Category Archives: Ethics

Victor Frankl and the Search for Meaning

False Dichotomies

We recently read the essay There Are Two Kinds of Happy People, which compares Stoic and Epicurean philosophies. The essay makes some good points (we can borrow from each other yet remain grounded in our own traditions), but essays like this create false dichotomies: you almost never hear people saying “Buddhists meditate and Christians pray, and maybe they should try each other’s techniques“. In reality, Buddhists also pray and Christians sometimes also meditate. The essay assumes that Epicureans do not seek meaning, or create meaning, and it perhaps even assumes that meaning and pleasure are mutually contradictory, but there is no reason whatsoever to think this is the case.

I want to resist the tendency to antagonize Stoics because that produces a situation where it seems like Epicureanism frustrates the search for meaning or the ability for resilience, and that is not at all true. Epicurean philosophy provides various different pathways to meaning and resilience.

He who has a why to live for can bear almost any how. – Nietzsche

I finally recently finished reading Victor Frankl’s book Man’s Search for Meaning, which is highly recommended among proponents of philosophy as therapy for the soul. It argues that human beings require meaning in their lives, and that the best way to deal with boredom, existential ennui, depression, or suffering, is to make it meaningful. He particularly favors three ways of doing this: through work (doing something significant), through loving someone, or through courage during difficulties.

As a psychoanalyst, Frankl proposes “logotherapy” (a therapy of meaning). Our Friend Nathan says:

It’s a powerful story of someone who survives grotesque circumstances. His themes seem to me to be within the existentialist genre, primarily, defining value and meaning in a violent and unforgiving world. He largely demonstrates how having an appropriate mental disposition can help people manage seemingly-hopeless circumstances.

Meaning-making is contrasted with nihilism and a depressing sense of defeat in life. This is from page 72

Regarding our “provisional existence” as unreal was in itself an important factor in causing the prisoners to lose their hold on life: everything in a way became pointless. Some people forgot that often it is just such an exceptionally difficult external situation which gives man the opportunity to grow spiritually beyond himself. Instead of taking the camp’s difficulties as a test of their inner strength, they did not take their life seriously and despised it as something of no consequence. They preferred to close their eyes and to live in the past. Life for such people became meaningless.

This other quote, from the following page (73), reminds us of our past meleta concerning Epimetheus (who only looks to the past) and his brother Prometheus (who looks to the future). To Frankl, redemption is found in the Promethean approach.

It is a peculiarity of man that he can only live by looking to the future. And this is his salvation in the most difficult moments of his existence, although he sometimes has to force his mind to the task.

… which remind me of Epicurean Saying 48:

While you are on the road, try to make the later part better than the earlier part; and be equally happy when you reach the end.

Frankl mentions laughter as a technique, and as a sign that one is healed. In Tending the Epicurean Garden, I mentioned that the Epicureans follow the lineage of the laughing philosophers, and that laughter helps us to feel superior to the thing we are laughing at / about. Frankl says this differently: being able to laugh at yourself and your situation is a sign that you have already begun to overcome.

At one point in page 130, Frankl seems to accuse materialist reductionism of producing nihilism. In Epicurean philosophy we see that that is not necessarily the case. Other materialists may be nihilists, but in our tradition we have methods of drawing values and meaning from the study of nature. Here, he attacks:

the danger inherent in the teaching that man is nothing but the result of the biological, psychological, and sociological conditions, or the product of heredity and environment … This neurotic fatalism is fostered and strengthened by a psychotherapy which denies that man is free.

I applaud that Frankl is drawing a connection between nihilism and materialism, as this is one of the main knots by which people who are suffering entangle themselves into harmful patterns of powerless thinking. To me, this accentuates the need for rejecting scientism (=the “excessive belief in the power of scientific knowledge and techniques“), and for studying philosophy as a separate and equally important field of knowledge alongside science.

“Embracing the Exile”: a Case Study

In my college years when I confided in a University social worker and mentor (whom I greatly respected and loved) concerning my struggles to reconcile my Christian upbringing with my gay sexuality, he kindly lent me the book Embracing the Exile – Healing Journeys of Gay Christians. Back then, this book had a great impact on me, since the religious and psychological abuse of homophobia were strongly imprinted in my mind and affected me in very real ways.

Embracing the Exile is my most familiar case study for logotherapy. It argued that as Christians, gay people should embrace their exile, and carry their particular cross, with acceptance. It also taught that we should love our enemies anyway, regardless of what they do to us or say about us, and it even treats Queer identities as a form of “chosenness” where we are left to make sense of our way of being different. The book meant to soften the passions of a bruised soul, and it succeeded, but in the end, Christianity was definitely not for me. Many LGBT Christians feel that they are able to lovingly engage in LGBT activism, and at the same time confront other Christians with the evil that is done in the name of their religion from inside their churches. I’m torn between my solidarity and support for the struggle of LGBT people who choose to remain Christian, and the need to address the profound epistemological errors (and cruelties) of Christianity.

Embracing the Exile might be particularly helpful for people who might be struggling with suicide ideation, or who have recently come out and who come from a Christian background and are still attached to it, or for LGBT people who wish to return to Christianity. It provides a few “technologies of the soul” for that specific population.

But the book is not without its potential dangers, even if it came from a place of love and sincerity. Church leaders are experts at softening the blows of their emotional and psychological acts of aggression and dressing things that are deeply worthy of objection in the disguise of innocence and sanctity. Furthermore, if we decide that our policy towards our abusers is to “love them anyway”, does this not risk neglecting the possibility of moral development for our abusers? It can be a difficult balance to maintain, particularly when those who are most likely to harm LGBT youth in a church are also the same people who find themselves most entangled in their ideological errors and are least likely to think they might be wrong. The idea of gays embracing Christianity reminds me of a commentary about the colorful cow in Nietzsche’s Zarathustra that I came across recently:

In the town called the Pied Cow, the people are extremely content. They exemplify the concept of decadence. As Nietzsche says in Thus Spake Zarathustra to a citizen of the town of Pied Cow: “thy cow, affliction, milkedst thou—now drinketh thou the sweet milk of her udder.” His language shows that the cow’s milk is pleasurable and sweet, but it is an affliction that causes us to forget our real purpose. It is analogous to soma in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, an orgasmically pleasurable drug that causes the citizens of a fascist regime to forget their suffering and keep working.

One of the main dangers of the logotherapy approach is that, by choosing a false refuge or a false sense of meaning, we may end up harming ourselves and wasting opportunities for moral reform, freedom, creativity, and true happiness. Meaning must therefore be secondary to our impulse towards truth and towards the sober pleasure that Epicurus mentions in his Epistle to Menoeceus.

Some Epicurean Ideas

Life is not obligated to make sense to us. We are the ones who seek to make sense of it willfully, using our creativity and resources, our art of living (techne biou), and with the help of the study of nature. In this, Lucretius, Epicurus, and others are role models to us.

We are able to create meaning through the process of hedonic calculus: by choosing and rejecting in a manner consistent with our values, our pains or sufferings are redeemed and made valuable by the greater pleasures that they gain.

When I recently shared 3 Brain Systems That Control Your Behavior: Reptilian, Limbic, Neo Cortex, by Robert Sapolsky, our Friend Nathan commented that these three parts of the brain reminded him of “sensations, feelings, and preconceptions”–the three sets of faculties that exist within the Epicurean canon, which are our connection with nature.

The video makes the argument that the most primitive part of the brain (the reptilian part) involves the most basic instincts. This includes the senses, but also the sense of time, the circadian rhythm–a set of faculties that require that animals attune themselves to the day and night cycles, and require cold-blooded animals to regulate their body temperature by various means. Then, our ancestors evolved the mammalian brain, which involved complex fight-or-flight mechanisms, panic instincts, and other powers that Nathan associates with the canonical faculties involved in feelings. The final evolutionary stage is where animals evolved the cortex of the brain that facilitates complex thinking and language. Of all the highest animals (mostly the primates), the humans are the ones who have evolved the most complex “prolepsis” cortex. The parallels noted between the canonical faculties and the layers of brain cortex are interesting, and it had never occurred to me to think of it this way.

I am particularly interested in this third set of faculties in our discussion of meaning because the prolepsis faculty facilitates language, and it seems to me that our discussion of meaning is a discussion of language, and that the creation of meaning is therefore mainly a function of the prolepsis faculty. We are perhaps translating our experiences into something that our rational brains may apprehend, and doing so helps us to process our ideas and emotions.

Seen this way, the thirst for meaning becomes an impulse toward naming our own narratives, our lives, our selves, our relations, our life cycles, the projects that “give” our lives “meaning”, our technologies of the soul, etc. How else do we create meaning? Nietzsche suggested (and I agree) that we may do this through art, poetry, dance, ritual. The technique of relabeling (as we’ve discussed before) is another method for this.

In the search for meaning, it often seems like self-expression has been frustrated and seeks an outlet. The prolepsis of self-expression (Self-Ex-Pression) reminds me of a process of pressing-out parts of the self into some external form. The faculty of prolepsis allows us to clearly conceive an idea, which is necessary in the first place if we are to “press it out” of our psyche. Prolepsis helps us to conceive, which reminds us of seeds, of germination. Conceiving an idea carries creative potential.

Conclusion

Some people say Frankl’s Man’s Search of Meaning is a Stoic book, but it’s more nuanced than that. Yes, Man’s Search for Meaning has a strong Stoic influence. It teaches that the “only” thing that others can’t take away is how we respond to a situation, and focuses on the realm of possible therapies available to someone who is powerless to change their fate. But it also elsewhere criticizes key aspects of Stoicism. In page 56, we find:

The camp inmate was frightened of making decisions and of taking any sort of initiative whatsoever. This was the result of a strong feeling that fate was one’s master, and that one must not try to influence it in any way, but instead let it take its own course. In addition, there was a great apathy, which contributed in no small part to the feelings of the prisoner.

The book is a bit depressing, but this is not necessarily a bad thing, as suffering does have the power to make us better people. My recent anecdote on this has to do with a particular co-worker who for many months did not greet me, or smile at me, or acknowledge me at all at work. Some people (particularly people who have money or power) can afford to be quite stand-offish; others are simply introverted by nature. This co-worker was a cancer survivor and, upon getting a second diagnosis of cancer, he changed. Perhaps he realized that life is short and shifted his conception of the things that matter. He began to greet me with a smile. He became more personal. I think his suffering as a result of his health, and his sense of vulnerability, is what made him a better, gentler, more caring person.

This anecdote confirms, to me, the power of suffering to purify our character–even if we rebel against the idealization and sacralizing of suffering that we see, for instance, in Catholicism.

Frakl says “man is ultimately self determining”, meaning that we are subjects, not objects or machines. One of the main virtues of this book is that Frankl humanizes his patients. He at all times refuses to diminish or humiliate or mistreat his patients. His years of suffering during World War II make Frankl a wounded healer: he had been through hell, and could now help others in a similar situation. For this reason, many people who are experiencing great suffering and who are truly powerless in their situation would benefit from critically engaging the insights of this book.

The Oshún Mythical Cycle: The Seduction of Ogún

The following is an Epicurean meleta (deliberation or commentary) on an African fairy tale, which is here placed before the eyes and treated as a philosophical parable about Divine Pleasure as the Guide of Life. In this myth, Oshún heroically smears herself in honey and dances seductively in order to lure Ogún out of the jungle and back into civilization, and save human society from collapse.

I’ve heard many Oriki (chants) for Oshún (Yoruba Goddess of sweetness, a form of the Venus-archetype) which I’ve found beautiful and enchanting, but if I was to choose a soundtrack for this essay (after all, Venus is associated with music, art, and aesthetics), I would choose either La India’s prelude to Yemayá y Ochún or, better yet, the magical Mongo Santamaría song Ye Ye.

I was speechless when I found this painting, by Lili Bernard, titled Sale of Venus. It refers to the arrival of the cult of Oshún to Cuba via the slave trade. Here, however, she is syncretized with Venus, instead of with her Catholic aspect as “Our Lady of Charity”.

When we studied the Prometheus myth at Eikas, we discussed a bit about some of the ethical problems related to technology (personified as Hephaistos), when it answers to power entanglements rather than to ethical guidance and personal loyalty. Today, I’d like to discuss a bit about how a parallel character (Ogún, the artisan and smith of the Yoruba Gods) was lured back into civilization by Oshún (the Yoruba version of Venus).

Concerning the archetype of Ogún, the story is that he was one of the first Orisha who made a path through the jungle. He was a scout, a hunter, and a perceptive tracker. But most importantly he “makes a path” where no one else has made a path yet. He is a creative force, and quite introverted by all accounts (even in the Greek version of this archetype, Hephaistos), being quite socially awkward in both traditions, and often preferring to remain in his workshop all day. He is the God of iron, of the forge, and of technology. Without Ogún, Yorubas believe that civilization simply cannot progress.

Yoruba myths are known in Cuba as patakís, and this one is found in this page, although many versions of it exist in oral tradition (and now on YouTube). For reasons explained in other myths, Ogún was “cursed” with constant toil, and part of his social contract involved the demands caused by the societal need for his particular skillset. In reality, Ogún represents men (and women) who are by their natural constitution hard-working and active in productive labor. In the myth, Ogún decided to take a break from all his work. The way it’s explained in the OrishaNet page, he did this because “his heart always remained in the forest”, but some may interpret this as a labor strike; others may interpret this as an episode of depression. This last interpretation is probably the most useful, ethically speaking, and also because when people are depressed they lose the pleasure derived from doing many things, which they normally desire to do.

The point is that “once upon a time” Ogún disappeared from the city and went into the forest, and very soon (since he is the Orisha or spirit of industriousness) civilization came to a halt. No tools can be built without him, since he is the smith. No trains may run. No wheels constructed, and no machines. No one can plow the fields. No construction. There’s no progress, no civilization.

Once they realized that Ogún went into hiding, many of the divine powers tried to convince him to return, but (after a long series of attempts) no one succeeded until a young Orisha, Oshún, offered to try to lure him back into the city. This worried the other Orishas, who did not think she would succeed. However, absent other options, she was allowed by wise old Obatalá (the Orisha of the head, where decisions are made) to go on this mission.

How did she do this? Oshún is the Goddess of sex, an enchantress. By singing and dancing semi-naked, and by seducing and entrancing Ogún with her charms, from time to time pouring honey over herself–and when she saw that Ogún was ogling her, placing some honey on his lips–she slowly got him to move out of his forest refuge and slowly lured him out, danced him out, seduced him out of the forest and back into the city. She probably did this following the path of some spring or river, as Oshún is a river-goddess of fresh waters and her role in the universe is to “cool” the other Orisha and to refresh the world with her sweet waters. The story ends:

And all learned that sweetness (is) sometimes the most powerful weapon of all, and that Oshún was much more powerful than she appeared and was to be respected.

… which immediately reminds me of our meleta on the Lucretian passage where Venus subdues Mars. I must here note a parallel between this patakí and another one where Oshún saves the world once again, this time during times of famine and by bringing rains. In that other myth, we also see that the other Orishas from the onset underestimated Oshún. Stories about Oshún seem to be an ongoing commentary in Yoruba mythos about the status of women, and a warning to not underestimate them but to allow them to be leaders and to prove themselves, because without their gifts there is no possibility of successful human civilization.

That Oshún is sexually emancipated, adds to her role as an empowering Orisha for women. One merely needs to look at the high levels of involvement of women at all levels of society in southern Nigeria, where Oshún is still revered, versus the horrible oppression that women suffer in the Islamic north of Nigeria, where women are constantly targeted for rape, violence, and abduction, and are routinely denied basic human rights.

This might give us some ideas about why Epicurean philosophy was not historically favored, unlike Platonism, Stoicism, and other philosophies. Epicureanism has always suffered the fate of enjoying the same reputation as that of the Goddess of sex and pleasure, who embodies our ethical ideals, and this reputation and respectability greatly diminished under patriarchal hegemony.

Going back to the role of Hephaistos in the Promethean cycle, during our meleta on The Betrayal and Passion of Prometheus, we had discussed:

Hephaistos (The God of Technology) had been closely related to both Prometheus and Athena, and in fact they were all three worshiped together (they are all tied to progress, civilization and science). However, in Prometheus Bound, Hephaistos betrays his friend and–even while expressing sadness for his friend–he’s the one who built the chains and bound Prometheus, against his own will, out of obedience (and/or fear?) of Zeus.

Throughout Prometheus Bound we see Zeus impiously referred to as a tyrant. The ethical problem of blind obedience to tyranny (the problem of the “good German” during the Nazi era), and the remorseless cruelty it produces, is seen in the Prometheus myth.

Hephaistos’ role also raises questions about the ethical utility of science and technology. In Principal Doctrines 10-13, Epicurus establishes an ethical purpose for science, however Prometheus Bound raises questions about what can happen when Technology serves the interests of power rather than ethical values.

In the Yoruba myth, Ogún is set right by Oshun’s sweetness, represented by the honey she smears on herself.

From the perspective of the psychological interpretation, where Ogún suffers from depression, she uses pleasure / honey / sweetness as medicine for depression and heals him.

From the perspective of refusal to work, she made him productive by using the powerful appeal and the seduction of pleasure, of sweetness. She would have made work agreeable.

From the literal perspective, he simply goes back to being himself and performing his role in the world … but what is going on inside? As when I studied Taoism, I am here reminded of Epicurean Saying 21:

We must not force Nature, but gently persuade her.

What were the Yoruba ancestors trying to teach when they articulated this particular myth? Notice the contrast between how the Greeks warned us that Zeus (associated with Power) corrupts Hephaistos, whereas the Yoruba warned us that the Yoruba Venus (associated with sweetness, Pleasure) saves and redeems both the Yoruba Hephaistos and the world.

Power corrupts, but Pleasure saves and heals.

Philosophy as Medicine for the Soul, Part II – English Transcript

Happy Twentieth: On “Love Your Neighbor”

Happy Twentieth to all the disciples of Epicurus! Psyche Magazine published an essay titled Sprinkle a little ancient philosophy into your daily routines, and the Ad Navseam podcast published an episode titled The Whole Enchilada: Epicureanism and Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura. Unfortunately, midway through the episode the authors cast doubt on whether Epicureans can be good citizens–never mind the historian Diogenes Laertius’ testimony about the character of Epicurus. To balance this, I would invite the student to read John Thrasher’s essay on Epicurean contractarianism.

This month, the latest episode of the Newstalk podcast “Talking History” is titled “Epicurus: a Life”. Several scholars were interviewed.

Love Your Neighbor

One of the teachers of the law came and heard them debating. Noticing that Jesus had given them a good answer, he asked him, “Of all the commandments, which is the most important?”

“The most important one,” answered Jesus, “is this: ‘Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God, the Lord is one. Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind and with all your strength. ’The second is this: ‘Love your neighbor as yourself.’ There is no commandment greater than these.”

– Jesus the Nazarene, in The Gospel according to Mark 12:28-31

Having been raised in a Christian household has made me aware of both the utility and the futility of Christian ethos–whether we delve into the details, or stick to the basics. Christianity provides a formative ethical framework for almost all of my family members and a large portion of the society I live in. Even after people leave Christianity behind, or stop taking most of its claims seriously, many still consider themselves Christian Humanists and frequently still unquestioningly accept the wisdom of “Love your neighbor“. Not wanting to embrace it or dismiss it without careful consideration, I decided to take a second look at the second of the two Christian commandments through the lens of my Epicurean ethical framework to see if “Love your neighbor” still works.

I believe that Epicurus would argue that a commandment to love God is a bit strange: if one is commanded to love someone, is it love or is it fear? Can sentient beings be ORDERED to feel an emotion? Furthermore, the Principal Doctrines on justice recognize the personal sovereignty of the individual, and so we do not have “commandments”, only doctrines and adages.

So the first Christian commandment is irrelevant to us, but I believe the second commandment is not only sound, but also that Epicurus and most of the Epicurean Guides might argue that it’s generally advantageous to love our neighbors–maybe not as much as we love ourselves, but we can still argue that it’s advantageous to let our brain brew its oxytocin and endorphin rush for them. I believe that they would argue this from the perspective of the safety and the advantages it brings, rather than merely virtue-signal around the teaching, as a sign of respect for the intelligence of their pupils. In fact, Lucretius, in De Rerum Natura 5:1015-27 includes compassion for the weak among the foundational cultural traits of human societies listed in Liber Qvintvs:

Then, too, did neighbours ‘gin to league as friends,
Eager to wrong no more or suffer wrong,
And urged for children and the womankind
Mercy, of fathers, whilst with cries and gestures
They stammered hints how meet it was that all
Should have compassion on the weak.

But first, let us clarify what the second Christian commandment says and what it doesn’t say. “Love your neighbor”, on its face, does not mean that we should love everyone everywhere and always. No one has the attention span or time to love everyone. It’s naturally impossible to love everyone. Love, if it’s true, if the word has any real meaning, is a time-consuming pleasure. Two individuals must have wholesome exchanges and get to know each other with some level of depth, which takes some time. They must take time to communicate, and to demonstrate care with concrete tokens of friendship.

Notice that the word chosen in English to translate the Gospel teaching is “neighbor”–which in its prolepsis implies physical proximity. In Spanish, the word chosen is “prójimo”, which is related to words like proximity and also implies nearness. Our friend Nathan adds:

Within the ancient Hebrew context of Leviticus, ‘neighbor’ does not refer to ‘humanity’, it only refers to ‘other members of our tribe’. The full quotation from Leviticus is important for context: “You shall not take vengeance or bear a grudge against any of your people, but you shall love your neighbor as yourself: I am the Lord.” (19:18 NRSV)

PD’s 27 and 39-40 argue for the benefits of loving our neighbors and keeping them near. The Doctrines seem to argue that it’s advantageous to love those who are in our proximity, for the sake of our safety and happiness. Although PD 39 is often used to justify the exclusion from our circles of people who bring trouble or conflict, it starts by spelling out the following ideal scenario:

The man who best knows how to meet external threats makes into one family all the creatures he can. – Principal Doctrine 39

Other issues we must discuss are the feasibility argument and the argument for a complete ethical education. We don’t know to what extent it’s possible to TRULY love all of our neighbors. It’s impractical for a community to set up a rule in its social contract that is impossible to follow, however, it’s not irrational to expect an agreement of harmlessness (rather than love) from relative strangers. While the Christian commandment is noble, it potentially imposes and breeds hypocrisy, whereas the Epicurean conception of justice founded on an agreement to neither harm nor be harmed is much more realistic and practical.

That is the feasibility argument. The argument for a complete ethical education, on the other hand, says: while a commandment by a god to love him makes that god sound narcissistic, and while his commanding us to love others sounds authoritarian, Epicurus’ approach of expounding arguments for the advantages and benefits of befriending and loving our neighbors constitutes a more complete ethical education, and appeals to both our self-interest and our prudence. Most importantly, it does not produce false reasons to love our neighbors, and respects the intelligence and autarchy of the practitioner of philosophy.

Some enemies of Epicurean philosophy have argued that Epicureans would not make good citizens, or have concern for others outside of their immediate circle, however:

Epicurus took care of orphans: he adopted and provided for the daughter of his best friend Metrodorus when she was orphaned. She must have been very young when Metro died, as he died eight years prior to Epicurus’ death and, as of the writing of his final will, Epicurus had not yet made arrangements for her to get married. Therefore, Epicurus had assumed responsibility for her and helped to raise her into adulthood
Epicurus taught his friends how to live properly and pleasantly: he had a concrete and useful curriculum that provided an ethical and philosophical education for both young and old in his community which specifically contributed to their happiness and to living correctly
The practice of friendship (philía) was a central aspect of the teaching mission. Each friend furnishes a concrete instance of loving our neighbor
Epicurus fed the people every month in a feast: his Kepos functioned like what we would think of today as a communal non-profit organization. The welcome sign at the gate in the garden said “_STRANGER_, here you do well to tarry”. Since strangers were welcome in the garden, this means that Epicurus fed strangers, which sounds like near-universal charity

Epicurus, I would argue, was an exemplary citizen by any measure who sought to make into one tribe all the creatures that he was able to befriend. When asking about this subject in our FB group, one of the group members Shahab had this to say:

I think showing affection toward a neighbor makes you feel more safe beside them. Nothing is guaranteed, as men wish more harm upon each other. In any case, your neighbor may be a religious, a superstitious family, or they may be from people working for the government (as in authoritarian regimes). In these cases you wouldn’t feel safe if you don’t show them friendly feelings, or once upon a time, inviting them for a party where they can find, at least, Epicurean friendly attitude, reassuring for a healthy happy life. Malevolent neighbors can sabotage your reputation, making you feel unsafe in the neighborhood. So, as long as it benefits an Epicurean, showing a well-calculated love and friendliness toward one’s neighbor is, to me, a wise thing to do.

Not everyone considers “Love your neighbor” as being useful. Jason says:

PD 39 sums it up for me. Enroll everyone possible into the social contract. Benevolence meets benevolence. If they cannot or will not keep the contract, avoid them and their disturbance. If they cannot be avoided, expel them. The English word love is too much of a catch-all term for all of the varieties of positive feeling I experience to apply it universally to all sentients.

The biochemistry of my brain responds differently to different people and circumstances. Putting all those feelings under one word makes for vague speech, something Christianity, out of all the Abrahamic faiths, excels in. It is precisely that vagueness that makes it incompatible with Epicurean philosophy.

Nathan also says:

“He who best knew how to meet fear of external foes made into one family all the creatures he could; and those he could not, he at any rate did not treat as aliens; and where he found even this impossible, he avoided all association, and, so far as was useful, kept them at a distance” (Principal Doctrine 39).

I invite everyone to heed scientific research, get vaccinated, and wear a mask. To those who are unable to get vaccinated, I understand and encourage safe practices. To those who take unnecessary risks, I’ll avoid like the plague.

To answer your original question: no, Epicurus would not have endorsed (Love thy neighbor), because that proposition is justified by devotional worship of a Creator and does not consider any negative consequences of unconditional love.

From PD 39, and from the above discussion, we conclude that he wisdom of setting boundaries must be balanced with making into one tribe everyone we can … and it’s up to each one of us to determine the extent of each.

Therefore, I believe Epicurus loved his neighbors just as well or better than any good Christian, because he demonstrated life-long love for those who were near him (and taught them by example how to love each other) not with naive, religious idealisms but with concrete tokens of benefits, and for the right reasons.

The Epicureans on Abortion

The abduction over the years of very religiously conservative judges into the Supreme Court of the US–seven of the nine Justices are Catholic and many are religious and conservative at a time when over a third of millennials identify as “nones–, and the recent events in Texas (where restrictions to legalized abortion inspired by particular interpretations of Christianity are now being imposed in a manner that is difficult to challenge) are scary for many of us who have for years feared the ongoing encroachment of Dominionist ideology and theocracy in America, both in the public square and in our private lives. Recently, we discussed the issue of abortion from an Epicurean perspective. I wanted to get the opinions of several of the members of the Garden of Epicurus FaceBook group, to ensure that my opinion is not the only one being expressed here and that the discussion remained as objective as possible. Below is the (edited) dialogue we had concerning abortion as an ethical problem from an Epicurean perspective.

Hiram. Concerning the Texas abortion law: do others see good Epicurean arguments for / against? I’m curious to see what others make of this.

My first instinct is to acknowledge that unborn babies, particularly in the first few weeks, are just “goo in a petri dish” (to cite comedian Bill Maher). They lack the neural complexity for sentience, and so are not yet human beings from the Epicurean perspective (Epicurus’ Principal Doctrine 2 ties living to sentience). A certain amount of neural complexity is needed to produce the actual experience of being human.

My second reaction is that forced motherhood creates more unwanted children (and, in the case of incense or rape, particularly when the mother is herself a child, compounds the trauma), and these unwanted children later go on to contribute significantly to virtually all the statistics of societal dysfunction. It also keeps families in poverty if they’re not prepared for the huge responsibilities of another child (it costs $ 250,000 to raise a child in the US outside of the cycles of poverty)

Jason. PD38 says it all, for me.

When circumstances have not changed and things that were thought to be just are shown to not be in accord with our basic grasp of justice, then those things were not just. But when circumstances do change and things that were just are no longer useful, then those things were just while they brought mutual advantage among companions sharing the same community; but when later they did not bring advantage, then they were not just.

We’re not the same community. This is a religious community trying to impose their values on people who are not in their community. It’s fundamentally unjust on the face of it.

If they want to virtue signal they can do so voluntarily. It ceases to be virtuous when the behavior is forced. Their own actions aren’t in alignment with their religious doctrine. Choice and avoidance is as important a part of Christianity as it is in Epicurean philosophy.

Hiram. The accusation of virtue signaling reminds me of our third Scholarch Polystratus, who argued that when people pursue virtue but fail to study nature, their virtue comes to nothing and degenerates into superstition and arrogance (fanaticism). And so true virtue is impossible without it being rooted in the physics. In this case, the neural complexity of the newborn child is what renders it sentient enough to eventually feel pain and pleasure, which is what dignifies a soul in our ethics. But Christians do not care about that. They magically attribute even “personhood” to an undeveloped fetus without considering its neural complexity.

Going back to our discussions on slavery, this policy is an instance of denial of consent: people who did not participate in articulating the terms of a particular “social contract” are being forced into it against their will (and in the case of forced motherhood, this also includes the unwanted child who is brought forcefully into the world against the will of parents, who may later also abuse or neglect the unwanted child).

Doug. The debate would likely seem bizarre to an ancient Greek Pagan. They practiced infanticide. The father had several days after the birth to decide whether the child should be allowed to live. If he thought so, then there was a ceremony to welcome the child into the family.

What does the Bible say about Abortion?

Jason. The debate is bizarre to everyone outside of the noisome group making it the center of their politics. It isn’t even in alignment with their own other anti-regulatory beliefs.

Eileen. Abortion bans are about a Christian belief in ensoulment at the point of conception, but I’m not clear on Epicurus’s stand on this. I do know that abortion was by turns tolerated and vilified in the ancient world, its fortunes seeming to rise and fall with society’s perceptions of their population status at any given time.

Ilkka. We must also remember that these are the same people who oppose factual sex education and easy availability of contraception. The actual methods of preventing abortions … An Epicurean might answer that legislation that is motivated by superstition is automatically unjust.

Beryl. There is something for me here about abortion or “killing one’s own whilst in the womb“ which seems strikingly unfriendly to human life. That said it’s also extremely unfriendly to legislate for fully adult people how they can use their own bodies.

Whilst science tells us when a fetus may be human and religion tells us when a human fetus has a soul, hedonic calculus tells us clearly that knowing that unprotected sex–despite the pleasure–can cause untold suffering of the life created if brought into poverty, servitude, or life situations that cause early infant death, is itself a hostile unfriendly act. Where are the legislators taxing men named and proven by DNA tests as progenitors of offspring that may suffer hardships in life?

So on one hand one could say that the Texas legislators are preventing suffering by preventing late abortion. This though when examined further is a lie since the legislation will overwhelmingly affect poor women, especially minority women, and their unwanted children who may have entire lives suffering psychologically from the impact of poverty. Essentially the ruling is a hostile act and unfriendly towards both women and their unborn children whilst masquerading as the opposite. This level of hypocrisy needs to be avoided and be unsupported as toxic anti-woman and -child rhetoric. This legislation further does not look at the true causation of maternal and infant suffering–namely poverty, and neither does it address issues such as free contraception access which could decrease suffering overall. So if happiness is to be the greatest good, legislation which harms women and children is not Epicurean, nor is is compatible with the concept of friendliness.

From my own experience as a mother and as a witness to folk who have undergone these surgeries, the love of our own children brings great happiness and is an immortal good, as remembrance of times past being the most delicious memories. Even early morning feeds are remembered fondly. From talking to folk who have opted for the path of abortion there is deep sadness for some and poverty, lack of love for the partner, youth of the mother, or illness, along with in ability to self-reflect and manage desires, are amongst the reasons that unwanted pregnancies arise. A friendly act would be to fund contraception, teach folk about consent, educate our young on respect for human life, and how we conduct ourselves, especially when desire pulls us in directions that can cause harm to others. The spotlight needs to be put equally on men and women as co-creators of human life, and as such equally responsible for the suffering they inflict on their unwanted children.

Marcus. They often say that science is amoral and morality is a separate field all together. Here is an example where science is very relevant to morality. At what point of its development does the fetus experience pain? How can we tell if the fetus is viable? Does it represent a health risk to the mother? Etc. Only science can bring any resemblance of an answer to these questions. Or at the very least, bring us to a place where we can start any reflection on these subjects. For a more scientifically-minded contribution to the debate, here is an article from Carl Sagan and Ann Druyan.

Epicurus’ Instructions on Meleta, Part II

The following is a continuation of the essay Meléta: Epicurus’ Instructions for Students. Upar and Onar: on correct and incorrect modes of leisure and activity is the sequel. Please read them in order for maximum benefit.

During our last Eikas meeting, we discussed the Meléta portion of Epicurus’ Epistle to Menoeceus, with is found towards the end of the letter and contains instructions for his true and sincere disciples, and some theory to help us understand what the final outcome of our practice should be. One of our SoFE members lamented his being unable to attend the meeting, and so for his benefit (and that of other students of EP), I am posting some of the notes from our discussion.

Both Private Learning and Communal Transmission

In the previous essay, we learned that there are two fields of practice. In our last Twentieth discussion, we brainstormed some ideas for what constitutes Meléta:

“Meleta by oneself” (introspection), which includes things like repetition, memorization, inner work on our character usually meant to remove bad habits and form new ones, (this can include journaling), and being informed by the Doctrines while carrying out our choices and avoidances, and
“Meleta with others of like mind” (philía, or Epicurean friendship), which involves studying together, practicing friendship, kindly giving and accepting frank criticism, practicing suavity and clear speech, teaching and collaborating and creating educational content together, observing Eikas with other Epicureans, carrying out autarchy projects, piety projects, and other experiments by which we may have pragmatic encounters with the Doctrines, looking at case studies for the Doctrines, and other ways to deliberate together.

This second field of Meléta creates an oral tradition, and opportunities for direct, interpersonal transmission of the philosophy. This is not an accidental feature: I believe this is essential, and that it helps to make philosophy tangible and to keep it relevant for practitioners.

After several years of practice, it’s clear to me that this second field of praxis contains an intangible curriculum of human values that is not found in the texts, and can only be acquired through the process of having Epicurean friends who are invested in our happiness and have noble expectations of us. When Epicurus says that we must practice both by ourselves and with others, he is giving us the additional social, intellectual challenges that come from friendship, and which contribute greatly to our moral development, and provide necessary checks and balances in our practice.

“Imeras kai Nuktos”: the Case for a Morning Practice and an Evening Practice

Epicurus is making a promise (that we will not be disturbed whether waking or sleeping), but if we read it within its context, we see that it’s contingent on carrying out proper Meléta. The practice must include both fields (introspection and friendship), as well as either a constant practice (one possible reading of “day and night”), or two separate instances of daily and nightly practice (imeras kai nuktos).

The portion “whether waking or sleeping” (úpar out ónar) seems to indicate that there are two types of perturbations that philosophy helps us to overcome, otherwise why would the Hegemon speak specifically of not being perturbed either while awake or while sleeping? We discussed how this might indicate the recognition of the existence of the unconscious / subconscious part of the psyche.

Waking perturbations could be interpreted as the conscious ones, which we are aware of and we can argue with / against in order to transform our habits of thinking or acting. It may be that we are aware of our tiredness or laziness, of our excessive cravings for food or some other pleasure, of some irrational fear, or maybe we’re deeply aware of some other aspect of our daily disposition that perturbs our happiness.

Epicurus’ mention of perturbations while we sleep may indicate the unconscious ones that we are not fully aware of due to lack of introspective and philosophical hygiene, or perhaps dormant ones. Ignored or repressed feelings of guilt often perturb people and keep them up at night. Epicurus does mention that some of our dispositions, tendencies, or habits are like germs or seeds in his “On Moral Development”. By using these words he is recognizing that we carry certain unrealized potentials within us that, under certain conditions, may become realized. These may be part of what the Hegemon calls our “initial constitution” (genetic, physical and/or natural), or “seeds” acquired through upbringing. As we mature and develop morally, Epicurus teaches that we are in charge of transforming the content of our character, and even the physical structure of our psyche … but we cannot do that if we do not become aware of what these “seeds” are that keep us up at night. Here, we must carry out psychotherapy, introspection, expose ourselves to parrhesia (the frankness of our friends), or figure out other techniques to uncover and treat these perturbations. Epicurean philosophy requires its disciples to manage their mental health diligently so as to be–as Epicurus says–“armed for happiness”.

If we place before our eyes what a morning practice and an evening practice look like, immediately it becomes clear that most people who have morning rituals are attempting to prepare for the day ahead, and most people who have evening rituals are preparing for sleep. ES 11 helps to clarify the utility of both imeras meléta (a day practice) and nuktos meléta (a night practice).

For most people, to be quiet is to be numb and to be active is to be frenzied. – Epicurean Saying 11

Here, ἡσυχάζον ναρκᾷ (hesuchason narka) uses a form of the word used in Principal Doctrine 14 (hesuchía) for the technique of “retreating from the crowd”, which can be done alone or with friends … but could also refer to preparing for bed. Here, (since we are not “most people”, and they are other-ized in this Saying) the Founders of our tradition (for ES is a post-Epicurus compilation) are saying that this Epicurean art of retreat involves real and sober pleasures, not numbness or narcotic-like states (narka). Similarly, the words κινούμενον λυττᾷ (kinóumenon lytta) set the standard for the utility of a morning practice: just as rest should not be numb, similarly we should prepare for our day so that activity or productivity will be pleasant, and not frenzied or mindless. The first word here reminds me of kinetic, or active, pleasures, while the practice of retreating for the evening reminds me of katastematic, or calm, pleasures.

Epicurean Saying 41 elaborates further on what repetition and memorization looks like if the practice is constant or daily, or while we are working (managing our household and business). Some students dismiss practices of repetition or anything that feels like chanting, but this is in my view a mistake. Many insights in the Doctrines remain unexplored if we arrogantly dismiss them, thinking we already know them. We must not dismiss the actual practice of repeating and memorizing the Doctrines, because there are habitual patterns in our subconscious that require treatment, and also associations in our mind with certain ideas that are unanalyzed or that we may remain unaware of. Using the technique of offa, as described in ES 41, requires that we utter the words of true philosophy out loud (fonás afientas), and produces an instant encounter with the Doctrine that allows the mind to seek out whatever subconscious associations and pragmatic repercussions the words bring up in our minds.

Epicurus taught that the words of true philosophy are medicines (pharmakos). Studying and assimilating the Doctrines constitutes the taking of some dose of these Doctrines so that they may bring health to the soul (psyche).

“Diataraxthesi”: Perturbations

Let us now put aside the possibility of different kinds of perturbations while waking or sleeping, and let us look at the prolepsis of the word used. The first definition of this word “diataraxi” (to which “diataraxthesi” points) is “anxiety, mental uneasiness“. The second one I found was “a deviation of a system or process from its regular or normal state or path, caused by an outside influence“. Some of the synonyms are: disturbance, perturbation, maze, agitation, riot, turmoil, scrimmage.

Similar Things: our Expanding Discourse

The words “similar things” (τούτοις συγγενῆ, toutois syggeni) open the door to the expansion of meléta beyond the words of Epicurus, so long as the object of our study qualifies as things that are “similar” to the contents of the Epistle to Menoeceus. This is where we can bring into our studies many case studies and intellectuals from our own tradition, or even from other traditions, so long as the ethical framework for meléta is Epicurean. We see that during the days of Diogenes of Sidon and Philodemus, the Epicureans were commenting on many works by philosophers like Theophrastus (Peri Oikonomias) and others who were well known in their day. This is how new arguments were able to emerge to defend against attacks from the other schools, and it’s how we adapt philosophy to new and highly particular situations.

It is up to us to determine what falls under “similar things” for the purposes of meléta. My theory is that the matters being studied should be approached with epilogismos (that is, we must apply empirical methods, as per Principal Doctrine 24) and should be beneficial to our happiness (Principal Doctrine 28). We must apply the canon and derive utility from the practice of philosophy. If we speculate endlessly and pointlessly, neglect the study of nature, and/or make ourselves miserable instead of happy by how we practice philosophy, this is clearly not meléta.

Gods Among Men: an Epicurean Transhumanism?

If we carry out meléta in the way Epicurus advises, and take the recommended doses of philosophy’s medicine, we will start living like immortals and we will be surrounded by “athanatois agathois” (immortal goods). This doctrine of immortal goods deserves further elaboration, since these goods are the necessary features of the ambience, environment or context within which we live like immortals. If a person lives like a god among mortals, there have to be god-like inner states (of varied pleasures) as well as a god-like field of action because, in Epicureanism, all things are relational and contextual. There is one other instance where an immortal goods are mentioned, and it refers to philía (holy friendships).

The noble soul is devoted most of all to wisdom and to friendship — one a mortal good, the other immortal. – Epicurean Saying 78

This is probably because friendships help us to build memories, and that which is memorable stays with us over the long-term, providing us with happy memories, thoughts, and feelings as frequently as we revisit these memories. If we cultivate a grateful disposition, we can strengthen and extend these grateful memories. What other things in our lives carry a similar power to help us abide in pleasure easily? These things could serve as considerations for our exploration of the Doctrine of Immortal Goods.

It is up to us to determine how we can best live like immortals based on Epicurean teachings. This is where Epicurean theology serves ethical purposes. Epicurus invites us to place before our eyes the Gods so that they may serve as images and carriers of our destiny, our happiness, our healthy soul, and our future self. This is because we are invited to carry out our choices and avoidances so that we live like gods among mortals; our life-state and the goods we surround ourselves with are a conscious imitation of the gods. Our practice is an attempt to sculpt ourselves in their image. By setting up the gods as our ethical models, Epicurus is calling us to a transcendental life-state, lifestyle and environment.

Let us look at the specific qualities that Epicurus says we must attribute to the gods: he says we may believe anything about them so long as it does not contradict their blessedness and their immortality. This involves invulnerability (autarchy) and ever-blissful states.

During our Eikas meeting, we speculated: “Can this be interpreted as a transhumanist manifesto?“, however we did not have time to delve into this question in enough depth. Transhumanism is a worldview that calls for the enhancement of human beings in order to advance a longer life-span, together with the enjoyment of health, and a variety of mental and physical enhancements. However, since any modern or future transhumanist technologies were not in existence when Epicurus wrote his Epistle to Menoeceus, these questions–while interesting and worthy of further consideration–are not immediately relevant to meléta and its benefits.

We therefore assume that the first Epicureans proved to themselves and to each other that it was, indeed, possible to live transcendentally, like a god among mortals, regardless of the current or future state of science. Through meléta, we train ourselves to do the same.

Upar and Onar: on correct and incorrect modes of leisure and activity

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PD 20: a Six-Part Doctrine

In recent months, a few of the members of the Society of Epicurus have been systematically studying all the Principal Doctrines of Epicurus as part of a process of gaining a concise understanding of all the pragmatic repercussions of each one. This has been a very gratifying process, and has created many new insights into the tradition.

When one systematically studies the PDs, the flow of the Doctrines becomes evident, as does the fact that they are the conclusions of long discussions among the founders which were found to be the most advantageous teachings for our happiness. Epicurus was saying: “If you don’t have time to study my 300 scrolls, at least study these 40 short Doctrines and be happy!”.

The first four (the Tetrapharmakos) are of great cosmological and ethical importance for the individual. The social Doctrines (on friendship, justice, and on the establishment of a “society of friends”) are towards the end. In between them, we find portions on the philosophy and ethics of science (PDs 10-13), on autarchy (PDs 15-16), the canonics (PDs 22-25), and the portion I am presenting today deals with the mental disciplines of pleasure (PDs 18-21). Principal Doctrine 20 in specific is a six-part formula, and although we’ve studied it before, I’d like to focus here on each one of the six parts of the Doctrine separately in order to extract new insights.

The flesh receives as unlimited, the limits of pleasure; and to provide it requires unlimited time. But the mind, intellectually grasping what the end and limit of the flesh is, and banishing the terrors of the future, procures a complete and perfect life, and we no longer have need of unlimited time. Nevertheless the mind does not shun pleasure, and even when circumstances make death imminent, the mind does not lack enjoyment of the best life.

Epicurus’ instructions in our study of his Doctrines revolve around repetition and memorization. Due to the length of this Doctrine, repeating and memorizing may be a bit more daunting than is the case with other Doctrines. Let us therefore divide the Doctrine into six portions, so that we can more carefully repeat, memorize, and carefully study each assertion, and compare it to other sources, until we fully assimilate all the cognitive and pragmatic repercussions of the Doctrine.

The flesh receives as unlimited, the limits of pleasure.
To provide this pleasure requires unlimited time.
The mind, intellectually grasping what the end and limit of the flesh is, procures a complete and perfect life.
The mind, banishing the terrors of the future, procures a complete and perfect life, and we no longer have need of unlimited time.
The mind does not shun pleasure.
Even when circumstances make death imminent, the mind does not lack enjoyment of the best life.

The Flesh Lacks Self-Control and Discipline

The first two statements are not saying that pleasure in the flesh is bad: only that the flesh does not have a means to discern their limits. Epicurean Saying 37, which seems to associate pleasant states with vitality and health, reiterates this:

Nature is weak in the face of what is bad, not what is good; for it is kept whole by pleasures and broken down by pains.

Among other things, the 20th Doctrine is a cure for limitless desires of the flesh: that is part of its medicine. The first statement says that the flesh does not know discipline: only the mind does, thanks to the faculty of reason. The second one says that this could potentially result in being assaulted by an infinite number of desires. We see that an existential problem is being framed in terms of the distinction between the flesh and the mind, their different natures, and their different powers. As with all the Doctrines, we must understand this clearly in order to carry out our choices and rejections prudently.

The Mind Must Discipline the Flesh

I divided 3 and 4 into two sentences, although originally they were one, because there are two assertions being made. These assertions are tied to the preceding PDs 18-19: the Baseline Doctrine and the Doctrine that stresses the limits of pleasure in time. If you study them with attention, you will see that PD’s 18 through 21 “give a sermon” together and seem to have been compiled as the authoritative conclusions of a single ethical discussion, the point of which was to say that the mind is responsible for securing a stable life of pleasure.

What are these Doctrines saying together? PD 18 and the third portion of PD 20, together, explain that the mind is able to grasp the limits of the flesh, which are mentioned in PD 18. The mind is able to directly observe, with full enargeia or immediacy, that as soon as the belly is somewhat full, there are no more pangs of hunger. It is able to apprehend that we do not experience pain when we neglect sexual passion, that it is not necessary, and that we can be content without it. While the flesh is unconscious and unable to apprehend these natural limits, the mind is aware and capable.

Similarly, PD 19, and the fourth statement of PD 20, together teach the superiority of reason over time, and how the mind is able to choose and reject how to reason about the past and future in such a way as to experience pleasure, and procure “a complete and perfect life“, a content and satisfied life that lacks nothing, that needs nothing. The point here is that we must think correctly about the past and future, rather than avoid thinking about them or think only of the present (as the Cyrenaics recommended). This is done by pleasant expectation and grateful recollection, two practices that Epicurus encouraged. PD 21 will complete these considerations, empowering us to question the amount of effort or sacrifice we dedicate to needless pleasures.

The Mind Must be Made an Ally

The fifth assertion, on its own, is of profound significance. It reminds me of Vatican Saying 21’s assertion that “We must not violate nature, but obey her“, or in some translations “We must not force nature, but gently persuade her“. This is essential to help us understand Epicurean ethics. If the mind does not shun pleasure, this means–again–that the mind is an ally in our practice of philosophy and in our pursuit of happiness; that our approach should be gentle; and that we do not have to fight against it, but work with it.

In cases where people have bad habits or insatiable desires that produce unwanted consequences and no longer passes hedonic calculus, they are often able to find a higher or healthier pleasure. When I found that coffee was harmful to my health, I opted for yerba maté, a herbal drink with stimulating properties that does not give me jitters. Similarly, the current globalized market furnishes a near infinite variety of culinary products that are guilt-free, fat-free, gluten-free, alcohol-free, fair trade, etc. This allows opportunities for moral agents to avoid feeling like we are punishing ourselves whenever we attempt to make healthier or more prudent choices. The thing to keep in mind is that there is usually a healthier pleasure available.

The final assertion reminds me of research on NDE’s (near-death experiences), which shows that, as soon as the brain realizes that we are dying and that it’s not getting the oxygen it needs, the brain immediately starts releasing blissful hormones. The body has the wisdom to die pleasantly. Epicurus’ manner of death is the prime example of this, but there may be other empirical sources of data by which we can glean further insights into the sixth assertion of this Doctrine. One that comes to mind involves the studies of meditating monks who are able to control their body’s temperature and to reach blissful states of mind at will. While the first skill may only be useful in cold environments, the second skill–if gained–is useful as a daily practice, and constitutes a pragmatic encounter with this Doctrine of great educational value. One way to practice PD 20 is by nurturing contemplative practices that reliably lead to blissful states.

The main intention of this final assertion is to show an extreme example of how the mind, once made an ally in our pursuit of pleasure, is indeed a reliable source of happiness (and of confident expectation of continued happiness). But in order for the mind to play the ethical role it’s supposed to play for an Epicurean, it must be kept healthy, ethically educated, and disciplined.

The flesh is unconscious; the mind is not. Protecting our mental health and cultivating disciplines of mental pleasure helps us to manage the quality of our sentience.

PD 1: On the Utility of the Epicurean Gods

That which is blissful and immortal has no troubles itself, nor does it cause trouble for others, so that it is not affected by anger or gratitude (for all such things come about through weakness). – Principal Doctrine One

Epicurus applied epilogismos (empirical thinking) to all things, even the gods. In thinking empirically about the gods, he specifically considered their role as witnesses to our oaths–which is why Philodemus equates piety with justice in his scroll On Piety–, Epicurus saw how oath-breakers are treated by the community, so that the gods seem to embody the collective memory, traditions, choices and avoidances, and norms of the tribe. Gods (or rather the social group, through invocation and use of its gods) have the “power” to bring specific curses and blessings, which may at times be specified in the social contract of the community. I should clarify that this is not a supernatural power, but rather a social function.

For instance, if you vow by Athena to be loyal to a friend, and then you turn around and betray your friend, many sincere worshipers of Athena will consider you cursed because you will have blasphemed Athena. They may have, as a community, ways of dealing with oath-breakers that are unpleasant, as a way of discouraging oath-breaking. We see in many modern religious communities that oath-breakers and apostates are often banned from their Mormon, Muslims, or other religious communities. As central symbols of tribes and communities, we see that the gods function as their unifying symbols that add coherence and stability to communities.

The Letter to Menoeceus says that gods make us feel “familiar” to them as a result of sharing similar virtues as they have. This “filial” (familiar) model of Epicurean piety has been distinguished from the “servile” model of vulgar piety that we see elsewhere.

We may view the gods and the practices concerning them as instances of (individual or communal) self-expression and reminders of our highest values.

The Epicurean gods also invite us to ask what kinds of sentient beings would be WORTHY of everlasting happiness, of immortal bliss, and also of immortality–which is a quite different question from the ontological station of the gods.

Therefore the Doctrine of Epicurus concerning the gods must be studied in terms of its utility so that, even if we do away with the Epicurean gods, we still have a clear grasp of their utility in their original context, and we may seek alternate ways to fulfil that same utility and possibly experiment with a non-theistic religiosity. I have speculated that this religiosity can perhaps focus its piety on the healing words of true philosophy, rather than on the gods.

A non-theistic Epicurean religiosity is a worthwhile project, however, a part of me still wonders if, by neglecting the moral tasks posed by the Epicurean gods, we’d be neglecting crucial exercises for the soul’s “muscles”, and whether we harm our moral development by ignoring the utility of the gods.

The Imaginary Friends Argument

Imaginary friends are often cited as a metaphor by atheists who wish to ridicule vulgar religiosity, but the “imaginary friends” metaphor actually may yield important insights concerning religiosity and should be treated as a legitimate ethical and anthropological argument.

Children have imaginary friends, which are sort of familiar spirits to them, and this is considered a normal part of childhood. This is probably because they are developing social faculties. I imagine it’s like a computer that has the program to update itself: the child’s brain is learning and processing for the first time complex social interactions, which give him skills necessary for adult life. The child must learn communication skills, and even subtle social cues. Perhaps imagining friends helps the brain to learn and practice these social skills in the initial stages of social development.

The Utility of Piety

Honoring a sage is itself a great benefit to the one who honors – Vatican Saying 32

This issue of the utility of piety is a separate question from the nature of the gods, even if related. But in what way do we benefit when we honor or respect something? Epicurus said piety had psycho-somatic effects: that it may help us to cultivate pleasant dispositions in the body and mind.

Piety can make us feel happy, attached to something wholesome and familiar, and can help us feel healthy and mentally strong.

Piety can also feel like a great peace, because we are being just whenever we honor our covenants of loyalty, friendship, or filial love, and one is genuinely happy when one hears the name of a loved one, and is reminded of that love. This sweetens life, is pleasant, memorable, and makes us happy.

Piety, if sincere, feels like reverence, which ennobles if the thing revered is worthy. When such piety feels like familiarity, filial, we may say that we share part of our (mental and bodily) identity with the thing revered, otherwise it would not feel familiar. The Epicurean Doctrines may also gain familiarity through acquaintance, repetition, and memorization.

When we observe the psycho-somatic effects of piety in us, we have clear, direct insight about its benefits, which justifies “faith” not in gods or in anything external to ourselves, but in the memorized Doctrines and their power and medicine in our soul.

Living Like Immortals

In the third book of De Rerum Natura, Lucretius praised the words of Epicurus saying: “like bees, we sip their nectar”–as if from flowers in a meadow–and that they’re “golden, ever worthy of immortal life”. In this way, he compared the Doctrines to ambrosia–the nectar of immortality.

Lucretius was conveying that the Aurea Dicta (the “golden words” of true philosophy) help us to live like immortals, and to feel as if we are surrounded by immortal goods. This is because these words point to all the things that make life worth living, and so the diligent study of the Aurea Dicta is the most advantageous activity for our happiness. But bees drink nectar in order to make honey: the idea of imbibing Epicurus’ words is to produce sweetness, pleasure.

Epicurus would not talk about living like immortals, as he did in his Epistle to Menoeceus, if he had not first placed before the eyes of his disciple, in clear detail, just what it means to live like an immortal.

Living like an immortal implies various things. Epicurus describes the gods as indestructible and forever happy. These are the only two religious taboos he gave us. He said we may believe anything about the gods so long as we do not blaspheme their immortality and their constantly blissful state of sentience. We are left to fill in the blanks.

This must mean that the gods are envisioned as sentient beings, since only such beings are able to experience constant pleasures. Living like an immortal implies that the pleasures that we experience are all of a higher nature, that we become resilient, indestructible, and transcendentally happy. Living like gods also implies an art of living, a methodology for living, a lifestyle, or a cultural expression which is modeled by our Epicurean narratives about the gods.

It can be dangerous to remain unaware of what gods, guiding values, and beliefs we have set for ourselves. Unanalyzed praise can sometimes degrade a soul, sinking it in unwholesome association. Epicurus invites us to consciously create our values in this manner, and to observe the pragmatic results of this ethical exercise in our own bodies and minds

The Future Self

This task may remind some of Nietzsche’s Overman. This is because the utility of the gods and the utility of our narratives about our own future are, in some ways, similar.

Just as we feel rooted in our past when we revere our ancestors, we also anchor our selves in the future when we revere our gods. There is a progression in time between these two cosmological imaginaries: the one (usually) below our feet in the graves of our ancestors where we are rooted like trees, and the one (usually) in the heavens towards which our instincts of freedom and creation inspire us to advance and evolve. Perhaps we subconsciously intuit our evolutionary advance from a less-evolved past to a more-evolved future, and this finds expression in these two forms of piety? We naturally (and perhaps subconsciously) seek to imitate and to become like the things we deify or idealize. The future Self has to be conceived and imagined so clearly, that it feels within reach. Thinking about our future self is, in itself, ethically useful if done right.

While you are on the road, try to make the later part better than the earlier part; and be equally happy when you reach the end. – Vatican Saying 48

The Letter to Menoeceus teaches that the future is partly ours and partly not ours. This means that we have causal responsibility for a portion of our destiny, of our future self. Concerning what this portion entails is a matter of great importance for our happiness and for our moral development. The favors we do to our future self give us hope in our future pleasure, stability, and confident expectation that we will easily secure our needs.

Exercise: Envision Your Gods

If we were to set up an existential task, or “a homework”, related to Principal Doctrine 1, it would be to place before our eyes: to clearly imagine, in detail, the lifestyle of the gods. This is a visualization exercise–which could be done in the form of journaling, if we are not very good visual thinkers.

I recently shared the Isle of the Blessed passage from Lucian’s comedy True Story. Since it depicts a paradise of pleasure, one worthy of Epicurus himself (whom Lucretius makes a resident there), the Isle of the Blessed might be a good example of a type of exercise similar to envisioning the gods, that we may draw inspiration from.

Since the Epicurean gods of the realist interpretation are what today would be considered extraterrestrial super-evolved animals, some of our readers may wish to draw inspiration from the emergent field of astro-biology. I have speculated that any creature that feels perfectly safe and invulnerable (as the gods do) would have to evolve in an ecosystem that has an extremely high level of symbiosis (that is, cooperation rather than competition) between creatures.

“Sculpting” our gods (or “imagined persons” if we are non-realist about them) in our minds, and putting before our eyes their activities, pastimes, narratives, opulences, pleasures, qualities, values, and attributes may serve as a good point of reference to help us to sculpt our own characters and lifestyles. In this way, we gain a clear conception in our minds of how to live a godlike lifestyle.

Envisioning the gods is an exercise in ethical self-creation, and in character-building. It’s a reflection on the quality of life that the highest form of sentient being in the cosmos would have. How would we live if we were to imitate their godly lifestyle? That is part of the utility of the Epicurean gods.

Finally, I wish to stress that this exercise is useful and has educational value even if we believe that our gods are imaginary: they can still be our lifestyle-models, who point us in the direction of the healthiest and happiest way of living.

The usefulness of this exercise is increased if we include concrete details concerning the aromas, tastes, architecture, fashion, and mental and emotional states of our gods. This is what we mean by “placing before the eyes”–a practice used by the Epicurean Guide Philodemus, and by Epicurus himself in his Letter to Menoeceus. In this way, we move from the abstract to the concrete, from the Platonic realm to the real and tangible world.

PD’s 39-40: An Intimate Koinonia of Friends

The man who best knows how to meet external threats makes into one family all the creatures he can; and those he can not, he at any rate does not treat as aliens; and where he finds even this impossible, he avoids all dealings, and, so far as is advantageous, excludes them from his life. – Principal Doctrine 39

In the past, the Koinonia of Friends of Epicurus has produced memes with the #KnowYourCircle hashtag. This is an appeal to the logic of concentric circles that we find in Doctrine 39, which says that we should have an inner circle of beings who are familiar and trustworthy, an outer circle of acquaintances with whom we have some familiarity, and then there may be people who are outside of our circles and worthy of avoidance for reasons of safety or due to other annoyances. This Doctrine may have been inspired by the Timocrates affair.

We call this the Doctrine of eumetry, a term coined by aesthetician Panayotis Michelis to denote a non-mathematical and non-symmetrical harmony that can at times even be superior to symmetry–which is often considered an important standard in aesthetics, or the study of beauty. Michelis was saying was that sometimes beauty can be measured in non-standard ways. However, neo-Epicurean French philosopher and historian Michel Onfray adapted this neologism for use in ethics. It comes from the Greek “eu-” (good) and “-metry” is related to measure, or distance, so that it implies keeping “a good distance”, or keeping “a safe distance: not too close, not too far”, as Onfray puts it. Knowing the right distance to keep with many people is meant to guarantee peace of mind.

One of the great life-long existential tasks that every Epicurean must carry out is expressed in Doctrine 27: it consists on building our own tribe, our own circle of friends. Since the closing of the Letter to Menoeceus says that we have two fields of praxis as Epicureans (introspective meleta by ourselves, and social meleta with friends of like mind), we must include some knowledgeable, sincere, and happy Epicureans in our circle of friends. By enshrining these things in Doctrine, Epicurus made it clear that he wanted his disciples to create intellectual tribes, to associate with and blend their minds with people who think alike.

Some of the Principal Doctrines “give a sermon together”–meaning, they must be interpreted in sequence or as part of a whole, because they seem to have been born as conclusions from a single, ongoing conversation among the Founders. That is the case with the last two Doctrines, and we must also consider why they were placed last. Once Doctrine 39 has been practiced consistently, and we have created an inner circle, Kyriai Doxai closes with these instructions:

Those who were best able to provide themselves with the means of security against their neighbors, being thus in possession of the surest guarantee, passed the most pleasant life in each other’s society; and their enjoyment of the fullest intimacy was such that, if one of them died before his time, the survivors did not mourn his death as if it called for sympathy. – Principal Doctrine 40

Once we have built our fortress of the soul and surrounded ourselves with “Friends of like mind”, we are able to enjoy an intimate society of Friends. This is the final instruction of Kyriai Doxai. It helps us to create a healthy and stimulating environment for Epicurean practice, for exploring the tasks and Doctrines both by ourselves and with others. It’s written in the past tense, which may indicate that we are to look to the founders as role models for ideas about what this intimate society of Friends looks like.

Perhaps as should be expected for the last one of the Principal Doctrines, it includes instructions on how NOT to mourn our Epicurean friends. Epicurus says we should remember them not with lamentations, but with pleasant remembrance. One of the Vatican Sayings teaches the practice of pleasant remembrance for that which we can not change. So there is a particular Epicurean tradition of remembering our Friends, which was enshrined in the Twentieth feasts which are in actuality memorial services for the Founders (and, broadly, for our Friends in philosophy who have parted).

Once you have an intimate society of Epicurean Friends, it’s natural that some will die, and we may be obligated (by oath) or compelled (by a sense of loyalty) to honor our friends’ memory in a manner that is true to their beliefs. The Roman Epicureans developed a tradition of burial where they placed the words “Non fvi. Fvi. Non svm. Non cvro.” (I was not, I was, I am not, I care not) on their tombstones. We may develop similar traditions today, or revive the ancient tradition. Part of the point of this Doctrine is that the practice of remembrance of our dead should be consistent with the rest of our theory and praxis. We must create Epicurean cultural expression that is authentic and reflects our values.

On Koinonia

I spoke here about our circles as intellectual tribes, and in my essay for How to Live a Good Life, I defended tribalism as a non-politically-correct but naturally-correct practice, based on the hundreds of thousands of years during which our ancestors evolved in tribal societies, and based on the Dunbar number. There’d be nothing special about being Epicurean if everyone could be Epicurean. It’s an intimate circle of friends, and somewhat exclusive. I now wish to tie this communitarian Doctrine to the sources.

Epicurean Koinonia are bound by hedonic contracts. Epicurus, in Principal Doctrines 37-38, uses the term κοινωνία (koinonia), saying that justice exists only in the context of companions who have agreements of mutual benefit. Depending on how the Doctrines are worded in English, it translates as “companions” or as “association”. When used in the New Testament, it’s often translated as “fellowship”, which is defined as:

1 : companionship, company
2a : community of interest, activity, feeling, or experience
b : the state of being a fellow or associate
3 : a company of equals or friends : association
4 : the quality or state of being comradely
5 obsolete : membership, partnership

The word is of Greek origin and was not used by Jesus, who spoke Aramaic. It appears in the Pauline literature in Acts 2:42, in 2 Corinthians 9:13, and in Philippians 3:10, which lends credibility to the theory by Norman DeWitt that the “apostle” Paul (who is credited with authoring these epistles) appropriated many Epicurean concepts and adapted them for his New Testament epistles (he also imitated our epistolary literary tradition).

DeWitt’s theory is that Paul was steeped in the study of Epicureanism, and that he transferred the concepts from our philosophy into his new religion, assigning new meaning to the concepts. But we are not interested in what koinonia came to mean for Christians. If we try to imagine ways in which Paul would have discovered the joys of fellowship among the Epicureans, or ways in which we can experience these pleasures today, we would come up with:

spending time with our friends and blending our minds with theirs
studying, learning, practicing, teaching, and creating together
honoring each other with gifts and celebrating each other’s birthdays and other joys
helping each other, when necessary
trusting our Epicurean Friends and turning to them when we have problems
even when we apply parrhesia (frank criticism), we may use suavity (the Epicurean virtue of sweet, kind speech) to soften the harshness of our words

Concerning the first point, the Havamal (although it’s from another tradition) has one stanza that accurately explains that “care will gnaw at your heart if you can’t share all your mind with another“. The second point fulfils Epicurus’ instructions on meleta, which should be done both by ourselves (introspection) and with “others of like mind“.

One further point must be made, based on the contextual interpretation of PD’s 37-38. These Doctrines deal with problems related to discerning how natural justice applies in a particular situation. Natural justice exists only where there are agreements between Friends. Since the use of koinonia in the Epicurean scriptures is restricted to this context, we assume that this fellowship is only possible among Friends who have such agreements (which require trust and a high degree of clear communication). These agreements may take the concrete forms of written contracts, verbal agreements, or oaths. Outside of this, there is no natural, concrete justice, and therefore no koinonia. This means that justice (defined as mutual benefit, and avoidance of mutual harm) is one of the foundations for Epicurean Friendship, since it’s not seen to flourish among people who do not agree to not harm each other, but to benefit each other. In this way, we can understand why the Doctrines on justice precede the final two in the progression of ideas that we find in the Kyriai Doxai, and why they’re advantageous for our happiness, and therefore included in the canonical collection of maxims as required practice.

Since these Doctrines discuss the intimacy of our communities, they’re a good place to evaluate the utility of the word Koinonia. It might be more advantageous for us to refer to the Society of Friends of Epicurus as a Koinonia, rather than as “this Society”, which may at times (by people who are hostile to us, or who are ignorant) be misconstrued to refer to the entire society of which we are part of, when we in reality are only referring to those who are in our circle and who are armed for happiness. The adoption of the term Koinonia may, therefore, be a clearer and more specific way for Epicureans to refer to our own circles of Friends, rather than “society” or other words whose meaning is broader.

PD’s 10-14: On the Utility of Science and the Pleasure of Safety

If the things that produce the delights of those who are decadent washed away the mind’s fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering, and furthermore if they taught us the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no complaints against them, since they would be filled with every joy and would contain not a single pain or distress (and that’s what is bad).

What are the things that produce the delights of those who are decadent? Some may say prostitution or endless pursuit of sexual pleasures, or endless desires (over-eating, abuse of drugs or alcohol). The PD says we DO have complaints against them (but it has nothing to do with the pleasure we gain from them): they are not productive of tranquil pleasure, their delights come with inconveniences. This Doctrine helps with hedonic calculus.

Anxiety often manifests as bored craving for needless things, or fears about not having those things. Extravagant, wasteful, licentious, or libertine pleasures are not necessarily “bad” so long as we understand the limits of nature. Principal Doctrine 11 is the doctrine of science as a means:

If our suspicions about astronomical phenomena and about death were nothing to us and troubled us not at all, and if this were also the case regarding our ignorance about the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no need for studying what is natural.

Both PDs 10-11 remind us that only empirical knowledge (epilogismos or empirical thinking) can tell us about the limits of nature. This Doctrine specifically explains the purpose of studying nature, that the study of nature is the cure for problems related to inherited superstitions, and that science is a means to our tranquility and happiness. Also, it says here that science is necessary to remove these fears and apprehensions; this is not to say we should not study nature beyond this (if it brings pleasure, or if it helps in some other way), but that this is the amount that falls within the category of necessary knowledge. There are three categories for what is necessary in the Letter to Menoeceus, and one of them consists of what is needed for our happiness–which includes some measure of scientific knowledge. This, naturally, has repercussions for the philosophy and practice of Epicurean education.

Polystratus, the third Scholarch of the Garden, said that if we pursue virtue without the study of nature, our virtue will degrade into nothing, have no utility, and may result in arrogance and superstition. We see this today among the practitioners of conventional religions, for they are often hostile to the advance of science and fanatical in their views. Therefore, without the study of nature, we say that it is also useless to pursue virtue (regardless of how well-meaning we are). PD 12 continues attacking our suspicions about the myths:

It is impossible for someone who is completely ignorant about nature to wash away his fears about the most important matters if he retains some suspicions about the myths. So it is impossible to experience undiluted pleasure without studying what is natural.

This doctrine helps to cure fear of hell and of gods, and other fear-based superstitions, by pointing to the study of nature. I am reminded of the founder of Atheist Republic and his attempts to commit suicide as a teenager because of his deep fear of the Islamic hell, which was instilled in him when he was growing up. The Epicurean Doctrines accentuate, more than once, that the study of nature (philologia) is necessary for happiness, and to heal the diseases of the soul that keep us from being happy.

Concerning the issue of “suspicions”, let us bring this word into relief in order to accentuate it against the mention of the word “gnomé” (conviction, judgment) in PD 28, the Doctrine of the utility of dogmatism, where Epicurus says: “you must KNOW these things!”. Here, the Hegemon requires a full cognitive commitment and assimilation of the Doctrines from the disciple. The key-word of this Doctrine is gnomé, which shares semantic roots with “to know”, “knowledge”, and “conocer” (to know) in Spanish.

Epicurus always carefully chose his words, which makes them particularly powerful. Notice (and contrast) the power and medicine of these two words: when we discuss “suspicions”, we are not giving credit to the relevant truth-claims. We are dismissing them as mere “suspicions”, whereas the truths we gain from the study of nature are knowledge. We do not suspect them, we KNOW them. We should seek to imitate Epicurus’ mastery of his choice of words for accuracy and clarity. PDs 13 and 14 are about safety.

It is useless to be safe from other people while retaining suspicions about what is above and below the earth and in general about the infinite unknown

PD 13 continues the reasoning of PD 12. Why is this a separate PD? It deals specifically with safety, which is in the category of natural and necessary pleasures. By attacking our “suspicions” based on fear-based superstitions, these Doctrines invite us to have a firm conviction and a clear understanding based on the study of nature. We must not be wishy-washy, or give the benefit of doubt to superstition for reasons of political correctness, or of tolerance, etc. as this leads to degrading superstition. To avoid giving undue credit to the suspicions about the myths, we must have a firm conviction (gnomé) in the scientific worldview, with no room for “suspicion”.

Epicurus in his ethics is concerned about the quality of the direct, immediate experience of the sentient being, and whether it’s pleasant or painful. True to this, he uses the word asphaléias not merely as security from other men and external threats (as important as those are), but as a subjective experience. He’s interested in security, surety, certainty and a sense of safety as a psychological or existential state. He wants us to know and feel that we are really safe, to experience inner, psychological safety. He says that without this, if we still harbor suspicions that lead to irrational fears, no safety from external threats makes up for our lack of subjective safety. He establishes a connection between subjective safety from superstitious fears and safety from external threats because he wants his disciple to pay attention to how safety feels in his soul.

And so the disciple must sincerely introspect concerning his opinions and suspicions, and align them with the study of nature and with his own advantage, fearlessness, and pleasure.

Although some measure of safety from other people is based in the power to fight them off and in abundant wealth, the purest security comes from solitude and breaking away from the herd.

Doctrine 14 discusses the method of retreat. The word used here is hesuchia, which translates as peace, quiet, stillness, rest, silence. Epicurus established the doctrine of an Epicurean retreat, presumably because it’s useful to cultivate ataraxia, which requires safety. We may consider this retreat in terms of an actual hermit tradition of the Gardens, but “breaking away from the herd” can be practiced in a calm oasis of peace in the middle of a city. The original Garden was at the margins of Athens. So each practitioner must consider what level and form of hesuchia passes hedonic calculus.

Doctrine 14 should inspire us to make our homes into holy places of retreat, peace, safety, and tranquil pleasure, wherever our homes may be. It calls us to actually take the care and time to enjoy the warmth, familiarity, love, and the other pleasures of privacy and safety among those we care about. It inspires us to separate the space set aside for our true, natural community from the spaces occupied by the mobs. In these places of refuge, of hesuchia, it is easier to enjoy the pleasures of peace and safety.