Category Archives: Friendship

No Politics*

NO POLITICS*

N. H. BARTMAN

*unless bailing friends from jail, shielding fugitives from extradition,
subverting property laws, emancipating slaves, empowering migrants,
amplifying female voices, funding monthly outreach programs, financing
stone monuments, patronizing finance ministers, ridiculing popular beliefs,
supporting good legislation, encouraging advantageous policies, distributing…

TABLE OF CONTENTS

· The Fruits of Society — Overview of Epicurean Politics
· Bustle, No Hustle — Politicking and Pólis-Living
· Ticks of the Pólis — The Urban Life of Epíkouros
· No Sleep Til Melítē — The Advantages of Citizenship
· Hiding in Plain Sight — Security By Association
· Live with Security (Not “in Obscurity”)  Láthe Biṓsas and Urbanity
· Law & Order — Hérmarkhos on the Common Defense
· Just Us — Epíkouros on Forming a More Perfect Union
· Strong Opinions — (A Brief History of Epicurean Political Engagement)
· Speaking Frankly — Philódēmos on Free Speech
· Bein’ Real and Breakin’ Balls The Pleasure of Decompressing
· Good Without Governing — Break Glass in Case of Pólis Collapse
· Brave Enough for Politics — The Power of Doing What You Can
· Part of This World — Take Responsibility for Your Thingamabobs

 


NO POLITICS

NOTE: Among all other Hellenistic schools, the Epicurean Garden boasts the greatest conceptual consistency as a philosophy, and the greatest historical consistency as an institution—after all, practical teachings that provide useful knowledge do not require revisions. To ensure that readers are being exposed to ancient source material, and not just the paraphrasing of modern academics, each citation has been studiously documented.

The Fruits of Society

Epíkouros did not mince words:

ΟΥΔE ΠΟΛΙΤΕΥΕΣΘΑΙ
oúde politeúesthai1

Life is best “NOT TO BE POLITICKED”.2 For the sake of living well, lovers of wisdom are exhorted by the Sage to neither “pursue public office”, nor “conduct government”, nor “administer the state”. After all, the “purest security is generated out of the peace and withdrawal from the masses”,3 as also it “is predominately perfected [by] friendship”.4 A life of constant struggle makes it difficult for a person to “take risks for the sake of friendship”.5 Political ambition itself challenges the natural goal of living a sweet life. God would never suffer the stress of office — why should the wise?6

Even so, the Hēgēmṓn recognizes that “some security” can be expected to be “generated out of [mutual association with other] people” so far as concerns a “certain supportive power and [mutual] abundance”.7 Epíkouros never passes an injunction against observing jurisprudence, nor dismisses the benefits of practical legislation. He affirms that the wise “will serve jury duty” and “at [a certain] time [will even be willing] to serve a monarch […] and will gain notoriety in public”.8 Hérmarkhos quips that even the multitude” see an obvious “advantage arising from an association with each other.”9

While “nothing is needed” in terms of things “acquired through competitions” and politicalassemblies”,10 nowheredoes the Sage dismiss the benefits of civic engagement, nor disparage the fruits of mutual association. After all, “it is possible for [the divine] nature to exist even with many troubles surrounding it.”11 The wealth of Naturethatis both defined and obtainable12 includes not only resources and replenishments, but people to call friends, and a place to practice friendship.

ΤΩΝ ΣΥΜΠΟΛΙΤΕΥΟΜEΝΩΝ
tṓn sympoliteuoménōn13

In the case “of those being governed together” or “of those being politically-engaged with one another14 (e.g. neighbors, citizens) the cultivation of mutual associations is foundational to living a good life. Indeed “only as a result of [learning to live with] those [others] can the [good life] possibly hope to be procured”.15 Far from demonizing all pólis-related activities, Epíkouros affirms that any association that cultivates “courage out of [living with other] peopleis, by nature, good”. When it comes to mutual association, the fruits of “political” activity are still sweet.

Bustle, No Hustle

The verb πολιτεύω (politeúō) includes both [1] the activity of “holding public office” and also [2] the general conditions related to “living as a citizen” (in a pólis). Epíkouros questions the practicality the former, but remarks on the utility of the latter. On one hand, he warns against the troubles that come from administering the affairs of the state. On the other, he praises the advantages that come from “being a citizen”, “being governed together”, and “living in a state”. The Hēgēmṓn warns against the troubles that come from living with politics, but defends the benefits of living within polities.

Ticks of the Pólis

Over half of the human population (over 4 billion people) of the 21st-century live in póleis, but this was not always the case. In the ancient world, less than 5% of all human beings lived in urban centers. As a result, pólis-related activities were once much less characteristic of the average human experience. The vast majority of humanity was dispersed across the globe in loose networks of settlements.

Epíkouros, however, was not among them. Nor was his family, nor most of his friends, nor many of his students. In fact, the Sage spent the vast majority of his life within the jurisdiction of a póleis. Raised in the prosperous, maritime hub of Sámos, Epíkouros was conscripted to Athens, the largest pólis in Greece, “City of the Violet Crown”.16 After two years of services, Epíkouros returns to his family in Ionia, who had since moved to rural Kolophṓn — the village presented him with limited, intellectual opportunities, so the Gargettian pursued education in nearby Téōs. Once he finished his education, he launched a career in Mytilḗnē, the largest pólis on the island of Lésbos, until advancing to the hub of Lámpsakos, where he cultivated a devoted following. He then returned to Athens, and founded the Garden. As his moniker suggests, the “Gargettian” was well-acquainted with the ways of the póleis.

History records “the famous Gargettian”17 as having been born on the Ionian island of Sámos, which was a cleruchy or independent colony of Athens at the time. His parents hailed from the Attic dḗmē18 of Gargēttós,19 and, as a result of his family’s political enfranchisement, he was afforded legal privileges as a citizen, such as the privilege to purchase property. Were it not for the fact of his citizenship and the advantage of his lineage, Epíkouros could not have founded The Garden.

Indeed, the Gargettian did not dwell in the wilderness like a locust-eating, doomsday-preaching ascetic.20 To the contrary, he owned a private home in the center of the largest pólis in ancient Greece.

No Sleep Til Melítē

In 306 BCE, after fifteen years off of the coast of Ionia, 35-year-old Epíkouros moves to Athens, largest pólis in Greece (and one of the largest póleis in the Eastern Mediterranean after Syracuse in Sicily and Alexándreia in Egypt). As history records, when given the choice, the Athenian pólis provided the Hēgēmṓn with more utility than the “withdrawal” of isolated settlements. In an era where most people were not living pólis-related lives, the ancient Epicureans chose the pleasures of the pólis. The students of the Garden chose to hold themselves accountable to pólis-related laws, and pay pólis-related taxes, embrace pólis-related ceremonies, celebrate pólis-related holidays, and enjoy pólis-related pleasures. In a world of wilderness, Epicureans aimed to enjoy the privileges of the pólis.

The fact of his citizenship gave Epíkouros the right to make a number of financial acquisitions: he acquired a residence in affluent Melítē,21 a city district in the center of Athens. He also deliberately purchased property between the Dípylon Gate and Plátōn‘s Akadēmía, which he called The Garden. Citizenship afforded him the right to file his Will at the mētrṓion (an administrative office that would facilitate inheritance). The document allocated funds for posthumous holidays, facilitated the successor-guardianship of the children of Metródōros and Polyaīnos (both having sons named Epikoúros), and established a dowry for Metródōros’ daughter. Lastly, it ensured the manumission of four slaves: “I set free Mýs, Nikías, Lýkōn: I likewise grant Little Phaídra [her] freedom.22

These inheritances and emancipations were afforded as a consequence of Epíkouros’ political status as a citizen. These actions were facilitated by the “supportive power” of the Athenian state. The public officials who preserved the archives (at the mētrṓion) ensured that the Hēgemṓn’s wishes were executed according to the conditions of his written will. As a result of his legal agency, his public presence, and his willingness to use the machinery of the pólis,Epíkouros’ best friend, Hérmarkhos, an immigrant who followed him as a child from Mytilḗnē, not only becomes the “hēgemṓn having been left behind”,23 but also becomes the financial manager of the Athenian Garden. The “succession” of the Epicurean school thus “goes on […] and [has hosted] countless of the familiar authorities”. 24

Hiding in Plain Sight

As a matter of practicality, Epíkouros affirms that the wise “will make plans to gain public approval” even if “only so far as to avoid being treated with contempt […] and will gain notoriety in public, but not enthusiastically”.25 Were it not for the practical utility of association, “it [might be] better not to receive public preferment”.26 Yet Philódēmos explains that “philosophers gain the friendship of public men by helping them out of their troubles27 and “those whom they find opposed to them they quickly soften”.28 As his biographer describes, the Sage of the Garden exemplifies this ideal:

Witnesses [revere] this considerable man [and his] unsurpassable goodwill to everyone, both [to those in his] fatherland [who] honored him with bronze statues, and his friends, so many [in] their extent as it would not be possible to measure [them with] whole cities, and all those familiar [with] the dogmatic[wisdom] of his [that enables them] to gain mastery over the [deceitful] sirens [of suffering].29

Defending the friendly disposition of Epíkouros, Diogénēs further celebrates

his unsurpassable kindness […] his gratitude to his progenitors, and his beneficence to his brothers, and his gentleness to his servants […] and that the [servants] philosophized with him […] and on the whole, his philanthropism [was apparent] to everyone, indeed his piety for the gods, and his fond disposition for his fatherland; for [owing to his] hyperbole [for] kindness, he never fastened to politics30

Live with Security (Not “in Obscurity”)

Indeed, the Hēgēmṓn “never fastened to politics” as a profession, nor as a means of income, (nor as a dubious obsession), but certainly, he fastened to the pólis, only leaving Athens “twice or thrice” to visit “friends” in “Ionia”, throughout the latter half of his life (nearly thirty-five, uninterrupted years in the pólis). This may surprise readers familiar with the Sage’s recommendation to “live unknown”.

The phrase λάθε βιώσας31 (láthe biṓsas, meaning “escape notice [‘n’] live!”) is usually translated as “live hidden”, “unnoticed”, “in obscurity”, “in anonymity”, or “live unknown”. Therein, Epíkouros encouraged his friends and followers to cultivate lives of philosophical calm, estranged from egotistical ambitions, indifferent to accolades, immune to the allure of approval, unburdened by popular opinion, unimpressed by affluence, uninspired by opulence, and liberated from vain beliefs about fame. He challenges them to live lives too blissfully unremarkable to appear on the turbulent pages of history. Truly, “there is no method by which one can” reliably “persuade the multitude, either always or in the majority of cases”,32 so politics is an unreliable and often unprofitable career path. To compensate for this condition, success in politics requires either “a lot of money made through unscrupulous means” or “servility to the mob or authority”.33 Neither of those conditions are conducive to happiness.

ΛΑΘΕ ΒΙΩΣΑΣ
láthe34 biṓsas35

This exhortation principally addresses private vulnerabilities (like envy) that lead a person to short-sighted decisions, which then increases overall public insecurity. In the context of a pólis, Epíkouros’ invocation to “live unknown” serves not as a call to the wild, but an affirmation to live a dignified life navigating society gracefully, without attracting unwanted attention. One might “withdraw” from the trends “of the masses” and cultivate emotional “stillness”, intellectual “peace”, and mental “tranquility” without abandoning one’s role as a neighbor and fellow citizen. One need not renounce the pleasant comforts of urban life (where they exist), retreat to a cave, or isolate oneself in the vast desert to find peace. The life of the wise need not be suffered in solitude, not silenced for the sake of virtue. To live in a pólis, it is necessary “to obtain money, and to prevent disfranchisement and exile”.36

Epíkouros was not drawn to the pólis for its troubles and deceptive rhetoric, but by her pleasures. He thus provides students with a set of expectations as concerns the benefits of both justice and law.

Law & Order

In a perfect community (of divinities), “there would be no need of laws”.37 However, within the póleis of the Earth, the wise do not observe all humans to be “capable of surveying and recollecting what is advantageous”. Not all neighbors will exercise neighborly relations, observing “pacts to neither harm nor be harmed”.38 Not all neighbors are willing to observe “the beneficial tendency” of laws, for example, against “readily destroying each other”.39 It is often necessary to defend “against harm from such people”.40 Indeed, for “the sake of achieving a profitable [outcome]”, groups of people “should not indiscriminately destroy each other”.41 It is therefore reasonable to safeguard “the salvation42 of the community with law — simultaneously, the community “works together for the sake of the distinct salvation of each [person]”. Granted, one need not reduce themselves to being a cog in the machine of society, especially “where one[could be] profitable [being] separated”, but one must still review their impact so that they are “not to produce ruinous” conditions for neighbors and fellow citizens.

Observing a social contract, Hérmarkhos insists that “legal institutes” originally “became lawful [not] through violence,” and forced coercion, “but through the consent of those that used them.”43 Certainly, it would be preferable if all humans “would spontaneously avoid such things” that lead to their neighbors’ destruction, yet not everyone can be expected to “do that which is right” in terms “of what is useful” and what is “detrimental”.44 Thus, anticipating inevitable abuses, “legislators ordained, that even involuntary” crime “should not be entirely void of punishment; in order that they might not only afford no pretext for the voluntary imitation of those deeds which were involuntarily performed”.45[H]ence legislators, wishing to restrain that indolence which is injurious to our neighbours” employed the tool of legislation and thereafter “prevented the commission of numerous offences”.46 Hence they endeavored still more firmly to restrain those who readily destroyed each other.47 Then “in attempting to effect this, they introduced those legal institutes which still remain in cities and nations48

By doing so, ancient legislators act toward “advancing the community itself” in terms of developing “the necessary [services in society]” so that “a befitting [community will have been] generated through [the] long [commitment to the aid] of one another.49 Unlike many of their philosophical opponents, the Epicureans provided an evolutionary description of human history, and explained that society developed gradually, over long periods, ultimately guided by the natural benefits of nature.

Then neighbours began to form the bonds of friendship, with a will
Neither to be harmed themselves, nor do another ill,
The safety of babes and womenfolk in one another’s trust,
And indicated by gesturing and grunting it was just
For everyone to have mercy on the weak. Without a doubt
Occasional infractions of the peace would come about,
But the vast majority of people faithfully adhered
To the pact, or else man would already have wholly disappeared;
Instead, the human race has propagated to this day.50

Though trouble is risked when pursuing a political career, that does not mean that legislators are categorically unable to help satisfy the natural needs of a community. By contrast, “thousands of [Greeks] have been useful ambassadors, were prudent in their advice, were not the cause of disaster, did not speak with an eye to gain, and were not convicted of malfeasance in office.”51 They are less concerned with trying “to classify and describe metaphors” instead of trying to give “practical working instructions”.52 In this regard, one canfind reason for pursuing practical rhetoric”. 53

Hermarkhos congratulates the wisdom of early legislators: “For those who introduced things of this kind to the multitude, excelled in wisdom” and demonstrated “a rational consideration of utility”. To prevent violent crimes, they threatened “the dread of the punishment ordained by law” as a “remedy for” those who possess “ignorance of what is beneficial”. For the threat of “punishment forcibly compels such as these to” consider the consequences of being unwilling to “subdue those impulses which lead them to useless actions” and “even now keeps the vulgar in awe, and” contributes to dissuading “them from doing any thing, either publicly or privately, which is not beneficial” to the community.54

[A]ncients legislators […] proclaimed unholy the slaughter of [an innocent] human […due to] one, natural association existing [among] the people, in the name of people, due to the similarity of [their]forms and of [their] souls [] a [murder is] not [going] to contribute towards [easing] the whole tension of life [that needs] to be supported55

Of course, circumstances change. Just laws can become unjust. The machine of politics creates emergent problems of its own that could be avoided by avoiding the pólis in the first place. Mutual human association develop prior to the compounding of society, so justice is natural, and informs our political outlooks. On this topic, of the justness of political relations, Epíkouros has a lot to say.

Just Us

At least half of the 40 Key Doctrines56 of Epíkouros address the conditions that arise from human co-existence. No less than 9 of those Doctrines57 mention “the nature of the just” or “justice” as when “someone establishes a law”.58Regarding the origin and nature of justice, Epíkouros writes (in full):

31The justice of nature is [a] pact [formed out] of a [mutual] profiting towards the [hope] neither to harm one another nor to be harmed. 32As of the animals [with whom] a pact was not able to be drafted in defense of the [hope] to neither harm nor be harmed, before these [pacts existed] nothing was just nor unjust; but in like manner also as [concerns the case] of the tribes [with whom a pact] was not able [to be composed] or [with whom] a pact was not wished to be composed, in [absence] of a [pact] to neither harm nor be harmed [so too was nothing just nor unjust]. 33Justice was not something [real] by itself, but [existed] in the gatherings [of the people] for the sake of one another, by however big [their]assemblies, but at some time, [at a] certain place, always for the sake of a [pact] neither to harm nor to be harmed. 34Injustice [is] not by itself evil, but [what is evil is] in the fear concerning the apprehension[of] whether [one] will not escape [the] notice [of] those punishers [who] have been monitoring in case of such [violations]. 35The one secretly moving [against all] of that (which they agreed [upon] with each other regarding the [pact] neither to harm nor to be harmed) is not [able] to have confidence that they will escape notice, even if ten-thousand-times by aid of the [one] being present they may escape notice; for until a catastrophic end [it will be] unclear if even they will escape detection. 36Concerning, on one hand, that [which is] common [for] all, what [is] just [is generally] the same, for some [natural] profiting was [always] being [generated by living] in a community with one another; concerning, however, what [is] unique [in terms] of place and [in terms] of however long a time [one is affected because] of the[underlying] causes then [what is] just [is] not [for] all [therefore] being followed to be the same. 37What truly is witnessed, that one profits in the service of the community [by providing utility] to one another,[this] possesses the character of the just, even if either the same might be generated [for] all, or even if the same could not [be generated for all]. If then one should pass [a] law, [that] should not result from the profiting of the community between one another, [then] no longer does it possess the nature of the just. And if it may fall from the [mark] concerning a just profiting, [for the] time then [that it] is fitted to the preconception59 of justice, [it is] not at all inferior in that way [at] the time [it] was just [and with reflection] the vain cries themselves may not confound, but look to the facts. 38When not [thought to be just, in the case] of recent [changes] being generated [as a result] of the surrounding affairs [of state], it was revealed not fitting in regard to the preconception60 [of justice against] the [things that] have been considered just in respect of the same matters [that in the past exemplified justice] — it was not [existing except as] those [things considered] just. But when [because] of recent [changes] being generated [out]of the [surrounding] affairs [of state], it was not yet harmonizing [with] the same just proceedings, therein then, at the time, truly, it was just, when [one] was profiting throughout the community with one another [in the case] of those who are politicallyengaged together;61 later then it was still not just, when not profiting together.

As described, regarding “those who are governed together”, Epíkouros expresses concern against both unjust actions, as with “one secretly moving against […] the pact neither to harm nor to be harmed” as well as laws that “no longer possesses the nature of what is just”. He expresses equal concern for those “tribes [with whom a pact] was not able to be composed” and expresses specific concern toward those tribes with whom “pact was not wished to be composed”, anticipating that the wise may need to respond to hostile parties as they would against wild animals. He observes the mutual benefits of society as when “one passes [a] law” that results in “the profiting of the community between one another”, and positively urges that every “one profits in the service of the community [by providing utility] to one another”. Indeed, rather than “not engaging in politics”, Epíkouros urges students to support laws that “possess the mark of justice”. Wise people will respond to unjust laws accordingly, both making “fitting” changes out “of the affairs [of state]”, and observing unjust laws selectively.

These foundational observations (in principle) are echoed throughout the documents that punctuate American history. The Declaration of Independence observes “certain unalienable Rights”, that “among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed”. The Preamble of the U.S. Constitution asserts that “in Order to form a more perfect Union,” the “People” set to “establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity”. In his Gettysburg Address, President Lincoln describes a “government of the people, by the people, for the people”. (World history presents many more examples than those easily accessible to my mind. Certainly, there are complications and nuances to the implementation of these ideals.)

As an animal cannot operate within its environment without making biome-related observations, so too is a human animal unable operate within a pólis without making pólis-related observations. As observers, Epicureans have amassed a breadth of observations within the walls of the póleis.

Strong Opinions

As we know from Philódēmos, “it is not like Epicurus to hesitate to speak the truth”.62 After all, the Epicurean sages “will be opinionated and will not be puzzled.”63 Far from abstaining from political speech, many Epicureans were known for their categorically-political commentary.

Philódēmos outright calls “democracy” the “worst form of government.64 He tutored Julius Caesar’s (then future) wife Calpurnia, and may have shared Cesarean sympathies, as did his close friend, Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus (Calpurnia’s father). These sympathies were shared by prominent Epicureans of 1st-century BCE Rome, including Gaius Trebatius Testa, Gaius Matius, Gaius Vibius Pansa Caetronianus, Lucius Cornelius Balbus, Publius Cornelius Dolabella, and Publius Volumnius Etrapelus. Conversely, a number of the Roman philosophers held positions againstCaesar, as was the case with Marcus Tullius Cicero and his Epicurean associates Aulus Manlius Torquatus, Lucius Manlius Torquatus, Aulus Hirtius, Gaius Cassius Longinus, Gaius Trebianus, Lucius Papirius Paetus, Marcus Fadius Gallus, and Statilius. The descriptions that Cicero catalogues preserve a spectrum of positions, from a dozen, political Epicureans, just prior to the collapse of the Rēs Pūblica.

The Romans, entrenched in their Great Civil War were far from being the only Epicureans of the ancient world who approached the political podium. In 88 BCE an Epicurean65 ambassador to Mithridátēs VI named Aristíōn66 seized the Athenian government and assumed the role of a tyrant:67

Archelaus sent them the sacred treasure of Delos by the hands of Aristion, an Athenian citizen, attended by 2,000 soldiers to guard the money. These soldiers Aristion made use of to make himself master of the country, putting to death immediately some of those who favored the Romans and sending others to Mithridates. And these things he did although he professed to be a philosopher of the school of Epicurus.

Within two years, the Roman general Sulla would conquer Athens and execute Aristíōn. Twenty years, later, a man named Lysías of Tarsós assumes the role of tyrant. Athḗnaios writes:

at Tarsus an Epicurean philosopher […] had become the tyrant of that city, Lysias by name; who having been created by his countrymen Stephanephorus, that is to say, the priest of Heracles, did not lay down his command, but seized on the tyranny. He put on a purple tunic with a white centre, and over that he wore a very superb and costly cloak, and he put on white Lacedaemonian sandals, and assumed also a crown of golden laurel leaves. And he distributed the property of the rich among the poor, and put many to death who did not surrender their property willingly.

Echoing the diversity of opinions held by Epicureans during the Roman Republic, the French Epicureans of the Baroque period68 introduce diverse political commentary into modern, Epicurean literature. They served flavors ranging from monarchism to liberalism to anarchism, united by their common, intellectual descent from the Epicurean Garden, and their shared rejection of the Church.

Early figures, like Michel de Montaigne and François de la Moethe le Vayer advocated “pragmatic” submission to monarchy. Others resisted, like Théophile de Viau and his lover Jacques Vallée Des Barreaux. Some came to question the divine authority of the state like Pierre Gassendi. To these, we add Machiavellian thinkers like Gabriel Naudé, and his friend Gui Patin. Aristocrats hosted salons, like the defiant courtesan Marion Delorme, and her lover Charles de Saint-Évremond, as well as the libertine Ninon de l’Enclos. François VI, Duc de La Rochefoucauld fought in the Fronde against both Cardinal Richelieu and the King’s Musketeers. Physician François Bernier came to revile the political “despotism” that he witnessed in Asia. Among poets, Antoinette Deshoulières shared loyalties with King Louis XIV, while Guillaume Amfrye de Chaulieu resisted royal authority. Jean de la Chapelle, the “father of French epicurean poetry” developed nationalistic propaganda against the Habsburg dynasty, while a series of anti-clerical secularists, including Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Denis Diderot, and Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron d’Holbach influenced minds like John Locke and Thomas Jefferson.

During the American Revolution, an Epicurean physician named Thomas helped organize the Boston Tea Party. His student, an Epicurean officer named Ethan helped found the State of Vermont. Another Epicurean friend of theirs (also named Thomas) gets elected as the 3rd President of the United States. In the 19th-century, an Epicurean feminist named Frances advocated utopian socialism. In the 20th-century, an Epicurean intellectual named Christopher shared critical insights on authoritarianism. In the 21st-century, an Epicurean farmer named José served as the 40th Presidente de la República Oriental del Uruguay. Each of these passionately political figures identified themselves as students of the Garden. “I too am an Epicurean” wrote Thomas Jefferson.69 Christopher Hitchens echoed Jefferson’s statement of purpose.70 Presidente José Mujica affirmed in his “humble way of thinking, that the problem we are facing is political. The Old Thinkers” like “Epicurus […] put it this way: a poor person is not someone who has little but one who needs infinitely more, and more and more.”71

Based on two-thousands years of anecdotes, it seems unrealistic to attempt to purge the pólis-related interests from the human mind, as though the pólis were fundamentally evil. Quite the opposite, the origins of political activity serve to promote the benefits of mutual association. Humans have engaged and re-engaged póleis-related activities for millennia, whether patronizing the Théatro tou Dionýsou, or catching a Broadway matinee. Far better is it for a happy human not to avoid the pólis (as a great pain), but rather, to maximize the natural goods that directly result from pólis-related activities. This means gracefully navigate pólis-related exchanges, rather than eliminating them from our thoughts.

Speaking Frankly

While one is best to “avoid contact” with antagonists and “expel them from thought”, it is not always the case that “these practices prove to be useful”.72 While it might be preferred to eliminate contact with antagonistic personalities, this is not always possible. Citizens must find ways to preserve their peace through compromise. After all, “the harmony that to some is good for others is indifferent”.73

Unlike the Socratic sages who alleged to “know nothing”, Epíkoruos affirms that true sages “will be opinionated.”74 At the same time, the ancient Epicureans criticize Sōkrátēs for having “offended many people and incurred political enmities, from which indeed in time hatred grew”.75 Of course, practicing free speech does not excuse one from the consequences of speaking. Thus, a wise person should “not [get] carried away so as to insult or strut or show contempt [or] do harm”.76 Pick your battles, for “there is no [necessity] to apply frankness in every case.”77 Philódēmos weighs the need to speak frankly against the practical ability of a person to receive criticism, hoping (usually) for them to enjoy the greatest advantage from constructive guidance. He explains that it “is hard work for those who are handling [a topic] by way of an epitome to be precise about every kind”78 since there are so many unique personalities, distinct relationships, and nuanced contexts. (Nonetheless, he attempts to do so).

Philódēmos wonders, “How will he handle those who have become angry toward him because of his frank criticism?79First, remember that “some [do not] perceive their own errors” and “it causes [them] to dis[trust]”,80 being “afflicted with passions that puff one up or generally hinder one”.81 Even so, to address the errors, the “wise person and philosopher speaks frankly” understanding that their criticism “should be administered appropriately”.82 As a result, they “will differ for each […] just as a lad differs from a woman and old men will differ […] and youngsters alike [… and one must admonish] prominent [men] and peoples according to each”.83 He notes that privileged citizens “do not gladly accept others confuting them [because] they believe that many people reproach them out of envy”.84

Some will require “a caring admonishment” instead of “an irony that pleases but pretty much stings” – many will become alienated when stung.85 Thereafter, they “cannot possibly endure [to listen] to [that them] with goodwill.”86Others “have judged it right to speak frankly [to] such people, but [moderately], given that sharp frankness bears a similarity to insult, as if insulting indeed out of ill will.87 Along those lines, one must not say “contemptuous or disparaging things […] in a strained tone”.88For how is he going to hate the one who errs […] when he knows that he himself is not perfect and rem[inds himself that everyone is accustomed to err?]89 Recognizing the profitability of patience, “if someone […] has been slighted, we do not prevent [them] from casting blame” nor assume them to have “been discredited”.90 Yet demanding all deliveries be sweetened attracts “men who are charlatans […] seizing them after some stress and enchanting them with their subtle kindnesses.91

In the case of “those more in need of treatment,” a caring teacher “intensifies [frankness]”. 92[T]he [wise man], being a person-tamer, [probes] the disobedience of a young man who is [arrogant].”93As Philódēmos describes, “they [will employ frankness] aggressively in regard to [laziness and] procrastination.”94 Often, a wise person “speaks frankly because” obstinate persons “made him speak frankly toward them”.95 As he explains, “it is necessary to show him his errors forthrightly and speak of his failings publicly.”96 In these cases, “we shall admonish others with great confidence”.97 For the sake education, one must not censure necessary criticism in the name of softening the proverbial blow, since “to act in secret is necessarily most unfriendly, no doubt. For he who does not report [errors] is clearly covering up these things […] and there will be no advantage”.98 The truth must be presented or else the error will not be corrected and the student will not grow. Provoking the temperament of a student “must be risked [or] otherwise [they]do not pay heed” and may never advance in wisdom.99

To an extent, it is necessary for the student “to endure admonishment graciously”.100 If they “will behave” tyrannically, then rational minds will rightly “hold [them] to be un[beara]ble”,101 as in the case of “some people who make jokes but do not endure others [making jokes at their expense]”.102 Certainly, wise people will adjust their tone to maximize the retention of those with whom they speak, but wise people need to vent like the rest of us, and Epicureans found pleasure in bonding over issues.

Now, if only one person or two or three or four or five or six or any larger number you choose, sir, provided that it is not very large, were in a bad predicament, I should address them individually and do all in my power to give them the best advice. But, as I have said before, the majority of people suffer from a common disease, as in a plague, with their false notions about things, and their number is increasing (for in mutual emulation they catch the disease from one another, like sheep)103

So far as concerns tone, the wise will not “tyrannize”, neither inflating dictatorial fantasies, nor indulging authoritarian ambitions (as Epíkouros writes “in the second book of On Lifestyles”);104 nor will they bark like a cynic”, after all, “one cannot be fearless” and enjoy the fruits of association if “one causes [others to be] fearful”.105In speaking one should not resort to ignoble rhetorical tricks, these have less effect than a straight-forward character”.106 Philódēmos cautions against employing “panegyric” rhetoric to advance an agenda — the wise will neither weaponize “charming speeches107 to manipulate crowds, nor patronize politicians with pageantry “in the fashion of the sophists”.108Philódēmos asks, “How can a natural philosopher become a politician and rhetor?”109 He affirms that “by no means should the philosopher acquire political experience”,110 which simply requires one to study “what pleases the crowd and practicing”.111 In this regard, “politics is the worst foe of friendship”.112 Whereas “everyone who bears goodwill and practices philosophy intelligently and continually […] is great in character and indifferent to fame” and “least of all a politician”.113

Be mindful of what you say — but among true friends, always speak your mind.

Bein’ Real and Breakin’ Balls

While thoughtful speech is recommended when engaging acquaintances, Philódēmos acknowledges that “there is nothing so grand as having one to whom one will say what is in one’s heart” without censoring oneself as if expecting censure, “for our nature strongly desires to reveal to some people what it thinks.”114 Of course, sharing “what is in one’s heart” with the wrong person can “further inflame […] those same men who do not like [them]”. Nonetheless, it is far healthier and more pleasurable to be involved “with one who is pure and loves [you] and […] knows how to treat [you].”115

Philódēmos supposes that “the wise men recognize each other, [and] will be reminded pleasurably by one another […]and they will sting each other with the gentlest of stings and will acknowledge gratitude”.116 Along those lines, a wise person should also be able to take a joke.

Good Without Governing

Ultimately, laws are temporary, conditions are unstable, and legislation is never as robust as inner strength. Even compared against the resources provided by of political agreements, “most valuable of all [is] self-sufficiency”,117 which allows us to “have confidence” when those agreements dissolve and “one might be in want of things”.118 As with every person, every place, and every planet, so, too, will every pólis dissolve. In the absence of law, wise people would still act ethically. For “philosophers do not enter politics, yet they help their native land by teaching the young to obey the laws; nay more, by teaching them to act justly even if there are no laws, and to shun injustice as they would fire.”119

The Epicurean Garden does not require the existence of a stable pólis to secure the good life. Plátōn supposed the best life to be lived within an ideal state ruled by a philosopher king. Aristotélēs described humans as being “political animals”120 that could not flourish without the advancement of political objectives — indeed, Karl Marx preferred Aristotélēs “above all the Ancients”.121 Stoics like the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius approached political office as a philosophical duty, though advising neutrality to “be neither of the green nor of the blue party at the games in the Circus”.122 Epicureans, however, did not evaluate their moral agency as a function their success in the political profession.

Happiness cannot depend upon “great commodities, nor pretentious business, nor authority, nor power, but painlessness and feeling gentleness.”123 After all, Epíkouros affirms to a student that “we must liberate ourselves, out of the prison [built] upon circular [proceedings]124 and political125 [affairs]”.126 He encourages Pythoklḗs to “avoid all programming127 and congratulates Apellḗs on having “committed to philosophy cleanly from every impurity” related to acculturation.128 [L]et us be content”, writes Philódēmos, “to live the quiet life of a philosopher without claiming a share in the ability to manage a city by persuasion”.129 He observes that every “good and honest [person] who confines [their] interest to philosophy alone, and disregards the nonsense of lawyers” and their legislative squabbles “can face boldly all such troubles, yea all powers and the whole world.”130

Not Brave Enough for Politics

The “political podium” is not the only mechanism by which to affect meaningful change in a pólis.

Epíkouros did not ban slavery, but he did free slaves. He did not reform jail, but he did post bail. He did not legalize women’s choices, but he did publish female voices. He did not manage the State, but he did transfer his estate to the management of a disenfranchised migrant, circumventing Athenian inheritance laws; he ensured a permanent asylum for philosophical friends of his garden. He was unmoved to speak in the assembly, but was inspired to write for the benefit of future generations.

He did abide by civic policies, but he did not endorse civil servants. He did encourage friends to fight fate, but he did not instigate pointless debate. He addressed policies without engaging politics, and he accomplished all of these activities without drawing the attention of vindictive authorities.

Part of This World

While we can practice independence from vain desires, we cannot practice independence from reality. While “the greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom”,131 we must remember that even the strongest people cannot be self-sufficient” forever. By definition, mortal life is enriched through fellowship.

[M]oreover, [it is] right to help [also] generations to come (for they too belong to us, though they are still unborn) and, besides, love of humanity prompts us to aid also the foreigners who come here. […]I wished to use this […] to advertise publicly the [medicines] that bring salvation. These medicines we have put [fully] to the test”132

In theologizing about the blessed lifestyles of our divinities, Philódēmos even imagines that “the gods do favors for each other” despite the fact that “each of them is independently capable of providing himself with the most perfect pleasure.”133 The gods are motivated by the good of nature “to maintain their community as a species” through “social intercourse”. So, they “also accept from each other what supplies their other needs, even though they are able to provide these things for themselves, just as we (human beings) sometimes do from those who have the same things (as ourselves).”134

So far as concerns the reality of modern enfranchisement, one can retire from social affairs and limit career ambitions, but one is much less likely to be able to escape their modern context as a citizen, subject to the laws of the territories in which they reside. To the contrary, “we must simultaneously laugh and philosophize and manage a household and administrate the economic affairs”.135 And when it comes to the skepticism and pessimism of the massive political institutions of the modern era, we should remember, “necessity is evil, but there is no necessity to live with necessity.”136


Footnotes

1 οὐδὲ πολιτεύσεσθαι (oúdé politeúsesthai) meaning “not to be politicked” (Laértios 10.119). Politeúsesthai is the present middle/passive infinitive of politeúō meaning “to be politically-involved” with the connotation of wanting “to pursue public office”, wishing “to conduct government”, seeking “to meddle in affairs”, or hoping “to administer the state”.

2 Epíkouros, On Lifestyles (as preserved by Diogénēs Laértios 10.119)

3 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 14 (Ibid., 10.143)

4 Ibid. 28 (Ibid., 10.148)

5 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 28

6 Cicero records μή πολιτεύσεσθαι (mḗ politeúsesthai) that the wise “should not to be politically-involved” (Usener 8).

7 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 14 (Ibid., 10.143)

8 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.120

9 Ibid.

10 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 21 (Ibid., 10.146)

11 Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 3

12 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 15 (Ibid., 10.144)

13 τῶν συμπολιτευομένων (tṓn sympoliteuoménōn) meaning “of those being governed together” or “of those being politically engaged with one another” (Key Doctrine 38). Other translators render “of those living together as citizens” in the form of a present active participle (e.g. “living” as citizens), but the verb is conjugated as the middle/passive participle (e.g. “being politicked”), thus, the middle/passive particle of politeúō means“being governed together”, or “being politically engaged with one another” (Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers10.153).

14 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 38 (Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.153)

15 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 6 (Ibid., 10.141)

16 Pindar, Fragment 76 (c. 5th-century BCE)

17 Cicero, Epistle to Cassius (January 45 BCE) 15.16; also Aelian, Varia Historia 4.13

18 The δῆμοι (dḗmoi) were administrative subdivisions of ancient Athens, similar in scale to modern suburbs or boroughs.

19 “EPÍKOUROS, son of Neoklḗs and Khairestrátē, [was an] Athenian [citizen] of the dḗmē Gargēttós, of the family of the Philaídai, as Mētródōros says in his book On Pedigree.” (Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.1)

20 Contrast against the ascetic John the Baptist from the Second Temple Period (see Matthew 3:4).

21 Μελίτη (Melítē) was an affluent district at the center of ancient Athens, just west of the Acropolis.

22 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.21

23 καταλελειμμένου ἡγεμόνος (kataleleimménou hēgemónos) meaning “of the hēgemṓn having been left behind” (10.20)

24 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.9

25 Ibid., 10.120

26 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 154, fr. XII

27 Ibid., II, 133, fr. IV

28 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 160, XXI-XXV. II, 162, fr. XXVII

29 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.9

30 Ibid., 10.10

31 Usener Fragment 551

32 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 120, fr. XIX

33 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 67

34 Λάθε (2nd-person singular, aorist, active, imperative) of λᾰνθᾰ́νω (lanthánō) meaning “[you] escape notice!”

35 βιώσας (2nd-person singular, aorist, active, imperative) of βιόω (bióō) meaning “[you] live!”

36 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric V

37 Hérmarkhos, Against Empedoklḗs 1.8

38 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 32

39 Hérmarkhos, Against Empedoklḗs 1.7

40 Ibid., 1.10

41 Ibid., 1.9

42 Ibid., 1.10

43 Ibid., 1.8

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid., 1.9

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid., 1.11

48 Ibid.

49 Hérmarkhos, Against Empedoklḗs 1.10

50 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 5.1019-1027; translated by A. E. Stallings.

51 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 224, col. XIX

52 Ibid., I, 171, 2, col. XII

53 Ibid., II, 54, 41

54 Hérmarkhos, Against Empedoklḗs 1.10

55 Ibid., 1.7

56Epíkouros, Key Doctrines 1, 5-7, 13-14, 17, 27-28, 30, 39-40 (including 31-38 on justice)

57Ibid. 17, 31-38

58Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 37

59πρόληψιν (prólepsin) meaning “preconception”, “anticipation”, “definition”, or “common notion”.

60Same note as above [#61]

61The one and only time in extant texts that Epíkouros directly employs the root πολιτευ (politeu) is in reference to the benefits of mutual association in the context of living in an urban environment ruled by law.

62 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II-b

63 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.120

64 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, VII

65 Appianòs of Alexandreús, Mithridatic Wars 6.28

66 Aoiz, Javier and Boeri, Marcelo. Theory and Practice in Epicurean Philosophy 147-148

67 τύραννος (týrannos) meaning “tyrant” or “absolute ruler”, usually with the connotation of a “dictator” or “despot”.

68 For more information, see Epicureans and Atheists in France, 1650-1729 by Alan Charles Kors (2016).

69 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to William Short (31 October 1819).

70 Jules Evans, Philosophy for Life and Other Dangerous Situations: Ancient Philosophy for Modern Problems (91)

71 José Mujica, Human Happiness and the Environment. Rio +20 Summit (20 June 2012, translated by Vero).

72 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 39 (Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.154)

73Epíkoruos, On the Wise (Ibid., 10.120)

74Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.120

75 Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 59

76 Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Col. Ib

77 Ibid., Col. lIb

78 Ibid., Col. Vllb

79 Ibid., Frag. 70

80 Ibid., Frag. 1

81 Ibid., Frag. 66

82 Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Frag. 2

83 Ibid., Col. VIa

84 Ibid., Col. XXIIIa

85 Ibid., Frag. 26

86 Ibid., Frag. 31

87 Ibid., Frag. 60

88 Ibid., Frag. 39

89 Ibid., Frag. 46

90 Ibid., Frag. 35

91 Ibid., Frag. 60

92 Ibid., Frag. 7

93 Ibid., Frag. 87 N

94 Ibid., Col. Va

95 Ibid., Frag. 58

96 Ibid., Frag. 40

97 Ibid., Frag. 45

98 Ibid., Frag. 41

99 Ibid., Frag. 10

100 Ibid., Frag. 36

101 Ibid., Frag. 34

102 Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Col. XVII

103 Diogénēs of Oìnóanda, Fragment 3; translated by M. F. Smith.

104 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.119

105 Epíkouros, Usener Fragment 537

106 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 126, fr. V

107 Ibid., II, 244, col. XLII

108 Ibid., I, 225, fr. I

109 Ibid., VI

110 Ibid., VI

111 Ibid., I-2

112 Ibid., Frag. 19

113 Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, col. Ia-Ib

114 Ibid., Frag. 28

115 Ibid., Frag. 44

116 Ibid., Col. VIIIb

117 Usener 476 – AYTAPKEIA or αὐτάρκεια (aútárkeia) expresses an “autarky”, “self-sufficiency”, or “independence

118 Usener 135a – This fragment was preserved by Stobaîos.

119 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, V, Fragment 13

120 Aristotélēs, Politics, Book I, 1253a

121 Karl Marx claims: “I have always felt a great tenderness for this philosopher [Hērákleitos], whom I prefer above all the Ancients save Aristotle.” (Letter to Ferdinand Lassalle 21 December 1857)

122 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 1.5

123 Usener Fragment 548

124 EΓΚΥΚΛΙΑ or ἐγκύκλια (enkýklia), meaning “cyclical”, “circular”, “recurrent”, “revolving”, or “ordinary” — it refers to both [I] the “gossip” or “daily affairs” that would have been “common to all citizens”, and, elsewhere [II] enkúklia is employed in the context of ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία (énkýklios paideía) an allegedly “‘well-rounded’ education” intended for aristocratic children in an effort to prepare them for civic obligations. In this context, the “rearing”, training”, “education”, and “upbringing“ is criticized by Epíkouros as being a “circular” system of “programming” designed to indoctrinate aristocratic youths with traditional, mythic rhetoric, instilling them with confusion and anxiety.

125 ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΑ or πολιτικὰ (politikà) refers to those conditions related to the pólis (“city”), or else, the troublesome activities that are administrative in nature. Therein, Epíkouros was not issuing a prohibition against civic engagement, which he elsewhere encourages, but was cautioning students against pursuing a career in political office. Holding office, albeit it through democracy or autocracy often relies upon either “a lot of money” made “through an unscrupulous means” or “servility to the mob or authority”, neither of which are conducive to the goal of the good life.

126 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 58

127 Usener Fragment 163

128 Usener Fragment 117

129 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, I, 234, col. IV

130 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 140, fr. XII

131 ελευθερία (eleuthería) has been translated as “freedom”, “liberty”, “manumission”, but also refers to a “license”.

132 Diogénēs of Oìnóanda, Fragment 3; translated by M. F. Smith.

133 Philódēmos, On Gods III 84

134 Ibid., 87

135 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 41

136 Ibid., 9

 


Works Cited

 

Aelian. "Book IV." Varia Historia. Translated by Thomas Stanley, 1665.

Aoiz, Javier and Boeri, Marcelo D. Theory and Practice in Epicurean Philosophy: Security, Justice and Tranquility. Bloomsbury Academic, 2023, 147-148.

Appian. "Mithradatic Wars." Roman History, translated by Horace White, Perseus Digital Library, catalog.perseus.org Aristotle. Politics. Translated by C. D. C. Reeve, Hackett Publishing, 2017.

Armstrong, David. "Epicurean Virtues, Epicurean Friendship: Cicero vs. the Herculaneum Papyri." Epicurus and the Epicurean Traditions, edited by Jeffrey Fish and Kirk R. Sanders, Cambridge University Press, 2011, 126-128.

Aurelius, Marcus. Meditations. Translated by Martin Hammond, Penguin Classics, 2014.

Cicero, Marcus Tullius. Letters to Friends. Edited and translated by D. R. Shackleton Bailey, Harvard University Press, 2001.

Curnow. The Philosophers of the Ancient Worlds: An A-Z Guide. 185 DeWitt, Norman. Epicurus and His Philosophy. Minnesota Press, 342-343 Diogénēs of Oìnóanda. The Epicurean Inscription. Translated by M. F. Smith, Bibliopolis, 1993.

Epíkouros. “Fragments”. Translated by N. H. Bartman, Leaping Pig Publishing, 2026, TWENTIERS.COM/FRAGMENTS.

Epíkouros. “Key Doctrines”. The Hedonicon: The Holy Book of Epicurus, 2023, 1-4. Epíkouros. “Vatican Sayings”. Translated by N. H. Bartman, Leaping Pig Publishing, 2025, TWENTIERS.COM/VATICAN-SAYINGS.

Essler, Holger. "Space and Movement in Philodemus’ De dis 3: an Anti-Aristotelian Account." Space in Hellenistic Philosophy: Critical Studies in Ancient Physics, edited by Graziano Ranocchia et al., De Gruyter, 2014

Evans, Jules. Philosophy for Life and Other Dangerous Situations: Ancient Philosophy for Modern Problems. Rider, 2013, 91.

Hérmarkhos. “Against Empedokles”. Select Works of Porphyry: Containing His Four Books On Abstinence From Animal Food; His Treatise on the Homeric Cave of the Nymphs; and His Auxiliaries to the Perception of Intelligible Natures. Translated by Thomas Taylor, 1823.

Hubbell, Harry M. The Rhetorica of Philodemus. Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1920.

Kors, Alan Charles. Epicureans and Atheists in France, 1650-1729. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Jefferson, Thomas. "Letter to William Short." 31 October 1819. The Papers of Thomas Jefferson: Retirement Series, edited by J. Jefferson Looney et al. (Princeton University Press), vol. 15, pp. 162–65

Jerome. Aspects of the Study of Roman History. 234

Jones, Howard. The Epicurean Tradition. Routledge, 1992.

Laértios, Diogénēs. The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, Book 10: The Life of Epíkouros. Translated by N. H. Bartman, Leaping Pig Publishing, 2025, TWENTIERS.COM/BIOGRAPHY.

Liddell, Henry George, and Robert Scott. A Greek-English Lexicon, revised by Henry Stuart Jones, Clarendon Press, 1940.

Logeion, uchicago.edu.

Loukianós of Samósta. Alexander the False Prophet. Translated by A. M. Harmon, Loeb Classical Library, 1936.

Lucretius. The Nature of Things. Translated by A. E. Stallings, Penguin Classics, 2007.

Marx, Karl. "Marx to Ferdinand Lassalle in Düsseldorf." 21 December 1857. Marx & Engels Collected Works, vol. 40, International Publishers, 1983, 225–227.

Philódēmos. On Frank Criticism. Translated by David Konstan, Society of Biblical Literature, 1980.

Philódēmos. On Gods. 2026, TWENTIERS.COM/ON-GODS Philódēmos. On Property Management. Translated by Tsouna, Society of Biblical Literature, 2013.

Philódēmos. On Piety. Translated by Drik Obink, Clarendon Press, 1996.

Philódēmos. On Rhetoric. Translated by Harry M. Hubble, Conn. Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1920.

Pindar. "Fragment 76." Greek Lyric, Volume IV: Bacchylides, The Epinikia, edited and translated by David A. Campbell, Harvard UP, 1992, p. X

Stewart, Matthew. Nature's God: The Heretical Origins of the American Republic. 2014.

The Holy Bible: New Revised Standard Version. Oxford University Press, 1989 Twentiers: Hogs from the Herd. Leaping Pig Publishing, 2026, TWENTIERS.COM. Usener, Hermann. Epicurea. Lipsiae, 1887.

Wilson, Catherine. Epicureanism at the Origins of Modernity. Clarendon Press, 2008

Superstition Ain’t the Way

N. H. BARTMAN

 

This essay has been translated into classic rock for easier comprehension. Find it here.

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INTRODUCTION: SUPERSTITION AIN’T THE WAY
· TRAMPLED UNDER FOOT

SIDE ONE: PHILOSOPHER’S GARDEN
· TAKE IT EASY
· THE BEST THINGS IN LIFE ARE FREE
· STAYIN’ ALIVE
· MIND GAMES
· HERE COME THE SUN

SIDE TWO: LOSING MY RELIGION
· PEOPLE ARE STRANGE
· BORN UNDER A BAD SIGN
· DREAM ON
· RAMBLE ON
· GREAT GIG IN THE SKY

SIDE THREE: DUST IN THE WIND
· YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT
· ALL THINGS MUST PASS
· DON’T STOP ME NOW
· EVERYBODY HURTS
· DON’T FEAR THE REAPER
· WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM MY FRIENDS
· IN MY LIFE
· IMAGINE
· IN MY TIME OF DYING

SIDE FOUR: THE GRAND ILLUSION
· BLINDED BY THE LIGHT
· MAD WORLD
· GASLIGHTING
· DARK SIDE OF THE MOON
· ABRA-ABRACADABRA
· PARANOID

CONCLUSION: I CAN SEE CLEARLY NOW
· WON’T GET FOOLED AGAIN

 


 

SUPERSTITION AIN’T THE WAY

NOTE: Among all other Hellenistic schools, the Epicurean Garden boasts the greatest conceptual consistency as a philosophy, and the greatest historical consistency as an institution—after all, practical teachings that provide useful knowledge do not require revisions. To ensure that readers have been provided ancient source material, and not just paraphrasing from modern academics, each citation has been studiously documented.

 

INTRODUCTION: TRAMPLED UNDER FOOT

Superstition confounds nature’s goal of “complete happiness”.1 Magical thinking not only obstructs the creative capacity of an individual to achieve their best life2 , but it also challenges the ability of individualsto live as neighbors”.3 Mythic beliefs exacerbate our deepest fears, antagonize the benefits of one another’s fellowship”,4 and “delay the joy5 of the good life.

More than any other personality in the ancient world, Epíkouros championed the “sober calculation6 required to dispel delusion. He provided students with powerful tools to defend against manipulation and mythic deceit. He warns that “if one does not know the whole of nature, but obsesses over the myths”, then one cannot dissolve “the fear over the most important matters.7 However, if one is “rightly following the phenomena” then “the myth departs”.8

The Sage of the Garden explains that “one must study naturepurely, “as the phenomena requires,” without mythic speculations—one must leave “space for the voices of the facts9 in order to “gain a share of genuine tranquility”.10Writing to a student, he affirms that “a life of disorder and empty opinion does not sustain our need, which is moreover, for us to live imperturbably.11 Neither will the wise suffer the deceit of disruptive fictions, nor the duplicity of sanctimonious tyrants. The poet Lucretius orchestrates the Sage’s triumph against “the grinding weight of superstition”:12

Religion, so, is trampled underfoot,
And by his victory we reach the stars
.13

QVARE RELIGIO PEDIBVS SVBIECTA VICISSIM
OPTERITVR NOS EXAEQVAT VICTORIA CAELO.

The Garden epitomizes the “the method of investigation” against “empty opinion”.14 She champions a realistic ethics that applies a practical “measuring by comparison”,15 making “life pleasant” and dispelling “the greatest confusion [that] overtakes our minds”.16 Her founder, consumed “with passion for true philosophy17 saw superstition as sickness—as disease antagonizes the constitution of the flesh, so, too, does “void doctrine18 about reality disturb what is “healthy throughout the soul”.19 As Epíkouros writes, “without a study of nature”, one cannot enjoy “the pure pleasures”.20 One cannot enjoy “tranquility and firm faith21 without “knowledge” to dispel frightening falsehoods.

Assuredly, “when you believe in things that you don’t understand, then you suffer”. As regards “real knowledge”,22 the wise agree, simply speaking, “superstition ain’t the way”.23

SIDE ONE: PHILOSOPHER’S GARDEN

While “taking into account the goal that exists” according to “all of the self-evident facts”,24 Epíkouros observes that “animals, as soon as they are born” naturally suppress “their toil and […] instinctively avoid the pains”.25 Whereas “the feeling of pleasure” is “truly friendly”, so “pain” is innately “hostile”. The Sage observes “in every animal” that “choice and avoidance are distinguished26 by the beacon of pleasure. Since “the primary and innate good27 in animals is “pleasure”, he concludes that the “goal” of the human animal is to secure “the best life28 through the “pursuit [of] pleasure”,29the beginning and ending of living blessedly”.30

The Good31 of pleasure32 to which Epíkouros refers includes both “activities” that excite “joy” and inspire “cheerfulness” as well as the “centered” pleasures of mental “impassiveness” and physical “painlessness”.33 The “kinetic” delights of “action” include “the pleasures of flavor”, “the pleasure of the belly”,34Aphrodisian35 intercourse” (“O thighs for which I justly died!”),36hearing”, “appearances”, “the sight of sweet motions”,37 and the company of “those who share a like-mind”.38The wise”, as Epíkouros writes, “are likely to love the countryside” and “enjoy themselves more than others by theorizing”,39 delighting in “the search for truth”.40 Other pleasures include the serenity of being “just”,41confidence from coexisting with other people”,42 successful “management of one’s possessions”,43 as well as the peace of being “easily satisfied with few possessions”. Everyone is encouraged to pursue pleasure “according to [their] own preference”,44 by the grace of Nature “as does a god”.45

The Hēgemṓn46 adds to his personal list one potlet of cheese”.47 Even those inclined to the unforgiving “podium48 of politics, and those disposed toward the thrill of “Aphrodisia49 are positively encouraged to (responsibly) explore the “change throughout [their] flesh”,50 free from mythic shame, so long as they “neither harm nor be harmed”.51

 

TAKE IT EASY

The pursuit of “absolute happiness52 does not include “the pleasures of the debauched and those lying sick with enjoyment” but only those pleasures that cause “neither suffering throughout the body nor grieving throughout the soul”.53 Nature privileges “pure pleasures”, persuading us to “not in any way prefer the most food but the most delightful”.54 It is not drinking and following festivals, nor taking advantage of subordinates55 and women, nor an expensive multitude of fish or whatever fills an extravagant table that makes life pleasant, but sober calculation” and a consideration of “choice and avoidances.56 Were this not the case, rather, were it the case that “complete happiness57 could be obtained mindlessly, then “there would be no need for the study of nature.” Yet, if one fails to practice proper calculation, “everything will be full of foolishness and of confusion”,58 thus, one must “constantly reference the goal of natural pleasure59 in a realistic context to understand the rewards and “limits of the good life”.60

 

THE BEST THINGS IN LIFE ARE FREE

Epíkouros did not find explicit fault in a “luxurious lifestyle”, so long as it “inherits the natural benefit of the good61 and so far as it notdifficult62 to maintain—however, he did question the value of any such a lifestyle that requires the satisfaction of rare delights, constantly “behold[ing] a change in energy”.63 As the Hēgemṓn recognized, necessary comforts of life (like food, water, and, warmth) are provided by nature in abundance, when compared with unnecessary desires, like acquiring rare pieces of expensive art or dominating political movements, things notoriously difficult to procure. “Thanks [to] the blessed nature”, Epíkouros writes, “that has made the necessities obtainable, but the unobtainable, unnecessary.”64

The Sage concludes that the best life is the “cheapest and simplest life65 required to maintain “equilibrium”.66 He concludes that it is better “to have courage lying upon a bed of straw than to agonize with a gold bed and a costly table.”67 He observes that inexpensive “barley-bread and water deliver the greatest pleasure whenever anyone in need has consumed them”.68 He avoided those “pleasures that come from extravagance”, and cautioned against indulgence, “not because of” the pleasures themselves, “but because of the difficulties that follow them.”69Therefore adapt into a simple and not extravagant lifestyle as it forms an essential part of health,”70 and “spit on what is beautiful and those who vainly worship, when nothing produces pleasure”!71

 

STAYIN’ ALIVE

While “there is elegance in simplicity”, the possibility of living “a pleasant life” is threatened when constantly challenged by severe, physical insecurity, as with malnutrition. Nature is “preserved by pleasures” but “weak to what is evil”,72 thus “all the suffering” caused by the “poverty” of being unable to satisfy the body’s basic living needs must be “removed. The wisest among us will find a way to “be happy” even if “tortured”, as they continue living their best inner-life, but even so, mental “health does involve some care and effort for the body.”73

As Philódēmos writes, “when [health] is absent”, it “causes unspeakably more distress”.74 One need not neglect the health of the body as though it were “vain”, simply for the sake of “virtues”.75 The Sage observes an inseparable link between “the bellow of the flesh” and “the bellow of the soul” because “the whine of the flesh” burdens “the soul; while truly difficult to impede, it is more dangerous for a person day-by-day to disobey the dictation of Nature”.76 Epíkouros goes so far as to define the pleasure “of a god” in terms of physical satisfaction: even a god must prioritize maintaining relief from “the cry of the[ir] flesh”, suffering “neither hunger, nor thirst, nor shiver[ing]77 The wise are warm with pleasure, having dispelled “the Winter of the soul78. “For if the one who possesses the latter can hope to possess this happiness they would contend beyond even Zeus.”79 A mind subsists most soundly “in a healthy body”.80

Epíkouros observes that a healthy lifestyle requires that “we simultaneously laugh and philosophize, and manage a household and administrate the economic affairs and never let go of the language of the forthright philosophy.”81 Philódēmos reasons that we must afford “a leisurely retreat with one’s friends, and a most dignified income”.82 We cannot “gain mastery over the sirens” of suffering “in every physical condition, nor in every cultural context”,83 nor in every location, as with regions that are grossly inhospitable to human existence. A life consumed by constant, physical need due to insecurity challenges everyone’s ability to live happily.

Thus, a wise person benefits by prioritizing the satisfaction of natural needs, whereas a fool “is consumed by procrastination84 and negligence. As the Hēgemṓn writes, nature thrives when “persuaded”, but shrinks when “violated”.85 One must “choose” to satisfy nature by selecting healthy choices, “fulfilling her necessary desires, and not those that cause harm”.86 Indeed, we exercise virtues “not for their own sake,” but “just as medicine, for the sake of health”.87

 

MIND GAMES

While eliminating “suffering throughout the body88 is necessary to cultivate a good life, the health of the body, alone, does not guarantee the soundness of the mind (as with the case of the masses who suffer from “vain beliefs” that fall “into infinity”).89 Even for those with sculpted flesh, blessed with the gift of a healthy constitution, even they may lack “a stout heart that has no fear of death90 and suffer deeply from irrational fears. Epíkouros notes that “great stresses draw [life] short” and that the stress that is excessive will bring on death.”91Without cultivating a stable foundation, psychological suffering, by itself can devastate and otherwise healthy body.

The Epicurean school recognized that “the flesh tossed in a storm only [suffers the] present,” which only lasts so long, “but the mind [suffers] the past, the present, and the future92. Seeing that the most enduring “pains of [the] body are inferior” to the “psychological” torment of the mind, the ancient Epicureans rejoiced that “the greater pleasures are of the mind93. Thus, the resilience of the intellect allows us to manage our pain through the patience, and to relieve inner turmoil with reflection. Without “the continuous activity into [the] study of nature,”94 we risk becoming like “mindless men”,95 susceptible to the influence of fears and the frauds.

Supernatural apprehensions not only disrupt rational discourse, but they also provide despots with a unique point of access to many of those who subscribe to the fables of the poets”.96 The Sage writes, from out of the doctrines” of the multitude, “the greatest confusion overtakes our minds”.97 When this transpires, “everything becomes full of foolishness and of confusion”.98 One wrestles confusion over the unknown and struggles against friends, needlessly fomenting suspicion and distrust against neighbors — “politics is the worse foe of friendship”.99

Of those things that wisdom prepares for a full life of blessedness, by far the most important is the possession of friendship.”100 The confusion introduced by conspiratorial myths aggravates social discord. To avoid becoming an agent of ignorance, one must “not allow empty speech to disturb”, but should “look to the realities.101 Assuredly, the superstitions of the common people do not disturb one who is persuaded” against both “the myths of the gods102 and the death, confident that, beyond the blessing of memory, a person suffer “no existence after death”.103This dually applies to conspiratorial thinking in a modern age, those reductive, mythic hypotheses based upon clueless conjecture. As the Sage writes to a student, above all104

devote yourself to a consideration of the beginnings, and of infinity, and of the related things, further still, we reflect on account of the criteria [of sensation and anticipation] and of feelings, and not those [myths,] for above all, these [considerations must] be contemplated calmly on account of looking into the causes responsible for creation.

HERE COMES THE SUN

Epíkouros observed that one must “remove from oneself, to the extent that it is possible […] the fear of things that are not to be feared105 to receive happiness. One must “step over much of the myth”,106 and “not allow empty speech” about speculations and conspiracies “to disturb” them. One must “look to realities”,107 like observing that death is “unconsciousness108 or “anesthetization”, and that superstitious beliefs are based upon “false assumptions”.109 These realizations “will banish anything irrational110 as when one apprehends supernatural terrors from “the myths”,111 or supposes mortal things to survive mortality, or anticipates pain to exist during an anesthetized state, or fears the “real” existence “bodilessbodies,112which supersede Nature. Lucretius describes the first principle needed to overcome mythic deceit:113

This terror then and darkness of mind must be dispelled
not by the rays of the sun and glittering shafts of day,
but by the aspect and the law of nature;
the warp of whose design we shall begin with this first principle,
nothing is ever gotten out of nothing by divine power.114

Epíkouros teachers that there can be “no receiving the pure pleasures” of life without “a study of nature”. One must commit to dissolving the fear over the most important matters” if one is to overcome the paranoid imaginings “about the myths115 that enshroud the modern world.

 

SIDE TWO: LOSING MY RELIGION

While mythic complexes have provided answers to fears about death, dying, and despair, they have also spread irrational panic. Indeed, greatly has religion been able to persuade [all kinds] of evils.”116 Twenty centuries before Voltaire urged contemporaries to reject “absurdities” lest they lead to “atrocities”,117philosophers from the Epicurean school observed that vain beliefs118 about “the nature of reality119 challenge our ability to make practical decisions and pursue pleasure. “As it happens”, people commonly “neither perceive their own errors nor discern what is advantageous120 and thus,many great evils, concerning many matters occur as result of the worthless assumptions” can be “avoided as a result of the right concepts”. 121

More often, on the contrary, it is Religion122 breeds
Wickedness and that has given rise to wrongful deeds,
As when the leaders of the Greeks, those peerless peers, defiled
The Virgin’s altar with the blood of Agamemnon’s child123

 

PEOPLE ARE STRANGE

People “place themselves in such a situation so as not to take advice from anybody about anything at all” as concerns rational inquiry. Yet ironically, many maintain a “belief that nothing depends on man, but everything is controlled by the god. Then, at any rate they fall into the evils which the lack of forethought tends to inflict“.124 For example, “in times of distress” superstitious minds “turn their thoughts to religion much more earnestly,125 abandoning practical solutions. Then, “because of their apprehension to do nothing against the will of the gods, they fail to act,126 and “sometimes they cast their own cities into evils as well“. Lucretius laments: 

This was what was deplorable and above all
eminently heart-rending: when a person saw themself
enmeshed by the disease, as though they were doomed to death,
losing all spirit they would lie with sorrow-stricken heart,
and with their thoughts turned on death would surrender their life then and there
.127

Epíkouros teaches that “to become truly and unshakably whole”,128one must not pretend to philosophize, but really philosophize”, not pretend to study nature, but really study nature, “for we do not pretend to need health, but in truth [need] health”.129 To pursue “perfect happiness”,130 one must dissect the “false assumptions of the masses about the deities”, death, and desire.131

 

BORN UNDER A BAD SIGN

Epíkouros contends, frankly, that “divination is not real” and “regard[s] the predictions [as] nothing to us”.132 He affirms “that romance is not sent by god133 and rejects “the contrivances of the deplorable astrologers134 as well as the “the vain” and “empty” practice of “astrology”.135 Divinatory practices like astromancy,136 more commonly referred to as “astrology137 eliminate moral agency in human beings, posed as mere puppets of stellar mechanics. Yet a person’s future does not depend on “whether one was born in the Ram or the Twins, or in both the Fishes.”138

To enjoy the good life, a person cannot “become a slave of physical inevitability”, bereft of “the expectation of dignity” that comes with living beautifully. In a world without choice, neither would we be accountable for our injustices, nor responsible for our restraint. Epíkouros writes that “the one who says that everything happens by necessity cannot then bring a charge against the one who says that not everything happens by necessity; for the former affirms the latter happens by necessity.”139 On the other hand, divination requires humans to be puppets of fate.

Even if” an allegedly “divine” prediction turned out to be “real”, a wise person would continue to “regard the predictions [as] nothing to us”.140 “Wisdom does not at all deal by chance”.141 One does not become more proficient at playing the lottery, even if one happens to win the lottery.Consider it is better to calculate well being unlucky than to have irrationally good luck”.142 Otherwise, no learning occurs, no knowledge is gained, and no wisdom is advanced.

Prophecy is unreliable and inconsistent, yet it wields great power to confound those who observe it — hypnotism works, but only on those who believe. Many beliefs exacerbate “fears, largely” because they fail to address the source of their anxiety, aggrandizing “the remaining143 apprehensions. These include “fears about both aerial phenomena144 and unknown “things of the sky”, as with some ufologists, “and beneath the earth and generally in the Infinite”.145

DREAM ON

Writing about the visions we apprehend “in sleep”, Epíkouros concludes that “neither is the divine nature received nor [is] prophetic power” obtained, “but really”, dreams “are generated from an inundation of images.”146Moreover,” the Sage rejects augury and omens: “the signs are generated” as a result of pure “coincidence”; they “are not at all being delivered” by some supernatural force. “[N]o such divine nature commands” these intelligible events.147

RAMBLE ON

Even “more absurd”, concurs the critic Cicero, “are the fables of the poets”.148 Like prophets, they credit transcendental forces for having designed the products of their own, creative labor. “To these idle and ridiculous flights of the poets we may add the prodigious stories invented by the Magi,149 and by the Egyptians” who also entertained dreamy practices like oneiromancy150 along “with the extravagant notions of the multitude”.151 Some, like “the Stoics”, teases Philódēmos, “invent […] peculiar and impossible arguments” based upon their preferred allegories, having “seize[d] upon the mythical inventions of others”.152 In this case, students of the Stoa153 are accused of appropriating the “fables of poets” (like Hómēros and Hēsíodos).154 Later, their Roman descendants inflated the myth of Hēraklḗs (known to them as Hercules), and represented this fictional figure as a divine icon of their program.155

Although “the wise will rightly hold dialogue about” the nuances of “both music and poetry” among themselves, Epíkouros affirms that “they would not expend energy writing about poems”,156 publicly defending one interpretation over another. All such fictions are the products of human creativity. The fictions themselves are derivative of events that otherwise could be studied directly. Philódēmos writes, “I pass over orators and poets and all that kind of trash157 in favor of a study of nature. Lucretius advances brutal criticism against religious superstition:

Let us agree that he can call the earth
Mother of the Gods, on this condition
That he refuses to pollute his mind
With the foul poison of religion.158

As Philódēmos describes, generations (enchanted by the tales of “self-important theologians and poets159 about transcendental “tyrants” with “terrifying” power) came to adopt false histories, thereby injecting a series of distressing expectations into their worldview. Humans gain little benefit in believing that Eve committed the first sin by chewing fruit, or that Pandora unleashed evil by uncorking a jar, or that Zeus sent a deluge to kill the peers of Deucalion, or that the LORD conjured a storm to flood the contemporaries of Noah … or any number of other stories that mislead people toexpect great misfortunes” from the future. Were we to rely upon the “false assumptions of the masses“,160 that include myth into their worldview, it “would accomplish nothing161 but aggravate disturbance. We cannot treat insanity with allegory.

GREAT GIG IN THE SKY

As fears” flourish in the absence of real knowledge about real “phenomena162, Epíkouros distinguishes the “suspicions about death163 as “the most [seemingly] horrible”, since we know, with certainty, that life will end. Treating fear of death with myth fails to address the reality of grief. As one mistakes a placebo for ointment, so the proverbial rash worsens. In failing to face this “perpetual terror”, a superstitious mind suffers, “always expecting some164 fear of loss.

Epíkouros observes that the multitude suffers” and “grieves” predictable inevitabilities as a result of mythic misunderstandings, “which is” as he writes, “the worst evil”.165 The time over which the pain of loss is processed can be drastically lessened by accepting that death is a natural end, and, to those who are dead, death is literally nothing. If a person is to procure “the complete life”, they must “step over” that which is “a myth166 and dissolve their “fears about both […] death167 and the burden of “grief”.168 Otherwise, anguish “screws them out of the best life.”169

SIDE THREE: DUST IN THE WIND

The Epicureans of the Hellenistic world observed that “all people, including those with [a] good […] physique […] became skeletons in a short period of time, and in the end are dissolved into their elementary particles”.170 The stories of “all those who have been and those who will come to be in the world” will be lost “when it has been destroyed” and “no one will be remembered”.171 As each cosmos has “been generated out of the countless” particles, “in turn, each is to be dissolved”,172 including “both animals, and plants, and all the rest being observed”.173 Thus, of all afflictions that plague the peace of the soul, those fears related to death and dying are the most pervasive.

Not even those who are “worshipped and well-liked”, who seem to have “procured safety”, those “pronounced popular174, who command “power”,175 boasting a “brilliant reputation and great wealth176 can secure themselves against death, “since fortune, ruler of all people, is capable of taking [everything] away”.177 Indeed, “we all reside in an unfortified city in relation to death”.178 Practically, “there was no point procuring protection if a person” succumbs to “suspicion of those things from the sky and beneath the earth and generally in the Infinite.”179

YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT

Angst is nothing new. Anguish is ancient—so, too are the principal sources of anxiety, “always intruding180 upon “the pleasures of the mind”.181 Turmoil itself is a feature of mortality. For most of human history, nearly half of all children died before their 10th birthday. To this day, disease holds the highest kill count in history. No political plot has ever been as deadly as tuberculosis. Modernity has only innovated upon anxiety; she did not invent it. The origins of dread precede the disasters of the contemporary era by an epoch — torment itself is prehistoric.

Human populations crashed during the paleolithic period after a series of unstoppable catastrophes and instances of environmental collapse. Until the contemporary period, tooth decay has been a leading cause of mortality. During the Peloponnesian War of the 5th-century BCE, an epidemic decimated over 25% of the Athenian population, including the prominent statesman Pericles. During the reign of Marcus Aurelius, the Antonine Plague killed millions, including the emperor’s adoptive brother (and co-ruler) Lucius Aurelius Verus. During the early medieval period, the Plague of Justinian (that lasted for two centuries), claimed the lives of tens of millions, both affluent and impoverished, famous and anonymous. The classical Maya civilization collapsed during an extended period of drought that instigated an agricultural crisis. Centuries after, the Black Death killed half of Eurasia. In the modern era, HIV/AIDS has claimed at least as many lives as the Black Death. Related, venereal disease has afflicted human relations and complicated human happiness for millennia; despite numerous advancements, over 1 million people contract curable STIs every day;182 in the span of one year, over 350,000 women die from cervical cancer.183 This brief paragraph only hints at the devastation that micro-organisms wreck upon the human body. These “enduring illnesses184 act as agents of death, and are among the greatest antagonists to human history, chief sources of historic anxiety

 

ALL THINGS MUST PASS

Managing fear of death is a key to happiness. “Remember”, urges the Epicurean philosopher Mētródōros, “that everything by nature is subject to death”,185 and while “it might be possible to furnish security against misfortune”, when it comes to death, “every human lives in a city without walls”.186 Truly, “every person, even if they should be stronger than the Giants, is transient in relation to life and death187 since “indiscriminately, we have all been infused with the fatal drug from birth”.188 Thus, “the most significant disturbance [to arise] within the souls [of] human beings is generated by […] perpetual terror”,189 by fearing the loss of friends, the pain of dying, and the state of being dead. This terror arrises “because of” their “being frightened of death”, and as a result, they are “unable to bear” the “burden of misfortune”.190 Death “truly” is the ultimate form of “necessity beyond human control”, thus a constant source of concern.191

 

DON’T STOP ME NOW

Yet while “necessity is evil […] there is no necessity to live with necessity”.192 For “necessity is not accountable, and [we] perceive luck [as] unreliable”.193 Becoming a “slave to physical inevitability” removes any “expectation of dignity”,194 forever “waiting for Godot”.195 Epíkouros affirms that “rarely is a sage disrupted by chance, but the greatest and most important matters are directed by reason throughout their lifetime.”196Luck is unreliable”—at most, “if one receives a paradoxical piece of good luck,” one might be “grateful to circumstances” and count their blessings.197 Otherwise, it would seem that “the whole of life is but a struggle in darkness”.198

 

EVERYBODY HURTS

The 2,100-year-old writings of the Philódēmos catalogue timeless suspicions about death that have historically darkened the mind—people naturally fear “the pains that come from loss199 and “the deprivation of good things200just as they principally threaten our pursuit of pleasure. In the context of being “gripped by illness”,201 like “those with heart disease202 who may become “unconscious in torpor and faintness”, some fear that they may “never again recover”,203 discouraged by “the whole decay from the peaks to old age”.204 Many obsessively dread an “untimely death”,205 condemned “to die young” before they advance their talents,206 enabling “enemies [to] rejoice over them”,207not leaving behind” a legacy208. Others are “distressed at not having left behind children209 so that “the fruits of [their] labors will” be devalued by “unworthy” and “wicked” people.210 Many fear that “parents or children or a spouse […] will be in dire straits on account of their death”.211 Some fear “dying abroad212, while others fear dying alone “on one’s bed […] rather than doing some doughty deed for even future generations to learn about.213 Conversely, others dread getting “killed like cattle in the lines of battle214 or dying “while fighting an enemy215 or fear “death at sea”,216 or “violently as a result of condemnation by a court or ruler”.217 Some “experience suffering at the prospect of not being remembered by anyone”,218 while others are “pained because [they are] going to be reviled”.219 Ineffectually, the masses are [either] fleeing death, sometimes as the greatest evil,” or else, they vainly imagine themselves to “prefer the repose in [Death] to living”.220

 

DON’T FEAR THE REAPER

Epíkouros reassures students that the state ofdeath in no way exists”, since “what has dissolved lacks perception; and that which lacks perception in no way exists for us”.221 Remembering this, students can avoid emotional paralysis when struck by mortality, neither fearing their own cessation, nor fearing the expiration of their loved ones. The Epicurean school denies any possibility that one could experience torment after death, since death is a state of “unconsciousness and non-existence”.222 For indeed, “to the [dead, death is nothing]”.223

This minimizes the misery of dying, reassuring us that “the peak of pain” exists for the absolute “briefest time224necessarily, the most excruciating, physical pains, those that are so severe that they lead to immediate death, are the most brief. By comparison, the rest of the pains, which are not so severe as to result in immanent death, are, by definition, survivable.

Even the superior torment “of the mind225 and “sorrow that weighs upon” the soul “on account of death226 can be slowly relieved with patience, introspection, and reflection. Epíkouros recommends that “we sympathize with the beloved [deceased] not by lamenting, but by reflecting”.227 Survivors find peace through the value of memory, and the therapeutic gratitude that contextualizes the “undying228 good of friendship. “Sweet [is] the memory of a friend who has died,”229 since pleasant remembrance “for those who died before their time had come230 eases the grief of loss.

WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM MY FRIENDS

The devastating pain of grief is significantly relieved by the blessing of friendship. Epíkouros exhorts us all to “be prepared” for death by bringing “together a fellowship of friends231 to support one another through the pain of loss, especially guaranteed losses, those of our mentors, parents, spouses, and every furry friend whom a person has every loved. In forming mutual bonds “with other people”, survivors “live pleasantly among one another keep[ing] steadfast faith”, thereby “engender[ing] the fullest intimacy”,232 sharing love during times of despair, so as to never suffer loss alone.

IN MY LIFE

One manages grief by honoring the memories of the deceased. By practicing gratitude, one reminds oneself of the powerful gift of love that is left after the loss of a loved one. “One must not spoil the present by yearning for the absent; but consider that also these [present] things were once of the [things for which] we wish.”233 Fittingly, it is love, from the memory of ones’ deceased friends that helps one endure sudden loss. Great loss can only come from the loss of a great love, yet no loss can lessen the greatness of the love that outlasts death.

Philódēmos offers consolation to those suffering sudden, unexpected loss, as when a parent loses a child, or a spouse loses their partner, seemingly “falling somewhat short of the best life”.234 Philódēmos asks survivors: “consider it irrational and incredible not if someone dies but if [one] endures for a certain length of time”, for “enduring all the way to old age really [is] a most prodigious thing”.235 Historically, most human lives have ended relatively shortly. Yet no life, no matter how short, need be wasted, nor lived ignobly, nor suffered without dignity. Nature enables living beings to “profit by one day as by eternity”,236 for “unlimited time contains pleasure” that is no less valuable “than that which is limited”.237 Nature’s goal is pleasure, not immortality. As Tolkien wrote, “’All we have to decide is what to do with the time that is given us’”.238

IMAGINE

As regards apprehensions about one’s own death, the Sage provides assurance that the experience of “death in no way exists for us”, given that “what has dissolved lacks perception; and that which lacks perception in no way exists for us”.239 The pain that is so severe that it leads to death is proportionally brief. After the loss of feeling, there can be no feeling of pain—nor can there be pleasure, nor bliss, nor relief; thus, there can be no incentive for suicide.Undoubtedly trivial are the greatest number of motives one might advance toward an exportation from life”.240

Meditating upon the real knowledge that Death is nothing to us creates [for] a mortal an enjoyable life, not [by] adding endless time, but [by] having been dispossessed of the yearning for immortality”.241 Philódēmos explains that in “avoiding a careless death, a person

is industrious because of the consequent doctrine based on the concept of the preservation of one’s goods. And since he does not cut short the long extent of his life, he always begins new activities and friendly attachments. And he attends to his own property as to how to administer it. Also, he reflects on former events in the belief that they may concern him in the future. And he treats with much care as many people as he can, and he is thankful to those who treated him kindly, in particular because he hopes that he will share in some goods with them or that he will receive some benefit by these same people again in the future242

Accepting the finality of mortality highlights the importance of preparing for the inevitable — for example, one can engage the practice of composing a living will (as did Epíkouros) to safeguard the continued happiness of those who survive the deceased, hoping to deter those who would harm them. It ispossible to take precautions243 against a number of potential misfortunes, such as preventing “a lot of indolence regarding financial matters” when it comes to succession and inheritance.244 In his will, Epíkouros ensured that his best friend, Hérmarkhos, a non-Athenian, would logistically inherit the Garden, circumventing typical stipulations by Athenian law. The Hēgemṓn also provisioned a clause to provide students with permanent access to the Garden. He emancipated his servants, and allocated resources for his friends’ children’s education (whose completion he would not have the pleasure of witnessing).

Before he died, the 2nd-century Epicurean Diogénēs of Oìnóanda commissioned a monument to the teachings of Epíkouros. Builders erected an 8-foot-tall, 260-foot wide stone stoa, surrounded by a portico, adorned with statues, etched with Epicurean teachings. It contained a survey of the wisdom of Epíkouros (as summarized by Diogénēs), as well as several Key Doctrines by the Hēgemṓn. Reflecting upon his own, impending death, the elderly Diogénēs writes,

Having already reached the sunset of my life (being almost on the verge of departure from the world on account of old age), I wanted, before being overtaken by death, to compose a [fine] anthem [to celebrate the] fullness [of pleasure] and so to help now those who are well-constituted. […] besides, love of humanity prompts us to aid also the foreigners who come here. Now, since the remedies of the inscription reach a larger number of people, I wished to use this stoa to advertise publicly the [medicines] that bring salvation. These medicines we have put [fully] to the test; for we have dispelled the fears [that grip] us without justification, and, as for pains, those that are groundless we have completely excised, while those that are natural we have reduced to an absolute minimum, making their magnitude minute.245

IN MY TIME OF DYING

When it comes to inevitable “sickness”, a wise person can address their fears of infirmity by planning to prevent becoming “irascible and hard to please and ill-tempered246 when deprived of sense faculties. Such a person “takes the greatest care of [their] health. And feeling confidence against illness and death, [they] endure with strength the therapies that can remove them.”247 By the Hellenistic period, ancient Epicureans had published a variety of scrolls on pain management and psychological health, including the scroll Theories about Disease248. Philódēmos explains that one should cultivate a robust “state of health249 and “be prepared […] from coexisting with other people”—yet when this is no longer possible, Philódēmos recommends that “the right management […] lies in this: in not feeling distressed about what one loses”.250

As the end of life approaches, so writes Philódēmos, one can choose to face death without fear, regret, and worry. The resilience of the intellect allows us to manage peak anxiety through the rejoicing of “the mind upon reliving the memory” of past pleasures. Even at the end of life, when faced with annihilation, “persons of sound mind” can recall their having “enjoyed everything” as “unconsciousness is taking hold of them”, allowing them to “expire […]undauntedly”,251 as “the old one anchors safely in the harbor that is retirement”, after “those good things that were once hoped for were captured” in memory “for safe charity”.252Even on “the day that is the last of life” despite pains “not abating in extremity of their greatness”,253 memories can bless the mind.

For those who pass due to diseases that afflict the mind, even then, bereft of memory, “we will try to make the end more excellent [than] the beginning; we should be taking the path into dawn; yet whenever we go so far as the end, [we should] enjoy ourselves equally.”254 In absence of this peace, confusion exacerbates the pain of dying and the fear of death. The promises of persuasive personalities, who reassure the intellect that we can escape death insults the human soul.

Diogénēs of Oìnóanda adds “as I have said before, the majority of people suffer from a common disease, as in a plague, with their false notions about things, and their number is increasing”.255

SIDE FOUR: THE GRAND ILLUSION

Charlatans thrive in a climate of fear.

Chiefly, swindlers target those vulnerable to mythic persuasion. As “false prophets256 spread myths in the ancient agora, so too do manicured politicians sell sound bites through modern speakers. Grifters, con-artists, and other malignant narcissists have prized and preferred to provoke gullible souls with superstition. They address the “public in the traditional patter of magicians257 as ridiculed by the ancient Epicurean author Loukianós. In an era characterized by disinformation and propaganda, cultivating tools against fraud is critical to living a good life.

 

BLINDED BY THE LIGHT

The FIRST science fiction writer, Loukianós of Samósata lambasted one such fraud who readily discerned that human life is swayed by two great tyrants, hope and fear, and that a man who could use both of these to advantage would speedily enrich himself”.258 The satirist documents an early instance of book-burning, instigated by a petulant zealot who took offense to theEstablished Beliefs” of Epíkouros. As Loukianós writes, the false prophet “greatly feared Epicurus […] seeing in him an opponent and critic of his trickery.”259 They continue:

he brought [the book] into the middle of the market-place, burned it on […] fig-wood just as if he were burning the man in person, and threw the ashes into the sea […] But the scoundrel had no idea what blessings that book creates for its readers and what peace, tranquillity, and freedom it engenders in them, liberating them as it does from terrors and apparitions and portents, from vain hopes and extravagant cravings, developing in them intelligence and truth, and truly purifying their understanding, not with torches and squills and that sort of foolery, but with straight thinking, truthfulness and frankness.260

Loukianós describes in high resolution an instance of trickery wrought by Alexander the False Prophet. In terms of the specific “ruse” the swindler employed, the Epicurean explains:

he contrived an ingenious ruse. Going at night to the foundations of the temple […] where a pool of water had gathered […] he secreted there a goose-egg, previously blown, which contained a snake just born; and after burying it deep in the mud, he went back again. In the morning he ran out into the market-place naked […] he congratulated the city because it was at once to receive the god in visible presence. The assembly […] had come running […] he ran at full speed to the future temple […] he asked for a libation-saucer, and when somebody handed him one, deftly slipped it underneath and brought up […] that egg in which he had immured the god […]. Taking it in his hands, he asserted that at that moment he held Asclepius! They gazed unwaveringly […] when he broke it and received the tiny snake into his hollowed hand, and the crowd saw it moving and twisting about his fingers, they at once raised a shout, welcomed the god, congratulated their city, and began each of them to sate himself greedily with prayers, craving treasures, riches, health, and every other blessing from, him. […] the whole population followed, all full of religious fervour and crazed with expectations.261

Ranking magical thinking among the greatest of evils (and sparing few words for those who perpetuate superstition), the satirist ridicules the “drivelling idiots262 and “thick-witted, uneducated fellows” who became willfully “deluded” by the charlatan’s “ruse”. The false prophet appealed to common expectations and misunderstandings. In doing so, the liar won the crowd.

Loukianós concludes that “the trick stood in need of […] Epicurus himself or Metrodorus, or someone else with a mind as firm as adamant toward such matters, so as to disbelieve and guess the truth”.263 Here again, an intellectual foundation, grounded in the reality of nature is needed to help guard against mythic deceit. By contrast, supernatural religions and mystical cults feed into the practice of myth and manipulation, doing little to relieve fear, and much to increase it.

MAD WORLD

The μῦθοι (mýthoi) or “myths” of the ancient world provided “plaguy scoundrel[s]”, “swindler[s]”,264 and “consummate rascals” (“greatly daring, fully prepared for mischief”,265practising quackery and sorcery”)266 with devious tools to exploit the superstitious sensibilities of those whom Loukianós‘ disparagingly referred to as “‘fat-heads’ and simpletons”.267 This was done to “line [the charlatan’s] purses fairly well at [the] expense268 of genuinely pious, yet tragically misguided believers. Lucretius orchestrates a mythic example — King Agamémnōn sacrifices his daughter Iphigéneia, to ensure that Ártemis would ordain their campaign:

More often, on the contrary, it is Religion269 breeds
Wickedness and that has given rise to wrongful deeds,
As when the leaders of the Greeks, those peerless peers, defiled
The Virgin’s altar with the blood of Agamemnon’s child270

History preserves an extensive list of violations and abuses by allegedly spiritual institutions. Whether sacrificing children (or marrying them), or dominating women, brutalizing neighbors, inciting mass slaughter, enslaving captives, persecuting foreigners, popularizing martyrdom, hosting crusades, organizing inquisitions, burning thinkers, drowning healers, hanging doctors, spinning lies, bombing medics, incinerating protestors …. Reality demonstrates how the agents of religious violence excuse themselves from observing “the nature of what is just”.271

This ancient, historical scheme developed over time. After millennia, myths that were once only shared around campfires were formalized by powers into social institutions. Many of those institutions facilitated the transfer of wealth from disadvantaged citizens to insulated priests. Many engaged in political manipulation by deceiving those politicians who based their process of decision-making on ecstatic visions, and not the study of nature. Many engaged in the abuse of the young, female “oracles” who had been trafficked to the temples. Many others, still, exploited their knowledge of natural events to manipulate their followers and gain influence.

In addition to exploiting with magical thinking, many institutions of religion have intertwined themselves with politics and government, growing empires, spreading propaganda, expanding colonies, stealing territory, justifying genocide, perpetuating slavery, pardoning rape, editing histories, robbing treasuries, defrauding economies, deceiving leaders, enchanting legislators —supernatural institutions and political states are two peas in a pod of power and deception.

Personalities like Charles Manson, Jim Jones, David Koresh, and Marshall Applewhite are not unique to the this era. Joseph Goebbels only innovated upon propaganda, he did not invent it. Leopold II was a mere rookie compared to the seasoned violence of Genghis Khan.

So it seems, people have … always been like this.

GASLIGHTING

The subterranean Ploutonia billowed with the deadly pneuma (or “breath”) of Kérberos, the three-headed, canine guardian of the underworld. The temples were named for their host, Ploútōn (better known as idēs) who ruled the ploútos, the great “wealth” from the substances that rest beneath the Earth’s surface. For mindless beasts and uninitiated supplicants, the mythic fumes of the temples were deadly—only clergy, due to their righteous piety and closeness to divinity had been graced with supernatural protection, inoculating the lethality of the dogs’ fumes.

Topographically, those sanctuaries were constructed above fault lines; their chambers trapped and flatulated volcanic gases. After centuries of habitation, some residents noticed—some vents triggered intoxication; some, convulsions; some, death. Some residents found ways to exploit their neighbors’ ignorance of this natural phenomenon. Strábōn elaborates on the specifics:

…the Plutonium, below a small brow of the mountainous country that lies above it, is an opening of only moderate size, large enough to admit a man, but it reaches a considerable depth, and it is enclosed by a quadrilateral handrail, about half a plethrum in circumference, and this space is full of a vapour so misty and dense that one can scarcely see the ground. Now to those who approach the handrail anywhere round the enclosure the air is harmless, since the outside is free from that vapor in calm weather, for the vapor then stays inside the enclosure, but any animal that passes inside meets instant death. At any rate, bulls that are led into it fall and are dragged out dead; and I threw in sparrows and they immediately breathed their last and fell. But the Galli, who are eunuchs, pass inside with such impunity that they even approach the opening, bend over it, and descend into it to a certain depth.272

To Strábōn, the ruse was obvious: the eunuch priests “hold their breath as much as they can”  so as to mechanically avoid ingesting toxic fumes until they have risen above them.273 The priests understood that some, lethal vapor must pool at the bottom of the cavern. Pliny the Elder records that “there is a place which kills all those who enter it. And the same takes place at Hierapolis in Asia, where no one can enter with safety, except the priest of the great Mother of the Gods.”275 In the center of this invisible, vaporous pool stood a raised landform from which a cleric spoke. Supplicants would encircle the stage like a captive audience. The theatre would proceed: a bull would be lead before the congregation into the breath of Kérberos. The terrific power of the underworld would then kill the unobservant beast. The devout priest, protected from the lethal vapors  would rise to the center, thus, demonstrating their power over death.

(As a supplement to this description .. and brief tangent … note that the institution to which we refer as “religion”, and the art to which we refer to as “theatre” were once indistinguishable. A fundamental function of ancient, stage-focused, stadium-seated theatre was to facilitate religion. Similarly, modern, stage-focused, stadium-seated religion employs theatre as a tool.)

By the Hellenistic period, rational minds penetrated the clerics’ contrivance. Many reasoned that the air we breathe must be made of several kinds of vapors that do not uniformly mix. Some rise, and some fall. “In other places there are prophetic caves, where those who are intoxicated with the vapour [that] rises from them predict future event”.274 Rising vapors (like the sweet-smelling, trance-inducing ethylene gas) flooded the sanctums of the oracles and induced visions. Falling vapors (like carbon dioxide) pooled at the bottom of the “Gates of Hell” in the “Holy City” of Hierápolis. Those vapors were suffocating. In small doses, hydrocarbon gases (like ethylene) could trigger visions. In higher doses, oracles could seize and convulse. In the highest doses, die.

The ancient Greek clergy’s abuse of their neighbors’ fears and ignorance of natural phenomena reflects a pattern found throughout human history. Ancient priests misrepresented to their neighbors discernible, predictable phenomena and staged (literally) theatrical performances for the purpose of impressing the reality of their manipulative cult. This was not the first, nor the last time in history when clever figures in positions of power weaponized knowledge by exploiting the ignorance of others. Fifteen centuries later, a Genoan, sailing on behalf of the Spanish crown employed a similar ruse as did those ancient priests. This time, however, it was not the flatulence of the Earth, but rather, the dance of the sky — in this case, a lunar eclipse …

 

DARK SIDE OF THE MOON

Prior to February 29th 1504, Christopher Columbus faced an extremely precarious situation — he had been marooned for a year. All four caravels loaned to him by the Crown lay in ruin. Dozens were dead. Half the crew mutinied. To his despair (as many of his peers back home expected), Columbus’ final expedition, afforded to him with great reluctance, failed.

Only four years earlier, royal commissioner Francisco de Bobadilla delivered Columbus to the Crown in chains, having imprisoned him over tyranny and abuse of the Taíno people. Stripped of titles and authority, Columbus was afforded by King Ferdinand one, final opportunity. Yet again, far from of accomplishing his goal, Columbus was broke, stranded, and faced starvation.

As history records, the “Admiral” had brought a particular book with him: in particular, Columbus carried a recently-published copy of Alamach Perpetuus Cuius Radix est Annum by Abraham Zacuth, astronomer of the Portuguese court of King Don Manuel. “It was this very book that Columbus used to predict the eclipse of the moon which so terrified the [Taíno] in Jamaica that they became obedient to him, and furnished his party food.”276 This was the context in which Columbus extorted the indigenous people of Jamaica, who lacked appropriateknowledge about the meteoric”,277 and were susceptible to the manipulation of superstition. In this case, Columbus, aware that a lunar eclipse was immanent, convinced the Taíno people that the moon would be destroyed if the Taíno did not provide him with provisions. Columbus’ son, Ferdinand Columbus recorded the entire manipulation. He writes of …

the eclipse beginning at the rising of the moon, and augmenting as she ascended, the Indians took heed and were so frightened that with great howling and lamentation they came running from every direction to the ships, laden with provisions, praying the Admiral to intercede by all means with God on their behalf; that he might not visit his wrath upon them, promising for the future diligently to furnish all they stood in need of. To this the Admiral replied that he wished to converse somewhat with God, and retired while the eclipse lasted, they all the while crying out to him to aid them. And when the Admiral observed that the totality of the eclipse was finished and that the moon would soon shine forth, he issued from his cabin, saying that he had supplicated his God and made prayers for them, and had promised Him in their names that henceforth they would be good and use the Christians well, fetching them provisions na necessary things … From that time forward they always took care to provide what they had need278

The ruse worked. Columbus received his provisions, and survived until rescue. The Taíno population was exploited. Today, American citizens champion Columbus, having been raised on textbooks that never mention the Taíno nor the crimes of European explorers“.

Within decades of his arrival, ninety percent of the Taíno population was killed. Tens-of-thousands were murdered. An unknown many committed suicide. These deaths are partially indicative of the failure of religious institutions in correcting the abuses that occur as a direct result of exploiting knowledge and ignorance — in this instance, the Taíno were not the only targets of manipulation: the famous venture to the “New World” was not only an economic enterprise, but, notably, a religious mission, sanctioned by the Church. The religious mission benefitted from the fealty of monarchs, and encouraged the expansion of a colonial empire.

Mythic ambitions were stoked. Irrational fears were instigated. Narratives were established. Hopes were inflated. Fears were exploited. Devious personalities with selfish agendas descended upon the fearful like vultures, as also happened in Imperial Russia.

 

ABRA-ABRACADABRA

Alix, the Tsarina of the Romanov dynasty was enchanted by Rasputin upon their first meeting. “It had not been very difficult for that expert in human faces to see how much she needed him, how tormented she was by the misfortunes that had befall them”.279 At the age of six, she lost sister to diphtheria; her mother succumbed to the same disease one month later. Only three years later, her father, Grand Duke Louis IV died of a heart attack, “the greatest sorrow of her life”.280 For the rest of her days, she would be consumed with overwhelming fears of death.

(… as were easily shared by those over whom her family ruled … but that’s another essay).

She was not alone. Her husband, Tsar Nicholas II equally ached—without an heir, his family’s status was existentially threatened. Yet when their only son was finally born, their dread only increased: Alexei inherited his family’s “curse”. The “long-awaited prince was suffering from a fatal disease inherited […] haemophilia. His fragile blood vessels were unable to withstand the pressure of his blood.” Such cruel irony, Alix had suffered a decade of pregnancies that left her with significant health issues. Succession laws were brutal. She found little relief.

until she meets Rasputin. “Alix, who so wanted to believe in miracles”, “with a face tormented by sleepless nights” found comfort in a wandering monk, an alleged “miracle-worker” who had recently gained popularity among the peasantry. “Nicky” (the Tsar), desperate to provide his son with safety, suspended his disbelief in the traveller after witnessing a “miracle” — the unsuspecting monk eased his son’s suffering, a feat at which his educated doctors failed.

Indeed, seven years prior to the birth of Alexei Romanov, a chemist named Felix Hoffmann synthesized a new form of acetylsalicylic acid that revolutionized medical science. Within several years, Bayer registered this product as “aspirin”. The “wonder drug”281 was immediately implemented throughout the world to relieve pain, reduce fever, and treat disease. The product was so effective, so manageable, so safe, it was used to treat symptoms in children, children like Alexei Romanov, children suffering from chronic bleeding disorders, children being treated with blood-thinners (the very last thing a child with Alexei’s condition needed).

As a странник (strannik) or “wanderer”, Rasputin rejected treating disease with the medical science, so when the Tsar, against the recommendation of his doctors, took the advice of the wanderer and denied his son the “wonder drug”, Alexei’s condition improved. Granted, Rasputin did not understand the functional mechanism by which anticoagulants interacted with the body; what he did recognize was the measurable, psychological power that he now held over the Romanov family. They credited him with preventing the death of their son in whom they had placed all of their hopes and fears. They hoped for him to prevent the deprivation of their pleasures. When Nicholas went to the front in World War I, Alix was left in charge with Rasputin as her personal advisor (wherein he gave predictably terrible advice and abused his authority). Still, the Tsar’s daughters wore pendants with Rasputin’s picture. His presence in their bedroom was sanctioned, despite protests from a nursemaid. After all, he was a Saint.

He was also accepting bribes. He was also negotiating with sexual favors. He was also accused of numerous acts of rape. He was abusing the Russian peoples’ Christian superstitions. He was a functional catalyst for the same revolution that lead to the execution of the very family who looked to him in the first place to prevent death. Ironically, the Romanov family feared death. They feared the weight of insecurity. They gave a sinister personality access to their home, their children, and their minds. They bared their souls to a grifter who convinced them that he could prevent death. Rasputin taught that touching his body healed—indeed, this was his favorite line to use with prostitutes. In this regard, the members of the royal family were used, willingly. By comparison, many of their subjects, increasingly suspicious of authority, disenchanted with both an ineffective monarch and an oppressive church, saw through Rasputin’ mythic ruse.

(These anecdotes fail to capture the full complexity of each, nuanced history — readers are encouraged to pursue their curiosity accordingly — nevertheless, each example provides a clear depiction of the chaos that can result from inflating superstitious beliefs.)

 

PARANOID

Fear of death disrupts rational thinking and consumes the minds of the fearful. A conspirator need only appeal to their target’s fear of death, abuse their misunderstandings about nature, fabricate a false narrative (usually promising deathless rewards), and choreograph a performance that advances a hidden agenda. Examples of this relationship between fear, ignorance, and exploitation are not limited to the dusty pages of history — the modern world of industrialized warfare and mass media provides a variety of devastating examples. For the purposes of this investigation, five instances of irrational thinking and manipulation have been reviewed:

[I] Over 73,000 human beings are currently imprisoned in immigration detention centers across the sometimes-called “Land of the Free”. At least half of those individuals have no criminal records in any capacity, having never threatened the safety of their neighbors. Less than 4,000 of those 73,000 have committed violent crimes. The policy that lead to the imprisonment of well over 69,000 non-violent human beings was enthusiastically supported by over 77 million of their neighbors. This fact further exemplifies a foundational policy of a political group that now dominates every branch of government, at every level of government. The implementation of this policy, of imprisoning 69,000 (and counting) non-violent human beings was largely motivated by fear and fueled by propaganda. Millions were persuaded to believe that unknown strangers threatened them; one man promised to easily release people from this fear. In attempting to rid themselves of fear, the targets of propaganda exacerbate existing tensions. Fear lubricates the machinery of propaganda and exposes the intellect to paranoia.

[II] We find another example of fears stoked by nationalistic myths in the city of Minneapolis, where a population of Somali immigrants, who comprise a statistical minority in city’s metro area, has been demonized as a result of an authoritarian personality’s political agenda. Millions of prejudicial minds allowed this personality to exploit fear and ignorance to their own detriment. Despite the fact that Somali immigrants represent less than 3% of the metro population, millions of otherwise unconcerned Americans have been persuaded to fear them.

The same fears have been irrationally inflated against transgendered peoples (despite comprising less than 1% of a population of over 360 million human beings), and peoples of African ancestry (who have comprised less than 15% of the population for over a century). These political myths distract millions of people from reality by appealing to vain prejudices. Meanwhile, those same minds turn a blind eye to actual existential threats that contradict their mythic worldviews. 

[III] Generations of committed researchers, in nearly every scientific discipline, from nearly every country on the planet, working with decades of analysis, experimentation, and peer review, have conclusively determined that irrevocable changes to the Earth’s biosphere will lead to the displacement of 2 billion human beings and cause the deaths of hundreds of millions more. Unconditionally, these deaths will be the result of environmental mismanagement — despite this, tens of millions of Americans reject the methodical findings of decades of peer-reviewed research. How many Earthlings choose not to prepare for their own futures on their own planet? Despite this very real, very immanent threat, despite documented sea level rises throughout history, contractors continue developing coastal real estate, and the energy grid continues increasing carbon emissions. Short-sighted politicians continue abusing mythic propaganda by manipulating ignorant minds to advance personal agendas.

[IV] These criticisms against fear and ignorance apply even more fully toward the treatment of disease. Millions have been convinced that demonstrably-effective medical treatments are more threatening than deadly diseases. Until the 20th-century, nearly half of all children died before the age of ten from either disease, or conditions resulting from malnutrition. Vaccines changed everything. Indeed, most human parents throughout history have been burdened with witnessing the death of at least one of their own children. Yet, despite radical advances that have largely eliminated the primary antagonists of human history, millions refuse effective medical treatment and question the very vaccines that saved the lives of their ancestors. Recently, millions died from complications related to a pandemic in 2020, and many refused medical treatment (despite initially calling emergency services and demanding to be assigned a bed). Those people are now dead. They are unable to tell us if it was worth it.

[V] No mythic narrative has been as effective (and exploitable) in America as Christianity. Consequently, no political movement presents more of a risk than Christian Nationalism. Ideologically, millions of American Christians have been persuaded (by appeals to fear) to inflate a paranoid belief that their super-majority is being “persecuted”. This belief is maintained despite America boasting the largest Christian population in the history of the human species. Yet more American Christians than ever describe their belief system as being “threatened”. Despite their nationally-dominant, politically-encapsulating, massively-wealthy collection of institutions that boast hundreds of millions of followers across the country (and billions more globally), many in America believe the existence of their tradition is threatened. As a result, millions of fearful minds have thrown their support behind charlatans who care more for profit than piety.

Since ignorance and fear create vulnerabilities for deceitful swindlers, conspiratorial thinking has been exploited by tyrants throughout history to gain the favor of violent mobs and fuel political violence — so, today, does the “Department of War” invoke the mythic language of the Christian apocalypse to empower young Christians to support a “Holy War” against Islamic countries in Asia Minor. Many people without violent records (such as children in uniforms) can be convinced to commit acts of violence as a result of religious myths. When political figures require acts of violence to be committed, they profit by stoking superstitious flames. So long as a population glorifies supernatural belief, they render society susceptible to mythic manipulation. These prejudicial myths not only harm others; they also consternate the intellects of the deluded; a fearful mind disrupts the ability of the intellect to cultivate future security. Vanity allows the intellect to inflate meaningless fears (that Christianity will no longer be the dominant religion in America) while ignoring genuine, existential threats (like agricultural collapse).

When civic decisions are not grounded a shared, natural reality, the vain beliefs of others, informed by delusions, threatens the safety of their neighbors, and the preservation of their own union for the future. “The study-of-nature does not incline one to boast nor [be] contriving of speech nor against the education highly prized by the masses, but both fearless and independent according to one’s own good, [and] not to think highly over the affairs of the [masses].”282

 

I CAN SEE CLEARLY NOW

In an era characterized by propaganda and misinformation, the Epicurean method of investigation arms students with powerful tools against these threats. One’s “considerations” must be based “in a [world] of facts, versus those on a mere rumor”.283 Armed with her unadulterated rejection of magical thinking, the Epicurean school provides stormy souls with an alternative to the lazy skepticism of the contemporary era that is as unhelpful in dispelling ignorance as is the cheap metaphysics sold in bookstores (those metaphysics that have failed to prevent even a single child’s death). Epíkouros provides a method to navigate these confusions, for, “a sufficient method produces [helpful] thoughts about the nature of reality284 and requires nothing more than the devoted study of nature. The Sage grounds true statements with verifiable observations. In the absence of material verification (or falsification), groundless conjectures are easily commandeered to construct fear-based alternatives.

Fundamentally, all “conjectural things are contingent upon sensible” stimuli. Any “opinion” regarding nature can be “either true or false”. Yet in order “to be true, [it] must corroborate or not-contradict; but if not-corroborating or contradicting, [it] happens to be false. Hence, this has introduced285 the need to practice waiting for confirmation, instead of inventing a pseudodoxy”. Compared against a true belief, a pseudodoxyhas gone astray from the” natural reality “being experienced that perpetually exists”.286 In the case of what remains “to be confirmed or to be contradicted, either it will be confirmed” or contradicted.

Often, “some other [persuasive] motion in us”,287 such as the fear of death, “operates for another purpose” besides the “goal of natural pleasure”.288 On these occasions, conspiracies, myths, and superstitions thrive. Self-reflection gets “combined” with some another “creative application289 of the mind, and imbues those who speculate with the confidence to pass “judgment even if [they] were not [capable of] confirming or contradicting” with evidence. Thus “a pseudodoxy is generated.” 290 These “pseudodoxies” are generated by those who fail to acknowledge the reality of their own sensations. “If you contest every single one of the sense perceptions, you can neither judge the outward appearance nor can you affirm which of the sensations you, yourself say are deceptive according to the way in which the criterion operates.”291

 

WON’T GET FOOLED AGAIN

Mythic hopes and conspiratorial apprehensions deeply afflict the mind’s ability to reason. Our 50,000-year-old brain-systems are no less immune to mythic deceit than the 48,000-year-old brain-systems of the ancient Greeks. While many modern persons might dismiss ancient peoples’ apprehensions of volcanoes and lightning, many ancient people would dismiss some modern persons’ insistence that the Earth is flat, a widely-accepted notion by the 2nd-century BCE. Consider that the masses of both antiquity and modernity struggle to appreciate the behavior of CO₂ then the superstitious masses misunderstood CO₂ as the divine breathe of Kérberos; now the masses underestimate the impact of CO₂ on strengthening the observable greenhouse effect. Many more overlook the impacts of pollution, deforestation, and general environmental mismanagement. Tragically, many millions of people, blessed with the health, safety, education, and stability of an advanced economy, nevertheless exacerbate irrational apprehensions toward life-saving vaccines despite being truly blessed by the benefits of modern medicine, far, far too many fail to appreciate the blessing of science. Far too many have been programmed by myth, misunderstanding that material science spares most people from (what is otherwise a nearly universal human experience) suffering the deaths of children; in fact, as history records, nearly half of them. If one has been spared this tragedy, one might thank science.

When decisions that affect others are grounded in a matrix of mythic fears (and not our shared, natural reality) then the vain actions of others, informed by delusions, both threatens the safety of our neighbors and the preservation of their own union for the future. As he writes, “the study-of-nature does not incline one to boast nor [be] contriving of speech nor against the education highly prized by the masses, but both fearless and independent according to one’s own good, [and] not to think highly over the affairs of the [masses].” The tools we have developed to respond to all manner of diseases reinforces the confidence we can have in the Epicurean method. Epíkouros encourages students to choose practically, love peacefully, behave justly, and live fearlessly. This is best achieved by studying nature and cultivating friendship.

When it comes to our own futures, Epicurean history provides brave examples like Mētródōros, undaunted against both disturbances and death”,292 virtuous and awesome”.293 To achieve the goal of nature, the Sage of the Garden asks us to “study these and those things, for yourself, day and night, as with those like yourself, and at no time, neither awake nor in a dream will you be confounded, for no living person surrounded by immortal Good seems like a mortal creature.294 As has been spoken more eloquently elsewhere, “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself.” Here again, “when you believe in things that you don’t understand, then you suffer.”

Superstition ain’t the way.

 


 

1 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.116

2 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 20 (10.145)

3 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 38 (10.153)

4 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 37 (10.152)

5 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 14

6 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.129

7 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 12 (10.143) | Vatican Saying 49

8 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.104

9 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.31; translated by N. H. Bartman

10 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.96

11 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.87

12 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1.63, translated by M. F. Smith (1969)

13 Ibid., 1.78-79, translated by Rolfe Humphries (1968)

14 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.87

15 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.129

16 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.132

17 The fragment  catalogued by Usener as #457 corresponds with a citation from Porphyry (Letter to Marcella 31) and Seneca (Letters to Lucilius 8.7), who writes “PHILOSOPHIAE SERVIAS OPORTET, VT TIBI CONTINGAT VERA LIBERTAS”.

18 Epíkouros, Key Doctrines 29-30 (10.151)

19 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.122

20 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 12 (10.143) | Vatican Saying 49

21 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.85

22 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.124

24 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 22 (10.146)

25 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.137; translated by N. H. Bartman

26 Ibid.,10.34

27 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.129

28 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 20 (10.145)

29 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 25 (10.148)

30 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.128

31 ΤΑΓΑΘΟΝ | τἀγαθὸν (tágathòn) or “The Good” as ἡδονή (hēdonḗ, “pleasure”), the τέλος (télos,) or “goal” of life.

32 Epíkouros, On the Ethical End as cited by Diogénēs Laértios (Lives 10.6)

33 Epíkouros differs from the Kyrēnaíc hedonists, who questioned the benefit of equilibrium.

34 Metródōros’ Epistle to Timokrátēs (Usener fragment 409) is echoed by Athḗnaios (Deipnosophists 7.280A, 12.546F), Cicero (Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso 17.66), and Ploútarkhos (Against Kolṓtēs 2.1108C, 30.1125A).

35 i.e. sexual intercourse, the act of Aphrodite, from which we inherit the word “aphrodisiac”.

36 Philódēmos, Epigram 15, translated by W. R. Paton (1916-18)

38 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 61

39 Epíkouros, “Words on the Wise” 10.120

40 Philódēmos, On Property Management 22.44, translated by Voula Tsouna (2012)

41 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 17 (10.144)

42 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 40 (10.154)

43 Philódēmos, On Property Management 16.36-37

44 Metródōros, Vatican Saying 51 was taken from a fragment from Metródōros to Pythoklḗs

45 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.121; translated by N. H. Bartman

46 Epíkouros was the ἡγεμών (hēgemṓn) meaning “leader”, “guide”, or “founder” of the Garden.

47  Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 10.11

48 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric 4, translated by Harry M. Hubbell (1920)

49 i.e. sexual intercourse, the act of Aphrodite, from which we inherit the word “aphrodisiac”.

50 Metródōros, Vatican Saying 51 was taken from a fragment to Pythoklḗs

51 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 31 (10.151)

52 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.116

53 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.131

54 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.126

55 This can also be translated as “servants” or “boys”, suggesting either a criticism of pederasty or slavery (or both). This may serve as an overall indictment against the objectification and indoctrination of those in subordinate positions.

56 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.132

57 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.116

58 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 23 (10.146)

59 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 25 (10.147)

60 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 21 (10.146)

61 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 7 (10.141)

62 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.130

63 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.136

64 Compare this sentiment contained in Usener fragment 469 to the Epistle to Menoikeús10.130.

65 Dioklḗs, Epitome III as documented by Diogénēs Laértios (Lives 10.10)

66 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers  10.136

67 Note the similarity of Usener fragment 207 with De Rerum Natura 2.34.

68 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.131

70 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.131

72 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 37

73 Philódēmos, On Property Management 13.11-14

75 Usener fragment 116 captures a quotation from Ploútarkhos (Against Kolṓtēs 17.1117A) ↩︎

76 Usener fragment  200 is echoed in Vatican Saying 33

77 Vatican Saying 33 echoes Epíkouros’ recommendation to Menoikeús (10.135)

78 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.128

79 Vatican Saying 33 echoes Epíkouros’ recommendation to Menoikeús (10.135)

80 Juvenal, Saurae IV  10.356

81 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 41

82 Philódēmos, On Property Management 23.14-18, translated by Voula Tsouna (2012)

83 Diogénēs Laértios ,Lives and Opinions 10.9; translated by N. H. Bartman

84 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 14

85 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 21. Compare this paragraph against Epíkouros’ description of desire in the Epistle to Menoikeús: “Then as for the desires one must conclude then [1] the Natural exist, and [2] the Vain, and of the Natural then [3] the Necessary, but only the natural [are needed]; then of the necessary those necessary are [instrumental] to happiness, and to the lack of distress of the body, and to their own living” (Lives 10.127)

86 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.138

87 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.138

88 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.131

89 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 15 (10.144)

90 Juvenal, Saurae IV 10.356

91 The fragment catalogued by Usener (457) corresponds with a citation from Porphyry (Letter to Marcella 31) and Seneca (Letters to Lucilius 8.7) who writes “PHILOSOPHIAE SERVIAS OPORTET, VT TIBI CONTINGAT VERA LIBERTAS”.

92 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.137

95 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 9, translated by Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan (1995)

96 Cicero, De Natura Deorum 1.16, translated by C. D. Yonge (1877)

97 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.132

98 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 23 (10.146)

99 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, fragment 19, translated by Harry M. Hubbell (1920)

100 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 27 (10.148)

101 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 37 (10.152)

102 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.133

103 Philódēmos, On Rhetoric 5

104 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.116

105 Philódēmos, On Property Management 4.23-30, translated by Voula Tsouna (2012)

106 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.116

107 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 37 (10.152)

108 Philódēmos, On Death 24.6-8, translated by W. Benjamin Henry (2009)

109 Philódēmos, On Piety 25.5-6, translated by Dirk Obbink (1996)

110 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.81

111 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.133

112 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.67

113 These lines are repeated four times throughout De Rerum Natura; see 1.146-148, 2.59-61, 3.91-93, and 6.39-41.

114 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1.146-150, translated by H. A. J. Munro (1860)

115 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine12 (10.143) | Vatican Saying 49

116 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1.101, translated by N. H. Bartman, from “TANTVM RELIGIO POTVIT SVADERE MALORVM”.

117 Voltaire warns against the political implications of superstitious belief, writing: “Certainement qui est en droit de vous rendre absurde est en droit de vous rendre injuste” (Questions sur la Miracles 412).

118 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 15 (10.144)

119 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.45

120 Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism 1, translated by David Konstan (1980)

121 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 9, translated by Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan (1995)

122 Other translators employ “superstition” as their preferred translation of RELIGIO. Lucretius, however, uses both RELIGIO and SUPERSTITIO as near synonyms, versus healthy PIETAS.

123 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1.82-85, translated by A. E. Stallings (2007)

124 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 7, translated by Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan (1995)

125 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 3.53-54, translated by H. A. J. Munro (1860)

126 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 8

127 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 6.1230-1234; translated by H. A. J. Munro (1860)

128 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.87

129 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 54

130 Philódēmos, On Piety 13.7-8, translated by Dirk Obbink (1996)

131 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.124

132 Diogénēs Laértios writes that “he also takes everything prophetic as wrong, and as in the Little Epitome, he so affirms, ‘Divination is not real, but even if real,” we should “regard the predictions [as] nothing to us.’” (Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers 10.135)

133 “…so writes Diogénēs” of Tarsós the Epicurean (c. 2nd-century BCE) “in the twelfth” book Epitome of the Ethical Doctrines of Epíkouros” (Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.118).

134 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.93

135 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.113

136 Astromancy, from ἄστρον (ástron, “[sky] glower”) and μαντεία (manteía, “divination”), literally “star-prophecy”.

137 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.113

138 Philódēmos, Epigram 28 (translated by W. R. Paton, 1916-18), there he goes, dissin’ astrology since 69 BCE.

139 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 40

140 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.118; translated by N. H. Bartman

141 Usener fragment 489 echoes the Epistle to Menoikeús 134 and Key Doctrine 16. ↩︎

142 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.135

143 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.81

144 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 10 (10.142)

145 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 13 (10.143)

146 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 24

147 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.115

148 Cicero, De Natura Deorum 1.16, translated by C. D. Yonge (1877)

149 !!! Practitioners of the Mazdayasni religion of Persia are popularly known as Zoroastrians, however, this designation creates a complication (as does referring to “Islam” by the now-obsolete term “Mohammedanism”). Mazdayasna centers around the worship of Ahura Mazda—Zarathustra (Hellenized as “Zōroastrēs”) was merely a prophet of Mazda.

150 Oneiromacy is the practice of allegedly scrying knowledge of future events from dreams.

152 Philódēmos, On Signs and Inferences 38.8-12, translated by by Philip and Estelle de Lacey (1941)

153 The ancient, Athenian Stoics gathered at ἡ ποικίλη στοά (ē poikélē stoá), the “Stoa Poikile” or “Painted Porch”.

155 According to Diogénēs Laértios, “Kleánthēs” the 2nd Stoic scholarch, “was called a second Hēraklḗs” by Zēnṓn, the first scholarch (Laértios 7.170). Seneca writes a tragedy of Hercules, exploring themes like perseverance and fate (Hēraklḗs Raging). Epíktētos makes numerous allusions to Hēraklḗs in Discourses (1.16, 2.16, 3.22, 3.24, 3.26, 4.10).

156 Epíkouros, “Words on the Wise” 10.120

157 Epíkouros, On Anger 31.21-24

158 Other translators employ “superstition” as their preferred translation of RELIGIO. Lucretius, however, uses both RELIGIO and SUPERSTITIO as near synonyms, versus healthy PIETAS.

159 Philódēmos, On Piety 71.1-12, translated by Dirk Obbink (1996)

160 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.124

161 Philódēmos, On Piety 71.1-12

162 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 10 (10.142)

163 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 11 (10.142)

164 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.81

165 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 10 (10.142)

166 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.116

167 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.81

168 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 10 (10.142)

169 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 20 (10.145)

170 Philódēmos, On Death 30.1-5, translated by W. Benjamin Henry (2009)

171 Ibid., 36.25-26

172 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.73

173 Ibid., 10.74

174 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 7 (10.141)

175 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 14 (10.143)

176 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 5, translated by Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan (1995)

177 Philódēmos, On Death 24.35-36

178 Ibid., 32.27

179 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 13 (10.143)

180 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.81

181 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.137; translated by N. H. Bartman

182 Harfouche, et al. “Estimated global and regional incidence and prevalence of herpes simplex virus infections and genital ulcer disease in 2020”. Sexually Transmitted Infections. 2025 May 19, 101, 4, 214-223.

184 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 4 (10.140) | Vatican Saying 3

185 Mētródōros, Vatican Saying 10

186 Mētródōros, Usener fragment 339, translated by N. H. Bartman (2025)

187 Philódēmos, On Death 37.23-25, translated by W. Benjamin Henry (2009)

188 Mētródōros, Vatican Saying 30

189 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.81

190 Philódēmos, On Death 39.6-7

191 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.133

192 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 9

193 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.133

194 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.134

195 Beckett, Samuel. Waiting for Godot. Faber & Faber, 2006.

196 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 16 (10.144)

197 Philódēmos, On Death 38.24

198 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 2.54, translated by Bailey (1910): “OMNIS CVM IN TENEBRIS PRAESERTIM VITA LABORET”

199 Philódēmos, On Death 2.15-16

200 Ibid., 2.10-11

201 Ibid., 2.13-14

202 Ibid., 5.1

203 Ibid., 5.4-6

204 Ibid., 9.4-5

205 Ibid., 12.2

206 Ibid., 13.15

207 Ibid., 20.3-4

208 Ibid., 22.10

209 Ibid., 22.10-11

210 Ibid., 23.7-14

211 Ibid., 25.2-6

212 Ibid., 26.10

213 Ibid., 28.2-4

214 Ibid., 28.37-29.2

215 Ibid., 29

216 Ibid., 32.32-33

217 Ibid., 33.37-34.3

218 Ibid., 35.1-2

219 Ibid., 36.31

220 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.125

221 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 2 (10.139) | Vatican Saying 2

222 Philódēmos, On Death 28.15-16

223 Diogénēs of Oìnóanda, Fragment 73, translated by M. F. Smith

224 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 4 (10.140) | Vatican Saying 3

225 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.137, translated by N. H. Bartman

226 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 10, translated by Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan (1995)

227 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 66

228 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 78 echoes the Epistle to Menoikeús 130

229 Usener fragment 213 corresponds with two, separate attestations, one by Ploútarkhos (It Is Impossible to Live Pleasantly in the Manner of Epíkouros 28.1105D) and one by Seneca (Letters to Lucilius 63.7).

230 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 40 (10.154)

233 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 35

234 Philódēmos, On Death 38.20, translated by W. Benjamin Henry (2009)

235 Ibid., 37.40

236 Ibid., 38.18-19

237 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 19 (10.145) | Vatican Saying 22

238 Tolkien, J. R. R. The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring. George Allen & Unwin, 1954, 60.

239 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 2 (10.139) | Vatican Saying 2

240 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 38

241 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.124

242 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 22, translated by Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan (1995)

243 Philódēmos, On Death 23.13-14, translated by W. Benjamin Henry (2009)

244 Philódēmos, On Property Management 15.10-12, translated by Voula Tsouna (2012)

245 Diogénēs of Oìnóanda,  Fragment 3, translated by M. F. Smith

246 Philódēmos, On Choices and Avoidance 10

247 Ibid., 23

248 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.28, translated by N. H. Bartman

249 Philódēmos, On Death 2.12-13, translated by W. Benjamin Henry (2009)

250 Philódēmos, On Property Management 4.23-30

251 Philódēmos, On Death 39.15-24

252 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 17

253 Epíkouros, Epistle to Idomeneus according to Diogénēs (Lives 10.22) or Hérmarkhos according to Cicero.

254 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 48

255 Diogénēs of Oìnóanda, Fragment 3, translated by M. F. Smith

256 Loukianós of Samósta. Alexander the False Prophet 1, translated by A. M. Harmon (1936).

257 Ibid. 7

259 Ibid. 47

261 Ibid. 13-14

262 Ibid. 20

263 Ibid. 17

264 Ibid. 32

265 Ibid. 8

266 Ibid. 6

267 Ibid.. 32

269 Other translators employ “superstition” as their preferred translation of RELIGIO. Lucretius, however, uses both RELIGIO and SUPERSTITIO as near synonyms, versus healthy PIETAS.

270 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1.82-85, translated by A. E. Stallings (2007)

271 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.152, translated by N. H. Bartman

272 Strábōn, Geōgraphiká 3.4.14

274 Pliny the Elder, Naturalis Historia 2.95

277 Epíkouros, Epistle to Pythoklḗs 10.95

279 Radzinsky, Edvard. The Rasputin File. Anchor Books, 2001.

281 Jeffreys, Diarmuid. Aspirin: The Remarkable Story of a Wonder Drug. Bloomsbury, 2005.

282 Epíkouros, Vatican Saying 44

283 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.34, translated by N. H. Bartman

284 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.45

285 Ibid. 10.34

286 Ibid. 10.50

287 Ibid. 10.51

288 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 21 (10.146)

289 Epíkouros, Epistle to Hērodótos 10.51

291 Epíkouros, Key Doctrine 23 (10.146)

292 Diogénēs Laértios, Lives 10.23, translated by N. H. Bartman

293 Usener fragment 387, preserved by Philódēmos reflects a sentiment expressed by Lucretius in De Rerum Natura 6.68.

294 Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeús 10.135

 


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Buxhoeveden, Baroness Sophie. The Life and Tragedy of Alexandra Feodorovna, Empress of Russia. Longmans, Green and Co, 1928.

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Cicero. De Natura Deorum. Translated by C. D. Yonge, Harper & Brothers, 1877.

Diogénēs of Oìnóanda. The Epicurean Inscription. Translated by M. F. Smith. Bibliopolis 1993

Guthrie, Kenneth Sylvan. Numenius of Apamea: The Father of Neo-Platonism. G. Bell and Sons, 1917.

Eleroy, William. The Authentic Letters of Columbus. Field Columbian Museum, vol. 1, no. 2, 116.

Epíkouros. “Fragments”. Translated by N. H. Bartman, Leaping Pig Publishing, 2026, TWENTIERS.COM/FRAGMENTS.

Epíkouros. “Key Doctrines”. The Hedonicon: The Holy Book of Epicurus, 2023, 1-4.

Epíkouros. “Vatican Sayings”. Translated by N. H. Bartman, Leaping Pig Publishing, 2025, TWENTIERS.COM/VATICAN-SAYINGS.

Fleming, Candace. The Family Romanov: Murder, Rebellion, and the Fall of Imperial Russia. Anne Schwartz Books, 2014.

Jeffreys, Diarmuid. Aspirin: The Remarkable Story of a Wonder Drug. Bloomsbury, 2005.

Laértios, Diogénēs. The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, Book 10: The Life of Epíkouros. Translated by N. H. Bartman, Leaping Pig Publishing, 2025, TWENTIERS.COM/BIOGRAPHY.

Loukianós of Samósta. Alexander the False Prophet. Translated by A. M. Harmon, Loeb Classical Library, 1936.

Lucretius. De Rerum Natura. Translated by H. A. J. Munro, Deighton, Bell and Co., 1860.

Lucretius. On the Nature of the Universe. Translated by Ronald Melville, Clarendon Press, 1997.

Lucretius. On the Nature of Things. Translated by Cyril Bailey, Clarendon Press, 1910.

Lucretius. On the Nature of Things. Translated by M. F. Smith, Sphere Books, 1969.

Lucretius. The Nature of Things. Translated by A. E. Stallings, Penguin Classics, 2007.

Lucretius. The Way Things Are. Translated by Rolfe Humphries, Indiana University Press, 1968.

Mann, Charles C. 1491. Vintage Books, 2006.

Pfanz, H., Yüce, G., Gulbay, A.H. et al. “Deadly CO2 gases in the Plutonium of Hierapolis (Denizli, Turkey)”. Archaeological and Anthropological Sciences, vol. 11, pages 1359–1371, 2018.

Philódēmos. Epigrams. Paton, W. R. The Greek Anthology: Volume I. Loeb Classical Library, 1916.

Philódēmos. On Choices and Avoidance. Translated by Giovanni Indelli and Voula Tsouna-McKirahan, Bibliopolis, 1995.

Philódēmos. On Death. Translated by W. Benjamin Henry, Society of Biblical Literature, 2009.

Philódēmos. On Frank Criticism. Translated by David Konstan, Society of Biblical Literature, 1980.

Philódēmos. On Property Management. Translated by Tsouna, Society of Biblical Literature, 2013.

Philódēmos. On Rhetoric. Translated by Harry M. Hubble, Conn. Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1920.

Philódēmos. On Signs and Inferences. Translated by Philip and Estelle de Lacey, The American Philological Association, 1941.

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Zinn, Howard. A People's History of the United States. HarperCollins Publishers, 2015.
Modified from "Pericles's Funeral oration" by Philipp Foltz (1852)

We Got Beef: A Disembowelment of the Dialectic, Politics, and Other Organs of Bullshit


“Rhetoricians might flatter flies with honey,
but politicians feed flies bullshit.”


Modified from “The Butcher’s Shop” by Gabriele Passerotti (1580)

WE GOT BEEF

A DISEMBOWELMENT OF THE DIALECTIC,
POLITICS, AND OTHER ORGANS OF BULLSHIT

 

I have a bone to pick with rhetoric.

Here’s the heart of the issue: talk is cheap. People chew fat in political chats without purpose — no learning occurs, no truth is shared, no friendship is found. Everyone misses the meat of the matter. Opinions are skin-deep. Debate rarely disembowels delusion. Too often, rhetoricians and orators enlist themselves in the service of manipulation. After all, “the end of rhetoric is to persuade in a speech” and not to validate truth with evidence (Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, I, col. 3). Their art does not “depend on arguments from physical facts” because “their art is a power of persuasion” (Ibid., II, 12, col. XIX). For instance, it is agreeable to suppose that honey attracts more flies than vinegar — true, but as a student of nature and pupil of the Garden (so guided to treat politics with suspicion), I observe that nothing attracts so many flies as bullshit.

Those who study in the rhetorical schools are deceived. They are charmed by the tricks of style, and pay no attention to the thought, believing that if they can learn to speak in this style they will succeed in the assembly and court of law. But when they find that this style is wholly unfitted for practical speaking they realize that they have lost their money.
(Epíkouros, Against the Rhetoricians)

The rhetorical τέχνη (tékhnē, “technique”) of the sophists provides a technical method without practical application; at the same time many practical orators enjoy success, and wield influence without technically possessing any teachable skills, having mastered neither art nor science. Dialecticians may enjoy sagacious reputations, but may also lack receptivity, perspective, and may provide people with impractical, ineffective advice. Both educated rhetoricians and natural orators present dangers as agents of persuasion — dialecticians turn the practical benefits of philosophy into abstractions; rhetors misuse the art of prose for manipulation; orators’ aptitude for practical persuasion lacks a foundation in natural ethics.

Each of the rhetorical arts and practices fails to ground themselves in nature. As human agents of manipulation, professional persuaders fail to refer to the natural “goal” of “living blessedly” (Laértios 10.128). Each of these tools can be appropriated to service a political agenda. Only the true philosophy provides students with the tools they need to understand reality and pursue happiness. To quote the lead character from a favorite, adult cartoon, “Everyone wants people they like to be right. That’s why popular people are fucking dumb” (Rick and Morty, Season 3, Episode 4). As Epíkouros teaches, “the purest security is possible by means of the peace and the withdrawal from the masses”, never by chasing their satisfaction (Key Doctrine 14).

Modified from artwork by Kasten Searles for “The Queen’s Gambit” from the Arkansas Times, March 2024

THE PRISON OF POLITICS

Unlike other schools, the Garden rejects politics as a valid field of inquiry and remonstrates the rhetorical tools that support the political ambitions of professional persuaders. As φιλοσοφία (philosophía) is the “love of wisdom”, so politics is antithetical to friendship and wisdom. While Epíkouros does not dismiss civic engagement, he warns against pursuing a political career. Such a pursuit requires either subservience to wealthy interests, or else, submission to popular opinion, or engagement with senseless gossip. The most effective politicians are not those who are the most educated, for “some come out of the schools worse than when they went in” (On Rhetoric, I, 35, 1 ff.=Suppl. 19.13 ff.), but those who are best at “studying what pleases the crowd and practicing” (Ibid., I, 45, 13 ff.=Suppl. 23, 20 ff.) In this way, through pleasing speech, an otherwise unskilled narcissist “can become skilled in politics” (Ibid.).

Political narratives, in particular, are uniquely dubious. Self-promoting orators spoil healthy discourse by drawing people into pointless debates. Rhetoricians excel at erecting scarecrows. Argumentative puppets present themselves as prime cuts of intelligence, yet many are without substance. Popular speakers are incentivized to sell unpalatable policies for the sake of their own enrichment. Politicians dress the inedible entrails they cook with zest. They spice lies to hide their rancid flavor. They sew empty arguments from skin and bones. Debates are dressed for taste, and, as mentioned, rarely dissect the meat of the matter. Dialectical discourse is dangerous. Rhetoric and oratory are ineffective at verifying true statements and, more importantly, impractical at cultivating friendships. As Philódēmos acknowledges, “Politics is the worst foe of friendship; for it generates envy, ambition and discord.” (On Rhetoric, II, 158, fr. XIX).

In speaking of a “free life”, Epíkouros affirms that it

is not possible to be acquired by a lot of money [made] through an unscrupulous means [nor] is without servility to the mob or authority, rather [it] acquires everything [it needs] in continuous abundance; nevertheless if [one did procure] any money by chance, then the latter can be easily distributed to those nearby for goodwill. (Vatican Saying 58)

In this essay, I mean to review rhetoric, dissect dialectic, purge politics, and oust the aura of oratory. We will skim the fat from inference by demonstrating the dangers of logical induction. As Epíkouros teaches, we “must liberate ourselves, out of the prison [built] upon circular” proceedings, social programming, indoctrination, senseless gossip, “political” affairs”, and other practices that sacrifice the testimony of the senses for persuasive story-telling (Vatican Saying 58). “If you contest every single one of the sense perceptions, you can neither judge the outward appearance nor can you affirm which of the sensations you, yourself say are deceptive according to the way in which the criterion operates” (Key Doctrine 23).

“Relativity” by M. C. Escher (1953)

UNFOUNDED INFERENCE

Epicureans reject both philosophical “reasonings in the form of Aristotelian syllogisms or inductions” as well as “other dialectical procedure(s)”  (On Irrational Contempt 2). As Polýstratos writes, those persuaded by such procedures “are fools who construct their argument solely on the basis of the conviction of others” and not through empirical investigation (Ibid.). “[B]y the dialectical means mentioned, one cannot deliver the soul from fear and anxious suspicion” because the conclusions of the rhetor, the orator, and the dialectician are not founded on physics (Ibid.). The dialectic is rejected “for want of qualification” as a reliable criterion of knowledge, for the Epicureans “suppose the study of nature provides the proper space for the voices of the facts” (Laértios 10.31). The only valid testimony is from the senses — speculation, hearsay, assumption, induction, and conjecture are inferior practices to the process of confirming hypotheses with evidence. “We shall say that the one who infers thus fails because he has not gone through all appearances well, and indeed that he is corrected by the appearances themselves” of real things (On Signs). When “divorced [from] the real phenomena”, then reality gets “cast out of the whole study of nature and then flows from a myth” (Laértios 10.87).

By contrast, Epicureans employ “the method of analogy”, observing nature, inferring hypotheses, and substantiating with evidence. “For there is no other correct method of inference besides this” (Philódēmos, On Signs). Sophistic rhetoric further confounds the process of substantiating hypotheses with observation. By contrast, evidence justifies the demonstrable truth of statements. Otherwise, flawed methods lead to self-defeating conclusions. “For the arguments that they devise to refute the [Epicurean] method of analogy contribute to its confirmation. […] It is the same in other cases, so that as a result they refute themselves.” (Ibid.). As pertains to professional persuaders, rarely are politicians and scientists the same people.

Modified from “The School of Athens by Rafael (1509-11)

DIABOLECTICIANS

Unlike other philosophers, Epíkouros does not recognize the dialectic as a distinct branch of philosophy (Laértios 7.41). Rather, he recognizes the dialectic as a mere method, which, by itself, cannot arrive at the “truth” it seeks to find. Speaking of the Epicurean Garden, Diogénēs reports that “she has withdrawn the Dialectic [and] rejects it for want of qualification;” for the Epicureans “suppose the [study of] natural [phenomena] provides [the proper] space for the voices of the facts.” (Ibid., 10.31). Epíkouros called “the Dialecticians totally toxic” (Ibid., 10.8) and later refers to “dialectic” as being “pretentious” (Epistle to Hēródotos 10.72). Contemporaneously, “Metródōros wrote […] Against the Dialecticians” (Laértios 10.24). He was documented “ridiculing those who consider the dialectic method more accurate” (On Rhetoric, II, 45, col. XLV). Philódēmos positively identifies the position of “the dialectician” as “a position which we refute” (Ibid., I, 190, col. IX; I, 191, col. X). Polýstratos writes that dialectical reasoning is based purely upon the false premises of dialectician’s “own conviction” (On Irrational Contempt 2). Instead, “one must, for the sake of oneself” observe nature to determine the truth of statements (Epistle to Hēródotos 10.72). Otherwise, as Philódēmos notes, “those who use dialectical reasoning do not know that they are shamefully refuting themselves” (On Signs).

For a demonstration of the dialectic in action, consider the following exampe, courtesy of the American, two-party political system: Suppose the Pink Team asserts that ‘An asteroid is coming! We need funds to stop it!’ The Yellow Team responds: ‘There is no asteroid. You just want money.’ Fortunately, everyone is a respectable, patient, educated dialectician, and everyone agrees to the wise rules of their admirable methodology. They proudly reach a compromise: ‘After extensive consideration, we have determined that there is a chance that an object, perhaps, in this case, an asteroid, of indeterminate size, mind you, may enter a region of spa —’

SLAM. That was the sound of nature crushing their dialectic.

Modified from “Asteroid Crashing into a Primordial Earth” by Don Davis / NASA (1991).png

THE RACKET OF RHETORIC

“[T]o practice rhetoric is toilsome to body and soul, and we would not endure it. [Rhetoric] is most unsuitable for one who aims at quiet happiness, and compels one to meddle more or less with affairs, and provides no more right opinion or acquaintance with nature than one’s ordinary style of speaking, and draw the attention of young men from philosophy”
(Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 52, col. 38., II, 53, col. L).

Rhetoric is a technique, an art of prose. Therein, Epicureans “do not claim that rhetoric is bad in itself” (Ibid., II, 142, fr. XIII). Simply, that rhetoricians “are like pilots, who have a good training but may be bad men.” Rhetoric is a weapon that any trained person can learn to wield. Even “the perfect orator” need not “be also a good man and a good citizen” as “in the case of any other art;” for example “a good musician may be a villain” (Ibid., II, 127, fr. XIII=II, 75, fr. XIII.). The 19th-century, French author Flaubert cautions, “Il ne faut pas toucher aux idoles: la dorure en reste aux mains” or “You shouldn’t touch idols: a little gold always rubs off” (Madame Bovary 3.5) — we receive this phrase as “never meet your heroes“. Indeed, were “the greatest rhetors [to] accomplish all they wish […] then they would be tyrants.” (On Rhetoric, II, 151, fr. VIII).

“To tell the truth,” so writes Philódēmos, “the rhetors do a great deal of harm to many people”, by defending the art of manipulation (Ibid., II, 133, fr. IV). He documents that rhetoricians “were not in good repute at the very beginning” as far as “in Egypt and Rhodes and Italy” (Ibid., II, 105, fr. XII). Hermarkhos claims that “rhetors [do not] deserve admiration”. “Moreover the rhetors charge for the help they give, and so cannot be considered benefactors” (Ibid., II, 159, fr. XX). By contrast, “the philosophers give their instruction without cost” (Ibid.). “Metrodorus teaches in regard to rhetoric that it does not arise from a study of science” (Ibid., II, 193, fr. 2). “The end of rhetoric is to persuade in a speech”, designed to disregard nature as is convenient. “It is clearly proven that the art of the rhetor is of no assistance for a life of happiness” (Ibid., I, 250, XVIII).

Modified from “The Death of Socrates” by Jacques-Loius David (1787)

STUPID SOPHISTS

If he knew that he could not […] become a philosopher […] he might propose to teach grammar, music, or tactics. For we can find no reason why anyone with the last spark of nobility in his nature should become a sophist…” (Ibid., II, 54, col. 39., col, LI).

The Epicurean critique against rhetoric is dually applied to and principally exhibited by a method that they refer to as sophistic (also referred to as “panegyric” or “epideictic” rhetoric). In general, people “are led astray by sophists and pay them money merely to get the reputation for political ability” (Ibid., II, 46, col. 33). It has been grossly easy for rich orators to persuade poor laborers to fund their schemes. Philódēmos observes that “sophistical training does not prevent faulty speech” (Ibid., I.182, col. I—I, 186, col. V). In fact, “some do not care at all for what they say” so long as it accomplishes their rhetorical goal, regardless of the greater goal of life (Ibid., I, 244. col XIII). “And when they do praise a good man they praise him for qualities considered good by the crowd, and not truly good qualities” (Ibid., I, 216 col. XXXVa, 14).

“[I]t follows that”, as is the case with other forms of technical rhetoric “those who possess this ability [of sophistic rhetoric] have acquired it without the help of scientific principles” (Ibid., I, 136, 20=Suppl. 61, 19). “[R]hetorical sophists” are known “for wasting their time on investigation of useless subjects, such as […] the interpretation of obscure passages in the poets”, as when civic policy is guided by mythic texts (Ibid., I, 78, 19 ff.=Suppl. 39, 5 ff). Compared against the philosophers, “the instruction given by the sophists is not only stupid but shameless, and lacking in refinement and reason” since it does not take into account the goal of life, nor commit to a devoted study of nature (Ibid., I, 223, fr. III). Instead, sophistic rhetoric appeals to authority and tradition by means of equivocation, obfuscation, and exploitation of ignorance.

“Paul Preaching in the Areopagus” by James Thornhill (1729-31)

CULTIVATING IGNORANCE

Often, obfuscation “is intentional”, as is the case “when one has nothing to say, and conceals the poverty of his thought by obscure language that he may seem to say something useful” as with equivocation (Ibid., I, 156, col. XIII). Other times, we observe “unintentional obscurity [that] arises from not mastering the subject, or not observing the proper formation […] and in general from failure” (Ibid., I, 158, col. XVI). Obscurity in discourse also arises “from ignorance of the proper meanings of words, their connotation, and the principles on which one word is to be preferred to another” (Ibid., I. 159, col. XVII). In these cases, the success of an orator corresponds not with knowledge, nor coherence, but with a practical ability to persuade a mob. “Most, if not all [of] the arguments do not prove what they claim to prove even if the premises be granted.” (Ibid., I, col. 5). “The worst class of arguments are those which act as boomerangs and demolish the position of the disputant” (Ibid. I, 4, col. I=Suppl. 4, 17).

For example, suppose that a sophist means to convince a legislative body to support a piece of legislation, but they lack meaningful substance. It behooves them to appeal to their audience’s preferences — moderates appreciate an appeal to custom (e.g. it’s the way it is); traditionalists appreciate an appeal to myth (e.g. it’s the way it’s always been); legalists appreciate an appeal to authority (e.g. it’s the law); populists appreciate an appeal to popularity (e.g. it’s what we want); economists appreciate an appeal to wealth (e.g. it’s profitable); bleeding-hearts appreciate an appeal to empathy (e.g. have a heart); ignorant people appreciate an appeal to simplicity (e.g. they’re trying to confuse you). The most ignorant are the most gullible, easy prey for skilled sophists. (Intentional obfuscation is masterfully exemplified by the “Chewbacca Defense” from the October 7, 1998 episode of South Park. The “Chewbacca Defense” leads to an irrelevant conclusion based on non-sequitur speech and a red herring.)

Modified from a screenshot of “Chef Aid,” South Park, season 2, episode 14, Comedy Central, 1998

EMPTY ORATORY

Philódēmos spends the better part of On Rhetoric distinguishing rhetoric as a technical art versus legislative and judicial oratory, which he identifies as a practical skill. He writes:

The practical skill acquired by observation is not called an art by the Greeks except that sometimes in a loose use of language people call a clever woodchopper an artist. If we call observation and practice art we should include under the term all human activity.
(Ibid., I, 57, 23 ff.=Suppl. 29, 15 ff.)

There is a “division between the different parts of rhetoric (i. e. sophistic and practical rhetoric) which was made by Epicurus and his immediate successors (Ibid., I, 49, 14 ff.=Suppl. 25, 15 ff.). Unlike sophistic, Philódēmos suggests that one “could find reason for pursuing practical rhetoric”, even though this form of oratory does not qualify as a formal art (Ibid., II, 54, 41). Unlike sophistic methods of argumentation, practical oration (the ambassadorial oratory of diplomats, the deliberative oratory or legislators, the forensic oratory of lawyers) provides practical utility: “thousands of [Greeks] have been useful ambassadors, were prudent in their advice, were not the cause of disaster, did not speak with an eye to gain, and were not convicted of malfeasance in office.” (Ibid., II, 224, col. XIX). In these cases, “some do succeed by means of natural ability and experience without the aid of rhetoric” (Ibid., I, 47, I ff.=Suppl. 24, 10 ff.). They are less concerned with trying “to classify and describe metaphors” instead of trying to give “practical working instructions” (Ibid., I, 171, 2, col. XII).

Still, even without methodical manipulation, oratory does not guarantee happiness, and provides no moral direction. It allows fools without skill to run offices that benefit from skill. Popularity insulates celebrities from the consequences of their actions. Oratory is the favored tool of talentless politicians whose only object is the advancement of destructive pursuits.

By contrast against the empty promises, unhelpful eloquence, and practical lies of orators, Philódēmos argues for παρρησία (parrēsía, “frank” or “free speech”), explaining that it is truly καλή φράσις (kalḗ phrásis), “lovely phrasing” or “beautiful speech” (On Rhetoric, I, 149 IV). Epíkouros commits to using “ordinary expressions appropriately, and not express oneself inaccurately nor vaguely, nor use expressions with double meaning” (Ibid., I,161, Col XIX). Ornate oratory might promote popularity, but rarely does it reduce anxiety.

Modified from a screenshot from “They Live” by John Carpenter (1988)

POLITICAL PROGRAMMING

Rhetoricians might flatter flies with honey, but politicians feed flies bullshit.

Epicurus believed that there was no art of persuading large bodies of men; that those who are not rhetoricians sometimes are more persuasive than the rhetoricians; that those trained in panegyric are less able to face the tumult of the assembly than those who have no rhetorical training; that Epicurus spoke of arts, and said that those acquainted with them were benefited, but did not mean that this enabled them to attain the end; if anyone possesses the power of persuasion it is responsible for evil and not for good.
(On Rhetoric, I, 99, 5b=Suppl. 48, 15)

While the arts of persuasion are discouraged, even then, Epicureans evaluate the dialectic and rhetoric above political discourse. “[W]e declare [politics not] to be an art “ (Ibid., Section II-a). Politicians are famously dishonest because “a clever man without studying the technical works of the sophists can study some sophist’s speech and so learn to imitate them.” (Ibid., I, 130. col. XXIX). Command does not require comprehension. “They certainly leave no place for any science…” (Ibid., I, 49, 14 ff.=Suppl. 25, 15 ff.). Indeed, “Delivery depends, too, on natural endowment, beauty of voice, grace of body” (Ibid., Col. XV). The job of “the statesman” is only to “discover the inherent political arguments” corresponding to “what appears true to the crowd” and then to manipulate them to the best of their ability (On Rhetoric, I, 209. col. XXVIII). As conditions change, one politician can advance murderous schemes, while another need to only wear the wrong-colored outfit to incite widespread, public ridicule. “There is no method by which one can” reliably “persuade the multitude, either always or in the majority of cases”, so pursuing politics is akin to delaying your own happiness (Ibid., II, 120, fr. XIX). Usually, success in politics requires either “a lot of money made through unscrupulous means” or “servility to the mob or authority” (Vatican Saying 67). Neither of those conditions are conducive to happiness.

To sum up; by no means should the philosopher acquire political experience, or rhetoric of that sort. It is evident that it is the height of folly to say that a study of nature produces a ἕξις [“habit”] of political oratory, especially since they introduce into the scheme of philosophy example andenthymeme” (On Rhetoric, II, 35, col. 38).

Philódēmos identifies those arguments that appeal to prejudice, traditional paradigms, historical precedence, and common belief as being “vain” (Ibid., I, 286, col. VII). They are “mere padding [to] provoke applause”, all “because the multitude is foolish” (Ibid., II, 39, col. XLI, I. 14). It is equally foolish that those “in political speeches use syllogism and induction which the dialecticians pride themselves on using” (Ibid., I, 286, col. VII). Therefore:

“[The wise] will [not] meddle in politics […] nor will they tyrannize; nor will they bark like a Cynic, […] and they will serve jury duty, and they will leave behind writings, but will not make public endorsements, and they will take precautions for their possessions” (Laertios 10.119).

Modified from “Departure of Odysseus from the Land of the Phaeacians” by Claude Lorrain (1646)

THE HARBOR OF PHILOSOPHY

“But this does not apply any more to philosophy”, nor does it apply to “the Epicureans who refrain from such things” (Ibid., II, 144, fr. II). “Philosophy is more profitable than epideictic rhetoric, especially if one practices rhetoric in the fashion of the sophists (Ibid., I, 225, fr. I). “To tell the truth”, so Philódēmos boasts, “philosophers gain the friendship of public men by helping them out of their troubles.” (Ibid., II, 133, fr. IV). He explains, “they live in peace and justice and tried friendship; those whom they find opposed to them they quickly soften” (Ibid., II, 160, XXI-XXV. II, 162, fr. XXVII). As mentioned, the Epicureans pride themselves on παρρησία (parrēsía, “free speech”). “In speaking one should not resort to ignoble rhetorical tricks, these have less effect than a straight-forward character” (Ibid., II, 126, fr. VI). Since the public tends to prefer comfortable lies, “it is better not to receive public preferment” (Ibid., II, 154, fr. XII.). Philosophers “help their country” not by patronizing the public, but “by teaching the young […] to act justly even if there are no laws, and to shun injustice as they would fire.” (Ibid., II, 154, fr. XIII.).

The primary resource that preserves the Epicurean deconstruction of oratory comes from Philódēmos in his book On Rhetoric. In this book, Philódēmos distinguishes technical rhetoric from practical oratory. He provides a critique of political speech and reviews the dialectic against the Epicureans’ method by analogy that anticipates the modern, scientific method.

Of chief concern, Philódēmos contrasts arts (like dialectic and rhetoric) against practical oratory and political speech, which are not teachable arts. “An art”, he writes “cannot be attained by one who has not studied it, and doing this regularly and certainly and not by conjecture.” He further explains that “this definition applies both to […] grammar and music”. He later adds “architecture, ship-carpentry, navigation, painting”, which all “had methods in olden time” (Ibid., I, 137, col. 33I.21). He concludes, “On the basis of this definition we declare sophistic to be an art” (Ibid., Section II-a). Here again, “That statement ‘He is a good rhetor’ simply means that he is experienced and skilled in speaking”, not that he is a good person. “For as we say ‘good rhetor’ we say ‘good artist’ meaning ‘skillful’” (Ibid., II, 234, col. XXXV).

Modified from “Sappho and Alcaeus” by Sir Lawrence Alma-Tadema (1881)

VARIETIES OF DISCOURSE

“One cannot even say that all rhetors adopt one style”, since orators alter their deliveries to suit the disposition of their audience (Ibid., I.152, Col. VIII). In On Rhetoric, our friend Philódēmos provides an overview of the various types of rhetoric and oratory, in addition to reviewing the positions of the Peripatetics and Stoics. In The Art of Rhetoric, Aristotélēs distinguishes rhetoric by three domains of persuasion: [I] deliberative or symbouleutic (e.g legislative), [II] forensic (e.g. judicial), and [III] epideictic (e.g. charismatic speeches) types (Technē Rhētorikē). A later Peripatetic adds [IV] enteuctic (e.g. ingratiation) as a fourth category. Conversely, the Stoics refer to epideictic rhetoric as [V] enconmiastic (e.g. eulogistic). Philódēmos also identifies [VI] ambassadorial (e.g. diplomatic) oratory and [VII] eristic (e.g. controversial). While ambassadorial, deliberative, and forensic styles of oratory exemplify practical oratory, the precision of rhetoric qualifies it as a technical art. Unlike practical oratory, technical rhetoric is exemplified by epideictic, rhetoric, also called [VII] panegyric (e.g. pageantic) and/or [VII] sophistic (e.g. deceptive).

As regards dialectic, Philódēmos offers professional respect (especially when compared against the profession of politics, the practice of oratory, and the art of rhetoric). He elaborates:

For the method of question and answer is necessary not only in philosophy and education, but often in the ordinary intercourse of life. The method of joint inquiry frequently demands this style. Moreover this method is adopted by the rhetor in the assembly as well as in the court of justice. (On Rhetoric, I, 241, col. XI).

While Philódēmos rejects the dialectic as a criterion of knowledge for “lack of qualification”, he accepts the general procedure as a logical tool, and acknowledges its applications in both technical rhetoric and practical oratory. In this way, “the rhetor is like the dialectician” (Ibid., II, 42, col. 30, I. 12.). The varieties of discourse are defined further at the end of this essay.

Modified from “Trilogy of the Desert: Mirage” by Salvador Dalí (1946)

THE MIRAGE OF SUCCESS

False illusions of success encircle us. Salary is not a reflection of skill. Popularity is not a mirror of value. Wealth cannot enrich friendship. Power cannot procure safety. Usually, these things produce antithetical effects: success incentivizes corruption, popularity rewards dishonesty, wealth challenges friendship, and power instigates insecurity. In his Key Doctrines, Epíkouros warns, “If for every occurrence you do not constantly reference the goal of natural pleasure, but if you suppress both banishment of pain and pursuit of pleasure to operate for another purpose, your reasonings and practices will not be in accordance” (25).

Wishing to be worshipped and well-liked, people procured security from people so long as they can be pronounced popular. And if so then indeed they were safe since such a lifestyle inherits the natural benefit of the good. If, however, they procured no safety, then they did not receive that for which they initially strove. (Key Doctrine 7)

Philódēmos provides us with a further warning in On Rhetoric as well as an example of when politicians, wishing to be popular, failed to procure safety:

“[M]any statesmen have been rejected by their fellow citizens, and slaughtered like cattle. Nay they are worse off than cattle, for the butcher does not hate the cattle, but the tortures of the dying statesmen are made more poignant by hatred” (Ibid., I, 234, col. V).

Based on these factors, Hermarkhos calls those who willfully pursue a career in rhetoric “insane”. They rarely achieve the goal of nature that such wealth and popularity is meant to secure. He affirms that “’It is better to lose one’s property than to keep it by lawsuits which disturb the calm of the soul‘” (Ibid., I, 81, 3ff.=Suppl. 40, 23 ff). For “it is much better to lose one’s wealth if one can not keep it otherwise, than to spend one’s life in rhetoric” (Ibid., I, 235, col. VI). Epíkouros summarizes, “Better for you to have courage lying upon a bed of straw than to agonize with a gold bed and a costly table” (Usener, Epicurea 207).

Modified from “Landscape with Farmhouses and Palm Trees” by Camille Pissarro (1853)

LIVE UNKNOWN

“[L]et us be content”, writes Philódēmos, “to live the quiet life of a philosopher without claiming a share in the ability to manage a city by persuasion” (On Rhetoric, I, 234, col. IV). Nothing secures a pleasant life so much as friendship, and nothing guarantees a life of pain so much as politics. Philosophy is more valuable that rhetoric because the “philosophy that teaches us how to limit our desires is better than rhetoric which helps us to satisfy them.” (Ibid., II, 150, fr. VII)

Philosophy is more profitable than epideictic rhetoric, especially if one practices rhetoric in the fashion of the sophists […]. The philosopher has many τόποι [“topics” or “positions”] concerning practical justice and other virtues about which he is confident; the busybody (i. e. the rhetorician) is quite the opposite. Nor is one who does not appear before kings and popular assemblies forced to play second part to the rich, as do rhetors who are compelled to employ flattery all their lives. (Ibid., I, 225, fr. I).

Escape notice and live! So writes Philódēmos, every “good and honest [person] who confines [their] interest to philosophy alone, and disregards the nonsense of lawyers, can face boldly all such troubles, yea all powers and the whole world.” (Ibid., II, 140, fr. XII). He observes:

“inspired before the same loud clamor, some will strive with the effort of Apollophanes [the Stoic] to advance wonderfully to the podium, but others, having landed in [philosophy’s] harbor and with hopes offered them that ‘not even the venerable flame of Zeus would be able to prevent them taking from the highest point of the citadel’ a life that is happy, afterwards, in spite of opposing winds….” (P.Herc 463)

Modified still from Star Wars: Andor, “Rix Road” (Season 1, Episode 12, November 23, 2022).

A GALAXY CLOSE TO HOME

If you will humor me, and entertain the possibility that I might attempt to “rightly hold dialogue about both music and poetry” (Laertios 10.120), consider that many of these points have been artfully orchestrated by writer and director Tony Gilroy in the television series Star Wars: Andor. One character in the fiction, the galactic senator, Mon Mothma, highlights the perils of propaganda (and political office) by exposing a dangerous, manufactured narrative: her dissent in politics has made her a target, and her agency as an orator is being suppressed. She redresses the Senate one, final time before withdrawing to a base, hidden deep in a distant forest:

The distance between what is said and what is known to be true has become an abyss. Of all the things at risk, the loss of an objective reality is perhaps the most dangerous. The death of truth is the ultimate victory of evil. When truth leaves us, when we let it slip away, when it is ripped from our hands we become vulnerable to the appetite of whatever monster screams the loudest. (Season 2, Episode 9)

In this fiction, diplomatic puppets defend and regurgitate loaded propaganda, having been convinced that a small, non-violent protest was actually an uprising. Only the survivors of the massacre, who heard the screams and saw the bodies for themselves know the truth. Similarly, Epíkouros advises that there “is a need to take into account […] all of the self-evident facts, according to which we refer our opinions”. Otherwise, “if not everything will be full of foolishness and of confusion” (Key Doctrine 22). Otherwise, one might be mislead to excuse genocide in the name of “security”. Otherwise, one might be mislead by political pundits and influential personalities to defend an armed mob of triggered, masked agents, deputized by a corrupt system to act with impunity. In the drama, one stormtrooper even shoots a woman in the face.

Trust your physical feelings and the force of nature. Lies are impractical. Propaganda is self-destructive. Oratory can be sinister. Principally, they target those who dismiss evidence and embrace superstition. It is dangerously easy to compel gullible minds to commit acts of violence through persuasive speech. Indeed, the modern-French philosopher Voltaire (heavily influenced by the propositions of the Epicurean school) observed that “Certainement qui est en droit de vous rendre absurde est en droit de vous rendre injuste” (Questions sur la Miracles 412). “Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities.” Persuasion is dangerous, and we rightly treat the instruments by which it spreads with scorn.

No deceptive speeches, manipulative oratory, lofty dialectic, nor rhetorical bullshit will convince a wise person to doubt their own eyes, discard their own feelings, and abandon their own study of nature. I invite you to see with your own eyes. Your life likely depends on it.


INDEX

Modified from “The Butcher’s Shop” by Gabriele Passerotti (1580)

    • Technical rhetoric includes epideictic, encomiastic, and panegyric or sophistic types. Philódēmos teaches that these methods of rhetoric are true arts.
    • Practical oratory includes ambassadorial, deliberative (or symbouleutic), and forensic types. Statesmen employ these methods for practical functions.
    • Political discourse “in this respect […] may fittingly be compared to the art of prophecy” (Ibid., I, 31, 3 ff.=Suppl. 17, 20 ff.). It is sometimes practical.
    • The Dialectic is a systemic, but deeply flawed method of reasoning privileged by
    • Socratics, Megarians, Academics, Peripatetics, and Stoics.
    • The Method by Analogy refers to the empirical reasoning of the Epicureans, which draws inferences from observations that can then be tested.
    • Philódēmos mentions several other rhetoric types, including the entuectic and eristic types that are not explicitly categorized, and may be synonyms or subsets.

  • AMBASSADORIAL ORATORY – πρεσβευτικός (presbeytikós). This practical form of oratory is employed by dignitaries and diplomats. Ambassadorial oratory is the ability “to be able to persuade in diplomatic negotiations by speech, not by power or bribes or dignities or anything else an ambassador might possess” (Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 217, col. XIII).

  • DELIBERATIVE ORATORY – συμβουλευτικά (symbouleutiká) is also known as “symbouleutic” oratory. This practical form of oratory is used by legislators. It “gives advice only on matters affecting the common welfare, and that this advice is not the product of the sophistic art, but of [something] quite a different…” (Ibid., I, 211. Col. XXX.19).

  • EPIDEICTIC RHETORIC – ἐπιδεικτικός (epideiktikós, “demonstrative”, “performative”). This is an art of study regarding “charming speeches” (Ibid., II, 244, col. XLII). It is also called “encomiastic” by Stoics (Laértios 7.142). It is far less profitable than philosophy “especially if one practices rhetoric in the fashion of the sophists” (Ibid., I, 225, fr. I.).

  • ENCOMIASTIC RHETORIC – ἐγκωμιαστικός (enkōmiastikós, “eulogistic” or “laudatory”) is rhetoric ἐπαίνους καὶ ψόγους (epaínous kai psógous) “of praise and blame”. “Furthermore, no one can believe encomiasts, because they praise bad men” (Ibid., 220, col. XXXIXa). Stoics called epideictic oratory “encomiastic” (Laértios 7.142)


  • ERISTIC SPEECH – ἐριστικός (eristikós, “eager for strife”). “Dialectic and eristic may be arts…” , however, the Epicurean school evaluates them as forms of persuasion, unconcerned with the validity of their statements as they correspond to reality (Ibid., I, 57, 23 ff=Suppl. 29, 15 ff.). Eristic speech is provocative and controversial.

  • FORENSIC ORATORY – δίκανικα (díkanika, “judicial”). Philódēmos compares the practicality of forensic oratory with “deliberative” and “ambassadorial” oratory (Ibid., I, 134, col. XXXI). Practically, forensic oratory is employed in courts of law in the form of criminal defense.

  • PANEGYRIC RHETORIC – πανηγυρικός (panēgyrikós, “assembly” speech). This form of rhetoric is synonymous with sophistic rhetoric. “Now we have already treated in a previous section the idea that sophistic or panegyric or whatever it may be called […] may be easily called rhetoric.” (Ibid., II, 234. col. XXXV.). Epíkouros writes that the wise “will not πανηγυριεῖν (panēgyrieîn)” or “make public speeches” (Laértios 10.120).

  • POLITICAL DISCOURSE – πολιτικός (politikós, “of the city”). Politics, by itself, is not an art. By itself, the “political faculty” is empty. It is not a technique, nor a method, but more like “prophecy”. “No man was able […] to impart to his contemporaries or to posterity [the principles of politics]” without the rhetorical arts of the philosophers (Ibid., I, 139, col. XXXIV). “[T]echnical treatises of rhetoricians […] are useless for producing the political faculty”, which does not require training (On Rhetoric, I, 64, II frr.=Supple. 32, 19 ff.).

  • PRACTICAL ORATORY – Practical forms of oratory (for example, speeches employed by dignitaries, deliberations employed by legislators, and defenses employed by lawyers) are distinguished from technical rhetoric (epideictic or enconmiatic, and panegyric or sophistic). Practical oratory is not considered an art that can be learned, only a practice that can be repeated, like civic speech, legislative debate, judicial defense, and diplomatic counsel. “Epicurean authorities hold that sophistic rhetoric does not perform the task of practical and political rhetoric” (Ibid., I, 119, 28 = Suppl. 59., 1e4. I, 120, 10= Suppl, 60, 6).

  • SOPHISTIC RHETORIC – σοφιστική (sophistikḗ). Sophistic is an art of epideixis, and of the arrangement of speeches, written and extemporaneous.” (Ibid., II-c). “Sophistic style is suited to epideictic oratory and written works, but not to actual practice in forum and ecclesia” (Ibid., III, 134. fr. V). Indeed, “the training given by the sophists does not prepare for forensic or deliberative oratory” (Ibid., II, 131, fr. I). “Sophistic can “persuade men to become villains. And when they do praise a good man they praise him for qualities considered good by the crowd, and not truly good qualities” (Ibid., I, 216 col. XXXVa, 14).

  • TECHNICAL RHETORIC – τεχνικός (tekhnikós, “technical”) refers to methods of oratory that properly fit the Epicurean definition of an “art” (or “technique”), including epideictic and sophistic methods. Technical rhetoric offers methods (as is the case with any true art) that can be taught, and reproduced to achieve the same result. “Two sciences produce the same result.” (Ibid., I, 4, co. I=Suppl. 4, 17.). However, compared against the study of nature, “technical rhetoric has never advanced anyone” (Ibid., I.192, col. XI).

  • THE DIALECTICδιαλεκτική (dialektikḗ). Before the idealistic Hegelians and materialistic Marxists, the “dialectic” was privileged by Socratics, Megarians, Academics, Peripatetics, and Stoics, who defined it as “the science of conversing correctly where the speeches involve question and answer — and hence they also define it as the science of what it true and false and neither” (Laértios 7.42). The Epicureans reject the dialect as being incapable of verifying “truth” because it assumes that “truth” is capable of being reasoned without reliance upon physical evidence. Most of the dialecticians encouraged political participation as a necessity to existential satisfaction; Epicureans outright reject political office.

  • THE METHOD BY ANALOGY καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα τρόποϛ (ho kath’ homoiotēta tropos, “method according to similarity”) anticipated the modern, scientific method by several millennia. Epíkouros accepted that inferences must comport with observation and abide by nature. We must “create an analogy that corresponds with what we see“ (On Nature, Book 11, III, b5-12).” [W]e shall not be prevented from making inferences, provided that we use the method of analogy properly” (On Signs). And “we say that the method of analogy is a sound method of inference, with this condition, that no other appearance or previously demonstrated fact conflicts with the inference” (Ibid.).

For additional commentary, please see “Reasonings About Philodemus’ Rhetoric

For more on deliberate misrepresentation, please see “On Bullshit” by Dr. Harry Frankfurt

Clipped version of “Saint Epicurus” by Genevra Catalano (2023)

Be well and live earnestly!

Your Friend,
EIKADISTES
Keeper of Twentiers.com
Editor of the Hedonicon

Commentaries on Metrodorus

Happy and Peaceful Eikas to all! Every month on or around the 20th, members of the Society of Friends of Epicurus gather in memory of the two main founders of our School, Epicurus of Samos and Metrodorus of Lampsacus. But while most students of philosophy have at least a basic familiarity with the first founder, very few people have even heard of his best friend. This series means to raise the profile of Metrodorus of Lampsacus, as I recently did with Colotes and Leontion.

  1. The First Ancestor of the Twentiers – a rough outline of the biography of the co-founder of the Epicurean Garden, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, and some notes on the tribe-building and soul-healing projects of the founders
  2. Metrodorus the Mystes – a commentary on Vatican Saying 10 and Metrodorus’ Epistle to Timarchus, which explores the intersection between Hellenistic mystery religions and the practices of the first Epicureans
  3. Mithras the Syrian – an exploration of the intersection between Zoroastrianism and the Epicureans (supplemented by The 22 Excellent Books on Empedocles), and also how the first Epicureans propagated wholesome human values by retelling stories of sacred friendship
  4. Metrodorus the Autarch: a theory and practice of self-rule – on Metrodorus’ self-sufficiency and economics, supplemented by Epitome On Wealth
  5. Metrodorus the Communicator – a commentary on Metrodorus’ efforts to reform his native language
  6. Epistle to Timocrates – a commentary on the controversies between Metrodorus and his brother
  7. The Activities of Vatican Saying 41 – a detailed elaboration of what I consider to be Metrodorus’ most important teaching, which connects theory and practice, and initiates us into the wisdom of the Epicurean laughing philosophers

The essays on Timocrates and VS 41 had been written previously, but I have added them here for the sake of convenience and easy reference, so that all of my commentaries on Metrodorus will be easily found in one place.

Additional Notes on the Belly

I do not wish to conclude this essay series without addressing the issue of the belly in Metrodorus’ philosophy. After re-reading these last two essays and the one on autarchy–since the belly prepares us for self-sufficiency by teaching us about the limits of our desires–, I developed one additional possible theory for why Metrodorus says “the seat of good is the belly” in his Epistle to Timocrates. In Mithras the Syrian I mention:

… the wisdom of PD 5 evolved into VS 41 when he attempted to connect theory and praxis. Metrodorus may have asked: “By what signs do I know that I’m living pleasantly?”, and answered with laughter …

Following the logic of this led me to think about the anatomy of laughter. Might Metrodorus not have been referring to laughter when he said that pleasure begins in, or has its seat in, the belly? Laughter (the “sign” or evidence of pleasure in the body) is a movement or tremor within the body that expels air suddenly. The lungs are constantly at work with the movement of breath, and their activity is mostly unconscious: the movement of laughter, on the other hand, requires the incitement of some pleasant motivation and originates in the belly. I invite you to observe this in your own laughter. It seems to me that the muscles of the belly, just under the lungs, must contract in order for laughter to take place. And so, the “seat of pleasure” might, among other things, be a reference to how the belly expresses pleasure in the form of laughter.

I unfortunately had to experience the grief of losing my oldest brother Junior on April 28th from cancer. During this experience, I took notice of how the belly also has a role in the anatomy of crying: air is expelled by the muscles of the belly and tremors take place there. Both crying and laughing have huge therapeutic benefits. It seems that much of the emotional wisdom within the body is found in the belly, or that many of our feelings are processed in the belly in some way.

Non-Epicurean philosophers have independently taken notice of the role of the belly. In Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche asserts that spirit is a stomach and acknowledges that much of what we associate with mental or “spiritual” states is really a series of organic and chemical signals that often originate in the belly. The belly has a role in stabilizing and centering the body in many contemplative and martial arts wisdom traditions. In Lie-zi’s Garden of Pleasure (in the parallel sayings section titled “The Belly as a Point of Reference”), I noted the importance of the belly in the distinction that Taoists make between the internal (which renders us self-sufficient and whole) and the external, and I invited students to read Chapter 12 of the Tao Te Ching.

Racing through the field and hunting make the mind wild. Searching for precious goods leads astray. Therefore, the sage attends to the belly, and not to what he sees. He rejects the latter and chooses the former. – Tao te Ching 12

Here, the appeal to the belly helps to keep us grounded and stable.

Other Literary Updates

In addition to the Metrodorus series, I published essays on other companions of the Hegemon and Metro in recent months:

Commentary on Leontion the Epicurean

Commentary on Colotes of Lampsacus

Nathan recently published A Hymn to Hedone, The Life of Epíkouros: A Translation for Twentiers and an expansive translation of the fragments of Book 2 from On Nature.

If you value this content, please consider supporting my work on Patreon or Substack.

Hymn to Hēdonḗ

Happy Jul’ Eikas and Merry Moon Landing!

I celebrate today to combat a plague of hopelessness, a similar plague as described by Lucretius in the final stanzas of De Rerum Natura, a spiritual plague characterized by the “heart-rending” despair of those “with sorrow-stricken” souls, who surrender hope as their “thoughts turned on death“. Like the Plague of Athens in 430 BCE that claimed 25% of the Athenian population, and like the Roman Civil War of 49 BCE that lead to a permanent dictatorship, plagues and political violence once again imperil our expectations and poison our minds with despair.

In Kashmir, a territorial dispute between two nuclear powers (perhaps now three) threatens to disrupt the flow of water from the Indus River that nourishes 90% of Pakistan’s crop yield, endangering nearly 250 million people. In Texas, a preventable measles outbreak reminds us that “whenever any refused to attend their own sick, killing neglect soon after would punish them” (De Rerum Natura 6.1238). We observe a similar, selfish attitude among Christian zealots who deny life-saving treatments to their own children. In Gaza and Ukrainesometimes you might see lifeless bodies of parents above their lifeless children, and then the reverse of this, children giving up life above their mothers and fathers” (Ibid. 6.1251). Slavery has not only expanded in the States, but Global Estimates of Modern Slavery count nearly 50 million people living without freedom. Sexual abuse of children is rampant, and Jeffrey Epstein and his cohort of political monsters represent only a small fraction of the abuse; most monsters hide within the cozy confines of church. Not even sanctuaries are safe. Our shepherds have become butchers: “All the holy sanctuaries of the gods too death had filled with lifeless bodies” (Ibid. 6.1267). The democratic institutions we formerly prized have been disemboweled and drained. In Florida, we anticipate a year of deaths from storms. Fear of Zeus returns. Clouds darken, and the light dims.

It is midnight, and we must build our own fire.

I mean for this meditation to act as an instrument of hope, a confident reminder of the importance of education, the value of advancement, and the significance of perseverance. When faced with death, Mētródōros indicates that we should continue to live with confidence and cheer, neither abandoning hope, nor capitulating to fear (VS47):

“We meet at a college noted for knowledge, in a city noted for progress, in a State noted for strength, and we stand in need of all three, for we meet in an hour of change and challenge, in a decade of hope and fear, in an age of both knowledge and ignorance.
(John Kennedy, Address at Rice University 1962)

I recite Kennedy’s Address at Rice University as a remedy against political despair; as we did in the 60s, we yet again find ourselves facing the savage works of war, executed throughout the seas and lands, provoked by the proverbial lords of battle. Yet again, we face preventable annihilation … and, yet again, I am reassured by both the fond love that Mother Nature strikes into the breasts of all people, as well as the voices of those who encourage us to advance “the best of our energies and skills”, and remind us that there is “new knowledge to be gained, and new rights to be won”. May we seek to accept these challenges “for the progress of all people”.

Surrounded by orcs on all sides, Tolkien reminds us, through the voice of a wise, old wizard: “There are other forces at work in this world, Frodo, besides the will of evil.“

We experience the force of goodness in the form of pleasure, not only with physical delights, but, more importantly, through the pleasures of freedom, forming bonds, securing peace, and cultivating love. These pleasures are only achievable through our innate compulsion to pursue a more pleasant existence, an existence that is properly defined through the study of nature:

“[C]ondense, if you will, the 50,000 years of man’s recorded history in a time span of but a half a century. Stated in these terms, we know very little about the first 40 years, except at the end of them advanced man had learned to use the skins of animals to cover them. Then about 10 years ago, under this standard, man emerged from his caves to construct other kinds of shelter. Only five years ago man learned to write and use a cart with wheels. Christianity began less than two years ago. The printing press came this year, and then less than two months ago, during this whole 50-year span of human history, the steam engine provided a new source of power. Newton explored the meaning of gravity. Last month electric lights and telephones and automobiles and airplanes became available. Only last week did we develop penicillin and television and nuclear power, and now if America’s new spacecraft succeeds in reaching Venus, we will have literally reached the stars before midnight tonight.

[…] If this capsule history of our progress teaches us anything, it is that man, in his quest for knowledge and progress, is determined and cannot be deterred. […]

[…] For the eyes of the world now look into space, to the Moon and to the planets beyond, and we have vowed that we shall not see it governed by a hostile flag of conquest, but by a banner of freedom and peace. We have vowed that we shall not see space filled with weapons of mass destruction, but with instruments of knowledge and understanding.

[…] We set sail on this new sea because there is new knowledge to be gained, and new rights to be won, and they must be won and used for the progress of all people. […]

We choose to go to the Moon. We choose to go to the Moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard, because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to win, and the others, too.” (John Kennedy, Address at Rice University 1962)

We have met overwhelming challenges before, and we will meet them again.

Pleasure motivates us, guides us, and rewards our pursuit of knowledge. In honor of the pleasure of education and achievement, I have composed a Prayer to the Goddess of Pleasure this Moon Landing Day, and have provided (my best attempt at) a translation, transposed into both English and ancient Greek. The structure of this poem is based on an Orphic Hymn to Zeus (provided below). Herein, the feeling of “pleasure” has been personified as a Blessed Queen, Beloved and Fearless. The icon of our devotion is Cheerful, Thoughtful, Faithful, Confident, and Fair. She calms, comforts, and fulfills. She dispels anxiety, eases anguish, lessens restlessness, satisfies need, and treats torment. Our conception of the Divine Pleasuress disposes us toward a blessed existence, practical, principled, and peaceable, full of friendship. The spirit of pleasure knows no pain. Nowhere in the metakósmios will we find a happier being than Hēdonḗ.

May she serve to remind us of the achievable goal of life in this petulant period.

Your Friend,
EIKADISTES
Keeper of Twentiers.com
Editor of the Hedonicon


Aphrodite by Genevra Catalano (2022)

Aphrodite by Genevra Catalano (2022)

AN EPICUREAN HYMN TO HĒDONḖ

PLEASURESS Blessed, PLEASURESS Incorruptible, to this, truly, we
are disposed, testimony, both liberating and therepeutic;
Oh, Queen, because of your divine image, the good life was disclosed,
flavor, fragrance, radiance, warmth, oh, Goddess Fruitful,
and the immortal good of friendship, oh, Mother Bountiful;
PLEASURESS of the GARDENS, prudent, principled, peaceable,
All-Mother, Source-of-all, and End-of-all,
Common-to-All, Motivating, Smile-Loving, Nurse of Love,
Faithful, Fearless, Beloved, Nourishing PLEASURESS;
Hear me, LEADERESS: permit, then, immaculate painlessness,
peace, and, Goddess, also, immaculate impassiveness.

Ἡδονή μακαρία Ἡδονή ἀφθαρτε τήνδε τοι ἡμεῖς
μαρτυρίαν τιθέμεσθα λυτήριον ἠδὲ θερᾰπευτικήν·
ὦ βᾰσῐ́λῐσσᾰ διὰ σὴν εἰκόνᾰ θεία ἐφάνη τὸν ᾰ̓γᾰθόν βῐ́ον
γεῦσῐς εὐωδία καλή θέρμη ὦ θεὰ πολῠ́φορβος
καὶ ᾱ̓θανᾰ́τη ᾰ̓γαθή φῐλῐ́ας ὦ μήτηρ καρποφορος·
Ἡδονή ἐν κήποις φρόνιμη καλή δῐκαία
Παντογένεθλ’ ἀρχὴ πάντων πάντων τε τέλᾱ
Ποθεινοτάτη φιλομμειδής ἐρωτοτρόφος Πάνδημον
πῐστή ἄφοβε φῐ́λῐε φυτάλιε Ἡδονή·
κλῦθί μευ ἡγεμόνη δίδου δ’ ᾰ̓τᾰρᾰξῐ́ᾱν ἄμεμπτον
εἰρήνην τε θεὰν καὶ πλούτου ἀπονῐ́ᾱν ἄμεμπτον.

Hēdonḗ makaría, Hēdonḗ áphtharte, tḗnde toi ēmeîs
martyrían tithémestha lūtḗrion ḗdè therapeutiiḗn.
Basílissa dià sḗn eikóna theía ephánē tòn agathón bíon,
geûsis euōdía kalḗ thérmē, ṓ theà polýphorbos,
kaì athanátē ágathḗ philías ṓ mtēr karpophóros.
Hēdonḗ èn Kēpois, Phrónimē, Kal, Dikaía,
pantogénethl’ árkhē pántōn, pántōn te teleutḗ,
Pándēmon Potheinotátē Philommeidḗs Erōtotróphos,
Pist Áphobe Phílie Phytálie Hēdonḗ;
klythí meu Hēgemónē dídou d’ aponían ámempton
eìrnēn te theàn kaì ploútou ataraxían ámempton.

(translations by N. H. Bartman)


ORPHIC HYMN 15 (TO ZEUS)

Zeus invaluable, Zeus imperishable, here, you see, we [bear]
testimony: you [are] to be reverred, delivering and pre-eminent.
Oh, King — by your lead it was revealed on this account, divine,
Earth, Goddess, Mother, mountains and resounding cliffs,
both sea and all, as high as heaven, positioned within,
Zeus Timekeeper, sceptered, thundering, wild,
All-Generator, beginning of all, and end of all,
Earthquaker, Increaser, Purifyer, All-Shaker,
Flashing, Thundering, Electrifying, Nourishing Zeus;
Hear me, One-of-Changing-Form, permit, then, immaculate health,
and peace, Goddess, and immaculate magnificence of wealth.

Ζεῦ πολυτίμητε, Ζεῦ ἄφθιτε, τήνδε τοι ἡμεῖς
μαρτυρίαν τιθέμεσθα λυτήριον ἠδὲ πρόσευξιν.
ὦ βασιλεῦ, διὰ σὴν κεφαλὴν ἐφάνη τάδε θείᾱς,
γαῖα θεὰ μήτηρ ὀρέουσᾰ θ’ ὑψηχέες ὄχθοι,
καὶ πόντος καὶ πάνθ’, ὁπόσ’ οὐρανὸς ἐντὸς ἔταξε
Ζεῦ Κρόνιε, σκηπτοῦχε, καταιβάτα, ὀμβριμόθυμε,
παντογένεθλ’, ἀρχὴ πάντων, πάντων τε τελευτή,
σεισίχθων, αὐξητά, καθάρσιε, παντοτινάκτα,
ἀστραπαῖε, βρονταῖε, κεραύνιε, φυτάλιε Ζεῦ ·
κλῦθί μευ, αἰολόμορφε, δίδου δ’ ὑγίειαν ἀμεμφῆ
εἰρήνην τε θεὰν καὶ πλούτου δόξαν ἄμεμπτον.

Zeú polytímēte, Zeú áphthite, tḗnde toi ēmeîs
martyrían tithémestha lytḗrion ḗdè próseuxin.
basileû, dià sḗn kephalēn ephánē táde theías ,
gaîa theà mtēr oréousa th’ hypsēkhées ókhthoi,
kaí póntos kaí pánth’, opós’ oúranòs éntos étaxe
Zeú Krónie, skēptoúkhe, kataibáta, ombrimóthyme,
pantogénethl’, árkhē pántōn, pántōn te teleutḗ,
seisíkhthōn, auzēntá, kathársie, pantotinákta,
ástrapaeîe, brontaèe, keraünie, phytálie Zeú;
klythí meu, aìolómorphe, dídou d’ ygíeian ámemphē
eìrnēn te theàn kaì ploútou dóxan ámempton.

(translations by N. H. Bartman)

Epicurean Gamikós (“Matrimonial”) Script

WARM GREETINGS to friends, and CHEERS to my fellow hogs!

I hope Mother Nature is sharing a kind abundance with you this New Years’ Eve (hopefully not too snow-fully kind for our friends in the frozen North). Ice aside, today I smile wide as I celebrate my ninth wedding anniversary with an exceptional person who continues to surprise, delight, and inspire me, every day. I find this New Years’ 2024 to be a particularly auspicious occasion, considering that tomorrow marks the 1st of Gameliṓn, the Winter month of Weddings on the ancient Attic Calendar, a time of togetherness, feasts, and fond illumination.

With this in mind, I mean to share with you a composition I have completed, a Gamikós (“Matrimonial“) Script that I intend to be used for ceremonial usage.

As an additional to our growing collection of devotional liturgy, this script presents the unique proposition, in coherence with the teachings of our philosophical tradition that “Marriage is an Act of Romantic Justice” (elaborated below). The script is designed to dignify the Justice of all forms of partnership bound by mutual oaths to neither harm nor be harmed, and, as such, it is explicitly prohibited to be used by any officiants who deny any consenting adults the bliss of marriage. The specific protections I have advised are listed in the official document (below).

Ultimately, I fantasize about a day when our tradition will be recognized by legal institutions that protect the privileges of other wisdom traditions. We have yet to receive formal recognition of our own. Despite Thomas Jefferson having declared himself to be an Epicurean, despite Ethan Allen, founder of the Free State of Vermont having “struck a blow for Epicurus”, alongside his mentor, organizer of the Boston Tea Party, Thomas Young, despite these, and other historical precedences, we still lack several legal privileges afforded to other institutions.

Consequently, I hope that this may be among the first of a growing corpus we can use toward receiving formal, legal recognition to receive the same privileges as our religious neighbors.

Without further ado, BEHOLD, a Matrimonial Script!

Epicurean Gamikós (Matrimonial) Script

(also intended to observe plural unions)
(This script is explicitly PROHIBITED for use by any fellowship that does not recognize same-sex unions)
“Greetings, friends—and blessings to the betrothed!

It is my sincere privilege to receive you to this ceremony.

We gather to dedicate this [Spring/Summer/Autumn/Winter] [Morning/Afternoon/Evening] to [X] & [Y] [& Z+], to observe their vows, to recognize their nuptials, and to celebrate their fortuitous confluence. This gathering serves to provide public recognition for the private partnership our friends have engendered, pursuing happiness through the cultivation of abiding love—truly, no other fruit of nature can nourish our thirst for happiness so completely as can the fruit of companionship.

As the philosopher Epicurus wrote, “Of those things that wisdom prepares for a full life of blessedness, by far the most important is the possession of friendship(Key Doctrine 27).

Epicurus taught that a eugamía, a “sweet partnership” must be cultivated with trust and mutual care. Like a thriving garden, with devotion and patience, love continues to flourish, long after its first harvest. The grace of Nature guides us to grow and compels us to pursue pleasure. As the Latin poet Lucretius wrote, we relish the natural “advantages of cohabitation (DRN 5.1011).

Thus, by the innate grace of Nature, and with the immortal blessing of friendship, these mortal creatures before me now endeavor upon this notably ancient curiosity called matrimony!

Ancient history records the Sage of the Garden as having been born in the Winter month of Gamelinincidentally, we receive the word Gamelin from the ancient Greek words gámos meaning “marriage” and gamēlía meaning “marriage feast”. Historically, then, the light of marriage would have illuminated the darkness of Winter, a month of feasts, to fill bellies and warm hearts.

We, too, mean to share the warmth of marriage by beholding this illumination of love.

The Sage of the Garden understood that the illuminating light of friendship perfectly prepares us for a life of happiness. He taught that “the wise will marry […] according to [proper] circumstances of life.” True friendship, therefore, is found at the heart of every happy marriage, never the promise of property and political power, nor appeasement to public pressure. The wise person seeks the pleasure of marriage only for the purpose of cultivating a sincere and abiding happiness.

True happiness, in the Epicurean tradition, is equally inseparable from integrity and justice, the justice that provides us with security, empowers confidence, and supports our greatest pursuits.

Matrimony is therefore an act of romantic justice. It is a peaceful pact between lovers to neither harm, nor be harmed, to work as a team in protecting shared interests, setting priorities and working to build a future together, savoring the endless pleasures of partnership and peace.

With Nature as our guide, let us now consecrate the justice of [X] and [Y]’s (and Z)s abiding peace!

(Confirmation)

1. [X], do you have [Y’s] (& Z+’s) [ring(s), token(s)]?

          RESPONSE: [Yes].

2. And [Y], do you have [X’s] (& Z+’s) [ring(s), token(s)]?

          RESPONSE: [Yes].

3. And [Z+], do you have [X] & [Y]’s [rings, tokens]?

          RESPONSE: [Yes].

(Exchange of Vows)

1. Then [X], do you invite this/these creature(s) to receive your loving partnership, to accept them, wholly and completely, embracing every tortured atom of their being, whether sweet or bitter, fit or infirm, prosperous or impoverished, cherishing your union and dignifying your affection, never ceasing to fight for your future together, so long as your love lasts?”

RESPONSE: [I do]

2. And [Y], do you accept this/these creature’s invitation to a loving partnership, to accept them, wholly and completely, embracing every tortured atom of their being, whether sweet or bitter, fit or infirm, prosperous or impoverished, cherishing your union and dignifying your affection, never ceasing to fight for your future together, so long as your love lasts?”

RESPONSE: [I do]

3. And  [Z+], do you accept these creatures’ invitation to a loving partnership, to accept them, wholly and completely, embracing every tortured atom of their beings, whether sweet or bitter, fit or infirm, prosperous or impoverished, cherishing your union and dignifying your affection, never ceasing to fight for your future together, so long as your love lasts?”

RESPONSE: [I do]

(Exchange of Rings/Tokens)

1. [X], as a symbol of your union, please present the [ring(s), token(s), etc.] to [Y] (and Z+).

Recite this blessing:

          ‘I offer this/these [ring(s), token(s), etc.] to Y [and Z+] [pause for recitation]
          as a symbol of my devotion, [pause for recitation]
          a token of my enduring faith, [pause for recitation]
          and an icon of abiding love.’ [pause for recitation]

2. [Y], please present the [ring(s), token(s), etc.] to [X] [and Z+].

Recite this blessing:

          ‘I offer this/these [ring(s), token(s), etc.] to [X]  [and Z+] [pause for recitation]
          as a symbol of my devotion, [pause for recitation]
          a token of my enduring faith, [pause for recitation]
          and an icon of abiding love.’ [pause for recitation]

3.  [Z], please present the [rings, tokens, etc.] to [X] and [Y].

Recite this blessing:

          ‘I offer these [rings, tokens, etc.] to [X] and [Y+] [pause for recitation]
          as a symbol of my devotion, [pause for recitation]
          a token of my enduring faith, [pause for recitation]
          and an icon of abiding love.’ [pause for recitation]

Finally, in unison, repeat after me:

          ‘We accept these [rings, tokens, etc.] as icons of faith, devotion, and abiding love.’

In the presence of friends, by the grace of nature, and in accordance with the guidance of the Gargettian, it is my overwhelming pleasure to behold the symphony of [X] and [Y] [and Z]. For the first time, I invite you to embrace in matrimony.

Dearest friends, live diligently and love passionately.”

N. H. Bartman
A Hog from the Herd
Society of Friends of Epicurus

(Check out TWENTIERS.COM for the largest English repository of Epicurean translations!)

Five contemplations on the gods: A path to community and friendship (part 5)

Continued from:

FIRST CONTEMPLATION: THE GODS

SECOND CONTEMPLATION: UTOPIA

THIRD CONTEMPLATION: THE SAGE

FOURTH CONTEMPLATION: THE FRIEND

FIFTH CONTEMPLATION: THE DEPARTED

Quote: Fragment from On the Gods by Philodemus[1]

Even if the gods’ community as a species is aloof from the supplying of things of practical help in order to motivate their companionship, their friendship communicates their feelings. For it is not possible for them to maintain their community as a species without any social intercourse. And indeed even amongst us, weak as we are, and needing from our friendship in addition things of practical help, no longer does our friendship to our friends we have lost provide practical help; and nonetheless our admiring reverence for characters which are peers of our own itself binds us together in affection, even in the highest degree. However, the gods also accept from each other what supplies their own needs, even though they are able to provide these things for themselves, just as we human beings sometimes do from those who have the same things as ourselves.

Commentary: divine friendship

In this passage, Philodemus is describing the lifestyle of the gods and how they interact with each other. Just like humans, they live in communities and have friends. What makes them different from us is that they do not share in our weakness, and do not need friendship to offer a sense of security by taking care of each other if they are sick, help them in case of financial difficulties, etc. And yet, the gods still choose to have friends. In fact they will even go as far accepting “from each other what supplies their own needs”, which seems to mean that they provide each other with gifts of some sort, perhaps a kind of nutrition that maintains their immortality, much like the ambrosia from the gods of myth, even though they can obtain it by themselves. The friendly gesture of gift exchange seems to serve a more psychological purpose, contributing to their blissfulness.

In order to make this clear, we can think of Epicurean friendship as having three levels (according to David Armstrong): (1) Friendships based on virtue, trust and mutual utility. (2) Friendships based on our strong natural desire for affection and open self-expression. This is only achievable after accomplishing the first kind of friendship. (3) God-like friendship, satisfying a desire for affection and open self-expression, apart from all consideration of utility.

This third type of friendship is mainly accessible to the gods, but only accessible to humans after the death of a friend once the mourning for our loss of them is over and we come to enjoy their memory. This is because once a loved one is dead, they no longer contribute to our basic needs beyond the psychological wellbeing acquired from the good memories. This helps us answer a question about why it is that Epicureans worship gods that do not intervene in human affairs, bestow favors, etc. The same could be said about our dead friends: why honor them when they are no longer there to serve our needs. This is because they fulfill a psychological need, even though they are no longer with us and in fact they don’t exist as their souls have been annihilated with their bodies.

However, they still exist in our memories, and this is why Epicurus referred to friendship as an immortal good, because even in death, they continue to impact us and they contributed in making us who we are. Remembering our friends is not a passive activity. This is why Epicurus set up rituals and festivities to commemorate his dead friends, Metrodorus and Polyaenus, as well as his parents and brothers.

Practice: friendship beyond death

First lesson: grieve for the loss of your friends. For Epicureans, friends can include family members as well, as is demonstrated by his devotion to his parents and brothers. He advises us not to suppress our emotions when faced with the loss of loved ones. The ancient writer Plutarch writes the following about the Epicureans: “They disagree with those who would do away with grief and tears and lamentation at the death of friends, and say that an absence of grief that renders us totally insensible stems from another great evil: hardness or a passion for notoriety so excessive as to be insane.”[2]

Second lesson: cultivate the good memories of your dead friends. After the grieving period which will vary from person to person, keep the flame of your friendship alive. They are a part of your life and nothing can take that away. This does not mean that you have to think about them all the time but every now and then, take a moment to bring up the pleasant times spent with that person in your mind and be thankful for the happiness they brought and continue to bring.

Third lesson: develop rituals to honor your friends. You might have kept photos, presents, letters from your lost friends. These are now sacred objects. It might be a good idea to develop some symbolic gestures and rituals to honor your friend. Perhaps there is a favorite song you shared. Perhaps you can listen to that music on your friend’s birthday. Or maybe you can just close your eyes and bring back a specific memory to your mind’s eye. There are countless ways to commemorate your loved ones.

Forth lesson: remember that the divine nature of friendship transcends life and death. This is how you become eternal. This is not just the final lesson of this Fifth Contemplation but of all five contemplations combined.

This is how you become a god. Atheists and other nonbelievers in supernatural religions are often asked this question: if there is no supernatural god ordering the universe and giving us purpose, if all that exists are atoms, molecules, forces, “stuff”, then all is without meaning. With no higher purpose, everything is empty, we are all alone. Many atheists bite the bullet and fall into nihilism. An Epicurean rejects this mode of reasoning entirely. We are not alone and without purpose. Life has meaning. Once we have a friend who acknowledges our existence and our value and we recognize them in return, and are committed to continue doing so for the long term, we become godlike. As Epicurus said to his friend and disciple Colotes, “go about as one immortal in my eyes, and think of me as immortal too.

CONCLUSION

And now we see the connection between the two ideas mentioned in the beginning of our introduction: philosophizing with a like-minded friend and living as a god among men. It is through friendship that we realize the highest ideal of the philosophical life.

Through the five contemplations, we have progressively descended from the domain of the gods outside our world, to a hypothetical utopian society, to the Epicurean communities of sages from the past, to the gesture of reverence between to philosopher friends, to culminate with the memories of lost friends conjured up in our minds.

An atheist could argue that we could very much have come up with much of the same philosophy without any reference to gods that probably do not exist in the first place.[3] This may be the case. But in response to that, we could say that by invoking the divine as a concept, we are invoking something that has the highest value to us, beyond just atoms and void.

When describing Epicurean philosophy, people often refer to it as a materialist philosophy that rejects the supernatural and divine providence, or a hedonistic philosophy defending a life of pleasure, albeit a modest reasonable pleasure defined as an absence of suffering of the body and tranquility of the mind. But these descriptions are incomplete and give us a very limited scope of what the philosophy is really about. By putting the gods front and center in their function as role models and comparing the immortality of the gods to that of the relationship between friends, it might be most accurate for us to conclude that Epicureanism is first and foremost a religion of friendship.

Notes:

[1] Quote from article Utility and Affection in Epicurean Friendship by David Armstrong.
[2] From Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible. Quote from http://www.attalus.org/translate/epicurus.html
[3] Many modern Epicureans consider themselves atheists and think that modern Epicureanism no longer has any use for any conception of the divine. This article was intended to give an alternative to this perspective by rethinking what we understand as being divine. For more on this debate, read The Third Way to Think about the Epicurean Gods.

Five contemplations on the gods: A path to community and friendship (part 4)

Continued from:

FIRST CONTEMPLATION: THE GODS

SECOND CONTEMPLATION: UTOPIA

THIRD CONTEMPLATION: THE SAGE

FOURTH CONTEMPLATION: THE FRIEND

Quote: Fragment of a letter by Epicurus to Colotes [1]

You, as one revering my remarks on that occasion, were seized with a desire, not accounted for by my lecture, to embrace me by clasping my knees and lay hold of me to the whole extent of the contact that is customarily established in revering and supplicating certain personages. You therefore caused me to consecrate you in return and demonstrate my reverence… Go about as one immortal in my eyes, and think of me as immortal too.

Commentary: friendship, the key that unlocks godhood

We now reach the core of Epicurean godhood, the ultimate manifestation of what it truly means to be divine. In this scene depicted in one of Epicurus’ letters meant to be read by his community, he portrays one of his closest disciples, Colotes, showing reverence for him and he in turn returns the favor. This gesture goes beyond a simple sign of appreciation; it has religious value. This scene would become immensely popular with later Epicureans when recounting the hagiographies of their tradition. Enemies of Epicureans would mock the over the top gestures of affection that existed within these communities.

At first, what we see is an overzealous disciple overcome with a fanatical need to worship his guru. After all, Epicurus could be seen as something of a spiritual master akin to Jesus or the Buddha. However, this gesture seems to have caught Epicurus off guard at first, as it refers to Colotes’ “desire, not accounted for by my lecture”. But then, Epicurus mirrors the action directed to him by his disciple by returning that gesture back at him. He turned what could have been an awkward moment into a philosophical lesson, but also into a symbolic scene that would be remembered by future practitioners of his philosophy.

Epicurus has often been criticized putting himself too much at the center of his philosophy. He has often been viewed as greedy for attention and fame. After all, why would he institute in his will an annual day to celebrate him (and Metrodorus) after his death, as well as a monthly celebration of himself and his best friend every twentieth of the month during his lifetime in his honor, the famous Eikas gatherings? All of this is only partly true. It would be more accurate to see Epicurus as a sort of “first among equals”. Epicurus did not found his philosophy alone, but with the aid of Metrodorus, Poyenus, Hermarchus and others. His annual celebration from his will is supposed to be in conjunction with funerary rites honoring his parents and brothers, showing his devotion to his family. And the monthly Eikas celebrations honor both him and his closest friend Metrodorus as a pair. Other friends such as Polyaenus and Pythocles were also honored after their deaths. By associating the honoring of his friends with religious rituals normally meant to celebrate gods and important individuals that are elevated to a status of godhood, he is placing friendship at the center of his philosophy of happiness.

This association of friendship with godhood is made obvious by the final part of the quoted fragment: “Go about as one immortal in my eyes, and think of me as immortal too”. How does this work? After all, unlike gods, our loved ones are notoriously mortal and losing them is a source of suffering. In what way can our friendships make us immortal? This will be the subject of the Fifth Contemplation.

Practice: building friendships

First lesson: take measures to make friends. In his Treatise On Choices and Avoidances, Philodemus says: “Since he does not cut short the long extent of his life, he always begins new activities and friendly attachments”. He adds: “He will treat with much care as many people as he can, and be thankful to those who have treated him kindly, in particular because he hopes that he will share in some goods with them or that he will receive some benefits by these same people in the future…”[2]. Here it seems we are beyond the restricted circle of close friends, engaging with society at large. This is what Epicureans might mean by practicing philanthropy. There is something here resembling enlightened self interest. We benefit others and we benefit in return. There is something transactional about this kind of relationship. But this is just a first step. What starts as something based on utility can become something more intimate. “Every friendship is an excellence in itself, even though it begins in mutual advantage.”[3] Being socially active will lead to developing more affectionate ties over time.

Second lesson: show your gratitude and generosity to the friends you have. Gratitude is one of the core values of Epicurean philosophy, especially with one’s friends. An Epicurean will be generous with his friends, willing to sacrifice his own comfort in order to make his friend’s feel good. Even when financially struggling, he will prefer to increase his own frugality than lack generosity for his friends. He will care for them when they are sick, give aid when they are struggling financially, protect them when they are in danger and under extreme circumstances, even sacrifice his life. He will also give them counsel and advice, with honesty, even if that means telling hard truths. Epicurus says: “When the sage contends with necessity, he is skilled at giving rather than taking — such a treasury of self-reliance has he found.”[4]

Third lesson: contemplate the divine nature of your friendships. While it is necessary and even useful to interact with society at large, it is among our closer friends that we find refuge, where we feel secure, where we come the closest to experiencing the imperishability of the gods. It is somewhat ironic that it is the possibility of being vulnerable with our friends that contributes to making us invulnerable. Epicurus, while addressing Metrodorus said: “I write this not for the many, but for you; each of us is enough of an audience for the other.”[5] Our friends bring us a feeling of confidence: “The same judgment produces confidence that dreadful things are not everlasting, and that security amidst the limited number of dreadful things is most easily achieved through friendship.”[6] Friends play a role similar to what a god would for many religious people. Just as they turn to a divine being in times of crisis, an Epicurean will turn to a friend.

Forth lesson: develop rituals with your friends. One way in which we can show our appreciation for a friend and celebrate a friendship is to come up with traditions you share exclusively with the person(s). As you get to know someone and spend time with them, you may find yourself repeating a very specific and semi-regular activity with that person. Perhaps you go to the same music festival every year, or go camping once a month, or some other special occasion. Perhaps you enjoy a certain drink socially, like yerba maté. Birthdays and anniversaries would be excuses for such rituals. Epicurus placed these celebrations of friendship as the center of his philosophical practice, as is made clear with the importance of Eikas, the monthly gathering every 20th of the month in honor of his relationship with Metrodorus, his closest friend.[7] This friendship, modeled on the gods, has strong symbolic value that has been celebrated for generations of Epicureans, and is a template of what a divine friendship should look like.

Notes:

[1] From Plutarch’s Against Colotes. Quote from http://www.attalus.org/translate/epicurus.html
[2] Philodemus, On Choices and Avoidances, published by Bibliopolis. See Hiram Crespo’s article https://societyofepicurus.com/reasonings-about-philodemus-on-choices-and-avoidances-part-i/
[3] Vatican Saying 23. Quote from https://monadnock.net/epicurus/vatican-sayings.html
[4] Vatican Saying 44. Quote from https://monadnock.net/epicurus/vatican-sayings.html
[5] Seneca, Letters to Lucilius. Quote from http://www.attalus.org/translate/epicurus.html
[6] Principle Doctrine 29. Quote from https://monadnock.net/epicurus/principal-doctrines.html
[7] See article from Hiram Crespo: https://societyofepicurus.com/eikas-and-ancestral-reverence/

Five contemplations on the gods: A path to community and friendship (part 3)

Continued from:

FIRST CONTEMPLATION: THE GODS

SECOND CONTEMPLATION: UTOPIA

THIRD CONTEMPLATION: THE SAGE

Quote: Wall inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda, fragment 125 – 126 [1]

For when images of persons who are far away from our sight invade our mind, they cause the greatest disturbance. But if you examine the whole matter carefully, you will learn that the images of persons who are not present are of precisely the same kind as those of persons who are present. For although the images are perceived not by the senses, but by the mind, they have the same power, as far as in them lies, for persons who are present as when they existed with those other persons present also. Therefore, with regard to these matters, mother, be of good heart: do not reckon the visions of us to be bad; rather, when you see them, think of us daily acquiring something good and advancing further in happiness. For not small or ineffectual are these gains for us which make our disposition godlike and show that not even our mortality makes us inferior to the imperishable and blessed nature; for when we are alive, we are as joyful as the gods, knowing that death is nothing to us; and when we dead, we are without sensation… Think of us then, mother, as always joyful in the midst of such good things and show enthusiasm for what we are doing.

Commentary: the sage is equal to a god

These fragments of a letter to a mother, quoted in Diogenes’ wall inscription, are attributed to Epicurus[2]. In it he reassures his mother who fears for his safety because of visions of her son, probably in a dream, which she took to be a bad omen. As is implied in the letter, Epicurus reminds his mother Chaerestrate (who was a priestess) that interpreting dreams or visions of any kind as having any kind of prophetic value is superstition and that there is nothing to fear.

After reassuring his mother of the nature of these images, he recommends she turn these manifestations to her advantage and visualize positive things regarding her son. Here we see a common exercise in Epicureanism: “placing before the eyes”, a kind of visualization technique meant to help us achieve virtue and overcome vice[3] for the sake of living pleasantly.

In this case, Epicurus is making the claim that thanks to philosophy, his mother has nothing to worry about, for he has already achieved the best of all possible lives. Thanks to his wisdom, he has learned to be content with little, and does not need much to live a satisfying life. Thanks to his friends’ support, he feels safe in case he is lacking in basic needs.

Even if something bad was to happen and he was to die, he does not fear death. Death is the absence of sensation. There is no suffering in being dead. There is no punishment in the afterlife. Thanks to his gratitude for the good memories of his past, he is secure in having lived a good life. He says: “Misfortune must be cured through gratitude for what has been lost and the knowledge that it is impossible to change what has happened”[4]. One could retort that even if Epicurus’ mother could be reassured about the happiness of her son, she may still fear losing him and never seeing him again. We will address this later.

Practice: envision the life you want to live and try to make it reality

First lesson: envision the life of a sage. After the dwellings of the gods and utopia on Earth, we reach the third phase in our quest for godhood: the community of sages. We are now beyond mere thought experiments and are much closer to history with the existence of Epicurean communities that existed around the Mediterranean for over five centuries.

What is a sage? For all intents and purposes, sages are equal to gods, though to be fair, they are not quite at that level as they are somewhat more vulnerable, subject to misfortune and obviously, mortal. However, they are better prepared than most for misfortune, as Diogenes points out: “Chance can befall us and do harm, but rarely; for it does not have fuel, like fire, which it may lay hold of. So Epicurus, having regard to these matters, refused to remove chance from things entirely–for it would have been rash and incompatible with philosophical respectability to give a false account of a matter so clear and patently obvious to all–, but not a few occurrences he called only small. As then the disposition of the wise man can represent the accidental happening in this way, so, it seems, it seldom operates dominantly, as the son of Neocles (Epicurus) says: «It is seldom that chance impedes the wise man: it is reason which controls and controlled the greatest and most important matters »”[5]. Wisdom is the highest achievement possible for a human and being wise is our way to mirror the life of the blessed and immortal beings.

Second lesson: make yourself worthy in the eyes of a sage. The Stoic philosopher Seneca, in a letter to his friends Lucilius, quotes Epicurus: “We need to set our affections on some good man and keep him constantly before our eyes, so that we may live as if he were watching us and do everything as if he saw what we were doing”[6]. Aside from having some wise person to look up to, be it an Epicurean philosopher or some friend of family member we know and admire, we must try to become better ourselves, and improve our lives.

Third lesson: rethinking what it is you really desire. If what you desire is fame, wealth, power and the like, you will fail in your pursuits. Even if you succeed, you will still fail. Rethink what is important in your life. There are very few things we really need: food, shelter, health and a few moderate luxuries to give life some flavor. Some extravagant pleasures, if they are fortunate to come across our path, such as vacations to foreign countries or refined food for example, can be appreciated and add good memories we can appreciate in the future, though they are not necessary. Most importantly, whatever the experiences are, whether modest or extravagant, make sure you share them with loved ones.

Forth lesson: aim to live a complete life. In his treatise On Death, Philodemus expresses this best: “But the sensible man, having received that which can secure the whole of what is sufficient for a happy life, immediately then for the rest of his life goes about laid out for burial, and he profits by one day as he would by eternity, and when the day is being taken away, he neither considers the things happening to him surprising nor goes along with them as one falling somewhat short of the best life, but going forward and receiving in a remarkable manner the addition provided by time, as one who has met with a paradoxical piece of good luck, he is grateful to circumstances even for this”[7]. From a psychological perspective, Philodemus unveils to us how a human, mortal as he is, can match the immortality of the gods: “he profits by one day as he would by eternity”. However, this is no reason to neglect our finances, health, diet, etc. While ready to die at any moment, the sage expects to live a long life. A healthy life is another way to imitate the gods.

Notes:

[1] Quote from M. F. Smith’s work, The Epicurean Inscription. See https://www.english.enoanda.cat/the_inscription.html
[2] There is some disagreement amongst scholars on whether this quote is from Epicurus but we will tentatively accept this hypothesis in order to move forward. What matters here is this is an Epicurean quote.
[3] https://societyofepicurus.com/ethics-of-philodemus-moral-portraiture-and-seeing-before-the-eyes/
[4] Vatican Saying 55. From https://monadnock.net/epicurus/vatican-sayings.html
[5] https://www.english.enoanda.cat/the_inscription.html
[6] From Seneca, Letters to Lucilius. Quote from http://www.attalus.org/translate/epicurus.html
[7] Philodemus, On Death, published by Society of Biblical Literature. See Hiram Crespo’s article https://societyofepicurus.com/reasonings-about-philodemus-on-death/

Five contemplations on the gods: A path to community and friendship (part 1)

The following is as five-essay collection of contemplations on the gods by SoFE member Marcus. Although we have made many efforts to clarify aspects of Epicurean cosmology, the ancient Epicurean conception of gods as cosmic beings who have physical bodies remains difficult for many students to understand. Epicurean theology falls more within the realm of astrobiology speculation and sci-fi, than within the realm of theology which (today) has become almost entirely Platonized. Marcus wrote these five contemplations to help us place the gods before our eyes, and to derive their intended ethical utility even if we are non-theistic. – Hiram Crespo

Educational Video: On the Epicurean Gods

Epicurus concludes his Letter to Menoeceus, the summary of his teachings on the happy life, as follows: “So practice these and similar things day and night, by yourself and with a like-minded friend, and you will never be disturbed whether waking or sleeping, and you will live as a god among men: for a man who lives in the midst of immortal goods is unlike a merely mortal being.”[1]

This is not the only passage in Epicurean literature where the idea of living wisely is compared to living as a god. Also notice that this passage places importance in practicing philosophy “with a like-minded friend”. As we shall see, these two ideas, living as a god among men and philosophizing with a like-minded friend, are not only very closely related but they represent the very core and highest realization of the entire Epicurean philosophical endeavor.

It shall be made clear that the recurring theme of becoming like a god is not hyperbolic or poetic, it is quite literal. To understand this, it will be necessary to think outside the box, outside the contours of monotheistic religions like Christianity or Islam. Epicurus defined a god as a “blissful and immortal being”[2]. This is nothing new or innovative on Epicurus’ part. These are very much the gods of Homer and Hesiod. For example, in his Theogony, Hesiod refers to “the blessed gods that are eternally”. Many of the other philosophical schools of this time, those of Plato, Aristotle or the Stoics for example, would have agreed with this definition. Where the Epicureans and the other philosophical schools disagreed with Homer and Hesiod is their characterization of the gods as being subject to petty human weaknesses such as jealousy, adultery, anger, cruelty, and so on. The god of a philosopher must represent reason, virtue and wisdom. As a result, these different philosophers agree that to become wise is to become like the gods.[3]

But getting back to the Epicureans… Unlike most other philosophical schools of their day, they believed that the gods do not intervene in human affairs or the workings of the universe. They do not punish or reward humans. So, rivals to Epicurus could – and did – ask: why care about these gods at all if they do not interfere with our lives? Why did Epicurus venerate these gods who are not concerned with us? Why did he encourage his followers to pray, worship statues of the gods, take part in religious festivals and mystery initiations? Long story short, the Epicurean gods serve as role models for the philosopher. What does this mean practically? This is what we will investigate.

Before we start exploring this conception of divinity and how it leads to the Epicurean ideal of friendship, we should clarify a few things: the object of this article is not to defend the existence of the Epicurean gods, for which there is obviously no evidence, nor point out any potential inconsistencies in their arguments concerning the gods.[4] In order to move forward, we can simply think of these gods as part of an ethical thought experiment that will lead to practical results on how we think about and experience our lives and our relationships.[5]

We will do this by examining five “contemplations” on divinity taken directly from Epicurean literature. Each quote will be followed by a commentary based on the evidence left to us by the Epicurean writings and suggested philosophical exercises on how to put these theories into practice in our daily lives.

This essay will be divided into 5 parts, each part dedicated to one of the contemplations:

FIRST CONTEMPLATION: THE GODS

SECOND CONTEMPLATION: UTOPIA

THIRD CONTEMPLATION: THE SAGE

FORTH CONTEMPLATION: THE FRIEND

FIFTH CONTEMPLATION: THE DEPARTED

Today we begin with the gods.

 

FIRST CONTEMPLATION: THE GODS

Quote: From On the Nature of Things, book 3, by Lucretius[6]

I see what is going on in all the void,
the majesty and calm habitations
of the gods reveal themselves in places
where no winds disturb, no clouds bring showers,
no white snow falls, congealed with bitter frost,
to harm them, the always cloudless aether
vaults above, and they smile, as far and wide
the light spreads out. Then, too, nature provides
plentiful supplies of all things—their peace
is not disturbed by anything at any time.

Commentary: the society of the gods

This passage from the 1st century BCE Roman philosopher-poet Lucretius is part of a eulogy to Epicurus included in his epic poem, De Rerum Natura, a presentation of Epicurean philosophy in verse. We can see that much emphasis is placed on the habitat in which these peacefully minded gods live, a calm pleasant environment not subject to the destructive forces of the universe.[7]

The Epicureans give us a number of arguments defending the existence of these gods that may seem debatable to a modern audience, but let’s indulge these ancient philosophers from two millennia ago for a bit (also, let’s not get lost in the complex details of ancient theories in physics).[8] To keep a very long and complicated story short, using contemporary terminology, we can think of the Epicurean gods as a kind of privileged extraterrestrial species living far outside of our world, somewhere within an infinite multiverse[9]. In other words, humans are not at the summit of creation. This is an important point, because the Epicureans are trying to imagine the best, most pleasant life possible in all of what exists, and what we can learn from it.[10]

According to this philosophy, divinity is thought of in biological, not supernatural, categories[11]. Philodemus makes this clear in On the Gods: “These demonstrate that every nature has a different location suitable to it. To some it is water, to others air and earth. In one case for animals in another for plants and the like. But especially for the gods there has to be a suitable location, due to the fact that, while all the others have their permanence for a certain time only, the gods have it for eternity.”[12]

But how should we imagine these beings? What are they like? In his Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus gives us the foundational principles needed to conceptualize the gods: “First, believe that god is a blissful, immortal being, as is commonly held. Do not ascribe to god anything that is inconsistent with immortality and blissfulness; instead, believe about god everything that can support immortality and blissfulness.”[13]

Beyond these two basic principles, blissfulness and immortality, Epicurus seems to be giving his followers license to fill in the gaps with all sorts of speculations. Epicurus wants us to represent the gods before our eyes, be it the mind’s eye, using our imagination, or our actual eyes, through statues, paintings, religious rituals and so on.

This is important for two reasons: first we must free ourselves from any fear that the gods might be a source of harm to humans. These gods will not punish us in our lives or the afterlife. Such petty actions would contradict their blissfulness and immortality. They are too far outside our world and too peaceful for that. The gods are to be admired, not feared. The second reason is that the gods are ethical ideals, role models to be imitated. How do we become more like the gods here on Earth? What can we do to try to match their supreme happiness? This is one reason the gods are represented as human looking: we are supposed to identify with them. They are just like us, only better. Let’s contemplate how we can become better…

Practice: deconstruct false conceptions of the gods

First lesson: change how we think of the divine. Do away with what has been taught to us by monotheistic religions, the notion of a single god that is all knowing, all powerful, being responsible for creating the universe and benevolent towards humans. Instead, think of the god as a supremely happy biological entity existing within our universe, not above it. Do not be afraid to represent them as humanoid. We are supposed to identify with them. Remember, this is a thought experiment. Forget about the fanatical impulse taught to us by monotheists to “smash the idols!” Do the opposite instead: build idols!

Second lesson: let’s imagine ourselves as living amongst the gods. Let’s make this fun! Imagine, for whatever reason, due to some amazing, ridiculously improbable coincidence, that these gods happen to look a lot like the characters from Greek mythology. They have the same names too! Imagine that you no longer have back pain, don’t have to wake up early on Monday to go to work and get yelled at by your tyrannical boss, get stuck in traffic, fill out your taxes… Now imagine yourself playing music with Apollo, discussing philosophy with Athena, observing the stars with Zeus, arm wrestling with Ares, playing poker with Hermes, partying with Dionysus, hiking with Pan, caressing the body of Aphrodite (or if you prefer, Eros)…

Third lesson: picture multiple gods. The second lesson had us interacting with the gods, the key word here being “interacting”. After all, we lack the invulnerability of the gods. We have weak bodies that get sick and old, have back pain… And of course, we have to deal with bad bosses, traffic, taxes and all the other “perks” of living among humans. We cannot avoid these things. But when we contemplate the perfect life of the gods, we see them living in communities, enjoying each other’s company, building friendships. This is within our grasp. Thinking about the gods is imagining the best of all possible lives. And that divine happiness has a word: friendship. And now we see why monotheism doesn’t work in this philosophy. A solitary god is no model for us. Gods are social animals.

Fourth lesson: view the gods as embodiments of happiness. Diogenes of Oinoanda, says: “Some statues of gods shoot arrows and are produced holding a bow, represented like Heracles in Homer; others are attended by a body-guard of wild beasts; others are angry with the prosperous, like Nemesis according to popular opinion; whereas we ought to make statues of the gods genial and smiling, so that we may smile back at them rather than be afraid of them.”[14]

Notes:

[1] Translated by Peter Saint-Andre: https://monadnock.net/epicurus/letter.html
[2] Also in the Letter to Menoeceus: https://monadnock.net/epicurus/letter.html
[3] For more on the complex relation between Greek philosophy and religion: https://www.academia.edu/4990433/Greek_Philosophy_and_Religion
[4] It should be noted that within scholarship, there are two interpretations of the Epicurean gods: realist an idealist. According to scholar David Sedley, : “Epicurean theology has come to be viewed as a battleground between two parties of interpreters, the realists and the idealists. Realists take Epicurus to have regarded the gods as biologically immortal beings […] idealists take Epicurus’ idea to have been, rather, that gods are our own graphic idealization of the life to which we aspire.” We consider that the textual evidence overwhelmingly favors the realist interpretation. In order to get a good understanding of Epicurus’ theology, we recommend the following article: The Polytheism of the Epicureans by Paul T M Jackson: https://www.academia.edu/36564126/The_Polytheism_of_the_Epicureans
[5] While we believe the realist interpretation of the gods is what Epicurus intended, this article takes the position the idealist interpretation is more useful to us today as part of an Epicurean revival for the 21st century. It is worth mentioning that many modern Epicurean practitioners prefer to call this the “non-realist” rather that “idealist” interpretation, but both mean the same thing.
[6] Translated by Ian Johnston: http://johnstoniatexts.x10host.com/lucretius/lucretius3html.html
[7] It is important to keep in mind that Epicurean theology is intertwined with Epicurean cosmology. The gods did not create the universe but are a part o it and subject to its laws.
[8] To get a sense of Epicurean reasoning on the gods, one argument they put forth is that in an infinite universe with infinite possibilities, the existence of such beings is inevitable.
[9] According to Epicurus and his followers, our cosmos is but one of an infinite amount of world systems.
[10] To live within a cosmos is to be subject to the same forces of destruction that end up destroying that cosmos. Nothing lasts forever and all life must end. There is no eternal soul, no afterlife. The gods seem to escape this fate because they live in the metakosmia—in other words, in the spaces in between different cosmoi.
[11] As physical beings, the gods lose atoms over time but they are able to replenish all the atoms that they lose with new ones. Also, the gods have intelligence and wisdom, which allows them to actively preserve their bodies and mind.
[12] Quote from Space and Movement in Philodemus’ De dis 3: an Anti-Aristotelian Account by Holger Essler. https://www.academia.edu/26142444/Space_and_Movement_in_Philodemus_De_dis_3_an_Anti_Aristotelian_Account
[13] https://monadnock.net/epicurus/letter.html
[14] Quote from M. F. Smith’s work, The Epicurean Inscription. See https://www.english.enoanda.cat/the_inscription.html