Author Archives: Hiram

About Hiram

Hiram is an author from the north side of Chicago who has written for The Humanist, Infidels, Occupy, and many other publications. He blogs at The Autarkist and is the author of Tending the Epicurean Garden (Humanist Press, 2014), How to Live a Good Life (Penguin Random House, 2020) and Epicurus of Samos – His Philosophy and Life: All the principal Classical texts Compiled and Introduced by Hiram Crespo (Ukemi Audiobooks, 2020). He earned a BA in Interdisciplinary Studies from NEIU.

PD’s 10-14: On the Utility of Science and the Pleasure of Safety

If the things that produce the delights of those who are decadent washed away the mind’s fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering, and furthermore if they taught us the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no complaints against them, since they would be filled with every joy and would contain not a single pain or distress (and that’s what is bad).

What are the things that produce the delights of those who are decadent? Some may say prostitution or endless pursuit of sexual pleasures, or endless desires (over-eating, abuse of drugs or alcohol). The PD says we DO have complaints against them (but it has nothing to do with the pleasure we gain from them): they are not productive of tranquil pleasure, their delights come with inconveniences. This Doctrine helps with hedonic calculus.

Anxiety often manifests as bored craving for needless things, or fears about not having those things. Extravagant, wasteful, licentious, or libertine pleasures are not necessarily “bad” so long as we understand the limits of nature. Principal Doctrine 11 is the doctrine of science as a means:

If our suspicions about astronomical phenomena and about death were nothing to us and troubled us not at all, and if this were also the case regarding our ignorance about the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no need for studying what is natural.

Both PDs 10-11 remind us that only empirical knowledge (epilogismos or empirical thinking) can tell us about the limits of nature. This Doctrine specifically explains the purpose of studying nature, that the study of nature is the cure for problems related to inherited superstitions, and that science is a means to our tranquility and happiness. Also, it says here that science is necessary to remove these fears and apprehensions; this is not to say we should not study nature beyond this (if it brings pleasure, or if it helps in some other way), but that this is the amount that falls within the category of necessary knowledge. There are three categories for what is necessary in the Letter to Menoeceus, and one of them consists of what is needed for our happiness–which includes some measure of scientific knowledge. This, naturally, has repercussions for the philosophy and practice of Epicurean education.

Polystratus, the third Scholarch of the Garden, said that if we pursue virtue without the study of nature, our virtue will degrade into nothing, have no utility, and may result in arrogance and superstition. We see this today among the practitioners of conventional religions, for they are often hostile to the advance of science and fanatical in their views. Therefore, without the study of nature, we say that it is also useless to pursue virtue (regardless of how well-meaning we are). PD 12 continues attacking our suspicions about the myths:

It is impossible for someone who is completely ignorant about nature to wash away his fears about the most important matters if he retains some suspicions about the myths. So it is impossible to experience undiluted pleasure without studying what is natural.

This doctrine helps to cure fear of hell and of gods, and other fear-based superstitions, by pointing to the study of nature. I am reminded of the founder of Atheist Republic and his attempts to commit suicide as a teenager because of his deep fear of the Islamic hell, which was instilled in him when he was growing up. The Epicurean Doctrines accentuate, more than once, that the study of nature (philologia) is necessary for happiness, and to heal the diseases of the soul that keep us from being happy.

Concerning the issue of “suspicions”, let us bring this word into relief in order to accentuate it against the mention of the word “gnomé” (conviction, judgment) in PD 28, the Doctrine of the utility of dogmatism, where Epicurus says: “you must KNOW these things!”. Here, the Hegemon requires a full cognitive commitment and assimilation of the Doctrines from the disciple. The key-word of this Doctrine is gnomé, which shares semantic roots with “to know”, “knowledge”, and “conocer” (to know) in Spanish.

Epicurus always carefully chose his words, which makes them particularly powerful. Notice (and contrast) the power and medicine of these two words: when we discuss “suspicions”, we are not giving credit to the relevant truth-claims. We are dismissing them as mere “suspicions”, whereas the truths we gain from the study of nature are knowledge. We do not suspect them, we KNOW them. We should seek to imitate Epicurus’ mastery of his choice of words for accuracy and clarity. PDs 13 and 14 are about safety.

It is useless to be safe from other people while retaining suspicions about what is above and below the earth and in general about the infinite unknown

PD 13 continues the reasoning of PD 12. Why is this a separate PD? It deals specifically with safety, which is in the category of natural and necessary pleasures. By attacking our “suspicions” based on fear-based superstitions, these Doctrines invite us to have a firm conviction and a clear understanding based on the study of nature. We must not be wishy-washy, or give the benefit of doubt to superstition for reasons of political correctness, or of tolerance, etc. as this leads to degrading superstition. To avoid giving undue credit to the suspicions about the myths, we must have a firm conviction (gnomé) in the scientific worldview, with no room for “suspicion”.

Epicurus in his ethics is concerned about the quality of the direct, immediate experience of the sentient being, and whether it’s pleasant or painful. True to this, he uses the word asphaléias not merely as security from other men and external threats (as important as those are), but as a subjective experience. He’s interested in security, surety, certainty and a sense of safety as a psychological or existential state. He wants us to know and feel that we are really safe, to experience inner, psychological safety. He says that without this, if we still harbor suspicions that lead to irrational fears, no safety from external threats makes up for our lack of subjective safety. He establishes a connection between subjective safety from superstitious fears and safety from external threats because he wants his disciple to pay attention to how safety feels in his soul.

And so the disciple must sincerely introspect concerning his opinions and suspicions, and align them with the study of nature and with his own advantage, fearlessness, and pleasure.

Although some measure of safety from other people is based in the power to fight them off and in abundant wealth, the purest security comes from solitude and breaking away from the herd.

Doctrine 14 discusses the method of retreat. The word used here is hesuchia, which translates as peace, quiet, stillness, rest, silence. Epicurus established the doctrine of an Epicurean retreat, presumably because it’s useful to cultivate ataraxia, which requires safety. We may consider this retreat in terms of an actual hermit tradition of the Gardens, but “breaking away from the herd” can be practiced in a calm oasis of peace in the middle of a city. The original Garden was at the margins of Athens. So each practitioner must consider what level and form of hesuchia passes hedonic calculus.

Doctrine 14 should inspire us to make our homes into holy places of retreat, peace, safety, and tranquil pleasure, wherever our homes may be. It calls us to actually take the care and time to enjoy the warmth, familiarity, love, and the other pleasures of privacy and safety among those we care about. It inspires us to separate the space set aside for our true, natural community from the spaces occupied by the mobs. In these places of refuge, of hesuchia, it is easier to enjoy the pleasures of peace and safety.

PD 16: Against The Worship of Fortune

Chance steals only a bit into the life of a wise person: for throughout the complete span of his life the greatest and most important matters have been, are, and will be directed by the power of reason.

One pragmatic method of exegesis is to think of a doctrine in terms of how we connect theory and practice. This helps us to make philosophy tangible. How can we carry out experiments with this doctrine? How is this practiced?

Sages do not need Chance to be happy. This PD does not directly forbid the use of oracles like the runes, Ifa, the Tarot cards, or the prophetic utterances of the monotheists … perhaps as entertainment they’re acceptable, or for things outside “the most important matters”, but from the way it’s worded, we could infer that for all practical purposes there’s a taboo against consulting oracles for true disciples of Epicurus.

One other thing must be noted in this (and many other passages): the expectations that the founders had of sages or even of philosophers were distinct from the expectations they had of average people. The average person is superstitious and waits for Chance to deliver blessings, and the common person considers this happiness. A sage, or a good Epicurean philosopher, must become the cause of his or her own pleasure / happiness.

In the Epistle to Menoeceus, we read that Epicurus also argues that the misfortune of the wise is better than the fortune of fools. Elsewhere in Vatican Saying 47, we see instructions to laugh with derision at Fortune.

I have anticipated thee, Fortune, and entrenched myself against all thy secret attacks. And I will not give myself up as captive to thee or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for me to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who vainly cling to it, I will leave life crying aloud a glorious triumph-song that I have lived well.

It is clear that the attitude of the Epicurean towards fate, destiny, and particularly towards Fortune as a Goddess (or God, when used as an euphemism for Fortune or Chance itself) is one of triumphal derision and mockery. Certainly the attitude is not one of reverence towards Fortuna or Chance. We see, as we see elsewhere, that what is blasphemous for the Epicurean can be worthy of reverence for the common person, while Epicurean doctrines are blasphemous to the average person.

Another way to connect theory and practice, in this doctrine, is to make plans, to leverage whatever control we have over situations. We may ask ourselves what we are trying to accomplish, apply hedonic calculus, and develop a plan. Norman DeWitt said that, while philosophers in general consider that the unexamined life is not worth living, the Epicureans consider that the unplanned life is not worth living.

There are additional literary resources that demonstrate this. Alexander the Oracle Monger contains comical depictions of what may happen when people fall for oracle peddlers. The entire work is about mocking Fortune-tellers, and the short novel could be seen as an exercise in the practice of both PD 16 and VS 47. Finally, as for cultural output, the song O Fortuna pours into verse the feelings of the Epicurean:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O5b7tgkdFH0

 

On Natural Holiness

The above video on the Epicurean gods may help us to contextualize the following discussion. When I say natural holiness, I mean as opposed to supernatural, and also holiness as it is empirically observed and experienced by mortals.

We recently carried out a study of holiness with the purpose of carrying out experiments in the theory and practice of Epicurean piety, and as part of an effort to formulate a non-theistic Epicurean religiosity for the 21st Century. We also wanted to rescue the words “holiness” and “the sacred” from centuries of appropriation by world-denying religions.

The holy and the sacred, in conventional religions, have sometimes come to be associated with what we view as unhealthy asceticism and self-denial, and sometimes even with the vulgar hypocrisy of people who are ostentatious about their false piety, whereas in Epicurus we find a non-Platonic concept of “righteous happiness” related to natural holiness, and which is not at all ascetic or world-denying. In Against the use of empty words, we learn that the founders of our School re-assigned new meanings to words as per the study of nature. The rectification of a natural conception of holiness, and the sacred, is a (mammoth and worthwhile) philosophical project.

On Holiness

Holiness shares semantic roots with wholeness (the state of being healthy and complete, safe and sound, uninjured, entire). Scottish hale (a related word that shares semantic roots) implies health, being whole, and happiness. In Spanish, the word “santo” (“the holy”) also shares semantic roots with “sano”, which means healthy, and with the English word sanity. The “in-sane” are people who lack mental health. So the naturally holy may have originally been tied to bodily and mental health.

One of the initial points I wish to make in our investigations of natural holiness is that at some point in history, the healthy and the holy separated in many languages, but they are Siamese twins.

Ancient people utilized “the holy” in order to avoid germs and diseases. This may help to explain the many purity and health codes in ancient religions related to hygiene, and the fact that the goddess of health is known as Hygieia (Hygiene, personified). So we may forgive our conventionally religious friends for having inherited so many hygiene-based superstitions and taboos concerning burial of decaying bodies, menstrual and purity taboos, avoidance of eating pork, etc. Many of these taboos are later corruptions of the initial prolepsis of the holy: the feeling of being happy, whole, complete, healthy and sound, which in antiquity (and even today, as the pandemic has shown) at times required certain taboos around hygiene and health.

On the Utility of the Holy

Philodemus taught that Epicurus ordered that all oaths be taken in the name of the most holy gods, and not on trivialities or non-divine things. One of the ancient Epicurean Guides, Philodemus of Gadara, said:

Piety and justice appear to be almost the same thing … because to break one’s oath is to be unjust and also to lie, and both are disturbing.

Over the years of studying together, the Friends of Epicurus have come to realize that a social contract is needed to properly practice Epicurean philosophy. The sincere student must abide by some house rules, and these rules need to be clearly delineated.

An oath, or agreement, between the teacher / community and the individual student helps to know the house rules (this is also true in most social settings). The specific details of any social contract or agreement must delineate the concrete rules by which that community attains the most advantageous ways of achieving its aims and values. If the social contract is vague, it will not serve its purposes efficiently. Since justice depends on very specific circumstances, contracts require specificity and concreteness.

This is the first, and most obvious, use of holiness: it serves as a guarantor of our oaths with each other. If you and I hold our friendship to be holy, and you swear on our friendship that you will complete a shared project, your disloyalty would be an act of injustice that implies a desecration of our holy friendship.

But there are other ways in which the holy is useful. Since it represents our Highest Values, on which we make our oaths, it also serves as a way to distinguish our highest values from our non-values. It creates a separate category for things of great value for a community.

On the Sacred

Let’s now look at the prolepsis (original attestation and meaning, or “proto-noesis“) of the sacred. A quick online search for the meaning of “sacred” yields some of the following meanings:

connected with God (or the gods) or dedicated to a religious purpose and so deserving veneration.

(of writing or text) embodying the laws or doctrines of a religion.

regarded with great respect and reverence by a particular religion, group, or individual.

The sacred is that which is set aside (or dedicated) as a Higher Value, or for the sake of a Higher Value. It’s set apart from the profane, which is ordinary.

It seems initially that the sacred and the holy are one and the same thing, since sacred comes from Latin sacrare, from sacer, sacr– ‘holy’. However, in our usage, people can be holy but not usually sacred (although I would argue that some people are sacred to us). Objects and books can be both holy and sacred.

Things can be made sacred by consecration. In our modern usage, the sacred is that which is “set aside” for a higher purpose or “set aside” as a higher value, and is worthy of great respect. Sacred things are not ordinary. Hence, the Torah scrolls are kept in the Ark in a synagogue. The eucharist is kept in the tabernacle in a Catholic church. The Krishna prasadam (food consecrated and served in Hindu temples) is not just eaten: it is “honored”. They are set apart from ordinary things, and connect us with the higher values they’re consecrated to.

Does the sacred exist in nature? Without a doubt. I do not consider ordinary people comparable in any way to my parents, to my siblings, to my friends. My mother is the most “sacred” person to me. The tomb of my grandmother is sacred to me because of the love and memories attached. The ground around her tomb is, comparably, meaningless and valueless, but her tomb is sacred. Many people go out of their way to visit their mothers’ graves on Mother’s Day, for instance: that means that the place that holds those remains is set apart, marked as sacred in some way. Even elephants have been observed assuming a solemn demeanor in the presence of bones of their loved ones when they stumble upon them during their long journeys.

It seems to me that the utility of the sacred has to do with a communal or individual choice to focus on some good, and with separating the things that we associate with our Higher Values (which are holy to us) from ordinary things. Sacredness also separates the things worthy of respect from those indifferent or unworthy. Religious scholar Durkheim argues that the sacred represents the interests of the group, including communal unity, which is embodied in symbols, as for instance in a totem (the symbol that unites a tribe). Mircea Eliade, another scholar of religion, says that religion is based on a sharp distinction between the sacred and the profane.

I argue that the sacred does exist in nature: that some things are observed to have a much greater value that most other things to certain sentient beings, and so we observe that they are considered to deserve special respect, so they are set aside.

In addition to things that are naturally sacred, things can come to be considered sacred by dedication, devotion, or formal and ceremonial consecration. The definitions of “consecrate” include:

To make / declare something sacred

To dedicate formally to a religious, divine, or sacred purpose

Ordain someone to sacred office

Devote something exclusively to a particular purpose

We sometimes hold on to pictures or objects that were given by loved ones or friends due to emotional attachment: they are “consecrated” to the memory of a loved one. When something is offered to a higher ideal, or to a friend, or towards a goal which is itself considered sacred, the thing offered becomes set apart, gains value from that sacredness.

The Sacred Within our Hierarchy of Values

Let us now contextualize the usefulness of the sacred within the framework of our highest existential projects and goals. Why? Because this helps to illuminate the relation between our hierarchy of priorities and values, and the practice of hedonic calculus. This places “the sacred” within an undeniably Epicurean ethical context, one that helps us navigate our choices and avoidances.

Can our goals (which guide our actions) be “sacred”, or be tied to things that are sacred? The pleasures and advantages we get from our toil justify the disadvantages and pains we choose. Our sacrifices must always be devoted to some higher goal or value, which redeems them or justifies them thanks to the mathematics of hedonic calculus. A rational mortal will sacrifice only lesser values to higher values. 

Notice how we are moving from the most holy gods to our Highest Values in our non-theistic discourse. Rather than sacrifice to Zeus or Dionysus, we are taming religious techniques, and recruiting them for ethical and philosophical purposes. This reminds me of the poem/epiphany early in Liber Primus (the First Book of “De rerum natura” by Lucretius) where religion is trampled underfoot by philosophy.

Also, notice that part of what I’m saying here is that the language used in conventional religions (words like the sacred, or sacrifice) can be transferred into a realism that rejects all supernaturalism; that we can return to the original prolepsis of these words in formulating our own Epicurean religiosity based on the study of nature.

In Epicurean philosophy, we believe Pleasure is the Guide of Life, and the faculty that points to what the goods are. We say a man may be “devoted” to his wife, or to his studies. This expression implies a goal (love and happiness within a matrimony, a PhD or some other professional or educational attainment with prospects of a higher salary, etc.) that justifies these sacrifices and could itself be “sacred”. In fact, matrimony is considered a sacrament by many religions. It’s seen as a holy contract, and an act of mutual consecration of two beings to each other so that they become each other’s Higher Values.

Our sacrifices are a good place to look for our highest values, since we do not seek pains except to serve greater pleasures, so that we observe that our sacrifices (and our hedonic calculus) point to an empirical encounter with in our hierarchy of values.

The word sacrifice carries the prolepsis “to make sacred”–that is, sacer(sacred) + facere (to make). A rational human only offers or makes sacrifices (of any kind) for worthy reasons, or to worthy ideals and goals. Sacrifices are, to speak naturally and concretely, the objects or actions that are “made sacred” and therefore redeemed or justified by consecration to our goals and our Higher Values. We may not think of these goals as sacred, but we use the word “sacrifice” (sacer-facere), which implies something sacred which justifies our efforts. I made huge sacrifices to obtain a school diploma, for instance. Some people sacrifice their marriage for an addiction or a short-lived affair, to offer an example of an irrational, unethical sacrifice that does not pass hedonic calculus.

If our pains are not “sacrificed” to a higher aim, they are not made sacred, they are not redeemed or justified, they lack meaning and value to us. In these cases, such pains or sacrifices are to be avoided, if possible. Please consider your own past and present choices and rejections, and place this before your eyes: we observe that the sacred is, by pragmatic definition, that which justifies our sacrifices by being a Higher Value. We make great sacrifices and accept great pains for the sake of our friends, our loved ones, our Highest Values, and our Gods (even metaphorical ones).

And while we are willing to make great sacrifices and take great risks for a loved one or a friend, we admit only lesser pains for the sake of a stranger. The life of a stranger may still be sacred to us, and we may still be moved by compassion, but not nearly as much as that of a loved one or friend.

Having explored the natural sense of the words holiness and sacred, let’s now move on to a specifically non-theistic religious discussion of them while keeping these definitions clearly in our mind.

Towards a Non-Theistic Experience of the Holy

Should we–and how do we–make the sacred tangible and material in a worldview that rejects the supernatural? How do we enjoy the pleasures of the holy as Epicureans or spiritual naturalists? I believe our experiments in piety within the context of a non-theistic Epicurean religiosity might contribute to the modern atheist arguments that we can create values without God with clear demonstrations of how it’s done, and in a manner that is true to our traditions.

I will begin by arguing that many things other than the holy gods are holy. For instance, people make non-theistic oaths, like “I swear on our friendship …”, with the assumption that said friendship is held in such high esteem that it is understood to be holy by the two parties. There are many other “immortal goods”. We could say “I swear on the words of Epicurus”, or “I swear on justice, or on my honor, or on my reputation”, with the assumption that these are things of value to us. Non-religious people, when they go to a court, have the option of swearing on the Constitution instead of a Bible, in the civic ceremonial tradition of the United States. Even the religious sometimes swear on things other than their god. “I swear on the tomb of my grandmother”, for instance, is a non-theistic oath. They are oaths taken on our (often shared) values, things we love, revere, or highly respect, among which we will find our sacred things.

Epicureanism as a Non-Theistic Religiosity

The imagery, in De Rerum Natura, where religion is trampled under the feet of man, teaches that religion must have utility for all the individuals it serves. Religion must be civilized, reformed, tamed by the Epicurean. Our chosen beliefs must serve us and increase our pleasures.

A naturalist, and perhaps non-theistic, religiosity can be useful, healthy, and relevant. It would purge religion of its less civilized elements, domesticate it, tame it, and keep the best aspects of religion that give people central symbols around which to organize their lives and communities, develop their culture and aesthetics, and make oaths. It’s also a sign that we respect ourselves, our chosen communities, our values, and our philosophy.

By creating tangible artifacts and ceremonies that are considered holy and worthy of reverence, by the sacralization of the words of Epicurus as a sacred text or object of contemplation, by the celebration of the Twentieth, by an oath, or by any other ceremony, philosophy furnishes all the things that conventional religions furnish. We are also making philosophy tangible by these acts of value-creation.

Impious is not so much the man who denies the Gods of the many as the man who attributes the beliefs of the many to them.

Ancient Epicureanism mimicked much of the utility and culture of conventional religion. It was a sect, had rituals, feasts, sacred oaths, Guides (the kath-hegemones), culture heroes (the four Founders) for whom sculptures were made and fetishized (as documented in The Sculpted Word), revered writings, and even a patron Goddess (Venus). It will take years for modern intellectuals to successfully rescue the original sense of many of the words, concepts and practices that world-denying religions have monopolized, but it is my view that carrying out concrete experiments in piety within the context of Epicurean philosophy as a legitimate (theistic or) non-theistic religion for the 21st Century deserves careful and sincere further exploration.

Meléta: Epicurus’ Instructions for Students

Do and practice (μελέτα), then, the things I have always recommended to you, holding them to be the stairway to a beautiful life …

So practice these and similar things day and night, by yourself and with a like-minded friend, and you will never be disturbed whether waking or sleeping, and you will live as a god among men: for a man who lives in the midst of immortal goods is unlike a merely mortal being. – Epicurus’ Epistle to Menoeceus

ταῦτα οὖν καὶ τὰ τούτοις συγγενῆ μελέτα πρὸς σεαυτὸν ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς <καὶ> πρὸς τὸν ὅμοιον σεαυτῷ, καὶ οὐδέποτε οὔθ’ ὕπαρ οὔτ’ ὄναρ διαταραχθήσῃ, ζήσῃ δὲ ὡς θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἔοικε θνητῷ ζῴῳ ζῶν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἀθανάτοις ἀγαθοῖς.

The Teaching Mission: “Deliberate … with a Like-Minded Friend”

A good disciple is one that tries to follow the instructions of his teacher. Based on the early part, and the closing, of the Letter to Menoeceus, it seems that Epicurus would not consider us true and sincere disciples if we don’t dedicate ourselves to deliberating (meléta) about philosophy in two ways: both by ourselves and with others who are similar to us (of like mind, or who are at the same level).

Epicurus may have been thinking, when he wrote these words at the end of LMenoeceus, that since he (and perhaps his philosopher friends) took so much time and effort to organize the doctrines for the students, that he preferred that they honored his effort by multiplying the fruits of his effort. Hence, by closing LMenoeceus in this manner, Epicurus was basically saying: “Go share this with (those among) your friends who are like-minded intellectual peers”

This is how (what Norman DeWitt called) “the teaching mission” of the Epicurean Gardens began: there was an Epicurean interest in education, or rather re-educating both old and young. We can think of the Epicurean critique of paideia (traditional Greek education) in this light: it comes with an attempt to offer an alternative or an addendum to conventional education.

Who was studying philosophy in the Garden? We might surmise–from the invitation at the beginning of LMenoeceus to young and old to study philosophy–that the Garden had at least two educational curricula: one for youth, and one for elders–or at least one for beginners, and one for advanced students, as we can also imagine from the fact that new students were given the Little Epitome to study, and advanced students had other works to study. We have to imagine also that these curricula included the three bodies of the Epicurean wisdom tradition (canon, physics, ethics).

We can also surmise that the disciples to whom these works were dedicated were advanced and sincere enough, that they were entrusted to continue passing down these teachings. A good teacher would not entrust the “teaching mission” to just anyone: he would not give a doctrine to share if it’s incomplete, or if the disciple who receives it has not mastered the basics and isn’t able to lead a study group, at the very least. Although elsewhere we have a fragment that says that Metrodorus, Polyaenus, and Hermarchus were Epicurus’ ambassadors–we have here an invitation to missionary work not for the Guides (kath-hegemones) of the Garden, but for Menoeceus: a regular disciple. As Norman DeWitt said: “each one teach one“.

Since both the PD’s and the LMenoeceus seem to be conclusive summaries–which is why Diogenes Laertius included them in his biography of Epicurus–, we can surmise that by the time they were given to the disciples, the doctrines of the Garden had matured to a point that was considered sufficiently stable and complete to warrant such a definite summary.

Epicurus said that his teachings were not for everyone, but for those who are “armed for happiness“. While there was a clear hierarchy of knowledge in the Garden, we see in LMenoeceus that every Epicurean pupil was considered intelligent enough to be a “like-minded friend” to other Epicureans, and in this sense there was a form of equality (which manifests as like-mindedness) in the Garden even among slaves, women, and people of different classes.

Practicing Meléta

I’d like to direct attention to the word used here, which is sometimes translated as “practice these things“, or “ponder these things“. The word meléta (μελέτα) has several meanings:

to think carefully
to meditate upon
to give oneself totally to
to dedicate oneself to
to practice
to cultivate
to ponder
to deliberate

This process of pondering is, of course, mostly private, and it’s meant to ensure a full, sincere, cognitive assimilation of the Doctrines, and clear convictions. It also helps us to do the introspective work that the Doctrines sometimes challenge us with.

But there’s a second mode of study that Epicurus recommends. He says we should study with “kindred souls“. He uses the word omoion, which is related semantically to the English word “same”, and with the idea of a counterpart, a double, or equivalent.

Studying Philodemus, Lucretius, and the other great Epicureans of the past (and present) gives us privileged access to the meléta processes of previous generations and allows us to capitalize on their wisdom, and to participate in some way in the meléta of others, enhancing our own, and giving us a different perspective.

As an exercise to help us visualize what is meant by the closing passage of the Letter to Menoeceus, we could ask ourselves: “How do I practice meléta (as defined above) with others, and by myself?“. That is,

How do I think carefully on the Epicurean doctrines with others, and by myself?
How do I meditate upon philosophy with others, and by myself?
How do I give myself totally to EP with others, and by myself?
How do I dedicate myself to the study of philosophy with others, and by myself?
How do I practice EP with others, and by myself?
How do I cultivate Epicurean philosophy with others, and by myself?
How do I ponder EP with others, and by myself?
How do I deliberate about EP with others, and by myself?

This may involve study, reading, writing essays to document what one is learning, asking questions to those who are more knowledgeable, and having conversations with them online or in person. The point is that collective deliberation with knowledgeable Epicurean friends helps to catch most errors, and that by exposing us to frank criticism, collective deliberation helps us to develop a good character, to practice true friendship, and to gain knowledge.

Why should anyone trust that our words are true to the Principal Doctrines, if we are not knowledgeable? Knowledge is an important currency to us. In the Society of Friends of Epicurus, we believe in a hierarchy of knowledge, and place great importance in having knowledgeable Epicureans (preferrably, formal Guides who have been trained in EP) to study with.

Another point that must be raised is that proof is in the pudding: Guides must be happy. They must show in their own life that they are living pleasantly with the aid of philosophy. If a person seems unhappy, impractical, unfriendly, if he relies on Fortune for his happiness, or if she relies heavily on particular and obscure interpretations with no reliance on the PDs, you should look for other students to study with.

Knowledgeable friends or Guides must not harbor ill-will, which destroys philosophical inquiry and makes philosophy degenerate into ad-hominem attacks. That is not true meléta. Guides must give parrhesia with good will, and with a sincere investment in the happiness, wisdom, and good character of their friends. They must also frequently cite the sources, and give exegetical or interpretative insight about them, rather than merely rely on their own pre-established biases. When they do discuss their own ideas or those of non-Epicureans, these ideas must be: 1. in harmony with the rest of the Epicurean doctrine, and be 2. internally consistent (these are Epicurus’ two instructions for innovation).

Meléta is Both Passive and Active

I wish to mention here the essay by R Braicovich (which I recently read in Spanish) on the use of epitomes (summaries) by Epicureans, which cites the critique by some hostile scholars who say that the Epicurean practice of memorizing and repeating doctrines is passive and does not constitute true philosophy. In the essay, the author argues that part of the utility of memorization (and of an Epicurean education) is to assist people in the process of hedonic calculus, and therefore this process of memorization was not as passive as these hostile scholars claim. The author also mentions that the epitomes must either 1. be memorized or 2. studied in depth with tutors (to cite Norman DeWitt: “each one teach one“) or with other writings that explain our summaries, but our discussion of the end of the Letter to Menoeceus makes it clear that these two forms of studying are not mutually exclusive: they are complementary, and both are necessary. The bottom line is that Epicurean studies require both a personal cognitive commitment, as well as a community of friends.

Furthermore, the essay stresses that learning is not merely passive memorization and repetition, but that the doctrines of Epicurus are meant to aid us in carrying out our hedonic calculus and in our choices and avoidances. In other words, we must actively interpret the doctrines and use them as moral agents in the real world. The doctrines furnish theory, and we must furnish praxis.

Conclusion

Epicurus advises us to passively and actively deliberate on his doctrines and teachings both by ourselves (private meléta, which takes the form of reading, repetition, memorizing, and evaluating the doctrines against empirical case studies) and with others who are of like mind (conversations with friends, as well as indirectly by studying the writings of other Epicureans and learning from their own process of meléta).

Continue Reading: Epicurus’ Instructions on Meleta, Part II

PD 6: On Methods of Exegesis

Over the last few weeks, I have been publishing essays expounding the Principal Doctrines. It has been a very enjoyable intellectual exercise. I’ve learned that it’s an error to take the PD’s for granted and to think that we know everything there is to know about them. In the process of writing these essays, I have been considering the various methods of exegesis that are available to us, and what method(s) might be the most useful for each PD.

The Contextual Method

My main method has been to try to reconstruct or discern (based on the text) what discussions or conversations took place among the founders, that led to these statements being established as authoritative conclusions of the Garden. I’m calling this the method of contextualization.

Clearly, the founders meant for the 40 Principal Doctrines to stand separate from the rest of the textual evidence we have. They are meant to be the forty most important ideas that a student must either revere or study (or both). By what line of thinking, by what arguments, did these 40 conclusions attain their superior status? I began to evaluate this in my study of PDs 24 and 28, on the utility of dogmatism.

The Literal Method

Another method of exegesis (that is, interpretation) is to stick to the literal translation of the text. If we know the original Greek language, we may focus on the anticipation–the initial empirical attestation and conception of each word–in order to deconstruct each PD word-for-word, and glean clarity. These two methods are not mutually exclusive, and are both useful and necessary. 

We know from sermons given by Epicurus–like the one Against empty words–that the founders were very adamant on using clear, concise language. They went as far as coining new terms when conventional language failed, as attested again by their own theory of the evolution of language. So there was no frivolous expression in the PD’s … but then there’s PD 6.

This is a case where the literal reconstruction and the anticipation of each word is necessary because the choice of words in the original was apparently so awkward, so specific, and attempted to be so clear, that most modern readers get lost in translation. So I had to contact a member of the Society of Friends of Epicurus who knows Greek, Panos, who helped me to get a grasp of what the words actually mean. Here is the original:

ἕνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ανθρώπων ἦν κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας ἀγαθόν, ἐξ ὧν ἄν ποτε τοῦτο οἷός τʼᾖ παρασκευάζεσθαι.

This was translated by Hicks as:

In order to obtain security from other people any means whatever of procuring this was a natural good.

It’s not clear to me why he used the past tense (“was a natural good”). If that’s in the original, it may mean that the original doctrine was meant to justify some event or action taken in the past. The Church of Epicurus translation says:

The natural good of public office and kingship is for the sake of getting confidence from [other] men, [at least] from those from whom one is able to provide this.

In this translation, we can appreciate the common interpretation of the PD as justifying ANY form of government that procures security. We could also interpret it as meaning that security is one of (but not the only) the reasons or purposes for setting up a form of government. And the Peter St. Andre translation says:

It is a natural benefit of leadership and kingship to take courage from other men (or at least from the sort of men who can give one courage).

Security, confidence, and courage all mean different things in English. The Epicuros site in modern Greek language has a version of the PD’s, the sixth of which Panos translates from modern Greek as:

With the goal of acquiring security against people, there was (always) the natural good of dominance and of kingship, through which (someone) could sometimes achieve this.

According to Panos,

I get a kinda opposite meaning of what I see in other translations. But it’s a pretty hard sentence to accurately translate …

Because of being afraid of people is right by the nature of authority and dominion, from which things (authority and dominion) if ever be able to prepare (against).

So basically the idea I get is:

It’s right to be prepared against people, just in case, because of oppression and authority.

… It does not say “it’s ok to use oppression and authority” as some translations I saw.

So the PD does not justify violence (which would go against the doctrines on justice based on avoiding mutual harm and seeking mutual benefit), or the overthrow of government (which would be out of line with the non-political nature of our ethics). Here is how Panos breaks down the words:

ἕνεκα: on account of (/regarding // because of)

τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ανθρώπων: the (tharrein)* from people
–*Tharrein: this word can mean either (a) to be afraid of, or (b) to take courage from!

ἦν κατὰ φύσιν: it was by nature (/quality)

ἀρχῆς: of authority

καὶ βασιλείας: and of dominion (/kingship)

ἀγαθόν, : good (morally good)

ἐξ ὧν : from which (genitive plural)

ἄν ποτε : at some time (/if ever)

τοῦτο: that thing (accusative sing.)

οἷός τʼᾖ : he is able (γʹ ενικ. υποτ. Ενεργ. ενεστ. | 3rd sing. subjunctive active present )

παρασκευάζεσθαι. : to be ready (/prepared)

And again:

ἕνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ανθρώπων
because of the (tharrein) from people

ἦν κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας ἀγαθόν
it was morally good by nature of authority and dominion

ἐξ ὧν
from which (plural which: so the which must refer to: “authority and dominion”)

ἄν ποτε τοῦτο
if ever that thing (which thing? τουτο is neutral accusative singular, so it is talking about a singular neutral object. From the words above, the only candidates are αγαθόν, and θαρρείν (tharrein). I think the only word that makes sense is tharrein…)

οἷός τʼᾖ παρασκευάζεσθαι
he is able (to be) prepare(d)
(so this is subjunctive active which is something like: I expect you prepare. It’s really hard to translate exactly but it’s not that important.)

With Panos finally concluding:

So the way I am seeing this:

Because of being afraid of people is right by the nature of authority and dominion, from which things (authority and dominion) if ever be able to prepare (against).

From all that I’ve read, it seems clear to me that the Hicks translation is flawed. It says

In order to obtain security from other people any means whatever of procuring this was a natural good.

Hicks makes an absolute claim that seems out of place in Epicurean philosophy, where all choices and avoidances must be subjected to hedonic calculus. I do not see mention of “any means necessary” in the original, and I suspect this translation may appeal to people with certain military ideas.

I wish to thank Panos for his assistance. The process we see above is the literal method, which seeks to know the initial pre-conception that belongs to each word chosen for this PD, and which assumes and trusts that the founders chose their words very carefully.

PD 6 in Light of Other Surviving Passages

The idea of the PD is that security is a natural and necessary pleasure. This idea is also expressed in the Epistle to Menoeceus, so it seems indigenous and accurate within an Epicurean list of key opinions.

PD 6 appears to justify (limited) (service to a) political power or civic engagement for the sake of safety. Vatican Saying 39 associates friendship with “help in the future”, and links true friendship with safety. Vatican Saying 67 criticizes “servility to mobs and monarchs“, and seems to imply that we get more safety from friends than from politics. Finally, VS 80 posits a (partly) attitudinal definition of security, one that is in the soul and not in the realm of society or politics: 

The first measure of security is to watch over one’s youth and to guard against what makes havoc of all by means of maddening desires.

A young man’s share in deliverance comes from watching over the prime of his life and warding off what will ruin everything through frenzied desires. (Monadnock translation)

VS 80 is a salvific passage. It uses the word “soterías” in the original. Soter means Savior. Epicurus was seen as a Savior by later generations because of his salvific doctrine. PD’s 10-13 also discuss a form of attitudinal safety: by learning a scientific account of the nature of things, we protect ourselves from superstition. PD 14 concludes this discussion:

Although some measure of safety from other people is based in the power to fight them off and in abundant wealth, the purest security comes from solitude and breaking away from the herd.

In light of context, PD 6 does not refer to this attitudinal sense of safety in the soul (as PDs 10-14 do), or being safe from limitless desires. It also does not refer to weapons or warfare, or constitute a call to violence. The later Lucretian jeremiad (in Book V) against the propagation of weapons after metal working was discovered, and Philodemus’ advice in On Property Management against taking up a military career, appear to confirm a general lack of affinity for warfare among the ancient Epicureans.

Based on the textual evidence we have seen, we may conclude that the necessary measure of safety for an Epicurean is mainly attained by association with friends and by avoiding certain people (PD 39). I will close with Panos’ suggested translation, and with an invitation to all sincere students to study these texts on their own.

It’s right to be prepared against people, just in case, because of oppression and authority.

PDs 32, 37 and 38 and the Moral Problem of Slavery

“But you only understanding the language of the sword” – Lyrics from Krigsgaldr (the Song of the Sword), by Heilung

Those animals which are incapable of making covenants with one another, to the end that they may neither inflict nor suffer harm, are without either justice or injustice. And those tribes which either could not or would not form mutual covenants to the same end are in like case. – Principal Doctrine 32

What does PD 32 mean, in practice? As regards to examples of people who have neither the power nor the desire of making a covenant to not harm or be harmed, we can think of warlike primitive humans, cannibals, or cognitively deficient humans who are incapable of communication and of understanding. These may fall within the category of those who are incapable of abiding by laws or rules. As for those who are unwilling, I think of the Vandals, Goths, and other Barbarian, “uncivilized” (lawless) tribes that sacked and invaded Roman lands. I also think of the Orcs from Lord of the Rings, terrorists, and anyone who is armed and unwilling to abide by laws against violence and against murder. If a person or group invades your home and is obviously unwilling to “agree to not harm”, then we have to do whatever we have to do for the sake of self-defense. It says there is no injustice (no contract or oath was violated), but there’s also no justice because this would have happened in a wild state of nature, in an uncivilized, lawless state of nature.

While Hobbes argued (in his Leviathan) that people in this lawless state can be “tamed” with a strong state and with strong laws, the Epicurean doctrines of justice create a category of wild, uncivilized humans, tribes, and animals that is separate from those that are domesticated or civilized–who are described as able to agree to not harm or be harmed. These contracts of mutual benefit and of non-violence are explained also by Lucretius in a passage (in Book V) on the origins of friendship and compassion for the weak. The bottom line is that civilized tribes and humans live by a legal code of some sort, whether a rudimentary one (an unwritten, tribal code of honor that may include an agreement not to kill or abuse members of one’s own tribe) or a complex system of laws (like those of modern countries). Wild animals and humans, on the other hand, do not have such a code and–since they live in a wild, lawless state and obey “the law of the jungle”–might make unreliable neighbors.

Laws are created not for the wise (who are naturally harmless to others), but for the unwise. But a code of laws is no guarantee that people will abide by them. We see in Diogenes’ Wall Inscription, that the Epicureans seem to have always expressed doubt as to whether many people (in particular, religious people) are able to abide by the laws out of fear of divine punishment. What does this mean? It means that the state (or the religion) and its laws are not enough to safeguard our security, since some people will not abide by the laws, and will live in a wild state even in places that offer the possibility of lawful coexistence. In these cases, there is neither justice nor injustice. In other words, we must engage in self-defense if we are attacked.

As history demonstrates, there are no gods who will come down and punish those who enslave others. There is no absolute or eternal justice. Humans invented the laws and humans must re-write them. Humans must figure out that a practice is disadvantageous or immoral, and reform themselves. Humans must also enforce whatever rules they set for their societies.

This doctrine tacitly accepts the possibility that some animals may be able to come to agreements with us. There are pods of dolphins in Brazil that have developed a habit of fishing together with human fishermen, with both species developing efficient communication techniques, and both groups enjoying the fruits of their work. In his sermon on moral development, Epicurus dedicated some time to discussing predators like sharks, and other beasts of whom we have the expectation that they will be wild (it must be added here that in that same sermon, Epicurus defends the idea of moral development–which is another important benefit of PD’s 37-38: they allow for laws and contracts to evolve with us). On the other hand, we have more noble expectations from humans and other domesticated animals because they are, well, domesticated–if not civilized. Recent years have seen a trend where certain species are being categorized as “non human persons” due to their high intelligence, and it is not entirely clear where they may fall in terms of justice and the ability to agree to not harm, although once trust is established (as we see in many research projects with apes), we observe that even humans can be accepted into the tribes of these higher animals. We likewise see in domestic animals an ability to abide by house rules, which we do not see in wild animals.

Other tacit teachings within this doctrine are that justice exists only for the civilized, and that it requires efficient communication (at least enough to have an agreement between two persons).

The PD’s and Slavery

The issue of slavery was brought up by Alan recently, as having moral clarity with regards to this issue is often seen as a litmus test for whether a moral system is useful and compatible with civilized life and with modern society.

There are various ways in which people in antiquity became slaves. The main way was debt-based slavery: less wealthy people signed a contract requiring to pay back money lent to them by wealthier people or institutions. If the debt remained unpaid by a certain date, then the person had to pay with their service or slavery for a period of time agreed upon, until the debt was entirely paid back.

There has never been a clear boundary between debt and slavery, even today. If a person today is in debt, that person must get involved in wage slavery or indented servitude, giving a bank or lender the fruits of their labor until the debt is paid.

This form of indented slavery (ancient or modern) is based on a mutual agreement, and the only way in which we can avoid debt-based slavery is by making these contracts illegal.

However, all or most Africans who were abducted unfairly and sold into slavery 400 years ago were, in all likelihood, not in debt.

Africans who were enslaved 400 years ago had the ability and the willingness to abide by laws or agreements of mutual benefit and of not harming or being harmed. They were taken against their will, which is unjust.

Slavery, and the Problem of Non-Consent

A black African person who was captured 400 years ago and enslaved, would have been able and willing to enter into covenants–at least as able as the black Africans who sold him. But they were denied consent.

Consent of the governed is found in the Declaration of Independence, and is a foundational political concept in the West. It gives moral legitimacy to a government and to a legal system. We could argue that today consent is given by voting into power a representative in government, in addition to the process of signing a contract.

Can Slavery Have Been Useful for Mutual Association?

So one Epicurean argument against slavery is that Principal Doctrine 32, when requiring that creatures be able and willing to abide by agreements and laws, contains a tacit taboo against non-consent. PD’s 37 and 38, on the other hand, make a definite value judgment and moral judgment in the cases where consent has been given. A person (the enslaver, in this case) who denies consent to another is attempting to recede back to the wild state of nature.

Among the things accounted just by conventional law, whatever in the needs of mutual association is attested to be useful, is thereby stamped as just, whether or not it be the same for all; and in case any law is made and does not prove suitable to the usefulness of mutual association, then this is no longer just. And should the usefulness which is expressed by the law vary and only for a time correspond with the prior conception, nevertheless for the time being it was just, so long as we do not trouble ourselves about empty words, but look simply at the facts. – Principal Doctrine 37

A fellow Epicurean asked me to interpret “whether or not it be the same for all”. My immediate thought was of instances where it is of mutual advantage for people with different skills to agree to do different things in the pursuit of a shared goal. This scenario is most often seen in work places. A great mathematician may agree to work as the accountant of the firm, a great manual laborer may agree to do the manual work and train others to do so, a good cook may prepare lunch for all workers, etc.

In the US and many countries, judges are considered prepared to judge among parties once they are sworn in. Other citizens are expected to abide by their judgments. Everyone can not be a judge, or a legislator, or a business owner. A society where everyone fulfills the same role is not a functional society. So justice is not about equal duties.

In PD 38, we are invited to judge laws by their consequences. This raises many other interesting moral questions concerning laws that have been recently abolished: we may think of the many detrimental consequences of the war on drugs (massive incarceration for victimless crimes, squandering of police resources, expenses of imprisonment for the tax-payer, inability to tax a huge industry, etc.) or of the illegality of gay marriage (closeted gay people marrying the opposite sex, and then being unhappy and unfaithful). Here, the disadvantages did not seem to justify the advantages of the legality of consuming cannabis and gay marriage.

Where without any change in circumstances the conventional laws, when judged by their consequences, were seen not to correspond with the notion of justice, such laws were not really just; but wherever the laws have ceased to be useful in consequence of a change in circumstances, in that case the laws were for the time being just when they were useful for the mutual association of the citizens, and subsequently ceased to be just when they ceased to be useful. – Principal Doctrine 38

Was slavery at one time useful for the mutual association of the citizens? Well, the institution of slavery (for instance, in the Americas) caused lives of misery for millions, huge security concerns, huge cruelty, a Civil War where thousands died, and its legacy created and perpetuated levels of inequality that are still today generating social unrest. Anyone who claims that slaves “would give them (or the enslavers) pleasure” and tries to justify slavery based on pure hedonism, is not expressing an Epicurean view–since we must walk with Pleasure, but also with Prudence and Justice. This is why some of us modern Epicureans take the liberty to criticize the hypocrisy of slavery in Jefferson and ancient Epicureans, even if we understand that those were different times.

Since–as we have seen–Blacks who were enslaved in the Americas were denied the opportunity to consent to the covenant into which they were inserted, it is impossible to argue for mutual advantage in slavery without considering how it was experienced in the bodies, minds, and realities of the Blacks. Due to the problem of non-consent, slavery in the Americas was carried out in a state of wilderness, of lawlessness, regardless of whether slavery was legal. It did not emerge out of contractual agreements or as a form of debt.

If 500 years ago, Africans had invaded and pillaged Europe (if they had been the original aggressors instead of being abducted into slavery), a different situation would have emerged, one where non-law-abiding humans would have inserted themselves into law-abiding societies with a clear unwillingness to agree not to harm others. This would have made imprisonment, enslavement, or violence a measure of self-defense for those invaded. But this was not the case.

I wish to accentuate, once again, that these PD’s give a definite moral judgment. They say “this is just / unjust”. While there is no absolute, de-contextualized or Platonic morality, the PD’s do not remain silent with regards to giving moral judgment. PD’s can be applied to modern legal codes, and to codes of honor, to certify whether they are just (even if for a time) based on utility for mutual association.

Let’s consider what it means to say that laws may change, depending on circumstances, in order to become just or to abolish injustice: this means that laws are man-made and what laws man has invented, man can abolish or change. There is no room for divine laws or superstition in any legal code certified by an Epicurean. It also creates the possibility of collective moral development, of self-betterment for individuals and their societies–for which the PD’s furnish guidelines based on mutual advantage, and for which we may apply public frank criticism, if this is advantageous.

Conclusion

And so, to summarize, the main Epicurean arguments against slavery as an institution are:

  1. Since there is no mutual benefit in slavery, laws that allowed for slavery by abduction were unjust. It’s not clear how Epicurus acquired his slaves, but it’s clear that Jefferson engaged in an unjust practice.
  2. The denial of consent problem presents a set of moral questions that have not been tackled effectively by later generations of Epicurean thinkers, and requires a deepening of our studies. My suggestion is that this is one of the implied requirements of contractarian justice, which is based on mutual agreements to not harm or be harmed.
  3. There is no absolute or divine, unchanging justice. We do not see evidence for divine enforcement of our laws in the study of nature. Humans invented the laws and contracts, and humans must re-write them when this is advantageous.
  4. The Principal Doctrines 37-38 do not shy away from giving moral judgment in cases where laws are not beneficial for mutual association. Epicurean philosophers may either draft our contracts, or issue opinions concerning the prevalent laws in our societies, based on these guidelines.
  5. Epicurean doctrines establish two categories of animals: those who are wild and uncivilized (incapable or unwilling to abide by laws and agreements), and those who are civilized (law-abiding and contract-abiding). Justice and injustice only exist for the civilized, while the former live like beasts.

PD 8: The Doctrine of Deferred Gratification

The practice of calculating hedons and dolons (units of pleasure and pain) in order to arrive at a path of action that leads to net pleasure was invented by the Cyrenaic pleasure philosopher known as Anniceris, who is sometimes called a “proto-Epicurean”. In Epicurean writings, hedonic calculus is also spoken of in terms of measuring advantages versus disadvantages. PD 8 is a simple observation that justifies hedonic calculus. It calls for occasional deferred gratification. It says:

No pleasure is bad in itself; but the means of paying for some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.

In his Epistle to Menoeceus, Epicurus elaborated the process of hedonic calculus:

And because this is the primary and inborn good, we do not choose every pleasure. Instead, we pass up many pleasures when we will gain more of what we need from doing so. And we consider many pains to be better than pleasures, if we experience a greater pleasure for a long time from having endured those pains. So every pleasure is a good thing because its nature is favorable to us, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen — just as every pain is a bad thing, yet not every pain is always to be shunned. It is proper to make all these decisions through measuring things side by side and looking at both the advantages and disadvantages, for sometimes we treat a good thing as bad and a bad thing as good.

The easiest examples of this doctrine are found in our natural limits to drugs or alcohol, and to food. For instance, I can generally drink one beer and enjoy it, but by the second or third beer, I typically do not like how I feel, so I avoid drinking the second beer. I also remember the dehydration and other symptoms of a hangover, which keep me from being productive the following day. As for food, both gaining weight and the feeling of having eaten too much are unpleasant. One feels lethargic and tired, and one can’t think clearly when one overeats.

Another example of deferred gratification for me was when I decided to finish my college education. I had no social life, was very poor, ate Ramen noodles frequently, and had to work temp jobs on the side to make ends sort-of meet. It was a difficult time at the tail-end of a period of under-employment, but I had set a goal: I wanted to finish what I started years ago. With great pride, I graduated Magna Cum Laude (one of the highest honors). I had chosen a minor in Communication, which led to my book Tending the Epicurean Garden being published. I also started publishing essays in various outlets, all of which had been part of my goal.

Metrodorus of Lampsacus, the co-founder of Epicureanism, often reminded his companions that for the sake of certain goods we have to take certain risks and go through certain difficulties. He was always referring all moral problems to the process of hedonic calculus and to the related process of deferred gratification. He accentuated health and friendship as two goods for the sake of which we go to great lengths and make many sacrifices, because without them we suffer greatly. If we lose a friend or loved one, we suffer, so we may put up with discomforts to help them from time to time. If we lose our health, we suffer, so we may make dietary changes or exercise in order to preserve our health.

Hedonic calculus is the reason why Epicureanism is a hedonism with an asterisk, a qualified hedonism. It’s confusing to call it a hedonist ethics without elaborating on the concept of hedonic calculus and deferred gratification. So if someone ever asks you for a short introduction to Epicurean ethics, do not say it’s “just hedonism”: say it’s a pleasure ethics that calls for a calculated, rational pursuit of pleasure, using hedonic calculus and deferred gratification whenever prudent. If asked about hedonic calculus, you may cite PD 8 and the relevant portion of the Epistle to Menoeceus, or simply explain that it’s a calculation of pleasures versus pains, and/or of advantages versus disadvantages in order to carry out our choices and avoidances successfully (=producing net pleasure).

PD 5: The Four Sisters and the Checks and Balances of Epicurean Ethics

The following essay is a continuation of our essay on PDs 24 and 28

Further Reading: Parable of the Hunter

It is not possible to live pleasantly without also living wisely and well and rightly, nor to live wisely and well and rightly without living pleasantly; and whoever lacks this cannot live pleasantly. – Principal Doctrine 5

The above Doctrine offers us a test to help us separate true Epicureans from other hedonists and from other philosophers.

The words used are φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως (phronimos kaj kalos kaj dikaios). Phronimos / phronesis is usually translated as Prudence, sometimes as practical wisdom. Kalos is sometimes translated as “well”, or as “noble”. Dikaios translates as “just”, sometimes as “right”. These ingredientes are all needed to live pleasantly according to Epicurean doctrine. For this reason, in order to encourage the memorization and paraphrase of this doctrine, I like to imagine this as the doctrine of the “Four Sisters” who must walk together with the true Epicurean: Iustitia (or any other personification of Justice), Prudentia (who could be personified by Athena / Minerva), Nobility, and Hedone (which I associate with Venus Urania, the patroness of the Garden). Imagining these “Four Sisters” “walking with” the genuine Epicurean is a way to memorize, visualize, or to imagine this Doctrine. In my attempts to create a visual of the Three of the Four Sisters, I was unable to find Minerva and Venus with Iustitia or Themis or Metis, but I found more than one depiction of them with Juno, so I used her instead. Upon thinking about this, Juno is perfect for this, as she is the goddess of marriage, which is one of the most universal types of contract.

Prudentia carries the preconception of “providentia” and of planning ahead of time, and therefore is needed for hedonic calculus. Minerva is an intellectual deity, and in fact her name shares semantic roots with the word “Mind”.

Minerva

Minerva, Goddess of philosophy and strategy

PD 5 clearly states that pleasure is not enough. This is due to the instructions in the Letter to Menoeceus to carry out hedonic calculus, which requires prudence (phronesis, or practical wisdom, which is required for living wisely) to help us discern which pleasures/pains to choose/avoid. That’s simple enough: we need Pleasure and Prudence, but why is Justice here?

The PD’s say A LOT more on Justice. For instance, in PD 17, we find the diagnosis of perturbation for the unrighteous. Righteous, law-abiding people who fulfil their terms of the social contract enjoy ataraxia (ὁ δίκαιος ἀταρακτότατος), but if people are unjust, they experience great perturbation or disquietude (ὁ δʼ ἄδικος πλείστης ταραχῆς γήμων). The key words here are ataraktotatos (which relates to tranquility, a-taraxia, the state of non-perturbation), and taraxes (perturbation). Here’s an instance where the PD’s emit a judgment that constitutes a diagnosis (a perturbation), that exposes a problem for treatment.

The just person enjoys the greatest peace of mind, while the unjust is full of the utmost disquietude. – Principal Doctrine 17

PD 17 and PD 5 taken together mean that these diseases of the soul (perturbations) tied to people’s unjust character must be treated and healed PRIOR TO being able to advance in philosophy.

One metaphor for how justice FEELS in one’s soul is the Kemetic (Ancient Egyptian) metaphor of the heart being weighed in the balance. If it’s lighter than a feather, then the dead may pass on to the afterlife. If the heart is too heavy, it does not pass. We do not believe in the afterlife, but this metaphor of light-heartedness as justice naturally appeals to any materialist. After all, weren’t the Epicureans known as “laughing philosophers”. Vatican Saying 41 makes it clear that laughter and light-heartedness is an Epicurean virtue, and the association of the feather of Ma’at (righteousness) with lightening up seems to indicate a relationship between justice and light-heartedness. Even Nietzsche said that if there IS a devil, it’s the “spirit of gravity”.

It is impossible for the person who secretly violates any article of the social compact to feel confident that he will remain undiscovered, even if he has already escaped ten thousand times; for right on to the end of his life he is never sure he will not be detected. – Principal Doctrine 35

Concerning Justice, we also find in PD 35 an appeal to a person’s sense of shame and apprehension at the possibility of being caught doing something that goes against the social contract. This doctrine could be called the “doctrine of the stigma”, because it discourages injustice based on an appeal to shame and fear of being detected, and based on the fear of the results of this. Another reason why we need PD 5 is that since the stigma of guilt is experienced as a perturbation, it keeps us from living blissful lives.

There are many scenarios that we can think about where either justice or prudence is lacking, and so the life of pleasure is not complete and can not be labeled Epicurean. These exercises of putting before our eyes various hypothetical scenarios, or thinking back to real ones we’ve encountered, may help to demonstrate what the founders were thinking about and discussing when they established Principal Doctrine 5.

The most common modern scenario for understanding PDs 5, 17, and 35, in my opinion, has to do with wage workers who fail to fulfil their side of the labor contract. Employers may experience this as fear of litigation, or of losing their best workers if they fail to uphold their side of the bargain. Working for wages is probably the most common type of contractarian relation in the modern world, one which most people get to experience at some point. We can imagine a worker who fails to perform his contractual duties, or is always late for work, or somehow does not deliver the services or goods he is bound to produce, or breaks important rules concerning harassment or other ethics rules of their job. If a person does this, they will be worried about losing their job. If they do not enjoy self-sufficiency, this worry may consume them. If they are self-sufficient and their job is only a source of extra income, the perturbation from their sense of guilt will be minor. So what this PD is saying is that an Epicurean must have Justice on his side, that he must avoid having to constantly worry about being caught breaking the terms of a covenant. He does this by fulfilling its terms, as he will not be able to live pleasantly if he constantly worries about possibly losing his job.

Of course, the other side of PD 17 is that the righteous experience ataraxia. Thanks to their innocence, they get to enjoy the pleasure of their sense of decency and peace of mind. This wholesome, healthy state is a positive value that most people who are just probably take for granted. If a worker or employer goes above and beyond their call of duty based on their contractual terms with each other, and learns to love the virtue of responsibility and hard work, they will experience a pleasant, edifying sense of pride, of decency, and of good character. Those of us who are immersed in wage slavery know too well the “Friday night” feeling, the sense of accomplishment and entitlement that comes with being a good worker.

Why else might Justice be a requirement for the Epicurean life, according to PD 5? One possible additional hypothesis is that this may have been a way for the founders to protect disciples from unwholesome association: if someone is incapable of fulfilling their part of the social contract, or of abiding by the law, then their not “walking with Justice” is supposed to exclude them from being seen as properly Epicurean. They will need to work on that prior to advancing in philosophy, and other Epicureans will appropriately be wary of the extent of their association with someone who is likely to break the terms of the social contract.

For this reason, I call PD 35 the “doctrine of the stigma”: it not only warns the perpetrator of the perturbations related to breaking oaths and being a social delinquent. It also warns the Epicurean friends (for whom the PD’s were authored) to be mindful of associating with oath-breakers. For this reason, I believe that PD 35 is a precursor to PD 39.

Further Reading:

Parable of the Hunter

Principal Doctrines 24 and 28 and the Utility of Conviction

In the days after the publication of this essay, it was announced that James Randi had died. Randi had been a champion of empirical thinking for most of his life, applying this Principal Doctrine (although he was not an Epicurean) to uncover frauds, magicians, and conmen. The Humanist featured an article in celebration of his legacy.

In our discussions of Epicurean philosophy, we sometimes come across people who claim to be Epicureans but fall short of clearly understanding and living many of the Principal Doctrines. As our recent discussions about Thomas Jefferson and his slavery practice demonstrate, there are and have always been bad or uninformed Epicureans out there, as well as arrogant ones who are set in their ways and whom Philodemus would’ve labeled “incurable”, as well as people who have their own intellectual and ideological commitments outside of EP, and we must judge their ideas by their connection to our sources as well as by their potential consequence–as Epicurus advised in his sermon against empty words, where Philodemus said:

Epicurus says that we think empirically concerning the actions based on the results observed from any course of action.

Concerning theories that do not seem to have empirical basis, they can be destroyed if they are false (whether rational or not), either if some other theoretical view based on it is false, or if when we establish a link with the action, this proves to be disadvantageous. If any of these things happen, it will be easy to conclude that theoretical arguments are false.

In the coming months, I will be delving into an in-depth study of various PD’s in order to help students to certify whether an opinion expressed in an online forum really represents an Epicurean doctrine or not. This will also constitute an invitation to a deeper study of the Principal Doctrines, as sometimes those who misrepresent EP will cite secondary, even hostile sources, but ignore the authoritative PD’s, of which Lucian of Samosata–writing in the Second Century of CE–had this to say:

The fellow had no conception of the blessings conferred by that book upon its readers, of the peace, tranquillity, and independence of mind it produces, of the protection it gives against terrors, phantoms, and marvels, vain hopes and inordinate desires, of the judgement and candour that it fosters, or of its true purging of the spirit, not with torches and squills and such rubbish, but with right reason, truth, and frankness.

The Principal Doctrines are the closest thing we have to an Epicurean Gospel. They’re the conclusions of very long conversations that led to authoritative declarations by the founders. As students (and in the absence of all the sources), we should try to imagine the discussions that took place PRIOR to the establishment of the doctrines, so that we may understand the ways in which they are coherent with the entire system. What led the founders to consider these truths to be so important, that they became a dogmatic School and set them up as the 40 authoritative doctrines?

There are two key doctrines I’d like to start with. Principal Doctrine 24 creates the taboo of separating that which awaits confirmation (the non-evident) from that which is clearly present (the evident). I use the word “taboo” because this doctrine includes a clear prohibition against mixing them up. Without this doctrine–which clearly establishes that this is an evidence-based philosophy based on the study of nature–, our dogmatism can not be justified.

If you reject a perception outright and do not distinguish between your opinion about what will happen after, what came before, your feelings, and all the layers of imagination involved in your thoughts, then you will throw your other perceptions into confusion because of your trifling opinions; as a result, you will reject the very criterion of truth. And if when forming concepts from your opinions you treat as confirmed everything that will happen and what you do not witness thereafter, then you will not avoid what is false, so that you will remove all argument and all judgment about what is and is not correct.Principal Doctrine 24

Notice here that “our feelings” (important as they are) are among the things that must be subjected to the checks and balances provided by the evidence of nature.

In Philodemus’ scroll On methods of inference we learn that it’s possible to infer about the non-evident based on the evident, but this applies only to phenomena that are considered similar enough to each other to warrant such inference by analogy. Outside of these (sometimes controversial) cases, the instructions here are to await confirmation (evidence) prior to issuing opinions or judgments. This Principal Doctrine is a precursor to modern scientific inquiry and the transgenerational human project of amassing useful knowledge by strict means of evidence.

So Principal Doctrine 24 is the doctrine of empirical reasoning (epilogismos) and of “awaiting confirmation”, and creates the taboo of separating the evident (that which is clearly present) from the non-evident (that which awaits confirmation). This doctrine justifies Epicurean dogmatism based on nature’s evidence. It is necessary to understand this doctrine prior to understanding PD 28:

The same judgment produces confidence that dreadful things are not everlasting, and that security amidst the limited number of dreadful things is most easily achieved through friendship. – Principal Doctrine 28

Here’s another translation:

The same conviction which inspires confidence that nothing we have to fear is eternal or even of long duration, also enables us to see that even in our limited conditions of life nothing enhances our security so much as friendship.

This doctrine is about friendship and about diminishing our existential fears, but it also specifically addresses our “convictions” or “judgments” as efficient means to acquire a confident expectation that leads to security–which is a mental pleasure, or perhaps at times an alleviation of mental anguish. This belief can be experienced as salvation if we’re ever on the verge of homelessness or danger and our friends come to the rescue, or it can simply create a stable sense of confidence.

Implicit in this doctrine is the view that certain beliefs or convictions are not only true, but are also efficient means to certain important and necessary pleasures. It’s not enough to have friends: one must also KNOW that they will be there in times of need. It’s not enough to have few desires: one must also KNOW, have a conviction, that we need few things to live pleasantly. It’s not enough to not fear death or chronic pain: we must KNOW that mental pleasure can be more potent than pain in the flesh and that death is not experienced by us. This is in line with Principal Doctrine 20, which says that the flesh does not know the limits established by nature for time, body and mind, while the mind can learn these limits, and so is in charge of securing our happiness.

And so dogmatism (the acceptance of certain premises which pass the test of the canon, and the taboo of separating the evident from the non-evident in PD 24) is a necessary feature of the practice of Epicurean ethics, and is necessary for us to abide in constant pleasures insofar as this is possible for mortals.

There’s this idea here that your beliefs should be carefully and empirically chosen, and also that your beliefs should do something for you, contribute to your happiness. Beliefs or doctrines can be tools that the mind uses to safeguard a life of pleasure. After all, the goal of an Epicurean ethical education is to give us confidence in our ability to live pleasantly, which is to say, to be happy.

I wanted to write this essay because I wanted to set a foundation for future exploration of the other Principal Doctrines, always coming back to these points. Peace and Safety!

Reply by Jordan:

Great article, Hiram. As always, I came away with a deeper understanding of EP, so thank you. One question: you write ‘It’s not enough to have few desires: one must also KNOW, have a conviction, that we need few things to live pleasantly.’ How do we, as comfortable Westerners, find out whether we really would be content with only natural and necessary goods? Are there any practices that might help give us a justified confidence that we could?

Reply by Hiram:

The Epicurean method is empirical so only by practicing living simply do we know these limits. If we have great comforts and have no memories to rely on of lacking our basic needs and still living pleasantly, we could diminish them temporarily, perhaps for a week, or once in a lifetime at least, or carry out other experiments, if we are devoted to the intellectual challenge of the Doctrines. Here is how Epicurus did it: he fasted from time to time.

 

 

Epicurus’ Epistle to Herodotus

Teachers of Epicureanism have always encouraged students to write down summaries of the doctrines for easy memorization, and outlines (often in the form of letters) were used widely as memory aids. Beginning-level Epicureans used to carry a Little Epitome with them, which was believed to be Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus. Once they assimilated the teachings of this epistle, which may have been a very short summary of Epicurus’ 37 books “On Nature”, they moved on to the Big Epitome where they were able to learn the advanced teachings.

The Epistle to Herodotus is a seminal work of natural philosophy and an important window into the history of early Western and scientific thought. It contains the earliest extant conversations between ancient atomists, and documents the progression of their arguments from the doctrine of atoms and void to their natural cosmology. It was preserved as part of Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Book Ten. In this translation, we have preserved the paragraph numbers used by most scholars for ease of reference.

Epicurus’ Epistle to Herodotus

35

“Epicurus to Herodotus, greeting.

On the importance of outlines and summaries

“For those who are unable to study carefully all my physical writings or to go into the longer treatises at all, I have myself prepared an epitome of the whole system, Herodotus, to preserve in the memory enough of the principal doctrines, to the end that on every occasion they may be able to aid themselves on the most important points, so far as they take up the study of Physics. Those who have made some advance in the survey of the entire system ought to fix in their minds under the principal headings an elementary outline of the whole treatment of the subject. For a comprehensive view is often required, the details but seldom.

36

“To the former, then – the main heads – we must continually return, and must memorize them so far as to get a valid conception of the facts, as well as the means of discovering all the details exactly when once the general outlines are rightly understood and remembered; since it is the privilege of the mature student to make a ready use of his conceptions by referring every one of them to elementary facts and simple terms. For it is impossible to gather up the results of continuous diligent study of the entirety of things, unless we can embrace in short formulas and hold in mind all that might have been accurately expressed even to the minutest detail.

37

“Hence, since such a course is of service to all who take up natural science, I, who devote to the subject my continuous energy and reap the calm enjoyment of a life like this, have prepared for you just such an epitome and manual of the doctrines as a whole.

Using the canon: anticipations, sensations, feelings

“In the first place, Herodotus, you must understand what it is that words denote, in order that by reference to this we may be in a position to test opinions, inquiries, or problems, so that our proofs may not run on untested ad infinitum, nor the terms we use be empty of meaning.

38

For the primary meaning of every term employed must be clearly seen, and ought to need no proving this being necessary, if we are to have something to which the point at issue or the problem or the opinion before us can be referred.

“Next, we must by all means stick to our sensations, that is, simply to the present impressions whether of the mind or of any criterion whatever, and similarly to our actual feelings, in order that we may have the means of determining that which needs confirmation and that which is obscure.

Nothing comes from nothing

“When this is clearly understood, it is time to consider generally things which are obscure. To begin with, nothing comes into being out of what is non-existent. For in that case anything would have arisen out of anything, standing as it would in no need of its proper germs.

39

And if that which disappears had been destroyed and become non-existent, everything would have perished, that into which the things were dissolved being non-existent. Moreover, the sum total of things was always such as it is now, and such it will ever remain. For there is nothing into which it can change. For outside the sum of things there is nothing which could enter into it and bring about the change.

Particles in space

“Further, the whole of being consists of bodies and space. For the existence of bodies is everywhere attested by sense itself, and it is upon sensation that reason must rely when it attempts to infer the unknown from the known.

40

And if there were no space (which we call also void and place and intangible nature), bodies would have nothing in which to be and through which to move, as they are plainly seen to move. Beyond bodies and space there is nothing which by mental apprehension or on its analogy we can conceive to exist. When we speak of bodies and space, both are regarded as wholes or separate things, not as the properties or accidents of separate things.

Bodies are either elementary or composite

“Again, of bodies some are composite, others the elements of which these composite bodies are made.

41

These elements are indivisible and unchangeable, and necessarily so, if things are not all to be destroyed and pass into non-existence, but are to be strong enough to endure when the composite bodies are broken up, because they possess a solid nature and are incapable of being anywhere or anyhow dissolved. It follows that the first beginnings must be indivisible, corporeal entities.

Universe is infinite

“Again, the sum of things is infinite. For what is finite has an extremity, and the extremity of anything is discerned only by comparison with something else. (Now the sum of things is not discerned by comparison with anything else: hence, since it has no extremity, it has no limit; and, since it has no limit, it must be unlimited or infinite.

“Moreover, the sum of things is unlimited both by reason of the multitude of the atoms and the extent of the void.

42

For if the void were infinite and bodies finite, the bodies would not have stayed anywhere but would have been dispersed in their course through the infinite void, not having any supports or counter-checks to send them back on their upward rebound. Again, if the void were finite, the infinity of bodies would not have anywhere to be.

Particles and primary elements have a limited variety of properties (1)

“Furthermore, the atoms, which have no void in them – out of which composite bodies arise and into which they are dissolved – vary indefinitely in their shapes; for so many varieties of things as we see could never have arisen out of a recurrence of a definite number of the same shapes. The like atoms of each shape are absolutely infinite; but the variety of shapes, though indefinitely large, is not absolutely infinite. [For neither does the divisibility go on “ad infinitum,” he says below; but he adds, since the qualities change, unless one is prepared to keep enlarging their magnitudes also simply “ad infinitum.”] (2)

Particles are always moving

“The atoms are in continual motion through all eternity.

43

[Further, he says below, that the atoms move with equal speed, since the void makes way for the lightest and heaviest alike.] Some of them rebound to a considerable distance from each other, while others merely oscillate in one place when they chance to have got entangled or to be enclosed by a mass of other atoms shaped for entangling.

44

“This is because each atom is separated from the rest by void, which is incapable of offering any resistance to the rebound; while it is the solidity of the atom which makes it rebound after a collision, however short the distance to which it rebounds, when it finds itself imprisoned in a mass of entangling atoms. Of all this there is no beginning, since both atoms and void exist from everlasting. [He says below that atoms have no quality at all except shape, size, and weight. But that colour varies with the arrangement of the atoms he states in his “Twelve Rudiments”; further, that they are not of any and every size; at any rate no atom has ever been seen by our sense.]

“The repetition at such length of all that we are now recalling to mind furnishes an adequate outline for our conception of the nature of things.

45

The doctrine of innumerable worlds

“Moreover, there is an infinite number of worlds, some like this world, others unlike it. For the atoms being infinite in number, as has just been proved, are borne ever further in their course. For the atoms out of which a world might arise, or by which a world might be formed, have not all been expended on one world or a finite number of worlds, whether like or unlike this one. Hence there will be nothing to hinder an infinity of worlds.

46

The nature of photons (films) and the speed of light

“Again, there are outlines or films, which are of the same shape as solid bodies, but of a thinness far exceeding that of any object that we see. For it is not impossible that there should be found in the surrounding air combinations of this kind, materials adapted for expressing the hollowness and thinness of surfaces, and effluxes preserving the same relative position and motion which they had in the solid objects from which they come. To these films we give the name of ‘images’ or ‘idols.’ Furthermore, so long as nothing comes in the way to offer resistance, motion through the void accomplishes any imaginable distance in an inconceivably short time. For resistance encountered is the equivalent of slowness, its absence the equivalent of speed.

47

“Not that, if we consider the minute times perceptible by reason alone, the moving body itself arrives at more than one place simultaneously (for this too is inconceivable), although in time perceptible to sense it does arrive simultaneously, however different the point of departure from that conceived by us. For if it changed its direction, that would be equivalent to its meeting with resistance, even if up to that point we allow nothing to impede the rate of its flight. This is an elementary fact which in itself is well worth bearing in mind. In the next place the exceeding thinness of the images is contradicted by none of the facts under our observation. Hence also their velocities are enormous, since they always find a void passage to fit them. Besides, their incessant effluence meets with no resistance, or very little, although many atoms, not to say an unlimited number, do at once encounter resistance.

48

“Besides this, remember that the production of the images is as quick as thought. For particles are continually streaming off from the surface of bodies, though no diminution of the bodies is observed, because other particles take their place. And those given off for a long time retain the position and arrangement which their atoms had when they formed part of the solid bodies, although occasionally they are thrown into confusion. Sometimes such films are formed very rapidly in the air, because they need not have any solid content; and there are other modes in which they may be formed. For there is nothing in all this which is contradicted by sensation, if we in some sort look at the clear evidence of sense, to which we should also refer the continuity of particles in the objects external to ourselves.

49

The objects we perceive are hitting our sensory receptors with particles

“We must also consider that it is by the entrance of something coming from external objects that we see their shapes and think of them. For external things would not stamp on us their own nature of colour and form through the medium of the air which is between them and us, or by means of rays of light or currents of any sort going from us to them, so well as by the entrance into our eyes or minds, to whichever their size is suitable, of certain films coming from the things themselves, these films or outlines being of the same colour and shape as the external things themselves. They move with rapid motion;

50

and this again explains why they present the appearance of the single continuous object, and retain the mutual interconnexion which they had in the object, when they impinge upon the sense, such impact being due to the oscillation of the atoms in the interior of the solid object from which they come. And whatever presentation we derive by direct contact, whether it be with the mind or with the sense-organs, be it shape that is presented or other properties, this shape as presented is the shape of the solid thing, and it is due either to a close coherence of the image as a whole or to a mere remnant of its parts. Falsehood and error always depend upon the intrusion of opinion (when a fact awaits) confirmation or the absence of contradiction, which fact is afterwards frequently not confirmed (or even contradicted) [following a certain movement in ourselves connected with, but distinct from, the mental picture presented – which is the cause of error.]

51

Various apprehensions of the same attestation produce checks and balances

“For the presentations which, e.g., are received in a picture or arise in dreams, or from any other form of apprehension by the mind or by the other criteria of truth, would never have resembled what we call the real and true things, had it not been for certain actual things of the kind with which we come in contact. Error would not have occurred, if we had not experienced some other movement in ourselves, conjoined with, but distinct from, the perception of what is presented. And from this movement, if it be not confirmed or be contradicted, falsehood results; while, if it be confirmed or not contradicted, truth results.

52

“And to this view we must closely adhere, if we are not to repudiate the criteria founded on the clear evidence of the senses, nor again to throw all these things into confusion by maintaining falsehood as if it were truth.

The nature of sound

“Again, hearing takes place when a current passes from the object, whether person or thing, which emits voice or sound or noise, or produces the sensation of hearing in any way whatever. This current is broken up into homogeneous particles, which at the same time preserve a certain mutual connexion and a distinctive unity extending to the object which emitted them, and thus, for the most part, cause the perception in that case or, if not, merely indicate the presence of the external object.

53

For without the transmission from the object of a certain interconnexion of the parts no such sensation could arise. Therefore we must not suppose that the air itself is moulded into shape by the voice emitted or something similar; for it is very far from being the case that the air is acted upon by it in this way. The blow which is struck in us when we utter a sound causes such a displacement of the particles as serves to produce a current resembling breath, and this displacement gives rise to the sensation of hearing.

On the material nature of smells

“Again, we must believe that smelling, like hearing, would produce no sensation, were there not particles conveyed from the object which are of the proper sort for exciting the organ of smelling, some of one sort, some of another, some exciting it confusedly and strangely, others quietly and agreeably.

54

The properties of particles are different from those of the bodies they compose

“Moreover, we must hold that the atoms in fact possess none of the qualities belonging to things which come under our observation, except shape, weight, and size, and the properties necessarily conjoined with shape. For every quality changes, but the atoms do not change, since, when the composite bodies are dissolved, there must needs be a permanent something, solid and indissoluble, left behind, which makes change possible: not changes into or from the non-existent, but often through differences of arrangement, and sometimes through additions and subtractions of the atoms. Hence these somethings capable of being diversely arranged must be indestructible, exempt from change, but possessed each of its own distinctive mass and configuration. This must remain.

55

Some properties (3) are inherent, others accidental

“For in the case of changes of configuration within our experience the figure is supposed to be inherent when other qualities are stripped off, but the qualities are not supposed, like the shape which is left behind, to inhere in the subject of change, but to vanish altogether from the body. Thus, then, what is left behind is sufficient to account for the differences in composite bodies, since something at least must necessarily be left remaining and be immune from annihilation.

Particles vary in size

“Again, you should not suppose that the atoms have any and every size, lest you be contradicted by facts; but differences of size must be admitted; for this addition renders the facts of feeling and sensation easier of explanation.

56

But to attribute any and every magnitude to the atoms does not help to explain the differences of quality in things; moreover, in that case atoms large enough to be seen ought to have reached us, which is never observed to occur; nor can we conceive how its occurrence should be possible, i.e. that an atom should become visible.

Bodies can not be divided infinitely, or else they would be of infinite size

“Besides, you must not suppose that there are parts unlimited in number, be they ever so small, in any finite body. Hence not only must we reject as impossible subdivision ad infinitum into smaller and smaller parts, lest we make all things too weak and, in our conceptions of the aggregates, be driven to pulverize the things that exist, i.e. the atoms, and annihilate them; but in dealing with finite things we must also reject as impossible the progression ad infinitum by less and less increments.

57

“For when once we have said that an infinite number of particles, however small, are contained in anything, it is not possible to conceive how it could any longer be limited or finite in size. For clearly our infinite number of particles must have some size; and then, of whatever size they were, the aggregate they made would be infinite. And, in the next place, since what is finite has an extremity which is distinguishable, even if it is not by itself observable, it is not possible to avoid thinking of another such extremity next to this. Nor can we help thinking that in this way, by proceeding forward from one to the next in order, it is possible by such a progression to arrive in thought at infinity.

58

We may infer about the minimal particles by observing the bodies they compose

“We must consider the minimum perceptible by sense as not corresponding to that which is capable of being traversed, i.e. is extended, nor again as utterly unlike it, but as having something in common with the things capable of being traversed, though it is without distinction of parts. But when from the illusion created by this common property we think we shall distinguish something in the minimum, one part on one side and another part on the other side, it must be another minimum equal to the first which catches our eye. In fact, we see these minima one after another, beginning with the first, and not as occupying the same space; nor do we see them touch one another’s parts with their parts, but we see that by virtue of their own peculiar character (i.e. as being unit indivisibles) they afford a means of measuring magnitudes: there are more of them, if the magnitude measured is greater; fewer of them, if the magnitude measured is less.

59

“We must recognize that this analogy also holds of the minimum in the atom; it is only in minuteness that it differs from that which is observed by sense, but it follows the same analogy. On the analogy of things within our experience we have declared that the atom has magnitude; and this, small as it is, we have merely reproduced on a larger scale. And further, the least and simplest things must be regarded as extremities of lengths, furnishing from themselves as units the means of measuring lengths, whether greater or less, the mental vision being employed, since direct observation is impossible. For the community which exists between them and the unchangeable parts (i.e. the minimal parts of area or surface) is sufficient to justify the conclusion so far as this goes. But it is not possible that these minima of the atom should group themselves together through the possession of motion.

60

Doctrine of relativity: an infinite cosmos has no center, only an infinite number of points of reference

“Further, we must not assert ‘up’ or ‘down’ of that which is unlimited, as if there were a zenith or nadir. As to the space overhead, however, if it be possible to draw a line to infinity from the point where we stand, we know that never will this space – or, for that matter, the space below the supposed standpoint if produced to infinity – appear to us to be at the same time ‘up’ and ‘down’ with reference to the same point; for this is inconceivable. Hence it is possible to assume one direction of motion, which we conceive as extending upwards ad infinitum, and another downwards, even if it should happen ten thousand times that what moves from us to the spaces above our heads reaches the feet of those above us, or that which moves downwards from us the heads of those below us. None the less is it true that the whole of the motion in the respective cases is conceived as extending in opposite directions ad infinitum.

61

Particles in space travel at great speed unless they meet resistance

“When they are travelling through the void and meet with no resistance, the atoms must move with equal speed. Neither will heavy atoms travel more quickly than small and light ones, so long as nothing meets them, nor will small atoms travel more quickly than large ones, provided they always find a passage suitable to their size, and provided also that they meet with no obstruction. Nor will their upward or their lateral motion, which is due to collisions, nor again their downward motion, due to weight, affect their velocity. As long as either motion obtains, it must continue, quick as the speed of thought, provided there is no obstruction, whether due to external collision or to the atoms’ own weight counteracting the force of the blow.

62

We can not infer about particles an identical behavior as composite bodies

“Moreover, when we come to deal with composite bodies, one of them will travel faster than another, although their atoms have equal speed. This is because the atoms in the aggregates are travelling in one direction during the shortest continuous time, albeit they move in different directions in times so short as to be appreciable only by the reason, but frequently collide until the continuity of their motion is appreciated by sense. For the assumption that beyond the range of direct observation even the minute times conceivable by reason will present continuity of motion is not true in the case before us. Our canon is that direct observation by sense and direct apprehension by the mind are alone invariably true.

63

On the nature of the mortal soul

“Next, keeping in view our perceptions and feelings (for so shall we have the surest grounds for belief), we must recognize generally that the soul is a corporeal thing, composed of fine particles, dispersed all over the frame, most nearly resembling wind with an admixture of heat, in some respects like wind, in others like heat. But, again, there is the third part which exceeds the other two in the fineness of its particles and thereby keeps in closer touch with the rest of the frame. And this is shown by the mental faculties and feelings, by the ease with which the mind moves, and by thoughts, and by all those things the loss of which causes death. Further, we must keep in mind that soul has the greatest share in causing sensation.

64

Still, it would not have had sensation, had it not been somehow confined within the rest of the frame. But the rest of the frame, though it provides this indispensable condition for the soul, itself also has a share, derived from the soul, of the said quality; and yet does not possess all the qualities of soul. Hence on the departure of the soul it loses sentience. For it had not this power in itself; but something else, congenital with the body, supplied it to body: which other thing, through the potentiality actualized in it by means of motion, at once acquired for itself a quality of sentience, and, in virtue of the neighbourhood and interconnexion between them, imparted it (as I said) to the body also.

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“Hence, so long as the soul is in the body, it never loses sentience through the removal of some other part. The containing sheath may be dislocated in whole or in part, and portions of the soul may thereby be lost; yet in spite of this the soul, if it manage to survive, will have sentience. But the rest of the frame, whether the whole of it survives or only a part, no longer has sensation, when once those atoms have departed, which, however few in number, are required to constitute the nature of soul. Moreover, when the whole frame is broken up, the soul is scattered and has no longer the same powers as before, nor the same motions; hence it does not possess sentience either.

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“For we cannot think of it as sentient, except it be in this composite whole and moving with these movements; nor can we so think of it when the sheaths which enclose and surround it are not the same as those in which the soul is now located and in which it performs these movements.

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“There is the further point to be considered, what the incorporeal can be, if, I mean, according to current usage the term is applied to what can be conceived as self-existent. But it is impossible to conceive anything that is incorporeal as self-existent except empty space. And empty space cannot itself either act or be acted upon, but simply allows a body to move through it. Hence those who call soul incorporeal speak foolishly. For if it were so, it could neither act nor be acted upon. But, as it is, both these properties, you see, plainly belong to soul.

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“If, then, we bring all these arguments concerning soul to the criterion of our feelings and perceptions, and if we keep in mind the proposition stated at the outset, we shall see that the subject has been adequately comprehended in outline: which will enable us to determine the details with accuracy and confidence.

“Moreover, shapes and colours, magnitudes and weights, and in short all those qualities which are predicated of body, in so far as they are perpetual properties either of all bodies or of visible bodies, are knowable by sensation of these very properties: these, I say, must not be supposed to exist independently by themselves (for that is inconceivable),

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nor yet to be non-existent, nor to be some other and incorporeal entities cleaving to body, nor again to be parts of body. We must consider the whole body in a general way to derive its permanent nature from all of them, though it is not, as it were, formed by grouping them together in the same way as when from the particles themselves a larger aggregate is made up, whether these particles be primary or any magnitudes whatsoever less than the particular whole. All these qualities, I repeat, merely give the body its own permanent nature. They all have their own characteristic modes of being perceived and distinguished, but always along with the whole body in which they inhere and never in separation from it; and it is in virtue of this complete conception of the body as a whole that it is so designated.

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Accidental properties of bodies

“Again, qualities often attach to bodies without being permanent concomitants. They are not to be classed among invisible entities nor are they incorporeal. Hence, using the term ‘accidents’ in the commonest sense, we say plainly that ‘accidents’ have not the nature of the whole thing to which they belong, and to which, conceiving it as a whole, we give the name of body, nor that of the permanent properties without which body cannot be thought of. And in virtue of certain peculiar modes of apprehension into which the complete body always enters, each of them can be called an accident.

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But only as often as they are seen actually to belong to it, since such accidents are not perpetual concomitants. There is no need to banish from reality this clear evidence that the accident has not the nature of that whole – by us called body – to which it belongs, nor of the permanent properties which accompany the whole. Nor, on the other hand, must we suppose the accident to have independent existence (for this is just as inconceivable in the case of accidents as in that of the permanent properties); but, as is manifest, they should all be regarded as accidents, not as permanent concomitants, of bodies, nor yet as having the rank of independent existence. Rather they are seen to be exactly as and what sensation itself makes them individually claim to be.

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Time is relative and accidental

“There is another thing which we must consider carefully. We must not investigate time as we do the other accidents which we investigate in a subject, namely, by referring them to the preconceptions envisaged in our minds; but we must take into account the plain fact itself, in virtue of which we speak of time as long or short, linking to it in intimate connexion this attribute of duration. We need not adopt any fresh terms as preferable, but should employ the usual expressions about it. Nor need we predicate anything else of time, as if this something else contained the same essence as is contained in the proper meaning of the word ‘time’ (for this also is done by some). We must chiefly reflect upon that to which we attach this peculiar character of time, and by which we measure it.

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No further proof is required: we have only to reflect that we attach the attribute of time to days and nights and their parts, and likewise to states of movement and states of rest, conceiving a peculiar accident of these to be this very characteristic which we express by the word ‘time.’

Bodies are ever emerging, changing, and dissolving

“After the foregoing we have next to consider that the worlds and every finite aggregate which bears a strong resemblance to things we commonly see have arisen out of the infinite. For all these, whether small or great, have been separated off from special conglomerations of atoms; and all things are again dissolved, some faster, some slower, some through the action of one set of causes, others through the action of another.

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On the diversity of planets

“And further, we must not suppose that the worlds have necessarily one and the same shape. [On the contrary, in the twelfth book “On Nature” he himself says that the shapes of the worlds differ, some being spherical, some oval, others again of shapes different from these. They do not, however, admit of every shape. Nor are they living beings which have been separated from the infinite.] For nobody can prove that in one sort of world there might not be contained, whereas in another sort of world there could not possibly be, the seeds out of which animals and plants arise and all the rest of the things we see. [And the same holds good for their nurture in a world after they have arisen. And so too we must think it happens upon the earth also.]

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Nature learns skills, reason and culture perfect them

“Again, we must suppose that nature too has been taught and forced to learn many various lessons by the facts themselves, that reason subsequently develops what it has thus received and makes fresh discoveries, among some tribes more quickly, among others more slowly, the progress thus made being at certain times and seasons greater, at others less.

Origin of language

“Hence even the names of things were not originally due to convention, but in the several tribes under the impulse of special feelings and special presentations of sense primitive man uttered special cries. The air thus emitted was moulded by their individual feelings or sense-presentations, and differently according to the difference of the regions which the tribes inhabited.

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Subsequently whole tribes adopted their own special names, in order that their communications might be less ambiguous to each other and more briefly expressed. And as for things not visible, so far as those who were conscious of them tried to introduce any such notion, they put in circulation certain names for them, either sounds which they were instinctively compelled to utter or which they selected by reason on analogy according to the most general cause there can be for expressing oneself in such a way.

Planets or stars are not gods or moved by gods; they move by their own nature

“Nay more: we are bound to believe that in the sky revolutions, solstices, eclipses, risings and settings, and the like, take place without the ministration or command, either now or in the future, of any being who at the same time enjoys perfect bliss along with immortality.

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For troubles and anxieties and feelings of anger and partiality do not accord with bliss, but always imply weakness and fear and dependence upon one’s neighbours. Nor, again, must we hold that things which are no more than globular masses of fire, being at the same time endowed with bliss, assume these motions at will. Nay, in every term we use we must hold fast to all the majesty which attaches to such notions as bliss and immortality, lest the terms should generate opinions inconsistent with this majesty. Otherwise such inconsistency will of itself suffice to produce the worst disturbance in our minds. Hence, where we find phenomena invariably recurring, the invariableness of the recurrence must be ascribed to the original interception and conglomeration of atoms whereby the world was formed.

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Science protects us from superstition (4)

“Further, we must hold that to arrive at accurate knowledge of the cause of things of most moment is the business of natural science, and that happiness depends on this (viz. on the knowledge of celestial and atmospheric phenomena), and upon knowing what the heavenly bodies really are, and any kindred facts contributing to exact knowledge in this respect.

Polyvalent logic so long as superstitions are discarded

“Further, we must recognize on such points as this no plurality of causes or contingency, but must hold that nothing suggestive of conflict or disquiet is compatible with an immortal and blessed nature. And the mind can grasp the absolute truth of this.

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On the limited usefulness of science for our happiness (5)

“But when we come to subjects for special inquiry, there is nothing in the knowledge of risings and settings and solstices and eclipses and all kindred subjects that contributes to our happiness; but those who are well-informed about such matters and yet are ignorant what the heavenly bodies really are, and what are the most important causes of phenomena, feel quite as much fear as those who have no such special information – nay, perhaps even greater fear, when the curiosity excited by this additional knowledge cannot find a solution or understand the subordination of these phenomena to the highest causes.

“Hence, if we discover more than one cause that may account for solstices, settings and risings, eclipses and the like, as we did also in particular matters of detail, we must not suppose that our treatment of these matters fails of accuracy, so far as it is needful to ensure our tranquillity and happiness.

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Infer about the non-evident and heavenly phenomena based on the evident

When, therefore, we investigate the causes of celestial and atmospheric phenomena, as of all that is unknown, we must take into account the variety of ways in which analogous occurrences happen within our experience; while as for those who do not recognize the difference between what is or comes about from a single cause and that which may be the effect of any one of several causes, overlooking the fact that the objects are only seen at a distance, and are moreover ignorant of the conditions that render, or do not render, peace of mind impossible – all such persons we must treat with contempt. If then we think that an event could happen in one or other particular way out of several, we shall be as tranquil when we recognize that it actually comes about in more ways than one as if we knew that it happens in this particular way.

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Heavenly bodies are not sentient

“There is yet one more point to seize, namely, that the greatest anxiety of the human mind arises through the belief that the heavenly bodies are blessed and indestructible, and that at the same time they have volitions and actions and causality inconsistent with this belief; and through expecting or apprehending some everlasting evil, either because of the myths, or because we are in dread of the mere insensibility of death, as if it had to do with us; and through being reduced to this state not by conviction but by a certain irrational perversity, so that, if men do not set bounds to their terror, they endure as much or even more intense anxiety than the man whose views on these matters are quite vague.

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But mental tranquillity means being released from all these troubles and cherishing a continual remembrance of the highest and most important truths.

“Hence we must attend to present feelings and sense perceptions, whether those of mankind in general or those peculiar to the individual, and also attend to all the clear evidence available, as given by each of the standards of truth. For by studying them we shall rightly trace to its cause and banish the source of disturbance and dread, accounting for celestial phenomena and for all other things which from time to time befall us and cause the utmost alarm to the rest of mankind.

Conclusion

“Here then, Herodotus, you have the chief doctrines of Physics in the form of a summary. So that,

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if this statement be accurately retained and take effect, a man will, I make no doubt, be incomparably better equipped than his fellows, even if he should never go into all the exact details. For he will clear up for himself many of the points which I have worked out in detail in my complete exposition; and the summary itself, if borne in mind, will be of constant service to him.

“It is of such a sort that those who are already tolerably, or even perfectly, well acquainted with the details can, by analysis of what they know into such elementary perceptions as these, best prosecute their researches in physical science as a whole; while those, on the other hand, who are not altogether entitled to rank as mature students can in silent fashion and as quick as thought run over the doctrines most important for their peace of mind.”

Such is his epistle on Physics.

Notes:

  1. We know that particles have a limited variety of properties because we observe in nature that different elements behave differently at different temperatures and in different circumstances, but this variety follows certain laws and never violates them.
  2. Diogenes Laertius left commentary as part of his report, based on his investigations.
  3. The ancient Greek word “atomos” means not-cuttable. The modern atomic theory does not neatly correspond with the original preconception of the atom. The modern English word for ancient Greek atoms is “particles”, sometimes rendered as “elementary particles”.
  4. Aphrodite Urania was the patroness Goddess of the Epicureans. Urania was also the name of the Muse of astronomy, which likely explains why Epicureans derived such great mental pleasure from the study of nature and from astronomy.
  5. Some enemies of Epicurus have accused him of being against learning and scholarship because he seems to limit the utility of science to how much pleasure it can add and how much pain, or superstitious fear, it can remove. But Epicurus had a clear understanding of the different goals of philosophy and of science. Raw scientific data can not replace or abolish the role of ethics. Ethics must coexist with scientific data, and guide its utility.