Category Archives: epicurus

Summary and Review of “The Compass of Pleasure”, a book that explores the neuroscience of pleasure

“Philosophers like the Epicureans, St. Augustine, and Nietzsche have tried to analyze and comprehend this elemental fact of our experience, but it is only recently that we have been able to study it empirically, thanks to remarkable advancements in neuroscience. In The Compass of Pleasure, David J. Linden, explains the recent research that has enabled us to understand how the brain’s pleasure circuits are engaged by our vices and, surprisingly, our virtues.”

– Dust jacket front blurb from The Compass of Pleasure: How Our Brains Make Fatty Foods, Orgasm, Exercise, Marijuana, Generosity, Vodka, Learning, and Gambling Feel So Good

I am coming up on approximately my first year since deciding to go deep into the study of Epicurean philosophy. In that time, I have learned a lot about the history of the development of pleasure ethics, from Plato’s Philebus, to Aristippus and the Cyrenaics, through to Epicurus’ more nuanced theory. However, I think that since we are living in the age of modern science, it could be useful for us to draw on the recent knowledge coming from the field of experimental neuroscience to inform and shape our understanding of pleasure ethics. It could be that modern science confirms, rejects, or at least further contextualizes the principles that were reasoned by the ancients but which could not be explored empirically until only recently. That thinking is what led to my review of this book.

The prologue to the book opens with an amusing story recounting a time when the author went travelling in Thailand. When he boarded one of the three-wheeled motorcycle taxis, the driver asked him essentially ‘what’s your pleasure?’, and proceeded to offer him a litany of contraband and illicit sexual opportunities. This triggered in his mind the question of why it is that we are such ‘dopamine fiends’, or why we go looking for pleasures of all varieties.

“We humans have a complicated and ambivalent relationship to pleasure, which we spend an enormous amount of time and resources pursuing. A key motivator of our lives, pleasure is central to learning, for we must find things like food, water, and sex rewarding in order to survive and pass our genetic material to the next generation. Certain forms of pleasure are accorded special status. Many of our most important rituals involving prayer, music, dance, and meditation produce a kind of transcendent pleasure that has become deeply ingrained in human cultural practice.”

Chapter 1: “Mashing the Pleasure Button”

This first chapter is an extended history lesson about past efforts to experiment (occasionally highly unethically by modern standards) with pleasure stimulation in animals and humans. He recounts the experiments by Hebb, Olds, and Milner starting in 1953, which involved implanting electrodes in the brains of rats and then sending electrical stimulation to specific brain regions when the rat pressed the lever. What they found was that the rats would over time become trained to seek the lever and be stimulated, and, dramatically, that the rats would furiously press the lever as many as thousands of times per hour to satisfy their fixation. They would choose the electrostimulation over food, over water, over sex, over parenting their offspring, to the point of death.

Eventually by 1972, these sorts of experiments were tried on humans, with the highly unethical goal of “bring[ing] about heterosexual behavior in a fixed, overt homosexual male.” The patient B-19 was hooked up with electrodes implanted directly at nine sites in his brain. When he was given the freedom to regulate his own stimulation, he would mash the button “like an eight-year-old playing Donkey Kong”. The author writes:

“This study is morally repugnant on many different levels — the profound arrogance of attempting to “correct” someone’s sexual orientation, the medical risk of unjustified brain surgery, the gross violations of privacy and human dignity. Fortunately, homosexual conversion therapy with brain surgery and pleasure center stimulation was soon abandoned.

Stepping back a bit, what we are left with, from this and a handful of other studies, is an appreciation of the immense power of direct electrical stimulation of the brain’s pleasure circuitry to influence human behavior, at least in the near term.”

He then gives an account of the underlying neuroscience of pleasure, which originates with signaling from neurons stemming from the ‘ventral tegmental area’ (VTA) in the brain. These electrical impulses move along the fibrous axons until they arrive at terminals. When they reach the terminals, the neurotransmitter dopamine is released from its stores in the terminal into the surrounding space, called the synaptic cleft. The dopamine then binds onto the target neuron’s dopamine receptors, and those which do not bind are then returned to the transmitting terminal in a process called ‘reuptake’ and are recycled for later use.

The molecules associated with certain drugs are able to prevent this reuptake process, which allows the stream of dopamine to cross the cleft more efficiently, and explains why these drugs are experienced as intensely euphoric and pleasurable. The author writes that the central insight of these diagrams is that:

“Experiences that cause the dopamine-containing neurons of the VTA to be active and thereby release dopamine in their targets (the nucleus accumbens, the prefrontal cortex, the dorsal striatum, and the amygdala) will be felt as pleasurable, and the sensory cues and actions that preceded and overlapped with those pleasurable experiences will be remembered and associated with positive feelings.”

These experiences remind me of what Epicurus refers to as kinetic pleasures, or the pleasures of variation and ‘motion’. Such pleasures include any of those that arise after some stimulus has impinged upon our senses, such as hearing a string quartet, licking an ice cream cone, petting a fluffy animal, gazing up at beautiful architecture, or smelling a lovely perfume. However, they are not limited to just those bodily pleasures that affect our senses, but also the mental pleasures such as remembering or anticipating pleasant experiences. These also have the power to trigger our dopamine response.

Chapter 2: “Stoned Again”

This chapter is about the different kinds of drugs and why we become addicted to them:

“All cultures use drugs that influence the brain. They range from mild stimulants like caffeine to drugs with potent euphoric effects, like morphine. Some carry a high risk of addition, some do not. Some alter perception, others mood, and some affect both. A few can kill when used to excess. The specific attitudes and laws relating to psychoactive drug use vary widely among cultures. . . “

He gives a number of historical and cross-cultural examples of drug use to illustrate his point. The first story used to illustrate the timelessness of human drug addiction is the (hitherto unknown to me but humorously surprising) case of the Stoic Emperor Marcus Aurelius’ addiction to opium:

“Perhaps it was easier to be a Stoic while stoned: The emperor was a notorious opium user, starting each day, even while on military campaigns, by downing a nubbin of the stuff dissolved in his morning cup of wine. Writings by Galen suggest that Marcus Aurelius was indeed an addict, and his accounts of the emperor’s brief periods without opium, as occurred during a campaign on the Danube, provide an accurate description of the symptoms of opiate withdrawal.”

Another interesting example of a drug used that is non-addictive and non-pleasure activating is DMT (or ayahuasca), administered in shamanic rituals by the tribes of the Amazon rainforest, which has the power to induce horrifying images in the mind (but with the therapeutic aim of overcoming these fears).

He distinguishes between those drugs that do light up our pleasure center in the brain and those that do not. As it turns out:

“Those psychoactive drugs that strongly activate the dopamine-using medial forebrain pleasure circuit (like heroin, cocaine, and amphetamines) are the very ones that carry a substantial risk of addiction, while the drugs that weakly activate the pleasure circuit (like alcohol and cannabis) carry a smaller risk of addiction. Drugs that don’t activate the pleasure circuit at all (like LSD, mescaline, benzodiazepines, and SSRI antidepressants) carry little or no risk of addition. This pleasure gradient also correlates strongly with the willingness of animals to work for these drugs.”

He also explains why only mildly-euphoric drugs like nicotine, taken in small but frequent doses, tend to be more addictive than infrequently used highly-euphoric drugs like injected heroin. It boils down to the user’s desire to achieve a comparable level of pleasure: since cigarettes are only mildly pleasant, it takes more of them to achieve a comparable dopamine hit, and the repetition of continuously exposing one’s brain to the stimulus creates dependency. He defines drug addiction as “persistent, compulsive drug use in the face of increasingly negative life consequences” and argues that addiction should be treated as a medical issue:

“When we say that addiction is a disease, aren’t we just letting addicts off the hook for their antisocial choices and behaviors? Not at all. A disease model of addiction holds that the development of addiction is not the addict’s responsibility. However, crucially, recovery from addiction is.”

From the Epicurean point of view, careful attention needs to be paid to the enjoyment of certain psychoactive drugs, and the information in this chapter is relevant to making prudent and informed decisions using the method of hedonic calculus. Additionally, we should look sympathetically towards those who are hooked on substances, because the path to recovery is arduous.

Chapter 3: “Feed Me”

This subject of this chapter is: ‘Why do we enjoy eating, how is eating regulated in the brain, and why do some people struggle with eating habits?’

The first task is to dispense with the myth of blood glucose as the primary trigger for the onset of feeding. The author says that “eating is biochemically induced only in cases of severe starvation,” and that under normal circumstances, there are other drivers of food regulation. This reminds me of a quote from Porphyry:

“Do not think it unnatural that when the flesh cries out for anything, the soul should cry out too. The cry of the flesh is, “Let me not hunger, or thirst, or shiver,” and it’s hard for the soul to restrain these desires. And while it is difficult for the soul to prevent these things, it is dangerous to neglect nature which daily proclaims self-sufficiency to the soul via the flesh which is intimately bonded to it.”

– Porphyry, Letter to Marcella

Addressing the last question first, the author explains how one contributor towards obesity is a deficiency in the hormone leptin. Leptin is secreted by fat cells that helps to regulate appetite and energy expenditure in the brain. When less fat cells are present, less leptin circulates in the body, which causes the desire for more food and less energy expenditure, resulting in weight gain. On the other hand, if there are an excess of fat cells present, more leptin in the blood is registered and so feeding is suppressed and metabolism and activity are increased to burn more energy.

“While the leptin homeostatic system explains how the brain can receive information about long-term changes in weight as indicated by body fat, it doesn’t account for the short-term regulation of appetite.”

In the short term, feeding is regulated by the feeding control circuit, taking place in the hypothalamus. There are two competing hormones, CRH which signals for hunger and orexin which signals for satiety. These hormones are in competition with one another. He likens the competition between these two signals to “an old-fashioned bathtub with separate hot and cold water taps: the temperature of the bath is then determined by the relative flow of hot and cold water.”

Okay, but this all sounds very deterministic, as if we were just biological machines responding to chemical circumstances and states in our brain. Don’t we have free will in all matters? This is what Linden has to say on that:

“The idea that eating is primarily a conscious and voluntary behavior is deeply rooted in our culture. We humans are invested in the notion that we have free will in all things. We want to believe that weight can be controlled by volition alone. Why can’t that fat guy just eat less and exercise more? He just lacks willpower, right? Not at all. Our homeostatic feeding control circuits make it very hard to lose a lot of weight and keep it off.”

We should not be too hard on ourselves or others who are struggling with diet and weight management. We can try to train ourselves to rely on less food, but not all people will be capable of doing so without medical intervention.

However, the first question has still not been addressed. Does the pleasure circuit activate during the naturally pleasant act of eating? “The answer is clearly yes,” says Linden. Eating releases a surge of dopamine:

“These studies revealed not only that eating was associated with dopamine release, but also that the degree of dopamine release could be used to predict how pleasurable the subject rated the experience of eating. Different foods produced different levels of dopamine release, a finding that correlated with the reported pleasures of eating. . . . Also, as hungry subjects continued to eat and became sated, the amount of dopamine released in the dorsal striatum was reduced. Not surprising: The first bites of a meal give the most pleasure when you’re hungry.”

This means that certain foods are more pleasant to eat than others, and the amount of pleasure experienced diminishes as eating proceeds, with that first bite being the most delicious. However, after the eating has occurred, it would seem that the feeling of satiety is the same regardless of what food was consumed. This reminds me of some lines from the Letter to Menoeceus:

“Just as he does not choose the greatest amount of food but the most pleasing food, so he savors not the longest time but the span of time that brings the greatest joy.”

“So simple flavors bring just as much pleasure as a fancy diet if all pain from true need has been removed, and bread and water give the highest pleasure when someone in need partakes of them.”

Later in the chapter he talks about how stress can lead to overeating. It does so by causing a complicated cascade of hormonal signaling that results in corticosterone passing into the brain, triggering the feeling of stress that leads to overeating. One possible remedy to this is to try out “behavioral strategies for stress reduction, like meditation or exercise, [that] can reduce the amplitude of stress hormone surges and are thereby effective in reducing stress-triggered overeating.”

So there is a utility to practices like meditation, which can help regulate our stress levels. An Epicurean meditation can consist of contemplation of the Epicurean gods or on the meaning of the Kyriai Doxai.

Chapter 4: “Your Sexy Brain”

“When I’ve spoken about our human behavior in regard to drugs or food, I’ve indicated that we’re basically the same as other mammals. While we have a bigger neocortex than a mouse or a monkey, and therefore a greater ability to counteract our subconscious drives with cognitive control, at the root our responses to food and psychoactive drugs are the same as those of our distant mammalian relatives. The same is not true of our mating system.”

This chapter looks at the experience of sex, sexual patterns, and sexual addiction (by now you might be finding a pattern in this book – he is very interested in how harmful behavioral patterns form). In humans, unlike some of the other mammals, sex is frequently recreational. Additionally, most of the other mammals are promiscuous, whereas humans tend to be monogamous. Homosexuality is another trait present in humans that can be found in animals. Looking towards our primate cousins, the author observes the following about bonobos:

“In bonobos, it seems as if homosexual behavior, in addition to providing sexual pleasure, also fulfills a social role by diffusing tension and promoting social bonding at the expense of aggression.”

So it seems that a variety of different orientations (heterosexual vs homosexual, etc.) and mating style tendencies (monogamous vs non-monogamous) can be found in the animal kingdom, as well as in humans.

Linden continues by examining the properties of sexual addiction. He regrets to observe that in our society, the sexually addicted have a low probability of seeking help due to social stigma. Sexual addiction is a very real phenomenon that has terrible consequences for not only those people who become addicted but also those people who are treated as means to the end of satisfying the addiction.

Regarding these topics, Metrodorus has this to say:

“[addressing a young man] I understand from you that your natural disposition is too much inclined toward sexual passion. Follow your inclination as you will, provided only that you neither violate the laws, disturb well-established customs, harm any one of your neighbors, injure your own body, nor waste your possessions. That you be not checked by one or more of these provisos is impossible; for a man never gets any good from sexual passion, and he is fortunate if he does not receive harm.”

Before we view this as a directive against any sort of sexuality whatsoever, we must appreciate the context in which this was written: a world without contraception, STD protection, and traditional social mores and regulations. If Metrodorus could see the context of today’s world, it is likely he would not be so hard on modern Epicureans who wish to satisfy their natural desires harmlessly. Care must be taken so as not to become sexually addicted.

Chapter 5: “Gambling and Other Modern Compulsions”

This chapter is about other miscellaneous compulsions, including a diverse range of addictions, such as addiction to the Internet, gambling, pornography, chocolate, consumerism, etc. One of the central questions he is attempting to address is why is it that abstract concepts (that are not immediately sensible) are perceived as pleasant. He presents a number of experiments to explore these matters in detail, such as experiments in reward association in monkeys. He concludes by saying that:

“This chapter has seen our ideas of the dopamine pleasure circuit extended in some provocative directions. Initially it seemed that the pleasure circuit was either naturally activated by intrinsically adaptive stimuli like food, water, or sex, or artificially engaged by drugs or stimulating electrodes placed deep within the brain. We also discussed how the development of addiction could slowly modify the structure and function of the pleasure circuit and thereby drain the pleasure out of any of these activities, replacing liking with wanting. These observations are all true, but they don’t tell the whole story.

We now know from Schultz’s monkey experiments that rapid associative learning can transform a pleasure signal into a reward prediction error signal that can guide learning to maximize future pleasure. It is likely that this same process is what enables humans to feel pleasure from arbitrary rewards like monetary gain (or even near misses in monetary gain) or winning at a video game.”

So it seems that we do have the capacity to experience mental pleasures that stem from the expectation of future reward. The Epicureans held that the pleasures of the mind can even exceed the pleasure of the flesh. The anticipation of a future pleasure can be a powerful motivator of behavior.

Chapter 6: “Virtuous Pleasures (and a Little Pain)”

This chapter is about the ‘virtuous’ pleasures – those pleasures that come with some voluntary effort but are overall good for us and our wellbeing, such as exercise, meditation, fasting, and philanthropic giving.

“Sustained physical exercise, whether it be running or swimming or cycling or some other aerobic activity, has well-known health benefits, including improvements in the function of the cardiovascular, pulmonary, and endocrine systems. Voluntary exercise is also associated with long-term improvements in mental function and is the single best thing one can do to slow the cognitive decline that accompanies normal aging. Exercise has a dramatic antidepressive effect. It blunts the brain’s response to physical and emotional stress.

Given these massive long-term benefits, it is clear that voluntary exercise is a useful component of one’s hedonic regimen. Although these activities may be strenuous in their performance, the subsequent advantages accrued are worth taking into consideration. Additionally, one may enjoy short-term benefits, such as “increased pain threshold, reduction of acute anxiety, and ‘runner’s high’, which is a short-lasting, deeply euphoric state that’s well beyond the simple relaxation or peacefulness felt by many following intense exercise.”

“Another virtuous pleasure that is culturally widespread and often linked to spiritual practice is meditation. . . .While meditation is certainly relaxing and is sometimes described as blissful, does it in fact activate the medial forebrain pleasure circuit? [One study] found a significant increase in dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens of their meditators. This result is suggestive, but it awaits both confirmation and extension to other forms of meditation.

What is clear about meditation is that it has the ability to reduce our stress, activate a large number of brain regions, and decrease the activation of other brain regions. What is still unclear is whether it triggers the release of dopamine. It is worth experimenting for yourself to see whether mediation can form a useful component of your hedonic regimen.

Can fasting also serve a role in our hedonic regimen? The staving off of eating for an increased period of time induces the body to enter a state of autophagy, whereby the body draws upon its stored resources to provide energy, hence burning fat. So fasting can help regulate body weight. Additionally, after one has fasted for a period of time, the amount of pleasure one experiences at the break of the fast may be impressive. Regarding fasting, Seneca had this to report about Epicurus:

“The great hedonist teacher Epicurus used to observe certain periods during which he would be frugal in satisfying his hunger, with the object of seeing to what extent, if at all, one thereby fell short of attaining full and complete pleasure, and whether it was worth going to much trouble to make the deficit good.  At least so he says in the letter he wrote to Polyaenus in the archonship of Charinus {308 – 307 B.C.}.  He boasts in it indeed that he is managing to feed himself for less than a half-penny, whereas Metrodorus, not yet having made such good progress, needs a whole half-penny!”

– Seneca, Letter to Lucilius

Partly through the chapter, the author dissects the claim by Jeremy Bentham that we are subjects of our masters, pleasure and pain:

“In the late eighteenth century the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham famously proclaimed,

“Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. . . . They  govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.”

The accumulating neurobiological evidence indicates that Bentham was only half correct. Pleasure is indeed one compass of our mental function, guiding us toward both virtues and vices, and pain is another. However, we now have reason to believe that they are not two ends of a continuum. The opposite of pleasure isn’t pain; rather, just as the opposite of love is not hate but indifference, the opposite of pleasure is not pain but ennui — a lack of interest in sensation and experience.

You don’t have to be a sadomasochistic sex enthusiast to know that pleasure and pain can be felt simultaneously: Recall Boecker’s aching but blissful long-distance runners, or women in childbirth. In the lexicon of cognitive neuroscience, both pleasure and pain indicate salience, that is, experience that is potentially important and thereby deserving of attention. Emotion is the currency of salience, and both positive emotions — like euphoria and love — and negative emotions — like fear, anger, and disgust — signal events that we must not ignore.”

So he contends that the opposite of pleasure is not pain but rather ennui, in this sense interpretable as a lack of excitement, and that pleasure and pain are both salient experiences, or having the quality of being important or prominent to respond to. For example, the sensation of pain in animals is often triggered by nociception, which is the response to exposure to noxious stimuli. In order to preserve the integrity of the endangered body part, the animal recoils and avoids the stimuli and experiences a feeling of pain.

Chapter 7: “The Future of Pleasure”

This chapter is about the future of pleasure as neuroscience and nanoscience research progress. The author is skeptical about the near term feasibility of nanobots invading our brains and simulating perfect-fidelity sensory experiences and virtual realities. He departs from the optimism of futurists like Ray Kurzweil, who think that the biotechnological revolution is coming in the next decade or two. The central disagreement is about the pace of the neuroscience research, which he argues will drag on in a linear fashion in spite of the fact that technological capability will continue to advance at an exponential pace.

He concludes the book with the following passage:

“In the end, however, thinking about the future of pleasure comes down to the individual. If pleasure is ubiquitous, what will happen to our human “superpower” of being able to associate pleasure with abstract ideas? Will it be washed away in a sea of background noise? If pleasure is everywhere, will uniquely human goals still exist? When pleasure is ubiquitous, what will we desire?

Conclusion

This has been a very brief and surface level summary of this book. I give it a strong recommendation (I think a copy can be picked up cheaply on ebay or abebooks, if not for free at the library), or from amazon. I think that it contains many positive and practical takeaways for the practitioner of Epicurean philosophy, or of pleasure/hedonic/utilitarian ethics in general.


David J. Linden, PhD, is a highly influential American professor of neuroscience at Johns Hopkins University and editor in chief of The Journal of Neurophysiology. He has written some popular books for the scientifically-interested lay audience, including in addition to this one, The Accidental Mind: How Brain Evolution Has Given Us Love, Memory, Dreams, and God and Touch: The Science of the Hand, Heart, and Mind.

This review summary was written by Friend Harmonious with editorial feedback from Guide Hiram.

Further Reading:

The Compass of Pleasure

Passages on the Soul, from Epicurus’ Epistle to Herodotus

The Letter to Herodotus is available here in its entirety. A commentary on the Epicurean Doctrine of the Psyche is here.

Also read: Some thoughts on the soul

Our canon is that direct observation by sense and direct apprehension by the mind are alone invariably true.

63

“Next, keeping in view our perceptions and feelings (for so shall we have the surest grounds for belief), we must recognize generally that the soul is a corporeal thing, composed of fine particles, dispersed all over the frame, most nearly resembling wind with an admixture of heat, in some respects like wind, in others like heat. But, again, there is the third part which exceeds the other two in the fineness of its particles and thereby keeps in closer touch with the rest of the frame. And this is shown by the mental faculties and feelings, by the ease with which the mind moves, and by thoughts, and by all those things the loss of which causes death. Further, we must keep in mind that soul has the greatest share in causing sensation.

64

Still, it would not have had sensation, had it not been somehow confined within the rest of the frame. But the rest of the frame, though it provides this indispensable condition for the soul, itself also has a share, derived from the soul, of the said quality; and yet does not possess all the qualities of soul. Hence on the departure of the soul it loses sentience. For it had not this power in itself; but something else, congenital with the body, supplied it to body: which other thing, through the potentiality actualized in it by means of motion, at once acquired for itself a quality of sentience, and, in virtue of the neighbourhood and interconnexion between them, imparted it (as I said) to the body also.

65

“Hence, so long as the soul is in the body, it never loses sentience through the removal of some other part. The containing sheath may be dislocated in whole or in part, and portions of the soul may thereby be lost; yet in spite of this the soul, if it manage to survive, will have sentience. But the rest of the frame, whether the whole of it survives or only a part, no longer has sensation, when once those atoms have departed, which, however few in number, are required to constitute the nature of soul. Moreover, when the whole frame is broken up, the soul is scattered and has no longer the same powers as before, nor the same motions; hence it does not possess sentience either.

66

“For we cannot think of it as sentient, except it be in this composite whole and moving with these movements; nor can we so think of it when the sheaths which enclose and surround it are not the same as those in which the soul is now located and in which it performs these movements. 

67

“There is the further point to be considered, what the incorporeal can be, if, I mean, according to current usage the term is applied to what can be conceived as self-existent. But it is impossible to conceive anything that is incorporeal as self-existent except empty space. And empty space cannot itself either act or be acted upon, but simply allows a body to move through it. Hence those who call soul incorporeal speak foolishly. For if it were so, it could neither act nor be acted upon. But, as it is, both these properties, you see, plainly belong to soul.

68

“If, then, we bring all these arguments concerning soul to the criterion of our feelings and perceptions, and if we keep in mind the proposition stated at the outset, we shall see that the subject has been adequately comprehended in outline: which will enable us to determine the details with accuracy and confidence.

Further Reading:

A Concrete Self

Some thoughts on the soul

 

On the Occasion of the Birth of the Hegemon

For many years, we have had difficulty establishing with certainty the date of the birth of Epicurus. This is because the Attic calendar–whose months were mentioned in Epicurus’ Last Will and Testament–was not widely used. It was very much a local calendar, and was lunisolar, which adds great confusion for us who are used to our (solar) Gregorian calendar. The Birth of the Hegemon should naturally be our biggest holiday, our equivalent of Christmas, Mawlid, or Buddha Purnima, so at the SoFE we decided it was time to fix the date and to start developing traditions around the holiday of the Birth of the Hegemon.

The Lunisolar Calendar Discussion

We looked into various possible solutions. I considered adapting the Attic calendar into a simplified lunisolar calendar, abandoning the traditional and difficult-to-pronounce Greek month names and replacing them with the generic “First Moon”, “Second Moon”, etc. as names for our months. Some years would have twelve moons, and others would have thirteen. According to Wikipedia:

The year was meant to begin with the first sighting of the new moon after the summer solstice.

This would have been easy enough, as there are plenty of lunar calendars online we can consult. In his final will, Epicurus describesthe customary celebration of my birthday on the tenth day of Gamelion in each year“. Gamelion was the seventh month, which typically falls in January-February. But in 2020-2021, the summer solstice coincided with the new moon, and therefore the lunisolar months came very early. According to space.com, there was a new moon on June 21st of 2020, which is right at the solstice, so the solstice coincided with the New (Lunisolar) Year.

If we count seven new moons from there, we will see that space.com sets the seventh new moon of year 2,361 of the Age of Epicurus as December the 14th.

Therefore, the tenth day of the seventh moon in this simplified lunisolar calendar, counting from December 14th, would have been the 23rd day of December of 2020–which would have been the Birth of the Hegemon in our simplified lunisolar calendar. However, in the ancient Attic calendar, each month began with the “first sighting of the new moon”, which in this case was probably one or two nights after the New Moon of the 14th of December of 2020. We are beginning to see how difficult it is to plan ahead for this, which creates many disadvantages.

When we say that we are in the Year of Epicurus 2,361, we calculate that from 2020 (current year in the Gregorian calendar, which begins the lunisolar cycle of 2020-2021), plus 341 (Before Common Era, the year of his birth).

When I consulted with the other members of the SoFE concerning the problem of the date of this holiday, we considered the possibility of adopting a private lunisolar calendar merely with the intention of clearly calculating the Birth of the Hegemon every year, and we had to carry out hedonic calculus between this option and sticking to our familiar Gregorian calendar for the sake of simplicity, ease, and custom. The idea of fixing the Birth of the Hegemon to the Gregorian calendar prevailed. While I am not averse to the idea of a lunisolar calendar, the utility of this is limited, since the only major lunisolar holiday we celebrate is the Birth of the Hegemon.

Also, we customarily have zoom gatherings on the Twentieth of every month (or sometimes on the most convenient date close to the Twentieth), which makes it advantageous to merge the Birth of the Hegemon and the Twentieth on its given month, and also helps us to respect and to make the best use of each other’s time.

Therefore, the Society of Friends of Epicurus has officially set the holiday of the Birth of the Hegemon to be henceforward celebrated on the 20th of February every year.

Meaning of Hegemon

Epicurus was known as the Hegemon by his disciples. We pronounce this word according to the US conventional pronunciation found here. This word is related to “hegemony”, which translates as:

 preponderant influence or authority over others. – Webster Dictionary

Other translations of the word are political, and do not apply to the ancient usage. This does not mean that he is infallible, or a prophet. He’s the founder of our School, our moral example due to his empirical thinking, clear and frank speech and clear thought, freedom from superstition and harmful beliefs, his pleasant disposition, his autarchy, his friendliness, and his kindness. He was the first Epicurean, the one whose name (and a portion of his identity) we make our own when we call ourselves Epicureans. The name Epicurus means “Friend” or “Ally”, and we know that friendship was holy to the first Epicureans, so in our Koinonia we strive to be true Friends and allies to each other.

We recognize only Epicurus of Samos as our Hegemon. His successors (diadochi) of direct lineage in the Garden of Athens were known as Scholarchs (Hermarchus, Polystratus, Zeno of Sidon, etc.) The Age of the Scholarchs lasted over five centuries. No one today can claim direct lineage, and so there are no Scholarchs today.

Under the Scholarchs, were the kath-hegetes (Guides)–people like Philodemus of Gadara, Philonides of Laodicea, Diogenes of Oenoanda, etc. In our SoFE lineage, this is the only office that we recognize as still potentially existing today.

In Celebration of the Birth of the Hegemon

Today is for remembering some of the key events in the biography and some of the key features of the character of Epicurus of Samos through poetry, declamation, and other art forms. We encourage all followers of Epicurus to write their own poems and statements in memory of the Hegemon for this day and to publish them on social media, or to share Lucretian and other relevant sources.

Today, we Hail the Hegemon and we invite all followers of Epicurean philosophy to learn about, toast, celebrate, and remember Epicurus in your own way. We wish you a pleasant Hegemon Day. Peace and Safety!

This is by Matt:

Hear these words O children of Nature’s swerve.
Let us rejoice in the freedom we desperately deserve.
Of prudent wisdom long obscured by shame.
Professed by Epicurus of noble fame.
Lucretius penned in days of old.
Across the gap of time, a truth so bold.
Arise the days of hedonic measure.
Restoring the truth of humankind’s pleasure.
Dispel the fears of death’s illusion.
Release humankind from all confusion.
Again I say, O children of Nature’s swerve.
Be frank in speech and keep your nerve.
Be ready now to strike your blow.
For Epicurus, his Garden and all who know.
The days shall come when the world will extol.
That pleasurable living was indeed the goal.

 

Non-Spoiler Review of “The Epicuriana” Novel

A Non-Spoiler Review of The Epicuriana Novel by Friend Harmonious

“I AM EPICURUS” 

The Epicuriana follows in the tradition of A Few Days in Athens, presenting itself as the reconstructed remains of a Herculaneum scroll recovered by archaeologists in the modern era. It is a fictional, historically plausible (though not always accurate), philosophical coming-of-age and romantic novel that explores the life of Epicurus primarily from his boyhood years through to later developments in his life as he travels across Ionia, amassing followers and spreading his new philosophy of tranquility and friendship.

The Good

It is deeply character-driven, exploring the intimate lives of Epicurus and those who contributed most importantly to his maturation both as a man and as a philosophical innovator, including but not limited to his father Neocles, mother Chaerestrata, and his childhood friend Servilia and her father Valerius. It includes flashback episodes to Epicurus in boyhood and concludes with a brief glimpse of Epicurus at the end of his life, and thus spans effectively his entire life.

It is clearly very well researched, drawing on a rather substantial bibliography to inform the historical plausibility of its narrative – though not completely avoiding all anachronisms and historical impossibilities.

It explores various themes such as the unpredictability of necessary and chance events, and how one’s actions as a free agent can affect dramatic changes with lasting consequences in one’s life. It touches on themes of Epicurean friendship and the love between friends (as distinct from Platonic or familial love, which are held in contrast). It explores a broad spectrum of human emotions as well as the fear of the unknown and of death.

The flow of the text certainly has the ability to evoke emotion in the reader and I found myself hooting and laughing and having other pleasant emotional responses occasionally throughout the reading of the text.

There are many interesting sequences throughout the novel, with Epicurus meeting and interacting with new characters who are pivotal to the development of the plot and of his own character. For example, there is a humorous and somewhat vicious encounter with a tag-team of Aristotelians who infiltrated the private house discussions of Epicurus and company while at Mytilene, an amusing conversation between Epicurus and the Gymnasiarch of Mytilene, and a number of adventurous episodes between Epicurus and the characters involved with the plotline of delivering Epicurus from Colophon to Lampsacus, including the captain of the ship, Master Panyotis, and a ragtag band of pirates, the latter of whom experience the fruits of Epicurus’ hoplite training skills firsthand.

One other reviewer had this to say of The Epicuriana after reading the whole work:

“[It is] A lovely personal story which mirrors the struggles and doubts of many of us today, but comes a full circle when we reflect on the past and the present. I still find it so interesting that [Epicurus’] struggles within himself, doubts, situations and successes have been repeated throughout the ages – perhaps we as people should spend time to look back at these ancient writings to learn for our future. But perhaps we are in too much of a hurry to make our own mistakes! The story really makes you think.”

The Bad

I wish that it had explored Epicurus’ friendships with Hermarchus and Metrodorus more. An individual chapter depicts a dialogue between Hermarchus and Epicurus, but the discourse was centered primarily around addressing the accusations and concerns of sexual impropriety in the Garden as advanced by the apostate Timocrates. Metrodorus is only very briefly present and his character is of singular dimension. Unfortunately, Polyaenus does not make an appearance as far as I remember, neither do any of Epicurus’ brothers (Neocles, Chaeredemus and Aristobulus), who are reported by Diogenes Laertius to have been members of the Garden School.

There are numerous minor historical anachronisms, such as the author positing that Epicurus heard the lectures of Aristotle in person in Athens, which is impossible because Aristotle had left Athens by the time Epicurus arrived, leaving his disciple Theophrastus in charge of the Lyceum (whom Epicurus may actually have heard lecture). Another glaring anachronism was evident when Epicurus was reflecting on the various philosophical schools vying for influence in the agora of Mytilene, and pauses to briefly consider the Stoics. Zeno of Citium had not started the Stoic school until a number of years after Epicurus had already established the Garden in Athens. These events (when Epicurus was still much younger and on Mytilene) being well before that time are an obvious impossibility. These inaccuracies caused me to suspend belief in some cases. The taking of certain liberties may have been deliberately chosen by the author to advance the narrative – if so, then I would view these as a disservice to the reader, as it is partly the duty of the presenter of historical fiction to clarify when they are deviating from the factual timeline.

There is also a contemporary timeline exploring the Herculaneum papyri scholars who are uncovering The Epicuriana scroll. The character relationships there are notably less interesting and fleshed-out than the ones in the ancient timeline. We only return to this timeline a few times and it may have sufficed to just leave it wholly out of the work.

The prose is impressive but is perhaps a bit too lavish in its use of rare or otherwise obscure vocabulary, especially being a contemporary piece of writing. Be prepared to have a dictionary or thesaurus near at hand to accompany the reading experience. In many cases, it would have sufficed to convey a similar meaning choosing less opulent words for the sake of the comprehensibility of the reader. It definitely interrupted the flow. These occurrences struck me somewhat as an attempt to signal the author’s own facility with language.

There is a bit too much inter-familial intrigue and melodrama for my taste, bordering close to soap opera. Without going into too much detail, it would have been tolerable if that was only central to one major plot reveal, but that’s how all the major plot reveals went.

Conclusions

I would still recommend reading A Few Days in Athens over it for an early student of Epicurean philosophy. I would only recommend The Epicuriana after one has the historical and philosophical facts clearly sorted in their mind and after having been exposed to the primary sources and the biographies by Diogenes Laertius and Norman DeWitt.

It is some pleasant and sweet fun for someone who is confident that they would be able to recognize where it goes wrong and not be susceptible to misinterpretation. I moderately recommend it.

On the Evolution of Language

The following is a commentary on the essay titled New Evidence for the Epicurean Theory of the Origin of Language: Philodemus, On Poems V, by Jacob Mackey and Epicurus, On nature, Book 28 by David N Sedley.

As we have seen before, the founders of Epicurean philosophy were deeply concerned with the role that language plays in our apprehension of the nature of things. The canonical faculty of prolepsis (anticipations) is tied to the use of language, and its place in the canon implies that language can be a shortcut to recalling things that were at one point empirically available to our other faculties. But language conventions can betray prolepsis, sometimes purposefully, as we see in the case of metaphors.

We are not necessarily against poetry. Philodemus says that poetry gives pleasure through excellence of diction and content. We may say that “mountains vomit clay into rivers”, and by context most people will know that we are speaking metaphorically. But we must never forget the utility of words in their context. This expression is fine when we speak poetically, but in his Epistle to Herodotus, Epicurus starts by saying that words are only useful if their clear meaning is kept in mind.

Epicurus clashed with Dialectitians from Megara. Among them, Diodorus Cronus (who was an extreme conventionalist), said that language isn’t natural. From these facts, we can imagine that Epicurus was arguing against them that language (and other phenomena) do exist and are natural.

Epicurus’ views concerning language evolved. He had begun adopting Metrodorus’ process of using conventional words (rather than the pedantic practice of some philosophers, who are very particular about their choice of obscure language) by the time he wrote On Nature 28:

“I now see, as I did not then, the particular difficulties concerning this class, of having correct names for individual things … as you (Metro) also used in those days to assign names without adapting certain conventional usages, so that you should not make plain the principle that by assigning any name one expresses an opinion, and see and reflect upon the indiscriminate treatment of words and objects.”

We see a distrust of words, and we see their preoccupation with avoiding the addition of opinion when we express ourselves, and a recognition of the great difficulty of this in our choice of words. We know that Lucretius mentions “opinion” as a category that does not belong in the canon. The argument here is that to name something is to express an opinion, which may be true or false. So the addition of opinion is a sign that a definition of a word is non-canonical, has no empirical basis, and is not based on true prolepsis.

In addition to these concerns, Epicurean anthropology recognizes three stages of the evolution of language.

First Stage: Nature teaches words

The founders believed that initially, language started by ananke (necessity) as a reaction to external stimuli. This view is held today by people like linguist Noam Chomsky, who has argued that there exists in the human brain an “inborn universal grammar”. But the ancients didn’t have a scientific field of linguistics. They only had empirical attestations from nature. They likely observed the role that certain calls have in certain communities of monkeys (if they came across them in their travels) or birds, who use calls to warn each other about the presence of predators, for mating, for warning enemies who enter their territory, and for other rudimentary uses. Award-winning studies of human reaction to the noise made by nails on a chalk board seem to indicate that this may an ancestral vestige of primate warning calls:

The authors hypothesized that it was due to predation early in human evolution; the sound bore some resemblances to the alarm call of macaque monkeys, or it may have been similar to the call of some predator. This research won one of the authors, Randolph Blake, an Ig Nobel Prize in 2006.

Second Stage: Reason develops language

So, the initial sounds and grunts made by our ancestors were wild, that is, invented by nature. Later, as humans became civilized, the founders argue that language was developed further by logismos (reason), which refined the first words. Since this stage is distinct from the third stage, I imagine that this stage did not involve an intellectual class, but emerged naturally from the intelligence of average language-users and from the pragmatic necessities of their interactions with each other and their environment.

Third Stage: Reason adds new discoveries

It’s in this final stage that the philosophers of the first Garden believed to be operating when they engaged in the practice of reassigning names. This is a practice that Confucian philosophers have also, interestingly, engaged in for the sake of clarity. It’s possible that this is a widespread practice among the intellectual classes of many cultures, and responds to real, universal problems of sophisticated human communication.

It’s also here that poets get to work on inventing novel ways of utilizing words, and sometimes these innovations end up having great utility, while at other times this creates confusion and obscures speech for the entire community.

Epicurus generally doubts the utility of definitions and insists that people use words as they are used commonly–and yet sometimes (as in Principal Doctrine 1, which uses the definition of the word “gods” rather than the word itself) it’s clear that he trusts the definition more than the word, because the word has been so corrupted by the culture that it’s best to clearly define it in conversation.

To the first Epicureans, the legitimate practice of word-coining was born from utility, rather than for aesthetics. When I wrote Tending the Epicurean Garden, my editor insisted that I avoid using Greek terms that no one was familiar with, and this has been a recurrent problem in the teaching mission of the Society of Friends of Epicurus, and in many of my projects of content-creation for many outlets. Rather than kinetic and katastematic, I had to refer to dynamic and abiding pleasure. Many emerging fields of scientific inquiry, new inventions, and modern media and technology, have also produced the need for many new words. This process of word-coining will never end, for as long as there is human civilization.

Further Reading:
Against the use of empty words

 

 

The Parable of the Hunter

“There are many scenarios that we can think about where either justice or prudence is lacking, and so the life of pleasure is not complete and cannot be labeled Epicurean. These exercises of putting before our eyes various hypothetical scenarios, or thinking back to real ones we’ve encountered, may help to demonstrate what the founders were thinking about and discussing when they established Principal Doctrine 5.”

In a previous article, Hiram discussed action theory within Epicureanism and offered the training tool of the ‘Four Sisters’ of pleasure, prudence, nobility, and justice. Let us put the following hypothetical scenario under the scrutiny of our eyes to understand better how the ‘Four Sisters’ tradition shapes our actions and inform the decisions we make within the Epicurean framework. 

The Parable of the Hunter

A long time ago, the world was cold and life was harsh. Deep in the Ice Age of Europe, there existed a hunter-gatherer tribe, a band of early humans. One member of the tribe was designated as the Hunter, whereas other members of the tribe filled different roles in the community. They naturally developed amongst themselves a proto-economy of bartering – the Hunter provides meat, and in return receives other gathered foods, crafted goods, and services in exchange. 

Normally, all the members of the tribe would wait out the winter, relying on the food supply they had built up over the warm seasons. However, it has been a particularly harsh winter and the food is running out. With careful rationing, it looks like there is only enough food for the tribe to last a month or so before starvation sets in.

In a measure of desperation, the community decides to set aside a large share of its remaining food for the Hunter’s personal needs on the promise that the Hunter will go off into the wilderness for a period of time and return with an animal to alleviate the coming hunger. After sharing, the tribe has less than two weeks’ worth of food remaining, whereas the Hunter’s food is enough for him to survive the frigid landscape without help for about as long as the tribe would while waiting for him, not longer. He will need to keep his energy up if he is to be successful in the hunt, and carrying back an animal will also be very tiring. So, he will be consuming more food than his friends and family back home. The Hunter gives his word, SWEARING AN OATH that he will return before what little they have left runs out. 

After the Hunter has left and wandered far enough away from the tribe to not be observed, he sits down by a fire to collect his thoughts and develop a plan of action. A number of options are present to choose from. 

He feels a PAIN in his stomach and so eats some of the berries from his pouch, mildly addressing his hunger. He also reduces the pain of thirst with a swig of water from his leather waterskin. After doing so, he reflects on the PLEASURE of consumption and realizes that he can continue to indulge these pleasures because of the large amount of food in his bag. He could abandon his mission and keep the food for himself, continuing to eat and drink until he is beyond satisfied. However, he quickly realizes that this would cause him to run out of food much faster than he had planned, and hunger would quickly set in again before he has the means to ensure his long-term satisfaction. Recognizing this, he decides to continue the hunt and re-evaluate his situation when closer to his prey. 

Due to seasonal migration, the herds of elk have ventured far from the tribe’s village. After a trek of about a week, the perilous Hunter tracks the herd to a semi-barren woodland, with barely enough morsels of foliage left for their graze. As an accomplished Hunter does, he stalks his prey until the most opportune time to strike. It would be worse for him to miss with his bow and arrow and have to give chase to the herd once it has started to run off, so he bides his time. 

While he waits for the sun to rise on the last night before his planned final rendezvous with his quarry, he contemplates the future. The winter should be ending soon and the snows will melt in three weeks or so. He notes that with the food he has been given, he could just about make it to that time if he exerts himself less from now onwards and forgets about the idea of bringing back any animal he manages to find tomorrow. What’s more, with any animal at all he would actually be in a state of abundance, relying on the elk meat primarily and saving his packed food as a backup. 

These ideas are all pleasant to him at first, until his mind focuses back to the condition of his friends and family that he would have to leave behind. It pains him to think about them all dying of starvation, and what is more, he would feel a pang of guilt when they realize that he betrayed his word and won’t be coming back.

Additionally, if by some chance a few of them did manage to survive to the springtime, he would live in perpetual FEAR of being hunted, for he knows that some of the elders and youths of the tribe also have some knowledge of tracking. Such a violation could not go unpunished and they would pursue his trail until they found him and exacted JUSTICE. Taking all of these possible future scenarios in mind, he knows what the best thing to do is.

The dawn arrives and the Hunter comes upon the herd, which had not traveled much further. The elk are loosely dispersed among trees, searching for hardy berries and other edible leaves. They aren’t too picky and options are scarce. One of the animals nearest to him munches away blissfully and unknowingly. Being very skilled, the Hunter carefully sights his bow, waiting for the exact moment. He looses his stone-tipped arrow and it finds its mark. He whispers lowly a solemn word of thankfulness to the animal. After some time, he prepares a makeshift sled and loads his handiwork on it to ease his return to his tribe and his people. 

After some two weeks of absence, the Hunter returns to his village to find the people just barely holding on. Hunger had set in, but not yet death. Upon seeing him, they rush over and form a cheerful parade. He greets them one by one, exchanging glances, smiles, and intimate embraces. They REJOICE to see that his journey was a success and that he has brought with him the means for all to survive to the next season. They express a deep and sincere GRATITUDE for what symbolizes to them the guarantee of the continuation of life, in spite of all the DIFFICULTIES that it may come with. The Hunter rejoices tearfully with his friends and family and derives PLEASURE not just from the RECOGNITION of familiar faces who were eager to greet him or the quenching of thirst and satiation of hunger at the subsequent feast, but also from the NOBILITY of his own personal character, which GUIDED him to CHOOSE the most pleasant possible outcome, in conformity with PRUDENCE and JUSTICE. 

Dewdrops glisten in the leaves of the trees and on the blades of grass. Spring has arrived and the tribe lives on to see another day. Though all these events happened a very long time ago and all of our characters have long since departed, the BLESSEDNESS of the memories of their time spent together and the friendships they enjoyed live on as IMMORTAL GOODS.


—————————————————————

Review of the ethical considerations of this Parable:

1) Course of action solely guided by pleasure but lacking prudence and justice:

The hunter continues to pursue the pleasure of consumption without regard for his inventory or the future.

Projected Result: Short-term pleasure but long-term pain. Pleasure not at its limit.

2) Course of action guided by pleasure and some prudence but lacking justice:

The hunter considers keeping his kill for himself and not returning to the tribe, instead waiting out the winter on his own with his supply and kill.

Projected Result: A longer-term pleasure than previous, but the nagging anxiety of being hunted is inescapable. Pleasure not at its limit.

3) Course of action guided by pleasure and justice and prudence:

The hunter honors his oath and returns with the food for the tribe. He keeps faith with the tribe and in return receives the pleasure of gratitude, of seeing their faces again, of sharing meals, of recognizing his own personal character, and of being accepted into a community of loved ones providing friendship and protection from the hardships of the state of nature.

Result: Longest-term pleasure of all. Pleasure at its limit. 

Prudence and the recognition of the pact of natural justice has helped our hunter to ascertain that without these, all would lead to outcomes deficient in pleasures and with significant accompanying pains in the long term. Pleasure is still the sovereign guide, but it needs the counsel and advice of practical wisdom and just action to ensure the most complete life.

This article was composed by Friend Harmonious.

PD 6: On Methods of Exegesis

Over the last few weeks, I have been publishing essays expounding the Principal Doctrines. It has been a very enjoyable intellectual exercise. I’ve learned that it’s an error to take the PD’s for granted and to think that we know everything there is to know about them. In the process of writing these essays, I have been considering the various methods of exegesis that are available to us, and what method(s) might be the most useful for each PD.

The Contextual Method

My main method has been to try to reconstruct or discern (based on the text) what discussions or conversations took place among the founders, that led to these statements being established as authoritative conclusions of the Garden. I’m calling this the method of contextualization.

Clearly, the founders meant for the 40 Principal Doctrines to stand separate from the rest of the textual evidence we have. They are meant to be the forty most important ideas that a student must either revere or study (or both). By what line of thinking, by what arguments, did these 40 conclusions attain their superior status? I began to evaluate this in my study of PDs 24 and 28, on the utility of dogmatism.

The Literal Method

Another method of exegesis (that is, interpretation) is to stick to the literal translation of the text. If we know the original Greek language, we may focus on the anticipation–the initial empirical attestation and conception of each word–in order to deconstruct each PD word-for-word, and glean clarity. These two methods are not mutually exclusive, and are both useful and necessary. 

We know from sermons given by Epicurus–like the one Against empty words–that the founders were very adamant on using clear, concise language. They went as far as coining new terms when conventional language failed, as attested again by their own theory of the evolution of language. So there was no frivolous expression in the PD’s … but then there’s PD 6.

This is a case where the literal reconstruction and the anticipation of each word is necessary because the choice of words in the original was apparently so awkward, so specific, and attempted to be so clear, that most modern readers get lost in translation. So I had to contact a member of the Society of Friends of Epicurus who knows Greek, Panos, who helped me to get a grasp of what the words actually mean. Here is the original:

ἕνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ανθρώπων ἦν κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας ἀγαθόν, ἐξ ὧν ἄν ποτε τοῦτο οἷός τʼᾖ παρασκευάζεσθαι.

This was translated by Hicks as:

In order to obtain security from other people any means whatever of procuring this was a natural good.

It’s not clear to me why he used the past tense (“was a natural good”). If that’s in the original, it may mean that the original doctrine was meant to justify some event or action taken in the past. The Church of Epicurus translation says:

The natural good of public office and kingship is for the sake of getting confidence from [other] men, [at least] from those from whom one is able to provide this.

In this translation, we can appreciate the common interpretation of the PD as justifying ANY form of government that procures security. We could also interpret it as meaning that security is one of (but not the only) the reasons or purposes for setting up a form of government. And the Peter St. Andre translation says:

It is a natural benefit of leadership and kingship to take courage from other men (or at least from the sort of men who can give one courage).

Security, confidence, and courage all mean different things in English. The Epicuros site in modern Greek language has a version of the PD’s, the sixth of which Panos translates from modern Greek as:

With the goal of acquiring security against people, there was (always) the natural good of dominance and of kingship, through which (someone) could sometimes achieve this.

According to Panos,

I get a kinda opposite meaning of what I see in other translations. But it’s a pretty hard sentence to accurately translate …

Because of being afraid of people is right by the nature of authority and dominion, from which things (authority and dominion) if ever be able to prepare (against).

So basically the idea I get is:

It’s right to be prepared against people, just in case, because of oppression and authority.

… It does not say “it’s ok to use oppression and authority” as some translations I saw.

So the PD does not justify violence (which would go against the doctrines on justice based on avoiding mutual harm and seeking mutual benefit), or the overthrow of government (which would be out of line with the non-political nature of our ethics). Here is how Panos breaks down the words:

ἕνεκα: on account of (/regarding // because of)

τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ανθρώπων: the (tharrein)* from people
–*Tharrein: this word can mean either (a) to be afraid of, or (b) to take courage from!

ἦν κατὰ φύσιν: it was by nature (/quality)

ἀρχῆς: of authority

καὶ βασιλείας: and of dominion (/kingship)

ἀγαθόν, : good (morally good)

ἐξ ὧν : from which (genitive plural)

ἄν ποτε : at some time (/if ever)

τοῦτο: that thing (accusative sing.)

οἷός τʼᾖ : he is able (γʹ ενικ. υποτ. Ενεργ. ενεστ. | 3rd sing. subjunctive active present )

παρασκευάζεσθαι. : to be ready (/prepared)

And again:

ἕνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ανθρώπων
because of the (tharrein) from people

ἦν κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας ἀγαθόν
it was morally good by nature of authority and dominion

ἐξ ὧν
from which (plural which: so the which must refer to: “authority and dominion”)

ἄν ποτε τοῦτο
if ever that thing (which thing? τουτο is neutral accusative singular, so it is talking about a singular neutral object. From the words above, the only candidates are αγαθόν, and θαρρείν (tharrein). I think the only word that makes sense is tharrein…)

οἷός τʼᾖ παρασκευάζεσθαι
he is able (to be) prepare(d)
(so this is subjunctive active which is something like: I expect you prepare. It’s really hard to translate exactly but it’s not that important.)

With Panos finally concluding:

So the way I am seeing this:

Because of being afraid of people is right by the nature of authority and dominion, from which things (authority and dominion) if ever be able to prepare (against).

From all that I’ve read, it seems clear to me that the Hicks translation is flawed. It says

In order to obtain security from other people any means whatever of procuring this was a natural good.

Hicks makes an absolute claim that seems out of place in Epicurean philosophy, where all choices and avoidances must be subjected to hedonic calculus. I do not see mention of “any means necessary” in the original, and I suspect this translation may appeal to people with certain military ideas.

I wish to thank Panos for his assistance. The process we see above is the literal method, which seeks to know the initial pre-conception that belongs to each word chosen for this PD, and which assumes and trusts that the founders chose their words very carefully.

PD 6 in Light of Other Surviving Passages

The idea of the PD is that security is a natural and necessary pleasure. This idea is also expressed in the Epistle to Menoeceus, so it seems indigenous and accurate within an Epicurean list of key opinions.

PD 6 appears to justify (limited) (service to a) political power or civic engagement for the sake of safety. Vatican Saying 39 associates friendship with “help in the future”, and links true friendship with safety. Vatican Saying 67 criticizes “servility to mobs and monarchs“, and seems to imply that we get more safety from friends than from politics. Finally, VS 80 posits a (partly) attitudinal definition of security, one that is in the soul and not in the realm of society or politics: 

The first measure of security is to watch over one’s youth and to guard against what makes havoc of all by means of maddening desires.

A young man’s share in deliverance comes from watching over the prime of his life and warding off what will ruin everything through frenzied desires. (Monadnock translation)

VS 80 is a salvific passage. It uses the word “soterías” in the original. Soter means Savior. Epicurus was seen as a Savior by later generations because of his salvific doctrine. PD’s 10-13 also discuss a form of attitudinal safety: by learning a scientific account of the nature of things, we protect ourselves from superstition. PD 14 concludes this discussion:

Although some measure of safety from other people is based in the power to fight them off and in abundant wealth, the purest security comes from solitude and breaking away from the herd.

In light of context, PD 6 does not refer to this attitudinal sense of safety in the soul (as PDs 10-14 do), or being safe from limitless desires. It also does not refer to weapons or warfare, or constitute a call to violence. The later Lucretian jeremiad (in Book V) against the propagation of weapons after metal working was discovered, and Philodemus’ advice in On Property Management against taking up a military career, appear to confirm a general lack of affinity for warfare among the ancient Epicureans.

Based on the textual evidence we have seen, we may conclude that the necessary measure of safety for an Epicurean is mainly attained by association with friends and by avoiding certain people (PD 39). I will close with Panos’ suggested translation, and with an invitation to all sincere students to study these texts on their own.

It’s right to be prepared against people, just in case, because of oppression and authority.

PD 8: The Doctrine of Deferred Gratification

The practice of calculating hedons and dolons (units of pleasure and pain) in order to arrive at a path of action that leads to net pleasure was invented by the Cyrenaic pleasure philosopher known as Anniceris, who is sometimes called a “proto-Epicurean”. In Epicurean writings, hedonic calculus is also spoken of in terms of measuring advantages versus disadvantages. PD 8 is a simple observation that justifies hedonic calculus. It calls for occasional deferred gratification. It says:

No pleasure is bad in itself; but the means of paying for some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.

In his Epistle to Menoeceus, Epicurus elaborated the process of hedonic calculus:

And because this is the primary and inborn good, we do not choose every pleasure. Instead, we pass up many pleasures when we will gain more of what we need from doing so. And we consider many pains to be better than pleasures, if we experience a greater pleasure for a long time from having endured those pains. So every pleasure is a good thing because its nature is favorable to us, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen — just as every pain is a bad thing, yet not every pain is always to be shunned. It is proper to make all these decisions through measuring things side by side and looking at both the advantages and disadvantages, for sometimes we treat a good thing as bad and a bad thing as good.

The easiest examples of this doctrine are found in our natural limits to drugs or alcohol, and to food. For instance, I can generally drink one beer and enjoy it, but by the second or third beer, I typically do not like how I feel, so I avoid drinking the second beer. I also remember the dehydration and other symptoms of a hangover, which keep me from being productive the following day. As for food, both gaining weight and the feeling of having eaten too much are unpleasant. One feels lethargic and tired, and one can’t think clearly when one overeats.

Another example of deferred gratification for me was when I decided to finish my college education. I had no social life, was very poor, ate Ramen noodles frequently, and had to work temp jobs on the side to make ends sort-of meet. It was a difficult time at the tail-end of a period of under-employment, but I had set a goal: I wanted to finish what I started years ago. With great pride, I graduated Magna Cum Laude (one of the highest honors). I had chosen a minor in Communication, which led to my book Tending the Epicurean Garden being published. I also started publishing essays in various outlets, all of which had been part of my goal.

Metrodorus of Lampsacus, the co-founder of Epicureanism, often reminded his companions that for the sake of certain goods we have to take certain risks and go through certain difficulties. He was always referring all moral problems to the process of hedonic calculus and to the related process of deferred gratification. He accentuated health and friendship as two goods for the sake of which we go to great lengths and make many sacrifices, because without them we suffer greatly. If we lose a friend or loved one, we suffer, so we may put up with discomforts to help them from time to time. If we lose our health, we suffer, so we may make dietary changes or exercise in order to preserve our health.

Hedonic calculus is the reason why Epicureanism is a hedonism with an asterisk, a qualified hedonism. It’s confusing to call it a hedonist ethics without elaborating on the concept of hedonic calculus and deferred gratification. So if someone ever asks you for a short introduction to Epicurean ethics, do not say it’s “just hedonism”: say it’s a pleasure ethics that calls for a calculated, rational pursuit of pleasure, using hedonic calculus and deferred gratification whenever prudent. If asked about hedonic calculus, you may cite PD 8 and the relevant portion of the Epistle to Menoeceus, or simply explain that it’s a calculation of pleasures versus pains, and/or of advantages versus disadvantages in order to carry out our choices and avoidances successfully (=producing net pleasure).

On Thomas Jefferson’s Epicureanism and Slavery

“The greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom.” – Vatican Sayings, 77

Epicurus’ philosophy is not only a philosophy of happiness, but it is also a philosophy of liberty. Epicurus emancipates the mind from the primeval horrors that seek to enslave it. Just as Helios casts out the shadows of the world, Epicurus illuminates the darkness of ignorance, and provides the foundation for living a life of freedom from fear and uncertainty.

That being said, I have recently returned from my travels to Monticello, where I reflected on what it means to be an Epicurean and on the many ways Thomas Jefferson fell short of what I had hoped and anticipated the more I learned about his life. After collecting my thoughts and synthesizing information across multiple sources, here is my attempt to evaluate the history of slavery within Epicureanism and to make sense of the contradictory life of Thomas Jefferson.

(The following was written by contributor Harmonious and reflects the opinions of the author.)

On Thomas Jefferson’s Epicureanism and Slavery

Epicurus’ Epistle to Herodotus

Teachers of Epicureanism have always encouraged students to write down summaries of the doctrines for easy memorization, and outlines (often in the form of letters) were used widely as memory aids. Beginning-level Epicureans used to carry a Little Epitome with them, which was believed to be Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus. Once they assimilated the teachings of this epistle, which may have been a very short summary of Epicurus’ 37 books “On Nature”, they moved on to the Big Epitome where they were able to learn the advanced teachings.

The Epistle to Herodotus is a seminal work of natural philosophy and an important window into the history of early Western and scientific thought. It contains the earliest extant conversations between ancient atomists, and documents the progression of their arguments from the doctrine of atoms and void to their natural cosmology. It was preserved as part of Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Book Ten. In this translation, we have preserved the paragraph numbers used by most scholars for ease of reference.

Epicurus’ Epistle to Herodotus

35

“Epicurus to Herodotus, greeting.

On the importance of outlines and summaries

“For those who are unable to study carefully all my physical writings or to go into the longer treatises at all, I have myself prepared an epitome of the whole system, Herodotus, to preserve in the memory enough of the principal doctrines, to the end that on every occasion they may be able to aid themselves on the most important points, so far as they take up the study of Physics. Those who have made some advance in the survey of the entire system ought to fix in their minds under the principal headings an elementary outline of the whole treatment of the subject. For a comprehensive view is often required, the details but seldom.

36

“To the former, then – the main heads – we must continually return, and must memorize them so far as to get a valid conception of the facts, as well as the means of discovering all the details exactly when once the general outlines are rightly understood and remembered; since it is the privilege of the mature student to make a ready use of his conceptions by referring every one of them to elementary facts and simple terms. For it is impossible to gather up the results of continuous diligent study of the entirety of things, unless we can embrace in short formulas and hold in mind all that might have been accurately expressed even to the minutest detail.

37

“Hence, since such a course is of service to all who take up natural science, I, who devote to the subject my continuous energy and reap the calm enjoyment of a life like this, have prepared for you just such an epitome and manual of the doctrines as a whole.

Using the canon: anticipations, sensations, feelings

“In the first place, Herodotus, you must understand what it is that words denote, in order that by reference to this we may be in a position to test opinions, inquiries, or problems, so that our proofs may not run on untested ad infinitum, nor the terms we use be empty of meaning.

38

For the primary meaning of every term employed must be clearly seen, and ought to need no proving this being necessary, if we are to have something to which the point at issue or the problem or the opinion before us can be referred.

“Next, we must by all means stick to our sensations, that is, simply to the present impressions whether of the mind or of any criterion whatever, and similarly to our actual feelings, in order that we may have the means of determining that which needs confirmation and that which is obscure.

Nothing comes from nothing

“When this is clearly understood, it is time to consider generally things which are obscure. To begin with, nothing comes into being out of what is non-existent. For in that case anything would have arisen out of anything, standing as it would in no need of its proper germs.

39

And if that which disappears had been destroyed and become non-existent, everything would have perished, that into which the things were dissolved being non-existent. Moreover, the sum total of things was always such as it is now, and such it will ever remain. For there is nothing into which it can change. For outside the sum of things there is nothing which could enter into it and bring about the change.

Particles in space

“Further, the whole of being consists of bodies and space. For the existence of bodies is everywhere attested by sense itself, and it is upon sensation that reason must rely when it attempts to infer the unknown from the known.

40

And if there were no space (which we call also void and place and intangible nature), bodies would have nothing in which to be and through which to move, as they are plainly seen to move. Beyond bodies and space there is nothing which by mental apprehension or on its analogy we can conceive to exist. When we speak of bodies and space, both are regarded as wholes or separate things, not as the properties or accidents of separate things.

Bodies are either elementary or composite

“Again, of bodies some are composite, others the elements of which these composite bodies are made.

41

These elements are indivisible and unchangeable, and necessarily so, if things are not all to be destroyed and pass into non-existence, but are to be strong enough to endure when the composite bodies are broken up, because they possess a solid nature and are incapable of being anywhere or anyhow dissolved. It follows that the first beginnings must be indivisible, corporeal entities.

Universe is infinite

“Again, the sum of things is infinite. For what is finite has an extremity, and the extremity of anything is discerned only by comparison with something else. (Now the sum of things is not discerned by comparison with anything else: hence, since it has no extremity, it has no limit; and, since it has no limit, it must be unlimited or infinite.

“Moreover, the sum of things is unlimited both by reason of the multitude of the atoms and the extent of the void.

42

For if the void were infinite and bodies finite, the bodies would not have stayed anywhere but would have been dispersed in their course through the infinite void, not having any supports or counter-checks to send them back on their upward rebound. Again, if the void were finite, the infinity of bodies would not have anywhere to be.

Particles and primary elements have a limited variety of properties (1)

“Furthermore, the atoms, which have no void in them – out of which composite bodies arise and into which they are dissolved – vary indefinitely in their shapes; for so many varieties of things as we see could never have arisen out of a recurrence of a definite number of the same shapes. The like atoms of each shape are absolutely infinite; but the variety of shapes, though indefinitely large, is not absolutely infinite. [For neither does the divisibility go on “ad infinitum,” he says below; but he adds, since the qualities change, unless one is prepared to keep enlarging their magnitudes also simply “ad infinitum.”] (2)

Particles are always moving

“The atoms are in continual motion through all eternity.

43

[Further, he says below, that the atoms move with equal speed, since the void makes way for the lightest and heaviest alike.] Some of them rebound to a considerable distance from each other, while others merely oscillate in one place when they chance to have got entangled or to be enclosed by a mass of other atoms shaped for entangling.

44

“This is because each atom is separated from the rest by void, which is incapable of offering any resistance to the rebound; while it is the solidity of the atom which makes it rebound after a collision, however short the distance to which it rebounds, when it finds itself imprisoned in a mass of entangling atoms. Of all this there is no beginning, since both atoms and void exist from everlasting. [He says below that atoms have no quality at all except shape, size, and weight. But that colour varies with the arrangement of the atoms he states in his “Twelve Rudiments”; further, that they are not of any and every size; at any rate no atom has ever been seen by our sense.]

“The repetition at such length of all that we are now recalling to mind furnishes an adequate outline for our conception of the nature of things.

45

The doctrine of innumerable worlds

“Moreover, there is an infinite number of worlds, some like this world, others unlike it. For the atoms being infinite in number, as has just been proved, are borne ever further in their course. For the atoms out of which a world might arise, or by which a world might be formed, have not all been expended on one world or a finite number of worlds, whether like or unlike this one. Hence there will be nothing to hinder an infinity of worlds.

46

The nature of photons (films) and the speed of light

“Again, there are outlines or films, which are of the same shape as solid bodies, but of a thinness far exceeding that of any object that we see. For it is not impossible that there should be found in the surrounding air combinations of this kind, materials adapted for expressing the hollowness and thinness of surfaces, and effluxes preserving the same relative position and motion which they had in the solid objects from which they come. To these films we give the name of ‘images’ or ‘idols.’ Furthermore, so long as nothing comes in the way to offer resistance, motion through the void accomplishes any imaginable distance in an inconceivably short time. For resistance encountered is the equivalent of slowness, its absence the equivalent of speed.

47

“Not that, if we consider the minute times perceptible by reason alone, the moving body itself arrives at more than one place simultaneously (for this too is inconceivable), although in time perceptible to sense it does arrive simultaneously, however different the point of departure from that conceived by us. For if it changed its direction, that would be equivalent to its meeting with resistance, even if up to that point we allow nothing to impede the rate of its flight. This is an elementary fact which in itself is well worth bearing in mind. In the next place the exceeding thinness of the images is contradicted by none of the facts under our observation. Hence also their velocities are enormous, since they always find a void passage to fit them. Besides, their incessant effluence meets with no resistance, or very little, although many atoms, not to say an unlimited number, do at once encounter resistance.

48

“Besides this, remember that the production of the images is as quick as thought. For particles are continually streaming off from the surface of bodies, though no diminution of the bodies is observed, because other particles take their place. And those given off for a long time retain the position and arrangement which their atoms had when they formed part of the solid bodies, although occasionally they are thrown into confusion. Sometimes such films are formed very rapidly in the air, because they need not have any solid content; and there are other modes in which they may be formed. For there is nothing in all this which is contradicted by sensation, if we in some sort look at the clear evidence of sense, to which we should also refer the continuity of particles in the objects external to ourselves.

49

The objects we perceive are hitting our sensory receptors with particles

“We must also consider that it is by the entrance of something coming from external objects that we see their shapes and think of them. For external things would not stamp on us their own nature of colour and form through the medium of the air which is between them and us, or by means of rays of light or currents of any sort going from us to them, so well as by the entrance into our eyes or minds, to whichever their size is suitable, of certain films coming from the things themselves, these films or outlines being of the same colour and shape as the external things themselves. They move with rapid motion;

50

and this again explains why they present the appearance of the single continuous object, and retain the mutual interconnexion which they had in the object, when they impinge upon the sense, such impact being due to the oscillation of the atoms in the interior of the solid object from which they come. And whatever presentation we derive by direct contact, whether it be with the mind or with the sense-organs, be it shape that is presented or other properties, this shape as presented is the shape of the solid thing, and it is due either to a close coherence of the image as a whole or to a mere remnant of its parts. Falsehood and error always depend upon the intrusion of opinion (when a fact awaits) confirmation or the absence of contradiction, which fact is afterwards frequently not confirmed (or even contradicted) [following a certain movement in ourselves connected with, but distinct from, the mental picture presented – which is the cause of error.]

51

Various apprehensions of the same attestation produce checks and balances

“For the presentations which, e.g., are received in a picture or arise in dreams, or from any other form of apprehension by the mind or by the other criteria of truth, would never have resembled what we call the real and true things, had it not been for certain actual things of the kind with which we come in contact. Error would not have occurred, if we had not experienced some other movement in ourselves, conjoined with, but distinct from, the perception of what is presented. And from this movement, if it be not confirmed or be contradicted, falsehood results; while, if it be confirmed or not contradicted, truth results.

52

“And to this view we must closely adhere, if we are not to repudiate the criteria founded on the clear evidence of the senses, nor again to throw all these things into confusion by maintaining falsehood as if it were truth.

The nature of sound

“Again, hearing takes place when a current passes from the object, whether person or thing, which emits voice or sound or noise, or produces the sensation of hearing in any way whatever. This current is broken up into homogeneous particles, which at the same time preserve a certain mutual connexion and a distinctive unity extending to the object which emitted them, and thus, for the most part, cause the perception in that case or, if not, merely indicate the presence of the external object.

53

For without the transmission from the object of a certain interconnexion of the parts no such sensation could arise. Therefore we must not suppose that the air itself is moulded into shape by the voice emitted or something similar; for it is very far from being the case that the air is acted upon by it in this way. The blow which is struck in us when we utter a sound causes such a displacement of the particles as serves to produce a current resembling breath, and this displacement gives rise to the sensation of hearing.

On the material nature of smells

“Again, we must believe that smelling, like hearing, would produce no sensation, were there not particles conveyed from the object which are of the proper sort for exciting the organ of smelling, some of one sort, some of another, some exciting it confusedly and strangely, others quietly and agreeably.

54

The properties of particles are different from those of the bodies they compose

“Moreover, we must hold that the atoms in fact possess none of the qualities belonging to things which come under our observation, except shape, weight, and size, and the properties necessarily conjoined with shape. For every quality changes, but the atoms do not change, since, when the composite bodies are dissolved, there must needs be a permanent something, solid and indissoluble, left behind, which makes change possible: not changes into or from the non-existent, but often through differences of arrangement, and sometimes through additions and subtractions of the atoms. Hence these somethings capable of being diversely arranged must be indestructible, exempt from change, but possessed each of its own distinctive mass and configuration. This must remain.

55

Some properties (3) are inherent, others accidental

“For in the case of changes of configuration within our experience the figure is supposed to be inherent when other qualities are stripped off, but the qualities are not supposed, like the shape which is left behind, to inhere in the subject of change, but to vanish altogether from the body. Thus, then, what is left behind is sufficient to account for the differences in composite bodies, since something at least must necessarily be left remaining and be immune from annihilation.

Particles vary in size

“Again, you should not suppose that the atoms have any and every size, lest you be contradicted by facts; but differences of size must be admitted; for this addition renders the facts of feeling and sensation easier of explanation.

56

But to attribute any and every magnitude to the atoms does not help to explain the differences of quality in things; moreover, in that case atoms large enough to be seen ought to have reached us, which is never observed to occur; nor can we conceive how its occurrence should be possible, i.e. that an atom should become visible.

Bodies can not be divided infinitely, or else they would be of infinite size

“Besides, you must not suppose that there are parts unlimited in number, be they ever so small, in any finite body. Hence not only must we reject as impossible subdivision ad infinitum into smaller and smaller parts, lest we make all things too weak and, in our conceptions of the aggregates, be driven to pulverize the things that exist, i.e. the atoms, and annihilate them; but in dealing with finite things we must also reject as impossible the progression ad infinitum by less and less increments.

57

“For when once we have said that an infinite number of particles, however small, are contained in anything, it is not possible to conceive how it could any longer be limited or finite in size. For clearly our infinite number of particles must have some size; and then, of whatever size they were, the aggregate they made would be infinite. And, in the next place, since what is finite has an extremity which is distinguishable, even if it is not by itself observable, it is not possible to avoid thinking of another such extremity next to this. Nor can we help thinking that in this way, by proceeding forward from one to the next in order, it is possible by such a progression to arrive in thought at infinity.

58

We may infer about the minimal particles by observing the bodies they compose

“We must consider the minimum perceptible by sense as not corresponding to that which is capable of being traversed, i.e. is extended, nor again as utterly unlike it, but as having something in common with the things capable of being traversed, though it is without distinction of parts. But when from the illusion created by this common property we think we shall distinguish something in the minimum, one part on one side and another part on the other side, it must be another minimum equal to the first which catches our eye. In fact, we see these minima one after another, beginning with the first, and not as occupying the same space; nor do we see them touch one another’s parts with their parts, but we see that by virtue of their own peculiar character (i.e. as being unit indivisibles) they afford a means of measuring magnitudes: there are more of them, if the magnitude measured is greater; fewer of them, if the magnitude measured is less.

59

“We must recognize that this analogy also holds of the minimum in the atom; it is only in minuteness that it differs from that which is observed by sense, but it follows the same analogy. On the analogy of things within our experience we have declared that the atom has magnitude; and this, small as it is, we have merely reproduced on a larger scale. And further, the least and simplest things must be regarded as extremities of lengths, furnishing from themselves as units the means of measuring lengths, whether greater or less, the mental vision being employed, since direct observation is impossible. For the community which exists between them and the unchangeable parts (i.e. the minimal parts of area or surface) is sufficient to justify the conclusion so far as this goes. But it is not possible that these minima of the atom should group themselves together through the possession of motion.

60

Doctrine of relativity: an infinite cosmos has no center, only an infinite number of points of reference

“Further, we must not assert ‘up’ or ‘down’ of that which is unlimited, as if there were a zenith or nadir. As to the space overhead, however, if it be possible to draw a line to infinity from the point where we stand, we know that never will this space – or, for that matter, the space below the supposed standpoint if produced to infinity – appear to us to be at the same time ‘up’ and ‘down’ with reference to the same point; for this is inconceivable. Hence it is possible to assume one direction of motion, which we conceive as extending upwards ad infinitum, and another downwards, even if it should happen ten thousand times that what moves from us to the spaces above our heads reaches the feet of those above us, or that which moves downwards from us the heads of those below us. None the less is it true that the whole of the motion in the respective cases is conceived as extending in opposite directions ad infinitum.

61

Particles in space travel at great speed unless they meet resistance

“When they are travelling through the void and meet with no resistance, the atoms must move with equal speed. Neither will heavy atoms travel more quickly than small and light ones, so long as nothing meets them, nor will small atoms travel more quickly than large ones, provided they always find a passage suitable to their size, and provided also that they meet with no obstruction. Nor will their upward or their lateral motion, which is due to collisions, nor again their downward motion, due to weight, affect their velocity. As long as either motion obtains, it must continue, quick as the speed of thought, provided there is no obstruction, whether due to external collision or to the atoms’ own weight counteracting the force of the blow.

62

We can not infer about particles an identical behavior as composite bodies

“Moreover, when we come to deal with composite bodies, one of them will travel faster than another, although their atoms have equal speed. This is because the atoms in the aggregates are travelling in one direction during the shortest continuous time, albeit they move in different directions in times so short as to be appreciable only by the reason, but frequently collide until the continuity of their motion is appreciated by sense. For the assumption that beyond the range of direct observation even the minute times conceivable by reason will present continuity of motion is not true in the case before us. Our canon is that direct observation by sense and direct apprehension by the mind are alone invariably true.

63

On the nature of the mortal soul

“Next, keeping in view our perceptions and feelings (for so shall we have the surest grounds for belief), we must recognize generally that the soul is a corporeal thing, composed of fine particles, dispersed all over the frame, most nearly resembling wind with an admixture of heat, in some respects like wind, in others like heat. But, again, there is the third part which exceeds the other two in the fineness of its particles and thereby keeps in closer touch with the rest of the frame. And this is shown by the mental faculties and feelings, by the ease with which the mind moves, and by thoughts, and by all those things the loss of which causes death. Further, we must keep in mind that soul has the greatest share in causing sensation.

64

Still, it would not have had sensation, had it not been somehow confined within the rest of the frame. But the rest of the frame, though it provides this indispensable condition for the soul, itself also has a share, derived from the soul, of the said quality; and yet does not possess all the qualities of soul. Hence on the departure of the soul it loses sentience. For it had not this power in itself; but something else, congenital with the body, supplied it to body: which other thing, through the potentiality actualized in it by means of motion, at once acquired for itself a quality of sentience, and, in virtue of the neighbourhood and interconnexion between them, imparted it (as I said) to the body also.

65

“Hence, so long as the soul is in the body, it never loses sentience through the removal of some other part. The containing sheath may be dislocated in whole or in part, and portions of the soul may thereby be lost; yet in spite of this the soul, if it manage to survive, will have sentience. But the rest of the frame, whether the whole of it survives or only a part, no longer has sensation, when once those atoms have departed, which, however few in number, are required to constitute the nature of soul. Moreover, when the whole frame is broken up, the soul is scattered and has no longer the same powers as before, nor the same motions; hence it does not possess sentience either.

66

“For we cannot think of it as sentient, except it be in this composite whole and moving with these movements; nor can we so think of it when the sheaths which enclose and surround it are not the same as those in which the soul is now located and in which it performs these movements.

67

“There is the further point to be considered, what the incorporeal can be, if, I mean, according to current usage the term is applied to what can be conceived as self-existent. But it is impossible to conceive anything that is incorporeal as self-existent except empty space. And empty space cannot itself either act or be acted upon, but simply allows a body to move through it. Hence those who call soul incorporeal speak foolishly. For if it were so, it could neither act nor be acted upon. But, as it is, both these properties, you see, plainly belong to soul.

68

“If, then, we bring all these arguments concerning soul to the criterion of our feelings and perceptions, and if we keep in mind the proposition stated at the outset, we shall see that the subject has been adequately comprehended in outline: which will enable us to determine the details with accuracy and confidence.

“Moreover, shapes and colours, magnitudes and weights, and in short all those qualities which are predicated of body, in so far as they are perpetual properties either of all bodies or of visible bodies, are knowable by sensation of these very properties: these, I say, must not be supposed to exist independently by themselves (for that is inconceivable),

69

nor yet to be non-existent, nor to be some other and incorporeal entities cleaving to body, nor again to be parts of body. We must consider the whole body in a general way to derive its permanent nature from all of them, though it is not, as it were, formed by grouping them together in the same way as when from the particles themselves a larger aggregate is made up, whether these particles be primary or any magnitudes whatsoever less than the particular whole. All these qualities, I repeat, merely give the body its own permanent nature. They all have their own characteristic modes of being perceived and distinguished, but always along with the whole body in which they inhere and never in separation from it; and it is in virtue of this complete conception of the body as a whole that it is so designated.

70

Accidental properties of bodies

“Again, qualities often attach to bodies without being permanent concomitants. They are not to be classed among invisible entities nor are they incorporeal. Hence, using the term ‘accidents’ in the commonest sense, we say plainly that ‘accidents’ have not the nature of the whole thing to which they belong, and to which, conceiving it as a whole, we give the name of body, nor that of the permanent properties without which body cannot be thought of. And in virtue of certain peculiar modes of apprehension into which the complete body always enters, each of them can be called an accident.

71

But only as often as they are seen actually to belong to it, since such accidents are not perpetual concomitants. There is no need to banish from reality this clear evidence that the accident has not the nature of that whole – by us called body – to which it belongs, nor of the permanent properties which accompany the whole. Nor, on the other hand, must we suppose the accident to have independent existence (for this is just as inconceivable in the case of accidents as in that of the permanent properties); but, as is manifest, they should all be regarded as accidents, not as permanent concomitants, of bodies, nor yet as having the rank of independent existence. Rather they are seen to be exactly as and what sensation itself makes them individually claim to be.

72

Time is relative and accidental

“There is another thing which we must consider carefully. We must not investigate time as we do the other accidents which we investigate in a subject, namely, by referring them to the preconceptions envisaged in our minds; but we must take into account the plain fact itself, in virtue of which we speak of time as long or short, linking to it in intimate connexion this attribute of duration. We need not adopt any fresh terms as preferable, but should employ the usual expressions about it. Nor need we predicate anything else of time, as if this something else contained the same essence as is contained in the proper meaning of the word ‘time’ (for this also is done by some). We must chiefly reflect upon that to which we attach this peculiar character of time, and by which we measure it.

73

No further proof is required: we have only to reflect that we attach the attribute of time to days and nights and their parts, and likewise to states of movement and states of rest, conceiving a peculiar accident of these to be this very characteristic which we express by the word ‘time.’

Bodies are ever emerging, changing, and dissolving

“After the foregoing we have next to consider that the worlds and every finite aggregate which bears a strong resemblance to things we commonly see have arisen out of the infinite. For all these, whether small or great, have been separated off from special conglomerations of atoms; and all things are again dissolved, some faster, some slower, some through the action of one set of causes, others through the action of another.

74

On the diversity of planets

“And further, we must not suppose that the worlds have necessarily one and the same shape. [On the contrary, in the twelfth book “On Nature” he himself says that the shapes of the worlds differ, some being spherical, some oval, others again of shapes different from these. They do not, however, admit of every shape. Nor are they living beings which have been separated from the infinite.] For nobody can prove that in one sort of world there might not be contained, whereas in another sort of world there could not possibly be, the seeds out of which animals and plants arise and all the rest of the things we see. [And the same holds good for their nurture in a world after they have arisen. And so too we must think it happens upon the earth also.]

75

Nature learns skills, reason and culture perfect them

“Again, we must suppose that nature too has been taught and forced to learn many various lessons by the facts themselves, that reason subsequently develops what it has thus received and makes fresh discoveries, among some tribes more quickly, among others more slowly, the progress thus made being at certain times and seasons greater, at others less.

Origin of language

“Hence even the names of things were not originally due to convention, but in the several tribes under the impulse of special feelings and special presentations of sense primitive man uttered special cries. The air thus emitted was moulded by their individual feelings or sense-presentations, and differently according to the difference of the regions which the tribes inhabited.

76

Subsequently whole tribes adopted their own special names, in order that their communications might be less ambiguous to each other and more briefly expressed. And as for things not visible, so far as those who were conscious of them tried to introduce any such notion, they put in circulation certain names for them, either sounds which they were instinctively compelled to utter or which they selected by reason on analogy according to the most general cause there can be for expressing oneself in such a way.

Planets or stars are not gods or moved by gods; they move by their own nature

“Nay more: we are bound to believe that in the sky revolutions, solstices, eclipses, risings and settings, and the like, take place without the ministration or command, either now or in the future, of any being who at the same time enjoys perfect bliss along with immortality.

77

For troubles and anxieties and feelings of anger and partiality do not accord with bliss, but always imply weakness and fear and dependence upon one’s neighbours. Nor, again, must we hold that things which are no more than globular masses of fire, being at the same time endowed with bliss, assume these motions at will. Nay, in every term we use we must hold fast to all the majesty which attaches to such notions as bliss and immortality, lest the terms should generate opinions inconsistent with this majesty. Otherwise such inconsistency will of itself suffice to produce the worst disturbance in our minds. Hence, where we find phenomena invariably recurring, the invariableness of the recurrence must be ascribed to the original interception and conglomeration of atoms whereby the world was formed.

78

Science protects us from superstition (4)

“Further, we must hold that to arrive at accurate knowledge of the cause of things of most moment is the business of natural science, and that happiness depends on this (viz. on the knowledge of celestial and atmospheric phenomena), and upon knowing what the heavenly bodies really are, and any kindred facts contributing to exact knowledge in this respect.

Polyvalent logic so long as superstitions are discarded

“Further, we must recognize on such points as this no plurality of causes or contingency, but must hold that nothing suggestive of conflict or disquiet is compatible with an immortal and blessed nature. And the mind can grasp the absolute truth of this.

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On the limited usefulness of science for our happiness (5)

“But when we come to subjects for special inquiry, there is nothing in the knowledge of risings and settings and solstices and eclipses and all kindred subjects that contributes to our happiness; but those who are well-informed about such matters and yet are ignorant what the heavenly bodies really are, and what are the most important causes of phenomena, feel quite as much fear as those who have no such special information – nay, perhaps even greater fear, when the curiosity excited by this additional knowledge cannot find a solution or understand the subordination of these phenomena to the highest causes.

“Hence, if we discover more than one cause that may account for solstices, settings and risings, eclipses and the like, as we did also in particular matters of detail, we must not suppose that our treatment of these matters fails of accuracy, so far as it is needful to ensure our tranquillity and happiness.

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Infer about the non-evident and heavenly phenomena based on the evident

When, therefore, we investigate the causes of celestial and atmospheric phenomena, as of all that is unknown, we must take into account the variety of ways in which analogous occurrences happen within our experience; while as for those who do not recognize the difference between what is or comes about from a single cause and that which may be the effect of any one of several causes, overlooking the fact that the objects are only seen at a distance, and are moreover ignorant of the conditions that render, or do not render, peace of mind impossible – all such persons we must treat with contempt. If then we think that an event could happen in one or other particular way out of several, we shall be as tranquil when we recognize that it actually comes about in more ways than one as if we knew that it happens in this particular way.

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Heavenly bodies are not sentient

“There is yet one more point to seize, namely, that the greatest anxiety of the human mind arises through the belief that the heavenly bodies are blessed and indestructible, and that at the same time they have volitions and actions and causality inconsistent with this belief; and through expecting or apprehending some everlasting evil, either because of the myths, or because we are in dread of the mere insensibility of death, as if it had to do with us; and through being reduced to this state not by conviction but by a certain irrational perversity, so that, if men do not set bounds to their terror, they endure as much or even more intense anxiety than the man whose views on these matters are quite vague.

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But mental tranquillity means being released from all these troubles and cherishing a continual remembrance of the highest and most important truths.

“Hence we must attend to present feelings and sense perceptions, whether those of mankind in general or those peculiar to the individual, and also attend to all the clear evidence available, as given by each of the standards of truth. For by studying them we shall rightly trace to its cause and banish the source of disturbance and dread, accounting for celestial phenomena and for all other things which from time to time befall us and cause the utmost alarm to the rest of mankind.

Conclusion

“Here then, Herodotus, you have the chief doctrines of Physics in the form of a summary. So that,

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if this statement be accurately retained and take effect, a man will, I make no doubt, be incomparably better equipped than his fellows, even if he should never go into all the exact details. For he will clear up for himself many of the points which I have worked out in detail in my complete exposition; and the summary itself, if borne in mind, will be of constant service to him.

“It is of such a sort that those who are already tolerably, or even perfectly, well acquainted with the details can, by analysis of what they know into such elementary perceptions as these, best prosecute their researches in physical science as a whole; while those, on the other hand, who are not altogether entitled to rank as mature students can in silent fashion and as quick as thought run over the doctrines most important for their peace of mind.”

Such is his epistle on Physics.

Notes:

  1. We know that particles have a limited variety of properties because we observe in nature that different elements behave differently at different temperatures and in different circumstances, but this variety follows certain laws and never violates them.
  2. Diogenes Laertius left commentary as part of his report, based on his investigations.
  3. The ancient Greek word “atomos” means not-cuttable. The modern atomic theory does not neatly correspond with the original preconception of the atom. The modern English word for ancient Greek atoms is “particles”, sometimes rendered as “elementary particles”.
  4. Aphrodite Urania was the patroness Goddess of the Epicureans. Urania was also the name of the Muse of astronomy, which likely explains why Epicureans derived such great mental pleasure from the study of nature and from astronomy.
  5. Some enemies of Epicurus have accused him of being against learning and scholarship because he seems to limit the utility of science to how much pleasure it can add and how much pain, or superstitious fear, it can remove. But Epicurus had a clear understanding of the different goals of philosophy and of science. Raw scientific data can not replace or abolish the role of ethics. Ethics must coexist with scientific data, and guide its utility.