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Ĉefaj Doktrinoj

1. Sankta kaj nedetruebla estaĵo ne havas malfacilaĵojn nek kreas problemojn por aliaj estaĵoj; do ĝi liberas je kolero kaj partieco, tio implikas malforton.

2. Morto estas nenio al ni; ĉar tio, kio estis solvita en ties elementoj ne spertas sentojn, kaj tio kio ne havas sentojn estas nenio al ni.

3. La grando de plezuro atingas sian limon kiam ĉia doloro estas forigita. Kiam tia plezuro ĉeestas, kiam ajn sen interrompo, neniu doloro ekzistas korpe aŭ mense.

4. Kontinua korpa doloro ne daŭras longe. Kontraŭe, doloro, se ekstrema, daŭras mallongan tempon, kaj eĉ tia nivelo de doloro kiu surkreskas ete la korpan plezuron ne daŭras multajn tagojn. La longtempaj malsanoj permesas troon de korpa plezuro super doloro.

5. Estas neeble vivi agrablan vivon sen vivi saĝe, honore kaj juste, kaj estas neeble vivi saĝe, noble kaj juste sen vivi agrable. Kiam ajn unu el tiuj mankas–ekzemple, se homo ne povas vivi saĝe kvankam li vivas noble aŭ juste–, estas neeble vivi agrablan vivon.

6. Ajna metodo serĉata por protekti sin de aliaj homoj, estas natura bonaĵo.

7. Kelkaj homoj volas famon kaj rangon, pensante ke tiel ili sekuriĝos kontraŭ aliaj homoj. Se la vivo de tiaj homoj vere sekuras, ili akiris naturan bonaĵon. Tamen, se ĝi ne sekuras, ili ne akiris la celon ke la naturo mem origine faris ilin serĉi.

8. Neniu plezuro estas malbona afero en si mem, sed aferoj produktitaj de iaj plezuroj enhavas tumultojn multfoje pligrandajn ol la plezuroj mem.

9. Se ĉia plezuro estus amasigebla, ne nur tratempe sed tra la tuta korpo aŭ almenaŭ tra la plej gravaj partoj de nia naturo, tiam la plezuroj neniam diferencus inter ili.

10. Se la aferoj kiuj plezurigas la homojn senregajn vere liberigus ilin el la mensaj timoj pri la ĉielaj kaj atmosferaj fenomenoj, la timo de morto kaj la timo de doloro; ja, se plue ili instruus al tiuj homoj pri kiel limigi siajn dezirojn, ni neniam devus trovi erarojn en tiaj homoj, ĉar ili tiam estus plezurplenaj el ĉiu fonto kaj neniam havus doloron korpan aŭ mensan, kiu estas la malbonaĵoj.

11. Se ni neniam ĝeniĝus pri la ĉielaj kaj atmosferaj fenomenoj, nek pri’l timo de morto aŭ pri nia nescio de’l limoj de doloroj kaj deziroj, ni ne bezonus sciencon naturan.

12. Estas neeble forigi la timojn pri la plej gravaj aferoj se oni ne konas la naturon de’l aĵoj, sed ankoraŭ donas ian krediton al la mitoj. Do sen studi la naturon ne ekzistas ĝuo de’l pura plezuro.

13. Ne ekzistas avantaĝo en akiri protekton kontraŭ aliaj homoj dum ni alarmiĝas pri la okazaĵoj sub kaj sur la tero, aŭ ĝenerale per ia ajn okazaĵo en la senfina universo.

14. La protekto kontraŭ aliaj homoj, atingitaj iagrade per la povo forpeli kaj per materiala prospero, en ĝia plej pura formo devenas el trankvila vivo for de la homamaso.

15. La riĉeco nature bezonata estas limigita kaj facile havebla; sed la riĉeco volata per vantaj idealoj etendas senfine.

16. Sorto malofte sin intermetas kun la saĝulo; liaj plej grandaj kaj plej altaj interesoj estis, estas kaj estos direktitaj per la rezono dum sia tuta vivo.

17. La justulo estas la plej senĝena, dum la maljustulo esta la plej ĝenplena.

18. La korpa plezuro ne pliiĝas kiam oni forigas mankodoloron; poste ĝi nur subtenas variadon. La limo de la mensplezuro tamen atingeblas kiam oni pripensas tiajn korpajn plezurojn kaj siajn rilatajn emociojn, kiuj kutimis kaŭzi al la menso la plej egajn alarmojn.

19. La tempoj limigita kaj senlima ambaŭ donas egalan kvanton de plezuro, se oni mezuras la limojn de’l plezuro rezone.

20. La karno ricevas kiel senlimaj la limojn de’l plezuro; kaj por ilin postuli oni bezonas senliman tempon. Sed la menso, komprenante la celon kaj limon de la karno, kaj forigante la terurojn pri’l estonteco, havendas kompletan kaj perfektan vivon, kaj oni ne plu bezonas senliman tempon. Tamen, la menso ne rifuzas la plezuron, kaj eĉ kiam cirkonstancoj faras la morton tuja, la menso ne mankas ĝuon de’l plejbonvivo.

21. Tiu kiu komprenas la limojn de’l vivo scias ke estas facile atingi kion forigas la mankodoloron, kaj kompletigas kaj perfektigas la tutan vivon. Tiel oni ne plu necesas l’aĵojn kiuj postulas lukton.

22. Ni devas konsideri la finfinan celon kaj repacigi ĉiujn niajn opiniojn kun la klara sensa evidenteco; alie ĉio estos plena je necerteco kaj konfuzo.

23. Se oni luktas kontraŭ siaj sentoj, oni ne havas normon al kiu rilati, kaj do neniel povas juĝi eĉ tion, kion asertas esti falsa.

24. Se oni malakceptas ajnan percepton sen halti por distingi inter siaj opinioj sur tio, kio jam estis konfirmita kiel ĉeestanta ĉu en emocioj aŭ sentoj aŭ ajna alia apliko de’l intelekto al la prezentoj, oni konfuzas la reston de siaj perceptoj kaŭze de opinioj sen fundamento kaj malakceptas ĉian normon de vero. Se oni rapide konkludas, ke estas konfirmataj la ideoj bazataj je opinio, ĉu oni atendas konfirmon aŭ ne, oni eraros, ĉar oni daŭrigos ĉian kialon por dubo en ĉia juĝo inter la prava kaj malprava opinioj.

25. Se oni ne ĉiam rilatas ĉiajn siajn agojn al la finfina celo establita de’l naturo, sed en siaj decidoj kaj nefaroj elektas alian celon, siaj agoj ne estos konsekvencaj kun siaj teorioj.

26. Ĉiuj deziroj kiuj ne kondukas al doloro kiam ili restas nesataj estas nenecesaj, sed la deziro estas facile forigebla kiam la afero dezirata estas malfacile akirebla aŭ kiam la deziroj ŝajnas kunporti la eblon damaĝi.

27. El ĉiuj rimedoj kiujn akiras la saĝeco por feliĉon certe havi tra la vivo, senkompare la plej grava estas la amikeco.

28. La sama konvinko kiu inspiras konfidon, ke nenio timenda estas eterna aŭ eĉ longdaŭra, ankaŭ montras al ni, ke el la limigitaj malbonoj de tiu ĉi vivo, nenio pli sekurigas nin ol la amikeco.

29. El niaj deziroj, kelkaj estas naturaj kaj necesaj, aliaj estas naturaj sed nenecesaj; kaj aliaj estas nek naturaj nek necesaj, sed estas pro senbazaj opinioj.

30. Tiaj naturaj deziroj kiuj alportas neniun doloron se oni ne satigas ilin, malgraŭ esti serĉataj intenspene, ankaŭ kaŭzatas pro senbazaj opinioj; kaj homoj malsukcesas forigi ilin, ne pernature sed per la opinioj senbazaj de’l homamasoj.

31. Natura justeco estas reciproke utila interkonsento por eviti ke oni estu damaĝata aŭ ke oni damaĝu la aliajn.

32. Tiuj estaĵoj kiuj estas nekapablaj fari interkonsentojn kun aliaj por ne kaŭzi suferadon nek vundiĝi konas nek justecon nek maljustecon; kaj la sama por tiuj kiuj estis nekapablaj aŭ nevolaj eniri en ĉi tiujn interkonsentojn.

33. Neniam ekzistis ia absoluta justeco, nur reciprokaj interkonsentoj inter homoj de malsamaj lokoj kaj tempoj kiuj evitis esti damaĝataj aŭ damaĝi la aliajn.

34. Maljusteco ne estas malbono en si mem, sed nur en konsekvenco de la timo asociita kun esti eltrovota per administrantoj por puni tiajn agojn.

35. Estas neeble por homo kiu sekrete malobservas la kondiĉojn de interkonsento ne damaĝi aŭ esti damaĝitaj, ke li sentu certecon ke li restos neeltrovota, eĉ se li jam eskapis dekmil fojojn; sed eĉ ĝis sia morto oni neniam certiĝos ke oni ne estos detektata.

36. Ĝenerale, la justeco estas la sama por ĉiuj, ĉar ĝi estas bazita sur reciproka avantaĝo en homaj aferoj, sed en sia apliko al apartaj lokoj aŭ cirkonstancoj, la justeco ne nepre estas la sama por ĉiuj.

37. Inter la aĵoj kiujn la leĝo konsideras justaj, ĉio kio estas pruvita avantaĝa en la homaferoj havas la stampon de justeco, ĉu tio estas la sama por ĉiuj; sed se homo faras leĝon kaj ne pruvas ke ĝi reciproke profitas, ĝi ne plu estas justa. Kaj se tio, kio reciproke avantaĝas, varias kaj nur mallonge samas al nia koncepto de justeco, tamen dum tiu tempo estas justa laŭ tiuj kiuj ne sin koncernas kun malplenaj vortoj sed nur rigardas la faktojn.

38. Kie, sen ekzisti ŝanĝo de cirkonstancoj, aperas ke aferoj konsideritaj justaj per la leĝo ne samas al la koncepto de justeco en praktiko, tie tiaj leĝoj ne vere justas; sed kie ajn la leĝoj ĉesis esti avantaĝaj pro ŝanĝo de cirkonstancoj, tiukaze la leĝoj estis justaj dum la tempo ke ili estis reciproke utilaj por la civitanoj, kaj ĉesis esti justaj kiam ili ne plu estis avantaĝaj.

39. La homo kiu plej bone scias alfronti eksterajn minacojn faras familion el ĉiu ajn kiun li eblas familiigi; kaj tiuj, kiuj oni ne povas unuigi al si, oni tamen ne ilin havu kiel fremduloj; kaj kiam oni trovas ke eĉ tio neeblas, oni evitu ĉian kontakton kun ili, kaj dum la tempo kiam tio avantaĝos, ekskludas ilin el sia vivo.

40. Tiuj kiuj havas la povon defendi sin kontraŭ minacoj de siaj najbaroj, havante la plej certan garantion de sekureco, vivas la plej agrablan vivon unu kun aliaj; kaj tia estas sia ĝuo kompleta de intimeco, ke se unu el ili mortas antaŭtempe, la aliaj ne lamentos sian morton kvazaŭ tio postulus domaĝon.

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Cosma Raimondi: The Rebirth of Epicurean Fervor

In a letter written in 1429, Cosma Raimondi–a native of Cremona in Lombardy, Italy who later migrated to France to teach–was one of the early Renaissance humanists who defended Epicurus against the Stoics, Platonists, and Aristotelians in an early epistolary treatise in defense of Epicurus and of virtuous pleasure. His letter–a translation of which is available from New Epicurean–and the fervor with which it was written, stand out as symptoms of the dawn of the Enlightenment. It’s titled A Letter to Ambrogio Tignosi in Defence of Epicurus against the Stoics, Academics and Peripatetics, and it was intended for an apostate who had at one point been Epicurean but had abandoned the Epicurean camp.

This indicates that they belonged to a circle of friends in the Italy of the early 15th Century that had an intellectually rich life and, in fact, he was a pupil of the well-known humanist teacher Gasparino Barzizza.

It is not just a dispute between ourselves, for all the ancient philosophers, principally the three sects of Academics, Stoics and Aristotelians, declared war to the death against this one man who was the master of them all. Their onslaught sought to leave no place for him in philosophy and to declare all his opinions invalid in my view, because they were envious at seeing so many more pupils taking themselves to the school of Epicurus than to their own.

Immediately, one feature stands out which reminds us of Jefferson’s epistle to William Short: his fervor for the doctrine. Jefferson refers to Epicurus as his Master and to himself as a pupil, and a true and passionate one who must defend the Master. In Jefferson’s letter, we find the author arguing in favor of the true, not the imputed teachings of Epicurus.

Cosma begins his arguments by ridiculing the Stoic view that virtue is the source of human happiness, and that even if a man is being tortured by the cruellest butchers, that he can still be happy.  The author calls this view absurd and dismisses it as obviously and self-evidently false.

How again could you be further from any sort of happiness than to lack all or most of the things that themselves make up happiness? The Stoics think that someone who is starving and lame and afflicted with all the other disadvantages of health or external circumstances is nonetheless in a state of perfect felicity as long as he can display his virtue.

He then goes on to question the neglect of the flesh, of the body, which goes along with the rejection of pleasure and the exaltation of virtue, as problematic.

Why do they consider only the mind and neglect the body, when the body houses the mind and is the other half of what man is?

And in the same way that the body is not to be thought healthy when some part of it is sick, so man himself cannot be thought happy if he is suffering in some part of himself. As for their assigning happiness to the mind alone on the grounds that it is in some sense the master and ruler of mans body, it is quite absurd to disregard the body when the mind itself often depends on the state and condition the body and indeed can do nothing without it. Should we not deride someone we saw sitting on a throne and calling himself a king when he had no courtiers or servants? Should we think someone a fine prince whose servants were slovenly and misshapen?

The Stoics’ lack of concern for bodily integrity, which comes adorned with an air of fortitude and nobility, constitutes to a great extent lack of compassion on the one hand, and on the other hand it produces, in its practical effects, indifference towards injustices and evils that may be committed against innocent persons. Together with the arbitrary and unqualified elevation of apathy and resignation to the status of virtues, this leads to a lifestyle that impedes the addressing of grievances and is in huge contrast with the approach that we see in Philodemus’ scroll On Anger, which calls for the compassionate treatment of anger and indignation as a source of insight and as an excuse for reformation and change.

By requiring the silence and consent of our emotions, Stoicism holds its victims hostage to fate even when things might be done to address grievances and to challenge evil, dangerous and harmful paradigms. Without finding useful and pragmatic outlets for anger, there would have been no civil rights movement, no Stonewall riots, no possibility of redemption from injustices.

The rationalizing of dangerous, cruel and irrelevant so-called moral views divorced from the study of nature also produces a kind of alienation from nature. Or perhaps this rationalizing is produced by alienation? Cosma makes the observation:

I find it surprising that these clever Stoics did not remember when investigating the subject that they themselves were men. Their conclusions came not from what human nature demanded but from what they could contrive in argument.

Cosma then visits all the senses and comments on how they like to dwell on the sensory objects that are aesthetically pleasing. He takes a moment to notice the self-evident truths of hedonistic naturalism. He does not rationalize these pleasures, or link them to theories such as natural selection. He also does not deny mental pleasures, in fact he includes them in his contemplation. He then concludes:

Epicurus was right, then, to call pleasure the supreme good, since we are so constituted as almost to seem designed for that purpose. We also have a certain inherent mental disposition to seek and attain pleasure: as far as we can, we try to be happy and not sad.

Cosma also makes indirect mention of the doctrine of confident expectation, which indicates that we derive ataraxia not only from friends, philosophy, and other pleasures, but from the confident expectation that our friends will be there if we need them, that the necessary and natural goods are easy to attain, etc. This, together with his indication that virtue derives its value from the pleasure it brings, indicates the author’s deep insight into Epicurean ethics.

If virtue brings no pleasure or delight, why should we want it or make much of it? But if it does, why not concede that the greatest of all goods what should seek above all is that for the sake of which virtue itself is desirable

Since Epicurus does not suppose that life should be lived without virtue, I do not think he leads the life of animals. So he is not to be shunned like some traitor who would overthrow or pervert human society. He does not corrupt public morals; his whole doctrine is instead directed at making us as happy as we can be.

The epistle closes with an invitation to return back to the philosophy that Ambrogio had once, like Cosma, embraced and defended, and with a regretful declaration that, due to limited time, he was unable to cover more points.

Further Reading:

A Letter to Ambrogio Tignosi in Defence of Epicurus against the Stoics, Academics and Peripatetics, translated by Martin Davies

Review of The Book of Community

The following five reasonings comprise, together, a long and in-depth review of The Book of Community, by the collective of bloggers known as Los Indianos.

The members of Las Indias make up a coop whose communal experiments have been inspired, in part, by Epicurus’ Garden, and who have written in the past about Epicurean philosophy. In my exchanges with them, many new insights have emerged that expand our understanding of key Epicurean concepts.

One of the most fruitful conversations has been the natural community discourse, which differentiates between Platonic, imagined communities versus real, inter-subjective and interpersonal communities. This distinction is much more crucial than we may initially think. Indianos argue against involvement in politics based on the view that it replaces natural community with Platonic, imagined identities that do not necessarily constitute real communal life, real conversation and interaction. They even argue that Epicurean cosmopolitanism was a reaction again the citizen identity conferred by the polis–city-state–and that the early Gardens constituted communal experiments timidly suggestive of the ideals of statelessness. While reading the book, further insights emerged on the subject of natural community. Here is a quote from the review:

The Book of Community, among other things, expands on a conversation that inspired me to blog about natural community based on some of the insights that the Indianos have shared on their blog … Indianos interestingly cite how in 1993, Robin Dunbar published a study that predicted “the maximum size of a human group” to be 147.8. This is known as the Dunbar number, interpreted as “the cognitive limit in the number of individuals with whom any person can maintain stable relationships“. This seems to not only vindicate the doctrine on natural community which was initially formulated as a result of my exchange with the Indianos, but also attaches a specific number of individuals to the size of a natural community.

In the book, they explain in detail the lathe biosas teaching on why political involvement is bad for organic communities because manufactured narratives tend to compete with communal ones, they call for the use of ceremony in order to strengthen community, they celebrate autarchy and criticize the narrative of the “common good”. Please enjoy the five-part series of articles on community.

Part I: Book Review
Part II: Community Vs. Polis
Part III: Ceremony
Part IV: On Productive Autonomy
Part V: Learning in Community

Further Reading:

The Book of Community: A practical guide to working and living in community

English translation of Las Indias’ Review of Tending the Epicurean Garden

The Epicurean Wise Man

Epicurus, on the qualities of a Wise Man, as cited by Diogenes Laertius in Lives of Eminent Philosophers

Before quoting his words, however, let me go into the views of Epicurus himself and his school concerning the wise man.

There are three motives to injurious acts among men–hatred, envy, and contempt ; and these the wise man overcomes by reason. Moreover, he who has once become wise never more assumes the opposite habit, not even in semblance, if he can help it. He will be more susceptible of emotion than other men : that will be no hindrance to his wisdom. However, not every bodily constitution nor every nationality would permit a man to become wise.

[118] Even on the rack the wise man is happy. He alone will feel gratitude towards friends, present and absent alike, and show it by word and deed. When on the rack, however, he will give vent to cries and groans. As regards women he will submit to the restrictions imposed by the law, as Diogenes says in his epitome of Epicurus’ ethical doctrines. Nor will he punish his servants ; rather he will pity them and make allowance on occasion for those who are of good character. The Epicureans do not suffer the wise man to fall in love ; nor will he trouble himself about funeral rites; according to them love does not come by divine inspiration : so Diogenes in his twelfth book. The wise man will not make fine speeches. No one was ever the better for sexual indulgence, and it is well if he be not the worse.

[119] Nor, again, will the wise man marry and rear a family : so Epicurus says in the Problems and in the De Natura. Occasionally he may marry owing to special circumstances in his life. Some too will turn aside from their purpose. Nor will he drivel, when drunken : so Epicurus says in the Symposium. Nor will he take part in politics, as is stated in the first book On Life ; nor will he make himself a tyrant ; nor will he turn Cynic (so the second book On Life tells us) ; nor will he be a mendicant. But even when he has lost his sight, he will not withdraw himself from life : this is stated in the same book. The wise man will also feel grief, according to Diogenes in the fifth book of his Epilecta. And he will take a suit into court. [120] He will leave written words behind him, but will not compose panegyric. He will have regard to his property and to the future.

He will be fond of the country. He will be armed against fortune and will never give up a friend. He will pay just so much regard to his reputation as not to be looked down upon. He will take more delight than other men in state festivals.

The wise man will set up votive images. Whether he is well off or not will be matter of indifference to him. Only the wise man will be able to converse correctly about music and poetry, without however actually writing poems himself. One wise man does not move more wisely than another. And he will make money, but only by his wisdom, if he should be in poverty, and he will pay court to a king, if need be. He will be grateful to anyone when he is corrected. He will found a school, but not in such a manner as to draw the crowd after him ; and will give readings in public, but only by request. He will be a dogmatist but not a mere sceptic ; and he will be like himself even when asleep. And he will on occasion die for a friend.

The school holds that sins are not all equal ; that health is in some cases a good, in others a thing indifferent ; that courage is not a natural gift but comes from calculation of expediency ; and that friendship is prompted by our needs. One of the friends, however, must make the first advances (just as we have to cast seed into the earth), but it is maintained by a partnership in the enjoyment of life’s pleasures.

[121] Two sorts of happiness can be conceived, the one the highest possible, such as the gods enjoy, which cannot be augmented, the other admitting addition and subtraction of pleasures.

Reasonings About Polystratus’ On Irrational Contempt

Polystratus was the third Scholarch of the Epicurean Garden in Athens. He was the first one to guide the community of Friends after the four founders had died, and it’s believed that he had met Epicurus and studied under him when he was only a boy and Epicurus a very old man.

Only fragments of two of his writings remain. Here, we are concerned only with his work On Irrational Contempt, which is a polemic directed “against those who irrationally despise popular beliefs.” The work is a diatribe against the Cynics, or the Skeptics, or both. Polystratus’ adversaries appear to be full of insolence. As in the case of Colotes, Polystratus also argues that the philosophies of the other schools are impractical, cannot be used without doing harm to oneself, and that they do not practice what they preach.

Comparison with other animals

The work begins by saying that the animals can not learn from their mistakes and can not find the causes of things. Today we know that this is not true in all cases: apes and dolphins are so smart that some scientists consider them non-human persons.

Polystratus also denies that animals dream, but we know that dogs dream, and he says that animals do not believe in gods and have no powers of reasoning like us. This seems to be an important premise of the work. Later we will see why this is important, when Polystratus discusses the relative qualities of things. He seems to be arguing that belief in gods is a human quality, a natural product of the human psychological experience.

The Need to Study Nature and its Purpose

A large portion of the work is devoted to this topic. The Scholarch argues that we cannot free ourselves from irrational fears only by dialectical means, that we need evidence-based reasoning, and that only the study of nature can help us understand the gods. This argument is still valid even if for most of us, the conclusion that we come to when we study nature is that the gods do not exist.

Polystratus insists that we must clearly understand the purpose of the study of nature and of philosophy. Some say that we just need to find health only, and not pleasure or the study of nature, but then fall into superstition and its fears. Truth dispels all concerns and truths do not contradict each other. The Scholarch continues with more warnings against the charismatic rhetors, many of which could be applied to modern religious preachers:

Those who want to dedicate themselves to the study of nature must not continue to follow those who make them afraid and those who, not worrying about the truth or about agreeing with what they themselves have already proven, practice irony while neglecting their own opinion to please the audience around them; but should pronounce on every issue freely and practice a consistent and true philosophy, so that they can bring the work of true philosophy to its point of perfection without haste, with full awareness. You will recognize even more clearly the truth of what I say if you examine what other philosophers say … (lacuna 10 lines) …

Take heed of their own purposes, as some draw conclusions especially through syllogisms and axioms, which they themselves do not use or follow during their lives, and like others, to please their attending audiences or to confuse them In order to get approval from and seduce the crowd, they develop a colorful verbiage that achieves nothing for them nor for their audience, to improve them or to provide them a better life … (lacuna 5 lines) … as they have gotten rid of the teachings that are consistent with the purposes that our very nature seeks.

Without the latter, in fact, all other things have the status of artifice; what concerns us is actually improving our life, it is that thanks to which, free from that passions that affect thinking, we progress towards serenity and to a kind of life free of sadness and according to our nature. And this is a result that is only obtained, as I already said, by the proper study of nature guided by those who have examined what is the nature of all things, as well as the power that is in her to produce consequences meet her or foreign to her, and guided by those who have observed which desires are natural and which are not …

In any case, the fact that even virtuous actions often have no advantage because, in the cases mentioned above, men show too much arrogance or fall back without reason into superstitious fears, and because in other actions in life they make many mistakes of every kind, so that no one really exhibits virtue. We, in turn, committed to follow pleasure, will witness in our favor that our affairs are carried out with more ease in the circumstances within which hitherto we had exhibited pain.

This last paragraph specifically speaks against those who seek virtue without studying nature and reminds us of the prevalence among the religious of degrading superstitions and of arrogant self-righteousness. This is futile and destroys virtue. The point that the Scholarch is arguing is that virtue, piety and faith are worthless without the study of the nature of things. A scientific understanding of reality is necessary to live a pleasant and healthy life.

In the book A Few Days in Athens we find the Masters insisting that “many worship Virtue but few stop to evaluate the pedestal on which she stands.” This pedestal is pleasure. That is, it is extremely important to understand why virtues are virtues: because they are means to pleasure, not ends in themselves. If a virtue does not increase happiness or remove suffering it can not be called a virtue.

Polystratus argues this point, saying that those who look to Virtue without a specific goal, not based on the study of nature, fall into superstition and abandon virtue, some falling into great torment. Again, this applies to religious people who reject science.

The Beautiful and the Ugly, the Pleasant and the Unpleasant

The skeptics argued that the noble (to kalon) and the base (to aiskhron) are culturally conditioned and therefore not objectively real; that there is no good and evil that can be discerned in nature. As elsewhere in philosophical discourse, there is tension between nomos (law, custom) and physis (nature).

Pyrrho’s powerful argument seems to appeal to materialist doctrine. If objective reality is made up of atoms and void, then good and evil, to exist, would have to be similarly made up of atoms and void and would be evident and there would be no disagreement with regards to what these things are in the diverse cultures.

The argument given by his opponents is that bronze, gold, and other metals are universally recognize for what they are by their own nature, independently of culture.

The example given here (apparently, so opponents) is the bronze, gold and other metals are universally recognized for what they are independent of culture being what they are by nature, not by convention.

Polystratus argues that this is a false analogy: the beautiful and the ugly are as real as bronze, except that they exist in a different way and the comparison is not valid. It is here that he proposes that things have inherent or innate properties, and relative or dispositional properties–tendencies exhibited by things in relation to other things. The beautiful and the ugly belong to the latter category, as well as the pleasant and unpleasant (aesthetic and ethical categories).

The beautiful and the ugly, like the pleasant and the unpleasant, are not the same for all creatures. Opponents say that men make an error when they seek this and fail to seek that, as if that which is desirable should be the same for all. Health, belief and corruption and their opposites are different for each according to their effects, their relative qualities. The Scholarch argues that

either all the things that make these effects are false

or there is no need to reject the beautiful and the ugly as if they were false opinions because they are not identical for all, as is gold or stone.

One example given by the Scholarch deals with the various curative properties of a single drug, all of which are effective and real. If we suffer from one disease, the drug will treat the symptoms of that one disease. If we suffer from another disease, it will treat the other disease, but it’s the same conventional drug which has different relational effects.

Drugs work for some diseases but not for others or for those who are healthy. It is useless for everyone to act the same at all times. One must act according to one’s own nature and to circumstances and particular accidents.

A magnet may only attract metal and not cement, but it remains a magnet insofar as it attracts metal. Notice that this relational property of a magnet is as observable, as measurable, and as real as conventional properties.

Therefore, we must not grant the same rank to relative categories that we give to innate categories. One can not say that one exists and the other does not, or that one and the other have the same properties.

We can come up with many other examples of relative qualities. Peanuts can be nourishing or deadly (to some who are allergic), but they’re not inherently deadly: this is a relational property, not a conventional property. Colors and flavors are relational properties: we only see the color of an object when light reflects against it.

Rotten meat is good for vultures and lions who have the enzymes to digest it, but bad for humans who do not and may die after eating a carcass.

The Evils Produced by False Doctrines

In fact no one could, in a valid way, submit all the difficulties in life that these doctrines cause to a detailed rational examination in order to understand, all the while giving attention to the passions and events, how unfortunate it is to demonstrate an irrational boldness, to fall into all these misfortunes, and to also live slavishly following the opinions transmitted at random; to be the victim of the many difficulties and desires they engender, constantly devoting oneself to the many diverse activities and harmful practices that arise from them. All the while, one’s aspirations multiply irrationally–because one is unhappy in reality and remorseful–and also one is in charge of numerous concerns over others.

It so happens that the same people who spend their lives driven by storms or exposed to fearful suspicions, never account for the true benefit and joy of life. Instead, expelled early from life after many futile sufferings always born of vain hopes and never fully confirmed, they consequently accumulate over their heads yet other evils, for reason of their inability to distinctly recognize the end which our very nature aims for, and the means by which this end is naturally attained. Because ignorance of these things is the first cause of all evil.

Strive then to distance yourself from the adversities of which I have spoken. On the contrary, giving yourself account of all things, as has been said, in a manner adapted to life and affections.

The above quote reminds us of the selfless lives of misery and supposedly selfless abnegation lived by the likes of Mother Theresa, of whom it was revealed after she died that she was tormented her entire faith with doubts about her faith, and that she aimed to be close to human suffering rather than to remove the suffering. A full exposé of Mother Theresa, which demonstrates Polystratus’ point that virtue is worthless without the study of nature, but goes much further, was done by Christopher Hitchens in his book Missionary Position.

Conclusion

The view defended by Polystratus–according to which the pleasant and the unpleasant exist and are really observable in nature–is known as moral realism, or natural realism, and some modern thinkers like Sam Harris have made it their life’s mission to prove that morality exists in nature just as Polystratus did in his day.

In addition to arguing in favor of hedonist realism, Polystratus denounces the evils that arise when we do not align our moral judgements with the evidence presented by nature before us. Therefore, he argues that it is impossible or difficult to be truly moral without studying nature.

The Scholarch’s hedonist realism insists firmly that pleasure is the end established by nature, and that all the true virtues lead to it. We must reiterate the importance of the following passage:

Their inability to distinctly recognize the end which our very nature aims for, and the means by which this end is naturally attained … ignorance of these things is the first cause of all evil.

By not setting pleasure as the natural goal, many philosophers and religious ethical thinkers have elaborated artificial ideologies that, in the end, generate vast amounts of suffering. They dismiss pleasure and run after the dictatorship of the proletariat, the free-market, the god of the desert, manliness or honor, willing to kill and commit abuses for the sake of their ideals which are arbitrary and divorced from the study of nature, which shows us that natural beings chase after pleasure and avoid pain. Therefore, naturalist philosophers should seek the most rational and healthiest means to attain pleasure and evade aversion.

We may forgive these ideologies for their harm by taking into account that they never promised a pleasant life. If we do not set this goal from the onset, how can we expect it as an end result?

When we do not base our views firmly on the study of nature, and when we do not have clear insight into how the good is the pleasant and the bad is the unpleasant in our direct, real and immediate experience, we end up serving ends other than the ends that nature has established for us as natural beings.

Naturalist moral realism is simple: as natural beings we can directly discern, with our faculties, both good and evil.

Read also:

Epicurus and Democritean Ethics: An Archaeology of Ataraxia, by James Warren

Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate,
edited by Lawrence Nolan

Very fragmentary transliteration of the Polystratus papyrus

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Epicurus the Sage Review

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The animated two-volume series Epicurus the Sage was created by writer Bill Messner-Loebs and artist Sam Keith, and published in 1989 by Piranha Press.

First, we must clarify that the series is fictional and characters from different centuries, as well as gods, are brought together in the same time and space.  Nonetheless, it constitutes a great introduction to philosophy for children (and adults) from a satirical, Epicurean perspective … except for the now-and-then rhetorical question being asked by a character: “anyone else smell sheepshit?”

Still, the sheepshit reference should be treated almost as a koan: raising children with critical thinking skills requires this kind of ability to openly question the givens in common conversation.

The creators of the series demonstrate a general familiarity with Epicurus’ perspectives and, although perhaps not intended as didactic material, the series does have some didactic value.  Through the use of mockery, it depicts the impracticality of Socratic reliance only on logic, the superstitious and fantastic worldview of Plato, the word-plays of the sophists, and how the gods behave in a manner that is all-too-human, even childish.

This last point is not articulated through the lips of the Epicurus character, but via the plot itself.  Through these dramatized critiques of other philosophies and beliefs, the Epicurean perspective on them and on the gods is eloquently articulated.

We also see Epicurus’ frequent, comical efforts to disassociate from Democritus, although he obviously had a debt of gratitude to his atomist teachings.

The series is available from amazon or ebay.

Epicurus the Sage Vol. 1 : Visiting Hades

Epicurus the Sage, Vol. 2: The Many Loves of Zeus
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Epicurean texts

Whereas other pursuits yield their fruit only to those who have practiced them to perfection, in the love and practice of wisdom knowledge is accompanied by delight; for here enjoying comes along with learning, not afterward.” – Epicurus, Vatican Saying 27

One of the issues faced by those interested in Epicureanism, as is the case with any other philosophical or spiritual tradition, is the amount of misinformation and misconceptions that we will encounter when we seek to learn more. The best way to avoid this trap is to consult the source material: the surviving writings of the Epicureans themselves. The overall goal of what follows is to give beginners and more advanced Epicurean aspirants free online access to the writings of the historical Epicureans.

There are 4 direct sources of Epicurean literature accessible to us:

  • The surviving letters and maxims of Epicurus (and other Kathegemones).
  • The De Rerum Natura of Lucretius
  • The Herculaneum Library mostly consisting of the writings of Philodemus
  • The wall inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda

To these sources we can add countless testimonies from antiquity whose reliability is of varying quality. We will divide this overview of Epicurean writings into two parts:

  1. The Pragmateia: the direct writings of the Epicureans
  2. Testimonies: indirect writings informing us of the Epicureans, their ideas and their lives from antiquity.

I. THE PRAGMATEIA

The Pragmateia (practices, applications) refers to the foundational writings of the ancient Epicureans, those of the Kathegemones, the four founders of the Epicurean school: Epicurus, Metrodorus, Hermarchus and Polyaenus. These writings were considered authoritative by generations of Epicureans and were read, studied and commented on for many centuries.

The term Pragmateia comes to us from Philodemus. Unfortunately almost all of these writings have been lost through the ages. For example, of the approximately 300 scrolls written by Epicurus, only three letters remain, as well as a certain amount of maxims and quotations from ancient authors. Even less remains from Metrodorus, Hermarchus and Polyaenus. Fortunately, thanks to the writings of Lucretius, the Herculaneum library and the wall inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda, we can reconstruct a new Pragmateia for those who want to live as Epicureans in the 21st century.

Letters and Maxims

Of the original Pragmateia, three letters survive; the Letter to Herodotus, the Letter to Pythocles and the Letter to Menoeceus. We also have the Kyria Doxai, the Principal Doctrines, which contain 40 maxims summing up Epicurean ethical philosophy. These writings are embedded in Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers of the 3rd century CE biographer Diogenes Laertius. The 10th book of this collection of biographical content, anecdotes and philosophical doctrines is dedicated to Epicurus.

The other direct work that survives from the original Pragmateia is the Epicurean Sayings, more commonly known as the Vatican Sayings because of the fact that it was discovered in a manuscript found in the Vatican Library. The Vatican sayings contain 81 quotes from Epicurus and other Epicureans founders such as Metrodorus, and some of them overlap with the Principal Doctrines. To this we can add Epicurus’ deathbed letter to Idomeneus and Epicurus’ final will, which is important in that it established Epicurean rituals, especially Eikas, the celebration of the Twentieth.

– Ethical writings

The Letter to Menoeceus is probably the easiest introduction to any aspiring Epicurean to the philosophy. It is a short summary of Epicurus’ ethical doctrines and gives a brief outline on the practices to follow in order to live a good life. It deals with subjects such as our attitude towards the divine, the fear of death, pleasure, choices and avoidances, the virtues, and many other topics.

Read Letter to Menoeceus

The next important ethical work is the Principal Doctrines. This list of 40 sayings gives us a general overview of Epicurean ethical doctrines and adds to the content of the Letter to Meoneceus with topics such as friendship, society and justice. It serves as a summary of Epicurus’ ethical system.

Read Principal Doctrines

The founder of the Society of Friends of Epicurus, Hiram Crespo, put together a helpful study guide to the Principal Doctrines here.

Finally we have the Vatican Sayings, which can be seen as complementing the Principal Doctrines with wisdom teachings covering various topics.

Read Vatican Sayings

It is strongly recommended that a student of Epicurean philosophy read these main teachings over and over again. Ideally, Epicurus wanted his followers to learn the content by heart. The more you read their content, which seems simple at first, the more you will discover new layers of meaning you haven’t seen before. And while it is important to also read and study the other Epicurean writings, these are the ones you want to keep returning to and keep close to your heart.

– Letters on Physics

Two letters on Epicurean physics, in other words Epicurus’ view of the universe, have been preserved. While the content of these letters may seem dry and outdated to the modern reader, it is important to keep in mind the purpose of Epicurean scientific inquiry: learn about the world around us to better overcome our fears and understand our place in it. This is the foundation upon which we can confront fears caused by religion, superstition, our mortality, and more. By studying Epicurean physics, we can better grasp the ethics. Once we understand Epicurean physics, we can update many of the ideas: Epicurean theories of natural selection can be replaced by Darwin’s theory of evolution, ancient atomism can be replaced by the Standard Model of particle physics, old theories of the soul can be replaced by neuroscience, and so on.

The first and most important of these writings is the Letter to Herodotus, a general introduction and summary of Epicurean physics.

Read the Letter to Herodotus

The second writing is the Letter to Pythocles, which introduces us to the Method of Multiple Explanations, an Epicurean method which consists in accepting multiple hypotheses as possible when confronted with an unexplained phenomenon rather than settling on a single explanation.

Read the Letter to Pythocles

Society of Friends of Epicurus founder Hiram Crespo elaborates on the Method of Multiple Explanations here.

For the real nerds among us, watch scholar Voula Tsouna’s presentation on the subject here.

– Epicurus’ Legacy

On his deathbed, Epicurus wrote this letter to his friend Idomeneus:

On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could increase them; but I set above them all the gladness of mind at the memory of our past conversations. But I would have you, as becomes your lifelong attitude to me and to philosophy, watch over the children of Metrodorus.

In this letter we see Epicurus’ gratitude towards his friends but also his devotion towards his community, in this case the children of his dead friend Metrodorus.

The other important document preserved is Epicurus’ Last Will, which is relevant to us because it mentions ritual celebrations that would define the identity of the Epicurean community: the celebration of Epicurus’ birthday, funerary rituals for his family, a day dedicated to his brothers, another day dedicated to his friend Polyaenus and most importantly, the celebration on the 20th of every month dedicated to Epicurus and his best friend Metrodorus known as Eikas and practiced by many Epicureans today.

Read Epicurus’ Last Will

De Rerum Natura by Lucretius

Lucretius was a Roman Poet from the 1st century BCE and a follower of Epicurean philosophy. Almost nothing is known about his life other than the fact that he wrote the Latin poem of six parts in Homeric verse known as De Rerum Natura, On the Nature of Things. The reason for writing this text in poetic verse was to give an esthetic appeal to what could otherwise be a dry subject: Epicurean physics. The artistic value of the text led to it being preserved throughout the Medieval period and rediscovered during the Renaissance.

Even though De Rerum Natura focuses on ancient atomistic theories (and can complement Epicurus’ Letters to Herodotus and Pythocles), there are many references to existential and ethical topics such as free will, the fear of death, the blinding nature of love, lust for power, the simple life, the social contract, religion and much more.

There are multiple translations of Lucretius in English and many of the ones you will find online are very old and hard to read for a modern audience. For this reason we recommend these two modern translations here and here.

Also, we recommend you consult this helpful study guide of De Rerum Natura put together by Hiram Crespo here.

Philodemus and the Herculaneum Library

The Herculaneum library was discovered in the ruins of the ancient city of Herculaneum which had been destroyed by the eruption of Mt Vesuvius in 79 CE, the same disaster that devastated Pompeii. This library was part of a villa which belonged to Piso, the father-in-law of Julius Caesar, who was a patron of the 1st century BCE Epicurean philosopher Philodemus. The contents of the library, over 1,800 papyrus scrolls, were carbonized due to the heat of the eruption, which at the same time paradoxically preserved them, even if in poor condition and therefore hard to unroll and decipher. However, thanks to modern imaging technology, it has become easier to decipher and reconstruct much of the content of the scrolls, leading to new research and publication of Epicurean content which has revolutionized our understanding of Epicurean philosophy. Most of the surviving writings belong to the 1st century BCE philosopher Philodemus.

While it is impossible to find much of the writings of Philodemus online, Hiram Crespo wrote summaries of many of his surviving works.

Read the summaries of the Herculaneum Library

We also recommend this introduction to Philodemus and his ideas by scholar Sonya Wurster and an article she wrote about how the discovery of the Herculaneum Library changed our understanding of Epicurean philosophy.

Those who wish to explore further can read the following ethical works of Philodemus published by the Society of Biblical Literature: On Frank Criticism, On Death, On Property Management and On Anger. Published by Bibliopolis: On Choices and Avoidances and On Methods of Inference. Also consult The Ethics of Philodemus by scholar Voula Tsouna, published by Oxford University Press. You can read a review of this last book by Hiram Crespo here:

Diogenes of Oinoanda’s wall inscription

An Epicurean wall inscription was built by Diogenes of Oinoanda, a wealthy philanthropist from the city of Oinoanda, province of Lycia (today Turkey), then part of the Roman Empire. It is believed that the construction of the wall dates back to the 2nd century CE. On this wall, located in the portico of the ancient city, are engraved several Epicurean philosophical texts. While the fragments of these texts were fragmentary, much of its content has been reconstructed by the efforts of scholars.

Diogenes of Oinoanda’s wall inscription was published by Bibliopolis (under the titles The Epicurean Inscription and Supplement to Diogenes of Oinoanda The Epicurean Inscription), but is quite pricey. However, you can read a free online version here, and more recently discovered fragments of the wall inscription here.

Documentary dedicated to Diogenes’ Wall

II. TESTIMONIES

Other than the direct writings of Epicurus and his followers over many centuries, we have many ancient writers who were more or less sympathetic, hostile or neutral towards Epicureanism who provide us with valuable information on the philosophy and lives of the Epicureans. These testimonies exist in the form of direct and indirect quotes from Epicurus and members of his school, summaries and references to many of their ideas, biographies, letters, epitaphs, inscriptions and more. Much of this information must be approached with caution because they may come from hostile sources or lack context. However, if used correctly, these sources can help give us a more complete picture of the ideas and lives of those who followed the Epicurean tradition in antiquity and those who would like to live by these principles today.

Diogenes Laertius’ Life of Epicurus

Diogenes Laertius is a 3rd century CE biographer who wrote Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers. He was an admirer of Epicurus and dedicated the last book of his long sequence of biographies to Epicurus. While he is mostly credited with preserving Epicurus’ letters and Principal Doctrines, he also provides us with valuable biographical information on Epicurus and his followers.

Read the Life of Epicurus

Usener’s Epicurea

Hermann Usener was a 19th century German scholar who specialized in philology and comparative religion. Most relevant to us, he organized and published a compilation of ancient sources dedicated to Epicurus called Epicurea. While many of the quotes included are from hostile sources, there is also much useful content, including direct quotes from lost works of Epicurus.

Read an English translation of Epicurea here:

Cicero’s testimony

The 1st century BCE Roman statesman and philosopher Cicero was no friend of Epicureanism and is often very critical. However, his relationship with Epicureanism is very complex. He studied under Epicurean teachers and there were many Epicureans in his circle with whom he was on good terms, including his best friend Atticus. Some of his works include presentations of Epicurean philosophy that are valued by scholars and their content was informed by Epicurean works that are no longer available to us. While often unfair, he does give Epicureans a voice through characters in his philosophical dialogues.

  • The Epicurean character Torquatus discusses pleasure, virtue and friendship in De finibus bonorum et malorum, On Moral Ends. Read the passage here.
  • The Epicurean character Velleius discusses the gods in De Natura Deorum, On the Gods. Read the passage here.

Of historical interest, Cicero exchanges letters with the Roman politician Gaius Cassius Longinus, one of Caesar’s assassins, who was an Epicurean. They make references to Epicurus in some of the letters. Read the letters here.

Cornelius Nepos’ testimony

This biography is that of Cicero’s Epicurean friend, Atticus.
Read here.

Philodemus’ Epigrams

The Epicurean philosopher Philodemus wrote poetry, including short entertaining poems called Epigrams. While most of these poems have little to do with Epicureanism, some of them make references to the Epicurean celebration on the Twentieth of the month known as Eikas and discuss what the diner tables looked like during these events, which is of historical significance to us. Read Philodemus’ Epigrams here.

Seneca’s testimony

The Stoic philosopher and statesman Seneca describes a visit to his dying friend Aufidius Bassus, an Epicurean, in his Letters to Lucilius and they have a philosophical discussion on suffering and death. Read the letter here.

Empress Pompeia Plotina and priest Aurelius Belius Philippus

This article quotes and comments on an inscription by Empress Pompeia Plotina, wife of Emperor Trajan and supporter of his successor Hadrian, where she exchanges with the Epicurean community in Athens. She was an ally and possibly member of that community. Also quoted is a dedication honoring a priest of the Syrian god Bel, Aurelius Belius Philippus, who was also the leader of the local Epicurean community. Read the article here.

Learn more about Empress Plotina

Regarding Aurelius Belius Philippus, some of you might be wondering how an Epicurean can be a priest. Find out here.

Lucian of Samosata’s Alexander the Oracle Monger

The 2nd century CE comical writer Lucian of Samosata writes to his Epicurean friend Celsus and defends the Epicureans of his time against the religious grifter and fraud Alexander.

Read Alexander the Oracle Monger

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF FRIENDS OF EPICURUS