Category Archives: Ethics

The Epicureans on Abortion

The abduction over the years of very religiously conservative judges into the Supreme Court of the US–seven of the nine Justices are Catholic and many are religious and conservative at a time when over a third of millennials identify as “nones–, and the recent events in Texas (where restrictions to legalized abortion inspired by particular interpretations of Christianity are now being imposed in a manner that is difficult to challenge) are scary for many of us who have for years feared the ongoing encroachment of Dominionist ideology and theocracy in America, both in the public square and in our private lives. Recently, we discussed the issue of abortion from an Epicurean perspective. I wanted to get the opinions of several of the members of the Garden of Epicurus FaceBook group, to ensure that my opinion is not the only one being expressed here and that the discussion remained as objective as possible. Below is the (edited) dialogue we had concerning abortion as an ethical problem from an Epicurean perspective.

Hiram. Concerning the Texas abortion law: do others see good Epicurean arguments for / against? I’m curious to see what others make of this.

My first instinct is to acknowledge that unborn babies, particularly in the first few weeks, are just “goo in a petri dish” (to cite comedian Bill Maher). They lack the neural complexity for sentience, and so are not yet human beings from the Epicurean perspective (Epicurus’ Principal Doctrine 2 ties living to sentience). A certain amount of neural complexity is needed to produce the actual experience of being human.

My second reaction is that forced motherhood creates more unwanted children (and, in the case of incense or rape, particularly when the mother is herself a child, compounds the trauma), and these unwanted children later go on to contribute significantly to virtually all the statistics of societal dysfunction. It also keeps families in poverty if they’re not prepared for the huge responsibilities of another child (it costs $ 250,000 to raise a child in the US outside of the cycles of poverty)

Jason. PD38 says it all, for me.

When circumstances have not changed and things that were thought to be just are shown to not be in accord with our basic grasp of justice, then those things were not just. But when circumstances do change and things that were just are no longer useful, then those things were just while they brought mutual advantage among companions sharing the same community; but when later they did not bring advantage, then they were not just.

We’re not the same community. This is a religious community trying to impose their values on people who are not in their community. It’s fundamentally unjust on the face of it.

If they want to virtue signal they can do so voluntarily. It ceases to be virtuous when the behavior is forced. Their own actions aren’t in alignment with their religious doctrine. Choice and avoidance is as important a part of Christianity as it is in Epicurean philosophy.

Hiram. The accusation of virtue signaling reminds me of our third Scholarch Polystratus, who argued that when people pursue virtue but fail to study nature, their virtue comes to nothing and degenerates into superstition and arrogance (fanaticism). And so true virtue is impossible without it being rooted in the physics. In this case, the neural complexity of the newborn child is what renders it sentient enough to eventually feel pain and pleasure, which is what dignifies a soul in our ethics. But Christians do not care about that. They magically attribute even “personhood” to an undeveloped fetus without considering its neural complexity.

Going back to our discussions on slavery, this policy is an instance of denial of consent: people who did not participate in articulating the terms of a particular “social contract” are being forced into it against their will (and in the case of forced motherhood, this also includes the unwanted child who is brought forcefully into the world against the will of parents, who may later also abuse or neglect the unwanted child).

Doug. The debate would likely seem bizarre to an ancient Greek Pagan. They practiced infanticide. The father had several days after the birth to decide whether the child should be allowed to live. If he thought so, then there was a ceremony to welcome the child into the family.

What does the Bible say about Abortion?

Jason. The debate is bizarre to everyone outside of the noisome group making it the center of their politics. It isn’t even in alignment with their own other anti-regulatory beliefs.

Eileen. Abortion bans are about a Christian belief in ensoulment at the point of conception, but I’m not clear on Epicurus’s stand on this. I do know that abortion was by turns tolerated and vilified in the ancient world, its fortunes seeming to rise and fall with society’s perceptions of their population status at any given time.

Ilkka. We must also remember that these are the same people who oppose factual sex education and easy availability of contraception. The actual methods of preventing abortions … An Epicurean might answer that legislation that is motivated by superstition is automatically unjust.

Beryl. There is something for me here about abortion or “killing one’s own whilst in the womb“ which seems strikingly unfriendly to human life. That said it’s also extremely unfriendly to legislate for fully adult people how they can use their own bodies.

Whilst science tells us when a fetus may be human and religion tells us when a human fetus has a soul, hedonic calculus tells us clearly that knowing that unprotected sex–despite the pleasure–can cause untold suffering of the life created if brought into poverty, servitude, or life situations that cause early infant death, is itself a hostile unfriendly act. Where are the legislators taxing men named and proven by DNA tests as progenitors of offspring that may suffer hardships in life?

So on one hand one could say that the Texas legislators are preventing suffering by preventing late abortion. This though when examined further is a lie since the legislation will overwhelmingly affect poor women, especially minority women, and their unwanted children who may have entire lives suffering psychologically from the impact of poverty. Essentially the ruling is a hostile act and unfriendly towards both women and their unborn children whilst masquerading as the opposite. This level of hypocrisy needs to be avoided and be unsupported as toxic anti-woman and -child rhetoric. This legislation further does not look at the true causation of maternal and infant suffering–namely poverty, and neither does it address issues such as free contraception access which could decrease suffering overall. So if happiness is to be the greatest good, legislation which harms women and children is not Epicurean, nor is is compatible with the concept of friendliness.

From my own experience as a mother and as a witness to folk who have undergone these surgeries, the love of our own children brings great happiness and is an immortal good, as remembrance of times past being the most delicious memories. Even early morning feeds are remembered fondly. From talking to folk who have opted for the path of abortion there is deep sadness for some and poverty, lack of love for the partner, youth of the mother, or illness, along with in ability to self-reflect and manage desires, are amongst the reasons that unwanted pregnancies arise. A friendly act would be to fund contraception, teach folk about consent, educate our young on respect for human life, and how we conduct ourselves, especially when desire pulls us in directions that can cause harm to others. The spotlight needs to be put equally on men and women as co-creators of human life, and as such equally responsible for the suffering they inflict on their unwanted children.

Marcus. They often say that science is amoral and morality is a separate field all together. Here is an example where science is very relevant to morality. At what point of its development does the fetus experience pain? How can we tell if the fetus is viable? Does it represent a health risk to the mother? Etc. Only science can bring any resemblance of an answer to these questions. Or at the very least, bring us to a place where we can start any reflection on these subjects. For a more scientifically-minded contribution to the debate, here is an article from Carl Sagan and Ann Druyan.

Epicurus’ Instructions on Meleta, Part II

The following is a continuation of the essay Meléta: Epicurus’ Instructions for Students. Upar and Onar: on correct and incorrect modes of leisure and activity is the sequel. Please read them in order for maximum benefit.

During our last Eikas meeting, we discussed the Meléta portion of Epicurus’ Epistle to Menoeceus, with is found towards the end of the letter and contains instructions for his true and sincere disciples, and some theory to help us understand what the final outcome of our practice should be. One of our SoFE members lamented his being unable to attend the meeting, and so for his benefit (and that of other students of EP), I am posting some of the notes from our discussion.

Both Private Learning and Communal Transmission

In the previous essay, we learned that there are two fields of practice. In our last Twentieth discussion, we brainstormed some ideas for what constitutes Meléta:

  • “Meleta by oneself” (introspection), which includes things like repetition, memorization, inner work on our character usually meant to remove bad habits and form new ones, (this can include journaling), and being informed by the Doctrines while carrying out our choices and avoidances, and
  • “Meleta with others of like mind” (philía, or Epicurean friendship), which involves studying together, practicing friendship, kindly giving and accepting frank criticism, practicing suavity and clear speech, teaching and collaborating and creating educational content together, observing Eikas with other Epicureans, carrying out autarchy projects, piety projects, and other experiments by which we may have pragmatic encounters with the Doctrines, looking at case studies for the Doctrines, and other ways to deliberate together.

This second field of Meléta creates an oral tradition, and opportunities for direct, interpersonal transmission of the philosophy. This is not an accidental feature: I believe this is essential, and that it helps to make philosophy tangible and to keep it relevant for practitioners.

After several years of practice, it’s clear to me that this second field of praxis contains an intangible curriculum of human values that is not found in the texts, and can only be acquired through the process of having Epicurean friends who are invested in our happiness and have noble expectations of us. When Epicurus says that we must practice both by ourselves and with others, he is giving us the additional social, intellectual challenges that come from friendship, and which contribute greatly to our moral development, and provide necessary checks and balances in our practice.

“Imeras kai Nuktos”: the Case for a Morning Practice and an Evening Practice

Epicurus is making a promise (that we will not be disturbed whether waking or sleeping), but if we read it within its context, we see that it’s contingent on carrying out proper Meléta. The practice must include both fields (introspection and friendship), as well as either a constant practice (one possible reading of “day and night”), or two separate instances of daily and nightly practice (imeras kai nuktos).

The portion “whether waking or sleeping” (úpar out ónar) seems to indicate that there are two types of perturbations that philosophy helps us to overcome, otherwise why would the Hegemon speak specifically of not being perturbed either while awake or while sleeping? We discussed how this might indicate the recognition of the existence of the unconscious / subconscious part of the psyche.

Waking perturbations could be interpreted as the conscious ones, which we are aware of and we can argue with / against in order to transform our habits of thinking or acting. It may be that we are aware of our tiredness or laziness, of our excessive cravings for food or some other pleasure, of some irrational fear, or maybe we’re deeply aware of some other aspect of our daily disposition that perturbs our happiness.

Epicurus’ mention of perturbations while we sleep may indicate the unconscious ones that we are not fully aware of due to lack of introspective and philosophical hygiene, or perhaps dormant ones. Ignored or repressed feelings of guilt often perturb people and keep them up at night. Epicurus does mention that some of our dispositions, tendencies, or habits are like germs or seeds in his “On Moral Development”. By using these words he is recognizing that we carry certain unrealized potentials within us that, under certain conditions, may become realized. These may be part of what the Hegemon calls our “initial constitution” (genetic, physical and/or natural), or “seeds” acquired through upbringing. As we mature and develop morally, Epicurus teaches that we are in charge of transforming the content of our character, and even the physical structure of our psyche … but we cannot do that if we do not become aware of what these “seeds” are that keep us up at night. Here, we must carry out psychotherapy, introspection, expose ourselves to parrhesia (the frankness of our friends), or figure out other techniques to uncover and treat these perturbations. Epicurean philosophy requires its disciples to manage their mental health diligently so as to be–as Epicurus says–“armed for happiness”.

If we place before our eyes what a morning practice and an evening practice look like, immediately it becomes clear that most people who have morning rituals are attempting to prepare for the day ahead, and most people who have evening rituals are preparing for sleep. ES 11 helps to clarify the utility of both imeras meléta (a day practice) and nuktos meléta (a night practice).

For most people, to be quiet is to be numb and to be active is to be frenzied. – Epicurean Saying 11

Here, ἡσυχάζον ναρκᾷ (hesuchason narka) uses a form of the word used in Principal Doctrine 14 (hesuchía) for the technique of “retreating from the crowd”, which can be done alone or with friends … but could also refer to preparing for bed. Here, (since we are not “most people”, and they are other-ized in this Saying) the Founders of our tradition (for ES is a post-Epicurus compilation) are saying that this Epicurean art of retreat involves real and sober pleasures, not numbness or narcotic-like states (narka). Similarly, the words κινούμενον λυττᾷ (kinóumenon lytta) set the standard for the utility of a morning practice: just as rest should not be numb, similarly we should prepare for our day so that activity or productivity will be pleasant, and not frenzied or mindless. The first word here reminds me of kinetic, or active, pleasures, while the practice of retreating for the evening reminds me of katastematic, or calm, pleasures.

Epicurean Saying 41 elaborates further on what repetition and memorization looks like if the practice is constant or daily, or while we are working (managing our household and business). Some students dismiss practices of repetition or anything that feels like chanting, but this is in my view a mistake. Many insights in the Doctrines remain unexplored if we arrogantly dismiss them, thinking we already know them. We must not dismiss the actual practice of repeating and memorizing the Doctrines, because there are habitual patterns in our subconscious that require treatment, and also associations in our mind with certain ideas that are unanalyzed or that we may remain unaware of. Using the technique of offa, as described in ES 41, requires that we utter the words of true philosophy out loud (fonás afientas), and produces an instant encounter with the Doctrine that allows the mind to seek out whatever subconscious associations and pragmatic repercussions the words bring up in our minds.

Epicurus taught that the words of true philosophy are medicines (pharmakos). Studying and assimilating the Doctrines constitutes the taking of some dose of these Doctrines so that they may bring health to the soul (psyche).

“Diataraxthesi”: Perturbations

Let us now put aside the possibility of different kinds of perturbations while waking or sleeping, and let us look at the prolepsis of the word used. The first definition of this word “diataraxi” (to which “diataraxthesi” points) is “anxiety, mental uneasiness“. The second one I found was “a deviation of a system or process from its regular or normal state or path, caused by an outside influence“. Some of the synonyms are: disturbance, perturbation, maze, agitation, riot, turmoil, scrimmage.

Similar Things: our Expanding Discourse

The words “similar things” (τούτοις συγγενῆ, toutois syggeni) open the door to the expansion of meléta beyond the words of Epicurus, so long as the object of our study qualifies as things that are “similar” to the contents of the Epistle to Menoeceus. This is where we can bring into our studies many case studies and intellectuals from our own tradition, or even from other traditions, so long as the ethical framework for meléta is Epicurean. We see that during the days of Diogenes of Sidon and Philodemus, the Epicureans were commenting on many works by philosophers like Theophrastus (Peri Oikonomias) and others who were well known in their day. This is how new arguments were able to emerge to defend against attacks from the other schools, and it’s how we adapt philosophy to new and highly particular situations.

It is up to us to determine what falls under “similar things” for the purposes of meléta. My theory is that the matters being studied should be approached with epilogismos (that is, we must apply empirical methods, as per Principal Doctrine 24) and should be beneficial to our happiness (Principal Doctrine 28). We must apply the canon and derive utility from the practice of philosophy. If we speculate endlessly and pointlessly, neglect the study of nature, and/or make ourselves miserable instead of happy by how we practice philosophy, this is clearly not meléta.

Gods Among Men: an Epicurean Transhumanism?

If we carry out meléta in the way Epicurus advises, and take the recommended doses of philosophy’s medicine, we will start living like immortals and we will be surrounded by “athanatois agathois” (immortal goods). This doctrine of immortal goods deserves further elaboration, since these goods are the necessary features of the ambience, environment or context within which we live like immortals. If a person lives like a god among mortals, there have to be god-like inner states (of varied pleasures) as well as a god-like field of action because, in Epicureanism, all things are relational and contextual. There is one other instance where an immortal goods are mentioned, and it refers to philía (holy friendships).

The noble soul is devoted most of all to wisdom and to friendship — one a mortal good, the other immortal. – Epicurean Saying 78

This is probably because friendships help us to build memories, and that which is memorable stays with us over the long-term, providing us with happy memories, thoughts, and feelings as frequently as we revisit these memories. If we cultivate a grateful disposition, we can strengthen and extend these grateful memories. What other things in our lives carry a similar power to help us abide in pleasure easily? These things could serve as considerations for our exploration of the Doctrine of Immortal Goods.

It is up to us to determine how we can best live like immortals based on Epicurean teachings. This is where Epicurean theology serves ethical purposes. Epicurus invites us to place before our eyes the Gods so that they may serve as images and carriers of our destiny, our happiness, our healthy soul, and our future self. This is because we are invited to carry out our choices and avoidances so that we live like gods among mortals; our life-state and the goods we surround ourselves with are a conscious imitation of the gods. Our practice is an attempt to sculpt ourselves in their image. By setting up the gods as our ethical models, Epicurus is calling us to a transcendental life-state, lifestyle and environment.

Let us look at the specific qualities that Epicurus says we must attribute to the gods: he says we may believe anything about them so long as it does not contradict their blessedness and their immortality. This involves invulnerability (autarchy) and ever-blissful states.

During our Eikas meeting, we speculated: “Can this be interpreted as a transhumanist manifesto?“, however we did not have time to delve into this question in enough depth. Transhumanism is a worldview that calls for the enhancement of human beings in order to advance a longer life-span, together with the enjoyment of health, and a variety of mental and physical enhancements. However, since any modern or future transhumanist  technologies were not in existence when Epicurus wrote his Epistle to Menoeceus, these questions–while interesting and worthy of further consideration–are not immediately relevant to meléta and its benefits.

We therefore assume that the first Epicureans proved to themselves and to each other that it was, indeed, possible to live transcendentally, like a god among mortals, regardless of the current or future state of science. Through meléta, we train ourselves to do the same.

Upar and Onar: on correct and incorrect modes of leisure and activity

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PD 20: a Six-Part Doctrine

In recent months, a few of the members of the Society of Epicurus have been systematically studying all the Principal Doctrines of Epicurus as part of a process of gaining a concise understanding of all the pragmatic repercussions of each one. This has been a very gratifying process, and has created many new insights into the tradition.

When one systematically studies the PDs, the flow of the Doctrines becomes evident, as does the fact that they are the conclusions of long discussions among the founders which were found to be the most advantageous teachings for our happiness. Epicurus was saying: “If you don’t have time to study my 300 scrolls, at least study these 40 short Doctrines and be happy!”.

The first four (the Tetrapharmakos) are of great cosmological and ethical importance for the individual. The social Doctrines (on friendship, justice, and on the establishment of a “society of friends”) are towards the end. In between them, we find portions on the philosophy and ethics of science (PDs 10-13), on autarchy (PDs 15-16), the canonics (PDs 22-25), and the portion I am presenting today deals with the mental disciplines of pleasure (PDs 18-21). Principal Doctrine 20 in specific is a six-part formula, and although we’ve studied it before, I’d like to focus here on each one of the six parts of the Doctrine separately in order to extract new insights.

The flesh receives as unlimited, the limits of pleasure; and to provide it requires unlimited time. But the mind, intellectually grasping what the end and limit of the flesh is, and banishing the terrors of the future, procures a complete and perfect life, and we no longer have need of unlimited time. Nevertheless the mind does not shun pleasure, and even when circumstances make death imminent, the mind does not lack enjoyment of the best life.

Epicurus’ instructions in our study of his Doctrines revolve around repetition and memorization. Due to the length of this Doctrine, repeating and memorizing may be a bit more daunting than is the case with other Doctrines. Let us therefore divide the Doctrine into six portions, so that we can more carefully repeat, memorize, and carefully study each assertion, and compare it to other sources, until we fully assimilate all the cognitive and pragmatic repercussions of the Doctrine.

  1. The flesh receives as unlimited, the limits of pleasure.
  2. To provide this pleasure requires unlimited time.
  3. The mind, intellectually grasping what the end and limit of the flesh is, procures a complete and perfect life.
  4. The mind, banishing the terrors of the future, procures a complete and perfect life, and we no longer have need of unlimited time.
  5. The mind does not shun pleasure.
  6. Even when circumstances make death imminent, the mind does not lack enjoyment of the best life.

The Flesh Lacks Self-Control and Discipline

The first two statements are not saying that pleasure in the flesh is bad: only that the flesh does not have a means to discern their limits. Epicurean Saying 37, which seems to associate pleasant states with vitality and health, reiterates this:

Nature is weak in the face of what is bad, not what is good; for it is kept whole by pleasures and broken down by pains.

Among other things, the 20th Doctrine is a cure for limitless desires of the flesh: that is part of its medicine. The first statement says that the flesh does not know discipline: only the mind does, thanks to the faculty of reason. The second one says that this could potentially result in being assaulted by an infinite number of desires. We see that an existential problem is being framed in terms of the distinction between the flesh and the mind, their different natures, and their different powers. As with all the Doctrines, we must understand this clearly in order to carry out our choices and rejections prudently.

The Mind Must Discipline the Flesh

I divided 3 and 4 into two sentences, although originally they were one, because there are two assertions being made. These assertions are tied to the preceding PDs 18-19: the Baseline Doctrine and the Doctrine that stresses the limits of pleasure in time. If you study them with attention, you will see that PD’s 18 through 21 “give a sermon” together and seem to have been compiled as the authoritative conclusions of a single ethical discussion, the point of which was to say that the mind is responsible for securing a stable life of pleasure.

What are these Doctrines saying together? PD 18 and the third portion of PD 20, together, explain that the mind is able to grasp the limits of the flesh, which are mentioned in PD 18. The mind is able to directly observe, with full enargeia or immediacy, that as soon as the belly is somewhat full, there are no more pangs of hunger. It is able to apprehend that we do not experience pain when we neglect sexual passion, that it is not necessary, and that we can be content without it. While the flesh is unconscious and unable to apprehend these natural limits, the mind is aware and capable.

Similarly, PD 19, and the fourth statement of PD 20, together teach the superiority of reason over time, and how the mind is able to choose and reject how to reason about the past and future in such a way as to experience pleasure, and procure “a complete and perfect life“, a content and satisfied life that lacks nothing, that needs nothing. The point here is that we must think correctly about the past and future, rather than avoid thinking about them or think only of the present (as the Cyrenaics recommended). This is done by pleasant expectation and grateful recollection, two practices that Epicurus encouraged. PD 21 will complete these considerations, empowering us to question the amount of effort or sacrifice we dedicate to needless pleasures.

The Mind Must be Made an Ally

The fifth assertion, on its own, is of profound significance. It reminds me of Vatican Saying 21’s assertion that “We must not violate nature, but obey her“, or in some translations “We must not force nature, but gently persuade her“. This is essential to help us understand Epicurean ethics. If the mind does not shun pleasure, this means–again–that the mind is an ally in our practice of philosophy and in our pursuit of happiness; that our approach should be gentle; and that we do not have to fight against it, but work with it.

In cases where people have bad habits or insatiable desires that produce unwanted consequences and no longer passes hedonic calculus, they are often able to find a higher or healthier pleasure. When I found that coffee was harmful to my health, I opted for yerba maté, a herbal drink with stimulating properties that does not give me jitters. Similarly, the current globalized market furnishes a near infinite variety of culinary products that are guilt-free, fat-free, gluten-free, alcohol-free, fair trade, etc. This allows opportunities for moral agents to avoid feeling like we are punishing ourselves whenever we attempt to make healthier or more prudent choices. The thing to keep in mind is that there is usually a healthier pleasure available.

The final assertion reminds me of research on NDE’s (near-death experiences), which shows that, as soon as the brain realizes that we are dying and that it’s not getting the oxygen it needs, the brain immediately starts releasing blissful hormones. The body has the wisdom to die pleasantly. Epicurus’ manner of death is the prime example of this, but there may be other empirical sources of data by which we can glean further insights into the sixth assertion of this Doctrine. One that comes to mind involves the studies of meditating monks who are able to control their body’s temperature and to reach blissful states of mind at will. While the first skill may only be useful in cold environments, the second skill–if gained–is useful as a daily practice, and constitutes a pragmatic encounter with this Doctrine of great educational value. One way to practice PD 20 is by nurturing contemplative practices that reliably lead to blissful states.

The main intention of this final assertion is to show an extreme example of how the mind, once made an ally in our pursuit of pleasure, is indeed a reliable source of happiness (and of confident expectation of continued happiness). But in order for the mind to play the ethical role it’s supposed to play for an Epicurean, it must be kept healthy, ethically educated, and disciplined.

The flesh is unconscious; the mind is not. Protecting our mental health and cultivating disciplines of mental pleasure helps us to manage the quality of our sentience.

PD 1: On the Utility of the Epicurean Gods

That which is blissful and immortal has no troubles itself, nor does it cause trouble for others, so that it is not affected by anger or gratitude (for all such things come about through weakness). – Principal Doctrine One

Epicurus applied epilogismos (empirical thinking) to all things, even the gods. In thinking empirically about the gods, he specifically considered their role as witnesses to our oaths–which is why Philodemus equates piety with justice in his scroll On Piety–, Epicurus saw how oath-breakers are treated by the community, so that the gods seem to embody the collective memory, traditions, choices and avoidances, and norms of the tribe. Gods (or rather the social group, through invocation and use of its gods) have the “power” to bring specific curses and blessings, which may at times be specified in the social contract of the community. I should clarify that this is not a supernatural power, but rather a social function.

For instance, if you vow by Athena to be loyal to a friend, and then you turn around and betray your friend, many sincere worshipers of Athena will consider you cursed because you will have blasphemed Athena. They may have, as a community, ways of dealing with oath-breakers that are unpleasant, as a way of discouraging oath-breaking. We see in many modern religious communities that oath-breakers and apostates are often banned from their Mormon, Muslims, or other religious communities. As central symbols of tribes and communities, we see that the gods function as their unifying symbols that add coherence and stability to communities.

The Letter to Menoeceus says that gods make us feel “familiar” to them as a result of sharing similar virtues as they have. This “filial” (familiar) model of Epicurean piety has been distinguished from the “servile” model of vulgar piety that we see elsewhere.

We may view the gods and the practices concerning them as instances of (individual or communal) self-expression and reminders of our highest values.

The Epicurean gods also invite us to ask what kinds of sentient beings would be WORTHY of everlasting happiness, of immortal bliss, and also of immortality–which is a quite different question from the ontological station of the gods.

Therefore the Doctrine of Epicurus concerning the gods must be studied in terms of its utility so that, even if we do away with the Epicurean gods, we still have a clear grasp of their utility in their original context, and we may seek alternate ways to fulfil that same utility and possibly experiment with a non-theistic religiosity. I have speculated that this religiosity can perhaps focus its piety on the healing words of true philosophy, rather than on the gods.

A non-theistic Epicurean religiosity is a worthwhile project, however, a part of me still wonders if, by neglecting the moral tasks posed by the Epicurean gods, we’d be neglecting crucial exercises for the soul’s “muscles”, and whether we harm our moral development by ignoring the utility of the gods.

The Imaginary Friends Argument

Imaginary friends are often cited as a metaphor by atheists who wish to ridicule vulgar religiosity, but the “imaginary friends” metaphor actually may yield important insights concerning religiosity and should be treated as a legitimate ethical and anthropological argument. 

Children have imaginary friends, which are sort of familiar spirits to them, and this is considered a normal part of childhood. This is probably because they are developing social faculties. I imagine it’s like a computer that has the program to update itself: the child’s brain is learning and processing for the first time complex social interactions, which give him skills necessary for adult life. The child must learn communication skills, and even subtle social cues. Perhaps imagining friends helps the brain to learn and practice these social skills in the initial stages of social development.

The Utility of Piety

Honoring a sage is itself a great benefit to the one who honors – Vatican Saying 32

This issue of the utility of piety is a separate question from the nature of the gods, even if related. But in what way do we benefit when we honor or respect something? Epicurus said piety had psycho-somatic effects: that it may help us to cultivate pleasant dispositions in the body and mind.

Piety can make us feel happy, attached to something wholesome and familiar, and can help us feel healthy and mentally strong.

Piety can also feel like a great peace, because we are being just whenever we honor our covenants of loyalty, friendship, or filial love, and one is genuinely happy when one hears the name of a loved one, and is reminded of that love. This sweetens life, is pleasant, memorable, and makes us happy.

Piety, if sincere, feels like reverence, which ennobles if the thing revered is worthy. When such piety feels like familiarity, filial, we may say that we share part of our (mental and bodily) identity with the thing revered, otherwise it would not feel familiar. The Epicurean Doctrines may also gain familiarity through acquaintance, repetition, and memorization.

When we observe the psycho-somatic effects of piety in us, we have clear, direct insight about its benefits, which justifies “faith” not in gods or in anything external to ourselves, but in the memorized Doctrines and their power and medicine in our soul.

Living Like Immortals

In the third book of De Rerum Natura, Lucretius praised the words of Epicurus saying: “like bees, we sip their nectar”–as if from flowers in a meadow–and that they’re “golden, ever worthy of immortal life”. In this way, he compared the Doctrines to ambrosia–the nectar of immortality.

Lucretius was conveying that the Aurea Dicta (the “golden words” of true philosophy) help us to live like immortals, and to feel as if we are surrounded by immortal goods. This is because these words point to all the things that make life worth living, and so the diligent study of the Aurea Dicta is the most advantageous activity for our happiness. But bees drink nectar in order to make honey: the idea of imbibing Epicurus’ words is to produce sweetness, pleasure.

Epicurus would not talk about living like immortals, as he did in his Epistle to Menoeceus, if he had not first placed before the eyes of his disciple, in clear detail, just what it means to live like an immortal.

Living like an immortal implies various things. Epicurus describes the gods as indestructible and forever happy. These are the only two religious taboos he gave us. He said we may believe anything about the gods so long as we do not blaspheme their immortality and their constantly blissful state of sentience. We are left to fill in the blanks.

This must mean that the gods are envisioned as sentient beings, since only such beings are able to experience constant pleasures. Living like an immortal implies that the pleasures that we experience are all of a higher nature, that we become resilient, indestructible, and transcendentally happy. Living like gods also implies an art of living, a methodology for living, a lifestyle, or a cultural expression which is modeled by our Epicurean narratives about the gods.

It can be dangerous to remain unaware of what gods, guiding values, and beliefs we have set for ourselves. Unanalyzed praise can sometimes degrade a soul, sinking it in unwholesome association. Epicurus invites us to consciously create our values in this manner, and to observe the pragmatic results of this ethical exercise in our own bodies and minds

The Future Self

This task may remind some of Nietzsche’s Overman. This is because the utility of the gods and the utility of our narratives about our own future are, in some ways, similar.

Just as we feel rooted in our past when we revere our ancestors, we also anchor our selves in the future when we revere our gods. There is a progression in time between these two cosmological imaginaries: the one (usually) below our feet in the graves of our ancestors where we are rooted like trees, and the one (usually) in the heavens towards which our instincts of freedom and creation inspire us to advance and evolve. Perhaps we subconsciously intuit our evolutionary advance from a less-evolved past to a more-evolved future, and this finds expression in these two forms of piety? We naturally (and perhaps subconsciously) seek to imitate and to become like the things we deify or idealize. The future Self has to be conceived and imagined so clearly, that it feels within reach. Thinking about our future self is, in itself, ethically useful if done right.

While you are on the road, try to make the later part better than the earlier part; and be equally happy when you reach the end. – Vatican Saying 48

The Letter to Menoeceus teaches that the future is partly ours and partly not ours. This means that we have causal responsibility for a portion of our destiny, of our future self. Concerning what this portion entails is a matter of great importance for our happiness and for our moral development. The favors we do to our future self give us hope in our future pleasure, stability, and confident expectation that we will easily secure our needs.

Exercise: Envision Your Gods

If we were to set up an existential task, or “a homework”, related to Principal Doctrine 1, it would be to place before our eyes: to clearly imagine, in detail, the lifestyle of the gods. This is a visualization exercise–which could be done in the form of journaling, if we are not very good visual thinkers.

I recently shared the Isle of the Blessed passage from Lucian’s comedy True Story. Since it depicts a paradise of pleasure, one worthy of Epicurus himself (whom Lucretius makes a resident there), the Isle of the Blessed might be a good example of a type of exercise similar to envisioning the gods, that we may draw inspiration from.

Since the Epicurean gods of the realist interpretation are what today would be considered extraterrestrial super-evolved animals, some of our readers may wish to draw inspiration from the emergent field of astro-biology. I have speculated that any creature that feels perfectly safe and invulnerable (as the gods do) would have to evolve in an ecosystem that has an extremely high level of symbiosis (that is, cooperation rather than competition) between creatures.

“Sculpting” our gods (or “imagined persons” if we are non-realist about them) in our minds, and putting before our eyes their activities, pastimes, narratives, opulences, pleasures, qualities, values, and attributes may serve as a good point of reference to help us to sculpt our own characters and lifestyles. In this way, we gain a clear conception in our minds of how to live a godlike lifestyle. 

Envisioning the gods is an exercise in ethical self-creation, and in character-building. It’s a reflection on the quality of life that the highest form of sentient being in the cosmos would have. How would we live if we were to imitate their godly lifestyle? That is part of the utility of the Epicurean gods.

Finally, I wish to stress that this exercise is useful and has educational value even if we believe that our gods are imaginary: they can still be our lifestyle-models, who point us in the direction of the healthiest and happiest way of living.

The usefulness of this exercise is increased if we include concrete details concerning the aromas, tastes, architecture, fashion, and mental and emotional states of our gods. This is what we mean by “placing before the eyes”–a practice used by the Epicurean Guide Philodemus, and by Epicurus himself in his Letter to Menoeceus. In this way, we move from the abstract to the concrete, from the Platonic realm to the real and tangible world.

Further Reading:

For There ARE Gods …

Dialogues on the Epicurean Gods

 The Isle of the Blessed

PD’s 39-40: An Intimate Koinonia of Friends

The man who best knows how to meet external threats makes into one family all the creatures he can; and those he can not, he at any rate does not treat as aliens; and where he finds even this impossible, he avoids all dealings, and, so far as is advantageous, excludes them from his life. – Principal Doctrine 39

In the past, the Koinonia of Friends of Epicurus has produced memes with the #KnowYourCircle hashtag. This is an appeal to the logic of concentric circles that we find in Doctrine 39, which says that we should have an inner circle of beings who are familiar and trustworthy, an outer circle of acquaintances with whom we have some familiarity, and then there may be people who are outside of our circles and worthy of avoidance for reasons of safety or due to other annoyances. This Doctrine may have been inspired by the Timocrates affair.

We call this the Doctrine of eumetry, a term coined by aesthetician Panayotis Michelis to denote a non-mathematical and non-symmetrical harmony that can at times even be superior to symmetry–which is often considered an important standard in aesthetics, or the study of beauty. Michelis was saying was that sometimes beauty can be measured in non-standard ways. However, neo-Epicurean French philosopher and historian Michel Onfray adapted this neologism for use in ethics. It comes from the Greek “eu-” (good) and “-metry” is related to measure, or distance, so that it implies keeping “a good distance”, or keeping “a safe distance: not too close, not too far”, as Onfray puts it. Knowing the right distance to keep with many people is meant to guarantee peace of mind.

One of the great life-long existential tasks that every Epicurean must carry out is expressed in Doctrine 27: it consists on building our own tribe, our own circle of friends. Since the closing of the Letter to Menoeceus says that we have two fields of praxis as Epicureans (introspective meleta by ourselves, and social meleta with friends of like mind), we must include some knowledgeable, sincere, and happy Epicureans in our circle of friends. By enshrining these things in Doctrine, Epicurus made it clear that he wanted his disciples to create intellectual tribes, to associate with and blend their minds with people who think alike.

Some of the Principal Doctrines “give a sermon together”–meaning, they must be interpreted in sequence or as part of a whole, because they seem to have been born as conclusions from a single, ongoing conversation among the Founders. That is the case with the last two Doctrines, and we must also consider why they were placed last. Once Doctrine 39 has been practiced consistently, and we have created an inner circle, Kyriai Doxai closes with these instructions:

Those who were best able to provide themselves with the means of security against their neighbors, being thus in possession of the surest guarantee, passed the most pleasant life in each other’s society; and their enjoyment of the fullest intimacy was such that, if one of them died before his time, the survivors did not mourn his death as if it called for sympathy. – Principal Doctrine 40

Once we have built our fortress of the soul and surrounded ourselves with “Friends of like mind”, we are able to enjoy an intimate society of Friends. This is the final instruction of Kyriai Doxai. It helps us to create a healthy and stimulating environment for Epicurean practice, for exploring the tasks and Doctrines both by ourselves and with others. It’s written in the past tense, which may indicate that we are to look to the founders as role models for ideas about what this intimate society of Friends looks like.

Perhaps as should be expected for the last one of the Principal Doctrines, it includes instructions on how NOT to mourn our Epicurean friends. Epicurus says we should remember them not with lamentations, but with pleasant remembrance. One of the Vatican Sayings teaches the practice of pleasant remembrance for that which we can not change. So there is a particular Epicurean tradition of remembering our Friends, which was enshrined in the Twentieth feasts which are in actuality memorial services for the Founders (and, broadly, for our Friends in philosophy who have parted).

Once you have an intimate society of Epicurean Friends, it’s natural that some will die, and we may be obligated (by oath) or compelled (by a sense of loyalty) to honor our friends’ memory in a manner that is true to their beliefs. The Roman Epicureans developed a tradition of burial where they placed the words “Non fvi. Fvi. Non svm. Non cvro.” (I was not, I was, I am not, I care not) on their tombstones. We may develop similar traditions today, or revive the ancient tradition. Part of the point of this Doctrine is that the practice of remembrance of our dead should be consistent with the rest of our theory and praxis. We must create Epicurean cultural expression that is authentic and reflects our values.

On Koinonia

I spoke here about our circles as intellectual tribes, and in my essay for How to Live a Good Life, I defended tribalism as a non-politically-correct but naturally-correct practice, based on the hundreds of thousands of years during which our ancestors evolved in tribal societies, and based on the Dunbar number. There’d be nothing special about being Epicurean if everyone could be Epicurean. It’s an intimate circle of friends, and somewhat exclusive. I now wish to tie this communitarian Doctrine to the sources.

Epicurean Koinonia are bound by hedonic contracts. Epicurus, in Principal Doctrines 37-38, uses the term κοινωνία (koinonia), saying that justice exists only in the context of companions who have agreements of mutual benefit. Depending on how the Doctrines are worded in English, it translates as “companions” or as “association”. When used in the New Testament, it’s often translated as “fellowship”, which is defined as:

1 : companionship, company
2a : community of interest, activity, feeling, or experience
b : the state of being a fellow or associate
3 : a company of equals or friends : association
4 : the quality or state of being comradely
5 obsolete : membership, partnership

The word is of Greek origin and was not used by Jesus, who spoke Aramaic. It appears in the Pauline literature in Acts 2:42, in 2 Corinthians 9:13, and in Philippians 3:10, which lends credibility to the theory by Norman DeWitt that the “apostle” Paul (who is credited with authoring these epistles) appropriated many Epicurean concepts and adapted them for his New Testament epistles (he also imitated our epistolary literary tradition).

DeWitt’s theory is that Paul was steeped in the study of Epicureanism, and that he transferred the concepts from our philosophy into his new religion, assigning new meaning to the concepts. But we are not interested in what koinonia came to mean for Christians. If we try to imagine ways in which Paul would have discovered the joys of fellowship among the Epicureans, or ways in which we can experience these pleasures today, we would come up with:

  1. spending time with our friends and blending our minds with theirs
  2. studying, learning, practicing, teaching, and creating together
  3. honoring each other with gifts and celebrating each other’s birthdays and other joys
  4. helping each other, when necessary
  5. trusting our Epicurean Friends and turning to them when we have problems
  6. even when we apply parrhesia (frank criticism), we may use suavity (the Epicurean virtue of sweet, kind speech) to soften the harshness of our words

Concerning the first point, the Havamal (although it’s from another tradition) has one stanza that accurately explains that “care will gnaw at your heart if you can’t share all your mind with another“. The second point fulfils Epicurus’ instructions on meleta, which should be done both by ourselves (introspection) and with “others of like mind“.

One further point must be made, based on the contextual interpretation of PD’s 37-38. These Doctrines deal with problems related to discerning how natural justice applies in a particular situation. Natural justice exists only where there are agreements between Friends. Since the use of koinonia in the Epicurean scriptures is restricted to this context, we assume that this fellowship is only possible among Friends who have such agreements (which require trust and a high degree of clear communication). These agreements may take the concrete forms of written contracts, verbal agreements, or oaths. Outside of this, there is no natural, concrete justice, and therefore no koinonia. This means that justice (defined as mutual benefit, and avoidance of mutual harm) is one of the foundations for Epicurean Friendship, since it’s not seen to flourish among people who do not agree to not harm each other, but to benefit each other. In this way, we can understand why the Doctrines on justice precede the final two in the progression of ideas that we find in the Kyriai Doxai, and why they’re advantageous for our happiness, and therefore included in the canonical collection of maxims as required practice.

Since these Doctrines discuss the intimacy of our communities, they’re a good place to evaluate the utility of the word Koinonia. It might be more advantageous for us to refer to the Society of Friends of Epicurus as a Koinonia, rather than as “this Society”, which may at times (by people who are hostile to us, or who are ignorant) be misconstrued to refer to the entire society of which we are part of, when we in reality are only referring to those who are in our circle and who are armed for happiness. The adoption of the term Koinonia may, therefore, be a clearer and more specific way for Epicureans to refer to our own circles of Friends, rather than “society” or other words whose meaning is broader.

PD’s 10-14: On the Utility of Science and the Pleasure of Safety

If the things that produce the delights of those who are decadent washed away the mind’s fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering, and furthermore if they taught us the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no complaints against them, since they would be filled with every joy and would contain not a single pain or distress (and that’s what is bad).

What are the things that produce the delights of those who are decadent? Some may say prostitution or endless pursuit of sexual pleasures, or endless desires (over-eating, abuse of drugs or alcohol). The PD says we DO have complaints against them (but it has nothing to do with the pleasure we gain from them): they are not productive of tranquil pleasure, their delights come with inconveniences. This Doctrine helps with hedonic calculus.

Anxiety often manifests as bored craving for needless things, or fears about not having those things. Extravagant, wasteful, licentious, or libertine pleasures are not necessarily “bad” so long as we understand the limits of nature. Principal Doctrine 11 is the doctrine of science as a means:

If our suspicions about astronomical phenomena and about death were nothing to us and troubled us not at all, and if this were also the case regarding our ignorance about the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no need for studying what is natural.

Both PDs 10-11 remind us that only empirical knowledge (epilogismos or empirical thinking) can tell us about the limits of nature. This Doctrine specifically explains the purpose of studying nature, that the study of nature is the cure for problems related to inherited superstitions, and that science is a means to our tranquility and happiness. Also, it says here that science is necessary to remove these fears and apprehensions; this is not to say we should not study nature beyond this (if it brings pleasure, or if it helps in some other way), but that this is the amount that falls within the category of necessary knowledge. There are three categories for what is necessary in the Letter to Menoeceus, and one of them consists of what is needed for our happiness–which includes some measure of scientific knowledge. This, naturally, has repercussions for the philosophy and practice of Epicurean education.

Polystratus, the third Scholarch of the Garden, said that if we pursue virtue without the study of nature, our virtue will degrade into nothing, have no utility, and may result in arrogance and superstition. We see this today among the practitioners of conventional religions, for they are often hostile to the advance of science and fanatical in their views. Therefore, without the study of nature, we say that it is also useless to pursue virtue (regardless of how well-meaning we are). PD 12 continues attacking our suspicions about the myths:

It is impossible for someone who is completely ignorant about nature to wash away his fears about the most important matters if he retains some suspicions about the myths. So it is impossible to experience undiluted pleasure without studying what is natural.

This doctrine helps to cure fear of hell and of gods, and other fear-based superstitions, by pointing to the study of nature. I am reminded of the founder of Atheist Republic and his attempts to commit suicide as a teenager because of his deep fear of the Islamic hell, which was instilled in him when he was growing up. The Epicurean Doctrines accentuate, more than once, that the study of nature (philologia) is necessary for happiness, and to heal the diseases of the soul that keep us from being happy.

Concerning the issue of “suspicions”, let us bring this word into relief in order to accentuate it against the mention of the word “gnomé” (conviction, judgment) in PD 28, the Doctrine of the utility of dogmatism, where Epicurus says: “you must KNOW these things!”. Here, the Hegemon requires a full cognitive commitment and assimilation of the Doctrines from the disciple. The key-word of this Doctrine is gnomé, which shares semantic roots with “to know”, “knowledge”, and “conocer” (to know) in Spanish.

Epicurus always carefully chose his words, which makes them particularly powerful. Notice (and contrast) the power and medicine of these two words: when we discuss “suspicions”, we are not giving credit to the relevant truth-claims. We are dismissing them as mere “suspicions”, whereas the truths we gain from the study of nature are knowledge. We do not suspect them, we KNOW them. We should seek to imitate Epicurus’ mastery of his choice of words for accuracy and clarity. PDs 13 and 14 are about safety.

It is useless to be safe from other people while retaining suspicions about what is above and below the earth and in general about the infinite unknown

PD 13 continues the reasoning of PD 12. Why is this a separate PD? It deals specifically with safety, which is in the category of natural and necessary pleasures. By attacking our “suspicions” based on fear-based superstitions, these Doctrines invite us to have a firm conviction and a clear understanding based on the study of nature. We must not be wishy-washy, or give the benefit of doubt to superstition for reasons of political correctness, or of tolerance, etc. as this leads to degrading superstition. To avoid giving undue credit to the suspicions about the myths, we must have a firm conviction (gnomé) in the scientific worldview, with no room for “suspicion”.

Epicurus in his ethics is concerned about the quality of the direct, immediate experience of the sentient being, and whether it’s pleasant or painful. True to this, he uses the word asphaléias not merely as security from other men and external threats (as important as those are), but as a subjective experience. He’s interested in security, surety, certainty and a sense of safety as a psychological or existential state. He wants us to know and feel that we are really safe, to experience inner, psychological safety. He says that without this, if we still harbor suspicions that lead to irrational fears, no safety from external threats makes up for our lack of subjective safety. He establishes a connection between subjective safety from superstitious fears and safety from external threats because he wants his disciple to pay attention to how safety feels in his soul.

And so the disciple must sincerely introspect concerning his opinions and suspicions, and align them with the study of nature and with his own advantage, fearlessness, and pleasure.

Although some measure of safety from other people is based in the power to fight them off and in abundant wealth, the purest security comes from solitude and breaking away from the herd.

Doctrine 14 discusses the method of retreat. The word used here is hesuchia, which translates as peace, quiet, stillness, rest, silence. Epicurus established the doctrine of an Epicurean retreat, presumably because it’s useful to cultivate ataraxia, which requires safety. We may consider this retreat in terms of an actual hermit tradition of the Gardens, but “breaking away from the herd” can be practiced in a calm oasis of peace in the middle of a city. The original Garden was at the margins of Athens. So each practitioner must consider what level and form of hesuchia passes hedonic calculus.

Doctrine 14 should inspire us to make our homes into holy places of retreat, peace, safety, and tranquil pleasure, wherever our homes may be. It calls us to actually take the care and time to enjoy the warmth, familiarity, love, and the other pleasures of privacy and safety among those we care about. It inspires us to separate the space set aside for our true, natural community from the spaces occupied by the mobs. In these places of refuge, of hesuchia, it is easier to enjoy the pleasures of peace and safety.

PD 16: Against The Worship of Fortune

Chance steals only a bit into the life of a wise person: for throughout the complete span of his life the greatest and most important matters have been, are, and will be directed by the power of reason.

One pragmatic method of exegesis is to think of a doctrine in terms of how we connect theory and practice. This helps us to make philosophy tangible. How can we carry out experiments with this doctrine? How is this practiced?

Sages do not need Chance to be happy. This PD does not directly forbid the use of oracles like the runes, Ifa, the Tarot cards, or the prophetic utterances of the monotheists … perhaps as entertainment they’re acceptable, or for things outside “the most important matters”, but from the way it’s worded, we could infer that for all practical purposes there’s a taboo against consulting oracles for true disciples of Epicurus.

One other thing must be noted in this (and many other passages): the expectations that the founders had of sages or even of philosophers were distinct from the expectations they had of average people. The average person is superstitious and waits for Chance to deliver blessings, and the common person considers this happiness. A sage, or a good Epicurean philosopher, must become the cause of his or her own pleasure / happiness.

In the Epistle to Menoeceus, we read that Epicurus also argues that the misfortune of the wise is better than the fortune of fools. Elsewhere in Vatican Saying 47, we see instructions to laugh with derision at Fortune.

I have anticipated thee, Fortune, and entrenched myself against all thy secret attacks. And I will not give myself up as captive to thee or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for me to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who vainly cling to it, I will leave life crying aloud a glorious triumph-song that I have lived well.

It is clear that the attitude of the Epicurean towards fate, destiny, and particularly towards Fortune as a Goddess (or God, when used as an euphemism for Fortune or Chance itself) is one of triumphal derision and mockery. Certainly the attitude is not one of reverence towards Fortuna or Chance. We see, as we see elsewhere, that what is blasphemous for the Epicurean can be worthy of reverence for the common person, while Epicurean doctrines are blasphemous to the average person.

Another way to connect theory and practice, in this doctrine, is to make plans, to leverage whatever control we have over situations. We may ask ourselves what we are trying to accomplish, apply hedonic calculus, and develop a plan. Norman DeWitt said that, while philosophers in general consider that the unexamined life is not worth living, the Epicureans consider that the unplanned life is not worth living.

There are additional literary resources that demonstrate this. Alexander the Oracle Monger contains comical depictions of what may happen when people fall for oracle peddlers. The entire work is about mocking Fortune-tellers, and the short novel could be seen as an exercise in the practice of both PD 16 and VS 47. Finally, as for cultural output, the song O Fortuna pours into verse the feelings of the Epicurean:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O5b7tgkdFH0

 

On Natural Holiness

The above video on the Epicurean gods may help us to contextualize the following discussion. When I say natural holiness, I mean as opposed to supernatural, and also holiness as it is empirically observed and experienced by mortals.

We recently carried out a study of holiness with the purpose of carrying out experiments in the theory and practice of Epicurean piety, and as part of an effort to formulate a non-theistic Epicurean religiosity for the 21st Century. We also wanted to rescue the words “holiness” and “the sacred” from centuries of appropriation by world-denying religions.

The holy and the sacred, in conventional religions, have sometimes come to be associated with what we view as unhealthy asceticism and self-denial, and sometimes even with the vulgar hypocrisy of people who are ostentatious about their false piety, whereas in Epicurus we find a non-Platonic concept of “righteous happiness” related to natural holiness, and which is not at all ascetic or world-denying. In Against the use of empty words, we learn that the founders of our School re-assigned new meanings to words as per the study of nature. The rectification of a natural conception of holiness, and the sacred, is a (mammoth and worthwhile) philosophical project.

On Holiness

Holiness shares semantic roots with wholeness (the state of being healthy and complete, safe and sound, uninjured, entire). Scottish hale (a related word that shares semantic roots) implies health, being whole, and happiness. In Spanish, the word “santo” (“the holy”) also shares semantic roots with “sano”, which means healthy, and with the English word sanity. The “in-sane” are people who lack mental health. So the naturally holy may have originally been tied to bodily and mental health.

One of the initial points I wish to make in our investigations of natural holiness is that at some point in history, the healthy and the holy separated in many languages, but they are Siamese twins.

Ancient people utilized “the holy” in order to avoid germs and diseases. This may help to explain the many purity and health codes in ancient religions related to hygiene, and the fact that the goddess of health is known as Hygieia (Hygiene, personified). So we may forgive our conventionally religious friends for having inherited so many hygiene-based superstitions and taboos concerning burial of decaying bodies, menstrual and purity taboos, avoidance of eating pork, etc. Many of these taboos are later corruptions of the initial prolepsis of the holy: the feeling of being happy, whole, complete, healthy and sound, which in antiquity (and even today, as the pandemic has shown) at times required certain taboos around hygiene and health.

On the Utility of the Holy

Philodemus taught that Epicurus ordered that all oaths be taken in the name of the most holy gods, and not on trivialities or non-divine things. One of the ancient Epicurean Guides, Philodemus of Gadara, said:

Piety and justice appear to be almost the same thing … because to break one’s oath is to be unjust and also to lie, and both are disturbing.

Over the years of studying together, the Friends of Epicurus have come to realize that a social contract is needed to properly practice Epicurean philosophy. The sincere student must abide by some house rules, and these rules need to be clearly delineated.

An oath, or agreement, between the teacher / community and the individual student helps to know the house rules (this is also true in most social settings). The specific details of any social contract or agreement must delineate the concrete rules by which that community attains the most advantageous ways of achieving its aims and values. If the social contract is vague, it will not serve its purposes efficiently. Since justice depends on very specific circumstances, contracts require specificity and concreteness.

This is the first, and most obvious, use of holiness: it serves as a guarantor of our oaths with each other. If you and I hold our friendship to be holy, and you swear on our friendship that you will complete a shared project, your disloyalty would be an act of injustice that implies a desecration of our holy friendship.

But there are other ways in which the holy is useful. Since it represents our Highest Values, on which we make our oaths, it also serves as a way to distinguish our highest values from our non-values. It creates a separate category for things of great value for a community.

On the Sacred

Let’s now look at the prolepsis (original attestation and meaning, or “proto-noesis“) of the sacred. A quick online search for the meaning of “sacred” yields some of the following meanings:

connected with God (or the gods) or dedicated to a religious purpose and so deserving veneration.

(of writing or text) embodying the laws or doctrines of a religion.

regarded with great respect and reverence by a particular religion, group, or individual.

The sacred is that which is set aside (or dedicated) as a Higher Value, or for the sake of a Higher Value. It’s set apart from the profane, which is ordinary.

It seems initially that the sacred and the holy are one and the same thing, since sacred comes from Latin sacrare, from sacer, sacr– ‘holy’. However, in our usage, people can be holy but not usually sacred (although I would argue that some people are sacred to us). Objects and books can be both holy and sacred.

Things can be made sacred by consecration. In our modern usage, the sacred is that which is “set aside” for a higher purpose or “set aside” as a higher value, and is worthy of great respect. Sacred things are not ordinary. Hence, the Torah scrolls are kept in the Ark in a synagogue. The eucharist is kept in the tabernacle in a Catholic church. The Krishna prasadam (food consecrated and served in Hindu temples) is not just eaten: it is “honored”. They are set apart from ordinary things, and connect us with the higher values they’re consecrated to.

Does the sacred exist in nature? Without a doubt. I do not consider ordinary people comparable in any way to my parents, to my siblings, to my friends. My mother is the most “sacred” person to me. The tomb of my grandmother is sacred to me because of the love and memories attached. The ground around her tomb is, comparably, meaningless and valueless, but her tomb is sacred. Many people go out of their way to visit their mothers’ graves on Mother’s Day, for instance: that means that the place that holds those remains is set apart, marked as sacred in some way. Even elephants have been observed assuming a solemn demeanor in the presence of bones of their loved ones when they stumble upon them during their long journeys.

It seems to me that the utility of the sacred has to do with a communal or individual choice to focus on some good, and with separating the things that we associate with our Higher Values (which are holy to us) from ordinary things. Sacredness also separates the things worthy of respect from those indifferent or unworthy. Religious scholar Durkheim argues that the sacred represents the interests of the group, including communal unity, which is embodied in symbols, as for instance in a totem (the symbol that unites a tribe). Mircea Eliade, another scholar of religion, says that religion is based on a sharp distinction between the sacred and the profane.

I argue that the sacred does exist in nature: that some things are observed to have a much greater value that most other things to certain sentient beings, and so we observe that they are considered to deserve special respect, so they are set aside.

In addition to things that are naturally sacred, things can come to be considered sacred by dedication, devotion, or formal and ceremonial consecration. The definitions of “consecrate” include:

To make / declare something sacred

To dedicate formally to a religious, divine, or sacred purpose

Ordain someone to sacred office

Devote something exclusively to a particular purpose

We sometimes hold on to pictures or objects that were given by loved ones or friends due to emotional attachment: they are “consecrated” to the memory of a loved one. When something is offered to a higher ideal, or to a friend, or towards a goal which is itself considered sacred, the thing offered becomes set apart, gains value from that sacredness.

The Sacred Within our Hierarchy of Values

Let us now contextualize the usefulness of the sacred within the framework of our highest existential projects and goals. Why? Because this helps to illuminate the relation between our hierarchy of priorities and values, and the practice of hedonic calculus. This places “the sacred” within an undeniably Epicurean ethical context, one that helps us navigate our choices and avoidances.

Can our goals (which guide our actions) be “sacred”, or be tied to things that are sacred? The pleasures and advantages we get from our toil justify the disadvantages and pains we choose. Our sacrifices must always be devoted to some higher goal or value, which redeems them or justifies them thanks to the mathematics of hedonic calculus. A rational mortal will sacrifice only lesser values to higher values. 

Notice how we are moving from the most holy gods to our Highest Values in our non-theistic discourse. Rather than sacrifice to Zeus or Dionysus, we are taming religious techniques, and recruiting them for ethical and philosophical purposes. This reminds me of the poem/epiphany early in Liber Primus (the First Book of “De rerum natura” by Lucretius) where religion is trampled underfoot by philosophy.

Also, notice that part of what I’m saying here is that the language used in conventional religions (words like the sacred, or sacrifice) can be transferred into a realism that rejects all supernaturalism; that we can return to the original prolepsis of these words in formulating our own Epicurean religiosity based on the study of nature.

In Epicurean philosophy, we believe Pleasure is the Guide of Life, and the faculty that points to what the goods are. We say a man may be “devoted” to his wife, or to his studies. This expression implies a goal (love and happiness within a matrimony, a PhD or some other professional or educational attainment with prospects of a higher salary, etc.) that justifies these sacrifices and could itself be “sacred”. In fact, matrimony is considered a sacrament by many religions. It’s seen as a holy contract, and an act of mutual consecration of two beings to each other so that they become each other’s Higher Values.

Our sacrifices are a good place to look for our highest values, since we do not seek pains except to serve greater pleasures, so that we observe that our sacrifices (and our hedonic calculus) point to an empirical encounter with in our hierarchy of values.

The word sacrifice carries the prolepsis “to make sacred”–that is, sacer(sacred) + facere (to make). A rational human only offers or makes sacrifices (of any kind) for worthy reasons, or to worthy ideals and goals. Sacrifices are, to speak naturally and concretely, the objects or actions that are “made sacred” and therefore redeemed or justified by consecration to our goals and our Higher Values. We may not think of these goals as sacred, but we use the word “sacrifice” (sacer-facere), which implies something sacred which justifies our efforts. I made huge sacrifices to obtain a school diploma, for instance. Some people sacrifice their marriage for an addiction or a short-lived affair, to offer an example of an irrational, unethical sacrifice that does not pass hedonic calculus.

If our pains are not “sacrificed” to a higher aim, they are not made sacred, they are not redeemed or justified, they lack meaning and value to us. In these cases, such pains or sacrifices are to be avoided, if possible. Please consider your own past and present choices and rejections, and place this before your eyes: we observe that the sacred is, by pragmatic definition, that which justifies our sacrifices by being a Higher Value. We make great sacrifices and accept great pains for the sake of our friends, our loved ones, our Highest Values, and our Gods (even metaphorical ones).

And while we are willing to make great sacrifices and take great risks for a loved one or a friend, we admit only lesser pains for the sake of a stranger. The life of a stranger may still be sacred to us, and we may still be moved by compassion, but not nearly as much as that of a loved one or friend.

Having explored the natural sense of the words holiness and sacred, let’s now move on to a specifically non-theistic religious discussion of them while keeping these definitions clearly in our mind.

Towards a Non-Theistic Experience of the Holy

Should we–and how do we–make the sacred tangible and material in a worldview that rejects the supernatural? How do we enjoy the pleasures of the holy as Epicureans or spiritual naturalists? I believe our experiments in piety within the context of a non-theistic Epicurean religiosity might contribute to the modern atheist arguments that we can create values without God with clear demonstrations of how it’s done, and in a manner that is true to our traditions.

I will begin by arguing that many things other than the holy gods are holy. For instance, people make non-theistic oaths, like “I swear on our friendship …”, with the assumption that said friendship is held in such high esteem that it is understood to be holy by the two parties. There are many other “immortal goods”. We could say “I swear on the words of Epicurus”, or “I swear on justice, or on my honor, or on my reputation”, with the assumption that these are things of value to us. Non-religious people, when they go to a court, have the option of swearing on the Constitution instead of a Bible, in the civic ceremonial tradition of the United States. Even the religious sometimes swear on things other than their god. “I swear on the tomb of my grandmother”, for instance, is a non-theistic oath. They are oaths taken on our (often shared) values, things we love, revere, or highly respect, among which we will find our sacred things.

Epicureanism as a Non-Theistic Religiosity

The imagery, in De Rerum Natura, where religion is trampled under the feet of man, teaches that religion must have utility for all the individuals it serves. Religion must be civilized, reformed, tamed by the Epicurean. Our chosen beliefs must serve us and increase our pleasures.

A naturalist, and perhaps non-theistic, religiosity can be useful, healthy, and relevant. It would purge religion of its less civilized elements, domesticate it, tame it, and keep the best aspects of religion that give people central symbols around which to organize their lives and communities, develop their culture and aesthetics, and make oaths. It’s also a sign that we respect ourselves, our chosen communities, our values, and our philosophy.

By creating tangible artifacts and ceremonies that are considered holy and worthy of reverence, by the sacralization of the words of Epicurus as a sacred text or object of contemplation, by the celebration of the Twentieth, by an oath, or by any other ceremony, philosophy furnishes all the things that conventional religions furnish. We are also making philosophy tangible by these acts of value-creation.

Impious is not so much the man who denies the Gods of the many as the man who attributes the beliefs of the many to them.

Ancient Epicureanism mimicked much of the utility and culture of conventional religion. It was a sect, had rituals, feasts, sacred oaths, Guides (the kath-hegemones), culture heroes (the four Founders) for whom sculptures were made and fetishized (as documented in The Sculpted Word), revered writings, and even a patron Goddess (Venus). It will take years for modern intellectuals to successfully rescue the original sense of many of the words, concepts and practices that world-denying religions have monopolized, but it is my view that carrying out concrete experiments in piety within the context of Epicurean philosophy as a legitimate (theistic or) non-theistic religion for the 21st Century deserves careful and sincere further exploration.

Meléta: Epicurus’ Instructions for Students

Do and practice (μελέτα), then, the things I have always recommended to you, holding them to be the stairway to a beautiful life …

So practice these and similar things day and night, by yourself and with a like-minded friend, and you will never be disturbed whether waking or sleeping, and you will live as a god among men: for a man who lives in the midst of immortal goods is unlike a merely mortal being. – Epicurus’ Epistle to Menoeceus

ταῦτα οὖν καὶ τὰ τούτοις συγγενῆ μελέτα πρὸς σεαυτὸν ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς <καὶ> πρὸς τὸν ὅμοιον σεαυτῷ, καὶ οὐδέποτε οὔθ’ ὕπαρ οὔτ’ ὄναρ διαταραχθήσῃ, ζήσῃ δὲ ὡς θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἔοικε θνητῷ ζῴῳ ζῶν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἀθανάτοις ἀγαθοῖς.

The Teaching Mission: “Deliberate … with a Like-Minded Friend”

A good disciple is one that tries to follow the instructions of his teacher. Based on the early part, and the closing, of the Letter to Menoeceus, it seems that Epicurus would not consider us true and sincere disciples if we don’t dedicate ourselves to deliberating (meléta) about philosophy in two ways: both by ourselves and with others who are similar to us (of like mind, or who are at the same level).

Epicurus may have been thinking, when he wrote these words at the end of LMenoeceus, that since he (and perhaps his philosopher friends) took so much time and effort to organize the doctrines for the students, that he preferred that they honored his effort by multiplying the fruits of his effort. Hence, by closing LMenoeceus in this manner, Epicurus was basically saying: “Go share this with (those among) your friends who are like-minded intellectual peers”. 

This is how (what Norman DeWitt called) “the teaching mission” of the Epicurean Gardens began: there was an Epicurean interest in education, or rather re-educating both old and young. We can think of the Epicurean critique of paideia (traditional Greek education) in this light: it comes with an attempt to offer an alternative or an addendum to conventional education.

Who was studying philosophy in the Garden? We might surmise–from the invitation at the beginning of LMenoeceus to young and old to study philosophy–that the Garden had at least two educational curricula: one for youth, and one for elders–or at least one for beginners, and one for advanced students, as we can also imagine from the fact that new students were given the Little Epitome to study, and advanced students had other works to study. We have to imagine also that these curricula included the three bodies of the Epicurean wisdom tradition (canon, physics, ethics).

We can also surmise that the disciples to whom these works were dedicated were advanced and sincere enough, that they were entrusted to continue passing down these teachings. A good teacher would not entrust the “teaching mission” to just anyone: he would not give a doctrine to share if it’s incomplete, or if the disciple who receives it has not mastered the basics and isn’t able to lead a study group, at the very least. Although elsewhere we have a fragment that says that Metrodorus, Polyaenus, and Hermarchus were Epicurus’ ambassadors–we have here an invitation to missionary work not for the Guides (kath-hegemones) of the Garden, but for Menoeceus: a regular disciple. As Norman DeWitt said: “each one teach one“.

Since both the PD’s and the LMenoeceus seem to be conclusive summaries–which is why Diogenes Laertius included them in his biography of Epicurus–, we can surmise that by the time they were given to the disciples, the doctrines of the Garden had matured to a point that was considered sufficiently stable and complete to warrant such a definite summary.

Epicurus said that his teachings were not for everyone, but for those who are “armed for happiness“. While there was a clear hierarchy of knowledge in the Garden, we see in LMenoeceus that every Epicurean pupil was considered intelligent enough to be a “like-minded friend” to other Epicureans, and in this sense there was a form of equality (which manifests as like-mindedness) in the Garden even among slaves, women, and people of different classes.

Practicing Meléta

I’d like to direct attention to the word used here, which is sometimes translated as “practice these things“, or “ponder these things“. The word meléta (μελέτα) has several meanings:

to think carefully
to meditate upon
to give oneself totally to
to dedicate oneself to
to practice
to cultivate
to ponder
to deliberate

This process of pondering is, of course, mostly private, and it’s meant to ensure a full, sincere, cognitive assimilation of the Doctrines, and clear convictions. It also helps us to do the introspective work that the Doctrines sometimes challenge us with.

But there’s a second mode of study that Epicurus recommends. He says we should study with “kindred souls“. He uses the word omoion, which is related semantically to the English word “same”, and with the idea of a counterpart, a double, or equivalent.

Studying Philodemus, Lucretius, and the other great Epicureans of the past (and present) gives us privileged access to the meléta processes of previous generations and allows us to capitalize on their wisdom, and to participate in some way in the meléta of others, enhancing our own, and giving us a different perspective.

As an exercise to help us visualize what is meant by the closing passage of the Letter to Menoeceus, we could ask ourselves: “How do I practice meléta (as defined above) with others, and by myself?“. That is,

How do I think carefully on the Epicurean doctrines with others, and by myself?
How do I meditate upon philosophy with others, and by myself?
How do I give myself totally to EP with others, and by myself?
How do I dedicate myself to the study of philosophy with others, and by myself?
How do I practice EP with others, and by myself?
How do I cultivate Epicurean philosophy with others, and by myself?
How do I ponder EP with others, and by myself?
How do I deliberate about EP with others, and by myself?

This may involve study, reading, writing essays to document what one is learning, asking questions to those who are more knowledgeable, and having conversations with them online or in person. The point is that collective deliberation with knowledgeable Epicurean friends helps to catch most errors, and that by exposing us to frank criticism, collective deliberation helps us to develop a good character, to practice true friendship, and to gain knowledge.

Why should anyone trust that our words are true to the Principal Doctrines, if we are not knowledgeable? Knowledge is an important currency to us. In the Society of Friends of Epicurus, we believe in a hierarchy of knowledge, and place great importance in having knowledgeable Epicureans (preferrably, formal Guides who have been trained in EP) to study with.

Another point that must be raised is that proof is in the pudding: Guides must be happy. They must show in their own life that they are living pleasantly with the aid of philosophy. If a person seems unhappy, impractical, unfriendly, if he relies on Fortune for his happiness, or if she relies heavily on particular and obscure interpretations with no reliance on the PDs, you should look for other students to study with.

Knowledgeable friends or Guides must not harbor ill-will, which destroys philosophical inquiry and makes philosophy degenerate into ad-hominem attacks. That is not true meléta. Guides must give parrhesia with good will, and with a sincere investment in the happiness, wisdom, and good character of their friends. They must also frequently cite the sources, and give exegetical or interpretative insight about them, rather than merely rely on their own pre-established biases. When they do discuss their own ideas or those of non-Epicureans, these ideas must be: 1. in harmony with the rest of the Epicurean doctrine, and be 2. internally consistent (these are Epicurus’ two instructions for innovation).

Meléta is Both Passive and Active

I wish to mention here the essay by R Braicovich (which I recently read in Spanish) on the use of epitomes (summaries) by Epicureans, which cites the critique by some hostile scholars who say that the Epicurean practice of memorizing and repeating doctrines is passive and does not constitute true philosophy. In the essay, the author argues that part of the utility of memorization (and of an Epicurean education) is to assist people in the process of hedonic calculus, and therefore this process of memorization was not as passive as these hostile scholars claim. The author also mentions that the epitomes must either 1. be memorized or 2. studied in depth with tutors (to cite Norman DeWitt: “each one teach one“) or with other writings that explain our summaries, but our discussion of the end of the Letter to Menoeceus makes it clear that these two forms of studying are not mutually exclusive: they are complementary, and both are necessary. The bottom line is that Epicurean studies require both a personal cognitive commitment, as well as a community of friends.

Furthermore, the essay stresses that learning is not merely passive memorization and repetition, but that the doctrines of Epicurus are meant to aid us in carrying out our hedonic calculus and in our choices and avoidances. In other words, we must actively interpret the doctrines and use them as moral agents in the real world. The doctrines furnish theory, and we must furnish praxis.

Conclusion

Epicurus advises us to passively and actively deliberate on his doctrines and teachings both by ourselves (private meléta, which takes the form of reading, repetition, memorizing, and evaluating the doctrines against empirical case studies) and with others who are of like mind (conversations with friends, as well as indirectly by studying the writings of other Epicureans and learning from their own process of meléta).

Continue Reading: Epicurus’ Instructions on Meleta, Part II
Upar and Onar: On Correct and Incorrect Activity and Rest

PD 6: On Methods of Exegesis

Over the last few weeks, I have been publishing essays expounding the Principal Doctrines. It has been a very enjoyable intellectual exercise. I’ve learned that it’s an error to take the PD’s for granted and to think that we know everything there is to know about them. In the process of writing these essays, I have been considering the various methods of exegesis that are available to us, and what method(s) might be the most useful for each PD.

The Contextual Method

My main method has been to try to reconstruct or discern (based on the text) what discussions or conversations took place among the founders, that led to these statements being established as authoritative conclusions of the Garden. I’m calling this the method of contextualization.

Clearly, the founders meant for the 40 Principal Doctrines to stand separate from the rest of the textual evidence we have. They are meant to be the forty most important ideas that a student must either revere or study (or both). By what line of thinking, by what arguments, did these 40 conclusions attain their superior status? I began to evaluate this in my study of PDs 24 and 28, on the utility of dogmatism.

The Literal Method

Another method of exegesis (that is, interpretation) is to stick to the literal translation of the text. If we know the original Greek language, we may focus on the anticipation–the initial empirical attestation and conception of each word–in order to deconstruct each PD word-for-word, and glean clarity. These two methods are not mutually exclusive, and are both useful and necessary. 

We know from sermons given by Epicurus–like the one Against empty words–that the founders were very adamant on using clear, concise language. They went as far as coining new terms when conventional language failed, as attested again by their own theory of the evolution of language. So there was no frivolous expression in the PD’s … but then there’s PD 6.

This is a case where the literal reconstruction and the anticipation of each word is necessary because the choice of words in the original was apparently so awkward, so specific, and attempted to be so clear, that most modern readers get lost in translation. So I had to contact a member of the Society of Friends of Epicurus who knows Greek, Panos, who helped me to get a grasp of what the words actually mean. Here is the original:

ἕνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ανθρώπων ἦν κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας ἀγαθόν, ἐξ ὧν ἄν ποτε τοῦτο οἷός τʼᾖ παρασκευάζεσθαι.

This was translated by Hicks as:

In order to obtain security from other people any means whatever of procuring this was a natural good.

It’s not clear to me why he used the past tense (“was a natural good”). If that’s in the original, it may mean that the original doctrine was meant to justify some event or action taken in the past. The Church of Epicurus translation says:

The natural good of public office and kingship is for the sake of getting confidence from [other] men, [at least] from those from whom one is able to provide this.

In this translation, we can appreciate the common interpretation of the PD as justifying ANY form of government that procures security. We could also interpret it as meaning that security is one of (but not the only) the reasons or purposes for setting up a form of government. And the Peter St. Andre translation says:

It is a natural benefit of leadership and kingship to take courage from other men (or at least from the sort of men who can give one courage).

Security, confidence, and courage all mean different things in English. The Epicuros site in modern Greek language has a version of the PD’s, the sixth of which Panos translates from modern Greek as:

With the goal of acquiring security against people, there was (always) the natural good of dominance and of kingship, through which (someone) could sometimes achieve this.

According to Panos,

I get a kinda opposite meaning of what I see in other translations. But it’s a pretty hard sentence to accurately translate …

Because of being afraid of people is right by the nature of authority and dominion, from which things (authority and dominion) if ever be able to prepare (against).

So basically the idea I get is:

It’s right to be prepared against people, just in case, because of oppression and authority.

… It does not say “it’s ok to use oppression and authority” as some translations I saw.

So the PD does not justify violence (which would go against the doctrines on justice based on avoiding mutual harm and seeking mutual benefit), or the overthrow of government (which would be out of line with the non-political nature of our ethics). Here is how Panos breaks down the words:

ἕνεκα: on account of (/regarding // because of)

τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ανθρώπων: the (tharrein)* from people
–*Tharrein: this word can mean either (a) to be afraid of, or (b) to take courage from!

ἦν κατὰ φύσιν: it was by nature (/quality)

ἀρχῆς: of authority

καὶ βασιλείας: and of dominion (/kingship)

ἀγαθόν, : good (morally good)

ἐξ ὧν : from which (genitive plural)

ἄν ποτε : at some time (/if ever)

τοῦτο: that thing (accusative sing.)

οἷός τʼᾖ : he is able (γʹ ενικ. υποτ. Ενεργ. ενεστ. | 3rd sing. subjunctive active present )

παρασκευάζεσθαι. : to be ready (/prepared)

And again:

ἕνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ανθρώπων
because of the (tharrein) from people

ἦν κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας ἀγαθόν
it was morally good by nature of authority and dominion

ἐξ ὧν
from which (plural which: so the which must refer to: “authority and dominion”)

ἄν ποτε τοῦτο
if ever that thing (which thing? τουτο is neutral accusative singular, so it is talking about a singular neutral object. From the words above, the only candidates are αγαθόν, and θαρρείν (tharrein). I think the only word that makes sense is tharrein…)

οἷός τʼᾖ παρασκευάζεσθαι
he is able (to be) prepare(d)
(so this is subjunctive active which is something like: I expect you prepare. It’s really hard to translate exactly but it’s not that important.)

With Panos finally concluding:

So the way I am seeing this:

Because of being afraid of people is right by the nature of authority and dominion, from which things (authority and dominion) if ever be able to prepare (against).

From all that I’ve read, it seems clear to me that the Hicks translation is flawed. It says

In order to obtain security from other people any means whatever of procuring this was a natural good.

Hicks makes an absolute claim that seems out of place in Epicurean philosophy, where all choices and avoidances must be subjected to hedonic calculus. I do not see mention of “any means necessary” in the original, and I suspect this translation may appeal to people with certain military ideas.

I wish to thank Panos for his assistance. The process we see above is the literal method, which seeks to know the initial pre-conception that belongs to each word chosen for this PD, and which assumes and trusts that the founders chose their words very carefully.

PD 6 in Light of Other Surviving Passages

The idea of the PD is that security is a natural and necessary pleasure. This idea is also expressed in the Epistle to Menoeceus, so it seems indigenous and accurate within an Epicurean list of key opinions.

PD 6 appears to justify (limited) (service to a) political power or civic engagement for the sake of safety. Vatican Saying 39 associates friendship with “help in the future”, and links true friendship with safety. Vatican Saying 67 criticizes “servility to mobs and monarchs“, and seems to imply that we get more safety from friends than from politics. Finally, VS 80 posits a (partly) attitudinal definition of security, one that is in the soul and not in the realm of society or politics: 

The first measure of security is to watch over one’s youth and to guard against what makes havoc of all by means of maddening desires.

A young man’s share in deliverance comes from watching over the prime of his life and warding off what will ruin everything through frenzied desires. (Monadnock translation)

VS 80 is a salvific passage. It uses the word “soterías” in the original. Soter means Savior. Epicurus was seen as a Savior by later generations because of his salvific doctrine. PD’s 10-13 also discuss a form of attitudinal safety: by learning a scientific account of the nature of things, we protect ourselves from superstition. PD 14 concludes this discussion:

Although some measure of safety from other people is based in the power to fight them off and in abundant wealth, the purest security comes from solitude and breaking away from the herd.

In light of context, PD 6 does not refer to this attitudinal sense of safety in the soul (as PDs 10-14 do), or being safe from limitless desires. It also does not refer to weapons or warfare, or constitute a call to violence. The later Lucretian jeremiad (in Book V) against the propagation of weapons after metal working was discovered, and Philodemus’ advice in On Property Management against taking up a military career, appear to confirm a general lack of affinity for warfare among the ancient Epicureans.

Based on the textual evidence we have seen, we may conclude that the necessary measure of safety for an Epicurean is mainly attained by association with friends and by avoiding certain people (PD 39). I will close with Panos’ suggested translation, and with an invitation to all sincere students to study these texts on their own.

It’s right to be prepared against people, just in case, because of oppression and authority.