Category Archives: Philodemus

Reasonings About Philodemus’ On the Stoics

stoa

On the Cynical Roots of Stoicism

On the Stoics is a polemic written by Philodemus where he argues that the founder of the Stoic school, Zeno, had been a pupil of the Cynics. The work starts out with historical details, and focuses on an early work by Zeno titled The Republic, which Philodemus says is full of faults and exhibits a vicious character, a kind of “disorder from the school to which he had begun to adhere”.

Among the horrors and impieties that the text says The Republic finds acceptable, there is mention of incest and cannibalism, apparently because it alludes to Greek tragedies that make these crimes part of the plot. But there is much more, and in fact a huge portion of the scroll is dedicated to the horrors defended in the text. Here are just a few:

To renounce their way of life to adopt that of dogs … to masturbate in public … to refuse to acknowledge as city or law that which we know as such …

There is also mention of evil speech, distrust and betrayal of friends, sexual exploitation of slaves, and adultery. The author also argues that Zeno never changed his mind, later in life, about the content of The Republic, which he says “proposes laws that aren’t for real people”. This book is praised by Cleanthes, and by Chrysippus while speaking of the uselessness of weapons. These are two prominent Stoics.

As to the arguments used by Stoics when confronted with these facts, Philodemus credits them with saying: “We dont’ judge Epicurus by his early writings, you shouldn’t judge our Zeno”, however Philodemus says that one can’t find anything shameful or impious in the early writings written by our Hegemon during his youth.

The Supreme End

… and it is a thing of inept people to not explain, once the supreme end has been invented, the rest (of the doctrine) in accordance! Now, what is actually coherent with the supreme end, is to admit that which is exposed throughout The Republic.

… it would have been better for Zeno not to have become a sage, that way there would be no place for indignation at his error! … but if they had had the sense of moderation, instead of loving the baseness, to the point of attaching themselves to perverse doctrines formulated in unsupportable terms …

The supreme end, to the Stoics, is virtue. Philodemus discards this doctrine as an “invention” of Zeno, to accentuate that virtue is not what nature has intended for us. In our teaching, we consider pleasure to be the end because the pleasure-aversion faculty is evident in nature. Stoic virtue, on the other hand, is an arbitrary ideal that is not clearly defined, much less in a way that is evident and observable in nature.

As to how we deal with the issue of pleasure as the end and virtues as means to pleasure, one good source to study this aspect of the Epicurean critique of Stoicism, and to clearly understand this key distinction and why it matters, can be found in the third chapter of A Few Days in Athens, where Frances Wright argues that many worship Virtue but few stop to evaluate the pedestal on which it sits.

We believe that while pleasure is real and tangible, other made-up criteria like virtue and “the good” are arbitrary and are never clearly defined. Pleasure is nature’s guide (and, therefore, transcultural), the others are cultural. Epicurus refused to even argue as to whether something was pleasant or produced aversion: this is not a matter for logic or for syllogisms to discern, it’s an immediate and real experience for a living being. Pleasure and aversion do not need to be learned. They’re innate.

Philosophers of logic can’t use word games to redefine pleasure. Instead, individuals can directly discern it with their own faculties, and so hedonism emancipates mortals from traditional authorities and can serve as a useful universal guide to anyone and everyone. In fact, the pleasure and aversion faculties are essential components of our moral compass.

We also believe that, as criteria, pleasure and pain do not lend themselves to the manipulations of rhetors which distort our moral compass in the way that other criteria do. A muslim might argue that pedophilia is virtuous because his prophet set the example, or that wife-beating and subjugation of women is virtuous because it’s in the Qur’an 4:34. A Christian might argue that killing gays is virtuous because Leviticus 20:13 establishes this practice, and a Jew might legitimize genocide in order to steal other people’s land. Authority-based, tradition-based or virtue-based moralities produce arbitrary rules that generate at times much more suffering than pleasure, whereas the goal of an Epicurean’s hedonic calculus is to produce net pleasure for the long term.

Other arbitrary criteria, like reason, can also serve ends other than human happiness and pleasure. Consider how objectivists have established the free-market as a sacred ideal that must never be toyed with or impeded, and how this led to the Bolivian water wars after all the water in that country was privatized and sold to an American company; or how deregulated financial markets led to the 2008 fiscal collapse, where Wall Street squandered over 40% of the savings that Americans had set aside for their retirement. Should we sacrifice our humanity and our happiness at the feet of the free market? Should people die on the streets fighting for access to water, and remain wage slaves until they die, even if they live to be over 90, for the sake of the free market? Should not the free market serve human life and happiness, instead?

And so there is always trouble and suffering and moral misjudgement when people set guides other than that which nature established, and which is evident in infants in the cradle: they seek pleasure and happiness and they avoid pain. Any other ideal, if it truly has a virtuous disposition, will lead to pleasure and to the avoidance or alleviation of pain. This is true ethics. This is a true and compassionate morality.

Closing

The content here is very different from what we’ve seen in all the other scrolls written by Philodemus. The tone of the controversy against the Stoics does seem out of character, and the scroll closes with the author swearing that he is telling the truth.

As for us, who have for a long time kept away from pollutions both our ears and our minds, defamation is forbidden to us as it is, in truth, the greatest source of pain, we swear.

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Reasonings About Philodemus’ on Arrogance

The practice of cataloguing the virtues is frequently seen in other traditions. Here Philodemus is summarizing and commenting on a writing by Ariston, whose identity is not entirely clear. Most of the text appears to be a summary of Ariston’s work titled On Arrogance, and the latter part appears to be Philodemus’ commentary.

The Sage Versus the Arrogant

The study of nature does not create men who are fond of boasting and chattering or who show off the culture that impresses the many, but rather men who are strong and self-sufficient, and who take pride in their own personal qualities not in those that depend on external circumstances. – Vatican Saying 45

The entire scroll appears to be a detailed elaboration of VS 45. Philosophers have throughout history been frequently accused of pedantry. This has resulted in very few people today wanting to identify as philosophers. This accusation is repeated in our own tradition, as we can see in the Pedantry of Aristotle quote from A Few Days in Athens. Because arrogance so often accompanies wisdom (or the appearance of wisdom), Philodemus had to first clearly distinguish between the person who suffers from the moral disease of arrogance and the true sage.

When we speak of virtue and vice, we are not only speaking of the habits that lead to pleasant and unpleasant existence, but also of the dispositions (diathesis) or underlying deeply-held beliefs that produce such behaviors. In our tradition, vicious dispositions that produce as symptoms the diseases of the soul, are treated with arguments and other therapeutic techniques. One technique we see frequently is the practice of “seeing before the eyes”, which was discussed in our reasonings on anger and which makes up the majority of this work.

The dispositions for the arrogant man have to do with how he despises others, feels superior, and is unwilling or unable to engage in relationships of mutual benefit and cooperation. He also frequently exaggerates and lacks moderation.

Some of the other dispositions that characterize many of the other major vices, as well as this one, have to do with ignorance about oneself and being unreasonable, so that Ariston says that the arrogant man or woman can’t be a good person, or happy.

The arrogant man seeks glory, entertains false pretensions, and hates all philosophers, even the ones undeserving of hate. He’s also inconsiderate toward others.

Having shown us all these symptoms, Philodemus then argues that the sage, on the other hand, is considerate towards others, does not give the impression of being arrogant and does not take others for fools. He does not admire himself, especially for reasons of fortune, since we should only take pride in our accomplishments and not those of fate.

In a later segment of the scroll, Philodemus compares highness versus arrogance by saying that those who have true grandeur disdain those who are arrogant by a gift of fortune, for this arrogance has nothing to do with moral greatness; therefore the arrogance of those blessed by Fortune who are morally inconsistent is laughable.

The sage shows no difference in any regard and does not avoid receiving others, does not avoid conversation or other exchanges with others. He does not proclaim others unworthy of him and he thanks those who help him.

If he does a favor to people more powerful than him, he tries to help and please them instead of seeking to obtain some benefit for himself. He expresses his own inferiority if needed and asks for forgiveness when appropriate. His friends, whom he trusts, are constantly with him.

He also takes care of his slaves, domestic workers and family members, aware that his inferiors express his will and represent him before guests and that he is ultimately responsible for how they treat his guests.

Different Mixtures of Vice

Arrogance can frequently be found together with other attributes and vices that, together, produce certain mixtures in our character. These various syndromes are treated as moral diseases of the soul.

A section of Ariston’s work dealt with the inconsiderate man, who is characterised by disdain for others, arrogance, irreflection and a feeling of one’s own value. This kind of man orders people to do things without asking politely; buys slaves without asking their names or naming them, simply choosing to call them “slave”; do not respond to favors or the hospitality of others in kind; do not employ common courtesies like “how are you doing?”, or like introducing themselves when they knock on people’s doors, or even in letters.

Another kind of moral disease is translated as l’homme suffisant, or the man who thinks he is enough. He is not entirely guilty of irreflection, but yet he won’t heed others’ advise or give it. He wants people to mind their own business and says that those who accept teachers remain as little children forever. Philodemus later adds that people disdain him because he thinks himself more intelligent and capable than everyone, and that many people are happy at his misfortunes. He ends up isolated and has difficulty succeeding.

Then there’s the know-it-all, who considers himself a genius, does everything on his own, and has many bad qualities that annoy people, including being an impostor and being disdainful toward others.

The hateful man is not always arrogant, but speaks with gravity and is condescending.

A critique of Socrates takes place under the heading the ironic man, where Philodemus characterizes his method as a kind of masked arrogance. He is described in the most detail. He is an impostor; says the opposite of what he’s really thinking and never means what he says; praises what he means to criticize; gives people aliases and uses dramatic cues to mock others, such as shaking his head, rolling his eyes, signaling to others, and so on. He also attributes his own ideas to others. Because of his theatrics, people often think the ironic man inventive and persuasive.

Finally, there is the man who treats others as imbeciles, or as nothings, as insignificant, as without merit. Like some of the other men described above, he likes to calumniate others with varying degrees of vehemence. This disposition to defamation, envy and cursing makes him hateful to others.

Treatment for Arrogance

As tools for self-correction, Philodemus offers the patient many scenarios to envision the potential negative repercussions to arrogance, as well as arguments that serve as cognitive therapy:

  • If you ever feel yourself floating in the air with arrogance, think back on your former humility and lowliness.
  • Think of how the arrogant will appear humble upon losing fortune.
  • Remember that only rhetors praise the glory that comes from fortune.
  • Consider that detachment from Fortune can free us from arrogance based on our good luck.
  • Consider the versatile, brutally-changing face of Fortune, which is compared to walking on a steep slope.
  • Consider that when Fortune turns on you, you may have to take refuge in your inferiors, the people you now see from a high vantage point. This has happened many times in history.
  • Think back about someone arrogant that you’ve met, and told yourself that you would never want to be like them. This may be other people’s reaction to us if we’re arrogant.
  • Don’t compare yourself to those poorer, but to those who are superior in all respects, whether in possession of lands or in power and ability to rule cities or other people.
  • Notice, and avoid, envy of others, for Philodemus says “how many ruins are provoked by envy, the whole world can see”.
  • Think of those who laugh at other’s misfortunes; consider the distrust they inspire.
  • Consider how it is unfair to gain prominence by humiliating others, instead of by one’s own grandeur.
  • Think of how failure frequently happens when one is isolated and how success frequently is due to the help of key allies.
  • Ask yourself what really makes you proud and arrogant.

It is frequently the case that the arrogant will not take the advise or help of others for reasons of presumption or disdain, or because they want all the glory. As a result, they only learns from their failures, and the lack of key allies also works against them in tribunals and assemblies.

In these treatments, we see that humility is an antidote to the vice of arrogance just as pride can at times be an antidote to excessive and undeserved humiliation.

Philodemus does not only use this technique of seeing before the eyes to show the harmful repercussions of vice. He also compares them versus the good repercussions of virtue. He does this by bringing to memory events from his recent history where the powerful acted as equals and won the trust and loyalty of others, versus the example of a king who had been abandoned by his army and lost its allegiance due to his arrogant speech. Another example is cited of Timocreon, an actor who suffered public mockery while on stage performing, for the same reason: his haughty speech had won him the ill-will of everyone present. These verses are reminiscent of how Confucius argued that shame played a very important role in humanist ethics.

The teaching here is that arrogance comes before the fall. It needlessly makes others our enemies and makes success in life more difficult. If we wish to maximize our chances of living a plasant life, we should treat this vice as an enemy of our souls.

Based on the French-language translation in Les Épicuriens titled L’arrogance, which itself is drawn from the tenth book of Philodemus’ work “The vices and their opposing virtues, those in whom they are found and the occasions where they are exerted”, otherwise simply The Vices

 

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The Philodemus Series

I learned about the papyri from the villa at Herculaneum and their importance while doing research for my book, Tending the Epicurean Garden, where I dedicate a chapter to fiscal and spiritual autarchy, and delve a bit into the need for reinventing labor and retirement in our society now that machines are replacing us, and elsewhere discuss the complexities of Epicurean friendship. Two of Philodemus’ scrolls dealt with economy and frank speech, which got me thinking about what would be the ideal professions and means of making a living for an Epicurean philosopher living in contemporary society and with modern labor conditions. The following is the fruit of these reasonings:

On Philodemus’ Art of Property Management

Reasonings about Philodemus’ On Frank Criticism:

(Part I) The Role of Frankness in a Philosophy of Freedom and Friendship
(Part II) The Masters as Moral Models
(Part III) Against the Charlatans

The Reasonings about Philodemus’ On Piety conclude, as in the case of On Property Management, with seven general teachings related to Piety and with an invitation to an ecumenic conversation between theists and Epicureans. His work On Death is, in my view, the greatest and most useful masterpiece in the application of personal ethics.

(Part I) Against the Accusers
(Part II) Doctrine of Harm and Benefits of the Gods, Against the Theologians
(Part III) On the Purpose of Religion and On Whether It’s Natural and Necessary
(Part IV) Socrates and the Live Unknown Maxim; Against the Atheists; Conclusion

Reasonings about On Death

Other works:

Reasonings About On Methods of Inference

Reasonings About Rhetorica

On Philodemus’ Scroll 1005

Reasonings On Anger

Reasonings about On Arrogance

Reasonings About On the Stoics

Reasonings About On Music

Reasonings About The Poems

Reasonings About Philodemus’ On Choices and Avoidances:

(Part I) Doctrine of the Principal Things

(Part II) Imaginary Evils

(Part III) Against Existing Only to Die

In addition to Philodemus’ works, the Library at Herculaneum included works by others. The works at the library were charred when Mount Vesuvius erupted in the year 79, but fragments have been rescued and deciphered over the last few centuries and recent scientific breakthroughs give us hope that more content will soon be desciphered. It’s possible that this collection of Herculaneum scrolls may continue to expand in the future.

The following is based on Polystratus, who was the third Scholarch of the Athenian Garden. Two extant scrolls by him were found at Herculaneum. Here, he expounds a doctrine of hedonist moral realism, and argues that the cultivation of virtue without the study of nature–which we frequently see in many religions–is not profitable and degenerates into superstitious fear and arrogance.

Reasonings About Polystratus’ On Irrational Contempt

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