only the majority, but not all patients, they are not called great artists or technicians.

Epicurus divided rhetoric between two parts: sophistic (art of writing speeches and delivering orations) and practical. Forensic and deliberative oratory is a separate art, presumably because the techniques and aims are different.

According to Rhetorica, someone within the school was disputing Epicurus’ view that sophistic was an art. Philodemus’ interlocutors argue that rhetoric is not an art on the assumption that an art must have method and a transmission of definite knowledge; they also classify politics as an art, which Philodemus argues against.

To sum up: we call arts those that have a certain character possessed by grammar and sculpture; we deny that are art those that lack this character and are characterized by observation, ergo sophistic is an art and politics is not.

Sophistic rhetoric is an art of epideixis and of the arrangement of speeches, written and extemporaneous.

Notice that sophists have a method. Traditionally, a speech writer would compose a proemium (introduction), narration, demonstration, exception, and summary. There is also a process of learning and transmission by observation, a clear aim (either to convince others or to deliver a speech involving praise or indictment) and its effects must not be the result of conjecture. Therefore, it meets the above mentioned requirements for an art.

Against Obscurity

Book IV argues against obscurity and flowery language, and in favor of words always being used in their proper meaning. As far as style (which can be overused by rhetors), Epicurus argued in favor of only the natural style.

Obscurity is of two kinds: intentional and unintentional. It is intentional when one has nothing to say and conceals the poverty of his thought by obscure language that he may seem to say something useful. Connected with this is the use of many digressions, poetic images, recondite allusions and archaic language. Solecisms prevent the hearer from understanding many things. ONLY THE TRUE PHILOSOPHER IS FREE FROM THESE FAULTS.

Unintentional obscurity arises from not mastering the subject, but also from believing that words are in harmony with things. Along the same lines, we find elsewhere: “in a picture all is light and shadow; a painting cannot produce a living being.” The word or image is confused for the thing that is meant. Words are oftentimes not concise or do not refer clearly to things that are meant.

Obscurity can also arise from not knowing how to express ourselves (using improper grammar, etc.), from too frequent use of hyperbata, or from the use of too much rhyme while paying little attention to meaning.

One should use ordinary expressions appropriately, and not express oneself inaccurately, nor vaguely, nor use expressions with double meaning.

Rhetors are criticized for not having scientific or specific rules for use of metaphor, for using them more frequently than even poets, and for how they ridicule a metaphor without explaining why it’s faulty. It is said that sophistical training does not prevent faulty speech, and the first section ends saying that the “study of technical rhetoric has never advanced anyone“.

An overview of this portion reveals an insistence on clear, concise, simple and plain speech, which is highly valued. Language is expected to be scientific and precise so that it may serve as an effective tool for communication.

The Amorality and Other Limitations of Rhetoric

We shall next consider the statement that every art is invented for some useful purpose, but rhetoric tends to deceive.

Section II is said to be the most important part of On Rhetoric. The true value of rhetoric is put into perspective, the author insisting that it is not superior to philosophy. We learn that the difference between dialectic and grammar is that dialectic teaches how to argue, grammar teaches how to read. To the traditional field of rhetorics (forensic, deliberative, encomiastic), Demetrius adds a fourth: obtaining favor with all. The book then goes on to discuss the limitations of rhetoric.

They have a system for making themselves appear dignified and noble, and for misleading their audiences. This system is not needed by any other artist, certainly not by the philosopher. The fact is, each profession has its own peculiar delivery.

The argument here is that someone who knows about rhetoric may know little of the subject being discussed, even if he can weave a persuasive argument. Only the professionals and experts in any given field have true authority to speak on it. This includes politics, the field that was most likely to employ rhetors in antiquity. This is still true in our day, in fact. The vast majority of US politicians have a background in law, and in fact the legal professions are the contemporary version of the professions that used to employ rhetors in antiquity.

If rhetoric can discover the possible arguments in questions relating to medicine, music, etc. the rhetoricians are immediately put into rivalry with the experts in each of these professions … Each profession has its own facts and principles, and is alone competent to argue about them.

I assert that the sophists can, at least as far as their technical treatises are concerned, discover not the slightest argument pertaining to politics.

Even when the expertise of rhetoric is recognized, another limitation (this time, moral) is found in the art of praise: ‘the praise of brute beasts does no good’. The ability to praise things unworthy of praise is not praiseworthy, and doesn’t change their nature. A rhetor who does not know philosophy, can’t discern between good and bad, and ends up praising bad things and encouraging vice. Elsewhere in the text, it is said that rhetoric is “responsible for great mischief and does not bring success in actual law cases“.

Their claim that rhetoric is the mother of all the arts and sciences is a vain pretense … it is based on deceit, and therefore harmful.

Book V continues the diatribe against rhetors and on how rhetoric is harmful because it is based on deceit, arguing that it’s also useless in public life. Philodemus’ critique of rhetors reminds us of his critique of flatterers. He even asserts that “rhetors must flatter all their lives“. Rhetors are accused of saying there’s no morality except public opinion. On the other hand, philosophy provides everything necessary for a happy life; and philosophers gain the friendship of public men by helping them out of their troubles, not by flattering them.

Those who are troubled with the itch make it worse by scratching … so with those who suffer from sycophants (flatterers).

The accusation of flattery is tied to the audience that rhetors cater to. It is impossible to be loyal to everyone at once. Philodemus argues that “mobs change and repent quickly” and are fickle, whereas philosophers are content to assist a few people. These arguments are tied to the deep-seated belief among Epicureans that one can’t be happy by making others happy.

We see the frequent accusation that this art is amoral, ergo incomplete without philosophy. It becomes clear that one of the arguments put forth is that philosophy must help us to judge the ethical uses of rhetoric and of speech. The purpose or effect of the speech is of great importance in these consideration.

(Rhetoric) does not indicate what use is to be made of the powers it gives.

Speeches of this sort are no disgrace, if the object of forensic oratory be to set forth the facts, and not to show one’s power.

Aside from the ethical issues, Philodemus argues that one can’t enjoy the power and wealth that come with rhetoric because of the toils that come with them. For instance, he says philosophers “by their life and conversation, benefit their followers, however the mobs envy rhetors“.  He also cites the general distrust that exists within the culture against professional speakers in courts (lawyers, in modern language) and how judges are more likely to trust simple people.

Every good and honest man who confines his interest to philosophy alone, and disregards the nonsense of lawyers can face boldly all such troubles.

… It is worth our while to consider what sort of a life those have lived who have spent it all in prosecution and defense.

… Persuasion creates distrust in philosophy.

At times while reading Philodemus, one wants to ask whether he’s being too hard on rhetors. We must keep in perspective how important rhetoric was to the other schools of philosophy, and its corrupting effects. It seems that Philodemus’ intention was to contrast this use of rhetoric against the therapeutic and medicinal ethics proposed by the Epicurean school. Rhetoric does not bring happiness. On the other hand philosophy, he reminds us, shows us how to limit our desires, and it is better than rhetoric which helps us to satisfy them: in other words, people oftentimes use rhetoric not only for immoral purposes, but also to run after vain and empty desires like fame and a political career. True philosophy also encourages us to seek a profession that leads to happiness, whereas “rhetoric is unsuitable for one who aims at quiet happiness” and produces “strange reasons to study politics“.

Philosophers Must Obey the Law

Some laws (just and unjust) are natural and never change, others vary by locality and condition. Rhetorica argues that it is better to obey all the laws and adapt to society. Otherwise, if a philosopher doesn’t think he can live well under the conditions created by a particular regulation, he may vote with his feet and leave the country.

(We should obey the laws) with pleasure and not under compulsion; steadily and not in an uncertain fashion.

The ancients apparently didn’t have a word for activism, but clearly rhetoric would serve the purposes of a modern activist. It’s not that philosophy does not contribute to the work of activists, but for the sake of ataraxia we must make sure that we live lawful lives. Living under the rule of tyranny would likely impede ataraxia. Hence the two choices given to the philosopher.

On the Proper Use of Rhetoric

We agree that a good delivery lends dignity to the speaker, secures the attention of the audience and sways their emotions.

Rhetorica makes us ask ourselves questions about the most ethical use of words and of communication, not just the most effective. There are several ways in which words can be harmful: they can be either deceitful (hence the Epicurean insistence on parrhesia, or frankness) or they can be insulting, hurtful and demoralizing (hence the insistence on suavity, or mild and kind manners).

Book VII concludes that one must pursue that which produces a painless life. Epicurean therapy uses treatments that consist on reasonings and evidence-based, carefully-built arguments. Therefore, although rhetors are willing to sell false views to common people, we must assume that rhetoric can and should be employed in the service of philosophy and to heal the soul via true and wholesome arguments.

Further Reading:

Read Philodemus De Rhetorica, translation and commentary by Dr. Harry M Hubbell (PDF)

Reasonings About Philodemus’ On Frank Speech, Parts I, II and III

The Rhetorica Of Philodemus

Back to the Main Page

Tweet This

Detailed Review of “A Few Days in Athens”

Read the full text, audio version, and links to PDF versions at  archive.com.

A Few Days in Athens

The first thing I told myself after reading A Few Days in Athens is “Why did I wait so long to read this masterpiece?”. That was the same reaction I had to reading Lucian’s Alexander the Oracle-Monger, a work which I knew about for very long but had been too lazy to read, and I even felt the need to apologize to our predecessor by writing a piece in praise of Lucian. Let this be my piece in praise of Frances Wright, as this is perhaps the only extant work by a female Epicurean author advocating in no uncertain terms a return to the wisdom of Epicurus.

The work had been recommended to me by Cassius, who said the following:

It is an amazing piece of material … It probably qualifies as the real (Epicurean) “Atlas Shrugged” or ultimate English-language manifesto of Epicurean philosophy, and it also lends itself to almost being used–without any changes at all–for a modern movie or screenplay that could easily be staged … I believe the portrayal of doctrine to be 100% faithful … Almost all the minute episodes and references are from various books of Diogenes Laertius, but the material is combined and told in story-form in such a way as to be a work of genius.

In general, I find the book extremely faithful to the core texts on every core point. And virtually every aspect of the book is a helpful explanation of Epicurean doctrine, along with a comparison of how he differed from other philosophers.

Short of Epicurus’ own letters, and Lucretius, and Diogenes of Oinoada, this is probably THE undiscovered treasure of world Epicurean literature. I am not familiar with what has been published in other languages, but it really stands alone in the English world, at least.

Simply by reading this one, single, easy-and-fun-to-read book, any educated layman can have a better grasp of the core ideas of Epicurus than most college students have after four years and a degree in philosophy.

Cassius also expresses doubts as to whether a young Frances Wright wrote the work by herself or with the aid of her great-uncle James Mylne, a professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow College who mentored her during a period of her life, as she was an orphan and moved to live with him in Scotland when she was 21. We can’t make any definite claims of co-authorship by her uncle, but he would have had a reputation to uphold, and with this being a book written partly in defense of atheism, it’s fair to consider the possibility of co-authorship.

I personally do not doubt that she could have written the work entirely by herself. She was a brilliant, passionate woman with very progressive views who (according to the sources) was acquainted with French materialist philosophy from an early age (a tradition which originates, let us not forget, with Pierre Gassendi: an Epicurean) and later went on to become a secularist, feminist and abolitionist activist, as well as one of Susan B. Anthony’s personal heroes.

A Few Days in Athens was also personally recommended by Thomas Jefferson and Marquis de Lafayette.

A treat to me of the highest order. The matter and manner of the dialogue is strictly ancient … the scenery and portraiture of the interlocutors are of higher finish than anything in that line left us by the ancients; and like Ossian, if not ancient, it is equal to the best morsels of antiquity. – Thomas Jefferson

… which should lead us to consider the historical importance of this work and its author. Together with Lafayette, Wright is known to have spent some time in the company of Thomas Jefferson when she came to America, an event which led to her humanitarian plan to purchase, educate, and later emancipate slaves. She scandalously criticized racial segregation more than a century prior to its abolition and called for miscegenation: the cultural and sexual mixing of races. She also exchanged letters with Jefferson, and shared with him an outspoken, profound distrust of the central bank.

As an interesting side note, which is reminiscent of the suspicion aroused by Epicurus’ early and precocious treatment of women as intellectual equals: the relationship between Lafayette and Wright also attracted gossip, and she even suggested he legally adopt her in order to silence the dissenting voices. It seems that Lafayette considered her worthy of meeting the other great minds of her day. So rare were the instances of women being treated as intellectual equals. It’s a testament to Epicureanism’s progressive values that our tradition nurtured these egalitarian models (invariably enduring gossip as it did so) 2,400 years ago, and then again a couple of hundred years ago.

It’s possible that A Few Days in Athens (which was written at the insistence of her co-conspirator Lafayette) is the novel that converted the founding father to Epicureanism, and in fact Jefferson carried around a notebook with quotes from the book.

Cassius also attests as to how complete an education in Epicureanism just reading this book represents, which makes is therefore a must-read for everyone studying our tradition and wanting to get a grasp of it on its own terms.

One thing this book NAILS DOWN is that (Jefferson) was not just some generic deist who had vague anti-christian feelings. This books shows (because it contains) that he was fully conversant in the most intricate details of the debates between the ancient schools, so when he said “I too am an Epicurean” he was not just talking loosely — he would have had a full understanding of what that meant.

Overview of the Work

Enough drum-beating! Let us now turn to a discussion of the book itself. The work commences with a claim of being a translation of a manuscript found in Herculaneum, but this reference was fictional and meant as a literary device.

The only set of views that is a later development in Epicureanism is Frances’ apparent agnosticism, which contrasts with the piety of the original founders of our tradition. This sympathy with atheistic views even takes on a strident tone reminiscent of contemporaries like Richard Dawkins and (Epicurean author) Christopher Hitchens at the point towards the end of the novel where religion is even denominated the root of all evil.

I have found the first link in the chain of evil; I have found it–in all countries–among all tribes and tongues and nations; I have found it, Fellow-men, I have found it in RELIGION.

We have named the leading error of the human mind, the bane of human happiness, the perverter of human virtue! It is RELIGION, that dark coinage of trembling ignorance! That poisoner of human felicity! That blind guide of human reason! That dethroner of human virtue which lies at the root of all evil and all the misery that pervade the world! 

We must treat Wright as an independent mind with an independent history and interpretation of Epicureanism. Just as Simone de Beauvoir was the feminist counterpart to Sartre among the French existentialists, Wright may be seen as an insightful feminist who is much less forgiving of religion than men (who have always enjoyed–even if at times unaware–religion’s privileges) may be inclined to be. Frances Wright’s Epicureanism is not the Epicureanism of our founders. It is a much freer, contemporary version of our tradition, one that could have only flourished where dissent does not necessarily invite danger.

Yet, this Epicureanism retains its refined, polished quality, and even fills the heart with love of virtue. Sages are viewed as compassionate, playful and just; the innocence of the good is justly protected and insisted upon, as there can be no imperturbability without innocence; good manners and wholesome character are celebrated.

If I ever saw simple, unadorned goodness; If I ever heard simple, unadorned truth, it is in, it is from Epicurus.

The book A Few Days in Athens is itself an exercise in good association and leaves us with the accompanying after-glow. One can easily envision and experience the healthy effects of associating with the virtuous, and one ends up wishing to profit from the study at the feet of philosophy–who is personified and even speaks in the first person, as in other wisdom traditions, in a section of the book.

Proper Relation Between Master and Pupil

The Stoic master Zeno and our own, Epicurus, are seen throughout the book as Guru figures. In a manner somewhat reminiscent of the Eastern protocol for relations between guru (spiritual teacher) and chela (pupil), here the pupil must be ready and receptive to the instructor and to the teaching in order to profit from the relationship.

Teach me, guide me, make me what you will. My soul is in your hand.  – Theon, taking refuge in Epicurus in A Few Days in Athens

On the other hand, reciprocity is expected and the Guru must be worthy of the name and lead by example. It’s understood that Epicurus taught by example and that his life is his message.

I answer (Stoic lies) with my life. – Epicurus, in A Few Days in Athens

Epicureans in antiquity believed that true sages taught philosophy by embodying the virtues so thoroughly that their mere presence had an effect on pupils. A similar belief exists also in the East, where the vision of a saint (called darshan), either in dream or awakened state, is considered a huge blessing. Wright’s book contains a detailed description of the main woman philosopher from the original Garden, Leontion. She is depicted as being comparable to Athena in dignity, wisdom and demeanor.

Throughout the text Epicurus is depicted as mild and candid. The author places words of praise for Epicurus and his virtues on the lips of Metrodorus, again evocating a sense of darshan, thus:

The life of Epicurus is a lesson of wisdom. It is by example, even more than precept, that he guides his disciples. Without issuing commands, he rules despotically … We are a family of brothers, of which Epicurus is the father.

Many of us have had bad habits, many of us evil propensities, violent passions. That our habits are corrected, our propensities changed, our passions restrained, lies all with Epicurus … he has made me taste the sweets of innocence, and brought me into the calm of philosophy. It is thus, by rendering us happy, that he lays us at his feet.

He cannot but know his power, yet he exerts it in no other way, than to mend our lives, or to keep them innocent.

Candor, as you have already remarked, is prominent feature of his mind, the crown of his perfect character.

Beholding the wisdom and virtue of a sage is crucial. The ultimate authority, however, is always the canon: the natural faculties by which we directly apprehend reality. It is this canon that vindicates a true sage. Once Theon (a Stoic who stumbles into Epicurus and must confront his deep-seated and demoralizing prejudices against hedonist philosophy) has his false notions put in their right place, Epicurus encourages him to think for himself based on the immediacy of his direct experience.

Learn henceforth to form judgements upon knowledge, not report. Credulity is always a ridiculous, often a dangerous failing.

The Abstract Versus the Real

We see an attack on Stoic and Platonic tendencies to speak of abstractions instead of addressing reality as it is, in the following quote attributed to Epicurus in the text.

Zeno hath his eye on man, I mine on men: none but philosophers can be stoics; Epicureans all may be.

Man, as an abstract idea removed from material reality and context, is contrasted here with men as individuals that exist interwoven with reality and context. The effect that this is said to have is that only philosophers can be stoics, but all may be Epicureans. To paraphrase the book, Zeno sees man as he should be; Epicurus sees him as he is. This is an important insight, and one that Thomas Jefferson in his Epistle to Peter Carr elaborated:

He who made us would have been a pitiful bungler, if he had made the rules of our moral conduct a matter of science. For one man of science, there are thousands who are not. What would have become of them?

Man was destined for society. His morality, therefore, was to be formed to this object. He was endowed with a sense of right and wrong, merely relative to this. This sense is as much a part of his Nature, as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling; it is the true foundation of morality, and not the [beautiful], truth, etc., as fanciful writers have imagined.

The moral sense, or conscience, is as much a part of man as his leg or arm. It is given to all human beings in a stronger or weaker degree, as force of members is given them in a greater or less degree. It may be strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb of the body. This sense is submitted, indeed, in some degree, to the guidance of reason; but it is a small stock which is required for this: even a less one than what we call common sense. State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former will decide it as well, and often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by artificial rules.

In a similar vein, later in the text there is a reference to how words are to things what means are to the end. When it is explained that virtue is happiness, it is understood that men speak of virtue (which is the means) as the end (which is really happiness) because they haven’t been able to distinguish the abstract conception of the pleasant from the real experience of pleasure.

I feel myself virtuous because my soul is at rest. – Epicurus, in A Few Days in Athens

Virtue and happiness (abiding pleasure) can be said to be one and the same insofar as one is the means to the other.

Of all the thousands who have yielded homage to virtue, hardly one has thought of inspecting the pedestal she stands upon.

Just as good and virtue equals pleasure, similarly evil is the abstraction to refer to pain, which is concrete.

With evil passions I should be disturbed and uneasy; with uncontrolled apetites I should be disorded in body as well as mind.

This important issue of abstractions versus concrete things, and of how words must always have concrete, clear and concise meaning, appears again and again: we find it in Philodemus, and it must be traced back to the original founders of the tradition.

It’s even more important when we consider what other philosophers do with rhetoric, how they twist truths and bend them for the benefit of their clients or to demonstrate their ability to persuade, and when we consider the blatant disregard for truth among the rhetors, a matter which will be covered in future reasonings concerning Philodemus’ Rhetorica.

Therefore, when discussing philosophy with other schools, as well as with each other, it’s important that words are clearly defined in concrete and concise terms to avoid confusion. This subject is revisited later in the text, when Metrodorus critiques the pedantry of Aristotle and how his dark sayings entice the mobs.

The language of truth is too simple for inexperienced ears. We start in search of knowledge like the demi-gods of old in search of adventure, prepared to encounter giants, to scale mountains … to find none of these things, but in their stead, a smooth road through a pleasant country with a familiar guide to direct our curiosity and point out the beauties of the landscape, disappoints us of all exploit and all notoriety; and our vanity turns too often from the fair and open fields into error’s dark labyrinths, where we mistake mystery for wisdom, pedantry for knowledge, and prejudice for virtue.

By Their Fruits Ye Shall Know Them

The above quote is associated with Jesus in the Gospels, but Wright appropriated it and prophetically placed it on the lips of Epicurus during a discussion with Zeno on the future decay and the future reputations of their respective schools, both of which they anticipate will be calumniated by “ambitious bigots”.

From the flavor, we pronounce of the fruit; from the beauty and the fragrance of the flower; and in a system of morals, or of philosophy, or of whatever else, what tends to produce good we pronounce to be good, what to produce evil, we pronounce to be evil.

We are here invited to judge each philosophy by the good it does (the pleasure it confers) and the evil (suffering) it prevents. If by these simple criteria we were to judge religions and philosophies prominent today, this would help us to judge Islam, Christianity, Marxism and other worldviews in light of historical and contemporary events (including how much violence and suffering they have produced) with a lucid and sober mind. Unlike political correctness, bigotries and bias, the pain and pleasure principle are not subjective or relative. They are real, natural, observable, concrete experiences.

“I gently awaken their sleeping faculties …”

The above considerations regarding virtue and pleasure, and how (guided by nature) one must distinguish them as the means and the end, have specific repercussions on the way in which Zeno and Epicurus teach philosophy. Epicurus concedes that Stoics are virtuous as well, but the severity and gravity of Zeno is contrasted beautifully against the compassion and the sweet mellows Epicurean philosophy.

With all his weaknesses, all his errors, all his sins … I call from my Gardens to the thoughtless, the headstrong, and the idle. “Where do ye wander, and what do ye seek? Is it pleasure? Behold it here. Is it ease? Enter and repose.” Thus do I court them from the table of drunkenness and the bed of licentiousness: I gently awaken their sleeping faculties, and draw the veil from their understandings.

“My sons, do you seek pleasure? I seek her also. Let us make the search together. You have tried wine, you have tried love; you have sought amusement in revelling, and forgetfulness in indolence. You tell me you are disappointed: that your passions grew, even while you gratified them; your weariness increased even while you slept. Let us try again. Let us quiet our passions, not by gratifying but subduing them; let us conquer our weariness, not by rest, but by exertion.”

Thus do I win their ears and their confidence. Step by step I lead them on … Temperance presides at the repast; innocence, at the festival; disgust is changed to satisfaction; listlessness, to curiosity; brutality, to elegance; lust gives place to love; Bacchanalian hilarity to friendship.

The contrast here lies in Epicurean insistence of gently yielding to the good in our nature, rather than the authoritarian, repressive approach of the Stoics. This is consistent with the proper understanding of virtue as not arising from some arbitrary or authoritarian principle (such as duty) but rather as that which gives way to the most pleasant existence. Let’s call this the grassroots understanding of virtue, since it is not implemented from the top-down, but organically.

Part of how Epicurus plants the seeds of his Garden and of pleasure and virtue in the hearts of his followers is by inflaming them with love of wisdom and of philosophy, and with a sense of fraternity with each other. A Few Days in Athens describes the serene life of philosophy in the most sublime manner.

A happy life is like neither to a roaring torrent, nor a stagnant pool, but to a placid and crystal stream that flows gently and silently along.

The text goes on to list all the virtues and how they make life pleasant, and insightfully ends up recognizing the relationship that philosophy has to nature.

True, Philosophy cannot change the laws of nature; but she may teach us to accomodate to them. She cannot annul pain; but she can arm us to bear it.

This passage begins a wonderful litany in praise of philosophy and what she can do for our souls, and concludes thus:

This … is our interest and our hapiness: to seek our pleasures from the hands of the virtues, and for the pain which may befall us, to submit to it with patience, or bear up against it with fortutide. To walk … through life innocently and tranquilly: and to look on death as its gentle termination, which it becomes us to meet with ready minds, neither regretting the past, nor anxious for the future.

A Mind Free of Prejudice

It were a poor compliment to the truths I have hitherto worshipped, did I shrink from their investigation. – Theon

The final portion of the book is perhaps the most controversial and difficult part, as it contains a polemic against conventional beliefs about God and a defense of atheism. It calls for questioning religious beliefs and a blissful indifference to deity. This is the part of the book that is most reminiscent to contemporary militant atheist authors, except that here the polemic is contextualized within Epicurean discourse and it does not specifically constitute a call to atheism as much as a call to end prejudice against atheists and against atheism.

Wright’s Epicurus had to first break the ice and challenge Theon’s blind adherence to Stoic doctrines about the Gods. He begins by challenging how a belief can be considered a crime or a virtue, as this attaches merit to credulity, and furthermore attaches demerit to investigation.

If the doubt of any truth shall constitute a crime, then the belief of the same truth should constitute a virtue.

The conversation then focuses on whether the mind has the power to believe or disbelieve, at pleasure, any truths whatsoever, or whether it possesses the power of investigation. In other words, do we owe it to ourselves to investigate truth claims? Do we even hold truth in high regard? Do we arrogantly believe as we wish, regardless of facts, or of the cost to our safety or to our lives of the tenets we hold?

A prudent and fair person can here only agree that investigation is necessary and a matter of intellectual decency. Therefore, it is fair to investigate whether the Gods exist or not, and it is fair to refrain from reaching a conclusion until we can directly apprehend them. Doubt is not a crime and unjustified certainty is not a virtue.

You enquire if the doctrine we have essayed to establish, be not dangerous. I reply, not if it be true. Nothing is so dangerous as error, nothing so safe as truth.

When asked by Theon what is truth and what is the fixed basis for it, Wright’s Epicurus answers:

A truth I consider to be an ascertained fact; which truth would be changed into an error, the moment the fact on which it rested was disproved. (Truth) surely has the most fixed (basis) of all: the nature of things, and it is only an imperfect insight into that nature which occasions all our erroneous conclusions, whether in physics or morals.

This notion of how one truth leads to another truth in a chain of causation is then elaborated into a sermon on the importance of attaching ourselves to empirical evidence and to our senses and faculties, since if the senses are denied, we are “set on wrong path as false views lead to more false views”.

The point of the anti-theological sermon is that we must free our minds from prejudice and from cultural corruption. Unlike religion and cultural values, science and empirical accumulation of knowledge are free from bias.

Chapter XIV closes with the following conclusion concerning the supposed immorality of atheism, which was believed by Theon originally to be a thought-crime. After explaining that it is no crime to believe with certainty in gods, but that’s it’s unreasonnable, Wright’s Epicurus closes:

(Let) this truth remain with you: that an opinion, right or wrong, can never constitute a moral offence, nor be in itself a moral obligation. It may be mistaken; it may involve an absurdity, or a contradiction. It is a truth, or it is an error: it can never be a crime or a virtue.

Leontium then assumes the role of instructor and criticizes Plato’s ideas and how theologians and Platonists establish laws and doctrines with no input from the study of nature, leading people into error, upon which of course further error is built.

A theory is built, and all animate and inanimate nature is made to speak in its support; an hypothesis is advanced and all the mysteries of nature are treated as explained.

Here, she would be making a mockery of Mormon “archaeogists” who have journeyed in vain to the lands of the first nations in the Americas in search of proof of the people and places of the mythical Book of Mormon, just as many Christians “archaeologists” have done in the Middle East. In this manner, a mind filled with cultural corruption and prejudice will start off on false premises that are unproven, and make the findings and the evidence accomodate to their pre-established views without considering the possibility that they’re based on a fraudulent foundation.

The science of philosophy is simply a science of observation, both as regards the world without us, and the world within; and to advance in it, are requisite only sound senses, well developed and exercised faculties, and a mind free of prejudice.

In a later chapter, we find a related sermon against what we might call the god of the gaps: the filling in the spaces of our ignorance with supernatural claims, which are considered evil insofar as they are fear-based and disturb our souls with fears of hell, of death, or of wrathful and tyrannical deities, robbing us of our freedom and happiness. The questions about gods and their nature must be addressed, for they

either open our minds to knowledge of the wonders working in and around us, as our senses and faculties can attain, or close them forever with the bands of superstitions, leaving us a prey to fear, the slaves of our ungoverned imagination, wondering and trambling at every occurrence in nature, and making our existence and destiny sources of dread and mystery.

… It behooves us to see that we come with willing minds; that we say not “so far will we go and no farther; we will examine, but only so long as the result of our examination shall confirm our preconceived opinions.”

The First Cause

The didactic novel continues with Theon arguing the existence of God by citing a first cause. It is here that we find the same answer to that argument that has been used by the likes of Richard Dawkins, who asks what caused the first cause: if all things have a cause, we end up right where we started. This is an old argument.

Epicureans have always held that it has never been in evidence that something comes from nothing. All things, when they decompose, their atoms return to the elements and form new things so that although constant change is everywhere in evidence, nothing comes from nothing. The constituents of all things (the atoms) are therefore held to be eternal.

Metrodorus Calls for a Neuroscience

There is no mystery in nature … things being as they are, is no more wonderful, than it would be if they were different.

Another area where thinkers, both religious and philosophical, have frequently made spurrious claims is the nature of the mind and of consciousness. Wright’s Metrodorus bursts the bubble of mystery and awe that surrounds the human mind by proposing a materialist view and explaining that mind is a property of the living and has no existence independent of matter.

No real advances can be made in the philosophy of the mind, without a deep scrutiny into the operations of nature, or material existences. Mind being only a quality of matter, the study we call the philosophy of mind is necessarily only a branch of general physics (the study of nature).

Against Fear-Based Religion

The final portion constitutes a diatribe against religion. The argument that it’s useful and that we should consider its utilitarian benefits is refuted with the argument that the world is full of religion and full of misery and crime. The text then goes into a litany of reasons why religion is mischievous and laments the state of the men who practice fear-based religion.

His best faculties dormant; his judgment unawakened; his very senses misemployed; all his energies misdirected; trembling before the coinage of his own idle fancy; seeing over all creation a hand of tyranny extended; and instead of following virtue, worshipping power! Monstruous creation of ignorance! … Man, boasting of superior reason, of moral discrimination, imagines a being at once unjust, cruel, and inconsistent, then kissing the dust, calls himself its slave.

To fear a being on account of his power is degrading, to fear him as he be good, ridiculous.

It is here that we find a detailed elaboration of Epicurus’ Trilemma, which says:

(1) If God is unable to prevent evil, he is not omnipotent.
(2) If God is not willing to prevent evil, he is not good.
(3) If God is willing and able to prevent evil, then why is there evil?
—Epicurus Trilemma

The theologian is then invited to banish fear and doubt from his creed, for love alone can be claimed by gods or yielded by men. The problem of fear-based religion and of the vulgar notions that people have about wrathful gods who interfere in human affairs is tackled one last time on the grounds of how degrading these beliefs are to humans.

Theist! You make your god a being more weak, more silly than yourself.

The final portion closes with the argument that if a God exists, any being worthy of the name God would want us to be happy and would be concerned with its own happiness and pleasure, wishing us to focus on our own. Therefore, the conclusion of all these reasonings is that we should:

Enjoy, and be happy! Do you doubt the way? Let Epicurus be your guide. The source of every enjoyment is within yourselves. Good and evil lie before you. the good is all which can yield you pleasure; the evil, what must bring you pain. Here is no paradox, no dark saying, no moral hid in fables.

Further Reading:

Read the full text, audio version, and links to PDF versions at afewdaysinathens.com, at archive.com

A Few Days in Athens
Varios días en Atenas (Spanish Edition)

Get book and commentary by Cassius Amicus from amazon

Wright’s biography from Encyclopaedia Britannica and a revealing summary of the relationship between Wright, Lafayette, and Jefferson

Back to the Main Page

Tweet This

Reasonings About Philodemus’ Treatise On Methods of Inference

PHILODEMUS: ON METHODS OF INFERENCE – A Study in Ancient Empiricism is the only extant work on logic that I know of that exists within our tradition. In it, Philodemus was arguing against other philosophers, mostly against Stoics, who relied heavily on syllogisms and logical juggling in order to ascertain truths.

There are many difficulties with this work, chief among them the fact that Epicureanism is a materialism and by necessity highly empirical, based heavily on evidence presented before the tribunal of the senses and things that can be grasped with our faculties as natural beings, whereas other philosophies are happy to discard the facticity of matter and evidence and degenerate into speculation and irrelevant abstraction.

On the Canon

There are several key features to our approach to logic, but prior to addressing them we must address why reason and logic are not within the canon. Epicureanism is a materialist and realist tradition of philosophy according to which reality exists and can be grasped with our faculties.

Because truth can be grasped, we are dogmatists: we believe that new truths must be in symphony with previously established truths, and that there must be criteria by which we judge things to be real.

These criteria are the canon (or measuring stick), our connection to reality. The canon includes three sets of faculties: the five senses, the pleasure/aversion principle, and the anticipations.

So far, so good. Now, some have interpreted anticipations as pre-conceptions, and given the impression that anticipations are ideas, concepts that are formed by the rational mind, but we hold this to be an error. Anticipations are innate, pre-rational. The three sets of faculties in the canon give raw data to reason and it’s the job of reason to make sense of it, to calculate with this data, but the data itself is irrational and whatever error we make with regards to this data, is an error of calculation, of reason, of logic. This is why logic/reason is not within the canon.

On the issue of how anticipations are innate and pre-rational, our friend Cassius, while citing Thomas Jefferson in his thoughts on anticipations, the canon, and reason, makes the case that humans, through natural selection, evolved as social beings with certain faculties. He also says:

The problem with the conventional Bailey view is that they say this “faculty” does not exist and they say that what Epicurus was talking about was the conceptual reasoning process. They say that anticipations are :

1) I see a chair

2) I see another chair

3) I form a concept in my mind of what I THINK a chair ought to look like

4) BINGO — that is an “anticipation” and the next time I see a chair, I recognize it because the “anticipation of a chair” is stored in my mind

Dewitt says that is ALL WRONG — because our mind, using reasoning in that case, have formed a CONCEPT of a chair.

Norman DeWitt said: “It was Epicurus’ determination to dethrone reason and set up nature as the norm.”

And so Epicureanism is fundamentally different from much reason-based philosophy out there. We’re very unlike the Aristotelians, the objectivists, and other cults of reason out there. We always keep our feet on the ground and do not consider irrelevant speculation without evidence to be true philosophy. Unlike other schools of philosophy, we look to Venus more than Athena.

And so the first problem that must be addressed when we approach On Methods of Inference is that we reject the premise that logic is a criterion for truth, as it was to the philosophers that Philodemus was arguing against. Cassius states: “You need to see the basic argument without letting them fool you into thinking they know more than you do”.

This is the kind of difficulty one encounters when one argues with non-Epicurean philosophers, or when one studies the arguments between various schools that utilized very different points of reference.

The Basic Arguments

Our friend Brian made available the following chart to help us begin to grasp the treatise. It includes some basic definitions, first among them the idea of signs, which are symptoms or indications that something is there and is real.

From a sign, we get what we see (which falls within the canon) and what we can infer (which does not and may be subject to error). As I see it, there key controversies in the text have to do with how we can know with any certainty that our inferences lead to firm truth, since they constitute indirect knowledge that is not immediately rooted in our experience or in evidence.

Inferences can be of two types:

  • general inferences draw generic information from a single instance of concrete fact
  • particular inferences draw very specific conclusions about a concrete fact

Our friend Cassius states: “… the Epicurean method of establishing truth is reasoning by analogy, by extention, and by comparison to things that we know already because they are clear … and … the method of Epicurus is sort of measurement-based“.

One of the main objections raised by other schools had to do with how Epicureans frequently draw generic non-evident conclusions from concrete, observed phenomena. These discussions centered on how there are many unique cases and exceptions to things that are generally perceived.

To justify this tendency to make generalizations, Epicureans cited inconceivability, which we can simplify by saying they invoked common sense. According to our friend Cassius, “inconceivable probably refers to something that CONFLICTS WITH A KNOWN FACT“. This is vindicated by Philodemus himself on the scroll:

… this has been observed to be a property of that in all cases that we have come upon, and because we have observed many varied living creatures of the same genus who have differences in all other respects from each other, but who all share in certain common qualities (e.g. mortality). – On Methods of Inference XXXV

For instance, it’s inconceivable that a man may be immortal because all men who existed in the past have died and there are no known and empirically verified cases to the contrary, and so it’s fair to expect that all men living today will also die.

We may call this the argument of no known exceptions: since all men are known to die, and we have no reason to suspect that men outside of our direct experience are immortal, then we can conclude that all men are mortal. The words used by Philodemus are with no case drawing us to the contrary.

It’s also inconceivable that a tree may ever have lungs or a nose, or grow hair or feathers, because never in our experience have we seen this. Cassius explains:

The entire argument of the whole book rests on “can our senses provide us an example on which to rest our argument” versus the Stoics “our argument can rest on logic through syllogism even though we have never seen or touched or sensed an example of what we are talking about”.

In my opinion, what the Epicureans were saying is that always, unless you can point to evidence of the senses as proving that each part of the syllogism is true, it is “inconceivable” that the syllogism can be true.

And so, again, we see the insistence on evidence presented before the tribunal of our natural faculties. As to the definition of syllogism, we generally find inference, conclusion, computation, calculation. Our friend Brian says that we may define it as a collected bit of observations.

One final note must be made based on commentary in page 168 of the book, which reasonably states that “the degree of certainty of an inference is often relative to the amount of variation observable”. Ergo, in addition to instances where there are no known exceptions, there may also be instances where exceptions are few or limited to very specific conditions, which limits what can be inferred based on evidence. The book cites as an example how we can establish with certainty “the actions of certain poisons, but only relative analogies can be established on the goodness or badness of foods”.

So, to conclude our discussion on syllogism:

If the premises in a syllogism can be validated by evidence / canon, then a syllogism may be valid.

If it’s not based on sense evidence or conflicts with reality, it’s not valid.

Period.

Our friend Cassius adds that probably the correct way to say it is that any syllogism, in order to be correct, must have all premises validated by evidence. It’s not complicated. In fact, many of Philodemus’ arguments against the Stoics simply refer back to the insistence on evidence. For instance:

… anyone who infers well about the unperceived objects that accompany appearances observes carefully the manifold variety of appearances in order to be sure that there is no conflicting evidence. He considers it impossible that the nature of things and their generation from each other should be inconsistent with appearances. – On Methods of Inference, XXXIII

Since we are not extremely fond of obscure language in Epicureanism, we prefer to say that we conclude or calculate this notion from that fact, rather than make use of technical terms that almost no one uses.

In fact, in many of our discussions with logicians we end up concluding that logic oftentimes makes things more difficult and complicated than they need to be, or than they are by nature.

Examples of Why The Canon Matters

Let’s have some fun and formulate some syllogisms so that these teachings can become strong in our souls, as Epicurus used to say.

Allah is the Greatest
The angels work for Allah
Therefore the angels are not the greatest beings in the cosmos

The above syllogism is perfectly valid. It has two premises and a conclusion which are internally consistent: there is one cosmic being who is the greatest, and creatures who are minions of this being, ergo these minions are not the greatest beings, they are secondary. A theologian would be happy with this perfectly logical syllogism. For us materialists, however, the lack of evidence for the existence of both Allah and Allah’s angels represents a serious problem. The premises, and therefore the conclusion, must all be false unless and until we can corroborate all three.

As we said earlier in these reasonings, Epicureans favor the method of similarity where we infer, for instance, from a finite sample to a whole population, or from the behavior of microscopic bodies to atoms or to bodies in heaven. According to James Allen, “if the opponents are right, the method will mistakenly project features belonging to the items in our experience onto items outside of our experience to which they do not belong“. He then goes on to cite that atoms would have color because things in our experience do, and that we would exclude possibilities that exist because they’re not in our experience.

However, we should answer to this by use of one final example, which is of particular interest because it confronts us with what happens when there is a unique exception: the platypus, an aquatic mammal who lays eggs and has a bird-like beak.

No mammals lay eggs
The platypus is a mammal
Therefore the platypus does not lay eggs

The above syllogism is valid, and if we did not pay importance to evidence, we would be obliged to conclude that the platypus does not ley eggs … except that it does. Evidence, not syllogisms or logical games of any kind, produces accurate conclusions about matters both rare and common. Prior to the discovery of the platypus, the syllogism would have been thought accurate. Now, not so; and it’s only because of evidence that we are forced to expand the definition of a mammal, and never from syllogisms. This is why the canon matters: it is our connection to reality.

Further Reading:

Inference from Signs: Ancient Debates about the Nature of Evidence, by James Allen
Against the Vulcans

PHILODEMUS: ON METHODS OF INFERENCE – A Study in Ancient Empiricism.
Back to the Main Page

Tweet This

Reasonings About Neuroscience

The following considerations are based on my reading of Buddha’s Brain, a book by neuroscientists Rick Hanson and Richard Mendius.

The book Buddha’s Brain adds much flesh to the bones of Epicurean notions of a science of happiness. It teaches how to scientifically and methodically cultivate a happy and healthy brain. It also substantiates and helps to understand the neuroscientific theories behind the practices that early Epicureans used to engage in (repetition, memorization, gratitude, etc.) as part of their regimen of abiding pleasures. These practices create and strengthen healthy neural connections in the tissue of our brain that are experienced, over the long term, as happiness.

The book also reminds us constantly of the physicality of the soul and all soul phenomena, of how each and every soul experience is rooted in some way in hormonal changes, bodily organs, neurons, etc. This is one of the crucial, central insights of our materialist philosophy, and the main reason why we utilize medicinal language when referring to the health of the soul just as mainstream culture does with the body. Like our own wisdom tradition, this book demonstrates a strong tendency to make applied, therapeutic philosophy tangible and concrete.

The Hedonic Tone

One of the first things the book does is to give us a theory, and new words, by which we may refer to the important knowledge being imparted. Much of the beginning portion of the book consists of establishing this framework.

The feeling tone, or hedonic tone, is defined as the quality of whether something is pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral. The hedonic tone is produced by the amygdala.

On the Importance of Mindfulness

As with all therapy, contemplation and meditation help us to identify suffering in its initial stages and to see how it arises in the mind. With this insight, we can stop the suffering process and lead the mind in a new direction.

People given to frivolous mental exercises might have a habit of avoiding mindfulness and attention, aware (or maybe unaware?) of the fact that once you observe pleasant activities, you burst the bubble and they cease being enjoyable. It is important to challenge this habit of mindlessness. Without attention and patient, non-judgemental mindfulness, it’s impossible to bring into awareness the issues that we must work through in order to cultivate a progressively happier mind.

There are many references to Buddhist teachings and techniques to educate the mind. The book frequently goes back to the first and second darts, a reference to the things outside of ourselves that generate suffering (loss of a loved one, insult, loss of a job, accidentally hurting ourselves, etc.), which constitute examples of the first dart, versus our REACTIONS to these things (anger, hatred, obsession with vengeance, vindictiveness, annoyance, etc) which are examples of the second dart. As you probably imagine, we have control usually only over the second dart, and so a great part of the training that we must undertake if we make a resolution to be happy, is to avoid throwing the second dart.

The authors speak of a progression from unconscious incompetence to conscious incompetence, and later on to conscious competence, and finally to unconscious competence. In the first stage, we are easily annoyed and affected by things with no conscious acknowledgement of it. In the second stage, we become aware of our reaction to events and how these reactions generate suffering, but we have not yet developed the wherewithal to discipline ourselves with prudence. The third stage is the beginning of discipline: we begin making conscious efforts to avoid throwing the second dart, and finally when we reach the fourth stage, we have become wise enough and gained enough insight to understand that our serenity, our ataraxia and tranquility, is worth too much to be sacrificed at the altar of vindictiveness, anger, or annoyance.

Implicit Memory

Notice that mindfulness, resolution, and discipline are all necessary in the cultivation of a steady, happy mind that habitually abides in pleasure.

The authors speak of implicit memory. It consists of the unconscious expectations, outlook, values, emotional states, relationships that are built around our experiences and result in our sense of self, our very identity, “what it feels like to be you”.

Going back to the learning process mentioned previously, the idea is to generate sufficient momentum for the happy and wholesome memories and experiences to become unconsciously competent. It is here that the daily practice of gratitude and other Epicurean disciplines of abiding (katastemic) pleasure gain a theoretical foundation in neurology.

Some piles of these implicit memories harm us, others help us, and so the idea is to increase the ones that help us. Part of the task of a good Epicurean has to do with wholesome memory-building. We are reminded of our sages’ advise to practice reminiscing about the good times frequently. The Epicurean Garden was provided as a place where practitioners built fond memories of virtuous friendship and affection. By allowing good times to settle into our memory banks as implicit memory and to become part of our very identities, we are nurturing a habitually happy, blessed state of being.

Dan Gilbert speaks about how happy memories are formed, insisting that his research leads to the understanding that people do not derive happiness from things. They derive happiness from experiences and relationships. Fond memories come from living, not having or thinking. Elsewhere in the book, the authors argue that we must turn happy facts into happy experiences.

It’s clear that happiness and abiding pleasure do not take place at the level of the intellect so much as at the level of being, of existing; that the entire being must be turned over to the experience of the good.

We buy things which give us some pleasure (clothes, cars, art, etc.), but we quickly forget the newness of these things. However, a night out with friends, weekly dinners with family, vacations with one’s partner, these are the things that fond memories are built from. They are experienced, they are lived.

Negativity Bias of the Brain

Since during our evolutionary history so much of our chances of survival depended on whether we were able to identify and avoid or confront dangers and threats in our environment, humans (like all animals) have a fairly developed fight-or-flight system of instincts which is coordinated, to a great extent, by the SNS (sympathetic nervous system).

In this way, we can understand how normal levels of anxiety and of threat response are natural and necessary, helping us to be more vigilant and pay attention. However, the necessity of the fight-or-flight instinct produces a brain that has a strong tendency to pay attention to the negative stimuli in our environment, those that are not particularly pleasant. Our brain is good at reminding us of what to avoid, and in this manner it believes that it’s constantly doing something good and important for us, for which we should be grateful.

The Cool-Head and the Hot-Head

The SNS produces instances where one must be hot-headed: angry, alert, ready for battle, impervious to pain. In contrast to this system, we also have the PNS (parasympathetic nervous system), which balances the fight-or-flight tendencies with tendencies that the authors of Buddha’s Brain call the rest and digest reflex.

This rest and digest reflex is the cooling, steadying tendency of the mind that we associate with ataraxia (imperturbability) and with abiding pleasure, which facilitates practices of gratitude and contemplation. It is here that (as in the case of Dan Gilbert’s science of happiness discourse) we begin to clearly see Epicurean theory by another name, even delving into the canon. In our tradition, we refer to these two tendencies as the pleasure and aversion principles.

Considering the fact that Epicureanism often gets called a philosophy of the stomach, it’s curious that the authors chose to include digestion into their notion of steady, cooling states of being, or the rest and digest reflex.

Buddha’s Brain refers frequently to notions of heat / hot-headedness and coolness. The book also makes mention of how awareness of the body suppresses chatter when one is attempting to meditate because chatter and body-awareness are tackled by two different hemispheres of the brain. This is all reminiscent to Yoruba lore and other traditional African wisdom traditions with their references to the physicality of the soul, which refer to the heat or coolness of the head and which were explored a bit in the piece On the Importance of Protecting One’s Head.

“Taking In the Good” and the Practice of Abiding Pleasure

The above is the framework within we can understand the importance of internalizing the good, the pleasant, of gratitude and of reminiscing about fond experiences. But what are the best techniques for this art of living, this art of abiding in pleasure?

In addition to the traditional Epicurean techniques known from our sources, there is in Buddhism the technique of taking refuge. Buddhist liturgy tells people to take refuge in the three jewels: the Buddha, the Dharma (or teaching) and the Sangha (the brotherhood of people who seek enlightenment).

Philodemus, on the other hand, accentuated the importance of personal choice in his oath where he spoke of “choosing to live according to Epicurus”. Many humanists today have difficulty with the idea of allegiance to a sage or Master, and when I wrote Tending the Epicurean Garden, my book editor encouraged me instead to articulate a modern version of Philodemus’ oath where we choose to live according to Epicureanism (the teaching) instead of according to Epicurus.

Perhaps a modern evolution of this refuge-taking remedy for abiding pleasure might be a simple liturgy along the lines of this one:

I choose to think good and wholesome thoughts
I choose to speak good and wholesome words
I choose to engage in good and wholesome activities
I choose good and wholesome association

In this manner, we choose the good actively rather than taking refuge in the good, which is a more passive choice. I am not saying refuge-taking is wrong or useless as a practice, merely offering an alternative liturgy for humanists and Epicureans to carry out experiments in their practice of abiding pleasure. In fact, Buddha’s Brain also speaks in an active voice with regards to how we must build our refuge through nurturing wholesome memories; and how this is not a denial of the bad or a mask for the prosaic. We must see it as a place within our very identity and experience where we can always go for safety. We must choose our anchors for refuge.

The notion of building our refuge, and the insights behind it, also vindicate the way in which our sages encouraged the development of an Epicurean identity rather than just allegiance to the teachings or concordance with the doctrine. An identity is a more visceral thing than an ideology and it is strengthened through association, through affiliation.

The above liturgy may be recited together with and prior to our daily practice of gratitude, which is required to have the disposition that is necessary for the practice Epicureanism. Our sages, in unison, teach that it’s impossible for an ungrateful person to be a true Epicurean.

A Natural Measure of Self

Among many life-denying faiths, the term ego has acquired a negative connotation. For that reason, I will stick to the use of the word self here in lieu of ego, but I wish to make a note of the fact that we have learned to speak of ego either as a bastion of weakness and vulnerability or as a crest of arrogance, almost invariably attaching a negative tone to any reference to ego and never considering that there is a natural measure of self that it is healthy to recognize and respect.

Buddha’s Brain draws from the wisdom tradition of Siddhartha Gautama (Buddha) and assumes many of its doctrines. One key distinction between Buddhism and Epicureanism is the doctrine of anatta, or no-self, which is one the the three marks of existence in Buddhism. Gautama Buddha believed that, because all beings are transitory and impermanent, they therefore do not exist as atman in the way Hinduism, the Bhagavad Gita and the Vedas believe them to exist (as eternal beings composed of soul).

Buddha further argues that suffering arises because of our illusion about the existence of a self. The “me” is hurt, the “me” is betrayed, the “me” suffers injustice, the “me” lacks basic needs and suffers misfortunes.

In the book, at one point the authors go as far as to compare the self to a unicorn because it’s nowhere to be seen, only to later admit that the self is useful. But usefulness does not go far enough in explaining the phenomena that appear as the self, even if it’s an accurate assertion.

The self is not just useful: it’s necessary and natural. Need breeds invention, and the varieties of experience tied to this body which appear as self are all inventions of nature that arise from the needs of the natural beings.

If we are perplexed by the varieties of experience that we think of as self (memory, personal historical narratives, possession of things and of people, jealousy, self as subject and object of perception, etc.) and which do not appear to be composed of atoms, and if we are perplexed by the fact that the self appears to be hidden from view and immaterial, then perhaps we can use terms that many English-speaking Buddhists use such as presence, or maybe mindstreams, to refer to the chain or currents of thoughts, memories and experiences that characterize each living being. All of these minstreams are impermanent, but they compose unique expressions of collective and individual self which is experienced as very real.

Do I form a desire, or does a desire form an I? – Buddha’s Brain

In Epicureanism, we do acknowledge that there is no self that is separate from the body and the conditional experiences of the natural being, and we do recognize the impermanence of it, but we do not deny the existence of self.

We also acknowledge that the self carries within it the potential for suffering, but we consider it madness to attempt to escape our natural condition into fantasies about selflessness. Self is context. We cannot operate efficiently in the world selflessly, and in fact the recognition of the self and of the self in another being is the very foundation of ethics and of compassion, kindness, and a plethora of other virtues which become unnecessary and make no sense without the self.

Many central concepts in our ethics require individual selves. Natural justice, for instance, is based on the social contract: an agreement that can only be entered into by independent agents who exhibit volition.

And so there is a way in which we exist as natural beings: a natural and necessary self which is anchored in the material experience of the human body.

If we fail to acknowledge the natural needs of the self, we risk generating even more suffering than when we attach ourselves obsessively to the self. We must, therefore, find a happy and healthy medium where we respect the self.

New Verbiage:

Anchor
Hedonic Tone
Implicit memory
Natural measure of self
Refuge (-building)
Rest and digest reflex

Back to the Main Page

Tweet This

SoFE Journal Volume 8 – 2014

ARTICLES

CONTINUING THE PHILODEMUS SERIES

Hiram Crespo
Reasonings About Philodemus’ On Choices and Avoidances  (pp. 1-5)
June 25, 2014

» Part I Full Text (HTML)    » Part II Full Text (HTML)   » Part III Full Text (HTML)

» Full Text (PDF)

Hiram Crespo
Reasonings About Philodemus’ On Piety (pp. 6-14)
June 16, 2014

» Part I Full Text (HTML)   » Part II Full Text (HTML)
» Part III Full Text (HTML)   » Part IV Full Text (HTML)

» Full Text (PDF)

Hiram Crespo
Reasonings About Philodemus’ On Death (pp. 15-19)
June 18, 2014

» Full Text (HTML)             » Full Text (PDF)

Hiram Crespo
On the Importance of Protecting One’s Head (pp. 20-23)
July 7, 2014

» Full Text (HTML)      » Full Text (PDF)

Hiram Crespo
Reasonings About Neuroscience 
July 23, 2014

» Full Text (HTML)

Cassius Amicus
New Spanish Language Translation of “A Few Days in Athens”
November 27, 2014

» Full Text (HTML)

REFLECTIONS

Joshua Becker
A Helpful Guide to Becoming Unbusy
July 1, 2014

»  Full Text (HTML)

REVIEWS 

Robert Hanrott
“Tending the Epicurean Garden” Review
October 19, 2014

»  Full Text (HTML)

Honoring Our Sages

Leave a reply

If you never give palm wine to your elders, you will never learn their proverbs. 

– Yoruba proverb

Many contemporary freethinkers dislike the notion of revering a Sage, as reverence oftentimes implies a certain servile attitude, and presages the impossibility of dissent and an authoritarian paradigm. Those that came before us in Epicureanism, however, favored paying honors to sages.

How do we honor a Sage?  More specifically, how do we properly honor OUR Sages? The immediate, obvious answer is by pleasing them through the rememberance of their words and by following their advice.

Our tradition teaches that association and respect, even reverence, for a wholesome personality has character-building power. We develop virtuous character through wholesome association just as we develop vices, or bad habits, through evil association.

This is easily observable. Please do not believe this blindly: learn directly how this happens by paying attention to the dynamics in the various types of cliques in your surrounding communities and see how people’s temperaments and qualities affect each other, and how the more intimately and long-term people associate with each other, the stronger their mutual influence. This is how identities are built and how cultures and sub-cultures develop.

Some people have stronger tendencies to admire great personalities than others.  It may be that, because we’re social beings, we inherently need to admire our parents as children, and then other mentors and role models as we grow older. Perhaps the adage on honoring sages has as its purpose the right and healthy channeling of this natural tendency in all social creatures. If we must have an alpha male (or female), let it be a sage, a person of prudence and wisdom, of good character.

By directly associating with sages, we gain the most benefit. By studying, reading, discussing and pondering their teachings indirectly, we still gain some distant benefit. People who admire a well-spoken, well-mannered sage are much more likely to conduct themselves likewise (and to exhibit shame when they don’t) than people who admire celebrities that exhibit superficiality and banality, or worse yet, than people who admire gangsters and criminals.

By observing and understanding the opposite of a certain virtue (bad versus good association), we can more fully discern its importance. Gangster culture, in particular, celebrates the most vulgar elements of society in elaborate cults of personality, and much of this has even made its way into mainstream culture.

Honoring a sage is itself a great good to the one who honors. – Vatican Saying 32

Let’s first consider the layers of meaning behind honor. It’s tied to being held in high esteem, admired, with enjoying great respect among one’s peers. We often hear it’s an honor to meet someone, or to have someone at our table or at our event: it’s a privilege, a joy, something to boast about and to be proud of.

In religious traditions, shrine-building, singing, praising and other forms of worship are the norm. In Lucretius, we find a pseudo-religious feeling for his Master, Epicurus, which seems to indicate that Epicureans in antiquity exhibited this type of behaviour.

You, who out of such black darkness were first to lift up so shining a light, revealing the hidden blessings of life – you are my leader, O glory of the Grecian race. In your well-marked footprints now I plant my resolute steps … You are our father, illustrious discoverer of truth, and give me a father’s guidance. From your pages, as bees in flowery glades sip every blossom, so do I crop all your golden sayings – golden indeed, and for ever worthy of everlasting life … As soon as your reasoning, sprung from that godlike mind, lifts up its voice to proclaim the nature of the universe, then the terrors of the mind take flight, the ramparts of the world roll apart, and I see the march of events throughout the whole of space. – On the Nature of Things, Book III

Effigies, busts and depictions of Epicurus were common among ancient Epicureans. Many of them may have been treated in a way not too different from how deities and saints are treated in many religious cultures. People took pleasure in honoring him, and later they took pleasure in honoring the original Four Masters just as many Christians honor the apostles, or just as many Americans honor the Founding Fathers, Martin Luther King, some of their Presidents and other great patriots (to use a secular example). Monuments and memorials are built; their words and deeds are celebrated and remembered.

The adage Do all things as if Epicurus was watching emerged among friends who were living their lives as if Epicurus was watching and advised others to do likewise. This is behavior quite typical of religious people. Frequent rememberance of the Master brought back memories of the original community of philosopher friends and the pleasure of their discussions. The mental and existential strength derived from these friendships was recalled and vindicated.

In antiquity there was a civic cult: an official, public cult of the city. It was considered civic duty to honor the deity of one’s polis, for instance, with formal recognition of the guiding principle of the city. Athens had the good fortune of having the Goddess of Wisdom as a patron, and so it was a city of philosophers because people were taught to hold Wisdom in high regard. The Epicureans honored Epicurus in a manner not too different from the civic cults: there was formal, public recognition of the founder of the tradition as a Humanist culture hero. He didn’t answer prayers and was not divine in the superstitious sense of being an immortal or having supernatural powers. He was not an Olympian, but a mortal hero.

It would be unfair to carry out the teaching mission without honestly addressing the frank religiosity of many of the original and later disciples of Epicureanism. Colotes prostrated before Epicurus once out of gratitude and affection. Epicurus returned the honor, perhaps embarrassed or intimidated by the display.

This Lucretian attitude of reverence towards our Sages seems perhaps out of character when we contrast it with the anti-authoritarian nature of the Canon, with how we accept evidence and direct observation as the final authority.

This paradigm shift happens because the Sages’ authority is founded upon nature’s authority. We can argue with gravity, but it will still pull us. This firm foundation, this firm understanding, nurtured a firm faith and trust in those that came before. They were not charlatans but genuine truth-seeking philosophers who were vindicated by the Canon. And so, while we ultimately always reserve the right to disagree with each and every one of our Sages, we ultimately align with their doctrine on most crucial matters.

My respect for Philodemus increased tremendously as I studied his writings. It provided me with a sense of legacy, of strengthening of my essence in a way, and I felt my studies placed me within a lineage system where teachings were handed down and strengthened by each generation. I may not have fallen to my kness like Colotes did, but I felt culturally and spiritually richer, and it was a great honor to study him.

And so it is my sincerest honor to join Philodemus in saying that I’m a follower of Epicurus and his associates, according to whom it has been my choice to live.

Back to the Main Page

A Helpful Guide to Becoming Unbusy

“Those who are wise won’t be busy, and those who are too busy can’t be wise.” ― Lin Yutang

It was in this video from Jeff Shinabarger that I first heard the phrase, “‘Busy’ has become the new ‘Fine’.” As in, when you ask somebody how they were doing, they used to answer, “Fine.” But nowadays, everybody answers, “Busy.”

Seemingly, busy has become the default state for too many of our lives.

But is the state of busy really improving our lives? Certainly not. Statistics indicate 75% of parents are too busy to read to their children at night. There is a rising number of children being placed in day cares and after-school activities. Americans are having a hard time finding opportunity for vacations these days. 33% of Americans are living with extreme stress daily. And nearly 50% of Americans say they regularly lie awake at night because of stress. This is a problem. We have become too busy.

But it doesn’t have to be this way. Busy is not inevitable. Each of us can take intentional steps to unbusy our lives.

Consider this Helpful Guide to Becoming Unbusy:

1. Realize that being busy is a choice. It is a decision we make. We are never forced into a lifestyle of busyness. The first, and most important, step to becoming less busy is to simply realize that our schedules are determined by us. We do have a choice in the matter. We don’t have to live busy lives.

2. Stop the glorification of busy. Busy, in and of itself, is not a badge of honor. In fact, directed at the wrong pursuits, it is actually a limiting factor to our full potential. It is okay to not be busy. Repeat this with me: It is okay to not be busy.

3. Appreciate and schedule rest. One of the reasons many of us keep busy schedules is we fail to recognize the value of rest. But rest is beneficial to our bodies, our minds, and our souls. Set aside one day per week for rest and family. Intentionally schedule it on your calendar. Then, guard it at all costs.

4. Revisit your priorities. Become more intentional with your priorities and pursuits in life. Determine again what are the most significant contributions you can offer this world. And schedule your time around those first. Busyness is, at its core, about misplaced priorities.

5. Own fewer possessions. The things we own take up far more time and mental energy than we realize. They need to be cleaned, organized, and maintained. And the more we own, the more time is required. Own less stuff. And find more time because of it.

6. Cultivate space in your daily routine. Take time for lunch. Find space in your morning to sit quietly before starting your day. Invest in solitude, meditation, or yoga. Find opportunity for breaks at work in between projects. Begin right away cultivating little moments of space and margin in your otherwise busy day.

7. Find freedom in the word, “no.” Seneca wrote, “Everybody agrees that no one pursuit can be successfully followed by a man who is preoccupied with many things.” Recognize the inherent value in the word “no.” Learning to say “no” to less important commitments opens your life to pursue the most important.

Busy does not need to define you. Unbusy is possible. It’s okay to be happy with a calm life. And doesn’t that sound wonderful right about now?

Written by Joshua Becker for his Becoming Minimalist blog. Please check out his article archives and his newsletter!

Back to the Main Page

Tweet This

SoFE Journal Volume 8 – 2014


CONTINUING THE PHILODEMUS SERIES

Hiram Crespo
Reasonings About Philodemus’ On Choices and Avoidances 
June 25, 2014

» Part I Full Text (HTML)      » Full Text (PDF)

» Part II Full Text (HTML)

» Part III Full Text (HTML)

Hiram Crespo
Reasonings About Philodemus’ On Piety
June 16, 2014

» Part I Full Text (HTML)     » Full Text (PDF)

» Part II Full Text (HTML)

» Part III Full Text (HTML)

» Part IV Full Text (HTML)

Hiram Crespo
Reasonings About Philodemus’ On Death
June 18, 2014

» Full Text (HTML)             » Full Text (PDF)

Joshua Becker
A Helpful Guide to Becoming Unbusy
July 1, 2014

» Full Text (HTML)

Hiram Crespo
Reasonings About Neuroscience
July 23, 2014

» Full Text (HTML)

Hiram Crespo
On Methods of Inference
August 4, 2014

» Full Text (HTML)

Hiram Crespo
Detailed Review of A Few Days in Athens
September 14, 2014

» Full Text (HTML)

Hiram Crespo
Democritus: the First Laughing Philosopher
September 24, 2014

» Full Text (HTML)

Hiram Crespo
About Philodemus’ Rhetorica
September 24, 2014

» Part I Full Text (HTML)

Hiram Crespo
The 17 Scholarchs and the Empress
September 28, 2014

» Full Text (HTML)

Hiram Crespo
About Polystratus’ On Irrational Contempt
September 29, 2014

» Full Text (HTML)          » Full Text (PDF)

Society of Friends of Epicurus Journal

Reasonings About Philodemus’ On Choices and Avoidances (Part III)

 Continued from Reasonings About Philodemus’ On Choices and Avoidances (Part II)

Against Existing Only to Die

Now, Philodemus of Gadara lived during the first century Before Common Era. Therefore, he did not live to see this particular heresy become virally widespread as it became several centuries after he lived. Saul of Tarsus taught that mortals are saved and gain immortality by faith. But even before the rise of Christianity, Philodemus would have witnessed the initiates of the Eleusinian mysteries and the Orpheic mysteries and other such cults making similar claims about immortality through faith and participation in rituals.

The specific evil that he criticizes about these faiths in the afterlife had to do with the initiates’ unwillingness to live while they’re alive.

Column XVIII. “Do I not live decently and justly? Or do I not live in accordance with the laws applying to men? Then when I shall die I shall be immortal.” And they are cut off from everything by means of which they would have a better life, exactly like men who are sentenced to death.

In other words, in the expectation of a blissful afterlife, it is easy to not follow our bliss in this life. Time rushes through people and they do not experience the joys or seek the things that make life worth living. They look forward to the time after death as a consolation, and fail to live. Philodemus later says that such people at times neglect their health–even as they are frightened by diseases–and other things that matter, avoid great pleasures for fear of troubles in the afterlife, and he lists many other evidences of lacking an art of living.

Because they burden themselves needlessly in this manner, such a life is equated to a death sentence. As we saw in our discussion of the scroll On Death, it is one thing to exist, quite another to live.

The Qualities of the Prudent

After listing the qualities of the person who does not understand what really matters, Philodemus then turns to the person who does understand the easy-to-attain chief goods and has full confidence in his ability to procure them. The text mentions that he works with equanimity, either because he does so for the sake of friends of because he has “closely examined the things which yield fruit in return for his labours”.

The commentary explains that the prudent man chooses mild toils with great pleasures, in other words he subjects his labor paradigm to hedonic calculus, choosing activities that are useful and maximize his revenue. Such a man is content with only the necessary amount of money and is not greedy, lives in the present, is generous, industrious, and self-sufficient, and remains always devoted to philosophy. He’s friendly, caring, and grateful to others in the hopes that others will do likewise in the future. He also, importantly, takes good care of his health and self-betterment, administers his property diligently and reminisces about the past both analysing it and being grateful for it.

After establishing the criteria for successfully making choices and avoidances based on the chief goods and needful things, and teaching us the importance of being confident in our abilities to procure these, Philodemus then gave a list of examples of what happens when people fail to distinguish between natural and necessary pleasures and those that are vain and unnecessary.

The scroll ends with this auspicious account of how the prudent man who is aware of the chief goods, lives a virtuous life.

*

On Choices and Avoidances, edited with translation and commentary by Giovanni Indelli and Voula Tsouna-McKirahan

The above reasonings were inspired by the following source:  G. Indelli, V. Tsouna-McKirahan (edd., trans.): [Philodemus]: [On Choices and Avoidances]. (Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, La Scuola di Epicuro, Collezione di testi ercolanesi diretta da Marcello Gigante, 15.) Pp. 248. Naples: Bibliopolis, 1995. ISBN: 88-7088-343-4.

Back to the Main Page

Tweet This

Reasonings About Philodemus’ On Choices and Avoidances (Part II)

… Continued from Reasonings About Philodemus’ On Choices and Avoidances (Part I)

Against the False View that the Gods Exhibit Volition

Column VII of the scroll contains a warning against belief in divine providence, saying that it causes innumerable failures

Column VII. For (these men) place themselves in such a situation so as to not take advise from anybody about anything at all, in the belief that nothing depends on man, but everything is controlled by the god.

In our own day and age many people who criticize the lack of action with regards to global warming oftentimes point the finger at apocalyptic beliefs among certain Christian groups, who hold that the Earth MUST be destroyed prior to Christ’s return and that, therefore, it is written that there will be cataclysms. Even more evil is the belief that there must be a great war prior to the return of Jesus that will devastate most of Earth, as this belief has made many Christian groups not just docile before greedy oil and military industrial complex investors who have appropriated the political machine to advance military plans that they profit from handsomely. There have always been conservative Christian groups, particularly in the US, who have been willing to celebrate such military agendas with the excuse that “it is written”.

To this example must be added the heinous example of medieval burnings of midwives, which was justified by reasoning that the pain of child-birth was originally intended as God’s punishment of all women for all eternity for Eve’s transgression. She ate the apple, ergo all women must suffer at child-birth, and to reduce the pain of women giving birth is therefore to challenge God’s law. But as with the above example, the execution of midwives during the Dark Ages was also profitable to a new class of professionals: male doctors, who were seeking to replace midwives in this role. It was also profitable for a large number of people in the legal profession, for whom the inquisition generated employment.

Without going into much detail, one must not fail to mention the many historical instances of holy wars and persecution, the Crusades, terrorist attacks and other evil acts done in the name of a God who is imagined as having a will, and a distorted sense of volition at that. God clearly “willed” the Jews to inherit Palestine and inhabit it forever as the Bible says, but then he “willed” that Muslims fight to the death anyone who persecutes them or throws them out of their homes for the sake of their religion. Is he being a Cosmic Don King, initiating fights to profit or take pleasure, in some sick manner, from the bloodshed? It’s more reasonable to suppose that mortals imagine their Gods doing THEIR will, and place convenient words in the mouths of their Gods.

And so we must not underestimate the dangers of fatal beliefs, that is, beliefs in oracles and in the notion that fate has been pre-determined by gods. These forms of superstition are profoundly dangerous and harmful. The freeze the actions of mortal agents in the expectation that supernatural aid knows best and that its will is unavoidable. They make mortals negligent and irrationally fearful of acting against the gods.

Philodemus also criticizes men who hold false beliefs about how the Gods can affect the afterlife. Many men believe that the evils that will befall mortals in the afterlife far surpass the goods that the Gods bestow while living, so they neglect living. This was as true in the days of Philodemus as it is today. Many people view pleasure as bad. They fear that if they sweeten their lives or achieve great things, they will be punished for doing so in the afterlife, that somehow one has to suffer or not live a pleasant life in order to earn a paradise after one dies.

The proverbial destruction of the Tower of Babel, which the Biblical God viewed as an act of human arrogance, is actually based on a similar Sumerian myth (Enmerkar and the Lord of Aratta). The premise here is that the Gods not only treat humans perpetually as children, but they are also imagined as easily given to anger and/or envious of human achievement. These views are seen by us as small-minded and superstitious, perhaps as projections of our own character flaws.

Imaginary Evils

By speaking of things that “resemble evils”, Philodemus makes a clear distinction between true evils and imagined ones. This invites further contemplation. Just as we must learn to have firm conviction about the kyriotatai or principal goods, and distinguish these from vain desires, so must we also recognize true evils, and distinguish them from imaginary evils.

These evils arise from superstition–but also from ungratefulness, which to us is a fundamental flaw in the human character that must be treated. The ungrateful person does not enjoy the good when he has it, and has the bad habit of being mindfully unhappy and mindlessly happy, which is the opposite of what the prudent man does.

There are instances where we see a combination of superstition and ungratefulness. We see it in the person that goes to the doctor, regains health, and thanks only God, not the doctor, not the scientists, when a cure is provided. Perhaps it doesn’t occur to him that the doctor made great sacrifices and studied diligently for over a decade to be able to practice medicine, or that for generations scientists diligently researched chemicals and natural compounds that led to the production of a cure, or that the doctor may have had help from the state or scholarships in order to be able to afford school. There are lands where medical assistant is unavailable or scarce. People fail to nurture accurate values when they are mindless and ungrateful.

Column X. They lament if they are afflicted by things which resemble evils, both the evils deriving from ingratitude towards men and the fatherland, and also the evils resulting from superstition, that is, because they take god to be the cause of both death and life … and because of the sorrow that weighs upon them on account of their death, they become irascible and hard to please and ill-tempered.

The term death denial principle was coined in the 1970’s and has been the object of research since then, but it’s interesting to note that the scrolls of Philodemus had a reference to this same idea 2,000 years ago. The idea is that people invent all kinds of religious fantasies, rituals, rites and many other cultural expressions in order to escape their anxiety about their own mortality. Recent research on the death denial principle has uncovered that people who have not evaluated these anxieties and worked through them also exhibit greater levels of hostility towards those who are different and are more judgemental, particularly right after they are reminded of their own mortality.

Philodemus here touches on a very deep insight about human nature. He says that those who haven’t therapeutically treated their apprehensions about death become “irascible, hard to please, ill-tempered”, which is not far from what recent research has found. As we will see when we study the Philodeman scroll On Death, this fear is also an imaginary evil.

On the other hand, there is the “we will die anyway” excuse, which Philodemus covers in Column XVII. This is the excuse that mortals use to avoid living up to their highest potential, to avoid conducting hedonic calculus and taking ownership for their choices and their creation. In his example, he speaks of people who abandon philosophy and do not accomplish noble and great things with this excuse, and attributes this attitude to ungratefulness–for the ungrateful do not expect gratitude in return for their good deeds. I’ve heard it from smokers who won’t quit and who damage their quality of life and health with this excuse.

Continues on Reasonings About Philodemus’ On Choices and Avoidances (Part III)

On Choices and Avoidances, edited with translation and commentary by Giovanni Indelli and Voula Tsouna-McKirahan
Back to the Main Page

Tweet This