Category Archives: epicurus

De Rerum Natura – Study Guide and Meleta

Our recommended translations:
LUCRETIUS, ON THE NATURE OF THINGS, Translated by Ian Johnston

Titus Lucretius Carus, ”On the Nature of Things”, English translation by Lamberto Bozzi

TITVS LVCRETIVS CARVS – Twentiers

De Rerum Natura, or On the Nature of Things, is an epic poem from the First Century BCE written by Lucretius. It introduces Epicurean canon, physics, and ethics, although the focus is mainly on the physics. The work marks a period of expansion, when Epicurean philosophy was adopted by speakers of Latin, and translated and adapted to a new audience.

I wish to thank Marcus for helping me to edit the links on this collection, and Nathan for sharing many of his own DRN study notes with me.

Essays:

Introduction to Lucretius – John R. Porter

Book I

Lucretius begins by invoking Venus, the embodiment of Pleasure, “The Guide of Life”. He goes on to discuss the sacrificial death of Iphianassa and the dangers of religion, and introduces Epicurus as a culture hero and Promethean Savior of humankind whose doctrines save us from the evils of superstition and lead to a life filled with pleasure. Thanks to his Doxai, religion is trampled beneath our feet, making us heaven’s equals.

1-49 Invocation to Venus

62-79 In praise of Epicurus

NOS EXAEQVAT VICTORIA CAELO. (I:67) “by [Epicurus’] victory we reach the stars.” (Humphries)

…QUOD CONTRA SAEPIVS ILLA RELIGIO PEPERIT SCELEROSA ATQVE IMPIA FACTA. (I:70-71) “More often has religion itself | Given birth to deeds both impious and criminal.” (Melville)

80-101 Sacrifice of Iphianassa

TANTVM RELIGIO POTVIT SVADERE MALORVM. (I:89) “So great the power religion had for evil.” (Melville)

102-148 Against superstition; on why we should study nature

149-237 First law of nature: nothing comes from nothing; Second law: nature breaks all things into their atoms, nothing dies off to nothing

NVLLAM REM E NIHILO GIGNI DIVINITVS VMQVAM. (I:150) “nothing ever springs miraculously out of nothing.” (Smith)

NIL POSSE CREARI DE NIHILO (I:155-156) “nothing can be created out of nothing.” (Smith)

Meleta:

Law of Conservation (Wikipedia)

238-264 First elements are indestructible

329-369 density of bodies varies due to the existence of void

418-448 All nature is atoms and void

440-448 a body “acts or is acted upon” — this is treated as an ontological criterion for whatever exists, also in Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus

449-458 Properties and accidents

Meleta:

Emergence – Wikipedia

Emergent Properties – Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy

459-463 Time is an accidental property 

483-564 Atoms are eternal and solid; bodies are also made up of molecules or combinations or atoms

565-599 Hard and soft bodies

600-634 Primal elements are indestructible

635-704 Against Heraclitus

Meleta:

Various refutations against the other philosophers between I.635-1113 (thank you, Nathan):

Heraclitus, Zeno – Fire
Thales – Water
Anaximander – Apeiron (infinity)
Anaxamines – Air
Anaxagoras – Homoiomereia
Xenophanes – Earth
Empedocles – “The Four Elements”
Pythagoras – Numbers

705-797 Against Empedocles and others

798-829 Compound bodies

830-920 Against Anaxagoras

951-1020 The universe is infinite, ergo prime bodies are always moving

1009-1013 atoms and void are forever bound to each other, ergo there is a space-time-matter continuum

Meleta:

What is Space-Time? – from Nature.com

The Nature of Space and Time – Scientific American

1021-1034 Randomness of particles

1035-1051 Infinite matter

1052-1117 The universe has no center

NAM MEDIVM NIHIL ESSE POTEST INFINITA (I:1070-1071) “There can be no centre in infinity.” (Latham)

Meleta:

Venus Over Mars

 Mahsa Amini: the new Iphianassa

Hermarchus’ 22 Books on Empedocles

Book II

Lucretius continues giving a basic overview of a particle-based cosmology. DRN is likely based on Epicurus’ 37 books On Nature. Here, we are presented with the Lucretian account of the doctrine of innumerable worlds, and with how nature does all things without gods ruling over her.

1-19 Philosophy is a fortress of the wise

20-46 Pleasure is easy to acquire (Principal Doctrine 3)

47-61 Science saves us from superstition

OMNIS CVM IN TENEBRIS PRAESERTIM VITA LABORET? (II:54) “…when the whole of life is but a struggle in darkness?” (Bailey)

62-141 Matter in motion

142-183 Speed of particles

184-215 Direction of motion of particles

216-237 The swerve

238-250 Matter travels at set speed in void

251-293 Against determinism

294-307 Laws of physics always the same

308-332 Microscopic motion happens

Meleta:

Brownian Motion – Wikipedia

333-521 Different kinds of particles

522-568 Endless particles

569-580 Growth and entropy

581-599 Different kinds of particles

Meleta:

Elementary and Composite Particles – Wikipedia

Periodic Table of the Elements – Wikipedia

600-643 Great Goddess / Mother Earth

644-660 The nature of the gods

661-729 Possible atom combinations 

730-841 Colors

842-864 Primary particles lack smell

865-943 Primary particles lack sensation

944-962 Hard blows numb sensation

963-989 Pain and Pleasure

990-1022 Cycles of death and renewal

CAELESTI SVMVS OMNES SEMINE ORIVNDI (II:991) “We all have come from heavenly seed.” (Humphries)

CEDIT ITEM RETRO, DE TERRA QUOD FVIT ANTE, IN TERRAS… (II:991) “What once sprung from earth sinks back into the earth.” (Bailey)

1023-1076 Doctrine of innumerable worlds

Meleta:

Exoplanets – Wikipedia

Exoplanet Exploration – NASA

1077-1089 Nature makes multiple samples

1090-1104 Gods do not rule over nature

1105-1143 Growth and decay

1144-1174 The universe has an end

Meleta: Lucretian Parable of the Alphabet

Book III

At the opening of DRN, Lucretius tells us that one of his goals in the poem is to shed light on the nature of the mortal soul in order to exorcise fear of death. Liber Tertivs focuses on this task, and argues that the study of nature provides the cure for this fear. The poet personifies Nature and makes her counsel man to leave this life satisfied at the time of death as one who has enjoyed all the delicacies of a banquet. 

Meleta:

Study Guide for the Epicurean canon

1-30 Invocation to Epicurus

31-93 Fear of death

Meleta:

The Denial of Death and the Practice of Dying – ErnestBecker.org

Cross-Reference: Yang Zhu, Chapter 3 of Liezi

94-369 On the nature of soul and mind

370-395 Soul is scattered throughout body

396-416 Mind is more vital than soul

417-547 Soul and mind are mortal

MORTALEM TAMEN ESSE ANIMAM FATEARE NECESSE (III:543) “you must admit the soul to be mortal” (Munro)

548-677 Soul dies if body dies

678-829 Soul is inside the body

830-869 Leave life as if leaving a banquet

NIL IGNITVR MORS EST AD NOS (III:831) “Death, therefore, to us is nothing” (Munro)

870-1094 Against fear of afterlife

VITAQVE MANCIPIO NVLLI DATVR OMNIBVS VSV (III:972) “No one is given life to own; we all hold but a lease.” (Stallings)

Cross References:

Yang Zhu, Book 7 of Liezi, Chapter 11

The Despisers of the Body, Nietzsche, in Thus Spake Zarathustra, IV

Meleta:

Passages on the Soul, from Epicurus’ Epistle to Herodotus

A Concrete Self

Some Thoughts on the Soul

Book IV

Liber Qvartvs focuses on the canon (the “measuring stick” or “standard” of truth), and on the importance of trusting the using our senses and our faculties. This was mainly a critique of the Sceptics, who taught that knowledge was neither possible nor desirable.

1-25 Poetry sweetens philosophy

34-268 Explanation of photons (eidolon)

125 Foul odors are cited as proof that tiny unseen particles exist

154 The wave function of light particles is mentioned: “simulacra redundent”, bodies emit images to us ‘wave on wave”

175 On the speed of light

205 Considers the lack of density in outer space

221 The air is ever filled with winged words: “variae cessant voces volitare per auras”

269-352 The case study of mirrors

E TENEBRIS AVTEM QVAE SVNT IN LVCE TVEMVR (IV:338) “Now we see out of the dark what is in the light” (Diderot’s motto in Philo. Tho. 1746)

353-364 Seeing objects from a distance

Meleta:

Scientific names of the various types of “illusions” Lucretius describes in IV.338-463 (thank you, Nathan):

Dark Adaptation (338-353), Distance Illusion (354-364), Beta Movement, and shadows as evidence that light waves are blocked (365-379), Induced Movement (388-391, 421-426, 444-447), Parallax (392-397), Vanishing Point (398-400, 433-436), Vertigo (401-404), The “Moon” Illusion (405-414), Entasis (427-432), Refraction of Light (437-443), Diplopia (“Double-vision”) (448-453), Dreams/Dreaming at Night (454-463)

379-466 Eyes are trustworthy; recognition of perspective

Nothing is harder than separating truth from the hasty, hazy additives of the mind. – Liber Qvartvs, 467-8

Since thus far they’ve seen no truth, how can they know what “know” and “not-know” mean, what thing creates the concepts “false” and “true”, what proves the dubious different from the sure? You’ll find the concept “truth” was first created by the senses, nor can we prove the senses wrong. – Liber Qvartvs, 474-8

467-521 Trusting the senses; 479 Senses can’t be proven wrong; 486-496 Each faculty is independent within the canon; 505 Parable of the building foundation

PROINDE QVOD IN QVOQVEST HIS VISVM TEMPORE VERVMST. (IV:500) “Therefore all sensations at all times are true.” (Smith)

522-614 On the nature of sound waves; 571 On echo

615-632 On the nature of taste

633-672 Animals have different senses

UT QVOD ALIIS CIBVS EST ALIIS FVAT ACRE VENENVM (IV:638) “What’s food for one is poison for another.” (Esolin)

673-721 On the nature of smell; 700 Odors can’t cross walls and boundaries that sound is able to cross, ergo sound is more subtle, and smells easily dissipate

722-822 Photons in the air (posited as a possible explanation for dreams and visions)

823-857 Against natural design, and against teleology in Darwinian evolution

858-876 Hunger and Thirst

877-986 On bodily movement

976 Mentions neural pathways

987-1029 On sleep

1030-1057 Human semen, “the wound of love” and criticism of passionate love, which makes men lose their wealth and their mind

1058-1287 Sexuality and sterility; includes in 1217-1236 the assertion that babies bear the seed of both father and mother, and inherit traits from both sides

… EST COMMUNIS VOLVPTAS (IV:1209) “…sexual pleasure is shared” (Smith)

1260 Food affects our “seed”

Meleta:

Three Lucretian Arguments Against Creationism

Diogenes’ Wall: Who will Choose to Seek What he can Never Find?

On the Canon: Enargeia and Epilogismos; Studying the Canon

Book V

Liber Qvintvs is the most complete extant epitome of Epicurean anthropology. It gives natural explanations for natural and cultural phenomena that ancients used to attribute to the gods. Instead, here nature invents new faculties or powers, and men later perfect their use through culture and habit. It is in this book that Lucretius takes us to the innumerable worlds by depicting a great battle taking place in space.

1-90 In honor of Epicurus

AT BENE NON POTERAT SINE PVRO PECTORE VIVI (V:18) “But a good life could not be lived without a pure mind” (Smith)

91-125 The Earth will also end

Meleta:

When will the Earth come to an end? – Big Think

How will life on Earth end? – Astronomy.com

126-145 Mind can only exist in the body

146-155 The gods are physical

156-194 The gods did not create the world

195-234 Flaws in nature show no design 

235-323 Matter is constantly recycled

324-379 Age of the Earth

380-415 How elements affect each other

416-470 How the Earth formed; 437-440 anticipates the modern scientific proposition of the Nebular Hypothesis

Meleta:

Accretion – Wikipedia

471-479 How the Sun and Moon formed

480-494 The land and sea

495-508 The aether / atmosphere

509-563 The motion of the stars and Earth

564-613 The size of the Sun and Moon

614-750 Motion of the Sun and Moon

751-779 Eclipses

780-836 When the Earth was young

NAM NEQVE DE CAELO CECIDISSE ANIMALIA POSSVNT (V:793) “Certainly living creatures cannot have dropped from heaven” (Smith)

… OMNIA MIGRANT (V:830) “…everything is in flux” (Smith)

837-854 Earth produced imperfect beings

855-877 Survival of the fittest

878-924 Animals belong to a single species

925-1010 Early humans

1011-1027 Origin of families and homes

Meleta:

Nathan notes: 1000-1288 in Book V use SEMINA explicitly refer to human male ejaculate fluid, thus, creating a fundamental poetic comparison between the generation of the Earth and the generation of a Child, both of which are composed of clumps of eternal matter that get entangled while falling through the void, both of which lead to inextricably vast complexity, coming from simple, primordial seeds.

1028-1090 Origin of language

1091-1104 Invention of fire

1105-1160 First towns founded

1161-1193 Origin of religion

1194-1240 The dangers of religion

1241-1286 Discovery of metalwork

1287-1349 How metals increased warfare; 1283-1296 anticipates Christian Jurgensen Thomsen’s “Three-Age System” of the “Stone” Age, “Bronze” Age, and “Iron” Age.

1350-1360 Fabrics for clothing

1361-1378 Farming

1379 … Singing and music

Meleta:

Liber Qvintvs

Naturalist Reasoning on Friendship

On the Intersection Between Science Fiction and Epicurean Philosophy

Lucretius on Iron and War

Better be a Subject and at Peace

Book VI

Lucretius continues giving natural explanations for natural phenomena that sometimes inspired fear-based beliefs in people. The final book includes the parable of the punctured jar, which illustrates the salvific power of philosophy. While some have argued that De rerum natura is an incomplete work, Michel Onfray calls our attention to the fact that the first book begins with a discussion of the creative powers of the Mother (nature), and the sixth and final book ends with a discussion of death.

1-42 In praise of Epicurus

43-95 Against fear-based belief

96-163 The nature of thunder

164-218 Sounds moves slower than sights; 164-166 both light and sound have finite speeds, and light moves more quickly than sound 

219-238 Lightning fires

239-299 How lightning originates

300-322 Wind can carry fire

323-422 The nature of lightning

423-534 Waterspouts

535-607 The nature of earthquakes; (Nathan says: I think lines VI.587-588 explicitly refer to the earthquake/tsunami that destroyed Helike in 373 BCE “near Aegium on the Peloponnesian” side of the Gulf of Corinth.)

Meleta:

Happy Twentieth: Liber Sextvs, on Harmful Beliefs

Plate tectonics – Wikipedia

608-638 The nature of the ocean

639-711 The nature of volcanoes; (Nathan says: the eruption of Etna referred to in VI.641 seems to refer to the eruption in 122 BCE that destroyed the Sicilian city of Catania.)

712-737 The river Nile

738-768 Avernian lakes

OMNIA QUAE NATURALI RATIONE GERUNTUR (VI:762) “All these phenomena are produced by the operation of nature” (Smith)

769-839 Toxic substances

840-905 Water in wells

906-1089 The nature of magnets

1090-1137 The nature of diseases

1138 … The plague in Athens; (Nathan adds context: the Plague of Athens (430 BCE) killed 25% of the population, between 75,000 and 100,000)

Additional Notes

List of literary figures who allude to or have adopted or been influenced by DRN directly (thank you, Nathan!):

Bacon, Bergson, Botticelli, Chaucer, Deleuze, Descartes, Diderot, Dryden, E. Darwin, Freud, Frederick II, Galileo, Gassendi, Goethe, Thomas Gray, Holbach, Hobbes, Horace, Hume, Jefferson, Kant, Locke, La Mettrie, Lord Byron, Marx, Melville, Milton, Machiavelli, Nietzsche, Newton, Pope, Rousseau, Shakespeare, Shelley, Spenser, Spinoza, Santayana, Tennyson, Virgil, Whitman, Wordsworth

 

Meleta:

The Punctured Jar Parable

The Method of Multiple Explanations

The Ethics of a Quarantine

Lucretius’ Apocalyptic Imagination, by Alessandro Schiesaro

Essays and Books on Lucretius:

The Epicureanism of Lucretius – Tim O’Keefe

Metaphor and Argumentation in Lucretius – Matthew Johncock

Predicting Modern Science: Epicurus vs. Mohammed

Happy Twentieth: Liber Sextvs, on Harmful Beliefs

Eikas cheers to all! This month, we were kindly invited to participate in a Q & A and a friendly discussion on Epicurean philosophy as an alternative for modern people by Gregory Lopez, of New York City Stoics. The result is NYC Stoics: A Conversation with Hiram, Alan, & Marcus from The Society of Friends of Epicurus.

In our society, there is a huge pandemic of harmful beliefs about divinity, from those who are praying for Armageddon, to those who deny science, or who reject their own family members as a result of severance from a cult … or the “Kill the Gays” Christian mob in Uganda. This month, a poll revealed that Americans are distancing themselves from traditional values–which means, in part, a rejection of traditional religiosity and the harmful practices and ideas it introduces.

Some outlets have reported the news of the poll as alarming. This manner of addressing the move away from traditional values obeys a nihilistic Christian logic, which requires meaning and values to derive from their particular supernatural claims only. It also obeys a Platonic logic, according to which meaning and values can be imposed by the polis, or otherwise be a mere reflection of cultural power, rather than nature. But what if this is an opportunity to practice more natural, authentic values?

Richard Reeves discusses, in The friendship recession, the need for having friends. Friendship is a model of relation tends to render individuals equal to each other in some way. In that sense, it is a more natural and pragmatic value than traditional values (like religiosity and patriotism, which are cited in the poll). It becomes increasingly possible, as old values continue to recede, for people to be better able to identify and pursue more private, more intimate and personal values that feel authentic and natural.

The death of traditional values should be treated as an invitation and an opportunity to practice friendship and philosophy, so that we may evaluate choice-worthy and true values with our friends of like mind.

Liber Sextvs

I wish to share some of my last remaining notes from a recent re-reading of Lucretius’ De rerum natura, since this is of some relevance to discussions about the old and new tables of values. The mail goal of Liber Sextvs–the sixth book of De rerum natura–is to banish religious fear and superstition. It includes the following jeremiad:

Men see in heaven and here on earth things happen, that often fill their minds with fear, and humble their hearts with terror of the gods.

They’re crushed; they crawl on earth, because, perforce through ignorance of causes they confer on gods all power and kingdom over the world.

If people have learned that gods live carefree lives, and still, for all that, wonder by what means phenomena may occur, especially those they see in heavenly zones above their heads, then they will slip back into their old beliefs and take on heartless masters, whom they deem almighty: poor fools, they don’t know what can be and what cannot; yes, and what law defines the power of things, what deep-set boundary stone; thus with reason blinded, they err and err.

Reject such thoughts! Far from your mind remove them, unworthy of gods and alien to their peace!

Else power divine, belittled by you, will often harm you–not that gods’ power can be so damaged that anger would drive them panting for fierce revenge, but that you’ll picture these placid, peaceful, harmless creatures aboil with billows of rolling wrath, and then won’t enter their temples with peace at heart.

– Lucretius, De rervm natvra, Liber Sextvs, 68-75

The harms of having false, fear-based beliefs about the gods, and the benefits of having wholesome ones is a complex subject, when addressed from the Epicurean perspective, in part because many of us have been indoctrinated into a cosmology and social contract quite different from that of the first Epicureans. Epicurean ideas and methods were used originally to criticize Pagan superstition, and must now be employed with different types of false religions and beliefs that are popular today.

The conclusion of the Lucretian passage is that the gods themselves (if they exist somewhere in the cosmos) are not affected by our views. Instead, we harm ourselves (and often harm others) when we belittle or degrade the gods with our harmful beliefs about them. Gods, in the social contract of the cultures that have them, embody their highest values, the moralizing things that we are supposed to admire and celebrate.

It is our beliefs that are the target of philosophy’s treatment and healing. Pragmatically, the distinction between ancient polytheisms and modern monotheisms is less important than the irrational fears, the methods by which they are diagnosed and treated, and the harmful or beneficial beliefs that an individual adopts. These beliefs (as Philodemus of Gadara explains with many examples) affect our disposition, our character, and our choices, and are themselves affected by our associations, and often affect whoever we associate with. (This is not just true in religion: a recent Aeon essay argues that even in the realm of economics, the opinions and theories that we apply and lens through which we consider things have huge practical and societal repercussions.)

In this essay on the benefits of prayer according to certain studies, the author reports these findings, which confirm that what we believe about deity has psychosomatic effects:

However, all types of prayer might not work in the same way — when hospitalized patients appraised God as a kind supporter, their mental and physical health improved. But when they perceived God as punishing or were angry with God, their health declined.

Let us re-read what I believe to be the core ethical teaching of this passage. It delivers the following revelation: we have the power to degrade “divine power” with our beliefs and, in doing so, to render it harmful to us.

Power divine, belittled by you, will often harm you.

In Latin, the passage ends with what was translated as “peace at heart”. In Greek, this is ataraxia (the state of no-perturbation), and so instances of perturbations are the signs by which we may diagnose harmful beliefs, or place them before our eyes in order to better understand them. These perturbations might be different from the ones that identify signs of injustice in Principal Doctrine 17, or from the guilt and paranoia that point to Principal Doctrine 35. Therefore, this passage explains that the exertion of power to belittle divinity may be at the root, or might be one cause among several, of some of the perturbations we observe in people who do not enjoy “peace at heart”.

Book Review of Epicurean Philosophy: An introduction from the “Garden of Athens”

Eikas cheers to all! The book Epicurean Philosophy: An introduction from the “Garden of Athens” was made public in the announcement related to this year’s annual symposium of Epicurean philosophy (the program for which is here), together with the following publications:

The educational efforts spearheaded by Christos, founder of the modern Epicurean Garden in Athens, and by some of the other Kathegemones (Epicurean Guides) in Greece, have yielded positive results, and documented the tangible benefits of philosophy in peer-reviewed studies. This is quite exciting, as it paves the way for future experimentation with similar curricula elsewhere. We are very proud of the work that has been done by the Epicureans in Greece.

I was most excited to hear about the English-language book that was published by the Epicurean Gardens in Greece, which harvests the wisdom gained by our friends for the benefit of the international community. In this essay, I review the book Epicurean Philosophy: An introduction from the “Garden of Athens”.

Epicureanism as a Scientific Humanism

The belief that exists about the nature of the divine as well as its influence on the world and humankind is also wrong and dangerous, creating fear and unrest as it attributes natural phenomena, human situations and behaviors to dark powers and divine intervention.” – Leonidas Alexandrides, Tetrapharmakos essay, p. 122

Throughout this book, we find an Epicurean conscience, perspective, and narrative of history, which inevitably includes a reaction against the terrors and errors of Christianity and of Christian hegemony or fascism. The editor refers to the Cristian Dark Ages (which, he admits, were not entirely dark since Epicurus was known to some intellectuals during the Middle Ages), calls the Christian Era “an interruption of 1,000 years of barbarism”, and frequently accentuates the scientific nature of Epicurean Humanism. Some people may be bothered by this characterization, but we must remember two things:

  1. The characterization is, frankly, accurate, and Epicureans have always been known for their parrhesia (frankness), both private and public, and
  2. The Greek Orthodox Church is just as toxic as the Evangelical Churches in the US. In 2018, the state in Greece stopped paying a salary to its priests only AFTER the considerable economic difficulties that Greece had faced in recent years, which were related to bankruptcy and chronic debt. According to this source, this decision was later reversed by conservatives, and the priests are now again on state payroll in spite of the continuing economic difficulties that Greece faces. This shows us how entrenched the church is in the power structures in Greece. Christos accentuates the virtues of secularism, of Enlightenment values, and of Epicurean philosophy against this background.

The point of this is that the liberating and enlightened way of thinking that Epicureans epitomize is clearly worth celebrating, when seen against the backdrop of the restrictive and harmful obscurantism that is prevalent still today because of Christian hegemony.

The Principle of Emergence

Among the trivia points that I found interesting in Christos’ presentation of philosophy, I found this in page 59:

Each composite body possesses properties that the particles comprising it do not possess (principle of emergence, the basis of chemistry). – 13th principle of atomic physics

The earliest instance of the emergent or relational properties of bodies is expressed in Epicurus’ Epistle to Herodotus. Later in page 88, Christos says that Epicurus

described the law of conservation of matter during chemical reactions, as Lavoisier rediscovered and named two millenia later. Therefore, Epicurus laid the foundations of the basic notions of chemistry.

In page 89, Christos quotes Lucretius to further accentuate how he discusses atoms binding together to form molecules (much of DRN is believed to be based on Epicurus’ 37 books On Nature):

Things which seem to us hard and compact are made of particles more hooked one to another, and are held together close-fastened at their roots, as it were by branching particles. – De rervm natvra, Book 2, 444-446

On Conceivability

Conceivability is one of the advanced or difficult concepts that I first encountered in Philodemus’ scroll On Methods of Inference. This book helped to contextualize the historical origin of this concept. In page 60, we read:

Epicurus, like the atom(ist) philosophers Leucippus and Democritus, accepted the Eleatic principle of ontological identification, which states that there is no reason why every real thing should not be conceivable.

Epicurus’ Influence on Modern Medicine

One of the most fascinating points made by the book is the claim (in page 92) that the modern medical division of acute pain versus chronic pain originates in Epicurus’ Principal Doctrine 4.

(the Epicurean) Asclepiades of Bithynia spoke of the pathology of molecules (the modern term is molecular medicine), overcoming Hippocrates’ theories of “the four fluids” …

He was the first physician to formulate the separation of diseases into “acute” and “chronic”, as an analogy with the fourth Principal Doctrine of Epicurus on acute and chronic pains. Asclepiades spoke of tiny invisible animals that live in stagnant waters and may cause diseases (microbes). He was the founder of Methodic Medicine (“methodos” implies systematic scientific investigation), which for half a millennium had been the only rational and scientific school of medicine in the ancient world that did not pollute medical practice with metaphysical beliefs based on divine intervention, astrological influence, and dream therapy.

Later, in page 100, we read that Asclepiades brought a scientific and compassionate approach to medicine:

Asclepiades adopted and applied friendly treatment and psychological support to patients … Influenced by an Epicurean quotation of acute and chronic pains, Asclepiades realized that some diseases are short-lived and should be treated immediately for healing. In contrast, others are chronic and incurable, and the best thing a physician should do is make the patient’s life more tolerable.

One reason why I love this passage is because it places before the eyes the actual utility and praxis of the very misunderstood Principal Doctrine 4, and in general of all the Kyriai Doxai. Many people forget that Epicurus himself suffered from chronic pain, that (true to his experimental and pragmatic canon) he tested Kyriai Doxai in his own body and experience, and that he primarily conceived of true philosophy as therapeutic. Asclepiades’ approach reminds us of the correct way to make use of Kyriai Doxai, which in this case helps us to proactively organize ourselves around our approach to and practice of pain management.

A Tetrapod or a Tripod?

Since the Canon (our epistemological system) is one of the most difficult aspects of Epicurean philosophy to explain to others, it’s beneficial to read how others understand and explain it. Christos comprehensively describes the Canon as a methodology, which includes two principles of confirmation (epimartyresis and antimartyresis). Christos says this is the source of the scientific method. We are still studying this at SoFE, but one source we found for this is in Sextvs Empiricvs, as preserved in a fragment known as Usener 247:

According to Epicurus, some opinions are true, some false. 

True opinions are those which are attested by and not contested by clear facts, while false opinions are those which are contested and not attested by clear facts

Attestation is perception through a self-evident impression, that the object of opinion is such as it once was thought to be—for example, if Plato is approaching from far off, I form the conjectural opinion, owing to the distance, that it is Plato. But then he has come close, there is further testimony that he is Plato, now that the distance is reduced, and it is attested by the self-evidence itself. 

Non-contestation is the conformity between a non-evident thing which is the object of speculation, and the opinion about what is apparent—for example, Epicurus, in saying that void exists, which is non-evident, confirms this through the self-evident fact of motion. For if void does not exist, there ought not be motion either, since the moving body would lack a place to pass into as a consequence of everything being full and solid. Therefore, the non-evident thing believed is not contradicted by that which is evident, since there is motion.

Contestation, on the other hand, is opposed to non-contestation, for it is the elimination of that which is apparent by the positing of the non-evident thing—for example, the Stoic says that void does not exist, something non-evident; but once this denial is put forward, then that which is evident, namely motion, ought to be co-eliminated with it. For if void does not exist, then motion does not occur either, according to the method already demonstrated. 

Non-attestation, likewise, is opposed to attestation, for it is confirmation through self-evidence of the fact that the object of opinion is not such as it was believed to be—for example, if someone is approaching from far off, we conjecture, owing to the distance, that he is Plato. But when the distance is reduced, we recognize through self-evidence that it is not Plato. This sort of thing turns out to be non-attestation.

So attestation and non-contestation are the criterion of something’s being true, while non-attestation and contestation are the criterion of its being false. And self-evidence (enargeia) is the foundation and basis of all [four] of these.

Unlike most of the Western Epicureans I know, Christos accepts a Tetrapod or four-legged epistemological system (four criteria in their Canon, mentioned in page 71) as opposed to our more familiar Tripod (three sets of faculties consisting of the five senses, the pleasure / pain faculty, and the prolepsis faculty).

The third criterion is the hardest to explain. One easy way to explain prolepsis is as a natural faculty for conceiving of abstractions (although my favorite explanation for it is the one found in García Gual’s book, which is only available in Spanish). Christos mentions “images from the subconscious”, and links prolepsis with Jungian archetypes. The point is that this is a natural, physical, and organic faculty, and not images from a Platonic or supernatural idealist realm. Some additional canonical remarks:

  • The fourth criterion of truth is mentioned as epibole tes dianoias (focusing of the mind) in Laertius’ Book Ten, which Christos associates with mental focus.
  • Christos discuses the method of multiple explanations (in page 76) as a process of hypotheses gathering.
  • He mentions modern contemplative studies (page 87) and compares them to Epicurus’ assertion that gods are perceived only by mind.

Jefferson

Panagiotis Panagiotopoulos wrote a chapter on the life of Thomas Jefferson, where he celebrates that Jefferson was the first in human history to write the right to happiness into a social contract when he wrote “life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness” into the Declaration of Independence (page 163 of the book).

I’d go further and say that Jefferson was practicing Kyriai Doxai when he wrote this. He was practicing the Epicurean doctrines on justice based on what is useful for mutual association, since he was steeped in Enlightenment values and wanted to create a society where, even if not everyone was Epicurean, at least those of us who were, would be able to thrive as Epicureans.

Conclusion

Some final notes:

  • Christos’ (in page 95) invites us to study these scientists: Lavoisier, Boyle, Dalton.
  • His chapter on the biography of Pierre Gassendi was fairly complete, engaging and enjoyable.
  • The book includes notes on some of the Epicurean ideas that contributed to the Islamic Enlightenment, of which I was not aware, although I had heard the name of Omar Khayam and the Mutazilites.
  • Babis Patzoglou (one of the contributors) shows signs of Hellenic nationalism, and gives a description of the Garden as a type of classless society (page 176). These ideas may not resonate with everyone.

The book has small editorial mistakes, which are in great part due to the fact that English is not the first language of the Kathegemones (Epicurean Guides) of the Gardens of Athens, Thessaloniki, and elsewhere in modern Greece. However, overall, I am stoked that this book was published in English. It’s a much needed intersection that allows for those of us who do not speak Greek to be able to harvest the wisdom of our Epicurean brethren in Hellas and to benefit from their expertise. 

Educational Content Update:

Epicurean Philosophy: An introduction from the “Garden of Athens”

Happy Eikas! – Lucian’s 10 Assertions on the Kyriai Doxai

Eikas cheers to all our readers! To members of Society of Friends of Epicurus, Eikas of February is officially our Gregorian-calendar Hegemon Day, which celebrates the birth of the first Epicurean in history. Epicurus of Samos elaborated a fully natural cosmology based on atomism, paved the way for our modern Western scientific worldview, and taught his friends an ethics that consisted in learning the art of living correctly, pleasantly, justly, and prudently. We invite our readers to learn more about our Hegemon by studying his own Code of Ethics: the Kyriai Doxai and the Epistle to Menoeceus.

Lucian of Samosata is poetically a “spirit of laughter” among our ancestors. He was at one and the same time an artist, an engaging storyteller, a clown, a satirist, and a comedian. Lucian practiced VS 41 when he chose to live with laughter, and to impart laughter while being true to the Kyriai Doxai. In portion 47 of Alexander the Oracle Monger, a satirical novel from the 2nd Century of Common Era, Lucian of Samosata gives a full book review of the Kyriai Doxai.

In this connection Alexander once made himself supremely ridiculous. Coming across Epicurus’s Accepted Maxims, the most admirable of his books, as you know, with its terse presentment of his wise conclusions, he brought it into the middle of the market-place, there burned it on a fig-wood fire for the sins of its author, and cast its ashes into the sea. He issued an oracle on the occasion: The dotard’s maxims to the flames be given.

The fellow had no conception of the blessings conferred by that book upon its readers, of the peace, tranquillity, and independence of mind it produces, of the protection it gives against terrors, phantoms, and marvels, vain hopes and inordinate desires, of the judgment and candor that it fosters, or of its true purging of the spirit, not with torches and squills and such rubbish, but with right reason, truth, and frankness.

Lucian says many things in this small passage, and I’d like to highlight ten assertions that he makes–in part because Epicureans have always been known for concise speech, and his choice of words looks like the product of a careful editorial process.

  1. That whoever insults or burns the Kyriai Doxai is “supremely ridiculous” (worth laughing at). This is how a laughing philosopher praises the Doxai.
  2. That Kyriai Doxai is the most admirable of Epicurus’ books.
  3. He chose the words “as you know”. This implies that Celsus (to whom he is writing the novel) already “knows” these things about the Kyriai Doxai, and we may infer that Celsus must have either been an Epicurean, or that they perhaps had studied the Kyriai Doxai together. In Laertius, Book Ten, we read that a sage will give public lectures, but only upon request. Lucian may have been applying this same logic to his Epicurean testimony. By mentioning that Celsus specifically requested the work, he sought to excuse himself from the accusation of preaching in public, and/or of being a demagogue (since Epicurus forbids public preaching). I believe that the mention of Celsus in this manner may have been a way to certify his fulfillment of the rules on passive recruitment. In this way, he is applying the Laertian loophole (of work being produced “upon request”) to his own missionary work, creating an analogy between public lectures and comedic literature. This analogy is appropriate, in my view, and in fact we have discussed it in our own Koinonia, and concluded that we consider it valid (that both lectures and written works produced by invitation fulfill the rules of the founders concerning passive recruitment). If he is indeed applying some form of the Laertian standard, then Lucian is aware that he’s engaging in missionary work when writing this.
  4. Lucian mentions the “terse presentment of wise conclusions”–this means clear, concise, to the point, polished, sparing. Philodemus of Gadara also praised Epicurean writings’ conciseness, precision and clarity.
  5. Lucian says that the Doxai confers blessings upon its readers, and goes on to mention them. It is here that he creates a depiction of Kyriai Doxai as a dynamic force within the psyche of students, and in the circle of friends that study together.
  6. Among these blessings, he mentions peace and tranquility, a claim which could be justified by Doxai 1-4, 6, 17, 35, and many others.
  7. He mentions the independence of mind KD produces, a claim which could be justified by our recent meleta on KD 14.
  8. He mentions protection, or in some translations liberation, specifically, from five named evils. The five evils mentioned by Lucian are “terrors, apparitions, portents, vain hopes, and extravagant cravings”. In other translations, I’ve seen them numbered as: “terrors, phantoms, and marvels, vain hopes and inordinate desires”. Concerning terrors and apparitions, these claims are justified by KD 1, 2, 10-14, and others. Vain hopes are destroyed in KD 2, 21, and 7, among others. Concerning portents or omens, this claim is justified by KD 16. These evils can be divided into two types: specific types of fears and specific types of unnatural desires. Lucian’s five evils remind me of the four “roots of all evil” in Diogenes’ Wall.
  9. Lucian says Kyriai Doxai fosters judgment and candor (open and honest expression).
  10. The term “TRUE purging” (sometimes translated as “purifying”) reminds me of the philosophical religiosity and spirituality espoused by Empedocles in his “Purifications”. Here, however, Lucian is using the term to differentiate Epicurus from the main character in Alexander the Oracle Monger, which is a parody of a false prophet and charlatan. He is saying that, unlike this charlatan, Epicurus does indeed truly purify the understanding by straight thinking (which I believe refers to the clarity bestowed by the canon, Doxai 22-25), and by Truthfulness and Frankness / Parrhesia.

Some translations of this passage use the verbs “create, engender, develop, liberate and purify”–all creative, life-affirming, and sustaining verbs. These actions are attributed to the Kyriai Doxai, and give the impression of the Kyriai Doxai as an active, dynamic force in the psyches of the readers. We have no way of knowing whether Lucian is writing his own testimony, or whether he is co-editing this with Celsus or another Epicurean Guide or mentor, but this does not affect how thought-provoking this passage is.

Lucian’s testimony concerning Epicurean philosophy does not end there. On Epicurus himself, Lucian wrote earlier in the same work:

[17] And at this point, my dear Celsus, we may, if we will be candid, make some allowance for these Paphlagonians and Pontics. The poor uneducated ‘fat-heads’ might well be taken in when they handled the serpent—a privilege conceded to all who choose—and saw in that dim light its head with the mouth that opened and shut. It was an occasion for a Democritus, nay, for an Epicurus or a Metrodorus, perhaps, a man whose intelligence was steeled against such assaults by skepticism and insight, one who, if he could not detect the precise imposture, would at any rate have been perfectly certain that, though this escaped him, the whole thing was a lie and an impossibility.

… [25] A time came when a number of sensible people began to shake off their intoxication and combine against him, chief among them the numerous Epicureans; in the cities, the imposture with all its theatrical accessories began to be seen through. It was now that he resorted to a measure of intimidation; he proclaimed that Pontus was overrun with atheists and Christians, who presumed to spread the most scandalous reports concerning him. He exhorted Pontus, as it valued the God’s favor, to stone these men. Touching Epicurus, he gave the following response. An inquirer had asked how Epicurus fared in Hades, and was told: Of slime is his bed, And his fetters of lead.

The prosperity of the oracle is perhaps not so wonderful, when one learns what sensible, intelligent questions were in fashion with its votaries. Well, it was war to the knife between him and Epicurus, and no wonder. What fitter enemy for a charlatan who patronized miracles and hated truth, than the thinker who had grasped the nature of things and was in solitary possession of that truth? As for the Platonists, Stoics, Pythagoreans, they were his good friends; he had no quarrel with them. But the unmitigated Epicurus, as he used to call him, could not but be hateful to him, treating all such pretensions as absurd and puerile

Notice here the assertion that Epicurus alone was in solitary possession of the truth about the nature of things. That the entire novel was written in solidarity with the numerous Epicureans that he also mentions in this passage is confirmed towards the end of the novel:

[61] My object, dear friend, in making this small selection from a great mass of material has been twofold. First, I was willing to oblige a friend and comrade who is for me the pattern of wisdom, sincerity, good humor, justice, tranquillity, and geniality. But secondly I was still more concerned (a preference which you will be very far from resenting) to strike a blow for Epicurus, that great man whose holiness and divinity of nature were not shams, who alone had and imparted true insight into the good, and who brought deliverance to all that consorted with him. Yet I think casual readers too may find my essay not unserviceable, since it is not only destructive, but, for men of sense, constructive also.

Here, Lucian again emphasizes that Epicurus was alone among the philosophers in terms of not being a sham, being truly holy, benefiting others, and having true insight and knowledge. Lucian is clear, emphatic, and unequivocal in all his statements about both Epicurus and his Principal Doctrines. Based on the reading of these passages, it seems to me that Celsus must have been a fellow Epicurean, because

  • as Lucian mentions early in the text, Celsus requested the collection of jokes, perhaps mixed with this defense of Epicurus–with the added benefit that in this way, Lucian evades breaking the Epicurean community’s rules against preaching in public when uninvited, and
  • Alexander the Oracle Monger was put into writing as a token of friendship between two Epicureans of the Second Century of Common Era, when Christians had become a visible minority and Epicureans were numerous in what is today Western Turkey. Lucian says “as you know” when praising the Kyriai Doxai, and “you will be very far from resenting” (that Lucian is striking a blow for Epicurus). These expressions indicate that Lucian and Celsus either studied philosophy together, or celebrated Eikas together, or in some other way had enjoyed Epicurean camaraderie. The dedication to Celsus makes me imagine that they had such sweet friendship, having spent innumerable hours laughing together at these things, that the compilation of jokes and stories was a testament of their fruitful and happy friendship in some way. Writing this work rendered immortal some of the best parts of their friendship. Their friendship and their laughter practice still benefits all the future generations who have since enjoyed reading “Alexander the Oracle Monger”.

Lucian is writing a comedy, but suddenly and emphatically he wants the reader to know that he is serious about Epicurus and the Kyriai Doxai. Lucian’s Epicurean testimony is a serious moment in the midst of a comedic work, although it’s entirely relevant and woven with ease into the rest of the narrative. For all these reasons, I see Lucian of Samosata as a great role model in placing before the eyes the practice of the laughing philosophers that is found in VS 41: at one and the same time, Lucian laughs, uses his talent to entertain friends, and finds his voice as a philosopher.

One must laugh and seek wisdom and tend to one’s home life and use one’s other goods, and always recount the pronouncements of true philosophy. – Epicurean Saying 41

This Month’s Literary Updates:

 Living for Pleasure: An Epicurean Guide to Life is a book review of a new friendly introductory book by Emily Austin

“Living for Pleasure: an Epicurean Guide to Life”: a SoFE Book Review

Boys and men are lonelier than ever. What can we do about it.

Further Reading:

Kyriai Doxai

Alexander the Oracle Monger

What’s so Funny About Lucian the Syrian?

The Lucian of Samosata Project

“Living for Pleasure”: a Book Review

Living for Pleasure: An Epicurean Guide to Life by Emily Austin is one of the latest books propagating Epicurean philosophy as an answer to modern philosophical questioning. It is non-academic, written in a style that is friendly and easy to follow, and most modern Epicureans who have read the book seem to have a positive opinion of the book, as do I.

One of the ideas I appreciate (because this is such a prominent problem today) is her treatment of anxiety and how it relates to taraxis / perturbation. Epicurean philosophy helps us to diagnose (by signs) hindrances to happiness, and to tackle them rather than be avoidant. Epicureans do not use philosophy to escape nature, but to thrive in it and live pleasantly. This book discusses the many issues that are tackled directly by Epicurean therapeutics, and how Epicurus and the other Epicurean Guides act as life-coaches, helping us to address all the important philosophical projects related to our happiness.

Paraphrasing the Kyriai Doxai

One didactic method utilized by Philodemus of Gadara (most famously, in the Tetrapharmakos) is the practice of paraphrasing the Kyriai Doxai. This is different from repeating them, and is a way of memorizing them and gaining full cognitive assimilation of them.

One valid criticism of the Tetrapharmakos is that it risks oversimplifying the first four of the Principal Doctrines. But the truth is that we have no reason to supposed that the Tetrapharmakos ever meant to replace in-depth study of the first four, or to diminish the importance of the other 36 of the Kyriai Doxai. On the contrary, I believe that Philodemus is teaching us the method of paraphrasing, using the Tetrapharmakos as an example that we can apply to the other Kyriai Doxai. This is a point that Philodemus himself insists on in Scroll 1005. In fact, the most brilliant extant work by Philodemus is an extensive elaboration of the second of the Four Cures, which takes up an entire book titled Peri Thanatos (On Death), where he lists in detail all the pragmatic repercussions of the second Principal Doctrine.

Having cleared this out, let us delve into how Emily Austin uses the Philodeman technique of paraphrasing a Doxa in order to better cognitively assimilate it. In this case, she paraphrases Principal Doctrine 29 (“the hierarchy of desires”), which says:

Among desires, some are natural and necessary, some are natural and unnecessary, and some are unnatural and unnecessary (arising instead from groundless opinion).

Austin re-labels the three categories as natural (natural and necessary), extravagant (natural, unnecessary) and corrosive (neither natural nor necessary) desires. She uses this terminology throughout the book. I believe this technique of paraphrasing works well, and is a great way for Kyriai Doxai to adapt and become native to our modern, English language discourse.

Reading and Writing Epicurus

Austin argues that in addition to studying the Epicurean sources, the student should also write his own epitomes and essays of Epicurean philosophy, rehashing and expressing Epicurean ideas in her own vernacular. This is one way of practicing Vatican Saying 41, which instructs us to “utter out loud” the words of true philosophy, rather than merely be a passive recipient of them.

In my experience, gathering our thoughts after we have spent time becoming experts in some aspect of EP by writing down what we’ve learned, as if this was our final homework, is one of the best ways to demonstrate that we have assimilated what we are learning, and also a great way of potentially benefiting our Epicurean friends. When we articulate what we have learned, we have proof of profiting from our didactic process.

Therefore, this practice of reading and writing about Epicurus and his teachings is a great auto-didactic method. It was used in the days of the founders, who encouraged their pupils to keep outlines and summaries of the teachings. Much later, in Roman times, the Epicurean Guide Philodemus of Gadara instructed his own students to keep an outline of the doctrines on wealth. This demonstrates that the reading-and-writing method has been used to help students become experts in both the general points of the philosophy, and in the specific aspects.

Meleta on Friendship

I found the following quote thought-provoking. It adds practical observations to our meleta on PD 27, on the importance of friendship, that are helpful in our choices and rejections. Perhaps some of my readers can add their own criteria to this list.

Using Epicurean standards, we might locate beneficial friendships and weed out harmful relationships along the following lines:

  • If someone makes us insecure bout our intellect, taste, status, or attractiveness, jump ship.
  • If someone abandons us or others in crisis, they cannot be trusted.
  • If we do not like who we become around someone (e.g., we become petty, mean, judgmental, gossipy, or status-conscious), the relationship does not benefit us.

Our friends should not measure us by the metrics of corrosive desires, give us the sense they will abandon us when we become inconvenient, or bring out the worst in us.

Conclusion

Overall, this book is a great new addition to the modern study of Epicurus, and makes a great gift to a friend that we wish to introduce to the practice of Epicurean philosophy.

Further Reading:
Living for Pleasure: an Epicurean guide to life, by Emily A Austin

Liber Tertivs: On the Nature of the Soul

Eikas cheers to all! We recently became aware of the book Epicurean Philosophy: An introduction from the “Garden of Athens”, edited / written by Christos Yapijakis, Panagiotis Panagiotopoulos, and others from the Epicurean Gardens in Greece.

The book Epicurus and His Influence on History, by Ben Gazur is available for pre-order. He has, in the past, written the essays An Epicurean Cure and Why Epicurus Matters Today.

This month, Revista Horizonte’s YouTube channel published the lecture “Perspectiva política de la filosofía epicúrea” by Estiven Valencia Marín. This is in Spanish, and the facilitator argues that Epicurean philosophy does not strictly forbid political engagement.

In Mahsa Amini: the new Iphianassa, we discussed that Lucretius opens his poem De rerum natura by giving various reasons for writing the poem, among them the perceived need for a new social contract that was not oppressive because of the corruption of religion. Near the opening, he also mentions that death and the nature of the soul are serious enough threats to human happiness, that they too were reasons for writing his poem.

For what the soul may be they do not know,
Whether ’tis born, or enter in at birth,
And whether, snatched by death, it die with us,
Or visit the shadows …
– Lucretius, De rerum natura, Liber Primus

Ergo, clarifying the nature of the soul is one of the intended purposes of De rerum natura. In the third of the six books, after summarizing Books 1 and 2 (verses 31-33), Lucretius introduces Liber Tertivm, the entirety of which (like Philodemus of Gadara’s wonderful scroll “Peri Thanatos” / “On Death”) contains meleta on Principal Doctrine 2, and which deals with both death and the nature of the soul. In fact, there are some parallels with the Philodeman scroll, and around verse 884 we see Lucretian criticism of being angry that one has to die and of worrying about various ways of dying, which is reminiscent of Peri Thanatos. The reason why he chose this particular subject (as per verses 36-93) is that he says that fear of hell and death lead to degrading or fear-based forms of religion, zeal (fanaticism), evil, greed, murder, and the quest for fame and of other vain and empty desires.

In verse 55, Lucretius says that when men are in doubt or in anger, we get to see what they’re made of, because they tend to use “the mask” of religious zeal. This is a profoundly insightful commentary on the nature of religiosity, and applies a Philodeman logic–where we diagnose some neurosis or what he calls “disease of the soul” based on signs.

Will hate of living and beholding light
Take hold on humankind that they inflict
Their own destruction with a gloomy heart-
Forgetful that this fear is font of cares,
This fear the plague upon their sense of shame,
And this that breaks the ties of comradry
And oversets all reverence and faith …

For just as children tremble and fear all
In the viewless dark, so even we at times
Dread in the light so many things that be
No whit more fearsome than what children feign,
Shuddering, will be upon them in the dark.
This terror, then, this darkness of the mind,
Not sunrise with its flaring spokes of light,
Nor glittering arrows of morning sun disperse,
But only nature’s aspect and her law.

Defining the Natural Soul

Further Reading: The Concrete Self
Lucretius Book 3 – Death of the Soul, and Other Good Things

Epicurus instructs at the opening of his Epistle to Herotodus, that we must first define the object of our investigation, before we begin any discourse. We generally think of the natural soul as the condition of the living flesh that gives us life and sentience. As Epicureans, we are unconcerned with any supernatural or Platonic conception of the soul. Instead, we speak of the nature of the soul, even of the health of the soul, in wholly physical terms. Lucretius defined the soul as part of the body, and connects it with the head or the intellect from where the organism governs itself.

The mind (animus / sometimes translated as soul) which oft we call the intellect (mentem), wherein is seated life’s counsel and regimen, is part no less of man than hand and foot and eyes are parts of one whole breathing creature. – Liber Tertivs, 94-95

In Liber Tertivs, Lucretius is expounding the same theories that Epicurus expounds in his Letter to Herodotus (portions 63-68), and in more detail. To be clear, the soul is physical. Lucretius explains that the soul is mortal (416, 603-614) and that it gets sick and ages with the body (445-491), that wine gets the soul drunk, and that the soul’s diseases can be treated with medicine (510-525). We also learn that the soul has no weight (230), that the five senses are among the soul’s faculties (624-633), and that the first atomists imagined that the atoms of the soul were particularly subtle or tiny because neural activity happens so fast (177-205), and in this he uses the analogy of how water moves faster than honey because it’s less dense.

Must we not grant that mind and soul consist of a corporeal nature? – 167

The Head, the Chest, and the Belly

Mind and soul (animum atque animam), I say, are held conjoined one with other, and form one single nature of themselves; but chief (caput) and regnant through the frame entire is still that counsel which we call the mind, and that cleaves seated in the midmost breast.

“Caput” means “head”, and indicates that the soul is the head of the body. He may have been working with, and translating from, the Greek word “psyche” in his sources.

Lucretius argues (147-160, and again in 395-415) that the mind is stronger than the flesh. This idea of the soul as the head of the body echoes the logic of Principal Doctrine 20, which we also find in the Wall Inscription of Oenoanda.

Emotions in antiquity were associated with the chest, so it’s not surprising that the ancient Epicureans believed the soul was partially in the chest. This is likely based on the process of “reasoning by signs”, and the observation that strong emotions increase the heart rate and that the heart stops beating at the moment of death. In reality, as Lucretius explains elsewhere, the soul or animating power is found embedded throughout the entire bodily frame.

The focus on the chest as seat of the natural soul might be part of the Epicureans’ insistence that man is more than a rational animal, that he has irrational faculties that are just as important as reason. Lucretius mentions some of these non-rational feelings and faculties of the soul (joy, terror, dismay, etc.)

There are many instinctive psychological processes that happen in the belly, and we know that many of the so-called “happiness hormones” are synthesized in the belly as well. Some yoga instructors teach focused exercises for what they call the “solar plexus”. Some (like Osho)–in a manner that may remind some of Metrodorus’ arguments with his brother–insist that we must “befriend the belly”. Current research shows that the belly has enough neurons to constitute a “second brain”

I do not wish to digress much into Taoism, but I wish to accentuate that one of its founders–Yang Chu, who was hugely influential among the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove and many other later thinkers–based his entire philosophy on the body as our ultimate ontology. He is the author of several chapters of the second most important classic in Taoism, the Zhuang Tzu. The lack of a Platonic split between body and soul in Taoism has produced a vibrant philosophy that expresses itself in bodily practices related to preventive health, movement, and martial arts, with no boundary whatsoever between the so-called spiritual world and the body.

In Taoist martial arts and meditative practices, the belly is the focus of attention and breath-work, and considered an important means of grounding an stabilizing oneself. The belly, together with certain dietary practices, are important in other cultures’ regimens of self-care.

Treatments for Fear of Death

The main utility of studying the nature of the physical soul is to produce a theory and practice that works, and that can provide treatments for fear of death. These treatments, for the Epicureans, usually focus on arguments, repetition, placing before the eyes, and other similar techniques.

One such argument from Liber Tertivs (verse 904) consists of comparing death to being asleep. Another one is the symmetry argument, which compares the time after death with the time before birth of which we remember nothing, and so there is nothing to fear.

Other arguments are less therapeutic, and more about giving a more complete account of the nature of death in the context of our inter-existence with the other bodies that make up the cosmos. For instance, Lucretius says (in 970) that one thing grows from another, and since all bodies need the particles of other bodies in order to subsist, therefore we must accept that life is a loan.

Lucretian Reassessment of Myths

A naturalist redefinition of the soul and of death has the domino effect of dismantling much of the vulgar mythology that our ancestors have built around them. Lucretius argues that hell is on Earth, that Tartarus is not a place under the ground but represents fear of the gods and of fate, that Tityus is about the dangers of quick care and vague desire, and that the Sisyphus myth (which we discuss below) is about the tendency to seek power even if it does not add pleasure, which feels as if we were pushing a boulder up a hill.

The bottom line is that there is NO other world or afterlife, and that the only relevance of these myths is found in this world.

The Jar Parable

Although the Punctured Jar parable is treated in Liber Sextvs, in the third book we see that the imagery of the jar is an ongoing theme in Lucretius. Here, the body is compared to a jar that cracks open at the time of death and releases its vitality (verses 434-444). Around verse 793 we read that the mind requires the body as a “vessel”, again refuting the idea that a soul may exist without a host body. That the mind needs the body as a vessel is again mentioned around verse 555:

And just as hand, or eye, or nose, apart,
Severed from us, can neither feel nor be,
But in the least of time is left to rot,
Thus mind alone can never be, without
The body and the man himself, which seems,
As ’twere the vessel of the same- or aught
Whate’er thou’lt feign as yet more closely joined:
Since body cleaves to mind by surest bonds.

It seems like the punctured jar parable was part of a long string of meditations and parables on the physical nature of the soul, which in Liber Sextvs culminates in a salvific teaching.

Around verse 1000, while discussing the myth of Sisyphus, Lucretius makes another reference to the idea of the soul as a jar when he compared Sisyphus’ pushing a stone uphill to the behavior of someone who “feeds forever a thankless heart with good things yet never fills it”.

Here in this life also a Sisyphus
In him who seeketh of the populace
The rods, the axes fell, and evermore
Retires a beaten and a gloomy man.
For to seek after power- an empty name,
Nor given at all- and ever in the search
To endure a world of toil, O this it is
To shove with shoulder up the hill a stone
Which yet comes rolling back from off the top,
And headlong makes for levels of the plain.
Then to be always feeding an ingrate mind,
Filling with good things, satisfying never-
As do the seasons of the year for us,
When they return and bring their progenies
And varied charms, and we are never filled
With the fruits of life- O this, I fancy, ’tis
To pour, like those young virgins in the tale,
Waters into a sieve, unfilled forever.

In the jar metaphor, Lucretius is using poetic imagery as an expedient means to instruct us on the nature of the soul and its need for philosophy, while still employing poetry, parables, and myths. He does not dismiss these cultural devices, but employs them according to the study of nature. In doing this, Lucretius helps to construct a new spirituality, one that is fully physical and consistent with the scientific worldview and with the study of nature, but yet does not reject storytelling, poetry, imagery, parables, etc. In other words, he’s continuing Epicurus’ project of elaborating a complete worldview and cosmology–from the elemental particles all the way to the innumerable worlds–that yet satisfies and cares for the soul and all of its existential needs.

Further Reading:

The Concrete Self

The Punctured Jar Parable

Happy Twentieth! Nietzsche and Kyria Doxa Deka-Tessera

Happy Holidays and Happy Twentieth! Daily Philosophy recently published Epicurus: a Guide to the Principal Doctrines, which is different from another KD Study Guide recently published by Philosophy Break and our own Kyriai Doxai Study Guide.

In solitude there groweth what any one bringeth into it–also the brute in one’s nature. Thus is solitude inadvisable unto many. – Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, Fourth Book, 73

Kyria Doxa Deka-Tessera

The positive value of fruitful solitude (which the recent pandemic enforced upon many of us), of individuality, and the accompanying challenge of thinking for ourselves and by ourselves have been on my mind recently, as I have been focusing on the study and praxis of Kyria Doxa Deka-Tessera (PD 14), which says:

Although some measure of safety from other people is based in the power to fight them off and in abundant wealth, the purest security comes from solitude and breaking away from the herd.

τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένης μέχρι τινὸς δυνάμει τε ἐξερειστικῇ καὶ εὐπορίᾳ, εἰλικρινεστάτη γίνεται ἡ ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν ἀσφάλεια.

Principal Doctrine 14

The word translated as solitude (sometimes as quietude) is ἡσυχίας (hesuchias), which is the same word used today for the tradition of the Greek Orthodox Christian monks. However, Epicurus’ earlier form of hesuchía belongs to the laughing philosophers. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, too, follows a tradition of laughing hermits. The word translated as “breaking away from the herd” is ἐκχωρήσεως (exchoriseos or exiting the chorus, literally).

I can think of at least two ways of practicing this Doxa, based on these words. If we can’t parrot whatever everyone else is saying blindly, then one option is to find our own voice. It will never be 100 % unique to us (because all communication originated in socializing processes), but insofar as it’s authentic, I think it fulfills the exchoriseos part.

If we can’t parrot what everyone else is saying, we can also stay silent. Therefore, a second way to practice this is via what the Taoist sages would call silent mastery. Silence does not have to be passive: it can be an act of power and health, just as speech is. It can be vitality that does not have to overflow to others, or the contented knowing that does not require external consent. In many wisdom traditions (Taoism, Yoruba, the Havamal) elders have observed that those who run their mouths tend to be ignorant, while the wise tend to choose their words carefully and are sparse with words. Philodemus addresses in Rhetorica some of the ways in which silence can be a philosophical practice.

Someone could argue that silence, solitude, and quietude can happen in the midst of society. That is possible. I think that this Doxa instills the value and the dignity of independent thinking, of privacy of thoughts (which I think must accompany freedom of thought, and without which freedom of thought would be meaningless), and of autarchy.

A more fruitful meleta on this Doxa might arise if we go down the rabbit hole of asking the following thought-provoking conversation-starter: “How do I set up the criteria to decide the means, the methods, and the techniques by which I will think for myself, and by myself?” (Nietzsche does much “philosophizing with his hammer” on this). In this way, the Doxa acquires the power to inform the choices and rejections by which we manage our inner life, and its insights become stronger. We may choose to think logically, or empirically, or practically … or playfully. Any of these ways of thinking for ourselves and by ourselves might pass hedonic calculus and be an outlet for the expression of our personal sovereignty–because this Doxa is, ultimately, an initiation into a PRACTICE of self-rule, of autarchy.

Of course, thinking for and by ourselves does not mean we know it all: we sometimes find it prudent to yield to the opinion of experts in certain fields. So we must also prudently discern even the limits of our self-reliance.

Free FOR What?

In Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche frequently refers to the lonesome ones, the seceding ones, and makes other references that remind me of Kyria Doxa Deka-Tessera / Epicurus’ Principal Doctrine 14.

TSZ is an encyclopedic volume, so I will focus only on chapter 17 of the work, which is titled “The Way of the Creating One” (the full work is here). The title and content of the chapter makes me think that to be free, the philosopher must be an artist. He must have creative resources, and if he does not cultivate creativity, he will not be practicing freedom but acting out patterns and programs born in the heads of others. And he will never be able to give a full and honest account of those others’ psychological profiles, histories, agendas, etc. Here, Nietzsche is philosophizing with his hammer!

Free, dost thou call thyself? Thy ruling thought would I hear of, and not that thou hast escaped from a yoke.

Art thou one ENTITLED to escape from a yoke? Many a one hath cast away his final worth when he hath cast away his servitude.

Free from what? What doth that matter to Zarathustra! Clearly, however, shall thine eye show unto me: free FOR WHAT?

Canst thou give unto thyself thy bad and thy good, and set up thy will as a law over thee? Canst thou be judge for thyself, and avenger of thy law?

Here, Nietzsche is teaching an active nihilism, and rejecting a passive one. I love this passage because setting up their will as a law (social contract) over themselves is exactly what Epicurus and his companions did when they authored, edited, and established the Principal Doctrines as authoritative for their circle of friends. In this way, the Kathegemones are a case study for this. Nietzsche later in this chapter goes on to warn the lonesome ones who have chosen to “exit the chorus” and to stop parroting the “manufacture of consent” pushed by the herd. He says:

And be on thy guard against the good and just! They would fain crucify those who devise their own virtue–they hate the lonesome ones.

Be on thy guard, also, against holy simplicity! All is unholy to it that is not simple; fain, likewise, would it play with the fire–of the fagot and stake.

I will not delve into the many other instances where Nietzsche speaks to the lonesome ones. I invite you, my readers, to get on his magic carpet by reading his works on your own, if you are inclined to visit the mountains of Zarathustra to gather this wisdom. It’s enough for my readers to accept the challenges of PD 14 and of TSZ 17, and practice with these insights for long enough and with a sustained enough effort to begin to see the inner revolution these words mean to incite in our souls.

If you seek yet another role model for learning to think and speak for yourself, for originality and creativity, consider Lucretius (this is from De rerum natura, Liber Qvartvs):

None before have walked where I walk.
I love to find new founts and drink;
I love to gether fresh new flowers
and seek the laureate’s crown whence Muses
never ere now have veiled the brow of any man …

Conclusion

Many moons ago, I had the delight of reading AC Grayling’s Good Book: a Humanist Bible, and wrote various book reviews and memes (like the Sheeple Meme) based on it. Having grown up Catholic, I have always enjoyed the idea of non-theistic literature that fulfills the role of scripture–not in the sense of being infallible, or inspired and aesthetically-pleasing literature, but in the sense of being a matrix of traditions, and a compilation of philosophical wisdom. Philodemus (when discussing the Pragmateia) added that true philosophical literature must help us to “walk forward in sweetness”. De rerum natura, and the Kyriai Doxai, have come to fill that role. But they’re not the only philosophical writings that I derive pleasure from.

Thus Spake Zarathustra reads like a Bible or other scripture, has almost the same number of chapters (80) as another non-theistic scripture, the Tao Te Ching (81 chapters), but its ardor, zeal, and passion make it feel more like a life-affirming atheistic Bible that vehemently rejects otherworldly beliefs. Like the Gospel or the Lotus Sutra, it has parables that have the power to shake the foundations of what we think we believe.

While TSZ is not perfect, and neither is Nietzsche, it can sometimes provide thought-provoking conversation-starters for our meleta, and its ideas can have strong synergy with some of the ideas in Lucretius and in the Doxai.

Further Reading:

SoFE’s Kyriai Doxai Study Guide

Friedrich Nietzsche – Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None (Entire Book Online)

Why Passivity Breeds Mediocrity and Mental Illness  (or, “Free For What?”)

Mahsa Amini: the new Iphianassa

Eikas cheers to everyone! An Eikas program given many moons ago on Epicurus’ Sermon On Moral Development is live on our YouTube channel. Please enjoy, comment, and share. Also, I wish to thank Anthony, Caleb, Thomas, Tom, Ron, Steve & Carmel for their continued Patreon support, which encourages me to keep creating content.

Simon Knutsson has published A defense of ataraxia: Undisturbedness as the hedonic ceiling. George Washington University published Are the modern Stoics really Epicurean?

The following essay is dedicated to the memory of Mahsa Amini, and is written in solidarity with the Iranian people, and in particular with Iranian women’s struggle for secular values and for the attainment of non-religious law and order.

I fear perhaps thou deemest that we fare
An impious road to realms of thought profane;
But ’tis that same religion oftener far
Hath bred the foul impieties of men:
As once at Aulis, the elected chiefs,
Foremost of heroes, Danaan counsellors,
Defiled Diana’s altar, virgin queen,
With Agamemnon’s daughter, foully slain.
She felt the chaplet round her maiden locks
And fillets, fluttering down on either cheek,
And at the altar marked her grieving sire,
The priests beside him who concealed the knife,
And all the folk in tears at sight of her.
With a dumb terror and a sinking knee
She dropped; nor might avail her now that first
‘Twas she who gave the king a father’s name.
They raised her up, they bore the trembling girl
On to the altar- hither led not now
With solemn rites and hymeneal choir,
But sinless woman, sinfully foredone,
A parent felled her on her bridal day,
Making his child a sacrificial beast
To give the ships auspicious winds for Troy:
Such are the crimes to which Religion leads.
Lucretius, De rerum natura, 1.80-101

The human sacrifice of an innocent girl by her father to the Goddess Diana is cited by Lucretius, from the onset of his poem, as an example of why we need philosophy. To those of us who grew up under the yolk of Abrahamic religiosity, the sacrifice of Jephthah’s daughter in Judges 11 is a Biblical equivalent. But murderous religion is still a problem today: hildren are killed or burnt after being accused of witchcraft by Christian animists in Africa, and the Iranian regime is known for killing young girls and protestors. One could even argue that a comparable compulsion to offer youth and vitality in the altar of reactionary, conservative religious and political ideology is the Russian Orthodox patriarch’s promise to wipe out the debt of all sins for young men who fight in Putin’s “holy” war.

Lucretius mentions Iphianassa in the opening portions of his poem, shortly after praying to Venus for “peace in the land”, as a way to justify his call for a non-superstitious social contract, one that is not tainted by the terrors of religion. Similarly, a Kurdish woman that was murdered by the Islamic regime is being used by Iranians as a symbol of their resistance, and her death seems to have marked the beginning of the end for the Islamic Republic of Iran.

A Kurdish Iphianassa

Mahsa Amini–an innocent 22-year old woman who was beat and executed by the “morality police” in Iran back in September for not covering her hair properly–has by now become an icon of the ongoing Iranian revolution, which registers the post-Muslim secularism that exists among the youth. Due to the totalitarian nature of the current regime and its disinformation campaigns, it’s impossible to know with certainty how many people still identify as Muslim in today’s Iran, but according to this source, less than a third of all Iranians consider themselves adherents to the official Shia doctrine of the state, while

22.2% identified as non-religious; 8.8% identified themselves as atheist; 7.1% as spiritual and 7.7% as Zoroastrian

A new generation ripens, surrounded by dangers, but made fierce by its struggles. Their slogan is “Jin Jiyan Azadi” (Woman, Life, Freedom). It represents a life-affirming doctrine by which people hope to rid themselves of the current official ideology. This new doctrine is born from the Kurdish independence movement and from the recent struggles against ISIS.

In adopting this slogan, part of what the nationalists are saying is that it’s not worth fighting for independence if they’re going to fall into Islamic totalitarianism, like their neighboring countries. After fighting the Islamic State, they know that a land of endless religious oppression would not be worth fighting and dying for. This is why they feel the need to articulate a new, secular, democratic social contract that includes women’s rights that are unacceptable for ultra-conservative Muslims. 

Ocalan and the New Kurdish Social Contract

One of the masterminds of the “Woman. Life. Liberty.” slogan is (Kurdish-Turkish political prisoner) Abdullah Ocalan–an anti-capitalist, anti-patriarchal proponent of federal democracy and of a local brand of feminism known as jineology–which translates into women’s wisdom, or women’s science. 

The female gender is a central theme in both Ocalan and in Lucretius. By placing women at the heart of the revolution and of the social contract, Ocalan made a similar plea as Lucretius in The Opening of DRN: they wanted a type of new peace in the land that made freedom for women (from religious oppression) non-negotiable. Both call for a social contract that is rid of religious errors and terrors.

We may or may not agree with Ocalan’s anti-capitalism, but there is a certain tactical validity to this ism. The people of Kurdistan have already voted for independence from Iraq, and are in the process of building a nation. This requires healthy cooperative and grassroots networks. They need values that unify them, and the ability to form federations is essential to help them overcome tribalism. In a way, Ocalan and his partisans are successfully creating a similar intertribal peace to the one that Muhammad had achieved in Medina, but in the name of a secular worldview adjusted to his particular historical and social reality. Conservative politics in the Middle East are almost always informed by religious fascism, so a unifying secular ideology must almost inevitably originate on the left.

As if echoing Lucretius’ argument that only Venus is able to tame the belligerent “Mars” energies in the land, Ocalan says that only FREE and educated women can tame the belligerent energies that threaten Kurdistan (from ISIS, as well as from Islam, Syria and Turkey). Let us remember how valiantly Kurdish women fought ISIS when demented men of God from all over the world gathered in Syria to enslave and rape women and girls, and to massacre anyone who was not aligned with their radical, violent form of Islamist ideology. 

Women. Life. Freedom. is a call to arms against theocracy in the Middle East, and a useful case-study that helps us to place before the eyes many thought-provoking aspects of the Epicurean doctrines concerning natural justice and the social contract. By placing liberty and women at the forefront as non-negotiable, the resistance posits a new social contract that cannot be reconciled with the Islamist theocratic one or with shari’a law. They are both mutually exclusive to each other.

With the clear intention of unifying people in order to reverse the spread of Islamist theocracy in the region after ISIS, Ocalan created a new grassroots feminism in the heart of the Middle East: an indigenous, secular doctrine of Liberty, one that calls for a new social contract that does not impose Islam, or religion, on people. This the first modern, native, Middle Eastern humanist philosophical, cultural, and social movement that wishes unequivocally to eradicate Islamic theocracy and enshrine liberty on its constitution and way of life, as far as I know, without blindly copying Western models of secular values. This indigenousness is important in a region where such great distrust of foreign ideologies prevails, and also in light of the fact that most pundits believe that Kurdistan will most likely become a new independent country in the coming decades

The slogan of the French Republic (“Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité”), and some of the foundational slogans of the American Republic (“Life, Liberty and Pursuit of Happiness”) are still fashionable statements of the values of our countries. Will the slogan of the new Republic of Kurdistan and of the hoped-for future secular, democratic Republic of Iran last 200+ years in a region surrounded by religious authoritarianism?

Women Warriors and the Channeling of Martial Energy

Natural justice is an expression of utility, to prevent one person from harming or being harmed by another. – Principal Doctrine 31

Not everyone will be harmless to the women and men of Iran and Kurdistan if they adopt a secular constitution. Principal Doctrine 39 reminds us that there will always be people who fit within our social contract, and others who do not. This is why virtually all societies tend to enforce conformity to their social contract, and must defend it from hostile forces. Hence, the women warriors of Kurdistan.

Notice that the Opening of DRN does not call for the censorship or the emasculation of Mars, of manhood, or of aggression; rather, it advises a pleasant outlet for Mars’ aggression, even as it recognizes its dangers. Aggression, when channeled correctly, is made pleasant or made to serve a pleasant existence. We can think of certain physical exercises, sports, or sex as healthy outlets for aggression.

In Iranian and Kurdish societies, we see that aggression is being used in self-defense by the defenders of secular values. Let us remember that this is the generation that had to fight ISIS and see with its own eyes the terrors of religion, and of tribalism. Woman, Life, Freedom is the ripened fruit of moral development gained in Kurdistan from having to confront the reality of what the Islamic state was and did. Kurds’ sense of peoplehood helped them to repel ISIS. As a result, public disgust at the Islamic State became part of the collective psyche and memory of Kurds, and rectifying the crucifixions, beheadings, human trafficking and rape of the Islamic State is a matter of self-respect and dignity for Kurds.

ISIS showed them the urgency to diminish the forces of Mars / belligerence in the land mentioned in the Opening of De Rerum natura. This, and Ocalan’s insistence that women must be in leadership positions in their new social contract, also reminds us of the Venus over Mars theme.

Another way to interpret or consider the Venus-Jinology connection is based on the fact that religious social contracts tend to be anti-woman. Perhaps we can also consider it in terms of how a “matriarchal” instinct may emerge in some societies as a refuge from or a counter-balance to violent patriarchal excesses.

Finally, let us concede here that what Lucretius depicts in poetic, archetypal form, expresses itself in history as a revolution brewing before our eyes which requires many sacrifices. It’s not a theory or contemplation, but a brutal struggle. Our comparison of women’s struggle with Lucretian philosophy, while insightful, cannot do it full justice.

The Burning of the Hijab

An ateshgah, or fire shrine.

The Mahsa Amini protests were inaugurated with ecstatic images of women dancing around bonfires, some of them like Sufi swirling dervishes, and burning their hijabs.

The Zoroastrian connection here is very easy to miss by most Westerners. Zoroaster was a laughing philosopher, and dancing is forbidden in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although the right to happiness has not made it into their slogans, it is clear that this is part of what Iranian women and youth are yearning for.

Fire is sacred to Zoroastrians and ancient Iranians. It’s a symbol of the Zoroastrian God, and the main ceremonial technology tied to Zoroastrianism. Furthermore, Zoroastrians have suffered near-genocide and are on the verge of extinction in the land of their birth as a result of the centuries of violent Islamization of Iran.

Therefore, when dancing women burn the hijab–a symbol of Islamic oppression–at the altar of their ancestral, pre-Islamic God, this is not just a protest. This is a ritual. They are returning to their pre-Islamic spiritual and philosophical roots, and conjuring ancestral powers and ideas to come to their aid at this junction in history.

In Solidarity

If Iran is ever able to overcome Islamic theocratic totalitarianism and become a secular democracy, this will greatly increase my optimism about humanity. Even more so if Kurdistan becomes a new, sovereign, democratic state. This would mean that there would be two new non-theocratic countries with kindred humanist values at the heart of the Middle East, spreading and defending secular ideas. I hope they succeed, and win for themselves a life that is free and happy.

Eikas and Ancestor Reverence

Eikas cheers to everyone! Last Sunday, October 16th we had our first live-libation Eikas in Chicago. For years, the Society of Friends of Epicurus has hosted a virtual Eikas program, and this month was no different, except that I had the pleasure of being visited by Alan / Harmonious–one of our most active members, who many moons ago performed Lumen Inlustrans inspired by De rerum natura and whose most recent Eikas presentation was on Epicurean guidance of the soul. We enjoyed the virtual program, as well as lentil soup, cheese, crackers, salami, and wine.

In addition to the Eikas experience, the previous day we had a delightful Ethiopian restaurant experience and visited the beautiful grounds of the Bahá’í temple just north of Chicago. Although we have no affinity with the religion, the temple itself is an architectural marvel (there’s only one temple of its kind per continent) and the Gardens were lovely, and there we recorded In the Garden: An Interview with Hiram Crespo. It was a perfectly sunny day with no clouds, as you can tell from how shiny my bald-head was during the interview!

Since the Principal Doctrines enjoy ease of reference and are authoritative, they act as a type of social contract among us, and are a source of ongoing study, practice, and discussion. This month, Philosophy Break published Epicurus’s Principal Doctrines: 40 Aphorisms for Living Well. It continues Erik Anderson’s meleta about the Kyriai Doxai, which he organized into an eight-fold path based on the narrative he perceived in them. Anderson was the curator of a couple of webpages, including the Epicurean wiki. I had the pleasure of exchanging a few emails with him before he passed away a few years back. I’m thrilled to see this type of invitation and guide to study the Doxai with the aid of a recent philosophical ancestor like Anderson. It’s an invitation to profit from his wisdom, long after he’s gone. It honors his memory, and his original intention, since he clearly wanted others to benefit from his organized way of doing meleta.

Young was I once, I walked alone,
and bewildered seemed in the way;
then I found me another and rich I thought me,
for man is the joy of man.

– Havamal, Stanza 47

Eikas and Epicurean Collective Memory

Every month on the weekend closest to the Twentieth, we celebrate Eikas. We offer a libation to the memory of our Hegemon, Epicurus of Samos, and another one to the memory of the first Epicurean Guide (Kathegemon), Metrodorus of Lampsacus. We then proceed to an educational program, where we continue the friendly conversations of Epicurus, Metrodorus, and their companions.

The tradition of Eikas predates Epicurus’ Final Will and Testament, where he mentioned “the rules now in force” concerning how to celebrate it. This means that the Hegemon and his friends started the tradition in memory of Metrodorus (who died first), and these traditions were likely influenced by the practices and values that were instilled on Epicurus by his mother (Chaerestrate), who had a keen interest in Greek folk healing and shamanism–which involved familial piety and ancestor reverence. Epicurus also honored the memory of his family members and his dear friend Polyaenus.

Two hundred years later, during the time of Philodemus of Gadara, we read in his scroll “On Piety” about Eikas as a sacrificial meal, and as a Festival of the Sacred Table. This makes me imagine that Eikas probably felt like a communion meal in the first century BCE. Today, Eikas is (usually) a virtual event that furnishes a chance for “meleta with others of like mind“, and it’s part of our toolkit for community-building.

Since October is a month that our culture dedicates to remembering our dead, in this essay, I’d like to evaluate some memorial aspects of the Eikas tradition in order to help us attain a deeper grounding on the theory and practice of Eikas. In my view, Eikas is the most essential Epicurean ceremony and the key to stabilizing and securing the continuity of our tradition, since we have observed that good Epicurean friends become a steady and helpful presence in each other’s lives through loyalty to the Eikas tradition.

Filial Piety Versus Blind Obedience

While there exists always some danger of excessive conservatism in ancestral reverence traditions, there are also benefits in the rootedness and grounding they offer.

Respect, love, and filial piety is not the same as tyranny of the old over the young, and does not imply blind obedience to elders. The Xiao Jing–the Chinese classic on filial piety, mentions that there should be “no ill will between superiors and inferiors“, and teaches: “Do not disgrace those who gave you birth“. Yet here, we find an embrace of tradition and strong social bonds, together with a rejection of blind obedience and the instruction to practice a form of parrhesia for the benefit of one’s elders described as “remonstrance” (defined as “a forcefully reproachful protest”):

Hence, since remonstrance is required in the case of unrighteous conduct, how can (simple) obedience to the orders of a father be accounted filial piety? – Xiao Jing

Epicurus’ Piety

The biographer Diogenes Laertius, in portion 10 of Book Ten of his “Lives of Eminent Philosophers“, cites Epicurus’ own character and filial piety (in the form of gratitude) towards Chaerestrate and Neocles:

… his gratitude to his parents, his generosity to his brothers, his gentleness to his servants … and in general, his benevolence to all mankind. His piety towards the gods and his affection for his country no words can describe.

Piety as a Technique

We can easily imagine how ancestral reverence traditions provide education, structure, and discipline to children and young people, and help to form their character, and also how “making our ancestors proud” may serve as an incentive for personal development, both in terms of our moral character and in terms of our achievements.

Since bodies of ancestors dissipate after death, they are not believed to intervene, therefore the theory behind Epicurean piety is not based on intervention from the spirit world. Filial piety techniques are meant to benefit the practitioners, not to reach the ancestral spirits.

The honor paid to a wise man is itself a great good for those who honor him. – Vatican Saying 32

The techniques of filial piety are much more efficient in forming the character if carried out with attention. In the Analects, Confucius argued that people should perform the sacrifices as if the ancestors were really there in the shrine, and similarly the ancient Epicureans used to say: “act as if Epicurus were watching“.

The object of piety should be someone worthy and wholesome, someone who was a helpful and loving presence in our lives. If their influence was degrading, piety is not due. In cases such as these, many ancestor reverence traditions incorporate therapeutic methods to help people work through these familial wounds.

The Libation as an Expression of Greek Piety

Having established the theoretical framework to consider Eikas in terms of filial piety, we’re also faced with the fact that Epicurean doctrines are at odds with much of what is traditionally associated with ancestor cults.

Philodemus, in his scroll Peri Thanatos (On Death), criticizes those who worry about whether a corpse was properly buried, and argued that it makes no distinction if one is unconscious in the water or under the ground. Ancient Greek tradition insisted that the dead had to be properly buried, but the Epicureans instead focused on the quality of the life lived, rather than the dignity of the corpse.

Ancestor reverence in Greece was tied to the Eleusinian mysteries and other mystery traditions and chthonic cults, where libations were poured for the dead in a consecrated pit dug into the ground. This is because the mysteries focused on nature deities, and the dead were believed to dwell underground. The members of the ancient Garden may or may not have strictly followed their culture’s filial piety traditions in this regard (perhaps they had an ancestral libation pit in their backyard, or perhaps not). Libations were offered using a phiale or patera (a consecrated ceramic or metal libation plate), and included milk, honey, wine and water.

After wine was poured from the phiale, the remainder of the oinochoē’s (wine jug) contents was drunk by the celebrant.

Since the social contract is a key concept in the Principal Doctrines of Epicurus, we must also consider the role of libations in sealing pacts. Libations were used for marking the act of entering into a covenant or social contract, or as a sign that one is fulfilling a pact previously made.

The Greek verb spéndō (σπένδω), “pour a libation”, also “conclude a pact” … spondaí marked the conclusion of hostilities, and is often thus used in the sense of “armistice, treaty.”

Nietzsche’s “New Fountains”

Attempts to create modern models of Epicurean community and practice remind me of a passage from Nietzsche’s Zarathustra where he discusses the reemergence of ancient ideas in “the fountains of the future”. He mentions that, after the death of God, new peoples would emerge.

He who hath grown wise concerning old origins, lo, he will at last seek after the fountains of the future and new origins.—O my brethren, not long will it be until new peoples shall arise and new fountains shall rush down into new depths. For the earthquake—it choketh up many wells, it causeth much languishing: but it bringeth also to light inner powers and secrets. The earthquake discloseth new fountains. In the earthquake of old peoples new fountains burst forth.

Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, Third Part, LVI. Old and New Tables, 25

I love this passage because our generation is seeing the emergence of many new peoples and new tribes. In addition to Epicurean communities, we are seeing Stoics, secular and religious Buddhists, every flavor of Paganism, and many other new sects and communities emerging in the post-Christian era. We can expect this trend to continue. I won’t dwell much on this so as to avoid going on a tangent, except to note that Nietzsche helps us to place the reemergence of EP within the context of the era in which we live, and that he does so with the use of poetry and art, which follows in the Lucretian tradition.

The Society of Epicurus Eikas

In our Koinonia, the libation is a mark of respect for tradition, and–for those of us who have made a formal resolution to practice Eikas–a mark of fulfillment of our word. But our virtual Eikas libation is of a secular variety, and our Libation is simply a toast in memory of Epicurus and Metrodorus, which pragmatically separates the initial period of informal introductions and conversations, from the time of discussion formally anchored in that month’s educational content.

But what is the utility of ceremony? There are several arguments. Confucian ceremoniousness is known as “Li“. According to that tradition, ceremony is used as a tool to impart harmony, stability, and order to social groups. The importance of ceremony was also accentuated by the Indianos in their Book of Community:

… That is why each community that wants to affirm its autonomy also has to face the creation of a ceremoniousness of its own … We not only need to tell the tale of what unites us, we need to represent it to feel like we are actors in the meaning of our lives.

As community we should be firm when faced with attitudes that strip away meaning, as this shows lack of self-respect.

The Taoists were not opposed to Li, but used to argue against excessive Li, since too much ceremony impedes naturalness (ziran). I believe this to be a legitimate criticism, which is why we only apply a minimal measure of ceremony at our Eikas.

A Word on Agreements and Oaths

Philodemus, in On Piety, says that Epicurus had strict rules concerning oaths (they must not be taken lightly, or in the name of trivial things). Oaths or agreements are a way to practice our Doctrines concerning justice. Organizing Eikas as a long-term tradition requires at least a small group of friends with the ability to collaborate effectively and fulfil their word. It’s considered unjust to break the agreements, except in cases where someone excuses themselves from Eikas via clear communication during a given month, with ample time for others to step in and carry the program that month.

Many human values are practiced through Eikas, in addition to the recipes or foods we may enjoy, the educational value we get, and sculptures/crafts we employ–like the traditional Double-Bust of Epicurus-Metrodorus, sometimes called a “double herm”. Eikas is a way of instilling the value of responsibility in young adults. The prolepsis of responsibility is linked to the ability to respond, to the act of answering to others for something we’re responsible for. Practicing this value produces the great advantage of having trustworthy members of a social unit. It glues communities together and helps them to accomplish concrete projects through teamwork. In any circle of responsible adults, people have a right to expect that each member will abide by their word–if we are to take our Doxai seriously.

Eikas as Medicine for Rootlessness and Nihilism

One final note comes from some of the ideas concerning recruitment of new Epicureans found in the book The Sculpted Word. This book deals with art-critique, but also with theories and practices related to our methods of passive recruitment, since Epicurus was avidly against preaching in public.

The author of the book argued that during the Hellenistic Era, when Epicurus founded the Garden, many people were rootless cosmopolitans. Perhaps this is because many Barbarians had been captured in the conflicts and wars of the age, and were therefore foreigners living among the Greeks as slaves. Slaves made up a large proportion of the population of Athens. We know that slaves were allowed to study in the Garden. We also know that there were a few hetairai (sometimes compared to prostitutes, but many of whom were probably just free, single women) who frequented the Garden, and perhaps this is because the Garden attracted many men who were single, or alone and in search of association and amusement.

Epicurean philosophy values philia (friendship): through wholesome association, people who were rootless were able to set roots in a new community and feel grounded.

This reminds me of Afro-Diasporic religions whose founding elders instituted godparent-godchild relations and “houses” (known as ilé in Cuban Santeria, or terreiro in Brazilian Candomble) in order to create new ancestral lineages and preserve African communal order and cultural traditions in Cuba, Brazil, and other American countries. This helped the African slaves to deal with the trauma of enslavement, abuse, exploitation, displacement, and rootlessness once they were in the New World. I suppose a similar sense of “adopted family” is attained when people enter a Buddhist lineage, or a Sufi lineage. Many Hispanic immigrants in the US who convert to Santeria and create new communities are also healing rootlessness this way. In the Yoruba initiation system used by Santeros, one is “adopted” into a new ancestral lineage. This enabled African cultural systems to be more fully trans-planted in the Americas. The ilé (adopted religious House) becomes the adoptive family of the initiate. If the theory described in The Sculpted Word is correct, then ancient Epicurean Koinonias (communities) and Kepos (Gardens) functioned a bit like the ilés of Afro-diasporic faiths, building new connections and growing new roots.

Blacks in Cuba had been indoctrinated into the Catholic Church, and they had no choice but to respect it, even if it was a racially white religion that supported slavery. Hence, their insistence on having a parallel African alternative religious narrative based on Yoruba spirituality. Similarly, many of us today also question the moral authority of the institutions that we grew up respecting. The creation of an alternative social contract is a model that, in addition to affirming our true and authentic values, responds to a crisis in legitimacy–in this case, we often question the the values of Christianity and of our culture’s prevailing nihilistic consumerism.

The example of Afro-diasporic faiths makes me think of Eikas as a practice of adoption of new ancestors (in this case Epicurus, Metrodorus, and perhaps other Guides like Lucretius and Philodemus) in order to nurture new roots.

Conclusion

Filial piety promotes a certain amount of conservative ethos. This is neither good nor bad in itself, but it lends a certain stability to cultural practices, identities, and institutions. It’s possible that this stability is part of what Epicurus was trying to impart via his Eikas feast: a certain measure of being grounded in the midst of a rootless, restless, nihilistic society.

By adopting Epicurus and Metrodorus as philosophical “ancestors” when we celebrate Eikas, we slowly grow new roots in the Epicurean Gardens. Eikas is one of the ways in which philosophy becomes native to a new land and to a new soul. The Eikas feast makes philosophy tangible in our time and place, and provides a concrete vessel to practice Epicurean friendship, wisdom, culture and community.

How to Eikas – PDF

On Votive Images

Video: Eikas, the Feast of the Twentieth

On Votive Images

Diogenes Laertius reports that Epicurus said that “a sage will set up votive images”, and Philodemus of Gadara–in his scroll On Piety–insisted that Epicurus was pious, citing many examples from his biography and practices, including how the house of the Hegemon was piously decorated for Eikas (the feast of the Twentieth) every month. Piety was part of his art of living (techne biou), of his technologies of the soul.

I asked others in our forum: “Why would Epicurus state this? What do you guys think of this?”, and here are some of the replies:

I’ve always understood it to be a normal part of ancient piety. – Michael

I think it’s not a whole lot different than how we put photographs of loved ones up on the mantle. A votive doesn’t have to be anything other than a reminder to ourselves (and the gods) of what’s important to us. – Jason

If it’s used as a way of focusing on people or ideas that mean a lot to the people involved, I can understand it. – Richard

I’ve seen other translations that say “he will erect statues” (of himself? His friends? The gods?) but will be “indifferent if he has any or not” … I guess a statue could be a votive image, but the passage is unclear. – Marcus

I wonder if this practice links to methods of passive recruitment as per the book The Sculpted Word. – Hiram

Possibly. Maybe also to give members a sense of identity, or maybe as placing before the eyes exercises? – Marcus

Piety itself seems to be psychologically and socially beneficial. I think I saw a quote from Nassim Nicholas Taleb once to the effect that the purpose of religious worship was to prevent one from thinking that they were a god. – Doug

Depends. In some cases, the goal may have been to approach the divine, or free the divine spark within us, as with the mystery religions. In the case of Epicurus, the goal was to “live as a god amongst men” and to “rival Zeus in happiness”. – Marcus

This discussion about the role of the gods made me think of how Epicurus ends his Epistle to Menoeceus, saying that we may live like gods among mortals, but with the condition that we must surround ourselves with immortal goods. What ARE these immortal goods (ἀθανάτοις ἀγαθοῖς) that appear in the ambience, in the environment, in the spaces occupied by someone who lives a blessed life? We know from Vatican Saying 78 that friends are among those goods, and we know (from Principal Doctrine 5) that Pleasure, Correctness, Prudence, and Justice are all necessary for a life lived pleasantly and correctly–so we must suppose these four qualities must be, somehow, tokenized, represented, or present in our environment. These votive icons may represent values or reminders of some of the immortal goods that are necessary for living a pleasant, wise, and correct life.

The Prolepsis of Numen

The rest of soul, throughout the body scattered, but obeys, moved by the nod and motion of the mind. – Liber Tertivs, 143-144

Here is the only instance of the term numen, or the numinous, in the entire work of De rerum natura. Let us consider the prolepsis of this term. The secular meaning of the word is “nod”. It is noteworthy that the numinous is used in the context of the movements of our own minds, rather than to refer to the gods or spirits, which are often the ones to receive the attributes of “the numinous” in the Latin language.

I do not believe this is accidental on the part of Lucretius, but very purposeful. I believe that Lucretius means to link the numinous to movements of the soul, the movement of assent in fact, of a nod: a yay-saying movement.

If we consider epoche–the suspension of belief proposed by Skeptics–as representing a suspension of assent, then numen (both as a nod, and more broadly as an act of yay-saying and of affirmation of some value or some authority) might have an anti-Skeptic / philosophically dogmatic connotation. The act of nodding is a bodily act of assent or affirmation (the making-firm of something), of creating, choosing, or acknowledging some value. Numen and “the numinous” are created as a motion of the mind within the body. There is nothing supernatural about the numinous in the pen of Lucretius.

If we think of the Gods poetically as non-supernatural or non-realist metaphors, we can still see how Gods may represent the values of the Enlightenment. Athena is philosophy, wisdom, prudence, and science. Hephaistos represents industry, craftiness, and inventiveness. Prometheus embodies progress, humanist values, and secularism. Hermes is the eloquent God of the market, of opportunity, communication, trade and exchange, etc. A nod to these personified principles (in the form of a votive image) might represent a recognition of their meaning and influence, and an affirmation of their values.

And so one possible utility of the votive images might involve a technique of active rejection of radical skepticism and cynicism concerning values by giving a nod to the values embodied by the chosen images.

The Prolepsis of Cvltvs

Another way to consider the importance of votive images is to think of the prolepsis of the words cultivation, culture, and cult. Lucretius (in the First Century BCE) hailed Epicurus as a savior and as a man-god in De Rervm Natvra. Historians report that people in the Greco-Roman world organized a cult to Epicurus as a culture hero, and also honored the other Founding Fathers of the School (Metrodorus, Hermarchus, and Polyaenus)–and even the Founding Mother Leontion, since we know that she wrote books and that there was at least one bust to her. If a disciple insulted or profaned the founders, Philodemus compared this behavior with “parricide” (murder of one’s parent). The Roman Empress Plotina hailed Epicurus as the “Savior” (Soter) of her soul. The ancient cvltvs seems to have some of the features that we today still associate with cults, but we must be careful not to project our modern values and perceptions.

As a Spanish speaker, I find it interesting that the word “cult” has such negative connotations in English. This is not a universal attitude, and probably speaks of a deep awareness of how harmful religion can get from our vantage point in history in the English-speaking world.

In Spanish (which has a greater degree of continuity with Latin than the English language does), the term “culto”–when used as an adjective–is used to refer to someone who is highly educated, someone who has cultivated themselves. If you say a gentleman is “culto” or a lady is “culta”, you’re saying that they are refined, that they have deep cultural expertise. Perhaps they speak many languages, have a high level of expertise in some field, or are able to appreciate or play certain types of musical instruments. According to dictionary.com

1610–20; Latin cultus habitation, tilling, refinement, worship, equivalent to cul-, variant stem of colere to inhabit, till, worship + -tus suffix of v. action

and according to Merriam-Webster

Cult, which shares an origin with culture and cultivate, comes from the Latin cultus, a noun with meanings ranging from “tilling, cultivation” to “training or education” to “adoration.” In English, cult has evolved a number of meanings following a fairly logical path. The earliest known uses of the word, recorded in the 17th century, broadly denoted “worship.” From here cult came to refer to a specific branch of a religion or the rites and practices of that branch, as in “the cult of Dionysus.” By the early 18th century, cult could refer to a non-religious admiration or devotion, such as to a person, idea, or fad (“the cult of success”). Finally, by the 19th century, the word came to be used of “a religion regarded as unorthodox or spurious.”

When seen through the lens of the prolepsis of the word cvltvs, a cult to an ancestor or founding figure entails some form of self-cultivation, as well as the systematic cultivation of a particular set of skills, knowledge, arts, or character traits that were exemplified by the chosen moral example. For instance, in China, students who wish to excel in school honor the sage Confucius as a god of learning by bowing and offering incense. The cult of Confucius represents him as personifying education as a celebrated human value. To teach, encourage and practice the honoring of Confucius is to instill and to celebrate the value of education. This is a value which has given the Chinese community here in the US a good reputation as a model minority.

The honor paid to a wise man is itself a great good for those who honor him. – Epicurean Saying 32

When we honor a sage or ancestor by offering sacrifices and by praising, nourishing and celebrating their memory, we are recognizing, celebrating, nourishing and strengthening the part of our souls that is like them, and the values they represent in our own souls. In this way, we continue to be influenced by them.

Another definition of “culture” relates to biology (as in, a culture of bacteria that we would grow in a Petri dish):

to grow (microorganisms, tissues, etc.) in or on a controlled or defined medium.

If we apply the methods of the third stage of language evolution–where conventionally used words are re-appropriated for abstract or advanced concepts–, we see the great utility of a philosophical cult and culture, re-defined poetically in the Lucretian tradition. Celebrating and re-membering the Hegemon and Kathegemon at Eikas is as if we were taking the portions of our souls represented by Epicurus and Metrodorus, placing them in a Petri dish, and cultivating them (by celebrating them, by studying them, and also by continuing their conversations) so that they grow and become a culture. This prolepsis of culture insinuates a kind of inner alchemy in our psyche through the cultivation of philosophy.

Considering philosophy as an act of cultivation and tilling, in addition to involving labor, also implies harvesting the fruits of our cultivation. Human culture implies the production of art or of some other concrete cultural product (foods, clothing, songs, etc.), and this also relates to the prolepsis of colere when understood as tilling, which is defined as “to prepare and cultivate (land) for crops“. The activity of cultivation has an end, a harvest.

What cultural products are we harvesting as practitioners of Epicurean philosophy? In his sermon on moral development, Epicurus speaks of the mature moral character as “the developed product”. A refined character, of course, expresses itself concretely in friendly exchanges, clear and intelligent thinking, clear speech, and other concrete tokens and benefits. We also generate cultural expressions, artistic artifacts, and other products by the practice of philosophy.

Eikas is a memorial service to our founders. We know that the atoms in the bodies of Epicurus and Metrodorus dissipated, that they died, and cannot receive our praise or celebration. Therefore, a cvltvs to them does not concern the historical persons of the founders, except as a point of reference in history, and is more concerned with the philosophical descendants’ choice to purposefully and systematically cultivate certain traits and qualities with the intention of harvesting the corresponding fruits.

Conclusion

If votive images are a way to access the numinous (often associated with the divine, the sacred), the prolepsis of “numen” reminds us that a numen is a physical act of nodding or affirming–that there is nothing supernatural about the numinous. It’s just an act of saying yes, of assent. And if setting up votive images is a cultic act, the prolepsis of culture/cult (understood naturally, rather than supernaturally) reminds us that they’re about cultivating certain qualities and practices with the aim of harvesting some fruit or result.

This discussion is meant as a preamble to an upcoming essay about Eikas as it relates to ancestor reverence.