Category Archives: Philodemus

No Politics*

NO POLITICS*

N. H. BARTMAN

*unless bailing friends from jail, shielding fugitives from extradition,
subverting property laws, emancipating slaves, empowering migrants,
amplifying female voices, funding monthly outreach programs, financing
stone monuments, patronizing finance ministers, ridiculing popular beliefs,
supporting good legislation, encouraging advantageous policies, distributing…

TABLE OF CONTENTS

· The Fruits of Society — Overview of Epicurean Politics
· Bustle, No Hustle — Politicking and Pólis-Living
· Ticks of the Pólis — The Urban Life of Epíkouros
· No Sleep Til Melítē — The Advantages of Citizenship
· Hiding in Plain Sight — Security By Association
· Live with Security (Not “in Obscurity”)  Láthe Biṓsas and Urbanity
· Law & Order — Hérmarkhos on the Common Defense
· Just Us — Epíkouros on Forming a More Perfect Union
· Strong Opinions — (A Brief History of Epicurean Political Engagement)
· Speaking Frankly — Philódēmos on Free Speech
· Bein’ Real and Breakin’ Balls The Pleasure of Decompressing
· Good Without Governing — Break Glass in Case of Pólis Collapse
· Brave Enough for Politics — The Power of Doing What You Can
· Part of This World — Take Responsibility for Your Thingamabobs

 


NO POLITICS

NOTE: Among all other Hellenistic schools, the Epicurean Garden boasts the greatest conceptual consistency as a philosophy, and the greatest historical consistency as an institution—after all, practical teachings that provide useful knowledge do not require revisions. To ensure that readers are being exposed to ancient source material, and not just the paraphrasing of modern academics, each citation has been studiously documented.

The Fruits of Society

Epíkouros did not mince words:

ΟΥΔE ΠΟΛΙΤΕΥΕΣΘΑΙ
oúde politeúesthai1

Life is best “NOT TO BE POLITICKED”.2 For the sake of living well, lovers of wisdom are exhorted by the Sage to neither “pursue public office”, nor “conduct government”, nor “administer the state”. After all, the “purest security is generated out of the peace and withdrawal from the masses”,3 as also it “is predominately perfected [by] friendship”.4 A life of constant struggle makes it difficult for a person to “take risks for the sake of friendship”.5 Political ambition itself challenges the natural goal of living a sweet life. God would never suffer the stress of office — why should the wise?6

Even so, the Hēgēmṓn recognizes that “some security” can be expected to be “generated out of [mutual association with other] people” so far as concerns a “certain supportive power and [mutual] abundance”.7 Epíkouros never passes an injunction against observing jurisprudence, nor dismisses the benefits of practical legislation. He affirms that the wise “will serve jury duty” and “at [a certain] time [will even be willing] to serve a monarch […] and will gain notoriety in public”.8 Hérmarkhos quips that even the multitude” see an obvious “advantage arising from an association with each other.”9

While “nothing is needed” in terms of things “acquired through competitions” and politicalassemblies”,10 nowheredoes the Sage dismiss the benefits of civic engagement, nor disparage the fruits of mutual association. After all, “it is possible for [the divine] nature to exist even with many troubles surrounding it.”11 The wealth of Naturethatis both defined and obtainable12 includes not only resources and replenishments, but people to call friends, and a place to practice friendship.

ΤΩΝ ΣΥΜΠΟΛΙΤΕΥΟΜEΝΩΝ
tṓn sympoliteuoménōn13

In the case “of those being governed together” or “of those being politically-engaged with one another14 (e.g. neighbors, citizens) the cultivation of mutual associations is foundational to living a good life. Indeed “only as a result of [learning to live with] those [others] can the [good life] possibly hope to be procured”.15 Far from demonizing all pólis-related activities, Epíkouros affirms that any association that cultivates “courage out of [living with other] peopleis, by nature, good”. When it comes to mutual association, the fruits of “political” activity are still sweet.

Bustle, No Hustle

The verb πολιτεύω (politeúō) includes both [1] the activity of “holding public office” and also [2] the general conditions related to “living as a citizen” (in a pólis). Epíkouros questions the practicality the former, but remarks on the utility of the latter. On one hand, he warns against the troubles that come from administering the affairs of the state. On the other, he praises the advantages that come from “being a citizen”, “being governed together”, and “living in a state”. The Hēgēmṓn warns against the troubles that come from living with politics, but defends the benefits of living within polities.

Ticks of the Pólis

Over half of the human population (over 4 billion people) of the 21st-century live in póleis, but this was not always the case. In the ancient world, less than 5% of all human beings lived in urban centers. As a result, pólis-related activities were once much less characteristic of the average human experience. The vast majority of humanity was dispersed across the globe in loose networks of settlements.

Epíkouros, however, was not among them. Nor was his family, nor most of his friends, nor many of his students. In fact, the Sage spent the vast majority of his life within the jurisdiction of a póleis. Raised in the prosperous, maritime hub of Sámos, Epíkouros was conscripted to Athens, the largest pólis in Greece, “City of the Violet Crown”.16 After two years of services, Epíkouros returns to his family in Ionia, who had since moved to rural Kolophṓn — the village presented him with limited, intellectual opportunities, so the Gargettian pursued education in nearby Téōs. Once he finished his education, he launched a career in Mytilḗnē, the largest pólis on the island of Lésbos, until advancing to the hub of Lámpsakos, where he cultivated a devoted following. He then returned to Athens, and founded the Garden. As his moniker suggests, the “Gargettian” was well-acquainted with the ways of the póleis.

History records “the famous Gargettian”17 as having been born on the Ionian island of Sámos, which was a cleruchy or independent colony of Athens at the time. His parents hailed from the Attic dḗmē18 of Gargēttós,19 and, as a result of his family’s political enfranchisement, he was afforded legal privileges as a citizen, such as the privilege to purchase property. Were it not for the fact of his citizenship and the advantage of his lineage, Epíkouros could not have founded The Garden.

Indeed, the Gargettian did not dwell in the wilderness like a locust-eating, doomsday-preaching ascetic.20 To the contrary, he owned a private home in the center of the largest pólis in ancient Greece.

No Sleep Til Melítē

In 306 BCE, after fifteen years off of the coast of Ionia, 35-year-old Epíkouros moves to Athens, largest pólis in Greece (and one of the largest póleis in the Eastern Mediterranean after Syracuse in Sicily and Alexándreia in Egypt). As history records, when given the choice, the Athenian pólis provided the Hēgēmṓn with more utility than the “withdrawal” of isolated settlements. In an era where most people were not living pólis-related lives, the ancient Epicureans chose the pleasures of the pólis. The students of the Garden chose to hold themselves accountable to pólis-related laws, and pay pólis-related taxes, embrace pólis-related ceremonies, celebrate pólis-related holidays, and enjoy pólis-related pleasures. In a world of wilderness, Epicureans aimed to enjoy the privileges of the pólis.

The fact of his citizenship gave Epíkouros the right to make a number of financial acquisitions: he acquired a residence in affluent Melítē,21 a city district in the center of Athens. He also deliberately purchased property between the Dípylon Gate and Plátōn‘s Akadēmía, which he called The Garden. Citizenship afforded him the right to file his Will at the mētrṓion (an administrative office that would facilitate inheritance). The document allocated funds for posthumous holidays, facilitated the successor-guardianship of the children of Metródōros and Polyaīnos (both having sons named Epikoúros), and established a dowry for Metródōros’ daughter. Lastly, it ensured the manumission of four slaves: “I set free Mýs, Nikías, Lýkōn: I likewise grant Little Phaídra [her] freedom.22

These inheritances and emancipations were afforded as a consequence of Epíkouros’ political status as a citizen. These actions were facilitated by the “supportive power” of the Athenian state. The public officials who preserved the archives (at the mētrṓion) ensured that the Hēgemṓn’s wishes were executed according to the conditions of his written will. As a result of his legal agency, his public presence, and his willingness to use the machinery of the pólis,Epíkouros’ best friend, Hérmarkhos, an immigrant who followed him as a child from Mytilḗnē, not only becomes the “hēgemṓn having been left behind”,23 but also becomes the financial manager of the Athenian Garden. The “succession” of the Epicurean school thus “goes on […] and [has hosted] countless of the familiar authorities”. 24

Hiding in Plain Sight

As a matter of practicality, Epíkouros affirms that the wise “will make plans to gain public approval” even if “only so far as to avoid being treated with contempt […] and will gain notoriety in public, but not enthusiastically”.25 Were it not for the practical utility of association, “it [might be] better not to receive public preferment”.26 Yet Philódēmos explains that “philosophers gain the friendship of public men by helping them out of their troubles27 and “those whom they find opposed to them they quickly soften”.28 As his biographer describes, the Sage of the Garden exemplifies this ideal:

Witnesses [revere] this considerable man [and his] unsurpassable goodwill to everyone, both [to those in his] fatherland [who] honored him with bronze statues, and his friends, so many [in] their extent as it would not be possible to measure [them with] whole cities, and all those familiar [with] the dogmatic[wisdom] of his [that enables them] to gain mastery over the [deceitful] sirens [of suffering].29

Defending the friendly disposition of Epíkouros, Diogénēs further celebrates

his unsurpassable kindness […] his gratitude to his progenitors, and his beneficence to his brothers, and his gentleness to his servants […] and that the [servants] philosophized with him […] and on the whole, his philanthropism [was apparent] to everyone, indeed his piety for the gods, and his fond disposition for his fatherland; for [owing to his] hyperbole [for] kindness, he never fastened to politics30

Live with Security (Not “in Obscurity”)

Indeed, the Hēgēmṓn “never fastened to politics” as a profession, nor as a means of income, (nor as a dubious obsession), but certainly, he fastened to the pólis, only leaving Athens “twice or thrice” to visit “friends” in “Ionia”, throughout the latter half of his life (nearly thirty-five, uninterrupted years in the pólis). This may surprise readers familiar with the Sage’s recommendation to “live unknown”.

The phrase λάθε βιώσας31 (láthe biṓsas, meaning “escape notice [‘n’] live!”) is usually translated as “live hidden”, “unnoticed”, “in obscurity”, “in anonymity”, or “live unknown”. Therein, Epíkouros encouraged his friends and followers to cultivate lives of philosophical calm, estranged from egotistical ambitions, indifferent to accolades, immune to the allure of approval, unburdened by popular opinion, unimpressed by affluence, uninspired by opulence, and liberated from vain beliefs about fame. He challenges them to live lives too blissfully unremarkable to appear on the turbulent pages of history. Truly, “there is no method by which one can” reliably “persuade the multitude, either always or in the majority of cases”,32 so politics is an unreliable and often unprofitable career path. To compensate for this condition, success in politics requires either “a lot of money made through unscrupulous means” or “servility to the mob or authority”.33 Neither of those conditions are conducive to happiness.

ΛΑΘΕ ΒΙΩΣΑΣ
láthe34 biṓsas35

This exhortation principally addresses private vulnerabilities (like envy) that lead a person to short-sighted decisions, which then increases overall public insecurity. In the context of a pólis, Epíkouros’ invocation to “live unknown” serves not as a call to the wild, but an affirmation to live a dignified life navigating society gracefully, without attracting unwanted attention. One might “withdraw” from the trends “of the masses” and cultivate emotional “stillness”, intellectual “peace”, and mental “tranquility” without abandoning one’s role as a neighbor and fellow citizen. One need not renounce the pleasant comforts of urban life (where they exist), retreat to a cave, or isolate oneself in the vast desert to find peace. The life of the wise need not be suffered in solitude, not silenced for the sake of virtue. To live in a pólis, it is necessary “to obtain money, and to prevent disfranchisement and exile”.36

Epíkouros was not drawn to the pólis for its troubles and deceptive rhetoric, but by her pleasures. He thus provides students with a set of expectations as concerns the benefits of both justice and law.

Law & Order

In a perfect community (of divinities), “there would be no need of laws”.37 However, within the póleis of the Earth, the wise do not observe all humans to be “capable of surveying and recollecting what is advantageous”. Not all neighbors will exercise neighborly relations, observing “pacts to neither harm nor be harmed”.38 Not all neighbors are willing to observe “the beneficial tendency” of laws, for example, against “readily destroying each other”.39 It is often necessary to defend “against harm from such people”.40 Indeed, for “the sake of achieving a profitable [outcome]”, groups of people “should not indiscriminately destroy each other”.41 It is therefore reasonable to safeguard “the salvation42 of the community with law — simultaneously, the community “works together for the sake of the distinct salvation of each [person]”. Granted, one need not reduce themselves to being a cog in the machine of society, especially “where one[could be] profitable [being] separated”, but one must still review their impact so that they are “not to produce ruinous” conditions for neighbors and fellow citizens.

Observing a social contract, Hérmarkhos insists that “legal institutes” originally “became lawful [not] through violence,” and forced coercion, “but through the consent of those that used them.”43 Certainly, it would be preferable if all humans “would spontaneously avoid such things” that lead to their neighbors’ destruction, yet not everyone can be expected to “do that which is right” in terms “of what is useful” and what is “detrimental”.44 Thus, anticipating inevitable abuses, “legislators ordained, that even involuntary” crime “should not be entirely void of punishment; in order that they might not only afford no pretext for the voluntary imitation of those deeds which were involuntarily performed”.45[H]ence legislators, wishing to restrain that indolence which is injurious to our neighbours” employed the tool of legislation and thereafter “prevented the commission of numerous offences”.46 Hence they endeavored still more firmly to restrain those who readily destroyed each other.47 Then “in attempting to effect this, they introduced those legal institutes which still remain in cities and nations48

By doing so, ancient legislators act toward “advancing the community itself” in terms of developing “the necessary [services in society]” so that “a befitting [community will have been] generated through [the] long [commitment to the aid] of one another.49 Unlike many of their philosophical opponents, the Epicureans provided an evolutionary description of human history, and explained that society developed gradually, over long periods, ultimately guided by the natural benefits of nature.

Then neighbours began to form the bonds of friendship, with a will
Neither to be harmed themselves, nor do another ill,
The safety of babes and womenfolk in one another’s trust,
And indicated by gesturing and grunting it was just
For everyone to have mercy on the weak. Without a doubt
Occasional infractions of the peace would come about,
But the vast majority of people faithfully adhered
To the pact, or else man would already have wholly disappeared;
Instead, the human race has propagated to this day.50

Though trouble is risked when pursuing a political career, that does not mean that legislators are categorically unable to help satisfy the natural needs of a community. By contrast, “thousands of [Greeks] have been useful ambassadors, were prudent in their advice, were not the cause of disaster, did not speak with an eye to gain, and were not convicted of malfeasance in office.”51 They are less concerned with trying “to classify and describe metaphors” instead of trying to give “practical working instructions”.52 In this regard, one canfind reason for pursuing practical rhetoric”. 53

Hermarkhos congratulates the wisdom of early legislators: “For those who introduced things of this kind to the multitude, excelled in wisdom” and demonstrated “a rational consideration of utility”. To prevent violent crimes, they threatened “the dread of the punishment ordained by law” as a “remedy for” those who possess “ignorance of what is beneficial”. For the threat of “punishment forcibly compels such as these to” consider the consequences of being unwilling to “subdue those impulses which lead them to useless actions” and “even now keeps the vulgar in awe, and” contributes to dissuading “them from doing any thing, either publicly or privately, which is not beneficial” to the community.54

[A]ncients legislators […] proclaimed unholy the slaughter of [an innocent] human […due to] one, natural association existing [among] the people, in the name of people, due to the similarity of [their]forms and of [their] souls [] a [murder is] not [going] to contribute towards [easing] the whole tension of life [that needs] to be supported55

Of course, circumstances change. Just laws can become unjust. The machine of politics creates emergent problems of its own that could be avoided by avoiding the pólis in the first place. Mutual human association develop prior to the compounding of society, so justice is natural, and informs our political outlooks. On this topic, of the justness of political relations, Epíkouros has a lot to say.

Just Us

At least half of the 40 Key Doctrines56 of Epíkouros address the conditions that arise from human co-existence. No less than 9 of those Doctrines57 mention “the nature of the just” or “justice” as when “someone establishes a law”.58Regarding the origin and nature of justice, Epíkouros writes (in full):

31The justice of nature is [a] pact [formed out] of a [mutual] profiting towards the [hope] neither to harm one another nor to be harmed. 32As of the animals [with whom] a pact was not able to be drafted in defense of the [hope] to neither harm nor be harmed, before these [pacts existed] nothing was just nor unjust; but in like manner also as [concerns the case] of the tribes [with whom a pact] was not able [to be composed] or [with whom] a pact was not wished to be composed, in [absence] of a [pact] to neither harm nor be harmed [so too was nothing just nor unjust]. 33Justice was not something [real] by itself, but [existed] in the gatherings [of the people] for the sake of one another, by however big [their]assemblies, but at some time, [at a] certain place, always for the sake of a [pact] neither to harm nor to be harmed. 34Injustice [is] not by itself evil, but [what is evil is] in the fear concerning the apprehension[of] whether [one] will not escape [the] notice [of] those punishers [who] have been monitoring in case of such [violations]. 35The one secretly moving [against all] of that (which they agreed [upon] with each other regarding the [pact] neither to harm nor to be harmed) is not [able] to have confidence that they will escape notice, even if ten-thousand-times by aid of the [one] being present they may escape notice; for until a catastrophic end [it will be] unclear if even they will escape detection. 36Concerning, on one hand, that [which is] common [for] all, what [is] just [is generally] the same, for some [natural] profiting was [always] being [generated by living] in a community with one another; concerning, however, what [is] unique [in terms] of place and [in terms] of however long a time [one is affected because] of the[underlying] causes then [what is] just [is] not [for] all [therefore] being followed to be the same. 37What truly is witnessed, that one profits in the service of the community [by providing utility] to one another,[this] possesses the character of the just, even if either the same might be generated [for] all, or even if the same could not [be generated for all]. If then one should pass [a] law, [that] should not result from the profiting of the community between one another, [then] no longer does it possess the nature of the just. And if it may fall from the [mark] concerning a just profiting, [for the] time then [that it] is fitted to the preconception59 of justice, [it is] not at all inferior in that way [at] the time [it] was just [and with reflection] the vain cries themselves may not confound, but look to the facts. 38When not [thought to be just, in the case] of recent [changes] being generated [as a result] of the surrounding affairs [of state], it was revealed not fitting in regard to the preconception60 [of justice against] the [things that] have been considered just in respect of the same matters [that in the past exemplified justice] — it was not [existing except as] those [things considered] just. But when [because] of recent [changes] being generated [out]of the [surrounding] affairs [of state], it was not yet harmonizing [with] the same just proceedings, therein then, at the time, truly, it was just, when [one] was profiting throughout the community with one another [in the case] of those who are politicallyengaged together;61 later then it was still not just, when not profiting together.

As described, regarding “those who are governed together”, Epíkouros expresses concern against both unjust actions, as with “one secretly moving against […] the pact neither to harm nor to be harmed” as well as laws that “no longer possesses the nature of what is just”. He expresses equal concern for those “tribes [with whom a pact] was not able to be composed” and expresses specific concern toward those tribes with whom “pact was not wished to be composed”, anticipating that the wise may need to respond to hostile parties as they would against wild animals. He observes the mutual benefits of society as when “one passes [a] law” that results in “the profiting of the community between one another”, and positively urges that every “one profits in the service of the community [by providing utility] to one another”. Indeed, rather than “not engaging in politics”, Epíkouros urges students to support laws that “possess the mark of justice”. Wise people will respond to unjust laws accordingly, both making “fitting” changes out “of the affairs [of state]”, and observing unjust laws selectively.

These foundational observations (in principle) are echoed throughout the documents that punctuate American history. The Declaration of Independence observes “certain unalienable Rights”, that “among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed”. The Preamble of the U.S. Constitution asserts that “in Order to form a more perfect Union,” the “People” set to “establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity”. In his Gettysburg Address, President Lincoln describes a “government of the people, by the people, for the people”. (World history presents many more examples than those easily accessible to my mind. Certainly, there are complications and nuances to the implementation of these ideals.)

As an animal cannot operate within its environment without making biome-related observations, so too is a human animal unable operate within a pólis without making pólis-related observations. As observers, Epicureans have amassed a breadth of observations within the walls of the póleis.

Strong Opinions

As we know from Philódēmos, “it is not like Epicurus to hesitate to speak the truth”.62 After all, the Epicurean sages “will be opinionated and will not be puzzled.”63 Far from abstaining from political speech, many Epicureans were known for their categorically-political commentary.

Philódēmos outright calls “democracy” the “worst form of government.64 He tutored Julius Caesar’s (then future) wife Calpurnia, and may have shared Cesarean sympathies, as did his close friend, Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus (Calpurnia’s father). These sympathies were shared by prominent Epicureans of 1st-century BCE Rome, including Gaius Trebatius Testa, Gaius Matius, Gaius Vibius Pansa Caetronianus, Lucius Cornelius Balbus, Publius Cornelius Dolabella, and Publius Volumnius Etrapelus. Conversely, a number of the Roman philosophers held positions againstCaesar, as was the case with Marcus Tullius Cicero and his Epicurean associates Aulus Manlius Torquatus, Lucius Manlius Torquatus, Aulus Hirtius, Gaius Cassius Longinus, Gaius Trebianus, Lucius Papirius Paetus, Marcus Fadius Gallus, and Statilius. The descriptions that Cicero catalogues preserve a spectrum of positions, from a dozen, political Epicureans, just prior to the collapse of the Rēs Pūblica.

The Romans, entrenched in their Great Civil War were far from being the only Epicureans of the ancient world who approached the political podium. In 88 BCE an Epicurean65 ambassador to Mithridátēs VI named Aristíōn66 seized the Athenian government and assumed the role of a tyrant:67

Archelaus sent them the sacred treasure of Delos by the hands of Aristion, an Athenian citizen, attended by 2,000 soldiers to guard the money. These soldiers Aristion made use of to make himself master of the country, putting to death immediately some of those who favored the Romans and sending others to Mithridates. And these things he did although he professed to be a philosopher of the school of Epicurus.

Within two years, the Roman general Sulla would conquer Athens and execute Aristíōn. Twenty years, later, a man named Lysías of Tarsós assumes the role of tyrant. Athḗnaios writes:

at Tarsus an Epicurean philosopher […] had become the tyrant of that city, Lysias by name; who having been created by his countrymen Stephanephorus, that is to say, the priest of Heracles, did not lay down his command, but seized on the tyranny. He put on a purple tunic with a white centre, and over that he wore a very superb and costly cloak, and he put on white Lacedaemonian sandals, and assumed also a crown of golden laurel leaves. And he distributed the property of the rich among the poor, and put many to death who did not surrender their property willingly.

Echoing the diversity of opinions held by Epicureans during the Roman Republic, the French Epicureans of the Baroque period68 introduce diverse political commentary into modern, Epicurean literature. They served flavors ranging from monarchism to liberalism to anarchism, united by their common, intellectual descent from the Epicurean Garden, and their shared rejection of the Church.

Early figures, like Michel de Montaigne and François de la Moethe le Vayer advocated “pragmatic” submission to monarchy. Others resisted, like Théophile de Viau and his lover Jacques Vallée Des Barreaux. Some came to question the divine authority of the state like Pierre Gassendi. To these, we add Machiavellian thinkers like Gabriel Naudé, and his friend Gui Patin. Aristocrats hosted salons, like the defiant courtesan Marion Delorme, and her lover Charles de Saint-Évremond, as well as the libertine Ninon de l’Enclos. François VI, Duc de La Rochefoucauld fought in the Fronde against both Cardinal Richelieu and the King’s Musketeers. Physician François Bernier came to revile the political “despotism” that he witnessed in Asia. Among poets, Antoinette Deshoulières shared loyalties with King Louis XIV, while Guillaume Amfrye de Chaulieu resisted royal authority. Jean de la Chapelle, the “father of French epicurean poetry” developed nationalistic propaganda against the Habsburg dynasty, while a series of anti-clerical secularists, including Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Denis Diderot, and Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron d’Holbach influenced minds like John Locke and Thomas Jefferson.

During the American Revolution, an Epicurean physician named Thomas helped organize the Boston Tea Party. His student, an Epicurean officer named Ethan helped found the State of Vermont. Another Epicurean friend of theirs (also named Thomas) gets elected as the 3rd President of the United States. In the 19th-century, an Epicurean feminist named Frances advocated utopian socialism. In the 20th-century, an Epicurean intellectual named Christopher shared critical insights on authoritarianism. In the 21st-century, an Epicurean farmer named José served as the 40th Presidente de la República Oriental del Uruguay. Each of these passionately political figures identified themselves as students of the Garden. “I too am an Epicurean” wrote Thomas Jefferson.69 Christopher Hitchens echoed Jefferson’s statement of purpose.70 Presidente José Mujica affirmed in his “humble way of thinking, that the problem we are facing is political. The Old Thinkers” like “Epicurus […] put it this way: a poor person is not someone who has little but one who needs infinitely more, and more and more.”71

Based on two-thousands years of anecdotes, it seems unrealistic to attempt to purge the pólis-related interests from the human mind, as though the pólis were fundamentally evil. Quite the opposite, the origins of political activity serve to promote the benefits of mutual association. Humans have engaged and re-engaged póleis-related activities for millennia, whether patronizing the Théatro tou Dionýsou, or catching a Broadway matinee. Far better is it for a happy human not to avoid the pólis (as a great pain), but rather, to maximize the natural goods that directly result from pólis-related activities. This means gracefully navigate pólis-related exchanges, rather than eliminating them from our thoughts.

Speaking Frankly

While one is best to “avoid contact” with antagonists and “expel them from thought”, it is not always the case that “these practices prove to be useful”.72 While it might be preferred to eliminate contact with antagonistic personalities, this is not always possible. Citizens must find ways to preserve their peace through compromise. After all, “the harmony that to some is good for others is indifferent”.73

Unlike the Socratic sages who alleged to “know nothing”, Epíkoruos affirms that true sages “will be opinionated.”74 At the same time, the ancient Epicureans criticize Sōkrátēs for having “offended many people and incurred political enmities, from which indeed in time hatred grew”.75 Of course, practicing free speech does not excuse one from the consequences of speaking. Thus, a wise person should “not [get] carried away so as to insult or strut or show contempt [or] do harm”.76 Pick your battles, for “there is no [necessity] to apply frankness in every case.”77 Philódēmos weighs the need to speak frankly against the practical ability of a person to receive criticism, hoping (usually) for them to enjoy the greatest advantage from constructive guidance. He explains that it “is hard work for those who are handling [a topic] by way of an epitome to be precise about every kind”78 since there are so many unique personalities, distinct relationships, and nuanced contexts. (Nonetheless, he attempts to do so).

Philódēmos wonders, “How will he handle those who have become angry toward him because of his frank criticism?79First, remember that “some [do not] perceive their own errors” and “it causes [them] to dis[trust]”,80 being “afflicted with passions that puff one up or generally hinder one”.81 Even so, to address the errors, the “wise person and philosopher speaks frankly” understanding that their criticism “should be administered appropriately”.82 As a result, they “will differ for each […] just as a lad differs from a woman and old men will differ […] and youngsters alike [… and one must admonish] prominent [men] and peoples according to each”.83 He notes that privileged citizens “do not gladly accept others confuting them [because] they believe that many people reproach them out of envy”.84

Some will require “a caring admonishment” instead of “an irony that pleases but pretty much stings” – many will become alienated when stung.85 Thereafter, they “cannot possibly endure [to listen] to [that them] with goodwill.”86Others “have judged it right to speak frankly [to] such people, but [moderately], given that sharp frankness bears a similarity to insult, as if insulting indeed out of ill will.87 Along those lines, one must not say “contemptuous or disparaging things […] in a strained tone”.88For how is he going to hate the one who errs […] when he knows that he himself is not perfect and rem[inds himself that everyone is accustomed to err?]89 Recognizing the profitability of patience, “if someone […] has been slighted, we do not prevent [them] from casting blame” nor assume them to have “been discredited”.90 Yet demanding all deliveries be sweetened attracts “men who are charlatans […] seizing them after some stress and enchanting them with their subtle kindnesses.91

In the case of “those more in need of treatment,” a caring teacher “intensifies [frankness]”. 92[T]he [wise man], being a person-tamer, [probes] the disobedience of a young man who is [arrogant].”93As Philódēmos describes, “they [will employ frankness] aggressively in regard to [laziness and] procrastination.”94 Often, a wise person “speaks frankly because” obstinate persons “made him speak frankly toward them”.95 As he explains, “it is necessary to show him his errors forthrightly and speak of his failings publicly.”96 In these cases, “we shall admonish others with great confidence”.97 For the sake education, one must not censure necessary criticism in the name of softening the proverbial blow, since “to act in secret is necessarily most unfriendly, no doubt. For he who does not report [errors] is clearly covering up these things […] and there will be no advantage”.98 The truth must be presented or else the error will not be corrected and the student will not grow. Provoking the temperament of a student “must be risked [or] otherwise [they]do not pay heed” and may never advance in wisdom.99

To an extent, it is necessary for the student “to endure admonishment graciously”.100 If they “will behave” tyrannically, then rational minds will rightly “hold [them] to be un[beara]ble”,101 as in the case of “some people who make jokes but do not endure others [making jokes at their expense]”.102 Certainly, wise people will adjust their tone to maximize the retention of those with whom they speak, but wise people need to vent like the rest of us, and Epicureans found pleasure in bonding over issues.

Now, if only one person or two or three or four or five or six or any larger number you choose, sir, provided that it is not very large, were in a bad predicament, I should address them individually and do all in my power to give them the best advice. But, as I have said before, the majority of people suffer from a common disease, as in a plague, with their false notions about things, and their number is increasing (for in mutual emulation they catch the disease from one another, like sheep)103

So far as concerns tone, the wise will not “tyrannize”, neither inflating dictatorial fantasies, nor indulging authoritarian ambitions (as Epíkouros writes “in the second book of On Lifestyles”);104 nor will they bark like a cynic”, after all, “one cannot be fearless” and enjoy the fruits of association if “one causes [others to be] fearful”.105In speaking one should not resort to ignoble rhetorical tricks, these have less effect than a straight-forward character”.106 Philódēmos cautions against employing “panegyric” rhetoric to advance an agenda — the wise will neither weaponize “charming speeches107 to manipulate crowds, nor patronize politicians with pageantry “in the fashion of the sophists”.108Philódēmos asks, “How can a natural philosopher become a politician and rhetor?”109 He affirms that “by no means should the philosopher acquire political experience”,110 which simply requires one to study “what pleases the crowd and practicing”.111 In this regard, “politics is the worst foe of friendship”.112 Whereas “everyone who bears goodwill and practices philosophy intelligently and continually […] is great in character and indifferent to fame” and “least of all a politician”.113

Be mindful of what you say — but among true friends, always speak your mind.

Bein’ Real and Breakin’ Balls

While thoughtful speech is recommended when engaging acquaintances, Philódēmos acknowledges that “there is nothing so grand as having one to whom one will say what is in one’s heart” without censoring oneself as if expecting censure, “for our nature strongly desires to reveal to some people what it thinks.”114 Of course, sharing “what is in one’s heart” with the wrong person can “further inflame […] those same men who do not like [them]”. Nonetheless, it is far healthier and more pleasurable to be involved “with one who is pure and loves [you] and […] knows how to treat [you].”115

Philódēmos supposes that “the wise men recognize each other, [and] will be reminded pleasurably by one another […]and they will sting each other with the gentlest of stings and will acknowledge gratitude”.116 Along those lines, a wise person should also be able to take a joke.

Good Without Governing

Ultimately, laws are temporary, conditions are unstable, and legislation is never as robust as inner strength. Even compared against the resources provided by of political agreements, “most valuable of all [is] self-sufficiency”,117 which allows us to “have confidence” when those agreements dissolve and “one might be in want of things”.118 As with every person, every place, and every planet, so, too, will every pólis dissolve. In the absence of law, wise people would still act ethically. For “philosophers do not enter politics, yet they help their native land by teaching the young to obey the laws; nay more, by teaching them to act justly even if there are no laws, and to shun injustice as they would fire.”119

The Epicurean Garden does not require the existence of a stable pólis to secure the good life. Plátōn supposed the best life to be lived within an ideal state ruled by a philosopher king. Aristotélēs described humans as being “political animals”120 that could not flourish without the advancement of political objectives — indeed, Karl Marx preferred Aristotélēs “above all the Ancients”.121 Stoics like the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius approached political office as a philosophical duty, though advising neutrality to “be neither of the green nor of the blue party at the games in the Circus”.122 Epicureans, however, did not evaluate their moral agency as a function their success in the political profession.

Happiness cannot depend upon “great commodities, nor pretentious business, nor authority, nor power, but painlessness and feeling gentleness.”123 After all, Epíkouros affirms to a student that “we must liberate ourselves, out of the prison [built] upon circular [proceedings]124 and political125 [affairs]”.126 He encourages Pythoklḗs to “avoid all programming127 and congratulates Apellḗs on having “committed to philosophy cleanly from every impurity” related to acculturation.128 [L]et us be content”, writes Philódēmos, “to live the quiet life of a philosopher without claiming a share in the ability to manage a city by persuasion”.129 He observes that every “good and honest [person] who confines [their] interest to philosophy alone, and disregards the nonsense of lawyers” and their legislative squabbles “can face boldly all such troubles, yea all powers and the whole world.”130

Not Brave Enough for Politics

The “political podium” is not the only mechanism by which to affect meaningful change in a pólis.

Epíkouros did not ban slavery, but he did free slaves. He did not reform jail, but he did post bail. He did not legalize women’s choices, but he did publish female voices. He did not manage the State, but he did transfer his estate to the management of a disenfranchised migrant, circumventing Athenian inheritance laws; he ensured a permanent asylum for philosophical friends of his garden. He was unmoved to speak in the assembly, but was inspired to write for the benefit of future generations.

He did abide by civic policies, but he did not endorse civil servants. He did encourage friends to fight fate, but he did not instigate pointless debate. He addressed policies without engaging politics, and he accomplished all of these activities without drawing the attention of vindictive authorities.

Part of This World

While we can practice independence from vain desires, we cannot practice independence from reality. While “the greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom”,131 we must remember that even the strongest people cannot be self-sufficient” forever. By definition, mortal life is enriched through fellowship.

[M]oreover, [it is] right to help [also] generations to come (for they too belong to us, though they are still unborn) and, besides, love of humanity prompts us to aid also the foreigners who come here. […]I wished to use this […] to advertise publicly the [medicines] that bring salvation. These medicines we have put [fully] to the test”132

In theologizing about the blessed lifestyles of our divinities, Philódēmos even imagines that “the gods do favors for each other” despite the fact that “each of them is independently capable of providing himself with the most perfect pleasure.”133 The gods are motivated by the good of nature “to maintain their community as a species” through “social intercourse”. So, they “also accept from each other what supplies their other needs, even though they are able to provide these things for themselves, just as we (human beings) sometimes do from those who have the same things (as ourselves).”134

So far as concerns the reality of modern enfranchisement, one can retire from social affairs and limit career ambitions, but one is much less likely to be able to escape their modern context as a citizen, subject to the laws of the territories in which they reside. To the contrary, “we must simultaneously laugh and philosophize and manage a household and administrate the economic affairs”.135 And when it comes to the skepticism and pessimism of the massive political institutions of the modern era, we should remember, “necessity is evil, but there is no necessity to live with necessity.”136


Footnotes

1 οὐδὲ πολιτεύσεσθαι (oúdé politeúsesthai) meaning “not to be politicked” (Laértios 10.119). Politeúsesthai is the present middle/passive infinitive of politeúō meaning “to be politically-involved” with the connotation of wanting “to pursue public office”, wishing “to conduct government”, seeking “to meddle in affairs”, or hoping “to administer the state”.

2 Epíkouros, On Lifestyles (as preserved by Diogénēs Laértios 10.119)

3 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 14 (Ibid., 10.143)

4 Ibid. 28 (Ibid., 10.148)

5 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 28

6 Cicero records μή πολιτεύσεσθαι (mḗ politeúsesthai) that the wise “should not to be politically-involved” (Usener 8).

7 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 14 (Ibid., 10.143)

8 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.120

9 Ibid.

10 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 21 (Ibid., 10.146)

11 Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 3

12 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 15 (Ibid., 10.144)

13 τῶν συμπολιτευομένων (tṓn sympoliteuoménōn) meaning “of those being governed together” or “of those being politically engaged with one another” (Key Doctrine 38). Other translators render “of those living together as citizens” in the form of a present active participle (e.g. “living” as citizens), but the verb is conjugated as the middle/passive participle (e.g. “being politicked”), thus, the middle/passive particle of politeúō means“being governed together”, or “being politically engaged with one another” (Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers10.153).

14 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 38 (Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.153)

15 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 6 (Ibid., 10.141)

16 Pindar, Fragment 76 (c. 5th-century BCE)

17 Cicero, Epistle to Cassius (January 45 BCE) 15.16; also Aelian, Varia Historia 4.13

18 The δῆμοι (dḗmoi) were administrative subdivisions of ancient Athens, similar in scale to modern suburbs or boroughs.

19 “EPÍKOUROS, son of Neoklḗs and Khairestrátē, [was an] Athenian [citizen] of the dḗmē Gargēttós, of the family of the Philaídai, as Mētródōros says in his book On Pedigree.” (Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.1)

20 Contrast against the ascetic John the Baptist from the Second Temple Period (see Matthew 3:4).

21 Μελίτη (Melítē) was an affluent district at the center of ancient Athens, just west of the Acropolis.

22 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.21

23 καταλελειμμένου ἡγεμόνος (kataleleimménou hēgemónos) meaning “of the hēgemṓn having been left behind” (10.20)

24 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.9

25 Ibid., 10.120

26 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 154, fr. XII

27 Ibid., II, 133, fr. IV

28 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 160, XXI-XXV. II, 162, fr. XXVII

29 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.9

30 Ibid., 10.10

31 Usener Fragment 551

32 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 120, fr. XIX

33 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 67

34 Λάθε (2nd-person singular, aorist, active, imperative) of λᾰνθᾰ́νω (lanthánō) meaning “[you] escape notice!”

35 βιώσας (2nd-person singular, aorist, active, imperative) of βιόω (bióō) meaning “[you] live!”

36 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric V

37 Hérmarkhos, Against Empedoklḗs 1.8

38 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 32

39 Hérmarkhos, Against Empedoklḗs 1.7

40 Ibid., 1.10

41 Ibid., 1.9

42 Ibid., 1.10

43 Ibid., 1.8

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid., 1.9

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid., 1.11

48 Ibid.

49 Hérmarkhos, Against Empedoklḗs 1.10

50 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 5.1019-1027; translated by A. E. Stallings.

51 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 224, col. XIX

52 Ibid., I, 171, 2, col. XII

53 Ibid., II, 54, 41

54 Hérmarkhos, Against Empedoklḗs 1.10

55 Ibid., 1.7

56Epíkouros, Key Doctrines 1, 5-7, 13-14, 17, 27-28, 30, 39-40 (including 31-38 on justice)

57Ibid. 17, 31-38

58Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 37

59πρόληψιν (prólepsin) meaning “preconception”, “anticipation”, “definition”, or “common notion”.

60Same note as above [#61]

61The one and only time in extant texts that Epíkouros directly employs the root πολιτευ (politeu) is in reference to the benefits of mutual association in the context of living in an urban environment ruled by law.

62 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II-b

63 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.120

64 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, VII

65 Appianòs of Alexandreús, Mithridatic Wars 6.28

66 Aoiz, Javier and Boeri, Marcelo. Theory and Practice in Epicurean Philosophy 147-148

67 τύραννος (týrannos) meaning “tyrant” or “absolute ruler”, usually with the connotation of a “dictator” or “despot”.

68 For more information, see Epicureans and Atheists in France, 1650-1729 by Alan Charles Kors (2016).

69 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to William Short (31 October 1819).

70 Jules Evans, Philosophy for Life and Other Dangerous Situations: Ancient Philosophy for Modern Problems (91)

71 José Mujica, Human Happiness and the Environment. Rio +20 Summit (20 June 2012, translated by Vero).

72 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 39 (Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.154)

73Epíkoruos, On the Wise (Ibid., 10.120)

74Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.120

75 Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 59

76 Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Col. Ib

77 Ibid., Col. lIb

78 Ibid., Col. Vllb

79 Ibid., Frag. 70

80 Ibid., Frag. 1

81 Ibid., Frag. 66

82 Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Frag. 2

83 Ibid., Col. VIa

84 Ibid., Col. XXIIIa

85 Ibid., Frag. 26

86 Ibid., Frag. 31

87 Ibid., Frag. 60

88 Ibid., Frag. 39

89 Ibid., Frag. 46

90 Ibid., Frag. 35

91 Ibid., Frag. 60

92 Ibid., Frag. 7

93 Ibid., Frag. 87 N

94 Ibid., Col. Va

95 Ibid., Frag. 58

96 Ibid., Frag. 40

97 Ibid., Frag. 45

98 Ibid., Frag. 41

99 Ibid., Frag. 10

100 Ibid., Frag. 36

101 Ibid., Frag. 34

102 Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Col. XVII

103 Diogénēs of Oìnóanda, Fragment 3; translated by M. F. Smith.

104 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.119

105 Epíkouros, Usener Fragment 537

106 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 126, fr. V

107 Ibid., II, 244, col. XLII

108 Ibid., I, 225, fr. I

109 Ibid., VI

110 Ibid., VI

111 Ibid., I-2

112 Ibid., Frag. 19

113 Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, col. Ia-Ib

114 Ibid., Frag. 28

115 Ibid., Frag. 44

116 Ibid., Col. VIIIb

117 Usener 476 – AYTAPKEIA or αὐτάρκεια (aútárkeia) expresses an “autarky”, “self-sufficiency”, or “independence

118 Usener 135a – This fragment was preserved by Stobaîos.

119 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, V, Fragment 13

120 Aristotélēs, Politics, Book I, 1253a

121 Karl Marx claims: “I have always felt a great tenderness for this philosopher [Hērákleitos], whom I prefer above all the Ancients save Aristotle.” (Letter to Ferdinand Lassalle 21 December 1857)

122 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 1.5

123 Usener Fragment 548

124 EΓΚΥΚΛΙΑ or ἐγκύκλια (enkýklia), meaning “cyclical”, “circular”, “recurrent”, “revolving”, or “ordinary” — it refers to both [I] the “gossip” or “daily affairs” that would have been “common to all citizens”, and, elsewhere [II] enkúklia is employed in the context of ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία (énkýklios paideía) an allegedly “‘well-rounded’ education” intended for aristocratic children in an effort to prepare them for civic obligations. In this context, the “rearing”, training”, “education”, and “upbringing“ is criticized by Epíkouros as being a “circular” system of “programming” designed to indoctrinate aristocratic youths with traditional, mythic rhetoric, instilling them with confusion and anxiety.

125 ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΑ or πολιτικὰ (politikà) refers to those conditions related to the pólis (“city”), or else, the troublesome activities that are administrative in nature. Therein, Epíkouros was not issuing a prohibition against civic engagement, which he elsewhere encourages, but was cautioning students against pursuing a career in political office. Holding office, albeit it through democracy or autocracy often relies upon either “a lot of money” made “through an unscrupulous means” or “servility to the mob or authority”, neither of which are conducive to the goal of the good life.

126 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 58

127 Usener Fragment 163

128 Usener Fragment 117

129 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, I, 234, col. IV

130 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 140, fr. XII

131 ελευθερία (eleuthería) has been translated as “freedom”, “liberty”, “manumission”, but also refers to a “license”.

132 Diogénēs of Oìnóanda, Fragment 3; translated by M. F. Smith.

133 Philódēmos, On Gods III 84

134 Ibid., 87

135 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 41

136 Ibid., 9

 


Works Cited

 

Aelian. "Book IV." Varia Historia. Translated by Thomas Stanley, 1665.

Aoiz, Javier and Boeri, Marcelo D. Theory and Practice in Epicurean Philosophy: Security, Justice and Tranquility. Bloomsbury Academic, 2023, 147-148.

Appian. "Mithradatic Wars." Roman History, translated by Horace White, Perseus Digital Library, catalog.perseus.org Aristotle. Politics. Translated by C. D. C. Reeve, Hackett Publishing, 2017.

Armstrong, David. "Epicurean Virtues, Epicurean Friendship: Cicero vs. the Herculaneum Papyri." Epicurus and the Epicurean Traditions, edited by Jeffrey Fish and Kirk R. Sanders, Cambridge University Press, 2011, 126-128.

Aurelius, Marcus. Meditations. Translated by Martin Hammond, Penguin Classics, 2014.

Cicero, Marcus Tullius. Letters to Friends. Edited and translated by D. R. Shackleton Bailey, Harvard University Press, 2001.

Curnow. The Philosophers of the Ancient Worlds: An A-Z Guide. 185 DeWitt, Norman. Epicurus and His Philosophy. Minnesota Press, 342-343 Diogénēs of Oìnóanda. The Epicurean Inscription. Translated by M. F. Smith, Bibliopolis, 1993.

Epíkouros. “Fragments”. Translated by N. H. Bartman, Leaping Pig Publishing, 2026, TWENTIERS.COM/FRAGMENTS.

Epíkouros. “Key Doctrines”. The Hedonicon: The Holy Book of Epicurus, 2023, 1-4. Epíkouros. “Vatican Sayings”. Translated by N. H. Bartman, Leaping Pig Publishing, 2025, TWENTIERS.COM/VATICAN-SAYINGS.

Essler, Holger. "Space and Movement in Philodemus’ De dis 3: an Anti-Aristotelian Account." Space in Hellenistic Philosophy: Critical Studies in Ancient Physics, edited by Graziano Ranocchia et al., De Gruyter, 2014

Evans, Jules. Philosophy for Life and Other Dangerous Situations: Ancient Philosophy for Modern Problems. Rider, 2013, 91.

Hérmarkhos. “Against Empedokles”. Select Works of Porphyry: Containing His Four Books On Abstinence From Animal Food; His Treatise on the Homeric Cave of the Nymphs; and His Auxiliaries to the Perception of Intelligible Natures. Translated by Thomas Taylor, 1823.

Hubbell, Harry M. The Rhetorica of Philodemus. Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1920.

Kors, Alan Charles. Epicureans and Atheists in France, 1650-1729. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Jefferson, Thomas. "Letter to William Short." 31 October 1819. The Papers of Thomas Jefferson: Retirement Series, edited by J. Jefferson Looney et al. (Princeton University Press), vol. 15, pp. 162–65

Jerome. Aspects of the Study of Roman History. 234

Jones, Howard. The Epicurean Tradition. Routledge, 1992.

Laértios, Diogénēs. The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, Book 10: The Life of Epíkouros. Translated by N. H. Bartman, Leaping Pig Publishing, 2025, TWENTIERS.COM/BIOGRAPHY.

Liddell, Henry George, and Robert Scott. A Greek-English Lexicon, revised by Henry Stuart Jones, Clarendon Press, 1940.

Logeion, uchicago.edu.

Loukianós of Samósta. Alexander the False Prophet. Translated by A. M. Harmon, Loeb Classical Library, 1936.

Lucretius. The Nature of Things. Translated by A. E. Stallings, Penguin Classics, 2007.

Marx, Karl. "Marx to Ferdinand Lassalle in Düsseldorf." 21 December 1857. Marx & Engels Collected Works, vol. 40, International Publishers, 1983, 225–227.

Philódēmos. On Frank Criticism. Translated by David Konstan, Society of Biblical Literature, 1980.

Philódēmos. On Gods. 2026, TWENTIERS.COM/ON-GODS Philódēmos. On Property Management. Translated by Tsouna, Society of Biblical Literature, 2013.

Philódēmos. On Piety. Translated by Drik Obink, Clarendon Press, 1996.

Philódēmos. On Rhetoric. Translated by Harry M. Hubble, Conn. Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1920.

Pindar. "Fragment 76." Greek Lyric, Volume IV: Bacchylides, The Epinikia, edited and translated by David A. Campbell, Harvard UP, 1992, p. X

Stewart, Matthew. Nature's God: The Heretical Origins of the American Republic. 2014.

The Holy Bible: New Revised Standard Version. Oxford University Press, 1989 Twentiers: Hogs from the Herd. Leaping Pig Publishing, 2026, TWENTIERS.COM. Usener, Hermann. Epicurea. Lipsiae, 1887.

Wilson, Catherine. Epicureanism at the Origins of Modernity. Clarendon Press, 2008

Superstition Ain’t the Way

N. H. BARTMAN

 

This essay has been translated into classic rock for easier comprehension. Find it here.

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INTRODUCTION: SUPERSTITION AIN’T THE WAY
· TRAMPLED UNDER FOOT

SIDE ONE: PHILOSOPHER’S GARDEN
· TAKE IT EASY
· THE BEST THINGS IN LIFE ARE FREE
· STAYIN’ ALIVE
· MIND GAMES
· HERE COME THE SUN

SIDE TWO: LOSING MY RELIGION
· PEOPLE ARE STRANGE
· BORN UNDER A BAD SIGN
· DREAM ON
· RAMBLE ON
· GREAT GIG IN THE SKY

SIDE THREE: DUST IN THE WIND
· YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT
· ALL THINGS MUST PASS
· DON’T STOP ME NOW
· EVERYBODY HURTS
· DON’T FEAR THE REAPER
· WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM MY FRIENDS
· IN MY LIFE
· IMAGINE
· IN MY TIME OF DYING

SIDE FOUR: THE GRAND ILLUSION
· BLINDED BY THE LIGHT
· MAD WORLD
· GASLIGHTING
· DARK SIDE OF THE MOON
· ABRA-ABRACADABRA
· PARANOID

CONCLUSION: I CAN SEE CLEARLY NOW
· WON’T GET FOOLED AGAIN

 


 

SUPERSTITION AIN’T THE WAY

NOTE: Among all other Hellenistic schools, the Epicurean Garden boasts the greatest conceptual consistency as a philosophy, and the greatest historical consistency as an institution—after all, practical teachings that provide useful knowledge do not require revisions. To ensure that readers have been provided ancient source material, and not just paraphrasing from modern academics, each citation has been studiously documented.

 

INTRODUCTION: TRAMPLED UNDER FOOT

Superstition confounds nature’s goal of “complete happiness”.1 Magical thinking not only obstructs the creative capacity of an individual to achieve their best life2 , but it also challenges the ability of individualsto live as neighbors”.3 Mythic beliefs exacerbate our deepest fears, antagonize the benefits of one another’s fellowship”,4 and “delay the joy5 of the good life.

More than any other personality in the ancient world, Epíkouros championed the “sober calculation6 required to dispel delusion. He provided students with powerful tools to defend against manipulation and mythic deceit. He warns that “if one does not know the whole of nature, but obsesses over the myths”, then one cannot dissolve “the fear over the most important matters.7 However, if one is “rightly following the phenomena” then “the myth departs”.8

The Sage of the Garden explains that “one must study naturepurely, “as the phenomena requires,” without mythic speculations—one must leave “space for the voices of the facts9 in order to “gain a share of genuine tranquility”.10Writing to a student, he affirms that “a life of disorder and empty opinion does not sustain our need, which is moreover, for us to live imperturbably.11 Neither will the wise suffer the deceit of disruptive fictions, nor the duplicity of sanctimonious tyrants. The poet Lucretius orchestrates the Sage’s triumph against “the grinding weight of superstition”:12

Religion, so, is trampled underfoot,
And by his victory we reach the stars
.13

QVARE RELIGIO PEDIBVS SVBIECTA VICISSIM
OPTERITVR NOS EXAEQVAT VICTORIA CAELO.

The Garden epitomizes the “the method of investigation” against “empty opinion”.14 She champions a realistic ethics that applies a practical “measuring by comparison”,15 making “life pleasant” and dispelling “the greatest confusion [that] overtakes our minds”.16 Her founder, consumed “with passion for true philosophy17 saw superstition as sickness—as disease antagonizes the constitution of the flesh, so, too, does “void doctrine18 about reality disturb what is “healthy throughout the soul”.19 As Epíkouros writes, “without a study of nature”, one cannot enjoy “the pure pleasures”.20 One cannot enjoy “tranquility and firm faith21 without “knowledge” to dispel frightening falsehoods.

Assuredly, “when you believe in things that you don’t understand, then you suffer”. As regards “real knowledge”,22 the wise agree, simply speaking, “superstition ain’t the way”.23

SIDE ONE: PHILOSOPHER’S GARDEN

While “taking into account the goal that exists” according to “all of the self-evident facts”,24 Epíkouros observes that “animals, as soon as they are born” naturally suppress “their toil and […] instinctively avoid the pains”.25 Whereas “the feeling of pleasure” is “truly friendly”, so “pain” is innately “hostile”. The Sage observes “in every animal” that “choice and avoidance are distinguished26 by the beacon of pleasure. Since “the primary and innate good27 in animals is “pleasure”, he concludes that the “goal” of the human animal is to secure “the best life28 through the “pursuit [of] pleasure”,29the beginning and ending of living blessedly”.30

The Good31 of pleasure32 to which Epíkouros refers includes both “activities” that excite “joy” and inspire “cheerfulness” as well as the “centered” pleasures of mental “impassiveness” and physical “painlessness”.33 The “kinetic” delights of “action” include “the pleasures of flavor”, “the pleasure of the belly”,34Aphrodisian35 intercourse” (“O thighs for which I justly died!”),36hearing”, “appearances”, “the sight of sweet motions”,37 and the company of “those who share a like-mind”.38The wise”, as Epíkouros writes, “are likely to love the countryside” and “enjoy themselves more than others by theorizing”,39 delighting in “the search for truth”.40 Other pleasures include the serenity of being “just”,41confidence from coexisting with other people”,42 successful “management of one’s possessions”,43 as well as the peace of being “easily satisfied with few possessions”. Everyone is encouraged to pursue pleasure “according to [their] own preference”,44 by the grace of Nature “as does a god”.45

The Hēgemṓn46 adds to his personal list one potlet of cheese”.47 Even those inclined to the unforgiving “podium48 of politics, and those disposed toward the thrill of “Aphrodisia49 are positively encouraged to (responsibly) explore the “change throughout [their] flesh”,50 free from mythic shame, so long as they “neither harm nor be harmed”.51

 

TAKE IT EASY

The pursuit of “absolute happiness52 does not include “the pleasures of the debauched and those lying sick with enjoyment” but only those pleasures that cause “neither suffering throughout the body nor grieving throughout the soul”.53 Nature privileges “pure pleasures”, persuading us to “not in any way prefer the most food but the most delightful”.54 It is not drinking and following festivals, nor taking advantage of subordinates55 and women, nor an expensive multitude of fish or whatever fills an extravagant table that makes life pleasant, but sober calculation” and a consideration of “choice and avoidances.56 Were this not the case, rather, were it the case that “complete happiness57 could be obtained mindlessly, then “there would be no need for the study of nature.” Yet, if one fails to practice proper calculation, “everything will be full of foolishness and of confusion”,58 thus, one must “constantly reference the goal of natural pleasure59 in a realistic context to understand the rewards and “limits of the good life”.60

 

THE BEST THINGS IN LIFE ARE FREE

Epíkouros did not find explicit fault in a “luxurious lifestyle”, so long as it “inherits the natural benefit of the good61 and so far as it notdifficult62 to maintain—however, he did question the value of any such a lifestyle that requires the satisfaction of rare delights, constantly “behold[ing] a change in energy”.63 As the Hēgemṓn recognized, necessary comforts of life (like food, water, and, warmth) are provided by nature in abundance, when compared with unnecessary desires, like acquiring rare pieces of expensive art or dominating political movements, things notoriously difficult to procure. “Thanks [to] the blessed nature”, Epíkouros writes, “that has made the necessities obtainable, but the unobtainable, unnecessary.”64

The Sage concludes that the best life is the “cheapest and simplest life65 required to maintain “equilibrium”.66 He concludes that it is better “to have courage lying upon a bed of straw than to agonize with a gold bed and a costly table.”67 He observes that inexpensive “barley-bread and water deliver the greatest pleasure whenever anyone in need has consumed them”.68 He avoided those “pleasures that come from extravagance”, and cautioned against indulgence, “not because of” the pleasures themselves, “but because of the difficulties that follow them.”69Therefore adapt into a simple and not extravagant lifestyle as it forms an essential part of health,”70 and “spit on what is beautiful and those who vainly worship, when nothing produces pleasure”!71

 

STAYIN’ ALIVE

While “there is elegance in simplicity”, the possibility of living “a pleasant life” is threatened when constantly challenged by severe, physical insecurity, as with malnutrition. Nature is “preserved by pleasures” but “weak to what is evil”,72 thus “all the suffering” caused by the “poverty” of being unable to satisfy the body’s basic living needs must be “removed. The wisest among us will find a way to “be happy” even if “tortured”, as they continue living their best inner-life, but even so, mental “health does involve some care and effort for the body.”73

As Philódēmos writes, “when [health] is absent”, it “causes unspeakably more distress”.74 One need not neglect the health of the body as though it were “vain”, simply for the sake of “virtues”.75 The Sage observes an inseparable link between “the bellow of the flesh” and “the bellow of the soul” because “the whine of the flesh” burdens “the soul; while truly difficult to impede, it is more dangerous for a person day-by-day to disobey the dictation of Nature”.76 Epíkouros goes so far as to define the pleasure “of a god” in terms of physical satisfaction: even a god must prioritize maintaining relief from “the cry of the[ir] flesh”, suffering “neither hunger, nor thirst, nor shiver[ing]77 The wise are warm with pleasure, having dispelled “the Winter of the soul78. “For if the one who possesses the latter can hope to possess this happiness they would contend beyond even Zeus.”79 A mind subsists most soundly “in a healthy body”.80

Epíkouros observes that a healthy lifestyle requires that “we simultaneously laugh and philosophize, and manage a household and administrate the economic affairs and never let go of the language of the forthright philosophy.”81 Philódēmos reasons that we must afford “a leisurely retreat with one’s friends, and a most dignified income”.82 We cannot “gain mastery over the sirens” of suffering “in every physical condition, nor in every cultural context”,83 nor in every location, as with regions that are grossly inhospitable to human existence. A life consumed by constant, physical need due to insecurity challenges everyone’s ability to live happily.

Thus, a wise person benefits by prioritizing the satisfaction of natural needs, whereas a fool “is consumed by procrastination84 and negligence. As the Hēgemṓn writes, nature thrives when “persuaded”, but shrinks when “violated”.85 One must “choose” to satisfy nature by selecting healthy choices, “fulfilling her necessary desires, and not those that cause harm”.86 Indeed, we exercise virtues “not for their own sake,” but “just as medicine, for the sake of health”.87

 

MIND GAMES

While eliminating “suffering throughout the body88 is necessary to cultivate a good life, the health of the body, alone, does not guarantee the soundness of the mind (as with the case of the masses who suffer from “vain beliefs” that fall “into infinity”).89 Even for those with sculpted flesh, blessed with the gift of a healthy constitution, even they may lack “a stout heart that has no fear of death90 and suffer deeply from irrational fears. Epíkouros notes that “great stresses draw [life] short” and that the stress that is excessive will bring on death.”91Without cultivating a stable foundation, psychological suffering, by itself can devastate and otherwise healthy body.

The Epicurean school recognized that “the flesh tossed in a storm only [suffers the] present,” which only lasts so long, “but the mind [suffers] the past, the present, and the future92. Seeing that the most enduring “pains of [the] body are inferior” to the “psychological” torment of the mind, the ancient Epicureans rejoiced that “the greater pleasures are of the mind93. Thus, the resilience of the intellect allows us to manage our pain through the patience, and to relieve inner turmoil with reflection. Without “the continuous activity into [the] study of nature,”94 we risk becoming like “mindless men”,95 susceptible to the influence of fears and the frauds.

Supernatural apprehensions not only disrupt rational discourse, but they also provide despots with a unique point of access to many of those who subscribe to the fables of the poets”.96 The Sage writes, from out of the doctrines” of the multitude, “the greatest confusion overtakes our minds”.97 When this transpires, “everything becomes full of foolishness and of confusion”.98 One wrestles confusion over the unknown and struggles against friends, needlessly fomenting suspicion and distrust against neighbors — “politics is the worse foe of friendship”.99

Of those things that wisdom prepares for a full life of blessedness, by far the most important is the possession of friendship.”100 The confusion introduced by conspiratorial myths aggravates social discord. To avoid becoming an agent of ignorance, one must “not allow empty speech to disturb”, but should “look to the realities.101 Assuredly, the superstitions of the common people do not disturb one who is persuaded” against both “the myths of the gods102 and the death, confident that, beyond the blessing of memory, a person suffer “no existence after death”.103This dually applies to conspiratorial thinking in a modern age, those reductive, mythic hypotheses based upon clueless conjecture. As the Sage writes to a student, above all104

devote yourself to a consideration of the beginnings, and of infinity, and of the related things, further still, we reflect on account of the criteria [of sensation and anticipation] and of feelings, and not those [myths,] for above all, these [considerations must] be contemplated calmly on account of looking into the causes responsible for creation.

HERE COMES THE SUN

Epíkouros observed that one must “remove from oneself, to the extent that it is possible […] the fear of things that are not to be feared105 to receive happiness. One must “step over much of the myth”,106 and “not allow empty speech” about speculations and conspiracies “to disturb” them. One must “look to realities”,107 like observing that death is “unconsciousness108 or “anesthetization”, and that superstitious beliefs are based upon “false assumptions”.109 These realizations “will banish anything irrational110 as when one apprehends supernatural terrors from “the myths”,111 or supposes mortal things to survive mortality, or anticipates pain to exist during an anesthetized state, or fears the “real” existence “bodilessbodies,112which supersede Nature. Lucretius describes the first principle needed to overcome mythic deceit:113

This terror then and darkness of mind must be dispelled
not by the rays of the sun and glittering shafts of day,
but by the aspect and the law of nature;
the warp of whose design we shall begin with this first principle,
nothing is ever gotten out of nothing by divine power.114

Epíkouros teachers that there can be “no receiving the pure pleasures” of life without “a study of nature”. One must commit to dissolving the fear over the most important matters” if one is to overcome the paranoid imaginings “about the myths115 that enshroud the modern world.

 

SIDE TWO: LOSING MY RELIGION

While mythic complexes have provided answers to fears about death, dying, and despair, they have also spread irrational panic. Indeed, greatly has religion been able to persuade [all kinds] of evils.”116 Twenty centuries before Voltaire urged contemporaries to reject “absurdities” lest they lead to “atrocities”,117philosophers from the Epicurean school observed that vain beliefs118 about “the nature of reality119 challenge our ability to make practical decisions and pursue pleasure. “As it happens”, people commonly “neither perceive their own errors nor discern what is advantageous120 and thus,many great evils, concerning many matters occur as result of the worthless assumptions” can be “avoided as a result of the right concepts”. 121

More often, on the contrary, it is Religion122 breeds
Wickedness and that has given rise to wrongful deeds,
As when the leaders of the Greeks, those peerless peers, defiled
The Virgin’s altar with the blood of Agamemnon’s child123

 

PEOPLE ARE STRANGE

People “place themselves in such a situation so as not to take advice from anybody about anything at all” as concerns rational inquiry. Yet ironically, many maintain a “belief that nothing depends on man, but everything is controlled by the god. Then, at any rate they fall into the evils which the lack of forethought tends to inflict“.124 For example, “in times of distress” superstitious minds “turn their thoughts to religion much more earnestly,125 abandoning practical solutions. Then, “because of their apprehension to do nothing against the will of the gods, they fail to act,126 and “sometimes they cast their own cities into evils as well“. Lucretius laments: 

This was what was deplorable and above all
eminently heart-rending: when a person saw themself
enmeshed by the disease, as though they were doomed to death,
losing all spirit they would lie with sorrow-stricken heart,
and with their thoughts turned on death would surrender their life then and there
.127

Epíkouros teaches that “to become truly and unshakably whole”,128one must not pretend to philosophize, but really philosophize”, not pretend to study nature, but really study nature, “for we do not pretend to need health, but in truth [need] health”.129 To pursue “perfect happiness”,130 one must dissect the “false assumptions of the masses about the deities”, death, and desire.131

 

BORN UNDER A BAD SIGN

Epíkouros contends, frankly, that “divination is not real” and “regard[s] the predictions [as] nothing to us”.132 He affirms “that romance is not sent by god133 and rejects “the contrivances of the deplorable astrologers134 as well as the “the vain” and “empty” practice of “astrology”.135 Divinatory practices like astromancy,136 more commonly referred to as “astrology137 eliminate moral agency in human beings, posed as mere puppets of stellar mechanics. Yet a person’s future does not depend on “whether one was born in the Ram or the Twins, or in both the Fishes.”138

To enjoy the good life, a person cannot “become a slave of physical inevitability”, bereft of “the expectation of dignity” that comes with living beautifully. In a world without choice, neither would we be accountable for our injustices, nor responsible for our restraint. Epíkouros writes that “the one who says that everything happens by necessity cannot then bring a charge against the one who says that not everything happens by necessity; for the former affirms the latter happens by necessity.”139 On the other hand, divination requires humans to be puppets of fate.

Even if” an allegedly “divine” prediction turned out to be “real”, a wise person would continue to “regard the predictions [as] nothing to us”.140 “Wisdom does not at all deal by chance”.141 One does not become more proficient at playing the lottery, even if one happens to win the lottery.Consider it is better to calculate well being unlucky than to have irrationally good luck”.142 Otherwise, no learning occurs, no knowledge is gained, and no wisdom is advanced.

Prophecy is unreliable and inconsistent, yet it wields great power to confound those who observe it — hypnotism works, but only on those who believe. Many beliefs exacerbate “fears, largely” because they fail to address the source of their anxiety, aggrandizing “the remaining143 apprehensions. These include “fears about both aerial phenomena144 and unknown “things of the sky”, as with some ufologists, “and beneath the earth and generally in the Infinite”.145

DREAM ON

Writing about the visions we apprehend “in sleep”, Epíkouros concludes that “neither is the divine nature received nor [is] prophetic power” obtained, “but really”, dreams “are generated from an inundation of images.”146Moreover,” the Sage rejects augury and omens: “the signs are generated” as a result of pure “coincidence”; they “are not at all being delivered” by some supernatural force. “[N]o such divine nature commands” these intelligible events.147

RAMBLE ON

Even “more absurd”, concurs the critic Cicero, “are the fables of the poets”.148 Like prophets, they credit transcendental forces for having designed the products of their own, creative labor. “To these idle and ridiculous flights of the poets we may add the prodigious stories invented by the Magi,149 and by the Egyptians” who also entertained dreamy practices like oneiromancy150 along “with the extravagant notions of the multitude”.151 Some, like “the Stoics”, teases Philódēmos, “invent […] peculiar and impossible arguments” based upon their preferred allegories, having “seize[d] upon the mythical inventions of others”.152 In this case, students of the Stoa153 are accused of appropriating the “fables of poets” (like Hómēros and Hēsíodos).154 Later, their Roman descendants inflated the myth of Hēraklḗs (known to them as Hercules), and represented this fictional figure as a divine icon of their program.155

Although “the wise will rightly hold dialogue about” the nuances of “both music and poetry” among themselves, Epíkouros affirms that “they would not expend energy writing about poems”,156 publicly defending one interpretation over another. All such fictions are the products of human creativity. The fictions themselves are derivative of events that otherwise could be studied directly. Philódēmos writes, “I pass over orators and poets and all that kind of trash157 in favor of a study of nature. Lucretius advances brutal criticism against religious superstition:

Let us agree that he can call the earth
Mother of the Gods, on this condition
That he refuses to pollute his mind
With the foul poison of religion.158

As Philódēmos describes, generations (enchanted by the tales of “self-important theologians and poets159 about transcendental “tyrants” with “terrifying” power) came to adopt false histories, thereby injecting a series of distressing expectations into their worldview. Humans gain little benefit in believing that Eve committed the first sin by chewing fruit, or that Pandora unleashed evil by uncorking a jar, or that Zeus sent a deluge to kill the peers of Deucalion, or that the LORD conjured a storm to flood the contemporaries of Noah … or any number of other stories that mislead people toexpect great misfortunes” from the future. Were we to rely upon the “false assumptions of the masses“,160 that include myth into their worldview, it “would accomplish nothing161 but aggravate disturbance. We cannot treat insanity with allegory.

GREAT GIG IN THE SKY

As fears” flourish in the absence of real knowledge about real “phenomena162, Epíkouros distinguishes the “suspicions about death163 as “the most [seemingly] horrible”, since we know, with certainty, that life will end. Treating fear of death with myth fails to address the reality of grief. As one mistakes a placebo for ointment, so the proverbial rash worsens. In failing to face this “perpetual terror”, a superstitious mind suffers, “always expecting some164 fear of loss.

Epíkouros observes that the multitude suffers” and “grieves” predictable inevitabilities as a result of mythic misunderstandings, “which is” as he writes, “the worst evil”.165 The time over which the pain of loss is processed can be drastically lessened by accepting that death is a natural end, and, to those who are dead, death is literally nothing. If a person is to procure “the complete life”, they must “step over” that which is “a myth166 and dissolve their “fears about both […] death167 and the burden of “grief”.168 Otherwise, anguish “screws them out of the best life.”169

SIDE THREE: DUST IN THE WIND

The Epicureans of the Hellenistic world observed that “all people, including those with [a] good […] physique […] became skeletons in a short period of time, and in the end are dissolved into their elementary particles”.170 The stories of “all those who have been and those who will come to be in the world” will be lost “when it has been destroyed” and “no one will be remembered”.171 As each cosmos has “been generated out of the countless” particles, “in turn, each is to be dissolved”,172 including “both animals, and plants, and all the rest being observed”.173 Thus, of all afflictions that plague the peace of the soul, those fears related to death and dying are the most pervasive.

Not even those who are “worshipped and well-liked”, who seem to have “procured safety”, those “pronounced popular174, who command “power”,175 boasting a “brilliant reputation and great wealth176 can secure themselves against death, “since fortune, ruler of all people, is capable of taking [everything] away”.177 Indeed, “we all reside in an unfortified city in relation to death”.178 Practically, “there was no point procuring protection if a person” succumbs to “suspicion of those things from the sky and beneath the earth and generally in the Infinite.”179

YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT

Angst is nothing new. Anguish is ancient—so, too are the principal sources of anxiety, “always intruding180 upon “the pleasures of the mind”.181 Turmoil itself is a feature of mortality. For most of human history, nearly half of all children died before their 10th birthday. To this day, disease holds the highest kill count in history. No political plot has ever been as deadly as tuberculosis. Modernity has only innovated upon anxiety; she did not invent it. The origins of dread precede the disasters of the contemporary era by an epoch — torment itself is prehistoric.

Human populations crashed during the paleolithic period after a series of unstoppable catastrophes and instances of environmental collapse. Until the contemporary period, tooth decay has been a leading cause of mortality. During the Peloponnesian War of the 5th-century BCE, an epidemic decimated over 25% of the Athenian population, including the prominent statesman Pericles. During the reign of Marcus Aurelius, the Antonine Plague killed millions, including the emperor’s adoptive brother (and co-ruler) Lucius Aurelius Verus. During the early medieval period, the Plague of Justinian (that lasted for two centuries), claimed the lives of tens of millions, both affluent and impoverished, famous and anonymous. The classical Maya civilization collapsed during an extended period of drought that instigated an agricultural crisis. Centuries after, the Black Death killed half of Eurasia. In the modern era, HIV/AIDS has claimed at least as many lives as the Black Death. Related, venereal disease has afflicted human relations and complicated human happiness for millennia; despite numerous advancements, over 1 million people contract curable STIs every day;182 in the span of one year, over 350,000 women die from cervical cancer.183 This brief paragraph only hints at the devastation that micro-organisms wreck upon the human body. These “enduring illnesses184 act as agents of death, and are among the greatest antagonists to human history, chief sources of historic anxiety

 

ALL THINGS MUST PASS

Managing fear of death is a key to happiness. “Remember”, urges the Epicurean philosopher Mētródōros, “that everything by nature is subject to death”,185 and while “it might be possible to furnish security against misfortune”, when it comes to death, “every human lives in a city without walls”.186 Truly, “every person, even if they should be stronger than the Giants, is transient in relation to life and death187 since “indiscriminately, we have all been infused with the fatal drug from birth”.188 Thus, “the most significant disturbance [to arise] within the souls [of] human beings is generated by […] perpetual terror”,189 by fearing the loss of friends, the pain of dying, and the state of being dead. This terror arrises “because of” their “being frightened of death”, and as a result, they are “unable to bear” the “burden of misfortune”.190 Death “truly” is the ultimate form of “necessity beyond human control”, thus a constant source of concern.191

 

DON’T STOP ME NOW

Yet while “necessity is evil […] there is no necessity to live with necessity”.192 For “necessity is not accountable, and [we] perceive luck [as] unreliable”.193 Becoming a “slave to physical inevitability” removes any “expectation of dignity”,194 forever “waiting for Godot”.195 Epíkouros affirms that “rarely is a sage disrupted by chance, but the greatest and most important matters are directed by reason throughout their lifetime.”196Luck is unreliable”—at most, “if one receives a paradoxical piece of good luck,” one might be “grateful to circumstances” and count their blessings.197 Otherwise, it would seem that “the whole of life is but a struggle in darkness”.198

 

EVERYBODY HURTS

The 2,100-year-old writings of the Philódēmos catalogue timeless suspicions about death that have historically darkened the mind—people naturally fear “the pains that come from loss199 and “the deprivation of good things200just as they principally threaten our pursuit of pleasure. In the context of being “gripped by illness”,201 like “those with heart disease202 who may become “unconscious in torpor and faintness”, some fear that they may “never again recover”,203 discouraged by “the whole decay from the peaks to old age”.204 Many obsessively dread an “untimely death”,205 condemned “to die young” before they advance their talents,206 enabling “enemies [to] rejoice over them”,207not leaving behind” a legacy208. Others are “distressed at not having left behind children209 so that “the fruits of [their] labors will” be devalued by “unworthy” and “wicked” people.210 Many fear that “parents or children or a spouse […] will be in dire straits on account of their death”.211 Some fear “dying abroad212, while others fear dying alone “on one’s bed […] rather than doing some doughty deed for even future generations to learn about.213 Conversely, others dread getting “killed like cattle in the lines of battle214 or dying “while fighting an enemy215 or fear “death at sea”,216 or “violently as a result of condemnation by a court or ruler”.217 Some “experience suffering at the prospect of not being remembered by anyone”,218 while others are “pained because [they are] going to be reviled”.219 Ineffectually, the masses are [either] fleeing death, sometimes as the greatest evil,” or else, they vainly imagine themselves to “prefer the repose in [Death] to living”.220

 

DON’T FEAR THE REAPER

Epíkouros reassures students that the state ofdeath in no way exists”, since “what has dissolved lacks perception; and that which lacks perception in no way exists for us”.221 Remembering this, students can avoid emotional paralysis when struck by mortality, neither fearing their own cessation, nor fearing the expiration of their loved ones. The Epicurean school denies any possibility that one could experience torment after death, since death is a state of “unconsciousness and non-existence”.222 For indeed, “to the [dead, death is nothing]”.223

This minimizes the misery of dying, reassuring us that “the peak of pain” exists for the absolute “briefest time224necessarily, the most excruciating, physical pains, those that are so severe that they lead to immediate death, are the most brief. By comparison, the rest of the pains, which are not so severe as to result in immanent death, are, by definition, survivable.

Even the superior torment “of the mind225 and “sorrow that weighs upon” the soul “on account of death226 can be slowly relieved with patience, introspection, and reflection. Epíkouros recommends that “we sympathize with the beloved [deceased] not by lamenting, but by reflecting”.227 Survivors find peace through the value of memory, and the therapeutic gratitude that contextualizes the “undying228 good of friendship. “Sweet [is] the memory of a friend who has died,”229 since pleasant remembrance “for those who died before their time had come230 eases the grief of loss.

WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM MY FRIENDS

The devastating pain of grief is significantly relieved by the blessing of friendship. Epíkouros exhorts us all to “be prepared” for death by bringing “together a fellowship of friends231 to support one another through the pain of loss, especially guaranteed losses, those of our mentors, parents, spouses, and every furry friend whom a person has every loved. In forming mutual bonds “with other people”, survivors “live pleasantly among one another keep[ing] steadfast faith”, thereby “engender[ing] the fullest intimacy”,232 sharing love during times of despair, so as to never suffer loss alone.

IN MY LIFE

One manages grief by honoring the memories of the deceased. By practicing gratitude, one reminds oneself of the powerful gift of love that is left after the loss of a loved one. “One must not spoil the present by yearning for the absent; but consider that also these [present] things were once of the [things for which] we wish.”233 Fittingly, it is love, from the memory of ones’ deceased friends that helps one endure sudden loss. Great loss can only come from the loss of a great love, yet no loss can lessen the greatness of the love that outlasts death.

Philódēmos offers consolation to those suffering sudden, unexpected loss, as when a parent loses a child, or a spouse loses their partner, seemingly “falling somewhat short of the best life”.234 Philódēmos asks survivors: “consider it irrational and incredible not if someone dies but if [one] endures for a certain length of time”, for “enduring all the way to old age really [is] a most prodigious thing”.235 Historically, most human lives have ended relatively shortly. Yet no life, no matter how short, need be wasted, nor lived ignobly, nor suffered without dignity. Nature enables living beings to “profit by one day as by eternity”,236 for “unlimited time contains pleasure” that is no less valuable “than that which is limited”.237 Nature’s goal is pleasure, not immortality. As Tolkien wrote, “’All we have to decide is what to do with the time that is given us’”.238

IMAGINE

As regards apprehensions about one’s own death, the Sage provides assurance that the experience of “death in no way exists for us”, given that “what has dissolved lacks perception; and that which lacks perception in no way exists for us”.239 The pain that is so severe that it leads to death is proportionally brief. After the loss of feeling, there can be no feeling of pain—nor can there be pleasure, nor bliss, nor relief; thus, there can be no incentive for suicide.Undoubtedly trivial are the greatest number of motives one might advance toward an exportation from life”.240

Meditating upon the real knowledge that Death is nothing to us creates [for] a mortal an enjoyable life, not [by] adding endless time, but [by] having been dispossessed of the yearning for immortality”.241 Philódēmos explains that in “avoiding a careless death, a person

is industrious because of the consequent doctrine based on the concept of the preservation of one’s goods. And since he does not cut short the long extent of his life, he always begins new activities and friendly attachments. And he attends to his own property as to how to administer it. Also, he reflects on former events in the belief that they may concern him in the future. And he treats with much care as many people as he can, and he is thankful to those who treated him kindly, in particular because he hopes that he will share in some goods with them or that he will receive some benefit by these same people again in the future242

Accepting the finality of mortality highlights the importance of preparing for the inevitable — for example, one can engage the practice of composing a living will (as did Epíkouros) to safeguard the continued happiness of those who survive the deceased, hoping to deter those who would harm them. It ispossible to take precautions243 against a number of potential misfortunes, such as preventing “a lot of indolence regarding financial matters” when it comes to succession and inheritance.244 In his will, Epíkouros ensured that his best friend, Hérmarkhos, a non-Athenian, would logistically inherit the Garden, circumventing typical stipulations by Athenian law. The Hēgemṓn also provisioned a clause to provide students with permanent access to the Garden. He emancipated his servants, and allocated resources for his friends’ children’s education (whose completion he would not have the pleasure of witnessing).

Before he died, the 2nd-century Epicurean Diogénēs of Oìnóanda commissioned a monument to the teachings of Epíkouros. Builders erected an 8-foot-tall, 260-foot wide stone stoa, surrounded by a portico, adorned with statues, etched with Epicurean teachings. It contained a survey of the wisdom of Epíkouros (as summarized by Diogénēs), as well as several Key Doctrines by the Hēgemṓn. Reflecting upon his own, impending death, the elderly Diogénēs writes,

Having already reached the sunset of my life (being almost on the verge of departure from the world on account of old age), I wanted, before being overtaken by death, to compose a [fine] anthem [to celebrate the] fullness [of pleasure] and so to help now those who are well-constituted. […] besides, love of humanity prompts us to aid also the foreigners who come here. Now, since the remedies of the inscription reach a larger number of people, I wished to use this stoa to advertise publicly the [medicines] that bring salvation. These medicines we have put [fully] to the test; for we have dispelled the fears [that grip] us without justification, and, as for pains, those that are groundless we have completely excised, while those that are natural we have reduced to an absolute minimum, making their magnitude minute.245

IN MY TIME OF DYING

When it comes to inevitable “sickness”, a wise person can address their fears of infirmity by planning to prevent becoming “irascible and hard to please and ill-tempered246 when deprived of sense faculties. Such a person “takes the greatest care of [their] health. And feeling confidence against illness and death, [they] endure with strength the therapies that can remove them.”247 By the Hellenistic period, ancient Epicureans had published a variety of scrolls on pain management and psychological health, including the scroll Theories about Disease248. Philódēmos explains that one should cultivate a robust “state of health249 and “be prepared […] from coexisting with other people”—yet when this is no longer possible, Philódēmos recommends that “the right management […] lies in this: in not feeling distressed about what one loses”.250

As the end of life approaches, so writes Philódēmos, one can choose to face death without fear, regret, and worry. The resilience of the intellect allows us to manage peak anxiety through the rejoicing of “the mind upon reliving the memory” of past pleasures. Even at the end of life, when faced with annihilation, “persons of sound mind” can recall their having “enjoyed everything” as “unconsciousness is taking hold of them”, allowing them to “expire […]undauntedly”,251 as “the old one anchors safely in the harbor that is retirement”, after “those good things that were once hoped for were captured” in memory “for safe charity”.252Even on “the day that is the last of life” despite pains “not abating in extremity of their greatness”,253 memories can bless the mind.

For those who pass due to diseases that afflict the mind, even then, bereft of memory, “we will try to make the end more excellent [than] the beginning; we should be taking the path into dawn; yet whenever we go so far as the end, [we should] enjoy ourselves equally.”254 In absence of this peace, confusion exacerbates the pain of dying and the fear of death. The promises of persuasive personalities, who reassure the intellect that we can escape death insults the human soul.

Diogénēs of Oìnóanda adds “as I have said before, the majority of people suffer from a common disease, as in a plague, with their false notions about things, and their number is increasing”.255

SIDE FOUR: THE GRAND ILLUSION

Charlatans thrive in a climate of fear.

Chiefly, swindlers target those vulnerable to mythic persuasion. As “false prophets256 spread myths in the ancient agora, so too do manicured politicians sell sound bites through modern speakers. Grifters, con-artists, and other malignant narcissists have prized and preferred to provoke gullible souls with superstition. They address the “public in the traditional patter of magicians257 as ridiculed by the ancient Epicurean author Loukianós. In an era characterized by disinformation and propaganda, cultivating tools against fraud is critical to living a good life.

 

BLINDED BY THE LIGHT

The FIRST science fiction writer, Loukianós of Samósata lambasted one such fraud who readily discerned that human life is swayed by two great tyrants, hope and fear, and that a man who could use both of these to advantage would speedily enrich himself”.258 The satirist documents an early instance of book-burning, instigated by a petulant zealot who took offense to theEstablished Beliefs” of Epíkouros. As Loukianós writes, the false prophet “greatly feared Epicurus […] seeing in him an opponent and critic of his trickery.”259 They continue:

he brought [the book] into the middle of the market-place, burned it on […] fig-wood just as if he were burning the man in person, and threw the ashes into the sea […] But the scoundrel had no idea what blessings that book creates for its readers and what peace, tranquillity, and freedom it engenders in them, liberating them as it does from terrors and apparitions and portents, from vain hopes and extravagant cravings, developing in them intelligence and truth, and truly purifying their understanding, not with torches and squills and that sort of foolery, but with straight thinking, truthfulness and frankness.260

Loukianós describes in high resolution an instance of trickery wrought by Alexander the False Prophet. In terms of the specific “ruse” the swindler employed, the Epicurean explains:

he contrived an ingenious ruse. Going at night to the foundations of the temple […] where a pool of water had gathered […] he secreted there a goose-egg, previously blown, which contained a snake just born; and after burying it deep in the mud, he went back again. In the morning he ran out into the market-place naked […] he congratulated the city because it was at once to receive the god in visible presence. The assembly […] had come running […] he ran at full speed to the future temple […] he asked for a libation-saucer, and when somebody handed him one, deftly slipped it underneath and brought up […] that egg in which he had immured the god […]. Taking it in his hands, he asserted that at that moment he held Asclepius! They gazed unwaveringly […] when he broke it and received the tiny snake into his hollowed hand, and the crowd saw it moving and twisting about his fingers, they at once raised a shout, welcomed the god, congratulated their city, and began each of them to sate himself greedily with prayers, craving treasures, riches, health, and every other blessing from, him. […] the whole population followed, all full of religious fervour and crazed with expectations.261

Ranking magical thinking among the greatest of evils (and sparing few words for those who perpetuate superstition), the satirist ridicules the “drivelling idiots262 and “thick-witted, uneducated fellows” who became willfully “deluded” by the charlatan’s “ruse”. The false prophet appealed to common expectations and misunderstandings. In doing so, the liar won the crowd.

Loukianós concludes that “the trick stood in need of […] Epicurus himself or Metrodorus, or someone else with a mind as firm as adamant toward such matters, so as to disbelieve and guess the truth”.263 Here again, an intellectual foundation, grounded in the reality of nature is needed to help guard against mythic deceit. By contrast, supernatural religions and mystical cults feed into the practice of myth and manipulation, doing little to relieve fear, and much to increase it.

MAD WORLD

The μῦθοι (mýthoi) or “myths” of the ancient world provided “plaguy scoundrel[s]”, “swindler[s]”,264 and “consummate rascals” (“greatly daring, fully prepared for mischief”,265practising quackery and sorcery”)266 with devious tools to exploit the superstitious sensibilities of those whom Loukianós‘ disparagingly referred to as “‘fat-heads’ and simpletons”.267 This was done to “line [the charlatan’s] purses fairly well at [the] expense268 of genuinely pious, yet tragically misguided believers. Lucretius orchestrates a mythic example — King Agamémnōn sacrifices his daughter Iphigéneia, to ensure that Ártemis would ordain their campaign:

More often, on the contrary, it is Religion269 breeds
Wickedness and that has given rise to wrongful deeds,
As when the leaders of the Greeks, those peerless peers, defiled
The Virgin’s altar with the blood of Agamemnon’s child270

History preserves an extensive list of violations and abuses by allegedly spiritual institutions. Whether sacrificing children (or marrying them), or dominating women, brutalizing neighbors, inciting mass slaughter, enslaving captives, persecuting foreigners, popularizing martyrdom, hosting crusades, organizing inquisitions, burning thinkers, drowning healers, hanging doctors, spinning lies, bombing medics, incinerating protestors …. Reality demonstrates how the agents of religious violence excuse themselves from observing “the nature of what is just”.271

This ancient, historical scheme developed over time. After millennia, myths that were once only shared around campfires were formalized by powers into social institutions. Many of those institutions facilitated the transfer of wealth from disadvantaged citizens to insulated priests. Many engaged in political manipulation by deceiving those politicians who based their process of decision-making on ecstatic visions, and not the study of nature. Many engaged in the abuse of the young, female “oracles” who had been trafficked to the temples. Many others, still, exploited their knowledge of natural events to manipulate their followers and gain influence.

In addition to exploiting with magical thinking, many institutions of religion have intertwined themselves with politics and government, growing empires, spreading propaganda, expanding colonies, stealing territory, justifying genocide, perpetuating slavery, pardoning rape, editing histories, robbing treasuries, defrauding economies, deceiving leaders, enchanting legislators —supernatural institutions and political states are two peas in a pod of power and deception.

Personalities like Charles Manson, Jim Jones, David Koresh, and Marshall Applewhite are not unique to the this era. Joseph Goebbels only innovated upon propaganda, he did not invent it. Leopold II was a mere rookie compared to the seasoned violence of Genghis Khan.

So it seems, people have … always been like this.

GASLIGHTING

The subterranean Ploutonia billowed with the deadly pneuma (or “breath”) of Kérberos, the three-headed, canine guardian of the underworld. The temples were named for their host, Ploútōn (better known as idēs) who ruled the ploútos, the great “wealth” from the substances that rest beneath the Earth’s surface. For mindless beasts and uninitiated supplicants, the mythic fumes of the temples were deadly—only clergy, due to their righteous piety and closeness to divinity had been graced with supernatural protection, inoculating the lethality of the dogs’ fumes.

Topographically, those sanctuaries were constructed above fault lines; their chambers trapped and flatulated volcanic gases. After centuries of habitation, some residents noticed—some vents triggered intoxication; some, convulsions; some, death. Some residents found ways to exploit their neighbors’ ignorance of this natural phenomenon. Strábōn elaborates on the specifics:

…the Plutonium, below a small brow of the mountainous country that lies above it, is an opening of only moderate size, large enough to admit a man, but it reaches a considerable depth, and it is enclosed by a quadrilateral handrail, about half a plethrum in circumference, and this space is full of a vapour so misty and dense that one can scarcely see the ground. Now to those who approach the handrail anywhere round the enclosure the air is harmless, since the outside is free from that vapor in calm weather, for the vapor then stays inside the enclosure, but any animal that passes inside meets instant death. At any rate, bulls that are led into it fall and are dragged out dead; and I threw in sparrows and they immediately breathed their last and fell. But the Galli, who are eunuchs, pass inside with such impunity that they even approach the opening, bend over it, and descend into it to a certain depth.272

To Strábōn, the ruse was obvious: the eunuch priests “hold their breath as much as they can”  so as to mechanically avoid ingesting toxic fumes until they have risen above them.273 The priests understood that some, lethal vapor must pool at the bottom of the cavern. Pliny the Elder records that “there is a place which kills all those who enter it. And the same takes place at Hierapolis in Asia, where no one can enter with safety, except the priest of the great Mother of the Gods.”275 In the center of this invisible, vaporous pool stood a raised landform from which a cleric spoke. Supplicants would encircle the stage like a captive audience. The theatre would proceed: a bull would be lead before the congregation into the breath of Kérberos. The terrific power of the underworld would then kill the unobservant beast. The devout priest, protected from the lethal vapors  would rise to the center, thus, demonstrating their power over death.

(As a supplement to this description .. and brief tangent … note that the institution to which we refer as “religion”, and the art to which we refer to as “theatre” were once indistinguishable. A fundamental function of ancient, stage-focused, stadium-seated theatre was to facilitate religion. Similarly, modern, stage-focused, stadium-seated religion employs theatre as a tool.)

By the Hellenistic period, rational minds penetrated the clerics’ contrivance. Many reasoned that the air we breathe must be made of several kinds of vapors that do not uniformly mix. Some rise, and some fall. “In other places there are prophetic caves, where those who are intoxicated with the vapour [that] rises from them predict future event”.274 Rising vapors (like the sweet-smelling, trance-inducing ethylene gas) flooded the sanctums of the oracles and induced visions. Falling vapors (like carbon dioxide) pooled at the bottom of the “Gates of Hell” in the “Holy City” of Hierápolis. Those vapors were suffocating. In small doses, hydrocarbon gases (like ethylene) could trigger visions. In higher doses, oracles could seize and convulse. In the highest doses, die.

The ancient Greek clergy’s abuse of their neighbors’ fears and ignorance of natural phenomena reflects a pattern found throughout human history. Ancient priests misrepresented to their neighbors discernible, predictable phenomena and staged (literally) theatrical performances for the purpose of impressing the reality of their manipulative cult. This was not the first, nor the last time in history when clever figures in positions of power weaponized knowledge by exploiting the ignorance of others. Fifteen centuries later, a Genoan, sailing on behalf of the Spanish crown employed a similar ruse as did those ancient priests. This time, however, it was not the flatulence of the Earth, but rather, the dance of the sky — in this case, a lunar eclipse …

 

DARK SIDE OF THE MOON

Prior to February 29th 1504, Christopher Columbus faced an extremely precarious situation — he had been marooned for a year. All four caravels loaned to him by the Crown lay in ruin. Dozens were dead. Half the crew mutinied. To his despair (as many of his peers back home expected), Columbus’ final expedition, afforded to him with great reluctance, failed.

Only four years earlier, royal commissioner Francisco de Bobadilla delivered Columbus to the Crown in chains, having imprisoned him over tyranny and abuse of the Taíno people. Stripped of titles and authority, Columbus was afforded by King Ferdinand one, final opportunity. Yet again, far from of accomplishing his goal, Columbus was broke, stranded, and faced starvation.

As history records, the “Admiral” had brought a particular book with him: in particular, Columbus carried a recently-published copy of Alamach Perpetuus Cuius Radix est Annum by Abraham Zacuth, astronomer of the Portuguese court of King Don Manuel. “It was this very book that Columbus used to predict the eclipse of the moon which so terrified the [Taíno] in Jamaica that they became obedient to him, and furnished his party food.”276 This was the context in which Columbus extorted the indigenous people of Jamaica, who lacked appropriateknowledge about the meteoric”,277 and were susceptible to the manipulation of superstition. In this case, Columbus, aware that a lunar eclipse was immanent, convinced the Taíno people that the moon would be destroyed if the Taíno did not provide him with provisions. Columbus’ son, Ferdinand Columbus recorded the entire manipulation. He writes of …

the eclipse beginning at the rising of the moon, and augmenting as she ascended, the Indians took heed and were so frightened that with great howling and lamentation they came running from every direction to the ships, laden with provisions, praying the Admiral to intercede by all means with God on their behalf; that he might not visit his wrath upon them, promising for the future diligently to furnish all they stood in need of. To this the Admiral replied that he wished to converse somewhat with God, and retired while the eclipse lasted, they all the while crying out to him to aid them. And when the Admiral observed that the totality of the eclipse was finished and that the moon would soon shine forth, he issued from his cabin, saying that he had supplicated his God and made prayers for them, and had promised Him in their names that henceforth they would be good and use the Christians well, fetching them provisions na necessary things … From that time forward they always took care to provide what they had need278

The ruse worked. Columbus received his provisions, and survived until rescue. The Taíno population was exploited. Today, American citizens champion Columbus, having been raised on textbooks that never mention the Taíno nor the crimes of European explorers“.

Within decades of his arrival, ninety percent of the Taíno population was killed. Tens-of-thousands were murdered. An unknown many committed suicide. These deaths are partially indicative of the failure of religious institutions in correcting the abuses that occur as a direct result of exploiting knowledge and ignorance — in this instance, the Taíno were not the only targets of manipulation: the famous venture to the “New World” was not only an economic enterprise, but, notably, a religious mission, sanctioned by the Church. The religious mission benefitted from the fealty of monarchs, and encouraged the expansion of a colonial empire.

Mythic ambitions were stoked. Irrational fears were instigated. Narratives were established. Hopes were inflated. Fears were exploited. Devious personalities with selfish agendas descended upon the fearful like vultures, as also happened in Imperial Russia.

 

ABRA-ABRACADABRA

Alix, the Tsarina of the Romanov dynasty was enchanted by Rasputin upon their first meeting. “It had not been very difficult for that expert in human faces to see how much she needed him, how tormented she was by the misfortunes that had befall them”.279 At the age of six, she lost sister to diphtheria; her mother succumbed to the same disease one month later. Only three years later, her father, Grand Duke Louis IV died of a heart attack, “the greatest sorrow of her life”.280 For the rest of her days, she would be consumed with overwhelming fears of death.

(… as were easily shared by those over whom her family ruled … but that’s another essay).

She was not alone. Her husband, Tsar Nicholas II equally ached—without an heir, his family’s status was existentially threatened. Yet when their only son was finally born, their dread only increased: Alexei inherited his family’s “curse”. The “long-awaited prince was suffering from a fatal disease inherited […] haemophilia. His fragile blood vessels were unable to withstand the pressure of his blood.” Such cruel irony, Alix had suffered a decade of pregnancies that left her with significant health issues. Succession laws were brutal. She found little relief.

until she meets Rasputin. “Alix, who so wanted to believe in miracles”, “with a face tormented by sleepless nights” found comfort in a wandering monk, an alleged “miracle-worker” who had recently gained popularity among the peasantry. “Nicky” (the Tsar), desperate to provide his son with safety, suspended his disbelief in the traveller after witnessing a “miracle” — the unsuspecting monk eased his son’s suffering, a feat at which his educated doctors failed.

Indeed, seven years prior to the birth of Alexei Romanov, a chemist named Felix Hoffmann synthesized a new form of acetylsalicylic acid that revolutionized medical science. Within several years, Bayer registered this product as “aspirin”. The “wonder drug”281 was immediately implemented throughout the world to relieve pain, reduce fever, and treat disease. The product was so effective, so manageable, so safe, it was used to treat symptoms in children, children like Alexei Romanov, children suffering from chronic bleeding disorders, children being treated with blood-thinners (the very last thing a child with Alexei’s condition needed).

As a странник (strannik) or “wanderer”, Rasputin rejected treating disease with the medical science, so when the Tsar, against the recommendation of his doctors, took the advice of the wanderer and denied his son the “wonder drug”, Alexei’s condition improved. Granted, Rasputin did not understand the functional mechanism by which anticoagulants interacted with the body; what he did recognize was the measurable, psychological power that he now held over the Romanov family. They credited him with preventing the death of their son in whom they had placed all of their hopes and fears. They hoped for him to prevent the deprivation of their pleasures. When Nicholas went to the front in World War I, Alix was left in charge with Rasputin as her personal advisor (wherein he gave predictably terrible advice and abused his authority). Still, the Tsar’s daughters wore pendants with Rasputin’s picture. His presence in their bedroom was sanctioned, despite protests from a nursemaid. After all, he was a Saint.

He was also accepting bribes. He was also negotiating with sexual favors. He was also accused of numerous acts of rape. He was abusing the Russian peoples’ Christian superstitions. He was a functional catalyst for the same revolution that lead to the execution of the very family who looked to him in the first place to prevent death. Ironically, the Romanov family feared death. They feared the weight of insecurity. They gave a sinister personality access to their home, their children, and their minds. They bared their souls to a grifter who convinced them that he could prevent death. Rasputin taught that touching his body healed—indeed, this was his favorite line to use with prostitutes. In this regard, the members of the royal family were used, willingly. By comparison, many of their subjects, increasingly suspicious of authority, disenchanted with both an ineffective monarch and an oppressive church, saw through Rasputin’ mythic ruse.

(These anecdotes fail to capture the full complexity of each, nuanced history — readers are encouraged to pursue their curiosity accordingly — nevertheless, each example provides a clear depiction of the chaos that can result from inflating superstitious beliefs.)

 

PARANOID

Fear of death disrupts rational thinking and consumes the minds of the fearful. A conspirator need only appeal to their target’s fear of death, abuse their misunderstandings about nature, fabricate a false narrative (usually promising deathless rewards), and choreograph a performance that advances a hidden agenda. Examples of this relationship between fear, ignorance, and exploitation are not limited to the dusty pages of history — the modern world of industrialized warfare and mass media provides a variety of devastating examples. For the purposes of this investigation, five instances of irrational thinking and manipulation have been reviewed:

[I] Over 73,000 human beings are currently imprisoned in immigration detention centers across the sometimes-called “Land of the Free”. At least half of those individuals have no criminal records in any capacity, having never threatened the safety of their neighbors. Less than 4,000 of those 73,000 have committed violent crimes. The policy that lead to the imprisonment of well over 69,000 non-violent human beings was enthusiastically supported by over 77 million of their neighbors. This fact further exemplifies a foundational policy of a political group that now dominates every branch of government, at every level of government. The implementation of this policy, of imprisoning 69,000 (and counting) non-violent human beings was largely motivated by fear and fueled by propaganda. Millions were persuaded to believe that unknown strangers threatened them; one man promised to easily release people from this fear. In attempting to rid themselves of fear, the targets of propaganda exacerbate existing tensions. Fear lubricates the machinery of propaganda and exposes the intellect to paranoia.

[II] We find another example of fears stoked by nationalistic myths in the city of Minneapolis, where a population of Somali immigrants, who comprise a statistical minority in city’s metro area, has been demonized as a result of an authoritarian personality’s political agenda. Millions of prejudicial minds allowed this personality to exploit fear and ignorance to their own detriment. Despite the fact that Somali immigrants represent less than 3% of the metro population, millions of otherwise unconcerned Americans have been persuaded to fear them.

The same fears have been irrationally inflated against transgendered peoples (despite comprising less than 1% of a population of over 360 million human beings), and peoples of African ancestry (who have comprised less than 15% of the population for over a century). These political myths distract millions of people from reality by appealing to vain prejudices. Meanwhile, those same minds turn a blind eye to actual existential threats that contradict their mythic worldviews. 

[III] Generations of committed researchers, in nearly every scientific discipline, from nearly every country on the planet, working with decades of analysis, experimentation, and peer review, have conclusively determined that irrevocable changes to the Earth’s biosphere will lead to the displacement of 2 billion human beings and cause the deaths of hundreds of millions more. Unconditionally, these deaths will be the result of environmental mismanagement — despite this, tens of millions of Americans reject the methodical findings of decades of peer-reviewed research. How many Earthlings choose not to prepare for their own futures on their own planet? Despite this very real, very immanent threat, despite documented sea level rises throughout history, contractors continue developing coastal real estate, and the energy grid continues increasing carbon emissions. Short-sighted politicians continue abusing mythic propaganda by manipulating ignorant minds to advance personal agendas.

[IV] These criticisms against fear and ignorance apply even more fully toward the treatment of disease. Millions have been convinced that demonstrably-effective medical treatments are more threatening than deadly diseases. Until the 20th-century, nearly half of all children died before the age of ten from either disease, or conditions resulting from malnutrition. Vaccines changed everything. Indeed, most human parents throughout history have been burdened with witnessing the death of at least one of their own children. Yet, despite radical advances that have largely eliminated the primary antagonists of human history, millions refuse effective medical treatment and question the very vaccines that saved the lives of their ancestors. Recently, millions died from complications related to a pandemic in 2020, and many refused medical treatment (despite initially calling emergency services and demanding to be assigned a bed). Those people are now dead. They are unable to tell us if it was worth it.

[V] No mythic narrative has been as effective (and exploitable) in America as Christianity. Consequently, no political movement presents more of a risk than Christian Nationalism. Ideologically, millions of American Christians have been persuaded (by appeals to fear) to inflate a paranoid belief that their super-majority is being “persecuted”. This belief is maintained despite America boasting the largest Christian population in the history of the human species. Yet more American Christians than ever describe their belief system as being “threatened”. Despite their nationally-dominant, politically-encapsulating, massively-wealthy collection of institutions that boast hundreds of millions of followers across the country (and billions more globally), many in America believe the existence of their tradition is threatened. As a result, millions of fearful minds have thrown their support behind charlatans who care more for profit than piety.

Since ignorance and fear create vulnerabilities for deceitful swindlers, conspiratorial thinking has been exploited by tyrants throughout history to gain the favor of violent mobs and fuel political violence — so, today, does the “Department of War” invoke the mythic language of the Christian apocalypse to empower young Christians to support a “Holy War” against Islamic countries in Asia Minor. Many people without violent records (such as children in uniforms) can be convinced to commit acts of violence as a result of religious myths. When political figures require acts of violence to be committed, they profit by stoking superstitious flames. So long as a population glorifies supernatural belief, they render society susceptible to mythic manipulation. These prejudicial myths not only harm others; they also consternate the intellects of the deluded; a fearful mind disrupts the ability of the intellect to cultivate future security. Vanity allows the intellect to inflate meaningless fears (that Christianity will no longer be the dominant religion in America) while ignoring genuine, existential threats (like agricultural collapse).

When civic decisions are not grounded a shared, natural reality, the vain beliefs of others, informed by delusions, threatens the safety of their neighbors, and the preservation of their own union for the future. “The study-of-nature does not incline one to boast nor [be] contriving of speech nor against the education highly prized by the masses, but both fearless and independent according to one’s own good, [and] not to think highly over the affairs of the [masses].”282

 

I CAN SEE CLEARLY NOW

In an era characterized by propaganda and misinformation, the Epicurean method of investigation arms students with powerful tools against these threats. One’s “considerations” must be based “in a [world] of facts, versus those on a mere rumor”.283 Armed with her unadulterated rejection of magical thinking, the Epicurean school provides stormy souls with an alternative to the lazy skepticism of the contemporary era that is as unhelpful in dispelling ignorance as is the cheap metaphysics sold in bookstores (those metaphysics that have failed to prevent even a single child’s death). Epíkouros provides a method to navigate these confusions, for, “a sufficient method produces [helpful] thoughts about the nature of reality284 and requires nothing more than the devoted study of nature. The Sage grounds true statements with verifiable observations. In the absence of material verification (or falsification), groundless conjectures are easily commandeered to construct fear-based alternatives.

Fundamentally, all “conjectural things are contingent upon sensible” stimuli. Any “opinion” regarding nature can be “either true or false”. Yet in order “to be true, [it] must corroborate or not-contradict; but if not-corroborating or contradicting, [it] happens to be false. Hence, this has introduced285 the need to practice waiting for confirmation, instead of inventing a pseudodoxy”. Compared against a true belief, a pseudodoxyhas gone astray from the” natural reality “being experienced that perpetually exists”.286 In the case of what remains “to be confirmed or to be contradicted, either it will be confirmed” or contradicted.

Often, “some other [persuasive] motion in us”,287 such as the fear of death, “operates for another purpose” besides the “goal of natural pleasure”.288 On these occasions, conspiracies, myths, and superstitions thrive. Self-reflection gets “combined” with some another “creative application289 of the mind, and imbues those who speculate with the confidence to pass “judgment even if [they] were not [capable of] confirming or contradicting” with evidence. Thus “a pseudodoxy is generated.” 290 These “pseudodoxies” are generated by those who fail to acknowledge the reality of their own sensations. “If you contest every single one of the sense perceptions, you can neither judge the outward appearance nor can you affirm which of the sensations you, yourself say are deceptive according to the way in which the criterion operates.”291

 

WON’T GET FOOLED AGAIN

Mythic hopes and conspiratorial apprehensions deeply afflict the mind’s ability to reason. Our 50,000-year-old brain-systems are no less immune to mythic deceit than the 48,000-year-old brain-systems of the ancient Greeks. While many modern persons might dismiss ancient peoples’ apprehensions of volcanoes and lightning, many ancient people would dismiss some modern persons’ insistence that the Earth is flat, a widely-accepted notion by the 2nd-century BCE. Consider that the masses of both antiquity and modernity struggle to appreciate the behavior of CO₂ then the superstitious masses misunderstood CO₂ as the divine breathe of Kérberos; now the masses underestimate the impact of CO₂ on strengthening the observable greenhouse effect. Many more overlook the impacts of pollution, deforestation, and general environmental mismanagement. Tragically, many millions of people, blessed with the health, safety, education, and stability of an advanced economy, nevertheless exacerbate irrational apprehensions toward life-saving vaccines despite being truly blessed by the benefits of modern medicine, far, far too many fail to appreciate the blessing of science. Far too many have been programmed by myth, misunderstanding that material science spares most people from (what is otherwise a nearly universal human experience) suffering the deaths of children; in fact, as history records, nearly half of them. If one has been spared this tragedy, one might thank science.

When decisions that affect others are grounded in a matrix of mythic fears (and not our shared, natural reality) then the vain actions of others, informed by delusions, both threatens the safety of our neighbors and the preservation of their own union for the future. As he writes, “the study-of-nature does not incline one to boast nor [be] contriving of speech nor against the education highly prized by the masses, but both fearless and independent according to one’s own good, [and] not to think highly over the affairs of the [masses].” The tools we have developed to respond to all manner of diseases reinforces the confidence we can have in the Epicurean method. Epíkouros encourages students to choose practically, love peacefully, behave justly, and live fearlessly. This is best achieved by studying nature and cultivating friendship.

When it comes to our own futures, Epicurean history provides brave examples like Mētródōros, undaunted against both disturbances and death”,292 virtuous and awesome”.293 To achieve the goal of nature, the Sage of the Garden asks us to “study these and those things, for yourself, day and night, as with those like yourself, and at no time, neither awake nor in a dream will you be confounded, for no living person surrounded by immortal Good seems like a mortal creature.294 As has been spoken more eloquently elsewhere, “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself.” Here again, “when you believe in things that you don’t understand, then you suffer.”

Superstition ain’t the way.

 


 

1 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.116

2 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 20 (10.145)

3 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 38 (10.153)

4 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 37 (10.152)

5 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 14

6 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.129

7 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 12 (10.143) | Vatican Saying 49

8 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.104

9 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.31; translated by N. H. Bartman

10 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.96

11 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.87

12 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1.63, translated by M. F. Smith (1969)

13 Ibid., 1.78-79, translated by Rolfe Humphries (1968)

14 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.87

15 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.129

16 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.132

17 The fragment  catalogued by Usener as #457 corresponds with a citation from Porphyry (Letter to Marcella 31) and Seneca (Letters to Lucilius 8.7), who writes “PHILOSOPHIAE SERVIAS OPORTET, VT TIBI CONTINGAT VERA LIBERTAS”.

18 Epíkouros, Key Doctrines 29-30 (10.151)

19 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.122

20 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 12 (10.143) | Vatican Saying 49

21 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.85

22 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.124

24 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 22 (10.146)

25 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.137; translated by N. H. Bartman

26 Ibid.,10.34

27 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.129

28 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 20 (10.145)

29 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 25 (10.148)

30 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.128

31 ΤΑΓΑΘΟΝ | τἀγαθὸν (tágathòn) or “The Good” as ἡδονή (hēdonḗ, “pleasure”), the τέλος (télos,) or “goal” of life.

32 Epíkouros, On the Ethical End as cited by Diogénēs Laértios (Lives 10.6)

33 Epíkouros differs from the Kyrēnaíc hedonists, who questioned the benefit of equilibrium.

34 Metródōros’ Epistle to Timokrátēs (Usener fragment 409) is echoed by Athḗnaios (Deipnosophists 7.280A, 12.546F), Cicero (Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso 17.66), and Ploútarkhos (Against Kolṓtēs 2.1108C, 30.1125A).

35 i.e. sexual intercourse, the act of Aphrodite, from which we inherit the word “aphrodisiac”.

36 Philódēmos, Epigram 15, translated by W. R. Paton (1916-18)

38 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 61

39 Epíkouros, “Words on the Wise” 10.120

40 Philódēmos, On Property Management 22.44, translated by Voula Tsouna (2012)

41 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 17 (10.144)

42 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 40 (10.154)

43 Philódēmos, On Property Management 16.36-37

44 Metródōros, Vatican Saying 51 was taken from a fragment from Metródōros to Pythoklḗs

45 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.121; translated by N. H. Bartman

46 Epíkouros was the ἡγεμών (hēgemṓn) meaning “leader”, “guide”, or “founder” of the Garden.

47  Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 10.11

48 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric 4, translated by Harry M. Hubbell (1920)

49 i.e. sexual intercourse, the act of Aphrodite, from which we inherit the word “aphrodisiac”.

50 Metródōros, Vatican Saying 51 was taken from a fragment to Pythoklḗs

51 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 31 (10.151)

52 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.116

53 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.131

54 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.126

55 This can also be translated as “servants” or “boys”, suggesting either a criticism of pederasty or slavery (or both). This may serve as an overall indictment against the objectification and indoctrination of those in subordinate positions.

56 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.132

57 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.116

58 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 23 (10.146)

59 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 25 (10.147)

60 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 21 (10.146)

61 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 7 (10.141)

62 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.130

63 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.136

64 Compare this sentiment contained in Usener fragment 469 to the Epistle to Menoikeús10.130.

65 Dioklḗs, Epitome III as documented by Diogénēs Laértios (Lives 10.10)

66 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers  10.136

67 Note the similarity of Usener fragment 207 with De Rerum Natura 2.34.

68 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.131

70 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.131

72 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 37

73 Philódēmos, On Property Management 13.11-14

75 Usener fragment 116 captures a quotation from Ploútarkhos (Against Kolṓtēs 17.1117A) ↩︎

76 Usener fragment  200 is echoed in Vatican Saying 33

77 Vatican Saying 33 echoes Epíkouros’ recommendation to Menoikeús (10.135)

78 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.128

79 Vatican Saying 33 echoes Epíkouros’ recommendation to Menoikeús (10.135)

80 Juvenal, Saurae IV  10.356

81 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 41

82 Philódēmos, On Property Management 23.14-18, translated by Voula Tsouna (2012)

83 Diogénēs Laértios ,Lives and Opinions 10.9; translated by N. H. Bartman

84 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 14

85 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 21. Compare this paragraph against Epíkouros’ description of desire in the Epistle to Menoikeús: “Then as for the desires one must conclude then [1] the Natural exist, and [2] the Vain, and of the Natural then [3] the Necessary, but only the natural [are needed]; then of the necessary those necessary are [instrumental] to happiness, and to the lack of distress of the body, and to their own living” (Lives 10.127)

86 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.138

87 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.138

88 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.131

89 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 15 (10.144)

90 Juvenal, Saurae IV 10.356

91 The fragment catalogued by Usener (457) corresponds with a citation from Porphyry (Letter to Marcella 31) and Seneca (Letters to Lucilius 8.7) who writes “PHILOSOPHIAE SERVIAS OPORTET, VT TIBI CONTINGAT VERA LIBERTAS”.

92 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.137

95 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 9, translated by Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan (1995)

96 Cicero, De Natura Deorum 1.16, translated by C. D. Yonge (1877)

97 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.132

98 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 23 (10.146)

99 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, fragment 19, translated by Harry M. Hubbell (1920)

100 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 27 (10.148)

101 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 37 (10.152)

102 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.133

103 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric 5

104 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.116

105 Philódēmos, On Property Management 4.23-30, translated by Voula Tsouna (2012)

106 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.116

107 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 37 (10.152)

108 Philódēmos, On Death 24.6-8, translated by W. Benjamin Henry (2009)

109 Philódēmos, On Piety 25.5-6, translated by Dirk Obbink (1996)

110 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.81

111 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.133

112 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.67

113 These lines are repeated four times throughout De Rerum Natura; see 1.146-148, 2.59-61, 3.91-93, and 6.39-41.

114 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1.146-150, translated by H. A. J. Munro (1860)

115 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine12 (10.143) | Vatican Saying 49

116 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1.101, translated by N. H. Bartman, from “TANTVM RELIGIO POTVIT SVADERE MALORVM”.

117 Voltaire warns against the political implications of superstitious belief, writing: “Certainement qui est en droit de vous rendre absurde est en droit de vous rendre injuste” (Questions sur la Miracles 412).

118 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 15 (10.144)

119 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.45

120 Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism 1, translated by David Konstan (1980)

121 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 9, translated by Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan (1995)

122 Other translators employ “superstition” as their preferred translation of RELIGIO. Lucretius, however, uses both RELIGIO and SUPERSTITIO as near synonyms, versus healthy PIETAS.

123 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1.82-85, translated by A. E. Stallings (2007)

124 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 7, translated by Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan (1995)

125 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 3.53-54, translated by H. A. J. Munro (1860)

126 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 8

127 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 6.1230-1234; translated by H. A. J. Munro (1860)

128 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.87

129 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 54

130 Philódēmos, On Piety 13.7-8, translated by Dirk Obbink (1996)

131 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.124

132 Diogénēs Laértios writes that “he also takes everything prophetic as wrong, and as in the Little Epitome, he so affirms, ‘Divination is not real, but even if real,” we should “regard the predictions [as] nothing to us.’” (Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.135)

133 “…so writes Diogénēs” of Tarsós the Epicurean (c. 2nd-century BCE) “in the twelfth” book Epitome of the Ethical Doctrines of Epíkouros” (Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.118).

134 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.93

135 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.113

136 Astromancy, from ἄστρον (ástron, “[sky] glower”) and μαντεία (manteía, “divination”), literally “star-prophecy”.

137 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.113

138 Philódēmos, Epigram 28 (translated by W. R. Paton, 1916-18), there he goes, dissin’ astrology since 69 BCE.

139 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 40

140 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.118; translated by N. H. Bartman

141 Usener fragment 489 echoes the Epistle to Menoikeús 134 and Key Doctrine 16. ↩︎

142 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.135

143 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.81

144 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 10 (10.142)

145 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 13 (10.143)

146 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 24

147 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.115

148 Cicero, De Natura Deorum 1.16, translated by C. D. Yonge (1877)

149 !!! Practitioners of the Mazdayasni religion of Persia are popularly known as Zoroastrians, however, this designation creates a complication (as does referring to “Islam” by the now-obsolete term “Mohammedanism”). Mazdayasna centers around the worship of Ahura Mazda—Zarathustra (Hellenized as “Zōroastrēs”) was merely a prophet of Mazda.

150 Oneiromacy is the practice of allegedly scrying knowledge of future events from dreams.

152 Philódēmos, On Signs and Inferences 38.8-12, translated by by Philip and Estelle de Lacey (1941)

153 The ancient, Athenian Stoics gathered at ἡ ποικίλη στοά (ē poikélē stoá), the “Stoa Poikile” or “Painted Porch”.

155 According to Diogénēs Laértios, “Kleánthēs” the 2nd Stoic scholarch, “was called a second Hēraklḗs” by Zēnṓn, the first scholarch (Laértios 7.170). Seneca writes a tragedy of Hercules, exploring themes like perseverance and fate (Hēraklḗs Raging). Epíktētos makes numerous allusions to Hēraklḗs in Discourses (1.16, 2.16, 3.22, 3.24, 3.26, 4.10).

156 Epíkouros, “Words on the Wise” 10.120

157 Epíkouros, On Anger 31.21-24

158 Other translators employ “superstition” as their preferred translation of RELIGIO. Lucretius, however, uses both RELIGIO and SUPERSTITIO as near synonyms, versus healthy PIETAS.

159 Philódēmos, On Piety 71.1-12, translated by Dirk Obbink (1996)

160 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.124

161 Philódēmos, On Piety 71.1-12

162 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 10 (10.142)

163 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 11 (10.142)

164 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.81

165 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 10 (10.142)

166 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.116

167 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.81

168 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 10 (10.142)

169 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 20 (10.145)

170 Philódēmos, On Death 30.1-5, translated by W. Benjamin Henry (2009)

171 Ibid., 36.25-26

172 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.73

173 Ibid., 10.74

174 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 7 (10.141)

175 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 14 (10.143)

176 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 5, translated by Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan (1995)

177 Philódēmos, On Death 24.35-36

178 Ibid., 32.27

179 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 13 (10.143)

180 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.81

181 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.137; translated by N. H. Bartman

182 Harfouche, et al. “Estimated global and regional incidence and prevalence of herpes simplex virus infections and genital ulcer disease in 2020”. Sexually Transmitted Infections. 2025 May 19, 101, 4, 214-223.

184 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 4 (10.140) | Vatican Saying 3

185 Mētródōros, Vatican Saying 10

186 Mētródōros, Usener fragment 339, translated by N. H. Bartman (2025)

187 Philódēmos, On Death 37.23-25, translated by W. Benjamin Henry (2009)

188 Mētródōros, Vatican Saying 30

189 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.81

190 Philódēmos, On Death 39.6-7

191 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.133

192 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 9

193 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.133

194 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.134

195 Beckett, Samuel. Waiting for Godot. Faber & Faber, 2006.

196 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 16 (10.144)

197 Philódēmos, On Death 38.24

198 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 2.54, translated by Bailey (1910): “OMNIS CVM IN TENEBRIS PRAESERTIM VITA LABORET”

199 Philódēmos, On Death 2.15-16

200 Ibid., 2.10-11

201 Ibid., 2.13-14

202 Ibid., 5.1

203 Ibid., 5.4-6

204 Ibid., 9.4-5

205 Ibid., 12.2

206 Ibid., 13.15

207 Ibid., 20.3-4

208 Ibid., 22.10

209 Ibid., 22.10-11

210 Ibid., 23.7-14

211 Ibid., 25.2-6

212 Ibid., 26.10

213 Ibid., 28.2-4

214 Ibid., 28.37-29.2

215 Ibid., 29

216 Ibid., 32.32-33

217 Ibid., 33.37-34.3

218 Ibid., 35.1-2

219 Ibid., 36.31

220 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.125

221 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 2 (10.139) | Vatican Saying 2

222 Philódēmos, On Death 28.15-16

223 Diogénēs of Oìnóanda, Fragment 73, translated by M. F. Smith

224 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 4 (10.140) | Vatican Saying 3

225 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.137, translated by N. H. Bartman

226 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 10, translated by Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan (1995)

227 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 66

228 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 78 echoes the Epistle to Menoikeús 130

229 Usener fragment 213 corresponds with two, separate attestations, one by Ploútarkhos (It Is Impossible to Live Pleasantly in the Manner of Epíkouros 28.1105D) and one by Seneca (Letters to Lucilius 63.7).

230 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 40 (10.154)

233 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 35

234 Philódēmos, On Death 38.20, translated by W. Benjamin Henry (2009)

235 Ibid., 37.40

236 Ibid., 38.18-19

237 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 19 (10.145) | Vatican Saying 22

238 Tolkien, J. R. R. The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring. George Allen & Unwin, 1954, 60.

239 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 2 (10.139) | Vatican Saying 2

240 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 38

241 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.124

242 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 22, translated by Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan (1995)

243 Philódēmos, On Death 23.13-14, translated by W. Benjamin Henry (2009)

244 Philódēmos, On Property Management 15.10-12, translated by Voula Tsouna (2012)

245 Diogénēs of Oìnóanda,  Fragment 3, translated by M. F. Smith

246 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 10

247 Ibid., 23

248 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.28, translated by N. H. Bartman

249 Philódēmos, On Death 2.12-13, translated by W. Benjamin Henry (2009)

250 Philódēmos, On Property Management 4.23-30

251 Philódēmos, On Death 39.15-24

252 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 17

253 Epíkouros, Epistle to Idomeneus according to Diogénēs (Lives 10.22) or Hérmarkhos according to Cicero.

254 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 48

255 Diogénēs of Oìnóanda, Fragment 3, translated by M. F. Smith

256 Loukianós of Samósta. Alexander the False Prophet 1, translated by A. M. Harmon (1936).

257 Ibid. 7

259 Ibid. 47

261 Ibid. 13-14

262 Ibid. 20

263 Ibid. 17

264 Ibid. 32

265 Ibid. 8

266 Ibid. 6

267 Ibid.. 32

269 Other translators employ “superstition” as their preferred translation of RELIGIO. Lucretius, however, uses both RELIGIO and SUPERSTITIO as near synonyms, versus healthy PIETAS.

270 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1.82-85, translated by A. E. Stallings (2007)

271 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.152, translated by N. H. Bartman

272 Strábōn, Geōgraphiká 3.4.14

274 Pliny the Elder, Naturalis Historia 2.95

277 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.95

279 Radzinsky, Edvard. The Rasputin File. Anchor Books, 2001.

281 Jeffreys, Diarmuid. Aspirin: The Remarkable Story of a Wonder Drug. Bloomsbury, 2005.

282 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 44

283 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.34, translated by N. H. Bartman

284 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.45

285 Ibid. 10.34

286 Ibid. 10.50

287 Ibid. 10.51

288 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 21 (10.146)

289 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.51

291 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 23 (10.146)

292 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.23, translated by N. H. Bartman

293 Usener fragment 387, preserved by Philódēmos reflects a sentiment expressed by Lucretius in De Rerum Natura 6.68.

294 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.135

 


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Buxhoeveden, Baroness Sophie. The Life and Tragedy of Alexandra Feodorovna, Empress of Russia. Longmans, Green and Co, 1928.

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Cicero. De Natura Deorum. Translated by C. D. Yonge, Harper & Brothers, 1877.

Diogénēs of Oìnóanda. The Epicurean Inscription. Translated by M. F. Smith. Bibliopolis 1993

Guthrie, Kenneth Sylvan. Numenius of Apamea: The Father of Neo-Platonism. G. Bell and Sons, 1917.

Eleroy, William. The Authentic Letters of Columbus. Field Columbian Museum, vol. 1, no. 2, 116.

Epíkouros. “Fragments”. Translated by N. H. Bartman, Leaping Pig Publishing, 2026, TWENTIERS.COM/FRAGMENTS.

Epíkouros. “Key Doctrines”. The Hedonicon: The Holy Book of Epicurus, 2023, 1-4.

Epíkouros. “Vatican Sayings”. Translated by N. H. Bartman, Leaping Pig Publishing, 2025, TWENTIERS.COM/VATICAN-SAYINGS.

Fleming, Candace. The Family Romanov: Murder, Rebellion, and the Fall of Imperial Russia. Anne Schwartz Books, 2014.

Jeffreys, Diarmuid. Aspirin: The Remarkable Story of a Wonder Drug. Bloomsbury, 2005.

Laértios, Diogénēs. The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, Book 10: The Life of Epíkouros. Translated by N. H. Bartman, Leaping Pig Publishing, 2025, TWENTIERS.COM/BIOGRAPHY.

Loukianós of Samósta. Alexander the False Prophet. Translated by A. M. Harmon, Loeb Classical Library, 1936.

Lucretius. De Rerum Natura. Translated by H. A. J. Munro, Deighton, Bell and Co., 1860.

Lucretius. On the Nature of the Universe. Translated by Ronald Melville, Clarendon Press, 1997.

Lucretius. On the Nature of Things. Translated by Cyril Bailey, Clarendon Press, 1910.

Lucretius. On the Nature of Things. Translated by M. F. Smith, Sphere Books, 1969.

Lucretius. The Nature of Things. Translated by A. E. Stallings, Penguin Classics, 2007.

Lucretius. The Way Things Are. Translated by Rolfe Humphries, Indiana University Press, 1968.

Mann, Charles C. 1491. Vintage Books, 2006.

Pfanz, H., Yüce, G., Gulbay, A.H. et al. “Deadly CO2 gases in the Plutonium of Hierapolis (Denizli, Turkey)”. Archaeological and Anthropological Sciences, vol. 11, pages 1359–1371, 2018.

Philódēmos. Epigrams. Paton, W. R. The Greek Anthology: Volume I. Loeb Classical Library, 1916.

Philódēmos. On Choices and Avoidance. Translated by Giovanni Indelli and Voula Tsouna-McKirahan, Bibliopolis, 1995.

Philódēmos. On Death. Translated by W. Benjamin Henry, Society of Biblical Literature, 2009.

Philódēmos. On Frank Criticism. Translated by David Konstan, Society of Biblical Literature, 1980.

Philódēmos. On Property Management. Translated by Tsouna, Society of Biblical Literature, 2013.

Philódēmos. On Rhetoric. Translated by Harry M. Hubble, Conn. Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1920.

Philódēmos. On Signs and Inferences. Translated by Philip and Estelle de Lacey, The American Philological Association, 1941.

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Zinn, Howard. A People's History of the United States. HarperCollins Publishers, 2015.
Modified from "Pericles's Funeral oration" by Philipp Foltz (1852)

We Got Beef: A Disembowelment of the Dialectic, Politics, and Other Organs of Bullshit


“Rhetoricians might flatter flies with honey,
but politicians feed flies bullshit.”


Modified from “The Butcher’s Shop” by Gabriele Passerotti (1580)

WE GOT BEEF

A DISEMBOWELMENT OF THE DIALECTIC,
POLITICS, AND OTHER ORGANS OF BULLSHIT

 

I have a bone to pick with rhetoric.

Here’s the heart of the issue: talk is cheap. People chew fat in political chats without purpose — no learning occurs, no truth is shared, no friendship is found. Everyone misses the meat of the matter. Opinions are skin-deep. Debate rarely disembowels delusion. Too often, rhetoricians and orators enlist themselves in the service of manipulation. After all, “the end of rhetoric is to persuade in a speech” and not to validate truth with evidence (Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, I, col. 3). Their art does not “depend on arguments from physical facts” because “their art is a power of persuasion” (Ibid., II, 12, col. XIX). For instance, it is agreeable to suppose that honey attracts more flies than vinegar — true, but as a student of nature and pupil of the Garden (so guided to treat politics with suspicion), I observe that nothing attracts so many flies as bullshit.

Those who study in the rhetorical schools are deceived. They are charmed by the tricks of style, and pay no attention to the thought, believing that if they can learn to speak in this style they will succeed in the assembly and court of law. But when they find that this style is wholly unfitted for practical speaking they realize that they have lost their money.
(Epíkouros, Against the Rhetoricians)

The rhetorical τέχνη (tékhnē, “technique”) of the sophists provides a technical method without practical application; at the same time many practical orators enjoy success, and wield influence without technically possessing any teachable skills, having mastered neither art nor science. Dialecticians may enjoy sagacious reputations, but may also lack receptivity, perspective, and may provide people with impractical, ineffective advice. Both educated rhetoricians and natural orators present dangers as agents of persuasion — dialecticians turn the practical benefits of philosophy into abstractions; rhetors misuse the art of prose for manipulation; orators’ aptitude for practical persuasion lacks a foundation in natural ethics.

Each of the rhetorical arts and practices fails to ground themselves in nature. As human agents of manipulation, professional persuaders fail to refer to the natural “goal” of “living blessedly” (Laértios 10.128). Each of these tools can be appropriated to service a political agenda. Only the true philosophy provides students with the tools they need to understand reality and pursue happiness. To quote the lead character from a favorite, adult cartoon, “Everyone wants people they like to be right. That’s why popular people are fucking dumb” (Rick and Morty, Season 3, Episode 4). As Epíkouros teaches, “the purest security is possible by means of the peace and the withdrawal from the masses”, never by chasing their satisfaction (Key Doctrine 14).

Modified from artwork by Kasten Searles for “The Queen’s Gambit” from the Arkansas Times, March 2024

THE PRISON OF POLITICS

Unlike other schools, the Garden rejects politics as a valid field of inquiry and remonstrates the rhetorical tools that support the political ambitions of professional persuaders. As φιλοσοφία (philosophía) is the “love of wisdom”, so politics is antithetical to friendship and wisdom. While Epíkouros does not dismiss civic engagement, he warns against pursuing a political career. Such a pursuit requires either subservience to wealthy interests, or else, submission to popular opinion, or engagement with senseless gossip. The most effective politicians are not those who are the most educated, for “some come out of the schools worse than when they went in” (On Rhetoric, I, 35, 1 ff.=Suppl. 19.13 ff.), but those who are best at “studying what pleases the crowd and practicing” (Ibid., I, 45, 13 ff.=Suppl. 23, 20 ff.) In this way, through pleasing speech, an otherwise unskilled narcissist “can become skilled in politics” (Ibid.).

Political narratives, in particular, are uniquely dubious. Self-promoting orators spoil healthy discourse by drawing people into pointless debates. Rhetoricians excel at erecting scarecrows. Argumentative puppets present themselves as prime cuts of intelligence, yet many are without substance. Popular speakers are incentivized to sell unpalatable policies for the sake of their own enrichment. Politicians dress the inedible entrails they cook with zest. They spice lies to hide their rancid flavor. They sew empty arguments from skin and bones. Debates are dressed for taste, and, as mentioned, rarely dissect the meat of the matter. Dialectical discourse is dangerous. Rhetoric and oratory are ineffective at verifying true statements and, more importantly, impractical at cultivating friendships. As Philódēmos acknowledges, “Politics is the worst foe of friendship; for it generates envy, ambition and discord.” (On Rhetoric, II, 158, fr. XIX).

In speaking of a “free life”, Epíkouros affirms that it

is not possible to be acquired by a lot of money [made] through an unscrupulous means [nor] is without servility to the mob or authority, rather [it] acquires everything [it needs] in continuous abundance; nevertheless if [one did procure] any money by chance, then the latter can be easily distributed to those nearby for goodwill. (Vatican Saying 58)

In this essay, I mean to review rhetoric, dissect dialectic, purge politics, and oust the aura of oratory. We will skim the fat from inference by demonstrating the dangers of logical induction. As Epíkouros teaches, we “must liberate ourselves, out of the prison [built] upon circular” proceedings, social programming, indoctrination, senseless gossip, “political” affairs”, and other practices that sacrifice the testimony of the senses for persuasive story-telling (Vatican Saying 58). “If you contest every single one of the sense perceptions, you can neither judge the outward appearance nor can you affirm which of the sensations you, yourself say are deceptive according to the way in which the criterion operates” (Key Doctrine 23).

“Relativity” by M. C. Escher (1953)

UNFOUNDED INFERENCE

Epicureans reject both philosophical “reasonings in the form of Aristotelian syllogisms or inductions” as well as “other dialectical procedure(s)”  (On Irrational Contempt 2). As Polýstratos writes, those persuaded by such procedures “are fools who construct their argument solely on the basis of the conviction of others” and not through empirical investigation (Ibid.). “[B]y the dialectical means mentioned, one cannot deliver the soul from fear and anxious suspicion” because the conclusions of the rhetor, the orator, and the dialectician are not founded on physics (Ibid.). The dialectic is rejected “for want of qualification” as a reliable criterion of knowledge, for the Epicureans “suppose the study of nature provides the proper space for the voices of the facts” (Laértios 10.31). The only valid testimony is from the senses — speculation, hearsay, assumption, induction, and conjecture are inferior practices to the process of confirming hypotheses with evidence. “We shall say that the one who infers thus fails because he has not gone through all appearances well, and indeed that he is corrected by the appearances themselves” of real things (On Signs). When “divorced [from] the real phenomena”, then reality gets “cast out of the whole study of nature and then flows from a myth” (Laértios 10.87).

By contrast, Epicureans employ “the method of analogy”, observing nature, inferring hypotheses, and substantiating with evidence. “For there is no other correct method of inference besides this” (Philódēmos, On Signs). Sophistic rhetoric further confounds the process of substantiating hypotheses with observation. By contrast, evidence justifies the demonstrable truth of statements. Otherwise, flawed methods lead to self-defeating conclusions. “For the arguments that they devise to refute the [Epicurean] method of analogy contribute to its confirmation. […] It is the same in other cases, so that as a result they refute themselves.” (Ibid.). As pertains to professional persuaders, rarely are politicians and scientists the same people.

Modified from “The School of Athens by Rafael (1509-11)

DIABOLECTICIANS

Unlike other philosophers, Epíkouros does not recognize the dialectic as a distinct branch of philosophy (Laértios 7.41). Rather, he recognizes the dialectic as a mere method, which, by itself, cannot arrive at the “truth” it seeks to find. Speaking of the Epicurean Garden, Diogénēs reports that “she has withdrawn the Dialectic [and] rejects it for want of qualification;” for the Epicureans “suppose the [study of] natural [phenomena] provides [the proper] space for the voices of the facts.” (Ibid., 10.31). Epíkouros called “the Dialecticians totally toxic” (Ibid., 10.8) and later refers to “dialectic” as being “pretentious” (Epistle to Hēródotos 10.72). Contemporaneously, “Metródōros wrote […] Against the Dialecticians” (Laértios 10.24). He was documented “ridiculing those who consider the dialectic method more accurate” (On Rhetoric, II, 45, col. XLV). Philódēmos positively identifies the position of “the dialectician” as “a position which we refute” (Ibid., I, 190, col. IX; I, 191, col. X). Polýstratos writes that dialectical reasoning is based purely upon the false premises of dialectician’s “own conviction” (On Irrational Contempt 2). Instead, “one must, for the sake of oneself” observe nature to determine the truth of statements (Epistle to Hēródotos 10.72). Otherwise, as Philódēmos notes, “those who use dialectical reasoning do not know that they are shamefully refuting themselves” (On Signs).

For a demonstration of the dialectic in action, consider the following exampe, courtesy of the American, two-party political system: Suppose the Pink Team asserts that ‘An asteroid is coming! We need funds to stop it!’ The Yellow Team responds: ‘There is no asteroid. You just want money.’ Fortunately, everyone is a respectable, patient, educated dialectician, and everyone agrees to the wise rules of their admirable methodology. They proudly reach a compromise: ‘After extensive consideration, we have determined that there is a chance that an object, perhaps, in this case, an asteroid, of indeterminate size, mind you, may enter a region of spa —’

SLAM. That was the sound of nature crushing their dialectic.

Modified from “Asteroid Crashing into a Primordial Earth” by Don Davis / NASA (1991).png

THE RACKET OF RHETORIC

“[T]o practice rhetoric is toilsome to body and soul, and we would not endure it. [Rhetoric] is most unsuitable for one who aims at quiet happiness, and compels one to meddle more or less with affairs, and provides no more right opinion or acquaintance with nature than one’s ordinary style of speaking, and draw the attention of young men from philosophy”
(Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 52, col. 38., II, 53, col. L).

Rhetoric is a technique, an art of prose. Therein, Epicureans “do not claim that rhetoric is bad in itself” (Ibid., II, 142, fr. XIII). Simply, that rhetoricians “are like pilots, who have a good training but may be bad men.” Rhetoric is a weapon that any trained person can learn to wield. Even “the perfect orator” need not “be also a good man and a good citizen” as “in the case of any other art;” for example “a good musician may be a villain” (Ibid., II, 127, fr. XIII=II, 75, fr. XIII.). The 19th-century, French author Flaubert cautions, “Il ne faut pas toucher aux idoles: la dorure en reste aux mains” or “You shouldn’t touch idols: a little gold always rubs off” (Madame Bovary 3.5) — we receive this phrase as “never meet your heroes“. Indeed, were “the greatest rhetors [to] accomplish all they wish […] then they would be tyrants.” (On Rhetoric, II, 151, fr. VIII).

“To tell the truth,” so writes Philódēmos, “the rhetors do a great deal of harm to many people”, by defending the art of manipulation (Ibid., II, 133, fr. IV). He documents that rhetoricians “were not in good repute at the very beginning” as far as “in Egypt and Rhodes and Italy” (Ibid., II, 105, fr. XII). Hermarkhos claims that “rhetors [do not] deserve admiration”. “Moreover the rhetors charge for the help they give, and so cannot be considered benefactors” (Ibid., II, 159, fr. XX). By contrast, “the philosophers give their instruction without cost” (Ibid.). “Metrodorus teaches in regard to rhetoric that it does not arise from a study of science” (Ibid., II, 193, fr. 2). “The end of rhetoric is to persuade in a speech”, designed to disregard nature as is convenient. “It is clearly proven that the art of the rhetor is of no assistance for a life of happiness” (Ibid., I, 250, XVIII).

Modified from “The Death of Socrates” by Jacques-Loius David (1787)

STUPID SOPHISTS

If he knew that he could not […] become a philosopher […] he might propose to teach grammar, music, or tactics. For we can find no reason why anyone with the last spark of nobility in his nature should become a sophist…” (Ibid., II, 54, col. 39., col, LI).

The Epicurean critique against rhetoric is dually applied to and principally exhibited by a method that they refer to as sophistic (also referred to as “panegyric” or “epideictic” rhetoric). In general, people “are led astray by sophists and pay them money merely to get the reputation for political ability” (Ibid., II, 46, col. 33). It has been grossly easy for rich orators to persuade poor laborers to fund their schemes. Philódēmos observes that “sophistical training does not prevent faulty speech” (Ibid., I.182, col. I—I, 186, col. V). In fact, “some do not care at all for what they say” so long as it accomplishes their rhetorical goal, regardless of the greater goal of life (Ibid., I, 244. col XIII). “And when they do praise a good man they praise him for qualities considered good by the crowd, and not truly good qualities” (Ibid., I, 216 col. XXXVa, 14).

“[I]t follows that”, as is the case with other forms of technical rhetoric “those who possess this ability [of sophistic rhetoric] have acquired it without the help of scientific principles” (Ibid., I, 136, 20=Suppl. 61, 19). “[R]hetorical sophists” are known “for wasting their time on investigation of useless subjects, such as […] the interpretation of obscure passages in the poets”, as when civic policy is guided by mythic texts (Ibid., I, 78, 19 ff.=Suppl. 39, 5 ff). Compared against the philosophers, “the instruction given by the sophists is not only stupid but shameless, and lacking in refinement and reason” since it does not take into account the goal of life, nor commit to a devoted study of nature (Ibid., I, 223, fr. III). Instead, sophistic rhetoric appeals to authority and tradition by means of equivocation, obfuscation, and exploitation of ignorance.

“Paul Preaching in the Areopagus” by James Thornhill (1729-31)

CULTIVATING IGNORANCE

Often, obfuscation “is intentional”, as is the case “when one has nothing to say, and conceals the poverty of his thought by obscure language that he may seem to say something useful” as with equivocation (Ibid., I, 156, col. XIII). Other times, we observe “unintentional obscurity [that] arises from not mastering the subject, or not observing the proper formation […] and in general from failure” (Ibid., I, 158, col. XVI). Obscurity in discourse also arises “from ignorance of the proper meanings of words, their connotation, and the principles on which one word is to be preferred to another” (Ibid., I. 159, col. XVII). In these cases, the success of an orator corresponds not with knowledge, nor coherence, but with a practical ability to persuade a mob. “Most, if not all [of] the arguments do not prove what they claim to prove even if the premises be granted.” (Ibid., I, col. 5). “The worst class of arguments are those which act as boomerangs and demolish the position of the disputant” (Ibid. I, 4, col. I=Suppl. 4, 17).

For example, suppose that a sophist means to convince a legislative body to support a piece of legislation, but they lack meaningful substance. It behooves them to appeal to their audience’s preferences — moderates appreciate an appeal to custom (e.g. it’s the way it is); traditionalists appreciate an appeal to myth (e.g. it’s the way it’s always been); legalists appreciate an appeal to authority (e.g. it’s the law); populists appreciate an appeal to popularity (e.g. it’s what we want); economists appreciate an appeal to wealth (e.g. it’s profitable); bleeding-hearts appreciate an appeal to empathy (e.g. have a heart); ignorant people appreciate an appeal to simplicity (e.g. they’re trying to confuse you). The most ignorant are the most gullible, easy prey for skilled sophists. (Intentional obfuscation is masterfully exemplified by the “Chewbacca Defense” from the October 7, 1998 episode of South Park. The “Chewbacca Defense” leads to an irrelevant conclusion based on non-sequitur speech and a red herring.)

Modified from a screenshot of “Chef Aid,” South Park, season 2, episode 14, Comedy Central, 1998

EMPTY ORATORY

Philódēmos spends the better part of On Rhetoric distinguishing rhetoric as a technical art versus legislative and judicial oratory, which he identifies as a practical skill. He writes:

The practical skill acquired by observation is not called an art by the Greeks except that sometimes in a loose use of language people call a clever woodchopper an artist. If we call observation and practice art we should include under the term all human activity.
(Ibid., I, 57, 23 ff.=Suppl. 29, 15 ff.)

There is a “division between the different parts of rhetoric (i. e. sophistic and practical rhetoric) which was made by Epicurus and his immediate successors (Ibid., I, 49, 14 ff.=Suppl. 25, 15 ff.). Unlike sophistic, Philódēmos suggests that one “could find reason for pursuing practical rhetoric”, even though this form of oratory does not qualify as a formal art (Ibid., II, 54, 41). Unlike sophistic methods of argumentation, practical oration (the ambassadorial oratory of diplomats, the deliberative oratory or legislators, the forensic oratory of lawyers) provides practical utility: “thousands of [Greeks] have been useful ambassadors, were prudent in their advice, were not the cause of disaster, did not speak with an eye to gain, and were not convicted of malfeasance in office.” (Ibid., II, 224, col. XIX). In these cases, “some do succeed by means of natural ability and experience without the aid of rhetoric” (Ibid., I, 47, I ff.=Suppl. 24, 10 ff.). They are less concerned with trying “to classify and describe metaphors” instead of trying to give “practical working instructions” (Ibid., I, 171, 2, col. XII).

Still, even without methodical manipulation, oratory does not guarantee happiness, and provides no moral direction. It allows fools without skill to run offices that benefit from skill. Popularity insulates celebrities from the consequences of their actions. Oratory is the favored tool of talentless politicians whose only object is the advancement of destructive pursuits.

By contrast against the empty promises, unhelpful eloquence, and practical lies of orators, Philódēmos argues for παρρησία (parrēsía, “frank” or “free speech”), explaining that it is truly καλή φράσις (kalḗ phrásis), “lovely phrasing” or “beautiful speech” (On Rhetoric, I, 149 IV). Epíkouros commits to using “ordinary expressions appropriately, and not express oneself inaccurately nor vaguely, nor use expressions with double meaning” (Ibid., I,161, Col XIX). Ornate oratory might promote popularity, but rarely does it reduce anxiety.

Modified from a screenshot from “They Live” by John Carpenter (1988)

POLITICAL PROGRAMMING

Rhetoricians might flatter flies with honey, but politicians feed flies bullshit.

Epicurus believed that there was no art of persuading large bodies of men; that those who are not rhetoricians sometimes are more persuasive than the rhetoricians; that those trained in panegyric are less able to face the tumult of the assembly than those who have no rhetorical training; that Epicurus spoke of arts, and said that those acquainted with them were benefited, but did not mean that this enabled them to attain the end; if anyone possesses the power of persuasion it is responsible for evil and not for good.
(On Rhetoric, I, 99, 5b=Suppl. 48, 15)

While the arts of persuasion are discouraged, even then, Epicureans evaluate the dialectic and rhetoric above political discourse. “[W]e declare [politics not] to be an art “ (Ibid., Section II-a). Politicians are famously dishonest because “a clever man without studying the technical works of the sophists can study some sophist’s speech and so learn to imitate them.” (Ibid., I, 130. col. XXIX). Command does not require comprehension. “They certainly leave no place for any science…” (Ibid., I, 49, 14 ff.=Suppl. 25, 15 ff.). Indeed, “Delivery depends, too, on natural endowment, beauty of voice, grace of body” (Ibid., Col. XV). The job of “the statesman” is only to “discover the inherent political arguments” corresponding to “what appears true to the crowd” and then to manipulate them to the best of their ability (On Rhetoric, I, 209. col. XXVIII). As conditions change, one politician can advance murderous schemes, while another need to only wear the wrong-colored outfit to incite widespread, public ridicule. “There is no method by which one can” reliably “persuade the multitude, either always or in the majority of cases”, so pursuing politics is akin to delaying your own happiness (Ibid., II, 120, fr. XIX). Usually, success in politics requires either “a lot of money made through unscrupulous means” or “servility to the mob or authority” (Vatican Saying 67). Neither of those conditions are conducive to happiness.

To sum up; by no means should the philosopher acquire political experience, or rhetoric of that sort. It is evident that it is the height of folly to say that a study of nature produces a ἕξις [“habit”] of political oratory, especially since they introduce into the scheme of philosophy example andenthymeme” (On Rhetoric, II, 35, col. 38).

Philódēmos identifies those arguments that appeal to prejudice, traditional paradigms, historical precedence, and common belief as being “vain” (Ibid., I, 286, col. VII). They are “mere padding [to] provoke applause”, all “because the multitude is foolish” (Ibid., II, 39, col. XLI, I. 14). It is equally foolish that those “in political speeches use syllogism and induction which the dialecticians pride themselves on using” (Ibid., I, 286, col. VII). Therefore:

“[The wise] will [not] meddle in politics […] nor will they tyrannize; nor will they bark like a Cynic, […] and they will serve jury duty, and they will leave behind writings, but will not make public endorsements, and they will take precautions for their possessions” (Laertios 10.119).

Modified from “Departure of Odysseus from the Land of the Phaeacians” by Claude Lorrain (1646)

THE HARBOR OF PHILOSOPHY

“But this does not apply any more to philosophy”, nor does it apply to “the Epicureans who refrain from such things” (Ibid., II, 144, fr. II). “Philosophy is more profitable than epideictic rhetoric, especially if one practices rhetoric in the fashion of the sophists (Ibid., I, 225, fr. I). “To tell the truth”, so Philódēmos boasts, “philosophers gain the friendship of public men by helping them out of their troubles.” (Ibid., II, 133, fr. IV). He explains, “they live in peace and justice and tried friendship; those whom they find opposed to them they quickly soften” (Ibid., II, 160, XXI-XXV. II, 162, fr. XXVII). As mentioned, the Epicureans pride themselves on παρρησία (parrēsía, “free speech”). “In speaking one should not resort to ignoble rhetorical tricks, these have less effect than a straight-forward character” (Ibid., II, 126, fr. VI). Since the public tends to prefer comfortable lies, “it is better not to receive public preferment” (Ibid., II, 154, fr. XII.). Philosophers “help their country” not by patronizing the public, but “by teaching the young […] to act justly even if there are no laws, and to shun injustice as they would fire.” (Ibid., II, 154, fr. XIII.).

The primary resource that preserves the Epicurean deconstruction of oratory comes from Philódēmos in his book On Rhetoric. In this book, Philódēmos distinguishes technical rhetoric from practical oratory. He provides a critique of political speech and reviews the dialectic against the Epicureans’ method by analogy that anticipates the modern, scientific method.

Of chief concern, Philódēmos contrasts arts (like dialectic and rhetoric) against practical oratory and political speech, which are not teachable arts. “An art”, he writes “cannot be attained by one who has not studied it, and doing this regularly and certainly and not by conjecture.” He further explains that “this definition applies both to […] grammar and music”. He later adds “architecture, ship-carpentry, navigation, painting”, which all “had methods in olden time” (Ibid., I, 137, col. 33I.21). He concludes, “On the basis of this definition we declare sophistic to be an art” (Ibid., Section II-a). Here again, “That statement ‘He is a good rhetor’ simply means that he is experienced and skilled in speaking”, not that he is a good person. “For as we say ‘good rhetor’ we say ‘good artist’ meaning ‘skillful’” (Ibid., II, 234, col. XXXV).

Modified from “Sappho and Alcaeus” by Sir Lawrence Alma-Tadema (1881)

VARIETIES OF DISCOURSE

“One cannot even say that all rhetors adopt one style”, since orators alter their deliveries to suit the disposition of their audience (Ibid., I.152, Col. VIII). In On Rhetoric, our friend Philódēmos provides an overview of the various types of rhetoric and oratory, in addition to reviewing the positions of the Peripatetics and Stoics. In The Art of Rhetoric, Aristotélēs distinguishes rhetoric by three domains of persuasion: [I] deliberative or symbouleutic (e.g legislative), [II] forensic (e.g. judicial), and [III] epideictic (e.g. charismatic speeches) types (Technē Rhētorikē). A later Peripatetic adds [IV] enteuctic (e.g. ingratiation) as a fourth category. Conversely, the Stoics refer to epideictic rhetoric as [V] enconmiastic (e.g. eulogistic). Philódēmos also identifies [VI] ambassadorial (e.g. diplomatic) oratory and [VII] eristic (e.g. controversial). While ambassadorial, deliberative, and forensic styles of oratory exemplify practical oratory, the precision of rhetoric qualifies it as a technical art. Unlike practical oratory, technical rhetoric is exemplified by epideictic, rhetoric, also called [VII] panegyric (e.g. pageantic) and/or [VII] sophistic (e.g. deceptive).

As regards dialectic, Philódēmos offers professional respect (especially when compared against the profession of politics, the practice of oratory, and the art of rhetoric). He elaborates:

For the method of question and answer is necessary not only in philosophy and education, but often in the ordinary intercourse of life. The method of joint inquiry frequently demands this style. Moreover this method is adopted by the rhetor in the assembly as well as in the court of justice. (On Rhetoric, I, 241, col. XI).

While Philódēmos rejects the dialectic as a criterion of knowledge for “lack of qualification”, he accepts the general procedure as a logical tool, and acknowledges its applications in both technical rhetoric and practical oratory. In this way, “the rhetor is like the dialectician” (Ibid., II, 42, col. 30, I. 12.). The varieties of discourse are defined further at the end of this essay.

Modified from “Trilogy of the Desert: Mirage” by Salvador Dalí (1946)

THE MIRAGE OF SUCCESS

False illusions of success encircle us. Salary is not a reflection of skill. Popularity is not a mirror of value. Wealth cannot enrich friendship. Power cannot procure safety. Usually, these things produce antithetical effects: success incentivizes corruption, popularity rewards dishonesty, wealth challenges friendship, and power instigates insecurity. In his Key Doctrines, Epíkouros warns, “If for every occurrence you do not constantly reference the goal of natural pleasure, but if you suppress both banishment of pain and pursuit of pleasure to operate for another purpose, your reasonings and practices will not be in accordance” (25).

Wishing to be worshipped and well-liked, people procured security from people so long as they can be pronounced popular. And if so then indeed they were safe since such a lifestyle inherits the natural benefit of the good. If, however, they procured no safety, then they did not receive that for which they initially strove. (Key Doctrine 7)

Philódēmos provides us with a further warning in On Rhetoric as well as an example of when politicians, wishing to be popular, failed to procure safety:

“[M]any statesmen have been rejected by their fellow citizens, and slaughtered like cattle. Nay they are worse off than cattle, for the butcher does not hate the cattle, but the tortures of the dying statesmen are made more poignant by hatred” (Ibid., I, 234, col. V).

Based on these factors, Hermarkhos calls those who willfully pursue a career in rhetoric “insane”. They rarely achieve the goal of nature that such wealth and popularity is meant to secure. He affirms that “’It is better to lose one’s property than to keep it by lawsuits which disturb the calm of the soul‘” (Ibid., I, 81, 3ff.=Suppl. 40, 23 ff). For “it is much better to lose one’s wealth if one can not keep it otherwise, than to spend one’s life in rhetoric” (Ibid., I, 235, col. VI). Epíkouros summarizes, “Better for you to have courage lying upon a bed of straw than to agonize with a gold bed and a costly table” (Usener, Epicurea 207).

Modified from “Landscape with Farmhouses and Palm Trees” by Camille Pissarro (1853)

LIVE UNKNOWN

“[L]et us be content”, writes Philódēmos, “to live the quiet life of a philosopher without claiming a share in the ability to manage a city by persuasion” (On Rhetoric, I, 234, col. IV). Nothing secures a pleasant life so much as friendship, and nothing guarantees a life of pain so much as politics. Philosophy is more valuable that rhetoric because the “philosophy that teaches us how to limit our desires is better than rhetoric which helps us to satisfy them.” (Ibid., II, 150, fr. VII)

Philosophy is more profitable than epideictic rhetoric, especially if one practices rhetoric in the fashion of the sophists […]. The philosopher has many τόποι [“topics” or “positions”] concerning practical justice and other virtues about which he is confident; the busybody (i. e. the rhetorician) is quite the opposite. Nor is one who does not appear before kings and popular assemblies forced to play second part to the rich, as do rhetors who are compelled to employ flattery all their lives. (Ibid., I, 225, fr. I).

Escape notice and live! So writes Philódēmos, every “good and honest [person] who confines [their] interest to philosophy alone, and disregards the nonsense of lawyers, can face boldly all such troubles, yea all powers and the whole world.” (Ibid., II, 140, fr. XII). He observes:

“inspired before the same loud clamor, some will strive with the effort of Apollophanes [the Stoic] to advance wonderfully to the podium, but others, having landed in [philosophy’s] harbor and with hopes offered them that ‘not even the venerable flame of Zeus would be able to prevent them taking from the highest point of the citadel’ a life that is happy, afterwards, in spite of opposing winds….” (P.Herc 463)

Modified still from Star Wars: Andor, “Rix Road” (Season 1, Episode 12, November 23, 2022).

A GALAXY CLOSE TO HOME

If you will humor me, and entertain the possibility that I might attempt to “rightly hold dialogue about both music and poetry” (Laertios 10.120), consider that many of these points have been artfully orchestrated by writer and director Tony Gilroy in the television series Star Wars: Andor. One character in the fiction, the galactic senator, Mon Mothma, highlights the perils of propaganda (and political office) by exposing a dangerous, manufactured narrative: her dissent in politics has made her a target, and her agency as an orator is being suppressed. She redresses the Senate one, final time before withdrawing to a base, hidden deep in a distant forest:

The distance between what is said and what is known to be true has become an abyss. Of all the things at risk, the loss of an objective reality is perhaps the most dangerous. The death of truth is the ultimate victory of evil. When truth leaves us, when we let it slip away, when it is ripped from our hands we become vulnerable to the appetite of whatever monster screams the loudest. (Season 2, Episode 9)

In this fiction, diplomatic puppets defend and regurgitate loaded propaganda, having been convinced that a small, non-violent protest was actually an uprising. Only the survivors of the massacre, who heard the screams and saw the bodies for themselves know the truth. Similarly, Epíkouros advises that there “is a need to take into account […] all of the self-evident facts, according to which we refer our opinions”. Otherwise, “if not everything will be full of foolishness and of confusion” (Key Doctrine 22). Otherwise, one might be mislead to excuse genocide in the name of “security”. Otherwise, one might be mislead by political pundits and influential personalities to defend an armed mob of triggered, masked agents, deputized by a corrupt system to act with impunity. In the drama, one stormtrooper even shoots a woman in the face.

Trust your physical feelings and the force of nature. Lies are impractical. Propaganda is self-destructive. Oratory can be sinister. Principally, they target those who dismiss evidence and embrace superstition. It is dangerously easy to compel gullible minds to commit acts of violence through persuasive speech. Indeed, the modern-French philosopher Voltaire (heavily influenced by the propositions of the Epicurean school) observed that “Certainement qui est en droit de vous rendre absurde est en droit de vous rendre injuste” (Questions sur la Miracles 412). “Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities.” Persuasion is dangerous, and we rightly treat the instruments by which it spreads with scorn.

No deceptive speeches, manipulative oratory, lofty dialectic, nor rhetorical bullshit will convince a wise person to doubt their own eyes, discard their own feelings, and abandon their own study of nature. I invite you to see with your own eyes. Your life likely depends on it.


INDEX

Modified from “The Butcher’s Shop” by Gabriele Passerotti (1580)

    • Technical rhetoric includes epideictic, encomiastic, and panegyric or sophistic types. Philódēmos teaches that these methods of rhetoric are true arts.
    • Practical oratory includes ambassadorial, deliberative (or symbouleutic), and forensic types. Statesmen employ these methods for practical functions.
    • Political discourse “in this respect […] may fittingly be compared to the art of prophecy” (Ibid., I, 31, 3 ff.=Suppl. 17, 20 ff.). It is sometimes practical.
    • The Dialectic is a systemic, but deeply flawed method of reasoning privileged by
    • Socratics, Megarians, Academics, Peripatetics, and Stoics.
    • The Method by Analogy refers to the empirical reasoning of the Epicureans, which draws inferences from observations that can then be tested.
    • Philódēmos mentions several other rhetoric types, including the entuectic and eristic types that are not explicitly categorized, and may be synonyms or subsets.

  • AMBASSADORIAL ORATORY – πρεσβευτικός (presbeytikós). This practical form of oratory is employed by dignitaries and diplomats. Ambassadorial oratory is the ability “to be able to persuade in diplomatic negotiations by speech, not by power or bribes or dignities or anything else an ambassador might possess” (Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 217, col. XIII).

  • DELIBERATIVE ORATORY – συμβουλευτικά (symbouleutiká) is also known as “symbouleutic” oratory. This practical form of oratory is used by legislators. It “gives advice only on matters affecting the common welfare, and that this advice is not the product of the sophistic art, but of [something] quite a different…” (Ibid., I, 211. Col. XXX.19).

  • EPIDEICTIC RHETORIC – ἐπιδεικτικός (epideiktikós, “demonstrative”, “performative”). This is an art of study regarding “charming speeches” (Ibid., II, 244, col. XLII). It is also called “encomiastic” by Stoics (Laértios 7.142). It is far less profitable than philosophy “especially if one practices rhetoric in the fashion of the sophists” (Ibid., I, 225, fr. I.).

  • ENCOMIASTIC RHETORIC – ἐγκωμιαστικός (enkōmiastikós, “eulogistic” or “laudatory”) is rhetoric ἐπαίνους καὶ ψόγους (epaínous kai psógous) “of praise and blame”. “Furthermore, no one can believe encomiasts, because they praise bad men” (Ibid., 220, col. XXXIXa). Stoics called epideictic oratory “encomiastic” (Laértios 7.142)


  • ERISTIC SPEECH – ἐριστικός (eristikós, “eager for strife”). “Dialectic and eristic may be arts…” , however, the Epicurean school evaluates them as forms of persuasion, unconcerned with the validity of their statements as they correspond to reality (Ibid., I, 57, 23 ff=Suppl. 29, 15 ff.). Eristic speech is provocative and controversial.

  • FORENSIC ORATORY – δίκανικα (díkanika, “judicial”). Philódēmos compares the practicality of forensic oratory with “deliberative” and “ambassadorial” oratory (Ibid., I, 134, col. XXXI). Practically, forensic oratory is employed in courts of law in the form of criminal defense.

  • PANEGYRIC RHETORIC – πανηγυρικός (panēgyrikós, “assembly” speech). This form of rhetoric is synonymous with sophistic rhetoric. “Now we have already treated in a previous section the idea that sophistic or panegyric or whatever it may be called […] may be easily called rhetoric.” (Ibid., II, 234. col. XXXV.). Epíkouros writes that the wise “will not πανηγυριεῖν (panēgyrieîn)” or “make public speeches” (Laértios 10.120).

  • POLITICAL DISCOURSE – πολιτικός (politikós, “of the city”). Politics, by itself, is not an art. By itself, the “political faculty” is empty. It is not a technique, nor a method, but more like “prophecy”. “No man was able […] to impart to his contemporaries or to posterity [the principles of politics]” without the rhetorical arts of the philosophers (Ibid., I, 139, col. XXXIV). “[T]echnical treatises of rhetoricians […] are useless for producing the political faculty”, which does not require training (On Rhetoric, I, 64, II frr.=Supple. 32, 19 ff.).

  • PRACTICAL ORATORY – Practical forms of oratory (for example, speeches employed by dignitaries, deliberations employed by legislators, and defenses employed by lawyers) are distinguished from technical rhetoric (epideictic or enconmiatic, and panegyric or sophistic). Practical oratory is not considered an art that can be learned, only a practice that can be repeated, like civic speech, legislative debate, judicial defense, and diplomatic counsel. “Epicurean authorities hold that sophistic rhetoric does not perform the task of practical and political rhetoric” (Ibid., I, 119, 28 = Suppl. 59., 1e4. I, 120, 10= Suppl, 60, 6).

  • SOPHISTIC RHETORIC – σοφιστική (sophistikḗ). Sophistic is an art of epideixis, and of the arrangement of speeches, written and extemporaneous.” (Ibid., II-c). “Sophistic style is suited to epideictic oratory and written works, but not to actual practice in forum and ecclesia” (Ibid., III, 134. fr. V). Indeed, “the training given by the sophists does not prepare for forensic or deliberative oratory” (Ibid., II, 131, fr. I). “Sophistic can “persuade men to become villains. And when they do praise a good man they praise him for qualities considered good by the crowd, and not truly good qualities” (Ibid., I, 216 col. XXXVa, 14).

  • TECHNICAL RHETORIC – τεχνικός (tekhnikós, “technical”) refers to methods of oratory that properly fit the Epicurean definition of an “art” (or “technique”), including epideictic and sophistic methods. Technical rhetoric offers methods (as is the case with any true art) that can be taught, and reproduced to achieve the same result. “Two sciences produce the same result.” (Ibid., I, 4, co. I=Suppl. 4, 17.). However, compared against the study of nature, “technical rhetoric has never advanced anyone” (Ibid., I.192, col. XI).

  • THE DIALECTICδιαλεκτική (dialektikḗ). Before the idealistic Hegelians and materialistic Marxists, the “dialectic” was privileged by Socratics, Megarians, Academics, Peripatetics, and Stoics, who defined it as “the science of conversing correctly where the speeches involve question and answer — and hence they also define it as the science of what it true and false and neither” (Laértios 7.42). The Epicureans reject the dialect as being incapable of verifying “truth” because it assumes that “truth” is capable of being reasoned without reliance upon physical evidence. Most of the dialecticians encouraged political participation as a necessity to existential satisfaction; Epicureans outright reject political office.

  • THE METHOD BY ANALOGY καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα τρόποϛ (ho kath’ homoiotēta tropos, “method according to similarity”) anticipated the modern, scientific method by several millennia. Epíkouros accepted that inferences must comport with observation and abide by nature. We must “create an analogy that corresponds with what we see“ (On Nature, Book 11, III, b5-12).” [W]e shall not be prevented from making inferences, provided that we use the method of analogy properly” (On Signs). And “we say that the method of analogy is a sound method of inference, with this condition, that no other appearance or previously demonstrated fact conflicts with the inference” (Ibid.).

For additional commentary, please see “Reasonings About Philodemus’ Rhetoric

For more on deliberate misrepresentation, please see “On Bullshit” by Dr. Harry Frankfurt

Clipped version of “Saint Epicurus” by Genevra Catalano (2023)

Be well and live earnestly!

Your Friend,
EIKADISTES
Keeper of Twentiers.com
Editor of the Hedonicon

Holy Shit: The Elements of Epicurean Psychedelia

Disclaimer: the ideas and opinions presented below are reflective of the author and may or may not be shared by other members of the Society of Friends of Epicurus.

PART I: THE ATOM PROPHET

Prior to ingesting psilocybin mushrooms at the age of 20, my theological positions were categorically Kyrēnaíc — as with “Theódōros, known as the atheist”, I “utterly rejected the current belief in the gods” whether they be Olympians, the Stars, or the Trinity (Laértios, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 2.86, 2.97). Like The Atheist, I, too “denied the very essence of a Deity” (Cicero, On the Nature of Gods 23). I was equally “great at cunning up anything with a jest”, happily reducing holy stories to hoary myths, lampooning the paradoxically pregnant virgin, teasing the tyranny of a childish creator, and “using vulgar names” for embarrassing social phenomena that appeared (to me) to be plagues upon the rational world, like hordes of superstitious rats, marching to the tune of their petty pipers (Laértios 4.52). I viewed the faithful as flocks of lost sheep following false shepherds. I rejected the religious experience as, at best, a benign delusion, and, at worse, untreated psychosis.

Then the blue meanies hit.

“Door of Perception” from an unpublished diary (June 2009).

I walked through the doors of perception ecstasis. My pulse increased and I felt warm, bursting with energy. Euphoria erupted with uninhibited joy, giddiness, and laughter. Outside, I felt as though I was walking on clouds and dissolving into the Earth. Back inside, my trip peaked. I saw trails behind moving objects. I had intense closed-eye visuals memories came to life; patterned lattices appeared. I began to see, eyes wide open, a warped reality, a curved, moving field of vision. I was overwhelmed by a sudden, intense sensation. I opened […] the unfiltered brain, raising the gates to flood my mind with sensation. (Unpublished Diary, June 2009)

The symptoms of the psychedelic experience, from the ancient Greek ψυχή (psykhḗ or “soul”) and δῆλος (dḗlos or “visible”), are exquisitely unique and reliably illuminating, if such insights can be apprehended — the flood of perceptual fluctuations that engulfs the ego often inundates the analytical faculties. Consequently, should one hope to return from the abyss triumphant, with the gift of bliss and the reward of wisdom, the intellect must stretch its reach, wielding an extended net of metaphor to capture the juicy insights swimming around it.

Half-aware, half-asleep, my sensation turned to insight. I was drifting through bubbles of different eyes altered states of consciousness. As I entered each bubble, I saw from a different mind possibilities of the unfiltered human mind. I saw from a different time as my own context hid with the realm of possibilities. The ordered chaos allowed me see as other people from other times and places. I even encountered that which I do not believe in or reject. I reveled at the windows open in my mind. I had the wonderment of a child. I loved everything that I witnessed, and those who were watching with me I loved as well. I heard my thoughts change, creatively toward the philosophical …

“The Realm of Psyches” from an unpublished diary (June 2009)

As sometimes happens, four grams of fungus triggered an existential deconstruction that challenged a host of perceptual certainties and inspired a journey to the edge of the soul.

I thought of the ancient Greek Sophists, and the egocentric predicament that evaded Descartes, Locke, and Kant. As I swept through more bubbles, I repeated a mantra, “It’s all relative; it’s all right; everything is in relation to everything else.” It is through an interface that we perceive the world, and we have faith that we perceive accurately. The world stimulates our bodies and then our thoughts; the external reveals itself to the internal. […] We cannot afford to limit ourselves to our own interface. We must transcend our own limitations. Falling asleep, I repeated the mantra, “All right, it is all right…”

The next morning, the tone of my theology transformed from the dismissive scorn of a faithless Kyrēnaíc to the confident assurance of a pious Epicurean, an “Atom-Prophet” observant of the material divinity within. While I was still unconvinced by popular expressions of faith, still suspicious of religious institutions, still scornful of magical thinking, dismissive of superstitious beliefs, and derisive of supernatural myths, I became convinced of a universal spirituality, a primal faith that conforms to physics, driven by chemical ecstasy, ritualized across innumerable cultures, each featuring the same symptoms of the psychedelic experience.

The impression of that event shines in my mind like a holy relic, a splinter from the true cross of ecstasy. I returned from the psychedelic realm with a gift of bliss and sacred testimony, having communed with the kaleidoscopic source of experience, liberated from vain, intellectual inflexibilities. Before that event, I reduced the religious experience to a mere neurological disturbance; but as an Epicurean, I elevate that experience to a neurological blessing. Far from being an empty construct the requires dismissal, the “divine nature” is palpable. The meanings of mythic metaphors become evident as the conditioned realm of assumptions and prejudices dissolves into void. The psychedelic sacrament cleansed my mind of toxic opinions and purged me of rage. I was kissed by blessed psilocybin, who left me with a lasting euphoria.

The founder of the Epicurean tradition defends this material form of ὁσιότητος (hosiótētos) “piety” while criticizing the misunderstandings of the masses and their misleading myths. He maintains that the “true” gods are “not the same sort the masses consider” who “continuously pray for cruel” punishments “against one another” (Epíkouros, Epicurea 388). It is not the godless Kyrēnaíc, “but the one who adheres to the masses’ doctrines about the deities” who is truly “impious” (Epistle to Menoikeus 123). “For pious is the person who preserves the […] consummate blessedness of God” versus those who ask “in prayer” for “things unworthy of the supposed indestructibility and complete blessedness” of the divine (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 40.9-13 and Col. 10.2-5). “Such a person we honour for his piety, whereas the other we despise as manifestly depraved” (Ibid., Col 41.1-5). Any other, incoherent “definition of piety […] gives a strange impression, partly of jealousy, and partly of hostility” (Ibid., Col. 65.7-11).

In essence, Epicurean theology affirms that “God” is neither employed as an administrator in cosmic government, nor appointed as a magistrate to establish metaphysical jurisprudence. “The gods” neither probe the universe for life like interstellar anthropologists, nor prey upon shapely bachelorettes, nor worry themselves with weather forecasts. True piety observes the divinity found in nature, in forming bonds, cultivating friendship, and securing tranquility through peaceful relations. “Piety appears to include not harming” (Ibid., Col 47.5-8). Indeed, “piety and justice appear to be almost the same thing” (Ibid., Col. 78.10-12). In the Epicurean tradition, piety is an acknowledgement that god does not direct the human drama. A true deity neither fulfills vain wishes like a genie, nor practices divination like a sorcerer, neither seeking power from a fear of death, nor seeking fickle approval to gain favor. They are neither omnipotent nor omniscient, neither causative nor administrative, but only exhilarative, inter-generational sources of inspiration from which the rituals of religion have been formed.

PART II: PARTY ANIMALS

And with regard to festivals and sacrifices and all such things generally, it must entirely be acknowledged that he acted in accordance with what he believed and taught and that he faithfully employed oaths and tokens of good faith and he kept them. (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 51.3-11)

While the Sage of the Garden is distinguished for his critical commentary against hypocritical beliefs and mythic deceit, he nevertheless contributes volumes of reflections on spiritual wisdom and religious practice, faithfully exhorting a friend to “consider the deity an incorruptible and blessed figure” (Laértios 10.123). Philódēmos records Epíkouros as having “loyally observed all forms of worship” since he “enjoined upon his friends to observe them, not only on account of the laws, but for physical reasons as well. For in On Lifecourses he says that to pray is natural…” (On Piety, Col. 26.5-14). Philódēmos later affirms:

He shared in all the festivals […] joining in celebrating the festival of the Choes and the […] Mysteries and the other festivals at a meagre dinner, and that it was necessary for him to celebrate this feast of the twentieth for distinguished revelers, while those in the house decorated it most piously, and after making invitations to host a feast for all of them. (Col. 28.18–Col. 29.10)

The public festivals that Philódēmos names include both “the festival of the Choes” or “the Pouring”, the second day of the three-day-long, flower-and-wine holiday of Anthestḗria, celebrated on the twelfth day of the eponymously-named month of Anthestēriōn (from ἄνθος or ánthos meaning “flower”), as well as τά Μυστήρια (tá Mystḗria) or “the Mysteries” — it is unclear whether Philódēmos means μυστήρια τ’άττικα (mystḗria t’áttika Col. 28.27-28) “the Attic” (perhaps Eleusían) Mysteries versus μυστήρια τ’άστικα (mystḗria t’asti “the Urban Mysteries” or “City Dionýsia” held during the month of Elaphēboliōn (mid-March-to-April), known for its theatrical competitions, reminiscent of contemporary fringe festivals. By extension, Epíkouros may also have observed the adjacent Dionysian festival of Λήναια (Lḗnaia) from ληνός (lēnós meaning “wine-press”) in honor of Dionýsios Lēnaíos (“of the wine-press”), celebrated in Epíkouros’ birth-month of Gamēliṓn, from γαμηλίᾰ (gamēlía) meaning “marriage” (mid-January-to-February). The Lesser Mysteries may also have been patronized by Epíkouros and his friends, which also transpire during the month of Anthestēriōn. These holidays share many of the same wedding, drinking, parading, and feasting features as Anthestḗria.

A number of contemporary scholars have attempted to reconstruct a portrait of the central rituals that defined these holidays including a wedding procession, a symbolic pageant, a symbolic marriage, performances, drinking games, dancing, an animal sacrifice, and the filling feast that followed. Among them, Henri Jeanmarie orchestrates the following scene:

[T]he procession was led by a flute player, followed by basket bearers in white dresses, with flowers in the baskets. Others carried the perfumed altar, then there followed the maritime cart containing the God. Next there came a flute player and participants carrying flower wreaths raised high, so that they formed a kind of arc or superstructure. Under this walked the sacrificial bull, decorated with white ribbons. The procession also included masked men dressed up as women, fertility demons and satyrs. […] Upon arrival at the sanctuary the procession met with the Basilinna or queen, and her fourteen priestesses who received Dionysos in the wagon. | Those participants who performed the secret rituals in the sanctuary dedicated to Dionysos in the Marshes, comprised a group of fourteen priestesses called gerarai (“the Venerable Ones”), the holy herald, and the Basilinna, who was the wife of the Archōn Basileus, the priest of Dionysos, who during his year of service was responsible for many of the older religious ceremonies […] during the ritual […] the animal sacrifice was also performed […] When the women’s rituals in the Marshes were finished, Dionysos then married the Basilinna, who, as already stated, was the wife of the Archōn Basileus. He presided over the festival, and played the role of the God in the hieros gamos […] After having fetched the bride, the colorful procession walked through the city […] Meanwhile women and men stood outside the doors and on the terraces of their houses, carrying lighted torches in their hands and watching the procession as it passed by. (Håland 406-409)

In a letter to his friend and co-founder Polýainos, Epíkouros insists that “Anthestḗria too must be celebrated”, beginning with [DAY 1] Πιθοίγια (Pithoígia) the “Casket-Opening” during which “libations were offered from the newly-opened jars to the god of wine” and “all the household, including servants or slaves [joined] in the festivity of the occasion” — so long as that person was “over three years of age…” (Encyclopædia Britannica 103). Pithoígia resembles in many ways the Celtic tradition of Samhain, as well as its Christian analogue, All Hallow’s Eve save that Pithoígia is set amidst the floral scenery of Anthestēriṓn (mid-February-to-March), just in time for the wine to have reached its intended perfection as the flowers of next year’s harvest begin to bloom. Participants, within fragrant “rooms […] adorned with spring flowers” would, expectantly, open their tall πίθοι (píthoi, “jars of wine”) anticipating the prize within — symbolically, the jars represent the “grave-jars” of the deceased: fumes from the the previous season’s vintage escape like the vapors of the departed, liberated from their dark tombs. The souls of the dead are mythologized to have escaped the underworld to torment the living. “To protect themselves from the spirits of the dead,” as was the Attic tradition, Athenians were seen “chewing ‘ramnon’, leaves of Hawthorn, or white thorn, and were anointing themselves and their doors with tar” (Psilopoulos, Goddess Mystery Cults and the Miracle… 268).

As noted by Philódēmos (On Piety), the following day of Anthestḗria was designated [DAY 2] Χοαί (Khoaí) or Choës meaning “The Pouring” — naturally, the “pouring of the cups” would follow the “opening of the jars”. Fortunately, for our survey, “literary testimony [of] the second day, the Choes” “is explicit” (Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion 39). The day is “dedicated to a hieros gamos, a wedding of the Gods”. It famously featured a “drinking contest, to celebrate the arrival of the God” (Greek Festivals, Modern and Ancient 406). Despite “the drinking contest, the flower-wreathed cups”, the family feasts, “and the wedding of Dionysos, all joyful elements of the service of the wine-god, the Choes was a dies nefastus, an unlucky day” that demanded pious observance (Prolegomena 39). “On the part of the state this day was the occasion of a peculiarly solemn and secret ceremony in one of the temples of Bacchus, which for the rest of the year was closed.” (“Anthesteria”, Encyclopedia Brittanica). It is within this context that the Hegemon affirms “it is necessary to make mention of the gods” (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 30.28-29). Epíkouros provides us with the following appeal:

Let us sacrifice to the gods […] devoutly and fittingly on the proper days, and let us fittingly perform all the acts of worship in accordance with the laws, in no way disturbing ourselves with opinions in matter concerning the most excellent and august of beings. Moreover, | let us sacrifice justly, on the view that I was giving. For in this way it is possible for mortal nature, by Zeús, to live like Zeús, as it seems. (Epistle to Polýainos)

One example of a “sacrifice” to which he alludes might be found in the libations offered during the final day of Anthestḗria [DAY 3] Χύτροι (Khýtroi), an ancient predecessor of Día de los Muertos, the Day of the Dead. “The third day was explicitly dedicated to the spirits of the dead” (Greek Festivals, Modern and Ancient 413). Practitioners would offer the contents of their χύτραι (khýtrai) or “[cooking] pots” to Hermes Chthónios, a deity of the ancient underworld — here, Hermes fulfills the role of a classical psychopomp whose function it is to guide departed souls through the unfamiliar terrain of the afterlife. The pots of pious devotees would contain a porridge called πανσπερμία (panspermía or “all-seeds”), a warm “meal of mixed grains” (A Companion to Greek Religion 336). Such a sacrifice, characterized by personal abstinence and modest renunciation, would have exemplified Epikouros’ conception of αὐταρκείας (autarkeías) or autarky, meaning “self-sufficiency”, “self-reliance”, or “independence” (a notable ἀρετή or aretḗ, meaning “virtue” or instrumental good). Epicurean autarky is further characterized as a freedom from vain desires. The Master writes that “we praise the [virtue of] self-sufficiency not so that one might be in want of things that are cheap and plain, but so we can have confidence with them” knowing that the best things in life, like friendship, are free (Epicurea U135b).

Beyond his participation in the traditional civic festivals and cults of the Athenian polis, Epíkouros established a number of sect-specific holidays for friends and future students. As recorded in his Last Will, the observances he recommends include:

…an offering to the dead thereupon for both my father and my mother and my brothers, and for us the practice having been accustomed to celebrate our [Epíkouros and Metródōros’] birthday of each year on the Twentieth of Gamēliṓn, and so long as an assembly comes into being each of the month celebrate on the Twentieth to philosophize for us in order to respect both our memory and Metródōros’. And then celebrate the day of my brothers for Poseideṓn, and then celebrate that of Polyainos for Metageitniṓn exactly as we have been doing. (Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 10.18)

The Epicurean practice of ritualizing the anniversary of one’s birthday will strike us as a familiar celebration, yet in ancient Greece, “birthdays” were unrecognized outside of Persia. The historian Hēródotos records that “of all the days in the year, the one which they” the Persians “celebrate most is their birthday. It is customary to have the board furnished on that day with an ampler supply than common” (Customs of the Persians 1.133). It was even traditional to prepare pastries or cakes, for they ate “little solid food but abundance of dessert, which is set on table, a few dishes at a time” (Ibid.). Birthdays for Epicureans signify “the blessedness of having come into existence, for having become part of Nature’s vast and awesome realities” (A Companion to Horace 329). Epíkouros writes that “the wise will have gratitude for friends both present and absent alike through both word and through deed” (Laértios 10.118). In treating our friends’ birthdays as holidays (“holy days”), we observe a classical expression of piety.

“Homoousian” from an unpublished diary entry (June 2009).

While birthdays provided celebrants with an opportunity to toast the living, days of remembrance provided celebrants with an opportunity to venerate the dead. Epíkouros reserves a number of days in memoriam — he sets aside funds to provide resources for memorials for his father, his mother, and commemorations for his brothers on a day in Poseideṓn (mid-December-to-January), as well as his two, deceased best-friends, Polýainos on the 6th of Metageitniṓn (mid-August-to-September) and Metródōros on his own birthday of Gamēliōn 20th (mid-January-to-February). Polýainos’ day likely overlapped the festival of Metageítnia (for which the month was named), a a feast commemorating the legendary migration of Apollo Metageitniṓn, holy patron of migrants (an analogue for the modern personification of Lady Liberty). Apollo Metageitniṓn may have been a sympathetic icon for members of the Athenian Garden, many of whom were migrants from Lámpsakos or refugees to Athens.

Memorial cults in the ancient world were usually observed on the death-days of the deceased (not the days of their birth), so it is possible that Polýainos died on the 6th of Metageitniṓn (P.Herc. 176). At the same time, hero cults celebrate the birthdays of the figures of their veneration annually, and the Hegemon presents his school as such. Epíkouros neither establishes a funerary cult to support the ghosts (in which he did not believe) of his fallen friends, nor a mortuary cult to ritualize their internment. Instead, he prescribes a hero cult for himself and his friends in the hope that future students might learn from their lives and benefit by emulating their examples. In addition to the obligatory feast that crowns each festival, days of remembrance provide devotees with opportunities to clean gravesites and decorate votives.

In addition to participating in civic festivals and private rites, Epíkouros formally establishes the celebration of Eikas (or “The Twentieth”) the so-called “Philosopher’s Sabbath”, the unifying Epicurean holiday, a symposium, open to friends, associates, and acquaintances, set on the 20th day of each month. Several ancient inscriptions, carved in stone preserve the name of an older cult known as οἱ Εἰκαδεῖς (oì Eìkadeîs), those bound by the mythic hero Εἰκαδεύς (Eìkadeús), worshipped as a manifestation of Apollo Parnessiós (a form of Apollo who resides on Mt. Parnassós, surrounded by muses and strumming a lyre). The Eìkadeîs, too, worshipped their patron on the 20th day of each month; indeed, a deity cult would observe its patron god monthly, whereas a hero cult would celebrate their heroes annually: a “monthly cult was reserved for divinities” (The Cambridge Encyclopedia to Epicureanism 24). Thus, in establishing a monthly practice for his tradition, Epíkouros was “moving as close to the gods as was humanly possible” (Diskin Clay, Paradosis and Survival: Three Chapters in the History of Epicurean Philosophy 97). Indeed, “the festival for which the Epicureans were best known [was] established on the Apollonian day”. “The date, the twentieth of the month, was an interesting choice by Epicurus. For that was a sacred day to the celebrants of Apollo at Delphi and it was also the day on which initiation rites were held at the Temple of Demeter in Eleusis” (Hibler, Happiness Through Tranquility: The School of Epicurus 18). In organizing monthly gatherings, Epíkouros was explicitly providing initiates with a non-supernatural alternative to the predominant cults that ritualized transcendence and resurrection. “In derision, the enemies of the Master named his cult Eikadistai which is from the Greek word for the twentieth” (Ibid. 18).

Epíkouros and his καθηγεμώνες (kathēgemṓnes) “co-guides” or “co-founders” established a school that moonlit as a naturalistic hero cult with religious undertones. They provided an alternative to the dominant superstitions that circulated among the masses and founded a tradition that welcomed the unwelcome. Ancient Epicureans expressed their piety by hosting feasts, participating in festivals, attending pageants, patronizing theatrical sanctuaries, venerating the living (i.e. anthropolatry), memorializing the dead, committing to a study of nature, exercising peaceful relations, honoring friendships, and meditating upon the visualizations of divinities, divinities like Ζεύς (Zeús), whose name is derived from a prehistoric word for the archetypal god of the day sky, Dyēus. (As an interesting historical sidenote, Zeus was frequently epitomized by the epithet Ζεύς Πατήρ or Zeús Patér, from which we inherit “Jupiter”, a continuation of the proto-Indo-European phrase “Dyēus Phtḗr” meaning “Sky Father”.)

PART III: BY ZEUS!

Epíkouros published a number of treatises on theology, including Περὶ Ὁσιότητος (Perì Hosiótētos or “On Piety”) and Περὶ Θεῶν (Perí Theôn or “On Gods”). In his texts, the Gargettian encourages worship of the gods while maintaining the validity of atomic physics and highlighting the emptiness of the supernatural. Elsewhere in his texts, the Sage of the Garden conducts a survey of religious history, provides an evaluation of the efficacy of rites and rituals, and he reflects upon the nature of the profound mental impressions that have inspired thousands of years of pious devotion. While these masterpieces have been lost, his ideas have been preserved by Philódēmos’ similarly-named works “On Piety” and “On Gods”, in addition to Metródōros’ Περὶ Μεταβολής (Perì Metabolês or “On Change”), and a work by Demḗtrios of Lakōnía entitled Περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ Μορφῆς (Perì toû Theoû Morphēs or “On the Form of a God”), within which the form and physics of the divine depictions are further deconstructed.

These texts preserve a variety of theological attitudes, characterized by flexibility and fluidity, compatibility and coherence. Casually, the authors shift between polytheism, henotheism, kathenotheism, qualified monotheism, monolatry, and thealogy. They observe infinite deities, patronizing some, revering others, preferring these, ignoring those, favoring the feminine, venerating the masculine, and honoring the conceptual unity that the multiplicity of gods compliment. Each of these theological positions exhibit coherence between the variations in our internal understandings of blessedness as they have been “manifest” (as Demḗtrios of Lakoniá suggests) to the mind’s eye. The deities are expressions for the divine nature, paragons of the divine nature, and participants in the divine nature. At times, their names are invoked reverently, as when Philódēmos offers a “drink in honor of Zeus the Savior(On Death 3.32) while at other times, their literary forms are employed as purely poetic devices, as when Philódēmos summons “Aphrodite” and “Andromeda”, or when Diogénēs of Oìnóanda patronizes “father Zeus” (153) and swears “in the name of the twelve” (128). Hermarkhos records the Hegemon as having exercised this same practice: “Concerning metaphor, he made use in human fashion of the connection with the (divine) entity” (Against Empedoklḗs). The Epicurean sages demonstrate themselves to be skillful rhetoricians who shift their tone appropriately, casually, creatively, technically, and frankly. As Epíkouros writes, “Only the wise will rightly hold dialogue about […] poetry” (Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 10.120).

When he isn’t dropping the names of gods as idioms (e.g. NH ΔIA, Nḗ Dία or “By Zeus!”) and expletives (e.g. ΠΑΙΑΝ ΑΝΑΞ, Paián Ánax meaning “Lord Paian!” compared with our swear “Jesus Christ!”), Epíkouros is describing a collective group of θεῶν (theṓn) “of [the] deities” in the genitive plural (Epistle to Menoikeus 124, 133, 134; Vatican Saying 65). Elsewhere we find the word “deities” as θεοὺς (theoùs) in the accusative plural (Ep. Men. 123, 139), θεοῖς (theoîs) in the dative plural (Ep. Men. 123), and θεοὶ (theoì) in the vocative plural (Ep. Men. 123). Epíkouros employs the singular word “deity” as θεὸς (theòs) in the nominative (135, U338), θεόν (theón 121, 123, 134) in the accusative, and θεῷ (theôi 134) in the dative, both with and without a definitive article (“the” deity versus simply “deity”). Three times in the Epistle to Menoikeus, Epíkouros employs the masculine pronoun “him” when referring to “the deity” in the accusative (αὐτὸν or aútòn), dative (αὐτῷ or autōî), and genitive declensions (αὐτοῦ or autoú 123). Concurrently, throughout his abridgment on meteoric phenomena, Epíkouros employs feminine expressions for “the divine nature”, found in the nominative (θεία φύσις or ḗ theía phýsis, Ep. Pyth. 97, 117) and accusative forms (τὴν θείαν φύσιν or tḗn theían phýsin 113).

Jesus Christ! I find myself refreshed by the flexible means with which Epíkouros expresses divinity. I am equally encouraged by the possibility of an inclusive, intelligible approach to spirituality, independent of incoherent myths and tyrannical clerics. Such a congenital expression of piety compliments my continued observation that religious establishments and mythic narratives have been artificially fabricated. The larger story of human history reflects a tale of animals who developed histories, cultivated civilizations, and generated religious icons over vast periods of time, all due to the simple swerve of tiny, cosmic threads.

“Poesis” from an unpublished diary (June 2009)

According to Cicero, Epíkouros “alone first founded the idea of the existence of the Gods on the impression which nature herself hath made on the minds of all men” (On the Nature of Gods 26). “For what nation, what people are there, who have not, without any learning, a natural idea, or prenotion, of a Deity?” According to the Gargettian, pre-historic humans first conceived of divinities as sublime psychological icons encountered during dreams and meditations (On Nature 12). The Pyrrhonian skeptic Sextus Empiricus preserves Epíkouros’ historical thesis: “The origin of the thought that god exists came from appearances in dreams” as well as godlike examples manifest among “the phenomena of the world” (Adversus Mathematicos 9.45-46). Far from being prophetic symbols θεόπεμπτος (theópemptos) “sent by the gods” (Diogénēs of Oìnóanda, fr. 9, col. 6), the delightful visions are, most immediately, mental representations apprehended from a “constant stream of” materially-bondable “images” (Laértios 10.139). Ancient humans’ internal encounters with these untroubled forms created deep impressions in their minds. The devotees developed conventions to celebrate the symbols of their insights. Traditions were cultivated and pious practice flourished, as did dramatic myths and misunderstandings. Eventually, “self-important theologians” and deluded priests diluted beliefs about the divine and perverted piety with a fog of fear (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 86A 1-2). God, himself, was assigned disturbing duties and became enlisted in the service of religious autocrats.

Contrary to the chilling myths championed by “self-important theologians”, the true nature of the divine knows no need to direct the production of the human drama. Epíkouros recognizes that “it is foolish to ask of the gods that which we can supply for ourselves” (Vatican Saying 65). The true benefits of worship are enjoyed by worshippers, not by the fantastic objects of our obeisance. Humans conceive of gods and goddesses as being kind, confident, and self-reliant; in practicing these virtues, we cultivate our own happiness: “Anyone who has these things […] can rival the gods for happiness” (Vatican Saying 33). Philódēmos exhorts us to “imitate their blessedness insofar as mortals can” and “endeavor most of all to make themselves harmless to everyone as far as is within their power; and second to make themselves so noble” (On Piety Col. 71.16-19, 23-29). Therefore, a correct understanding of theology and religious practice is integral to cleansing oneself of the turmoil that is symptomatic of magical thinking. Millennia later, the American diplomat Benjamin Franklin recycles this ancient aphorism in his publication Poor Richard’s Almanack, suggesting that “God helps them that helps themselves.”

PART IV: ALL PARTICLES GO TO HEAVEN

To rationally explore concepts like divinity and prayer, Epíkouros defines a standard of knowledge that is grounded in atomic interactions — “the criterion of truth [includes] the sensations and preconceptions and that of feeling” (Laértios 10.31). The Gargettian defines the divine nature (“the gods” or “God”) as being presented by the mental προλήψις (prolēpsis) “impression” of μακαριότητα (makariótēta) “blessedness”, also described as τελείαν εδαιμονίαν (teleían eùdaimonían) “perfect happiness”. The gods of Epíkouros are primarily θεωρητούς (theōrētoús 10.62, 135) “observed” or “contemplated” as φαντασίαν τ διανοί (phantasían tḗi dianoíai) “visualizations” or “appearances [in] the mind” (10.50). Epíkouros affirms that the gods μὲν εἰσιν (mèn eísin 123) “truly exist” yet are only “seen” or “reached” through an act of λόγῳ (lógoi 10.62, 135) “contemplation”, “consideration”, “reasoning”, “reckoning”, or “logical accounting” (10.62, 135). He observes that the mental φαντάσματα (phantásmata) or “appearances” of the gods arise κ τς συνεχος πιρρύσεως τν μοίων εδώλων (èk ts synekhoús èpirrū́seōs tn homoíōn eidṓlōn) “from a continuous stream of similar images” that leave impressions upon the mind. The divine impressions are generated from the coalescence of “similar images” through a process of ὑπέρβασις (hypérbasis) “sublimation”. The images the intellect apprehends have been ποτετελεσμένωι (ápotetelesménōi) “rendered” to human souls in human forms, inspiring, perpetually-healthy, perfectly-happy people.

Having reviewed the psychiatric evidence of memory against the criteria of knowledge (exemplified by the Epicurean canon), Epíkouros explains that the functional “coherence” or “resemblance” between internal φαντάσματα (phantásmata) “appearances” and external τος οσί (toís ousí) “reality” (or literally, “the beings”) requires an initial impulse to complete a sequence of successive impacts, ultimately yielding a perception in the mind, “since we could not have sought the investigation if we had not first perceived it” (Laértios 10.33). A sensible τύπος (týpos) “impression” initiates a perceptual relay through various pathways in the soul — the sense organs are stimulated by acoustic ῥεύμᾰτᾰ (rheúmata) or “currents”, olfactory ὄγκοι (ónkoi) or “hooklets”, and visual είδωλα (eídōla) or “images” “impinging [upon] us [as] a result of both the colorful realities and concerning a harmonious magnitude of like morphologies”. The μαχυμερέστερον (makhymerésteron) “marching army of particles” (Dēmḗtrios of Lakonía, On the Form of a God 21) enter “the face or the mind” […] yielding an appearance and an [affective] sympathy as a result of the observing” (10.49-50). The earliest people who experienced these visions assumed “the object of thought as a thing perceived in relation to a solid body […] understanding perception that can be grasped by corporeal sensation, which they also knew to be derived from a physical entity [i.e. nature].” (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 15.8-18). Thus, “the gods” were born, and forms of worship developed to venerate their appearance.

Mental phantasms can be instigated passively through the indiscriminate mechanism of sensation, either externally, through the trigger of touch, or internally, “in respect of slumbers” when the mind is least encumbered by daily disturbances. They can also be summoned intentionally, through a directed act of contemplation, involving τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας (tinàs épibolàs tḗs dianoías) “some applications of the intellect” like μνήμην (mnḗmēn) “memory”. Dēmḗtrios of Lakōnía elaborates that the representations in the mind are caused both as those memories manifest” through focus, “and also” by the physical impulse of “pre-existing [bodies] that, upon [striking] the mind produce constructive cognition” (On the Form of a God 12). Because of this, mental representations of religious figures can be summoned through meditation as readily as when gazing upon a the body of a physical icon. In prayer, the supplicant manually retrieves the mental impressions of blessed impulses from memory. Depictions of divinity have been “apparent” (and readily-available) to most people for millennia — the fields of the Earth are filled with statues, votives, frescoes, mosaics, murals, metalwork, jewelry, pottery, and architecture that glorify the divine. Each civilization peppers its conception of divinity with fresh colors, shapes, and stories just as each culture ritualizes a contemplative path to care for the health of the soul. In doing so, each group creates a cultural matrix into which subsequent generations are enmeshed. Concurrently, each tradition preserves its own, procedural means by which to make the contents of their psykhḗ become dḗlos.

When a supplicant prays, meditates, concentrates, reflects, or generally applies directed focus toward the memory of the “form” of “blessedness”, they generate a mental image “as if” practitioners were literally ἐν εἰκόνι (én eìkóni) “in the presence” of a physical “representation”, “portrait”, or “icon”. As with the memory of “brightness”, “loudness”, “softness”, and “sweetness”, the mental “appearance” of a divine form arises κ τς συνεχος πιρρύσεως τν μοίων εδώλων (èk ts synekhoús èpirrū́seōs tn homoíōn eidṓlōn) “from a continuous stream of similar impulses” received from abroad. To further isolate the genesis of our conceptions, we can trace the atomic crumbs of cognition to their energetic source. In the case of divine entities, we discover that our representations have been conditioned through our experiences with human nature combined with the congenital preconception of blessedness. As with the preconception of δίκαιος (díkaios) “justice”, the mental prototype of a “god” functions as an organizing principle and can act as a standard against which real-world examples can be evaluated — an alleged divinity who punishes and terrorizes neither meets the definition of “blessed” nor of “just”, and cannot, by definition, be “a god”. So long as a personal conception of divinity coheres with the definition of “blessedness”, it can be considered to be a god. Thus, an endless collection of divinities can be perceived, in a variety of forms, supported by the infinity of particles.

The intelligible form of a god appears to us, as does each, conceptual formation in the mind, as τὸ ὄν (tò ón) “a being” or “an entity” (Philódēmos, On Piety 1892, 66a 11). According to Epíkouros, each “entity” can be conceived of as an individual ἑνότης (henótēs) “unity” or “union” composed of many other particles that coalesce together to form representational σύγκρισεις (sýnkriseis) “compounds” in the mind. As Metródōros writes, each νότητα διότροπον (henótēta idiótropon) “distinctive unity” also exists as a “compound made up of things that do not exist as numerically distinct” (On Change; in Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 4.13-15). Epíkouros clarifies, “unified entities” in the mind exhibit one of two constitutions — some “are perfected out of the same elements and others from similar elements” (On God; in Philódēmos, On Piety Col. 8.14-17) The φύσεις (phýseis) “natures” or “constitutions” of all of these “unified entities” are therein grouped according to the origin of their birth, either from a single source, or having coalesced from multiple sources  ἐξ ὑπερβάσεως τν μεταξύ (èx hyperbáseōs tôn metazù Col.12.8-9) “as a result of transposition” during traversal “between” the source and its representative conception in the mind. If the mental form of an entity is composed of particles that only originate from a single source, Epíkouros says that they are all αὐτή (autḗ) “the same” in constitution — “the same” form is one that reflects a numerically-singular entity in one’s environment. By contrast, Epíkouros says that the appearances composed of particles coming from multiple sources are only superficially ὁμοία (homoía) “similar” because they are only related insofar as their composition as an array of εἴδωλα (eídola). Besides their shared form as bundles of images, they have different origins that combined during conception.

To demonstrate this constitution, visualize a dog. The appearance of this dog is a mental representation. It was previously impressed upon your mind when dog-particles travelled from a dog through spacetime and impacted your eyes. The resulting dog-form is a bundle of distinct particles that correspond κατ’ ἀριθμόν (kat’ arithmón) “in number” to the measurable proportions of “that same”, furry creature in reality. Your representation is composed of particles whose φύσεις (phýseis) “origins” are all αὐτή (autḗ) “the same” — your internal perception of a “dog” is uncontaminated from the particles of other, distinct objects. The generative flow of images reflects the activity of the original body, and a dog is not confused for another form (e.g. when dog-forms coalesce with human-forms in our imagination, we picture werewolves).

Next, visualize a god (any god. Take your pick. Any such forms will do.) Like the dog-form, your god-form is a mental image. Like the dog-form, the god-form is also apprehended by the intellect. Like the dog-form, the god-form too was initially triggered by impulses “received from abroad”. However, unlike the mental aggregate that constitutes your impression of a “dog”, your impression of a “god” is a ὑπέρβασις (hypérbasis), a “superimposition” of at least two different bodies of εἴδωλα (eídola) that are only superficially ὁμοία (homoía) “similar” insofar as their material composition as a picture in the mind. The compound nature of these images enables their being φθαρτον “indestructible”. By comparison, after the death of a dog (and the end of that dog’s eídola), that dog’s form can only be retrieved from memory — we are left with the impressions that a mortal creature gave us of itself during its limited lifespan. The forms of the gods, however, are not at risk of dissolution because they do not have a single source that is subject to death — the sources of the god-forms are unending, undying, and limitless, the infinite soup of particles that is constantly interlacing before our very souls. In this regard, “the form of god” is neither a simple body (like a particle), nor a regular compound (like a dog), but is a sort of irregular compound. Neither compound is a simple body (i.e. a particle), and both are combinations of simple bodies, but unlike the mental form of “a dog”, the mental form of “a god” is not composed of particles that are κατ ριθμν (kat’ árithmòn) “numerically-identical” to their source, but rather, the form of “a god” is composed of particles that are καθ μοείδειαν [kath’ hòmoeídeian] “similar in consistency” such that they can become enlaced to imagine new forms — the image of a human mixes in the mind with the concept of perfect happiness, as well as other notions, like agelessness to form the idea of “God”. Epíkouros explains ος μν κατ ριθμν φεσττας (oús mèn kat’ árithmòn hyphesttas) “on one hand” the forms of the gods appear to be “subsisting by number”, as though each on is a “unified entity”; “but on the other hand” ος δ καθμοείδειαν (oús mèn kath’ hòmoeídeian) it is also the case that the gods are formed from multiple sources due to their substantial existence “as a consistency” or “similarity” of images that produce “a common appearance”, or “likeness” (Laértios 10.139).

In the case of the specific characteristics of the form of a god, our mind seems to universally apprehend any given representation of the divine nature ἀνθρωποειδῶς (anthrōpoeidṓs) “as-a-human-idol” or “anthropomorphically” (Ibid. 139). Granted, they are not “to be considered as bodies of any solidity […] but as images, perceived by similitude and transition” (Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 28). “We do not find the calculation” so writes Demḗtrios, “that any other shape” besides that “of the human” could qualify as a blessed and incorruptible being.” Indeed, the gods “are granted to be perfectly happy; and nobody can be happy without virtue, nor can virtue exist where reason is not; and reason can reside in none but the human form” (Ibid.). Philódēmos writes that “we have to infer from the appearances” of their characteristics. Indeed, the form of a god is “conceived as a living being” (On Gods III, Col. 10):

One must believe with Hermarchus that the gods draw in breath and exhale it, for without this, again, we cannot conceive them as such living beings as we have already called them, as neither can one conceive of fish without need in addition of water, nor birds [without additional need] of wings for their flight through the air; for such [living beings] are not better conceived [without their environment] .

Philódēmos further reflects on the dwelling-place of the gods:

[E]very nature has a different location suitable to it. To some it is water, to others air and earth. In one case for animals in another for plants and the like. But especially for the gods there has to (be a suitable location), due to the fact that, while all the others have their permanence for a certain time only, the gods have it for eternity. During this time they must not encounter even the slightest cause of nuisance… (On Gods III, Col. 8).

The Epicurean scholarch Apollódōros, the “Tyrant of the Garden” infers that that “the dwellings” of the infinite gods “have to be far away from the forces in our world”, not necessarily by distance, but impalpability (On Gods III, Col. 9). The ghostly forms of the gods transcend the perils of our perishable plasma through a perpetual replenishment of spectral particles, motes, most minor and minute, as the most minuscule molecules of the human mind.

Philódēmos acknowledges that the deities possess perception and pleasure. Their behavior is recognizably human-like, finding delight in thought and conversation:

we must claim that the gods use both voice and conversation to one another; for we will not conceive them as the more happy or the more indissoluble, [Hermarchus] says, by their neither speaking, nor conversing with each other, but resembling human beings that cannot speak; for since we really do employ voice, all of us who are not disabled persons, it is even the height of foolishness that the gods should either be disabled, or not resemble us in this point, since neither men nor gods can create utterances in any other way. And particularly since for good men, the sharing of discourse with men like them showers down on them indescribably pleasure. And by Zeus one must suppose the gods possess the Hellenic language or one not far from it, and that their voices in expressing rationalist are clearest(Philódēmos, On Gods III, Col. 13)

The innumerable forms of the deities seem to be enjoying the greatest-possible happiness, a perfect happiness, that which cannot be heightened by excess. They seem ceaselessly-satisfied, savoring friendship and pleasure, “for it is not possible for them to maintain their community as a species without any social intercourse” (Philódēmos, On Gods, fr. 87). Unburdened by the undue responsibilities of celestial governance, astral adjudication, and cosmic corrections, the holy inhabitants of the mind are wholly self-reliant. Perfectly prudent, they privilege the preservation of their own peace above other obligations. As living figures, they seemingly breathe; as social figures, they seemingly converse; as intelligent figures, they seemingly reflect; as blessed figures, they live without fear, paragons of imperishability and models of ethical excellence.

Demḗtrios notes that, “when we say in fact the God is human-shaped” we should remember that God is not actually human (On the Form of a God 15). Velleius explains in On the Nature of the Gods that god “is not body, but something like body; nor does it contain any blood, but something like blood” (28). Though, he adds,“these distinctions were more acutely devised and more artfully expressed by Epicurus than any common capacity can comprehend”. They are, nonetheless, “real”, “unified entities”, even as appearances in the mind.

In order that he might “realize” his own “fulfillment”, scrutinizing the forms of these “beings surpassing [περβαλλουσν or hyperballousōn] in power [δυνμει or dynámei] and excellence [σπουδαιότητι or spoudaiótēti]”, who equally “excel [περέχον or hyperékhon] in sovereignty [γεμονίαν or hegemonían]”, Philódēmos infers that:

that of all existing things, [the divine nature] is the best [ριστον or áriston] and most holy [σεμνότατον or semnótaton, “dignified” or “revered”], most worthy of emulation [ξιοζηλωτότατον or áxiozēlōtótaton, “enviable”], having dominion over all good things [πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν κυριευόντα or pántōn tōn agathṓn kurieúonta], unburdened by affairs [πραγμάτευτον or pragmáteuton], and exalted [ψηλόν or hypsēlon, “sublime” or “proud”] and great-minded [μεγαλόφρονα or megalóphrona, “noble” or “generous”] and great-spirited μεγαλόψυχον or megalópsykhon, “magnanimous”] and ritually pure [γιον or hágion, “sacred”] and purest [γιοτατον or àgiōtaton, “holiest”] and propitious [ῑ̔́λεων or hī́leōn, “blameless”]. Therefore they say that they alone strive after the greatest form of piety and that they hold […] the purest views as regards the ineffable [φραστον or áphraston, “inexpressible” or “marvelous”] pre-eminence [περοχήν or hyperokhēn, “superiority”] of the strength [σχύος or ìskhúos, “power”] and perfection [τελειότητος or teleiótētos, “completeness”] of the divine [toû theíou] […] [Epíkouros] advises not to think [God] bad-tempered (as he is thought), for example, by the poets. (On Piety, Col 45.2-30).

PART V: THE MYSTERIES

It might seem counter-intuitive for an atomist to have embraced categorical mysticism, but history is unequivocal, “in Epíkouros’ case” his capacity to entertain mystical practices “is shown by his eagerness for sharing in των Ἀθήνησιν μυστηρίων (tōn Athḗnēsin mystḗríōn) the mysteries at Athens” (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 20.6-11). Both friends and opponents attest to this point, including Timokrátēs, the former Epicurean and estranged brother of Mētródōros, who implicates the Hegemon of having engaged in μυστικὴν ἐκείνην (mystikēn hekeínēn) “mystical fraternizations” at night (Laértios 10.6). Epíkouros rejects any inerrant interpretations of the mythic fictions, but still, he committed to attendance. From the attestations provided by Philódēmos, Epíkouros recognized the practical psychological (or spiritual) benefits from the induction of a mystical experience. Indeed, the “mind-manifesting” features of psychedelia provide a bridge to support an image-based conception of “the deities” as described by the Gargettian, otherwise only privately manifest to the mind’s eye. Epíkouros establishes this coherence with his theory of knowledge. His observations laid a framework with which to explain the dynamics of religious ecstasy, divine madness, and psychedelic mysticism.

We inherit the word “mystery” (μυστήριον or mystḗrion) from the verb μύω (mýō) meaning “close” or “shut”, as in “shutting [one’s eyes]”. Therein, the μύστης (mýstēs) “initiate” or “mystic” is one who seeks to minimize external disruptions and maximize the conscious absorption of internal phenomena (parenthetically, we also inherit the words “myopia” and “myopic” from μύω or mýō). The rituals in which the mýstēs participates are called μυστήρια (mystḗria) the “Mysteries”, and the qualities of the private ceremonies and the ecstatic visions for which mystics anticipated are described as μυστικός (mystikós) “mystical”.

Though the language of mysticism is Greek, the family of practices and altered states to which it refers are universal. Ecstasy can be elicited via trance, auto-hypnosis, contemplation, prayer, meditation, sex, fasting, dancing, music, focused breathing, and through chemical induction by means of an entheogen (Pahnke 1962). The analytical contents of these exercises might be further illuminated by concepts like “the Perennial Philosophy” of Aldous Huxley, the “religious experience” of William James, the “collective unconscious” of Carl Jung, and the “universal myths” of Joseph Campbell — these seem to me, in particular, to be reasonable attempts by devoted thinkers to map the territory of the human mind.

“Psyche-Soma” from an unpublished diary (June 2009).

Religious institutions also offer helpful analogues against which we can compare and contrast both ancient mystería as well as modern psychedelia. Consider the variety of rituals and beliefs that contribute to visionary experiences, such as the Orthodox practices of “théōsis” and “apothéōsis”, or the Roman Catholic process of “deification” or “divinization”, as well as the corresponding practice of ἡσυχασμός (hēsykhasmós) “inward stillness” established by the the Desert Monastics from which apothéōsis it received. Hesychasm corresponds with the contemplatio “contemplation” of the early Christian Fathers of the Church — incidentally, the word contemplatio is a translation of θεωρία or theōría, the same word that Epíkouros employs to refer to the traditional means by which the deities manifest — of those Church Fathers, several of them dually identified as Platonists or Neo-Platonists. Like the Christians whom they inspired, the Neo-Platonists developed the practice of Theoria as a means of engaging divinity. Whereas Christians sought “the presence of God”, so Neo-Platonists sought union through ἕνωσις (hénōsis) “two from one” with the “Monad”, “the One”, or “the Absolute”. Incidentally, Neo-Platonism, itself, is a partial, Academic re-branding of Hindu Vedanta by the founder of Neo-Platonism, Ammṓnios Sakkás, a possible, Indian mystic named from the ancient Śākya clan (from which the Brahmin family of Siddhartha Guatama hailed, eight centuries earlier).

The Neo-Platonic ἕνωσις (hénōsis) provides a direct conceptual link between visionary Greek and Indian wisdom traditions. A similar parallel exists between the Greek θεοφάνεια (theopháneia) “appearance of a deity” and the Dharmic दर्शन (darśana) “sight of a divinity”. Other constructs that presents similar (though not identical) examples, including the Hindu notions of प्रज्ञा (prajñā) “insight” and विद्या (vidya) “knowledge”, the Buddhist term बोधि (boddhi) “enlightenment”, which corresponds with the Chinese word 見性 (kenshō), and the Japanese word 悟り (satori). It may be further helpful to compare the “divine madness” of Plato (Phaedrus 244-245; 265a–b) with the “enlightenment” constructs of the Indian subcontinent, including समाधि (samādhi), मोक्ष (mokṣa), and निर्वाण (nirvana). We also find some correspondence with the Sufi practice of مراقبة (Murāqabah) “observance”, as well as the γνῶσις (gnōsis) from various Gnostic sects. Many of these traditions that achieved mystical states through psycho-physical exercises also incorporated entheogens (from ἔνθεος or éntheos, “possessed by a god”) that trigger chemognosis (from χυμεία or khymeía, “art of mixing alloys” or “alchemy” that leads to divine γνῶσις or gnôsis, “[secret] knowledge”).

While the aforementioned practices and states of consciousness are not at all identical, nor even completely translatable, they help exemplify some of the ways in which traditions have been shared and re-formulated since pre-history. In addition to the earlier-mentioned link between “Jupiter” and the proto-Indo-European god “Dyēus Ph₂tḗr” meaning “Sky Father”, we see ancient examples with the Pyrrhonists, who adopted the wisdom of the ancient Indian अज्ञान (Ajñana) mendicants and re-branded it to the ancient world as “Skepticism”. In return मध्यमक (Madhyamaka) Buddhists’ borrowed the epistemological methods of the Pyrrhonists. The late Academics’ synthesized the philosophy of Plátōn with Hindu Vedanta and sold the entire program as “Neo-Platonism”. Centuries earlier, it seems that Greek materialists borrowed atomism from their वैशेषिक (Vaiśeṣika) counterparts in India. (The dimensions of these historical traditions have been explored more thoroughly elsewhere, and readers are encouraged to expand on these ideas and properly delve into each tradition on its own accord.)

Each of these traditions shares levels of correspondence with τά Μυστήρια ( Mystḗria) or “the Mysteries” that help reconstruct the particularities of those religious experiences that would been contemporaneous with Epíkouros (of which, there were many). The Eleusían mysteries were the most popular (of which Plátōn was fond), followed closely by the Dionysian mysteries (mentioned earlier) — and Orphic cults (of which Pythagóras was fond). The Orphic cult later inherited the Dionysian tradition, and heavily influence the context in which the Christian resurrection deity emerged. The Mysteries in which Epíkouros participated would have exposed him to psychedelic phenomena — even if, hypothetically, he never induced the mind-bending experience within himself, he would have heard the testimony of others, either from their own experiences, or popular lore. The visions that would have become activated under the influence of an entheogen would have corresponded with symbolic pageantry ritualizing the creation of life, the passage of the soul, the changing of seasons, the inevitability of death, the transition of the self, and the resurrection of the soul from the underworld through a mystery, shared only with the τελεστής (telestēs) meaning “initiator” or “priest” (Col. 32.11-12).

Anthestḗria and the Urban Mysteries are dedicated to Dionýsios (or Bákkhos, celebrated by the Romans during Bacchalania), so the Dionysian Mysteries may have been Epíkouros’ preferred mystery. As he relates to mysticism, Dionýsios is a transformational deity whose metamorphic powers ferment cheap grapes into rich wine and transmute simple produce into palliative potions — simultaneously, the soul of the initiate undergoes a procedural, psychiatric process of transformation that subjectively mirrors the seasonal procession of death and rebirth, animated through the subjective sense of having been psychologically reborn. The Mysteries celebrate this primordial nature that echos from the depths of the soul.

The Orphic tradition can be examined at length elsewhere, but in summary, the cult of Orphism ritualized the creation of humanity from the bodies of the recently-annihilated Titans and the soul of the recently-deceased Dionysos, son of Zeus. “In the later classical period, the Dionysus cult was adopted and adapted into the Orphic mysteries of death and rebirth, where Dionysus symbolized the immortal soul, transcending death” (Metzner). Later writers equated Orphism with the Pythagorean school. Both traditions influenced Plátōn, as they share the common belief in μετεμψύχωσις (metempsýkhōsis), “the-process-after-incarnation” or “reincarnation.” This theme of rebirth is central to the Mysteries. The Orphic cult also shares significant topical consistency with the resurrection deity of early Christianity both deities are sons of a supreme God, both deities are killed by an ancient evil force, both deities are resurrected in spirit. 

The Eleusían Mysteries were the most popular in ancient Athens, and may well have been the tradition in which Epíkouros may have ingested a holy sacrament. Like its counterparts, the Eleusían Mysteries developed from much earlier cults likely corresponding with Minoan and Mycenaean civilizations. The cult may originally have patronized Demeter, envisioned as a poppy goddess: “For the Greeks Demeter was still a poppy goddess, | Bearing sheaves and poppies in both hands”, thus, reinforcing a connection between psychoactive substances, ecstasy, and the formalization of religious rituals (Thekirtos VII 157). In Eleusis: Archetypal Image of Mother and Daughter, “Karl” Kerényi interprets the Eleusían Mysteries as having featured a sort of “epiphany”, “not as a vision for common eyes” but “visible only to the blind man in the hour of his death” (85). According to his personal translation of Plátō’s Phaídros, “the beatific vision” of “a goddess” transports an initiate “into a state of eternal beatitude” (95). As he writes, “divine apparitions” could “be induced by magical ceremonies” (114). According to Karl, a sacramental “pharmaceutical” was ingested to trigger “a real seeing, not as a subjective illusion”. He further speculates that this “pharmaceutical” involved an initiate needing to “drink the kykeon” to “attain a state of epopteia, of ‘having seen,’ by his own inner resources” (113).

The Elysian Mysteries were of two — the Lesser Mysteries took place during Anthestēriōn under the direction of the ἄρχων βασιλεύς (árchōn basileús) “lord sovereign” who would initiate “mystics” into the cult. The Greater Mysteries took place in Boedromin (mid-September-to-October). Michael Cosmopoulos orchestrates the following scene:

On the first day [agrymós], the fifteenth of Boedromion, the Archon Basileus summoned the people in the Poikile Stoa. […] On the second day [élasis], the sixteenth […] the mystai proceed to either Piraeus or Phaleron, where they purified themselves by washing a piglet in the water of the sea […] On the third day, the seventeenth of Boedromion, there may have been sacrifices int eh Eleusionion under the supervision of the Archon-Basileus […] The fourth day and last day of [public] festivities in Athens was called Epidauria or Asklepieia […] it may have celebrated the introduction of the cult of Asklepios in Athens. […] On the fifth day, the nineteenth of Boedromion, a grandiose procession (pompe] took the hiera from Athens back to Eleusis. The procession started from the Eleusinion and proceeded through the Panathenaic Way and the Agora to the Dipylon Gates and from there followed the Sacred Way back to Eleusis. The mystai and their sponsors were dressed in festive clothes, crowned with myrtle wreaths, and held branches of myrtle tied with strands of wool (the “bacchos”). […] at the head of the procession were the priests and the Priestesses Panageis carrying the Hiera is the kistai […]Next in turn were the mystai and their sponsors. At the end of the procession were placed the pack animals with the supplies needed fo rhte long trip. The procession followed the modern highway from Kerameikos to the Sacred Way, up to the sanctuary of Aphrodite, where it turned toward the hill and the lakes of the Rheitoi before reaching the sea by the bridge. From that point the Sacred Way followed the modern highway once more. | During the procession two events took place: the krokosis would occur after the mystai crossed the bridge and consisted of tying a krokos, a ribbon of saffron color, around the right hand and the left leg of each mystes. This wen ton until the sunset, and then the pompe continued by torchlight. […] The second event took place on the bridge of the river Kephissos, where the initiates were harassed and insulted. […] Once the procession reached the sanctuary of Eleusis, Iakhos was received ceremoniously at the court. For the rest of the night the initiates sang and danced in honor fo the Goddess. The dances traditionally took place around the Kallichoron well and were meant to cheer the grieving goddess. […] Ont he following day (the twentieth of Boedromion) several sacrifices too place […] during the day the initiates fasted […] The fast came to an end with the drinking of the kykeon, the special potion of the Eleusinian Mysteries.” (18-19)

The Hegemon demonstrates that one need not suspend disbelief in atomic principles to enjoy the pleasure of the ritualism of the Mysteries. From textual fragments, Epíkouros enjoyed fellowship, celebration, procession, and self-reflection during these mystical ceremonies. Simultaneously, he rejected any literal interpretations of the mythic pageant. He may have appreciated the acknowledgement of change and the inevitability of death, while disregarding the proposition of the immortality of the human soul. Nonetheless, he participated in the rituals, including drinking kyken, an allegedly god-manifesting sacrament.

“Teonanacatl” from an unpublished diary (June 2009).

PART VI: THE SACRAMENT

Was Epíkouros tripping? Did his floor start rippling some 30 minutes after ingestion? Did tiny bits of light in the dark trigger complex, kaleidoscopic, visual geometric patterns?

Since the 1950s, a number of notable anthropologists, ethnobotanists, ethnomycologists, and chemists, including Albert Hoffman, who first synthesized the contemporary entheogen known as lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) have specifically presented the Greek sacrament of kykeōn used in Eleusian ceremonies as the chemical instigator that made the mind visible. ΚΥΚEΩΝ (κυκεών or kyken) comes from the ancient Greek verb κυκάω (kūkáō) meaning “[it] stirs” or “[it] mixes”—it also carries the connotation of a mixture that “confuses” and “confounds”. Kyken was thus employed when referring to a “potion”, “tonic”, “elixir”, or “mixed beverage”. We find a number of mentions of this substance in ancient texts.

In the Homeric Hymn to Dēmḗtēr, written between the 8th-and-7th-centuries BCE, the queen Metáneira “offered her [Demeter] a cup, having filled it with honey-sweet wine” (206):

Then she ordered her [Metáneira] to mix some barley and water
with delicate pennyroyal [mint], and to give her that potion to drink.
So she made the kukeôn and offered it to the goddess, just as she had ordered. (208-210)

The queen’s potion is accepted “for the sake of the ὅσια” or hósia, the “sacred” or “holy” rite whereupon a sacrifant initiates a “relationship” with the aforementioned deity wherein a supplication of χάρις (kháris) “thanks” or “grace” might be exchanged (211).

In The Iliad, “fair-tressed” Hekamḗdē mixes “a potion”. As further described:

Therein the woman, like to the goddesses, mixed a potion for them with
Pramnian wine, and on this she grated cheese of goat’s milk with
a brazen grater, and sprinkled thereover white barley meal;
and she bade them drink, when she had made ready the potion.

ἐν τῷ ῥά σφι κύκησε γυνὴ ἐϊκυῖα θεῇσιν
οἴνῳ Πραμνείῳ, ἐπὶ δ᾽ αἴγειον κνῆ τυρὸν
κνήστι χαλκείῃ, ἐπὶ δ᾽ ἄλφιτα λευκὰ πάλυνε,
πινέμεναι δ᾽ ἐκέλευσεν, ἐπεί ῥ᾽ ὥπλισσε κυκει. (Iliás 11.638–641)

In The Odyssey, Hómeros describes “all the baneful wiles” of the goddess Kírkē, a vengeful sorceress who “will mix thee a potion, and cast drugs into the food…” (Odýsseia 10.289-290; Murray 1919). Before spiking the punch, she:

made for them [a potion] of cheese and barley-meal and yellow honey
with Pramnian wine;

σφιν τυρόν τε καὶ ἄλφιτα καὶ μέλι χλωρὸν
οἴνῳ Πραμνείῳ ἐκύκα· (Odýsseia 10.234-235)

The various kykenes were composed “of mixtures” that usually included barley, cheese, and wine, but could also include, as is twice described by Hómeros in the foundational myths of the Hellenic people, an unknown adulterant. While the alcohol present in wine is known to produce mild states of euphoria and shades of bliss, it is utterly dissimilar to the intense, mystical dissolution that entheogens produce leading to visions of divine beings.

One compound to have been responsible for the psychedelic affects of kyken was an active alkaloid from the ergot fungus Claviceps purpurea that produced visions, speechlessness, and euphoria (symptoms otherwise with religious ecstasy). At the Mas Castellar site in Girona, Spain, “Ergot sclerotia fragments were found inside a vase along with remains of beer and yeast, and within the dental calculus in a jaw of a 25-year- old man, providing evidence of their being chewed” (Juan-Stresserra 70). However, outside of sterile conditions, ingestion of the ergot fungus risks ergotism, a debilitating conditions caused by toxic molds. Raw ergot may have been unreliable in inducing desired visionary experience. Still, given the frequency of ingestion and the length of time over which this tradition was practiced, it is possible that, on occasion, proper chemical conditions could be facilitated to induce a euphoric visionary experience to orchestrate the myths of the Mysteries through the mycodegradation of barley or rye.

If ergot presents too much instability, opium is another candidate for a possible mystery sacrament: “It seems probable that the Great Mother Goddess who bore the names Rhea and Demeter, brought the poppy with her from her Cretan cult to Eleusis and it is almost certain that in the Cretan cult sphere opium was prepared from poppies” (Kerenyi 25). As Taylor-Perry describes, “there is ample iconographic and literary evidence linking poppy capsules not only with Demeter but also specifically with Eleusis” (121). A the same time, the sedating effects of opiates may not necessarily reflect the vivid experiences of psychedelia. Nonetheless, both induce a sense of euphoria and are have been demonstrated to stimulate hallucinations.

Ethnomycologists Valentine Pavlovna and Robert Gordon Wasson began fieldwork in 1956 on Mesoamerican rituals involving psilocybin mushrooms (Psilocybe mexicana) or teonanácatl, from the Nahuatl teotl (“god”) + nanácatl (“fungus”) — note the linguistic correspondence between teonanácatl and βρῶμα θεόν (brṓma theón), an ancient Greek reference to mushrooms, being the “food of the gods”. Wasson’s research later fueled speculations that these chemicals were ingested during rituals to commemorate the Eleusían Mysteries. They co-authored a The Road to Eleusis: Unveiling the Secret of the Mysteries with Albert Hofmann, a Swiss chemist — widely known for being the first person to synthesize and ingest lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) as well as isolating and synthesizing the principal component in psychedelic mushrooms, psilocybin and psilocin — who further reinforces these claims. In Food for Centaurs (1960) and The Greek Myths (1964), Robert Graves suggests that Amanita muscaria, the “fly agaric” mushroom was an added ingredient to the sacramental beverage. Terence McKenna makes a similar claim in Food of the Gods (1992). “The original cult of Dionysus almost certainly had its origins in the mushroom cults of ancient Crete” (Russell 103). “Among the Greeks mushrooms were apparently called” ‘food of the gods’ (broma theon), while the neoplatonic philosophy porphyry (ca. 233-309 CE) called them ‘nurslings of the gods’ (theotrophos)” (Russell 82).

Coherent with Epikouros’ approach of providing multiple explanations for unusual phenomena, I would like to share the following proposition: whether ergot, or poppy, or mushrooms, or wine infused with psychoactive mints, the insistence of Epíkouros on participating in the Mysteries is a reflection of his recognizing the pleasurable feeling associated with ingesting psychedelics. One of the most identifiable symptoms of the psychedelic experience are complex visual forms, kaleidoscopic shapes, intricate geometric lattices, patterned space, multi-textured surfaces, shifting contours, oscillating color, and complex entities — these visual images are deeply impressive, and considering the results of Timothy Leary’s Marsh Chapel Experiment, the anticipation one possesses of communing with a deity, when under the influence of psychedelics, seems to reliably produce the internal perception that a deity or divine state is present.

We should keep in mind that Epíkouros recommends restraint and sobriety as the rule and cautions against indulgence. Epíkouros dismisses “Bacchant revelers” as those who “rave like lunatics”, indicating a balanced approach with respect to intoxicants, composed yet compelled, rational yet enthusiastic (Philodemus, On Piety, Col. 19.9-12). Given the sacrament that would have been featured in the Mysteries was psychoactive (at least with wine), it would be historically anomalous for an Athenian who participated in the Mysteries to have been unfamiliar with altered states. It would have been even stranger for a person to have found no correspondence between the sacrament, the cult, and the mystical experience. The ubiquity with which entheogens have been documented through the ancient world leads me to believe, quite simply, that ancient Epicureans liked tripping as much as the rest of us.

PART VII: FUN GUYS

You won’t see me at Sunday School, but I do share in most of the “traditional festivals and sacrifices” of our society. I practice remembrance on Memorial Day and exercise gratitude on Thanksgiving. I enjoy the festivities of St. Patrick’s Day and liberation on Cinco de Mayo. I find Día de los Muertos to be beautiful, and compelling, and I will never stop dressing-up for Halloween. I extend kindness and generosity in the name of patrons like Lady Liberty and Father Christmas. I support local Spring fringe festivals and the artists who host them, who explore the breadth of the human soul on-stage, and induce a communal catharsis. We further celebrate Thespis, ancient patron of theatre. You might even find me in a dark room, listening to Pink Floyd, having ingested fungus to induce the same state as did Greek mystics thousands of years ago.

None of these activities require our suspension of disbelief in mythical characters or genuine enthrallment with political propaganda. It’s a blessing to spend time with friends, regardless of the reason. I enjoy decorating a Christmas tree without indulging the nativity myth. I find the darkness and the candles of midnight mass to be beautiful, even if the rest of the program disgusts me. Springtime feels naturally rejuvenating, and I mean to celebrate it, but I feel no need to complicate that pleasure by mythologizing seasonal necromancy. Prayer, meditation, contemplation, and confession each provide practical utility in the form of psychological healing. That measurable healing that reliably occurs supersedes any superpowers supposed to be available. The true “secret” of “the secret of the Mysteries” is that mysticism itself is a totally-natural phenomena. It is repeatable, measurable, and, by-definition, literally manifest to the mind’s eye. The Mysteries represent a “fantastic mental application”, analogous to a waking dream, that can be used like a tool to induce the same visionary experiences that have been documented in nearly every wisdom tradition on the planet, both esoteric and institutional.

Like Epíkouros, I reject taking the myths of my own culture literally … otherwise, one could be lead to think that God is measurably weak, having failed to stop the escalation of authoritarian regimes … and every mass act of violence in my adult life. Like Epíkouros, I express particular frustration with any practices that target the finances of needy people, so astrology, in particular, is fraudulently detestable (nonetheless, the same, useless form that failed to provide meaningful answers 2,330 years ago). Whether it is 305 BCE or 2025 CE, history records the masses of human beings searching for answers in all of the wrong places. A robust, philosophical system is required to ground an individual against the confusion and turmoil of cultural insanity, and provide them with psychological tools to confront the universal fear of death. Even when immersed in a society defined by science and technology, the masses continue to revert to superstitious myths, even despite a dozen-or-so years of education.

For this reason, a material description of the religious experience is a requirement. Without a standard of knowledge, the difference between inspiration and delusion is relative. Without a standard based in nature, all propositions are merely temporary speculations. The symptoms of spirituality, used irresponsibly, can be exploited to reinforce false mythologies. When used properly, it unleashes the mind at large and allows one to interface with the full symphony of nature, overcoming the myths that are created by our misunderstandings.

Centuries of critics have been categorically wrong in charging against Epicureans that we deprive good and just men of the fine expectations which they have of the gods sincere and sonorous prayers” simply because we reject mythic expressions of religious faith that are incoherent, dangerous, emotionally-immature, and psychologically-irresponsible (On Piety Col. 49.19-25). We reject cosmic narcissists, holy puppeteers, ghostly voyeurs, and divine strategists. The existence of any of these mythic super-beings would imply that a supernatural force every day fails to prevent inexhaustible violence — or else, it means that our lives are so utterly meaningless that inexhaustible violence is insignificant on a theological scale — here lies the danger against which Epíkouros warned: the representation of “God” spread by many today is capricious, partisan, and despotic. In this regard, many popular conceptions of “God” do not meet the Epicurean qualification for a truly blessed being. When presented as a crusader, a chess master, a politician, or a monarch, “God” seems more like a monster, more like an ancient trickster of tragic poets than a divine icon of blessedness. Like those tragic poets, the authors who incite these conceptions combine multiple, unrelated preconceptions together to form paradoxical divinities who cause trouble and suffer pain — and they profit from it. The mythic texts of frauds are filled with examples of “gods” behaving badly. We do not hold these chimeras to be gods.

After my psychedelic experience, I am compelled to defend piety, especially against those who would pervert it into a political narrative or a pyramid scheme. “Spirituality” has been appropriated, and those who have appropriated it risk alienating many of us who wrestle with genuine turmoil, and have been disenchanted by myths: Belief in an ever-present spirit will not calm someone suffering from paranoia. Faith in an otherworld will not reassure someone suffering from suicidal ideation. In my state of psychedelic euphoria, the immediacy of life and death was manifest, and the importance of making the most of the only time I have became immanently clear. The significance of kindness and the value of friendship became central. The smallness of prejudice and the breadth of the universe was embodied. I became conspicuously aware of the uselessness of rage and the blessing of tranquility. That mystical experience triggered by a handful of mushrooms cleansed my mind and reaffirmed a commitment to pursue true happiness.

Doubt me if you will!

… but eat 4 grams of blue meanies, I promise … I promise, the obviousness of the relationship between entheogens and the prehistoric formation of religion will become immanently clear. (Use responsibly). Now, if I might make a final recommendation:

Turn onto philosophy, tune into nature, and drop out of myth.

Your Friend,
EIKADISTES
Keeper of Twentiers.com
Editor of the Hedonicon

“The Aquarium” from an unpublished diary (June 2009)

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Philodemus’ Method of Studying and Cultivating the Virtues

The following essay is the first in a blog series that was written as a book review of The Ethics of Philodemus.

The Ethics of Philodemus is a great introduction to the legacy of Philodemus of Gadara, who taught Epicurean philosophy to the father-in-law of Caesar during the first century in Herculaneum. He had studied under Diogenes of Sidon, who was the Scholarch of the School of Athens–an Epicurean Patriarch with direct lineage going back to Epicurus and Hermarchus. Many of his scrolls are notes that he took while studying under the Scholarch, and his legacy is the fruit of two centuries of living Epicurean tradition.

Defining the Terms

First of all, Herodotus, we must grasp the ideas attached to words, in order that we may be able to refer to them and so to judge the inferences of opinion or problems of investigation or reflection, so that we may not either leave everything uncertain and go on explaining to infinity or use words devoid of meaning. – Epicurus, in his Letter to Herodotus

Among his scrolls, we find a series of writings on the virtues and their corresponding vices. Concerning the word usually translated as virtue, one of our fellow students in the Garden of Epicurus Facebook group argued that virtue has many negative connotations, as it’s tied to Christian ideas of morality, and since Christianity is at war with the body and sexuality and pleasure, this may be an inadequate word to use today. According to Wikipedia,

Arete (Greek: ἀρετή), in its basic sense, means “excellence” of any kind. The term may also mean “moral virtue”. In its earliest appearance in Greek, this notion of excellence was ultimately bound up with the notion of the fulfillment of purpose or function: the act of living up to one’s full potential.

The correct Epicurean understanding of the virtues (aretai, meaning excellences) involves them being not ends in themselves, but means to a life of pleasure. Since Epicurus taught that we should use words as commonly used, I will henceforward use the term excellences for the sake of clarity.

Efficient Means to Pleasure

It’s important not to confuse the means for the end, but–as we will see–disregarding the means is as much of a mistake as confusing the ends. The excellences are important for a happy life (insofar as they relate to our dispositions and habits), and must be properly studied and understood. This is what Epicurus has to say of them:

Prudence is more valuable than philosophy and is the source of every other excellence, teaching us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without also living wisely and nobly and justly, nor to live wisely and nobly and justly without living pleasantly. For the excellences grow up together with the pleasant life, and the pleasant life is inseparable from them. – Epicurus, in his Letter to Menoeceus

Tsouna helps us to understand the ways in which the excellences grow together in the soul. Habits (both bad ones and good ones, that is: vices and virtues) grow and dwell together in the soul because they’re based on the same cognitive basis. They imply interconnected dispositions and traits that are based on false beliefs (in the case of vices, or bad habits) or true beliefs (in the case of virtues). In this manner, the Epicurean conception of vices and virtues sees them both as based on the study of nature. The main insight that Tsouna gives us about them helps to explain the ways in which, according to the Letter to Menoeceus, they “grow together” in the soul.

Philodemus repeatedly suggests that false beliefs tend to form clusters, and the same holds for the harmful emotions to which they give rise. – Voula Tsouna in The Ethics of Philodemus, page 280, note 138.

Emotions, according the the Epicureans, have a cognitive component. We feel (rightly or not) that we were wronged, so we feel anger. Or we may believe that our happiness depends on matching the level of wealth, beauty, or achievement of our neighbors, and struggle constantly to fit a mold that we do not fit–and this may inspire envy, or ill-intention towards our neighbors. Or we believe that fame or status will lead to a happy life, and this may inform many of our actions–and a sense of inferiority.

On the other hand, accurately believing that what is naturally good, is easy to get, produces a feeling of gratitude and pleasure, and greater confidence in our ability to be self-sufficient. This self-sufficiency creates a virtuous cycle, because it renders us less vulnerable to both fate and harm from others.

Philodemus believes vicious people are irrational and lack self awareness. They can’t explain their attitudes on adequate grounds. This is to say, since (as we have seen) the emotions have a cognitive component, the passions / emotions can be irrational, and that they are in fact irrational in vicious people. People who exhibit the excellences (virtuous people) exhibit rational emotions.

The Mother of the Excellences

Now, as we saw in the Epistle to Menoeceus, since Prudence secures other excellences, and is essential for our hedonic calculus, it occupies a higher place in Epicurean ethics that the other excellences. In the Epistle to Menoeceus, Prudence (or practical wisdom) is named as the mother of all the virtues. Also, according to Principal Doctrine 27,

Of all the things that wisdom provides for the complete happiness of one’s entire life, by far the greatest is friendship.

ὧν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις.

Here, Epicurus uses wisdom (sofía) rather than practical wisdom (fronesis). So we see that Epicurus saw Wisdom and/or Prudence (the practice of which is philosophy) as the procurer, the mother of all the means to happiness. Implicit in this Principal Doctrine is the view that people who lack friends, also lack prudence. We are beginning to see the excellences as Philodemus sees them: he has a symptomatic and empirical approach. He sees a good or bad habit, names it, and infers the underlying beliefs that inhabit the soul of the individual. Philodemus studies individuals’ characters, paying attention to the causes of pleasures and desires, to the causal relations between them, the dispositions and the habits that are in evidence.

In addition to this empirical approach, and also in order to not confuse the means for the ends, we must pay attention to the progression that we see in the sources from wisdom/prudence > to the virtues > to the pleasures, and henceforward, in order to speak clearly, avoid abstractions and stay connected with nature, we should speak of specific Epicurean virtues and of concrete instances of pleasant actions and states/dispositions which make up the pleasant life.

The book The Ethics of Philodemus mentions that there is a causal relation between the true virtues and the Epicurean pleasures, and between the virtues with each other. In other words, we as moral agents become the cause of our own happiness by employing them in our art of living and in our choices and avoidances. This causal relation is mentioned as “sowing seeds” in some Philodeman sources. For instance, he compares the things that we do for our friends and the sacrifices we suffer for their sake to “sowing seeds”. Let’s keep this in mind as we study Philodemus.

We may think of the psychological or hedonic utility of each excellence in terms of what pleasures it secures or causes. In his Epistle to Menoeceus, Epicurus mentions three categories of the necessary pleasures: for health, for happiness, and for life itself. Insofar as excellences lead to these goods, they are necessary, and we begin to see why they must grow together with the pleasant life.

The rational pursuit of pleasure can be conducted only with the aid of the virtues. – Voula Tsouna

Epicurus: the Physician of the Soul

Philosophy that does not heal the soul is no better than medicine that does not heal the body. – Epicurus

Physicians make the best philosophers. – Julien Offray de la Mettrie

As we’ve seen, Philodemus’ approach to the dis-eases of the soul was pragmatic: he observed the patient, inferred by means of signs, and gave a diagnosis. This is the method of the empiric school of medicine in ancient Greece, which strongly influenced the Epicurean approach to ethics: based on signs (semeion), they proceed from the visible to the invisible.

As part of this approach, Philodemus (and, presumably, Diogenes of Sidon and his circle) relied on medical records or histories (istoría) that had been kept on previous patients of Epicurean philosophy. These histories are mentioned in the scroll On frank criticism (Peri Parrhesias), and contain records of the treatment of vices and irrational passions by early authorities of the school, using the Epicurean method. The text cites Cleanthes and Metrodorus as two important sources for these histories. It’s safe to infer that Philodemus’ discussions of the vices and their opposing virtues were based, to some extent, on elaborations of these initial histories, and continued record-keeping following their methodology.

Finally, we must connect the “philosophy as medicine” approach to Epicurus’ sermon On Moral Development, where he discusses his materialist theory of moral development based on neuroplasticity. He said that, initially, we all carry our own constitution, and that some individuals are more malleable or changeable than others. But as we mature, we become causally responsible for the content of our characters up to the point where, through habituation, we change the atomic / physical structure of the brain. Epicurus’ theory of moral development is incredibly optimistic and imbued with very high and noble expectations, and helps to explain the salvific power of Epicurean philosophy: we must gently (by challenging our false views and habits, and nurturing wholesome ones) transform our very nature. If redemption from the vices was impossible, there would be no point in studying philosophy.

Let us now take a closer look at the excellences from the theoretical framework described above.

Prudence

Practical wisdom is essential for carrying out our choices and avoidances (hedonic calculus), and helps us to discern excellent habits from bad habits (vices), and to procure the means to a happy life.

Discipline

We must not violate nature, but obey her; and we shall obey her if we fulfil those desires that are necessary, and also those that are natural but bring no harm to us, but we must sternly reject those that are harmful. – Vatican Saying 21

Moderation or discipline opposes laziness, and this excellence helps us to achieve autarchy / self sufficiency, responsibility, and moral maturity. It also protects us from many annoyances or disadvantages linked to poverty, scarcity, illness (by helping us enjoy a healthy diet), and protects us from any potential embarrassments of educational or professional under-achievement, and–as we see in the above quote–discipline is necessary if we are to reject harmful desires.

Courage

This excellence is tied to protection and safety (a natural and necessary desire), and to the sixth Principal Doctrine:

In order to obtain security from other people any means whatever of procuring this was a natural good.

Courage is also sometimes necessary to preserve our friendships or protect our friends. Vatican Saying 28 says that we must run risks for the sake of friendship.

Justice

The just man is most free from disturbance, while the unjust is full of the utmost disturbance. – Vatican Saying 12

VS 12 argues that justice is tied to a certain wholesome and pleasant disposition that involves peace of mind and having a clear conscience: in other words, innocence.

In the Principal Doctrines, we see that justice is tied to the execution of what is of mutual benefit, and one of the Vatican Sayings says that “friendship initially starts as mutual benefit“–naturally, it would be difficult to befriend someone who takes advantage of us but does not produce any advantage for us, or whose relation brings mutual disadvantage. If one person is exploiting the other, there is no true friendship. Also, if a person is evil, it is difficult to acquire a friendly disposition towards that person: there must be some redeeming qualities in a person in order for friendship to emerge. A greater degree of innocence means that a person is more likely to be a loyal and trustworthy friend. Friendship is likely to occur between people who are just to each other, because it starts from mutual advantage. Justice and friendliness are two of the excellences that “grow together with pleasure” in our soul. It is commonly understood that we develop a good (or bad) character by associating with wholesome (or evil) friends and loved ones.

Autarchy

Epicurus’ life when compared to other men’s in respect of gentleness and self-sufficiency might be thought a mere legend. – Vatican Saying 36

The greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom. – Vatican Saying 77

Self-sufficiency (or, autarchy) is cited as one of the key excellences exhibited by both Epicurus and Metrodorus. It’s linked to maturity and developed character. It protects us from neediness and from lacking any of the things we need to live pleasantly. It also gives confidence. A person who is self-sufficient does not need the approval of strangers or of the masses. This excellence accompanies, and may be a pre-requisite for, generosity towards one’s friends.

A free life cannot acquire many possessions, because this is not easy to do without servility to mobs or monarchs, yet it possesses all things in unfailing abundance; and if by chance it obtains many possessions, it is easy to distribute them so as to win the gratitude of neighbors. – Vatican Saying 67

Gratitude

The ungrateful greed of the soul makes the creature everlastingly desire varieties of in its lifestyle. – Vatican Saying 69

Without gratitude, it’s impossible to profit from Epicurean doctrines. Various sayings criticize the ungrateful person. One who accurately understands the limits set by nature to our desires, understands also how they justify our gratefulness. One Epicurean fragment says:

We are grateful to nature because she made the necessary things easy to procure, and the things that are difficult to acquire, she made them unnecessary.

Also, gratitude is a pleasant disposition that has psychosomatic benefits. It leads to both health and happiness, both of which natural and necessary goods. There are studies that link a grateful disposition to increased happiness and to health benefits, like greater quality of sleep and improvement in bodily and psychological health. Gratitude also strengthens friendships by producing gifts-exchanges and other concrete tokens of gratefulness to our friends in the form of words of advice and sharing of important experiences with them, while ungrateful people risk losing friends.

The love of money, if unjustly gained, is impious, and, if justly gained, is shameful; for it is unseemly to be parsimonious even with justice on one’s side. – Vatican Saying 43

Gratitude is part of a cluster of healthy beliefs and habits, and is opposed by a cluster of bad ones. It has to do with our understanding of how much we need to be happy. Philodemus says that the self-sufficiency person feels a lesser degree of gratitude, because he does not feel that he needs the benefits of others. When we allow vain desires to settle in our character, one of the opposing moral ailments of gratitude and contentment, is envy, which involves comparing our happiness to that of others and the view that externals determine our happiness. Envy is an irrational disposition, or vice.

We must envy no one, for the good do not deserve envy and the bad, the more they prosper, the more they injure themselves. – Vatican Saying 53

Gratitude also helps us enjoy a complete life and has therapeutic value. The practice of grateful recollection of past pleasures is an important part of the hedonic regimen that Epicurus recommends:

The saying, “look to the end of a long life,” shows ungratefulness for past good fortune. – Vatican Saying 75

We must heal our misfortunes by the grateful recollection of what has been and by the recognition that it is impossible to undo that which has been done. – Vatican Saying 55

In pages 77 and 121 of Ethics of Philodemus, Tsouna describes one example of a treatment for ingratitude from Philodemus’ scrolls. It consisted on reading certain writings aloud (possibly the ones shared above), and an assignment that consisted of composing a speech against ingratitude.

Suavity

The excellence of gentle and kind speech (suavity) one of the main virtues by which ancient Epicureans were known. This tells us that part of the curriculum in human values that people learned in the Garden involved learning how to communicate. Sweet speech is intended to help us avoid hurting the feelings of others while administering the medicine of frank criticism–therefore it’s tied to both friendship and eloquence. The opposing vices would be harsh speech (a tendency to insult) and vulgarity.

Adaptability

This is the cardinal virtue of Aristippus of Cyrene, the inventor of pleasure ethics. It can be taken to an extreme. For instance, he was so willing to adapt to the association of the tyrant Dionysus, that he frequently allowed him to mistreat and abuse him. Most of us would probably limit our adaptability in cases where our self-respect suffers. However, adaptability may help us to find opportunities to have pleasant experiences and to avoid pain in most circumstances and help us to live pleasantly.

The opposing vice would be hard-headedness and inflexibility, which make it difficult for us to evolve and change. This reminds us of Epicurus’ mention (in On moral development) of malleability as a necessary quality for someone who wishes to develop his character.

Adaptability relates to social relations by helping us to give up the idea of absolute justice: in the last ten Principal Doctrines, we learn that there is no such thing, and that justice varies, changes, and is related to whatever is of mutual advantage in any given situation. An adaptable person is teachable, and is better able to see reality as it is, as relative.

Pride / Dignity

I include pride among the virtues because it refers to one who is magnanimous or a good person and knows his or her self-worth–but perhaps in modern English parlance, this virtue might be best expressed as dignity or a dignified demeanor or disposition. The opposing vices are self-loathing on one extreme, and arrogance on the other extreme.

While pride implies an accurate assessment of our sense worth, arrogance implies a sense of entitlement that far exceeds what one deserves. It affects cooperation and mutual respect between individuals, and ergo affects the social fabric, and produces misanthropy in general. Arrogant people are often incapable and unwilling to work with others for a common goal. Philodemus says that arrogant people lack self awareness, are irrational, and live a friendless life.

The study of nature does not make men productive of boasting or bragging nor apt to display that culture which is the object of rivalry with the many, but high-spirited and self-sufficient, taking pride in the good things of their own minds and not of their circumstances. – Vatican Saying 45

In order to be a virtue, pride must concern itself with our own actions, achievements and qualities, and not on the accidents of fate or of nature because, as Epicurus says in his Epistle to Menoeceus, “our own actions are free, and it is to them that praise and blame naturally attach“.

Arrogant people frequently take “pride” in things for which they had no causal responsibility, ergo their pride is unnatural and based on false views. People who deny that luck is blind (like many Stoics, Jews, Muslims, and Christians) risk falling into these false views when they believe that “God blesses” his chosen; this leads them to favor arbitrary judgement rather than one based on causal responsibility, and it also leads to and justifies having no pity or compassion for those who are unfortunate. Furthermore, arrogant people are hard to change because they don’t see the need for change.

Epicurus’ treatment of women and slaves as intellectual equals is an example of the non-arrogant sage who is yet proud and dignified, and who honors the dignity of others.

Further Reading:

Philodemus’ On Arrogance

Cheerfulness

We must laugh and philosophize at the same time and do our household duties and employ our other faculties, and never cease proclaiming the sayings of the true philosophy. – Vatican Saying 41

According to the above saying, in the study of Epicurean philosophy, if we’re not enjoying ourselves we’re not doing it right. Cheerfulness was the cardinal virtue of Democritus, the first of the “laughing philosophers” and the first atomist, and therefore an intellectual ancestor of Epicurus. Epicurus obviously adopted this excellence, but chose ataraxia as his cardinal virtue. The reasons for this may have to do with the importance he placed on our mental dispositions, as made evident by Principal Doctrine 20.

Ataraxia

The man who is serene causes no disturbance to himself or to another. – Vatican Saying 79

For Philodemus, thymos is a habitual / dispositional anger blown out of proportion: the vice of irascibility, an irrational excess of anger. The opposite virtue is even temper, peace of mind. There is also the problem of anxiety or angst (agonia, in Greek). Against these problems, we have the fearless imperturbability and peace of mind that we know as ataraxia, by which one may sculpt one’s soul as a refuge of tranquility.

This excellence is linked to autarchy insofar as a truly self-sufficient person is protected from unlimited, vain and empty desires. Therefore, autarchy has a causal relationship with ataraxia, and a contented mind that is always at ease also makes it easier to secure self-sufficiency:

The disturbance of the soul cannot be ended nor true joy created either by the possession of the greatest wealth or by honor and respect in the eyes of the mob or by anything else that is associated with or caused by unlimited desire. – Vatican Saying 81

This connection between self-sufficiency and our peace of mind, I believe, accentuates the importance of accepting both active and passive pleasures into our hedonic regimen. If we only accept kinetic (moving) pleasures, we will always have to chase external goods that will furnish our pleasure, but if we accept katastematic (abiding, or attitudinal) pleasures, then it naturally follows that we will cultivate certain dispositions and gain greater self-sufficiency in our pleasure.

Further Reading:

On the Virtue of Coolness

Philodemus’ On Anger

Good Will

In the scrolls by Philodemus, we find the word eunoia (good will, benevolence) as the opposite virtue of ill will (which carries suspicion, envy, malicious joy, and other unwholesome emotions based on empty beliefs). Good will is a disposition that characterizes relations between philosopher friends, and leads to gratitude and favors between them.

On envy and malicious joy, Philodemus says that these are bestial conditions, that they are tied to ungratefulness and lead to theft. These passions are tied to the false belief that externals are needed for happiness. Philodemus’ strategy to avoid malicious joy is to never indulge it.

We see examples of malicious joy today in gossip shows, in conflicts between religious fanatics where they exhibit joy at each other’s suffering and that of others whom they are taught to hate (the “God Hates Fags” movement, conflicts between Jews and Palestinians, etc.). We see it frequently in attitudes related to tribalism. If we survey a few examples of malicious joy, it’s not difficult to see why Philodemus calls this vice a bestial condition, and the ways in which it relates to false views, to superstition and arrogance.

Naturalness

The highest good is like water. Water gives life to the ten thousand things and does not strive. It flows in places men reject and so is like the Tao. – Tao Te Ching, Chapter 8

While the virtue of authenticity is most celebrated in the tradition of Existentialism, in Epicurean philosophy we do find frequent references to naturalness: an un-forced manner of living which reminds us of authenticity. Tsouna is not the first to note the ambiguity of the term “natural” as used by the Epicureans, and the need to clarify it. In page 224, note 93 of The Ethics of Philodemus, we find:

Zeno of Sidon (Epicurean Scholarch or Patriarch of the School of the First Century) and his entourage had explored (the ambiguities deriving from different senses of the term “natural”) … Man is said to be “by nature” a procurer of food, because he does this by unperverted instinct; “by nature” susceptible to pain because he is so by compulsion; “by nature” to pursue virtue, because he does it to his own advantage … According to Demetrius of Laconia, the expression “by nature” in Epicurus’ statement does not mean without perversion or distortion, but freely, without compulsion or force.

It’s possible that Demetrius said this because other Epicureans were arguing that naturalness is opposed to perversion (by culture, by upbringing, or by association?), and it’s possible that these other Epicureans were on to something. PD 15 is one of the sources that also refers to “natural” (wealth) versus empty wealth. Here, that which is natural is described as having a limit and being easy to procure.

Nature’s wealth at once has its bounds and is easy to procure; but the wealth of vain fancies recedes to an infinite distance. – Principal Doctrine 15

In this case, as in the case of the saying that “we do not the appearance of health but true health”, naturalness is tied to not being presumptuous and not feigning a certain disposition or state for the sake of public opinion. I compare this virtue of Epicurean authenticity with the Taoist virtue known as ziran, which most often gets translated as naturalness.

Based on what we’ve read, there are various ways in which something may be natural: it may be unforced or uncompelled; it may be advantageous; it may be sound, based on correct views and a correct assessment of relevant factors; and according to Philodemus, it may be an unperverted reaction to intentional offense. In any case, it makes sense that a philosophy of freedom would promote this kind of naturalness and authenticity.

Further Reading:

Ziran (Wikipedia)

Ziran (Encyclopedia Britannica)

Mindfulness

It occurs to me that there may be ethical problems today that the ancients did not think about, and maybe we could brainstorm modern “therapies” for these bad habits. I’m particularly thinking about: is there a therapy for short attention span? With so much instant gratification, so much media, and handheld phones trying to grab our attention all day every day, it would be beneficial to have practices that help us cultivate the benefits of focus.

If attentiveness or mindfulness is seen as a virtue, then absent-mindedness would be the disease it’s attempting to heal. There’s precedent for mindfulness practice in pleasure ethics: Aristippus taught his disciples a practice known as presentism, which involved being present to the pleasures available here and now. Epicurus later added reminiscing about past pleasures and anticipating future ones, but it would be an interesting experiment to revitalize some form of this practice of presentism, and to incorporate it as part of our hedonic regimen. Furthermore, the practice of presentism would help us to avoid postponing our happiness, which is one of the problems that Epicurus wanted to protect his disciples from:

We are born only once and cannot be born twice, and must forever live no more. You don’t control tomorrow, yet you postpone joy. Life is ruined by putting things off, and each of us dies without truly living. – Vatican Saying 14

If we find ourselves frequently postponing pleasure, and take VS 14 seriously, a practice that frequently reminds us to be mindful of, and thankful for, the present pleasures might help us to develop new habits that help us savor life. It could be a zen-like practice of abiding attentively in the here and now, or the chanting of this Vatican Saying like a mantra, or any other efficient means that helps us to cultivate a presence in the midst of the pleasures that are available.

Why Is This Information Vital?

The ways in which these excellences cause and influence each other, and “grow together with the pleasant life” as we have seen above, should demonstrate some of the reasons for their importance. But there are several other ways of thinking about the importance of the virtues in Epicurean philosophy: if Epicurus says that philosophy that does not heal the soul is no better than medicine that does not heal the body, then we may consider his teachings in terms of what dis-eases are being treated by the Epicurean doctrines. This helps us to understand the importance of studying philosophy for our happiness.

Studying the particular virtues also helps us to gain clarity regarding why we have chosen our values, and in what way they help us to live pleasantly. They may also help us in our process of choosing and avoiding.

Another way to consider the Epicurean doctrines concerning the excellences is by asking ourselves: What happens if we remove these virtues? From what we have seen, due to their habitual nature and their basis on true beliefs, excellences do not exist in isolation in our soul. The study of Philodemus’ approach to the excellences helps us to see the ways in which they “grow together with the pleasant life”, as Epicurus says in his Letter to Menoeceus. This is because many of these habits and attitudes (as well as their opposing vices) are based on particular beliefs concerning whether we need externals for happiness, or whether the happiness or suffering of strangers affects our own, etc. So if an individual lacks certain virtues, this shows inconsistencies in his or her adherence to some aspect of Epicurean philosophy.

It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and nobly and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and nobly and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the person is not able to live wisely, though he lives well and justly, it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life. – Principal Doctrine 5

One final note concerning our discussion of the Epicurean virtues concerns the reason why many of us came to the study of Epicurus in the first place: as traditional religion becomes obsolete, people look to more authentic ways of living, and for models of morality that do not depend on superstition. The Epicurean approach to moral development is based on the study of nature. It is empirical and does not require belief in the supernatural. In this manner, it addresses the inherited false belief that morality requires religion, or that it only derives from being religious–and that, therefore, non-religious people can’t be excellent (virtuous), or happy, or good. Epicurean philosophy posits a theory of moral development that is not only mature and pragmatic, but also based on the study of nature (which is to say: reality). For all these reasons, it deserves to be studied attentively.

Further Reading:

The Ethics of Philodemus

The Philodemus Series

On Philodemus’ Scroll 1005

The following is my synopsis and commentary of PHerc 1005, whose title is translated into French as “À l’addresse des …” in Les Epicuriens; the name of the scroll is not complete, but it seems to be addressed to people who call themselves Epicurean yet do not study the sources.

In the scroll that scholars identify as PHerc 1005, Philodemus admonishes those who call themselves Epicurean but do not know the writings and doctrines, and prefer outlines that generalize. He also warns about there being incomplete sources of ill repute.

In addition to the problem tied to the summaries of the doctrines, the scroll mentions that there were books in circulation about which Zeno of Sidon (his Master, who was the Epicurean Scholarch of Athens at the time) doubted their authenticity. This led students of Epicurean philosophy to praise people who lacked knowledge. Philodemus argued that it was “inexcusable to ignore our books” because, in the end, by reading works of doubtful origin, these students “lend an ear to the insults to our great men, and judging from the abundance of these insults, “it would appear they had all the vices!”. Therefore, he warns that the study of these illegitimate books would “make us walk backwards in sweetness” (=in pleasure).

He also accentuates the blessings that come with the study of the correct books. He explains that those who have studied philosophy from childhood to old age have written works that are very interesting for their precision (clarity), and elsewhere he speaks of “the exactness which characterizes us“. Clear speech was always of huge importance to the Epicureans. We may infer from this that some of the works being criticized by Philodemus lacked clarity and precision, or used words that the founders would likely not have used or approved of.

Works Mentioned

Philodemus mentions several works that did not survive to our day. He was attempting to direct the attention of students away from the works he deemed inauthentic and to these works. He mentions a book (or series?) by Epicurus titled The Virtues, and a collection of books titled Pragmateia (Application, or Practices?), which included the books of the four founders (Epicurus, Metrodorus, Hermarchus and Polyaenus). This would have been the Epicurean equivalent of the “New Testament”. Philodemus criticizes an individual who claimed to have the Pragmateia, but it turned out he only had the headings of chapters of “many anthologies”–which tells us that thte Pragmateia was a vast collection of works.

There is nothing wrong with having summaries or outlines of the works, but Philodemus was arguing that this was not an excuse to avoid the complete books. However, this work raises the problem that, considering the vast library of Epicurean books that existed, it’s understandable that students sought shortcuts because many of them probably either lacked the money or the time to read this many books.

As the generations went by, the Epicureans were confronted with attacks by Platonists, Stoics, and others, and developed methodologies and arguments specifically to address these attacks. In note 19, page 1310 of Les Epicuriens, we read:

The expression “Prescriptions to Follow” covers without a doubt a sort of practical manual, of a catechetical type (“do this, don’t do that”), which could have been meant to provide the disciples of the Garden with weapon to resist the attacks of the rival schools against Epicurean doctrine.

This “Prescriptions to Follow” work, rendered in Greek, was titled A Prostattetai Poiein.

Divine Raptures

This scroll also furnishes a window into the reverence paid to the founders by the Epicureans of late antiquity. In pages 738-739, we find Philodemus praising his Scholarch’s Zeno of Sidon ecstatic level of devotion for Epicurus and the other founders.

I have become a tireless flatterer … of the delights and divine raptures that Epicurus inspired him.

By this, we see that feelings were not only one of the criteria in the canon, but that the practice of Epicurean philosophy involved the exercise of wholesome and pleasant emotions.

Conclusion

I’d like to conclude with three observations:

  1. Philodemus is aware of the utility of summaries and outlines, and in fact not only is he (and/or his Scholarch Zeno of Sidon) responsible for the shortened formulation known as the Tetrapharmakos (Four Cures), but he also instructs his students to write outlines of the doctrines on wealth. So he is making full use of these outlines and summaries (also known as Epitomes) in his own method of teaching, and yet he also instructs his students to delve into the sources and read the books. So he is NOT telling people to avoid the use of outlines–he would not have forbidden a practice that he himself engaged in. What he was saying is that the outlines are tools for memorizing and learning, not an excuse to neglect our philosophical studies.
  2. Philodemus was a librarian. He probably had spent great amount of time collecting and having his scribes make copies (or making copies himself) of these important works, and wanted students to take advantage of his considerable amount of work, and he (and/or his Master Zeno of Sidon) also would have carefully chosen the volumes that he copied.
  3. Cicero also criticized how, when Epicureanism spread to the Latin-speaking world (Italy), many peasants and rural people with little intellectual formation converted to Epicureanism. Cicero’s critique was inspired in an elitist attitude: since when does “the rabble” philosophize? But Cicero was not committed to the proliferation of Epicurean doctrine. Philodemus, on the other hand, was evidently more concerned with the quality of the content that these common folk were consuming. We may compare this to how, in many parts of the so-called “third world”, many Christian churches today are led by pastors who do not have a real theological or professional formation as ministers, counselors, or deep familiarity with the Bible, and some of them have limited literacy. If something like this was happening among the Epicureans in Italy, then Philodemus did have reason for concern.

Having explained all these problems, Philodemus argues that many individuals fall into the category of sympathizers who haven’t been warned (non-avertis) about Epicurean teaching. This category is labeled “the profane” in the notes in Les Epicuriens–that is, non-initiates in philosophy, the almost-Epicurean, or the Epicurean-friendly. Philodemus concludes the scroll saying that many of these sorts of people (who assume the label Epicurean but do not diligently study the books) aren’t Epicurean.

Happy Herculaneum Day!

Happy Herculaneum Day! Today is the anniversary of the eruption of the volcano that destroyed the city of Herculaneum, which hosted both Philodemus of Gadara and the poet Horace. In memory of those who came before us, this month we published links to essays and quotes from sources to help students of Epicurean philosophy who wish to deepen their understanding of the content of the Philodeman scrolls on piety and on property management.

First Principle of Autarchy

Second Principle of Autarchy

Fourth Principle of Autarchy

Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Principles of Autarchy

*

First Principle of Piety

Second, Third and Fourth Principles of Piety

FIfth, Sixth, and Seventh Principle of Piety

Happy Herculaneum Day!

On August 24 of the year 79 of Common Era, the cities of Pompeii and Herculaneum were buried in the ash and pyroclastic material produced by the Mt Vesuvius eruption. The 79 eruption is the most famous volcanic eruption in ancient history, and recent comparable eruption events–like the one that wiped out the town of Plymouth, on the island of Montserrat–have been compared to it.

The town of Herculaneum contained the villa of the father-in-law of Julius Caesar, of the Piso clan, a patrician family. The villa was a wealthy enclave that overlooked the Mediterranean Sea, and contained a large ancient library of Epicurean texts, many of which have now been deciphered and translated into English with commentary. Commentaries on these texts can be found in the Philodemus Series on the Society of Epicurus page.

In addition to the scrolls preserving the wisdom of the original Scholarchs–many of which are actual notes that Philodemus took while studying philosophy under Zeno of Sidon–there are poems and other works of literature. In one epigram, Philodemus invites his benefactor of the Piso family to celebrate the Twentieth, the traditional feast of reason that was held monthly by the Epicureans.

Philodemus is not the only great Epicurean in history who catered to the Piso family. The poet Horace also frequented the villa, and Horace’s Epistle to the Pisos shows the highly cultured and refined nature of the exchange between them. Herculaneum was a major center of culture, philosophy, and the arts.

August 24th has been declared Herculaneum Day by the Society of Epicurus, as part of the Epicurean Year initiative. Please enjoy it by sharing the wisdom of the Library of Herculaneum with others!

Further Reading:

The Epicurean Nag Hammadi

The Philodemus Series

About Philodemus’ The Poems

Like almost every other scroll written by Philodemus, this one was a reaction, summary and commentary on Crates of Mallus, who was himself commenting on theories by other thinkers. The book is mainly written in the negative, contradicting the theories on literary critique posited by other thinkers, but never really proposing a theory of the Epicurean School. The critiques focus mainly on the lack of clear definition of the terms used, and the ideals expressed, by other schools.

The conversation focuses on what is a poet, what is his role, and what constitutes a good poem, poetic excellence, and a good poet.

Among the arguments presented by other thinkers, we find the issue of whether poetry should have educational or character-building content, whether it should give poetic form to traditional content. Is good poetry charming to the ear and useless, as some argue? Or must the words be useful or have educational value? Philodemus argues that nothing prohibits the poet from creating useful content.

Another opponent says that a poet must use current idioms and possess the art of melody, but Philodemus uses the same critique that he uses for most other arguments throughout the text: these ideals are arbitrary. How are these ideals determined, and how are they judged?

Another opponent argues that poetry must be brief and contain evidence whereas for thought, it must have force of conviction and evidence also. He says this last is the art of the poet, but again Philodemus raises the same critique as he did with the previous one; adding that these criteria can also be applied to prose and are not exclusive to poetry.

Other arbitrary criteria are presented: poems must have vigor, richness, gravity, simplicity, refined conception, elaboration of style, and proper words. Philodemus questions what gravity consists of, and how poems that lack intensite are different from the pompous ones; he questions what is precisely meant by many of these criteria, and what Neoptolemus means by “posessing poetic art and power”, or what is meant elsewhere when it is said that poems must be “serious” and where no examples are provided of what this means, although it may be construed that they should contain wise thoughts and be meant to educate. A long portion of the scroll deals with whether poetry should be without value or serious–in other words, whether it’s purely aesthetic, or also didactic.

One Stoic presents the idea of “the principle of the art”, which again is not clearly defined and is derived from Stoic beliefs in how art is a gift of Divine Reason.

One point of controversy deals with how Philodemus differentiates between the faculties of hearing and of reason. He says it’s ridiculous to say that “a serious composition can’t be grasped by reason, only by ear”, as if the ear had judgement powers.

One argument where Philodemus coincides with other thinkers has to do with how there is a difference between a poet and one who creates great works; in other words, just as some musicians create bad music, so with poets. Another agreement has to do with how a vicious composition can damage a poem, even if it’s refined.

In coinciding regarding these points, Philodemus is conceding that “believe it or not” there are no arbitrary rules to judge poetry, yet rules do exist; he later states that only rhythm charms the ear and that only reason can judge composition.

… which brings us to the Canon. Although the scroll does not produce a literary theory that can be applied to judging poetry, based on the Canon it seems like it would be undeniable that a good poem should produce pleasure in the ear and be enjoyable (therefore appealing to the pleasure faculty within the Canon), and that it may or may not have usefulness. By this, we may be referring to educational value (poetry may help to memorize adages and teachings), or therapeutic benefit depending on the content, as we saw in our discussions on music.

Based on the French translation in Les Epicuriens of the original scroll from Herculaneum titled Les Poèmes V.

Philodemus: On Poems, Book I (Philodemus Translation Series)

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On Epicurean Virtue

A discussion of Epicurean virtue is needed as a result of our constant encounters with students of philosophy who have been exposed to Stoic and Platonic notions about virtue devoid of context and of telos, as we understand it.

Clarifying some of the Problematic Issues

Concerning the end that nature has established for natural beings, our teachers insist that the end is pleasure, and Polystratus goes as far as saying that not having a clear understanding of how pleasure is the end is the architect of all evils. This is because of the confusion of values problem: people fail to attach accurate value to things and develop artificial systems of value that are not aligned with the nature of things. For the sake of the virtue of courage they may fight needless wars that generate more suffering than pleasure in the end; for the sake of the so-called “virtue” of duty they commit attrocities and accept authoritarian models of ethics that are dehumanizing. Virtue, to us, has no value if it does not lead to net pleasure after we subject our choices and avoidances to hedonic calculus.

Virtues in Epicurean doctrine are, therefore, downgraded to the status of means to pleasure whereas the Stoics see “Virtue” as the end … “Virtue” here in the singular, which is usually a symptom that we are being presented with a Platonized concept divorced from context in nature. Perhaps a good comparison to Epicurean virtues is the very practical conception of Buddhist upayas, which translate as efficient means, and incorporate not just virtues as they are frequently understood, but also specific techniques and practices.

Another crucial issue, which was discussed already in our Reasonings About Philodemus’ scroll On the Stoics, had to do with how when words are not clearly defined, they become useless.

A third issue emerged in our Reasonings About Philodemus’ scroll On Anger which puts our School in direct opposition with Stoic notions about virtue: it’s the compassionate recognition of anger and indignation as potentially having both a virtuous disposition and usefulness.

Our insistence in dethroning virtue in favor of pleasure, and others’ confusion of the means with the end, has produced discussions where we have been accused of being haters of “Virtue”, again in the singular. As a result of these controversies, and also as a way of extending the olive branch to our Stoic brethren, these reasonings on the Epicurean virtues attempt to rescue them from Platonized, dis-embodied oblivion, to capture them from the heavenly realms and to find where in nature the virtues can be observed and in what way they may lead to maximizing pleasure and avoiding pain.

Ancient Epicureans did not frequently address the virtues as points of reference, preferring instead to speak in clear and concise terms and to avoid words that were not clearly defined, but Frances Wright in her work A Few Days in Athens did incorporate a sermon on the virtues that might be a good starting point to explore them.

The Practical Means to Long-Term Pleasure Can Work in Unison

Epicurus stood in the midst of the expectant scholars. “My sons,” he said, “why do you enter the gardens? Is it to seek happiness, or to seek virtue and knowledge? Attend, and I will show you that in finding one, you shall find the three. To be happy, we must be virtuous; and when we are virtuous, we are wise. – A Few Days in Athens, Chapter X

The problems generated from seeking virtue without knowledge are explored by Polystratus in his Irrational Contempt. They mostly deal with degenerating into degrading superstition. The above may have been a paraphrase of the fifth Principal Doctrine, which states:

It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and honorably and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and honorably and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man is not able to live wisely, though he lives honorably and justly, it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life.

except that, if you’ll notice, the original doctrine excludes a reference to virtue because, as I said, the founders were hesitant to use words that led to misinterpretation and favored clear speech; and, as we’ve discussed, this is one of the criticisms of virtue in our school.

It frequently seems that A Few Days in Athens was written, in part, to appease worshipers of Virtue, of whom Frances Wright says that “many worship at the altar of Virtue, but few stop to inspect the pedestal on which She stands“. That pedestal is, of course, pleasure.

The first four doctrines correlate to the Four Cures, which constitute the basic points of the ethical doctrine. The fifth doctrine must have been important enough in our ethics, that it had to follow the Tetrapharmakon, as if only the Four Cures had been more important. I believe the reason for this has to do with it relating to the accusations by the philosophers of the polis that a hedonist could not be a good citizen. Professor John Thrasher addresses how Epicurean contractarianism answers this accusation. A modern version of the same accusation is the sociopath argument, where we have been asked “What is to keep a sociopath / psychopath from being a good Epicurean?”. The reply to this is found in Epicurus’ teaching that a sage will be willing to give his life for a friend, and also in Principal Doctrines 5 (above) and 39, which says:

The man who best knows how to meet external threats makes into one family all the creatures he can; and those he can not, he at any rate does not treat as aliens; and where he finds even this impossible, he avoids all dealings, and, so far as is advantageous, excludes them from his life.

The answer to the sociopath argument seems to be that we would ostracize this person and exclude him from our lives, and in fact the modern justice and prison systems already do just that. Our friend Cassius says:

Most sociopaths do not pursue pleasure wisely, honorably, and justly, and therefore cannot live happily, because the human nature of those around him will punish him and prevent it.

Which is true: the potential repercussions of sociopathic behavior include not only imprisonment, but also isolation, loss of support from friends and family, potential loss of jobs and other opportunities and sources of income. It is impossible, or at least very difficult, to have friendship or conduct business with partners who lack the ability to establish trusting relations with others.

And so, in order to ensure a life of pleasure, we must have knowledge of nature to avoid superstitious fears, and we must have blessed friendship which excludes sociopathic behavior and requires many wholesome dispositions. Happiness, wisdom, and the virtues all lead to the natural end that nature has established for us: the pleasant life.

Frances Wright’s Survey of the Epicurean Virtues

The relevant portion begins with Epicurus inviting his followers to sit and study at the feet of Philosophy with an open disposition, without pedantry and pretension.

Let us then begin: and first, let us for a while hush our passions into slumber, forget our prejudices, and cast away our vanity and our pride. Thus patient and modest, let us come to the feet of philosophy; let us say to her, ‘Behold us scholars and children, gifted by nature with faculties, affections, and passions. Teach us their use and their guidance. Show us how to turn them to account — how best to make them conduce to our ease, and minister to our enjoyment.’ – A Few Days in Athens, Chapter X

Then, just as we see in the Bible’s wisdom books, where Wisdom speaks in the first person, the same thing happens:

“Sons of earth,” says the Deity, “you have spoken wisely; you feel that you are gifted by nature with faculties, affections, and passions; and you perceive that on the right exertion and direction of these depends your well-being. It does so. Your affections both of soul and body may be shortly reduced to two, pleasure and pain; the one troublesome, and the other agreeable. It is natural and befitting, therefore, that you shun pain, and desire and follow after pleasure. Set forth then on the pursuit; but ere you start, be sure that it is in the right road, and that you have your eye on the true object. Perfect pleasure, which is happiness, you will have attained when you have brought your bodies and souls into a state of satisfied tranquillity. To arrive at this, much previous exertion is requisite; yet exertion, not violent, only constant and even. – A Few Days in Athens, Chapter X

Philosophy begins by pointing the finger at our natural faculties. The study of nature must begin from where we are, from the tools that we have to apprehend her. Among these tools, the one that is most relevant to ethics is the pleasure and aversion faculty. The natural goal established by our own nature is asserted as the first thing that we must clearly understand.

Immediately, the author knows that some will equate pleasure with debauchery and mindless instant gratification. She then introduces Prudence as the mother of all the virtues and handmaiden of wisdom. Sometimes translated as practical wisdom, prudence is a shortened form of pro-videntia, or prior-seeing, that is, seeing before things happen, seeing ahead (and planning ahead). Here, with regards to control of desires, Prudence is the reasoning faculty by which we conduct hedonic calculus, the comparative measure of pain versus pleasure over the long term.

And first, the body, with, its passions and appetites, demands gratification and indulgence. But beware! for here are the hidden rocks which may shipwreck your bark on its passage, and shut you out for ever from the haven of repose. Provide yourselves then with a skilled pilot, who may steer you through the Scylla and Charybdis of your carnal affections, and point the steady helm through the deep waters of your passions. Behold her! it is Prudence, the mother of the virtues, and the handmaid of wisdom. Ask, and she will tell you, that gratification will give new edge to the hunger of your appetites, and that the storm of the passions shall kindle with indulgence. Ask, and she will tell you, that sensual pleasure is pain covered with the mask of happiness. Behold she strips it from her face, and reveals the features of disease, disquietude, and remorse. – A Few Days in Athens, Chapter X

Wright then argues that prudence leads to ataraxia, which translates as equanimity. A beautiful, poetic comparison of a pleasant life of ataraxia as “neither a roaring torrent, nor a stagnant pool, but a placid and crystal stream”. Notice how she sees ataraxia in positive terms, not as mere pain relief (the common academic interpretation of Epicurean ataraxia), but as pleasant abiding, “healthy contentment”, joy.

Ask, and she will tell you, that happiness is not found in tumult, but tranquillity; and that, not the tranquillity of indolence and inaction, but of a healthy contentment of soul and body. Ask, and she will tell you, that a happy life is like neither to a roaring torrent, nor a stagnant pool, but to a placid and crystal stream, that flows gently and silently along. – A Few Days in Athens, Chapter X

Mother Philosophy then presents the virtues, beginning with temperance or moderation. She contributes to hedonic calculus by protecting us from “future evil” (evil means suffering to an Epicurean), and from “all disquiet to the soul and injury to the body”.

And now Prudence shall bring to you the lovely train of the virtues. Temperance, throwing a bridle on your desires, shall gradually subdue and annihilate those whose present indulgence would only bring future evil; and others more necessary and more innocent, she shall yet bring down to such becoming moderation, as shall prevent all disquiet to the soul and injury to the body.

Fortitude or endurance is seen next. Perhaps another word for courage, she protects us from fears and from fate.

Fortitude shall strengthen you to bear those diseases which even temperance may not be efficient to prevent; those afflictions which fate may level at you; those persecutions which the folly or malice of man may invent. It shall fit you to bear all things, to conquer fear, and to meet death.

Justice and generosity follow. The first one adds to our pleasure by making us safe among our neighbors. The latter one wins us friends, which are one of the most persistent sources of intense pleasure in life. Friendship is also addressed below.

Justice shall give you security among your fellows, and satisfaction in your own breasts. Generosity shall endear you to others, and sweeten your own nature to yourselves. Gentleness shall take the sting from the malice of your enemies, and make you extract double sweet from the kindness of friends.

Then, we see gratitude and friendship among the virtues. There are many documented benefits of gratitude, but here the author mentions how it helps us to bear our obligations pleasantly. In my studies of Epicurean doctrine, I’ve come to conclude that it’s impossible to profit from it if one is ungrateful.

Gratitude shall lighten the burden of obligation, or render it even pleasant to bear. Friendship shall put the crown on your security and your joy. With these, and yet more virtues, shall prudence surround you. And, thus attended, hold on your course in confidence, and moor your barks in the haven of repose.”

Also, notice here how pleasure is a gift of nature, and the virtues have to attend to nature as the final authority. In our tradition we never rebel against nature. That is the equivalent of rebelling against reality.

But, my sons, methinks I hear you say, ‘You have shown us the virtues rather as modifiers and correctors of evil, than as the givers of actual and perfect good. Happiness, you tell us, consists in ease of body and mind; yet temperance cannot secure the former from disease, nor can all the virtues united award affliction from the latter.’ True, my children, Philosophy cannot change the laws of nature; but she may teach us to accommodate ourselves to them. She cannot annul pain; but she can arm us to bear it.

After the train of the virtues is presented and the natural limits of the virtues are addressed, another efficient means follows: that of fond rememberance of happy memories. Again, not just virtues but also certain practices can serve as means to pleasure.

Hath he not memory to bring to him past pleasures, the pleasures of a well-spent life, on which he may feed even while pain racks his members, and fever consumes his vitals?

A later portion of the tenth chapter of A Few Days in Athens then evaluates further how avoiding vices and cultivating virtues can protect us from suffering. Temperance helps to diminish suffering due to poverty; modesty helps to experience luxury in the midst of simplicity and to avoid anger, disapointment and pain; knowledge protects us from superstition. It is reminiscent to Philodemus’ instruction on how self-sufficiency (another important virtue) protects us from being too vulnerable.

What is poverty, if we have temperance, and can be satisfied with a crust, and a draught from the spring? If we have modesty, and can wear a woolen garment as gladly as a tyrian robe? What is slander, if we have no vanity that it can wound, and no anger that it can kindle? What is neglect, if we have no ambition that it can disappoint, and no pride that it can mortify? What is persecution, if we have our own bosoms in which to retire, and a spot of earth to sit down and rest upon? What is death, when without superstition to clothe him with terrors, we can cover our heads, and go to sleep in his arms?

Vulnerability and Virtue

Fortitude and vulnerability are not opposed in a fluid system, whereas the philosophers of logic might invent sillogisms according to which they are mutually exclusive. In our system, just as both anger and gratitude can have virtuous dispositions, similarly vulnerability and fortitude can be virtuous.

Fear of death is then addressed, particularly the death of a friend or loved one, which is the most painful way in which we experience death. This is truly a difficult pain to bear, the author acknowledges, and she recalls the pleasures and the tenderness of friendship and of love for our close ones in one of the most moving portions of the novel.

Here, rather than feign fortitude, the author advises that we cry the necessary tears even as we engage in the pleasures of remembering our friends who have died. It should serve us as consolation that even crying and being vulnerable can be a virtue. Crying is essential to avoid depression and resolve grief, and our tears even contain toxins so that we are literally cleansed through them. There is absolutely nothing wrong with crying. It is entirely natural, and sometimes unavoidable, and we should not fear being vulnerable. Tied in with this, is the teaching that we should never avoid loving someone for fear of losing them at a later point because “happiness forbids it”. The author here presents us with the challenge of wishing that we had never met our loved ones.

And is it forbidden to us to mourn its loss? If it be, the power is not with us to obey. Should we, then, to avoid the evil, forego the good? Shall we shut love from our hearts, that we may not feel the pain of his departure? No; happiness forbids it. Experience forbids it. Let him who hath laid on the pyre the dearest of his soul, who hath washed the urn with the bitterest tears of grief — let him say if his heart hath ever formed the wish that it had never shrined within it him whom he now deplores. Let him say if the pleasures of the sweet communion of his former days doth not still live in his remembrance. If he love not to recall the image of the departed, the tones of his voice, the words of his discourse, the deeds of his kindness, the amiable virtues of his life. If, while he weeps the loss of his friend, he smiles not to think that he once possessed him. He who knows not friendship, knows not the purest pleasure of earth.

The rush of endorphins (the hormone associated with pleasure) that takes place after a good cry makes the case for crying and being vulnerable as an Epicurean virtue: it produces pleasure in the end and resolves grief. Crying, therefore, can also be an efficient means to maximizing pleasure.

This, then, my sons, is our duty, for this is our interest and our happiness; to seek our pleasures from the hands of the virtues, and for the pain which may befall us, to submit to it with patience, or bear up against it with fortitude. To walk, in short, through life innocently and tranquilly. – A Few Days in Athens, Chapter X

Contrast this approach to emotions to the Stoic ideal of apathy, which deprives us of our full humanity and is sometimes an affront to our nature, as the above considerations and ethical challenges related to the death of a friend should make evident. It might even be considered cowardice to live our lives as a desperate attempt to avoid healthy and natural emotion, attachment and pain.

Our philosopher friends who are influenced by the Stoic school will notice how distinct our approaches are, and how far-reaching are the repercussions of Epicurus’ instruction that we “must not force nature”. Emotions are symptoms that we are human, and they deserve our consideration and compassion. With that, I will close these reasonings with one final quote from the novel:

Everyone may be an Epicurean, but only a philosopher may be a Stoic.

Further Reading:

14 Health Benefits of Practicing Gratitude According to Science

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