Category Archives: Physics

Modified from "Pericles's Funeral oration" by Philipp Foltz (1852)

We Got Beef: A Disembowelment of the Dialectic, Politics, and Other Organs of Bullshit


“Rhetoricians might flatter flies with honey,
but politicians feed flies bullshit.”


Modified from “The Butcher’s Shop” by Gabriele Passerotti (1580)

WE GOT BEEF

A DISEMBOWELMENT OF THE DIALECTIC,
POLITICS, AND OTHER ORGANS OF BULLSHIT

 

I have a bone to pick with rhetoric.

Here’s the heart of the issue: talk is cheap. People chew fat in political chats without purpose — no learning occurs, no truth is shared, no friendship is found. Everyone misses the meat of the matter. Opinions are skin-deep. Debate rarely disembowels delusion. Too often, rhetoricians and orators enlist themselves in the service of manipulation. After all, “the end of rhetoric is to persuade in a speech” and not to validate truth with evidence (Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, I, col. 3). Their art does not “depend on arguments from physical facts” because “their art is a power of persuasion” (Ibid., II, 12, col. XIX). For instance, it is agreeable to suppose that honey attracts more flies than vinegar — true, but as a student of nature and pupil of the Garden (so guided to treat politics with suspicion), I observe that nothing attracts so many flies as bullshit.

Those who study in the rhetorical schools are deceived. They are charmed by the tricks of style, and pay no attention to the thought, believing that if they can learn to speak in this style they will succeed in the assembly and court of law. But when they find that this style is wholly unfitted for practical speaking they realize that they have lost their money.
(Epíkouros, Against the Rhetoricians)

The rhetorical τέχνη (tékhnē, “technique”) of the sophists provides a technical method without practical application; at the same time many practical orators enjoy success, and wield influence without technically possessing any teachable skills, having mastered neither art nor science. Dialecticians may enjoy sagacious reputations, but may also lack receptivity, perspective, and may provide people with impractical, ineffective advice. Both educated rhetoricians and natural orators present dangers as agents of persuasion — dialecticians turn the practical benefits of philosophy into abstractions; rhetors misuse the art of prose for manipulation; orators’ aptitude for practical persuasion lacks a foundation in natural ethics.

Each of the rhetorical arts and practices fails to ground themselves in nature. As human agents of manipulation, professional persuaders fail to refer to the natural “goal” of “living blessedly” (Laértios 10.128). Each of these tools can be appropriated to service a political agenda. Only the true philosophy provides students with the tools they need to understand reality and pursue happiness. To quote the lead character from a favorite, adult cartoon, “Everyone wants people they like to be right. That’s why popular people are fucking dumb” (Rick and Morty, Season 3, Episode 4). As Epíkouros teaches, “the purest security is possible by means of the peace and the withdrawal from the masses”, never by chasing their satisfaction (Key Doctrine 14).

Modified from artwork by Kasten Searles for “The Queen’s Gambit” from the Arkansas Times, March 2024

THE PRISON OF POLITICS

Unlike other schools, the Garden rejects politics as a valid field of inquiry and remonstrates the rhetorical tools that support the political ambitions of professional persuaders. As φιλοσοφία (philosophía) is the “love of wisdom”, so politics is antithetical to friendship and wisdom. While Epíkouros does not dismiss civic engagement, he warns against pursuing a political career. Such a pursuit requires either subservience to wealthy interests, or else, submission to popular opinion, or engagement with senseless gossip. The most effective politicians are not those who are the most educated, for “some come out of the schools worse than when they went in” (On Rhetoric, I, 35, 1 ff.=Suppl. 19.13 ff.), but those who are best at “studying what pleases the crowd and practicing” (Ibid., I, 45, 13 ff.=Suppl. 23, 20 ff.) In this way, through pleasing speech, an otherwise unskilled narcissist “can become skilled in politics” (Ibid.).

Political narratives, in particular, are uniquely dubious. Self-promoting orators spoil healthy discourse by drawing people into pointless debates. Rhetoricians excel at erecting scarecrows. Argumentative puppets present themselves as prime cuts of intelligence, yet many are without substance. Popular speakers are incentivized to sell unpalatable policies for the sake of their own enrichment. Politicians dress the inedible entrails they cook with zest. They spice lies to hide their rancid flavor. They sew empty arguments from skin and bones. Debates are dressed for taste, and, as mentioned, rarely dissect the meat of the matter. Dialectical discourse is dangerous. Rhetoric and oratory are ineffective at verifying true statements and, more importantly, impractical at cultivating friendships. As Philódēmos acknowledges, “Politics is the worst foe of friendship; for it generates envy, ambition and discord.” (On Rhetoric, II, 158, fr. XIX).

In speaking of a “free life”, Epíkouros affirms that it

is not possible to be acquired by a lot of money [made] through an unscrupulous means [nor] is without servility to the mob or authority, rather [it] acquires everything [it needs] in continuous abundance; nevertheless if [one did procure] any money by chance, then the latter can be easily distributed to those nearby for goodwill. (Vatican Saying 58)

In this essay, I mean to review rhetoric, dissect dialectic, purge politics, and oust the aura of oratory. We will skim the fat from inference by demonstrating the dangers of logical induction. As Epíkouros teaches, we “must liberate ourselves, out of the prison [built] upon circular” proceedings, social programming, indoctrination, senseless gossip, “political” affairs”, and other practices that sacrifice the testimony of the senses for persuasive story-telling (Vatican Saying 58). “If you contest every single one of the sense perceptions, you can neither judge the outward appearance nor can you affirm which of the sensations you, yourself say are deceptive according to the way in which the criterion operates” (Key Doctrine 23).

“Relativity” by M. C. Escher (1953)

UNFOUNDED INFERENCE

Epicureans reject both philosophical “reasonings in the form of Aristotelian syllogisms or inductions” as well as “other dialectical procedure(s)”  (On Irrational Contempt 2). As Polýstratos writes, those persuaded by such procedures “are fools who construct their argument solely on the basis of the conviction of others” and not through empirical investigation (Ibid.). “[B]y the dialectical means mentioned, one cannot deliver the soul from fear and anxious suspicion” because the conclusions of the rhetor, the orator, and the dialectician are not founded on physics (Ibid.). The dialectic is rejected “for want of qualification” as a reliable criterion of knowledge, for the Epicureans “suppose the study of nature provides the proper space for the voices of the facts” (Laértios 10.31). The only valid testimony is from the senses — speculation, hearsay, assumption, induction, and conjecture are inferior practices to the process of confirming hypotheses with evidence. “We shall say that the one who infers thus fails because he has not gone through all appearances well, and indeed that he is corrected by the appearances themselves” of real things (On Signs). When “divorced [from] the real phenomena”, then reality gets “cast out of the whole study of nature and then flows from a myth” (Laértios 10.87).

By contrast, Epicureans employ “the method of analogy”, observing nature, inferring hypotheses, and substantiating with evidence. “For there is no other correct method of inference besides this” (Philódēmos, On Signs). Sophistic rhetoric further confounds the process of substantiating hypotheses with observation. By contrast, evidence justifies the demonstrable truth of statements. Otherwise, flawed methods lead to self-defeating conclusions. “For the arguments that they devise to refute the [Epicurean] method of analogy contribute to its confirmation. […] It is the same in other cases, so that as a result they refute themselves.” (Ibid.). As pertains to professional persuaders, rarely are politicians and scientists the same people.

Modified from “The School of Athens by Rafael (1509-11)

DIABOLECTICIANS

Unlike other philosophers, Epíkouros does not recognize the dialectic as a distinct branch of philosophy (Laértios 7.41). Rather, he recognizes the dialectic as a mere method, which, by itself, cannot arrive at the “truth” it seeks to find. Speaking of the Epicurean Garden, Diogénēs reports that “she has withdrawn the Dialectic [and] rejects it for want of qualification;” for the Epicureans “suppose the [study of] natural [phenomena] provides [the proper] space for the voices of the facts.” (Ibid., 10.31). Epíkouros called “the Dialecticians totally toxic” (Ibid., 10.8) and later refers to “dialectic” as being “pretentious” (Epistle to Hēródotos 10.72). Contemporaneously, “Metródōros wrote […] Against the Dialecticians” (Laértios 10.24). He was documented “ridiculing those who consider the dialectic method more accurate” (On Rhetoric, II, 45, col. XLV). Philódēmos positively identifies the position of “the dialectician” as “a position which we refute” (Ibid., I, 190, col. IX; I, 191, col. X). Polýstratos writes that dialectical reasoning is based purely upon the false premises of dialectician’s “own conviction” (On Irrational Contempt 2). Instead, “one must, for the sake of oneself” observe nature to determine the truth of statements (Epistle to Hēródotos 10.72). Otherwise, as Philódēmos notes, “those who use dialectical reasoning do not know that they are shamefully refuting themselves” (On Signs).

For a demonstration of the dialectic in action, consider the following exampe, courtesy of the American, two-party political system: Suppose the Pink Team asserts that ‘An asteroid is coming! We need funds to stop it!’ The Yellow Team responds: ‘There is no asteroid. You just want money.’ Fortunately, everyone is a respectable, patient, educated dialectician, and everyone agrees to the wise rules of their admirable methodology. They proudly reach a compromise: ‘After extensive consideration, we have determined that there is a chance that an object, perhaps, in this case, an asteroid, of indeterminate size, mind you, may enter a region of spa —’

SLAM. That was the sound of nature crushing their dialectic.

Modified from “Asteroid Crashing into a Primordial Earth” by Don Davis / NASA (1991).png

THE RACKET OF RHETORIC

“[T]o practice rhetoric is toilsome to body and soul, and we would not endure it. [Rhetoric] is most unsuitable for one who aims at quiet happiness, and compels one to meddle more or less with affairs, and provides no more right opinion or acquaintance with nature than one’s ordinary style of speaking, and draw the attention of young men from philosophy”
(Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 52, col. 38., II, 53, col. L).

Rhetoric is a technique, an art of prose. Therein, Epicureans “do not claim that rhetoric is bad in itself” (Ibid., II, 142, fr. XIII). Simply, that rhetoricians “are like pilots, who have a good training but may be bad men.” Rhetoric is a weapon that any trained person can learn to wield. Even “the perfect orator” need not “be also a good man and a good citizen” as “in the case of any other art;” for example “a good musician may be a villain” (Ibid., II, 127, fr. XIII=II, 75, fr. XIII.). The 19th-century, French author Flaubert cautions, “Il ne faut pas toucher aux idoles: la dorure en reste aux mains” or “You shouldn’t touch idols: a little gold always rubs off” (Madame Bovary 3.5) — we receive this phrase as “never meet your heroes“. Indeed, were “the greatest rhetors [to] accomplish all they wish […] then they would be tyrants.” (On Rhetoric, II, 151, fr. VIII).

“To tell the truth,” so writes Philódēmos, “the rhetors do a great deal of harm to many people”, by defending the art of manipulation (Ibid., II, 133, fr. IV). He documents that rhetoricians “were not in good repute at the very beginning” as far as “in Egypt and Rhodes and Italy” (Ibid., II, 105, fr. XII). Hermarkhos claims that “rhetors [do not] deserve admiration”. “Moreover the rhetors charge for the help they give, and so cannot be considered benefactors” (Ibid., II, 159, fr. XX). By contrast, “the philosophers give their instruction without cost” (Ibid.). “Metrodorus teaches in regard to rhetoric that it does not arise from a study of science” (Ibid., II, 193, fr. 2). “The end of rhetoric is to persuade in a speech”, designed to disregard nature as is convenient. “It is clearly proven that the art of the rhetor is of no assistance for a life of happiness” (Ibid., I, 250, XVIII).

Modified from “The Death of Socrates” by Jacques-Loius David (1787)

STUPID SOPHISTS

If he knew that he could not […] become a philosopher […] he might propose to teach grammar, music, or tactics. For we can find no reason why anyone with the last spark of nobility in his nature should become a sophist…” (Ibid., II, 54, col. 39., col, LI).

The Epicurean critique against rhetoric is dually applied to and principally exhibited by a method that they refer to as sophistic (also referred to as “panegyric” or “epideictic” rhetoric). In general, people “are led astray by sophists and pay them money merely to get the reputation for political ability” (Ibid., II, 46, col. 33). It has been grossly easy for rich orators to persuade poor laborers to fund their schemes. Philódēmos observes that “sophistical training does not prevent faulty speech” (Ibid., I.182, col. I—I, 186, col. V). In fact, “some do not care at all for what they say” so long as it accomplishes their rhetorical goal, regardless of the greater goal of life (Ibid., I, 244. col XIII). “And when they do praise a good man they praise him for qualities considered good by the crowd, and not truly good qualities” (Ibid., I, 216 col. XXXVa, 14).

“[I]t follows that”, as is the case with other forms of technical rhetoric “those who possess this ability [of sophistic rhetoric] have acquired it without the help of scientific principles” (Ibid., I, 136, 20=Suppl. 61, 19). “[R]hetorical sophists” are known “for wasting their time on investigation of useless subjects, such as […] the interpretation of obscure passages in the poets”, as when civic policy is guided by mythic texts (Ibid., I, 78, 19 ff.=Suppl. 39, 5 ff). Compared against the philosophers, “the instruction given by the sophists is not only stupid but shameless, and lacking in refinement and reason” since it does not take into account the goal of life, nor commit to a devoted study of nature (Ibid., I, 223, fr. III). Instead, sophistic rhetoric appeals to authority and tradition by means of equivocation, obfuscation, and exploitation of ignorance.

“Paul Preaching in the Areopagus” by James Thornhill (1729-31)

CULTIVATING IGNORANCE

Often, obfuscation “is intentional”, as is the case “when one has nothing to say, and conceals the poverty of his thought by obscure language that he may seem to say something useful” as with equivocation (Ibid., I, 156, col. XIII). Other times, we observe “unintentional obscurity [that] arises from not mastering the subject, or not observing the proper formation […] and in general from failure” (Ibid., I, 158, col. XVI). Obscurity in discourse also arises “from ignorance of the proper meanings of words, their connotation, and the principles on which one word is to be preferred to another” (Ibid., I. 159, col. XVII). In these cases, the success of an orator corresponds not with knowledge, nor coherence, but with a practical ability to persuade a mob. “Most, if not all [of] the arguments do not prove what they claim to prove even if the premises be granted.” (Ibid., I, col. 5). “The worst class of arguments are those which act as boomerangs and demolish the position of the disputant” (Ibid. I, 4, col. I=Suppl. 4, 17).

For example, suppose that a sophist means to convince a legislative body to support a piece of legislation, but they lack meaningful substance. It behooves them to appeal to their audience’s preferences — moderates appreciate an appeal to custom (e.g. it’s the way it is); traditionalists appreciate an appeal to myth (e.g. it’s the way it’s always been); legalists appreciate an appeal to authority (e.g. it’s the law); populists appreciate an appeal to popularity (e.g. it’s what we want); economists appreciate an appeal to wealth (e.g. it’s profitable); bleeding-hearts appreciate an appeal to empathy (e.g. have a heart); ignorant people appreciate an appeal to simplicity (e.g. they’re trying to confuse you). The most ignorant are the most gullible, easy prey for skilled sophists. (Intentional obfuscation is masterfully exemplified by the “Chewbacca Defense” from the October 7, 1998 episode of South Park. The “Chewbacca Defense” leads to an irrelevant conclusion based on non-sequitur speech and a red herring.)

Modified from a screenshot of “Chef Aid,” South Park, season 2, episode 14, Comedy Central, 1998

EMPTY ORATORY

Philódēmos spends the better part of On Rhetoric distinguishing rhetoric as a technical art versus legislative and judicial oratory, which he identifies as a practical skill. He writes:

The practical skill acquired by observation is not called an art by the Greeks except that sometimes in a loose use of language people call a clever woodchopper an artist. If we call observation and practice art we should include under the term all human activity.
(Ibid., I, 57, 23 ff.=Suppl. 29, 15 ff.)

There is a “division between the different parts of rhetoric (i. e. sophistic and practical rhetoric) which was made by Epicurus and his immediate successors (Ibid., I, 49, 14 ff.=Suppl. 25, 15 ff.). Unlike sophistic, Philódēmos suggests that one “could find reason for pursuing practical rhetoric”, even though this form of oratory does not qualify as a formal art (Ibid., II, 54, 41). Unlike sophistic methods of argumentation, practical oration (the ambassadorial oratory of diplomats, the deliberative oratory or legislators, the forensic oratory of lawyers) provides practical utility: “thousands of [Greeks] have been useful ambassadors, were prudent in their advice, were not the cause of disaster, did not speak with an eye to gain, and were not convicted of malfeasance in office.” (Ibid., II, 224, col. XIX). In these cases, “some do succeed by means of natural ability and experience without the aid of rhetoric” (Ibid., I, 47, I ff.=Suppl. 24, 10 ff.). They are less concerned with trying “to classify and describe metaphors” instead of trying to give “practical working instructions” (Ibid., I, 171, 2, col. XII).

Still, even without methodical manipulation, oratory does not guarantee happiness, and provides no moral direction. It allows fools without skill to run offices that benefit from skill. Popularity insulates celebrities from the consequences of their actions. Oratory is the favored tool of talentless politicians whose only object is the advancement of destructive pursuits.

By contrast against the empty promises, unhelpful eloquence, and practical lies of orators, Philódēmos argues for παρρησία (parrēsía, “frank” or “free speech”), explaining that it is truly καλή φράσις (kalḗ phrásis), “lovely phrasing” or “beautiful speech” (On Rhetoric, I, 149 IV). Epíkouros commits to using “ordinary expressions appropriately, and not express oneself inaccurately nor vaguely, nor use expressions with double meaning” (Ibid., I,161, Col XIX). Ornate oratory might promote popularity, but rarely does it reduce anxiety.

Modified from a screenshot from “They Live” by John Carpenter (1988)

POLITICAL PROGRAMMING

Rhetoricians might flatter flies with honey, but politicians feed flies bullshit.

Epicurus believed that there was no art of persuading large bodies of men; that those who are not rhetoricians sometimes are more persuasive than the rhetoricians; that those trained in panegyric are less able to face the tumult of the assembly than those who have no rhetorical training; that Epicurus spoke of arts, and said that those acquainted with them were benefited, but did not mean that this enabled them to attain the end; if anyone possesses the power of persuasion it is responsible for evil and not for good.
(On Rhetoric, I, 99, 5b=Suppl. 48, 15)

While the arts of persuasion are discouraged, even then, Epicureans evaluate the dialectic and rhetoric above political discourse. “[W]e declare [politics not] to be an art “ (Ibid., Section II-a). Politicians are famously dishonest because “a clever man without studying the technical works of the sophists can study some sophist’s speech and so learn to imitate them.” (Ibid., I, 130. col. XXIX). Command does not require comprehension. “They certainly leave no place for any science…” (Ibid., I, 49, 14 ff.=Suppl. 25, 15 ff.). Indeed, “Delivery depends, too, on natural endowment, beauty of voice, grace of body” (Ibid., Col. XV). The job of “the statesman” is only to “discover the inherent political arguments” corresponding to “what appears true to the crowd” and then to manipulate them to the best of their ability (On Rhetoric, I, 209. col. XXVIII). As conditions change, one politician can advance murderous schemes, while another need to only wear the wrong-colored outfit to incite widespread, public ridicule. “There is no method by which one can” reliably “persuade the multitude, either always or in the majority of cases”, so pursuing politics is akin to delaying your own happiness (Ibid., II, 120, fr. XIX). Usually, success in politics requires either “a lot of money made through unscrupulous means” or “servility to the mob or authority” (Vatican Saying 67). Neither of those conditions are conducive to happiness.

To sum up; by no means should the philosopher acquire political experience, or rhetoric of that sort. It is evident that it is the height of folly to say that a study of nature produces a ἕξις [“habit”] of political oratory, especially since they introduce into the scheme of philosophy example andenthymeme” (On Rhetoric, II, 35, col. 38).

Philódēmos identifies those arguments that appeal to prejudice, traditional paradigms, historical precedence, and common belief as being “vain” (Ibid., I, 286, col. VII). They are “mere padding [to] provoke applause”, all “because the multitude is foolish” (Ibid., II, 39, col. XLI, I. 14). It is equally foolish that those “in political speeches use syllogism and induction which the dialecticians pride themselves on using” (Ibid., I, 286, col. VII). Therefore:

“[The wise] will [not] meddle in politics […] nor will they tyrannize; nor will they bark like a Cynic, […] and they will serve jury duty, and they will leave behind writings, but will not make public endorsements, and they will take precautions for their possessions” (Laertios 10.119).

Modified from “Departure of Odysseus from the Land of the Phaeacians” by Claude Lorrain (1646)

THE HARBOR OF PHILOSOPHY

“But this does not apply any more to philosophy”, nor does it apply to “the Epicureans who refrain from such things” (Ibid., II, 144, fr. II). “Philosophy is more profitable than epideictic rhetoric, especially if one practices rhetoric in the fashion of the sophists (Ibid., I, 225, fr. I). “To tell the truth”, so Philódēmos boasts, “philosophers gain the friendship of public men by helping them out of their troubles.” (Ibid., II, 133, fr. IV). He explains, “they live in peace and justice and tried friendship; those whom they find opposed to them they quickly soften” (Ibid., II, 160, XXI-XXV. II, 162, fr. XXVII). As mentioned, the Epicureans pride themselves on παρρησία (parrēsía, “free speech”). “In speaking one should not resort to ignoble rhetorical tricks, these have less effect than a straight-forward character” (Ibid., II, 126, fr. VI). Since the public tends to prefer comfortable lies, “it is better not to receive public preferment” (Ibid., II, 154, fr. XII.). Philosophers “help their country” not by patronizing the public, but “by teaching the young […] to act justly even if there are no laws, and to shun injustice as they would fire.” (Ibid., II, 154, fr. XIII.).

The primary resource that preserves the Epicurean deconstruction of oratory comes from Philódēmos in his book On Rhetoric. In this book, Philódēmos distinguishes technical rhetoric from practical oratory. He provides a critique of political speech and reviews the dialectic against the Epicureans’ method by analogy that anticipates the modern, scientific method.

Of chief concern, Philódēmos contrasts arts (like dialectic and rhetoric) against practical oratory and political speech, which are not teachable arts. “An art”, he writes “cannot be attained by one who has not studied it, and doing this regularly and certainly and not by conjecture.” He further explains that “this definition applies both to […] grammar and music”. He later adds “architecture, ship-carpentry, navigation, painting”, which all “had methods in olden time” (Ibid., I, 137, col. 33I.21). He concludes, “On the basis of this definition we declare sophistic to be an art” (Ibid., Section II-a). Here again, “That statement ‘He is a good rhetor’ simply means that he is experienced and skilled in speaking”, not that he is a good person. “For as we say ‘good rhetor’ we say ‘good artist’ meaning ‘skillful’” (Ibid., II, 234, col. XXXV).

Modified from “Sappho and Alcaeus” by Sir Lawrence Alma-Tadema (1881)

VARIETIES OF DISCOURSE

“One cannot even say that all rhetors adopt one style”, since orators alter their deliveries to suit the disposition of their audience (Ibid., I.152, Col. VIII). In On Rhetoric, our friend Philódēmos provides an overview of the various types of rhetoric and oratory, in addition to reviewing the positions of the Peripatetics and Stoics. In The Art of Rhetoric, Aristotélēs distinguishes rhetoric by three domains of persuasion: [I] deliberative or symbouleutic (e.g legislative), [II] forensic (e.g. judicial), and [III] epideictic (e.g. charismatic speeches) types (Technē Rhētorikē). A later Peripatetic adds [IV] enteuctic (e.g. ingratiation) as a fourth category. Conversely, the Stoics refer to epideictic rhetoric as [V] enconmiastic (e.g. eulogistic). Philódēmos also identifies [VI] ambassadorial (e.g. diplomatic) oratory and [VII] eristic (e.g. controversial). While ambassadorial, deliberative, and forensic styles of oratory exemplify practical oratory, the precision of rhetoric qualifies it as a technical art. Unlike practical oratory, technical rhetoric is exemplified by epideictic, rhetoric, also called [VII] panegyric (e.g. pageantic) and/or [VII] sophistic (e.g. deceptive).

As regards dialectic, Philódēmos offers professional respect (especially when compared against the profession of politics, the practice of oratory, and the art of rhetoric). He elaborates:

For the method of question and answer is necessary not only in philosophy and education, but often in the ordinary intercourse of life. The method of joint inquiry frequently demands this style. Moreover this method is adopted by the rhetor in the assembly as well as in the court of justice. (On Rhetoric, I, 241, col. XI).

While Philódēmos rejects the dialectic as a criterion of knowledge for “lack of qualification”, he accepts the general procedure as a logical tool, and acknowledges its applications in both technical rhetoric and practical oratory. In this way, “the rhetor is like the dialectician” (Ibid., II, 42, col. 30, I. 12.). The varieties of discourse are defined further at the end of this essay.

Modified from “Trilogy of the Desert: Mirage” by Salvador Dalí (1946)

THE MIRAGE OF SUCCESS

False illusions of success encircle us. Salary is not a reflection of skill. Popularity is not a mirror of value. Wealth cannot enrich friendship. Power cannot procure safety. Usually, these things produce antithetical effects: success incentivizes corruption, popularity rewards dishonesty, wealth challenges friendship, and power instigates insecurity. In his Key Doctrines, Epíkouros warns, “If for every occurrence you do not constantly reference the goal of natural pleasure, but if you suppress both banishment of pain and pursuit of pleasure to operate for another purpose, your reasonings and practices will not be in accordance” (25).

Wishing to be worshipped and well-liked, people procured security from people so long as they can be pronounced popular. And if so then indeed they were safe since such a lifestyle inherits the natural benefit of the good. If, however, they procured no safety, then they did not receive that for which they initially strove. (Key Doctrine 7)

Philódēmos provides us with a further warning in On Rhetoric as well as an example of when politicians, wishing to be popular, failed to procure safety:

“[M]any statesmen have been rejected by their fellow citizens, and slaughtered like cattle. Nay they are worse off than cattle, for the butcher does not hate the cattle, but the tortures of the dying statesmen are made more poignant by hatred” (Ibid., I, 234, col. V).

Based on these factors, Hermarkhos calls those who willfully pursue a career in rhetoric “insane”. They rarely achieve the goal of nature that such wealth and popularity is meant to secure. He affirms that “’It is better to lose one’s property than to keep it by lawsuits which disturb the calm of the soul‘” (Ibid., I, 81, 3ff.=Suppl. 40, 23 ff). For “it is much better to lose one’s wealth if one can not keep it otherwise, than to spend one’s life in rhetoric” (Ibid., I, 235, col. VI). Epíkouros summarizes, “Better for you to have courage lying upon a bed of straw than to agonize with a gold bed and a costly table” (Usener, Epicurea 207).

Modified from “Landscape with Farmhouses and Palm Trees” by Camille Pissarro (1853)

LIVE UNKNOWN

“[L]et us be content”, writes Philódēmos, “to live the quiet life of a philosopher without claiming a share in the ability to manage a city by persuasion” (On Rhetoric, I, 234, col. IV). Nothing secures a pleasant life so much as friendship, and nothing guarantees a life of pain so much as politics. Philosophy is more valuable that rhetoric because the “philosophy that teaches us how to limit our desires is better than rhetoric which helps us to satisfy them.” (Ibid., II, 150, fr. VII)

Philosophy is more profitable than epideictic rhetoric, especially if one practices rhetoric in the fashion of the sophists […]. The philosopher has many τόποι [“topics” or “positions”] concerning practical justice and other virtues about which he is confident; the busybody (i. e. the rhetorician) is quite the opposite. Nor is one who does not appear before kings and popular assemblies forced to play second part to the rich, as do rhetors who are compelled to employ flattery all their lives. (Ibid., I, 225, fr. I).

Escape notice and live! So writes Philódēmos, every “good and honest [person] who confines [their] interest to philosophy alone, and disregards the nonsense of lawyers, can face boldly all such troubles, yea all powers and the whole world.” (Ibid., II, 140, fr. XII). He observes:

“inspired before the same loud clamor, some will strive with the effort of Apollophanes [the Stoic] to advance wonderfully to the podium, but others, having landed in [philosophy’s] harbor and with hopes offered them that ‘not even the venerable flame of Zeus would be able to prevent them taking from the highest point of the citadel’ a life that is happy, afterwards, in spite of opposing winds….” (P.Herc 463)

Modified still from Star Wars: Andor, “Rix Road” (Season 1, Episode 12, November 23, 2022).

A GALAXY CLOSE TO HOME

If you will humor me, and entertain the possibility that I might attempt to “rightly hold dialogue about both music and poetry” (Laertios 10.120), consider that many of these points have been artfully orchestrated by writer and director Tony Gilroy in the television series Star Wars: Andor. One character in the fiction, the galactic senator, Mon Mothma, highlights the perils of propaganda (and political office) by exposing a dangerous, manufactured narrative: her dissent in politics has made her a target, and her agency as an orator is being suppressed. She redresses the Senate one, final time before withdrawing to a base, hidden deep in a distant forest:

The distance between what is said and what is known to be true has become an abyss. Of all the things at risk, the loss of an objective reality is perhaps the most dangerous. The death of truth is the ultimate victory of evil. When truth leaves us, when we let it slip away, when it is ripped from our hands we become vulnerable to the appetite of whatever monster screams the loudest. (Season 2, Episode 9)

In this fiction, diplomatic puppets defend and regurgitate loaded propaganda, having been convinced that a small, non-violent protest was actually an uprising. Only the survivors of the massacre, who heard the screams and saw the bodies for themselves know the truth. Similarly, Epíkouros advises that there “is a need to take into account […] all of the self-evident facts, according to which we refer our opinions”. Otherwise, “if not everything will be full of foolishness and of confusion” (Key Doctrine 22). Otherwise, one might be mislead to excuse genocide in the name of “security”. Otherwise, one might be mislead by political pundits and influential personalities to defend an armed mob of triggered, masked agents, deputized by a corrupt system to act with impunity. In the drama, one stormtrooper even shoots a woman in the face.

Trust your physical feelings and the force of nature. Lies are impractical. Propaganda is self-destructive. Oratory can be sinister. Principally, they target those who dismiss evidence and embrace superstition. It is dangerously easy to compel gullible minds to commit acts of violence through persuasive speech. Indeed, the modern-French philosopher Voltaire (heavily influenced by the propositions of the Epicurean school) observed that “Certainement qui est en droit de vous rendre absurde est en droit de vous rendre injuste” (Questions sur la Miracles 412). “Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities.” Persuasion is dangerous, and we rightly treat the instruments by which it spreads with scorn.

No deceptive speeches, manipulative oratory, lofty dialectic, nor rhetorical bullshit will convince a wise person to doubt their own eyes, discard their own feelings, and abandon their own study of nature. I invite you to see with your own eyes. Your life likely depends on it.


INDEX

Modified from “The Butcher’s Shop” by Gabriele Passerotti (1580)

    • Technical rhetoric includes epideictic, encomiastic, and panegyric or sophistic types. Philódēmos teaches that these methods of rhetoric are true arts.
    • Practical oratory includes ambassadorial, deliberative (or symbouleutic), and forensic types. Statesmen employ these methods for practical functions.
    • Political discourse “in this respect […] may fittingly be compared to the art of prophecy” (Ibid., I, 31, 3 ff.=Suppl. 17, 20 ff.). It is sometimes practical.
    • The Dialectic is a systemic, but deeply flawed method of reasoning privileged by
    • Socratics, Megarians, Academics, Peripatetics, and Stoics.
    • The Method by Analogy refers to the empirical reasoning of the Epicureans, which draws inferences from observations that can then be tested.
    • Philódēmos mentions several other rhetoric types, including the entuectic and eristic types that are not explicitly categorized, and may be synonyms or subsets.

  • AMBASSADORIAL ORATORY – πρεσβευτικός (presbeytikós). This practical form of oratory is employed by dignitaries and diplomats. Ambassadorial oratory is the ability “to be able to persuade in diplomatic negotiations by speech, not by power or bribes or dignities or anything else an ambassador might possess” (Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 217, col. XIII).

  • DELIBERATIVE ORATORY – συμβουλευτικά (symbouleutiká) is also known as “symbouleutic” oratory. This practical form of oratory is used by legislators. It “gives advice only on matters affecting the common welfare, and that this advice is not the product of the sophistic art, but of [something] quite a different…” (Ibid., I, 211. Col. XXX.19).

  • EPIDEICTIC RHETORIC – ἐπιδεικτικός (epideiktikós, “demonstrative”, “performative”). This is an art of study regarding “charming speeches” (Ibid., II, 244, col. XLII). It is also called “encomiastic” by Stoics (Laértios 7.142). It is far less profitable than philosophy “especially if one practices rhetoric in the fashion of the sophists” (Ibid., I, 225, fr. I.).

  • ENCOMIASTIC RHETORIC – ἐγκωμιαστικός (enkōmiastikós, “eulogistic” or “laudatory”) is rhetoric ἐπαίνους καὶ ψόγους (epaínous kai psógous) “of praise and blame”. “Furthermore, no one can believe encomiasts, because they praise bad men” (Ibid., 220, col. XXXIXa). Stoics called epideictic oratory “encomiastic” (Laértios 7.142)


  • ERISTIC SPEECH – ἐριστικός (eristikós, “eager for strife”). “Dialectic and eristic may be arts…” , however, the Epicurean school evaluates them as forms of persuasion, unconcerned with the validity of their statements as they correspond to reality (Ibid., I, 57, 23 ff=Suppl. 29, 15 ff.). Eristic speech is provocative and controversial.

  • FORENSIC ORATORY – δίκανικα (díkanika, “judicial”). Philódēmos compares the practicality of forensic oratory with “deliberative” and “ambassadorial” oratory (Ibid., I, 134, col. XXXI). Practically, forensic oratory is employed in courts of law in the form of criminal defense.

  • PANEGYRIC RHETORIC – πανηγυρικός (panēgyrikós, “assembly” speech). This form of rhetoric is synonymous with sophistic rhetoric. “Now we have already treated in a previous section the idea that sophistic or panegyric or whatever it may be called […] may be easily called rhetoric.” (Ibid., II, 234. col. XXXV.). Epíkouros writes that the wise “will not πανηγυριεῖν (panēgyrieîn)” or “make public speeches” (Laértios 10.120).

  • POLITICAL DISCOURSE – πολιτικός (politikós, “of the city”). Politics, by itself, is not an art. By itself, the “political faculty” is empty. It is not a technique, nor a method, but more like “prophecy”. “No man was able […] to impart to his contemporaries or to posterity [the principles of politics]” without the rhetorical arts of the philosophers (Ibid., I, 139, col. XXXIV). “[T]echnical treatises of rhetoricians […] are useless for producing the political faculty”, which does not require training (On Rhetoric, I, 64, II frr.=Supple. 32, 19 ff.).

  • PRACTICAL ORATORY – Practical forms of oratory (for example, speeches employed by dignitaries, deliberations employed by legislators, and defenses employed by lawyers) are distinguished from technical rhetoric (epideictic or enconmiatic, and panegyric or sophistic). Practical oratory is not considered an art that can be learned, only a practice that can be repeated, like civic speech, legislative debate, judicial defense, and diplomatic counsel. “Epicurean authorities hold that sophistic rhetoric does not perform the task of practical and political rhetoric” (Ibid., I, 119, 28 = Suppl. 59., 1e4. I, 120, 10= Suppl, 60, 6).

  • SOPHISTIC RHETORIC – σοφιστική (sophistikḗ). Sophistic is an art of epideixis, and of the arrangement of speeches, written and extemporaneous.” (Ibid., II-c). “Sophistic style is suited to epideictic oratory and written works, but not to actual practice in forum and ecclesia” (Ibid., III, 134. fr. V). Indeed, “the training given by the sophists does not prepare for forensic or deliberative oratory” (Ibid., II, 131, fr. I). “Sophistic can “persuade men to become villains. And when they do praise a good man they praise him for qualities considered good by the crowd, and not truly good qualities” (Ibid., I, 216 col. XXXVa, 14).

  • TECHNICAL RHETORIC – τεχνικός (tekhnikós, “technical”) refers to methods of oratory that properly fit the Epicurean definition of an “art” (or “technique”), including epideictic and sophistic methods. Technical rhetoric offers methods (as is the case with any true art) that can be taught, and reproduced to achieve the same result. “Two sciences produce the same result.” (Ibid., I, 4, co. I=Suppl. 4, 17.). However, compared against the study of nature, “technical rhetoric has never advanced anyone” (Ibid., I.192, col. XI).

  • THE DIALECTICδιαλεκτική (dialektikḗ). Before the idealistic Hegelians and materialistic Marxists, the “dialectic” was privileged by Socratics, Megarians, Academics, Peripatetics, and Stoics, who defined it as “the science of conversing correctly where the speeches involve question and answer — and hence they also define it as the science of what it true and false and neither” (Laértios 7.42). The Epicureans reject the dialect as being incapable of verifying “truth” because it assumes that “truth” is capable of being reasoned without reliance upon physical evidence. Most of the dialecticians encouraged political participation as a necessity to existential satisfaction; Epicureans outright reject political office.

  • THE METHOD BY ANALOGY καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα τρόποϛ (ho kath’ homoiotēta tropos, “method according to similarity”) anticipated the modern, scientific method by several millennia. Epíkouros accepted that inferences must comport with observation and abide by nature. We must “create an analogy that corresponds with what we see“ (On Nature, Book 11, III, b5-12).” [W]e shall not be prevented from making inferences, provided that we use the method of analogy properly” (On Signs). And “we say that the method of analogy is a sound method of inference, with this condition, that no other appearance or previously demonstrated fact conflicts with the inference” (Ibid.).

For additional commentary, please see “Reasonings About Philodemus’ Rhetoric

For more on deliberate misrepresentation, please see “On Bullshit” by Dr. Harry Frankfurt

Clipped version of “Saint Epicurus” by Genevra Catalano (2023)

Be well and live earnestly!

Your Friend,
EIKADISTES
Keeper of Twentiers.com
Editor of the Hedonicon

Epicurus Was Not an Atomist

Disclaimer: the ideas and opinions presented below are reflective of the author and
may or may not be shared by other members of the Society of Friends of Epicurus.

Epíkouros was not an atomist. (THUD.)

Nor was Dēmókritos. (GASP.)

… now that I have your attention, please excuse the provocative title — forgive my rhetorical provocation, having trespassed against the taxonomical conventions of academic tradition. I seek to provide nuance to your understanding of the teachings of Epíkouros, and to challenge the academic presentation of atomism as it has been so conceived. We will do so by privileging the perspective of a sweaty, 3rd-century Athenian and by providing critical context to supplement our understanding (we being students who are subject to the prejudices of modernity). We have been trained to catch ’em all, programmed to collect facts like cards. Too often, the presentation of philosophy is like a catalogue of products, each designed by a different manufacturer, each reviewed as a consumer flips the pages of a magazine. Yet Epíkouros did not manufacture sensations. He observed nature, and shared clever inferences. He arrived at his conclusions without the benefit of a vast repository of laboratory evidence.

In a nutshell, if you were an Epicurean in the Garden of Epíkouros (c. 3rd-century BCE), you would have had to have waited several thousand years before anyone called you an “atomist” (or ατομιστής). Prior to the Renaissance era, an Epicurean was just a “student of the Garden” or a “follower of Epíkouros”. The word “atomist” was coined by Renaissance minds in Latin, largely by anti-Epicurean thinkers who dismissed Epicurean particle physics as a silly fiction. The closest title I have found was employed by Athenaios in the 3rd-century CE (Deipnosophistaí 5.4) as προφήτας ἀτόμων (prophḗtas atómōn, meaning, literally, “prophets of atomic” particles). Here again, we find “of atoms” in a substantive, adjectival phrase, not as a proper noun. As a result, I wish to present an alternative lexicon that avoids the neologisms of our opponents.

Now, obviously the Hegemon teaches us that observable bodies are composed of atomic “particles” (and void, impressively anticipating the surprising conclusion of Rutherford’s gold foil experiment by over 2,200 years, demonstrating that solid objects are, generally speaking, about 0.01% stuff and 99.99% space). Nonetheless, the distinctions implied by words like “atoms” and “atomism” create slight incongruities that either warp Epíkouros’ description of particles, or else, beg misunderstandings as a result of sleepy translations and clumsy semantics. 

What’s in a Name?

Consider the fact that (so far as I have found) history does not document ancient proponents of particle physics as having referred to the “pieces” of reality by the plural noun άτομα (átoma, or “atoms”), nor any declension of the singular noun άτομο (átomo, or “atom”). This root compound “a-” and “témnō” is only ever found as an adjective ἄτομος (átomos, or “uncuttable”). Ancient texts do not record students of particle physics as having identified themselves by the proper noun ατομιστής (atomists, or “atomist”), nor as having codified their doctrines using the word ατομισμός (atomismós, or “atomism”). Epicureans did not see themselves as “atomists” attached to a theory of “atomism”, so much as adherents of the “true philosophy”, which understood the origins of “the real” world to be “atomic”. Of course, please NOTE: we do find the adjectival phrase ὁ ἄτομος (hó átomos, or “the atomic” body) and its various declensions throughout Epicurean texts. This substantive phrasing [article + adjective] implies a noun. Thus, translating   (“the”) átomos (“atomic”) as “the atom” is not unreasonable, nor inappropriate. Simply, I find it to be incomplete, and potentially-misleading. We miss an opportunity to expand our mental aggregate by reducing the swerving objects of Epicurean physics to mere “atoms”.

Cuttable Uncuttables

As it must seem ironic to students of Greek, the modern world refers to cuttable elements (like uranium) as “uncuttables”. Further complicating things, the Standard Model refers to the truly uncuttable bodies from which “uncuttables” are composed using the Latin prefix “sub-”, thus, framing “sub-atomic” particles as being (ironically) “under the [cuttable] uncuttables”. Historically, we inherit this irony as a vestige of the modern quest to identify the truly “uncuttable” components of nature. Scientists after the Renaissance assigned the atomic compounds they discovered with the allusive title of “atoms” (or “uncuttables”). Yet, as has been (unforgettably) demonstrated for just over eight decades, the modern “uncuttables” are actually, horrifyingly cuttable. Ancient “uncuttables”, however, were truly indivisible, and could not be split.

Of course, this nuance does not, in any way, invalidate ancient atomic theory. Simply put, ancient Epicureans did not imagine “atomic parts” the same way we imagine “hydrogen” and “oxygen” (as opposed to a correctly-named “lepton” which meets the “uncuttable” qualification). Granted, Epíkouros’ speculations were not infallible, and he sometimes assigns particles with an agency that properly belongs to “molecules” (as when he proposes that we are able to “smell” particles (10.53); in fact, we smell collections of particles “enlaced” as chemical “compounds”). Nonetheless, these naturalistic  propositions were deeply insightful, and functionally useful prior to the innovations of the 19th and 20th-centuries. Excitingly, modern physics provides modern Epicureans with the necessary, experimental evidence that is required (from the variety of explanations that Epíkouros provides, in accordance with his practice of entertaining multiple explanations prior to experimental confirmation) to eliminate false hypotheses, and to adopt coherent alternatives. No doubt, had the Hegemon (somehow) extended his lifespan (by a few, measly millennia), he would have welcomed the evidence that supports our discoveries, all of which are consistent with his explanation for the non-supernatural origins of reality. 

Body-and-Voidism

New followers of the true philosophy may be further mislead by the word “atomism” as Epíkouros, unlike Dēmókritos, rejected the reductive description of nature. Dēmókritos assumes that everything is “just” particles, for “atoms and the vacuum were the beginning of the universe; and that everything else existed only in opinion” (Laértios 9.44). From the Democritean perspective, what “truly” exists are microscopic bodies (and void). As a result, he concludes that we cannot be certain that our perceptions of bodies and their emergent qualities (like “color”) can be considered “true” because the “true” nature of reality (according to Dēmókritos) occurs at the atomic level — only atoms are “real”. Dēmókritos “rejects” emergent “qualities” that arise from atomic interactions: “Of a truth we know nothing, for truth is in a well.” (Ibid., 9.71).

Epíkouros rejects this skepticism. From the Epicurean perspective, what “truly” exists are bodies and void, some of which are visible, enlaced bodies (i.e. “compounds”) and some of which are invisible, simple bodies (i.e. “particles”). Both “compound bodies” and “simple bodies” are “real” (just as compound notions in the mind are physically “real” as images). As Epíkouros writes, “all” of our sensations are reliable. Consequently, even if we are to adopt the “ismizing” of the humanists, it is reasonable to suppose that, simply, “bodyism” (or “matterism”) would be appropriate designations for Epicurean particle physic, so much as “atomism” (which might be understood to implicate Dēmókritos’ teaching that only particles are real). Consider also that either attempt (including my flippant one) at neologizing particle physics yields the further implication that only particles (or bodies) are “real”, yet both Demokritos and Epíkouros agree that, indeed, “void” is also a “real” thing; it is simply “intangible” (Ibid., 10.39-40). Therein, it would be just as appropriate to call particle physicists “Voidists”, since they, unlike their many opponents, recognized the existence of empty space. Others, like Aristotélēs, insist that “nature abhors a vacuum” (Physikḗs 4.8). Technically, it would be reasonable to call Demokritos an “Atom-and-Voidist”, or to call Epíkouros a “Body-and-Voidist”. Practically, of course, these are clumsy and redundant neologisms, because the existence of one seems to imply the other. Nonetheless, be not mislead into thinking that the Sage taught that only atoms exist.

…Like Crumbs-of-Carbon and Water

As Diogénēs records, Epíkouros did not see himself as an ally to the tradition of Dēmókritos (Lives 10.4), and may have only temporarily considered himself as such during his youth (Ploútarkhos, Against Kōlõtēs 3). The Hegemon explicitly rebukes Dēmókritos’ philosophy for having been influenced by the skepticism of Dēmókritos’ teacher, Pýrrhōn, founder of Greek skepticism. For Epíkouros, his rejection of Pýrrhōn’s teachings, along with his necessary (and brilliantly modern) innovation of the παρέγκλισις (parénklesis, or CLINAMEN, “swerve”) places the Garden in a completely different category than the school of Dēmókritos. Grouping the two of them together, as philosophical allies, is a paradigm defended by ancient opponents of the Epicurean tradition and modern academics. So I argue, if, again, we are willing to entertain the anachronistic fantasy of ancient Epicureans adopting the Latin convention of “ismizing”, then Epíkouros would not have seen his physics as being the same “-ism” as Dēmókritos. It is reasonable to entertain the possibility thatsensualism” or “realism” (if someone puts a gun to our head and forces us to employ an “-ism”) are more reflective and complete expressions of Epicurean physics thanatomism”; and while Epíkouros does meet the criterion for our modern definition of an “atomist”, he did not see himself as such. Indeed, he reserved a collection of slurs for Dēmókritos, the so-called “Authority on Nonsense” (Diogénēs Laértios 10.8).

To my fellow Epicureans, I encourage you to challenge the paradigm that ancient philosophers who defended particle physics should be placed in the same category. In fact, their physics differed. (For a thorough comparison on the two physics, please set aside a few hours to read “The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature”, the doctoral dissertation of Karl Marx. In particular, if you have a negative, political opinion of Marx, you may find yourself charmed by his encyclopedic knowledge of ancient, Hellenistic philosophy. Ultimately, he expresses sympathy for Aristotélēs … that is another topic for another essay).

Pieces of Reality

Sure, “atoms” is cool … but what about “seeds”, “grains”, “firstlings”, or “hooklets”? Have you thought about simplesplinters”, “centsof consciousness, or “motesof matter? Each of these expressions are employed by Epíkouros in his Epistle to Herodotos as alternative names for the bodies that are popularly identified as “atoms” (orchestrated more colorfully elsewhere). Yet, nowhere in ancient writings does the Hegemon explicitly name particles as “atoms”, only descriptively as uncuttable parts: Epíkouros only employs the adjective ἄτομος (átomos, or “uncuttable”, as in “the uncuttable” pieces of reality). While the substantive phrase ὁ ἄτομος (hó átomos, or “the uncuttable”) implies a noun, it does not provide a noun.

Even then, note that, based on the frequency with which each word is employed in the extant texts, the Hegemon only occasionally refers to the smallest pieces of tangible reality as being “uncuttable”. As many times as Epíkouros describes the fundamental pieces of reality as being “uncuttable”, he equally refers to them as being “countless”, “microscopic”, and “unchanging”. Just as easily as we have coined the contemporary neologism “atom”, we could have, consistent with linguistic conventions, conceived of a “particle” as an “apeiron“ (from ἄπειρος, Laértios 10.41-43, 45 56-57, 60), “micron” (from μικρός, Ibid., 10.59, 61), or “ametableton” (from αμετάβλητος, Ibid., 10.41). Each of these neologisms is as accurate (or inaccurate) as “atom”.

Of historical note, several words that Epíkouros employs when naming the microscopic pieces of reality have been preserved and functionally repurposed, having been enlisted in the service of contemporary physics. Indeed, the ancient words “photon” and “lepton” survived the turbulence of history and became codified into the jargon of modernity. We receive “lepton” from λεπτομερὲς (leptomerès), derived from λεπτός (leptós, or “fine–grained”, “refined”, “subtle”, “minute”) and μέρος (méros, or “part”, “component”, “portion”, “particle”)—meaning “small particles”, “minute motes”, or “fine grains”. A modern “lepton” is a class of particle in the Standard Model that includes the electron. Similarly, we receive “photon” from the ancient Greek φωτός (phōtós, meaning “of light“). This is the particle that carries the electromagnetic force. In both cases, the particles are sub-atomic, and cannot be further divided into parts.

Epíkouros properly names these bits of matter σπερμά (spermá, “seeds”), ᾰ̓ρχαί (ărkhaí, “beginnings” or “firstlings”), σώματα (sṓmata, “bodies”), ὄγκοι (ónkoi, “hooks”), τομαί (tomaí, “splinters”), λεπτομερής (leptomerḗs, “particles” or “fine parts”), λεπτοί (leptoí, “cents”), μόρια (mória, “motes”), and, most often, μέρη (mérē), meaning “parts”, “pieces”, or “particles”.

Uniquely, Epíkouros uses both the plural adjective a-tomoi (or “uncuttable” crumbs) as well as its opposite, τομὴν (tomḗn, Laértios 10.56) meaning “cutting” (as in a “cutting” of wood), or also, a “stump”, “splinter”, or “shedding”. It is employed by Epíkouros as a synonym for the “particles” that comprise creation; it is derived from the verb τέμνω (témnō) meaning “to cut”, “hew”, “butcher” or “sacrifice”. It is also the root of “a-tom”. Herein, Epíkouros employs the image of wood clippings from a tree as an analogy for the minute motes of matter spread through the multiverse. Epíkouros describes particles as “cuttings” that are, themselves, “uncuttable”, so we may just as easily call Epíkouros a “tomist” so much as an “a-tomist”. Here again, Epicurean physics employs analogical reasoning that relies upon visible phenomena. His method does not require abstract vocabulary, only imagery. Primarily, Epíkouros infers that visible phenomena results from invisible beginnings. The “firstlings” of physics are not expressed as contemporary, mathematical objects — the Sage of the Garden calls them “motes” like dust in a beam of sunlight, like “grains” of cereal, like fluffy “hooklets” from dandelions, like “cents” of money, and “splinters” of wood. They are “countless”, “unchanging”,  “infinite”, and “microscopic”.

Particles were so much more than merely being “uncuttable”.

The Prejudice of the Enlightment

In addition to these observations, note that Enlightenment-era thinkers like Descartes, Boyle, Newton, and Locke, those who loosely adopted the general notion of particle physics, popularly rejected the Greek designation of “atomist” (as one who accepts the doctrine of “atoms”) in favor of their preferred, Latin term “corpuscularian”, one who studies “corpuscules” (from the Latin CORPVSCVLVM meaning “small body”). This designation was partially made as a defense of piety, partially as a rejection of the “godless” and “immoral” behavior of Libertines (themselves, inspired by Epíkouros), and partially as a means of distinguishing their observations as being unique and unprecedented. The words employed by 17th-century thinkers to refer to particles were loaded with assumptions and prejudices. Many of these thinkers associated “atomism” with other, controversial positions, like “atheism” (despite the fact that all brands of ancient “atomists” rejected atheism). Additionally, the particle physics of some of these thinkers was mechanistic, and conflicted with the non-deterministic spirit of Epicurean ethics.

(For a much more thorough, accurate, and expansive treatment of the context of the debate between “corpuscularianism” and “atomism” as contextualized in the 17th-century, please see the first two chapters of Dr. Catherine Wilson’s book Epicureanism at the Origin of Modernity).

Even in the last few centuries, naturalists, having recognized the coherence of particle physics, have defined and redefined “atomism” according to their own preferences and prejudices, as well as by the misunderstandings they adopted about ancient history, and the social pressures they inherited from the societies that coerced them. On one hand, thinkers like Dēmókritos, Epíkouros, Galileo, Descartes, Boyle, Locke, and Einstein each flirted with general “atomism”; on the other hand, each thinker, more often than not, rejected having their own physics subsumed within the same ismistic grouping as their opponents. They did not necessarily identify as members of the same “-ism”, and often distinguished themselves as philosophical opponents.

In any case, be real and think big about history.

Big Diction Energy

Do not mistake my thesis — I do not mean to suggest that, given modern jargon, as employed by scholars of “philosophy”, Epíkouros should be identified as a “non-atomist”, or as an opponent to ”atomism”. (I recognize that this deconstructive approach risks obfuscation, so forgive me for beleaguering these post-structuralistic points.) Nevertheless, within our fellowship, speaking frankly, I observe that we can be considered “apeironists”, “micronists”, and “ametabletists” just as readily as “atomists”. Concurrently, Epicurean “particles” can be accurately expressed as “apeirons”, “microns”, and “ametabletons”, so much as they are “atoms”.

The ancient Greeks did not practice the convention of “ismizing”, or, as I write, “expressing different systems or processes as ‘-isms’” (see my earlier essay, “On -Isms and Pleasure Wisdom”). Historically, the Ismist paradigm is a result of the widespread adoption of Latin affixation, the ubiquitous “-ISMVS” from the rarely used “-ισμός”. We ismize ideas we detest, (e.g. “Islamism”), we ismize ideas we admire (e.g. “altruism”), and we ismize ancient ideas that never needed ismizing in the first place (e.g. “atomism”). Many of our certainties rest upon assumptions that have been inherited from derivative sources. In this case, our taste for ancient Greece has been spiked by the flavor of Renaissance Latin, yet ancient Epicureans enjoyed a pure draught. As a follower of this tradition, I seek to share the original flavor of the “true philosophy”, and I encourage seekers of knowledge to pursue their goal with the same intent.

Still … if you put a gun to my head … fine, I’ll properly “ismize” Epicurean physics as follows:

BEHOLD! Epíkouros properly defends a theory of somato-kenoism (versus the atomo-kenoism of Dēmókritos). Though, neither system exemplifies strict atomism, since both philosophers also accept the “intangible void” as a “real” part of their physics. Conversely, one might imagine a sort of “Peripatetic Atomist” who both believes that “nature abhors a vacuum”, but also, accepts that the “Five Elements” (including Aether) are made of invisible particles. … chew on that, Ismists.

Still, as always, I recommend against ismizing everyone and everything in the first place. (As a friend suggested, we are students of “Epicurean Philosophy” and not of “Epicureanism“.)

Anyway … Happy Solstice to the friends of the true philosophy!

And blessings to the swerving firstlings.

Your Friend,
EIKADISTES
Keeper of Twentiers.com
Editor of the Hedonicon

All Particles Go to Heaven: The Form and Formation of the (Epicurean) Gods

This paper was originally published on Academia.edu. The paper, itself has been adapted from a larger publication on ancient Epicurean piety. It has been edited and re-formatted for academic presentation. For additional commentary, see “Holy Shit: The Elements of Epicurean Psychedelia” published by the Society of Friends of Epicurus

Epíkouros advances a developed theology in his treatises Περὶ σιότητος (Perì Hosiótētos, “On Piety”), Περ Θεν (Perí Theôn, “On Gods”), Περὶ Φύσεως (Perì Phýseōs, “On Nature”), and his distinguished “Letter on Happiness” προς Μενοικεα (pròs Menoikéa, “to Menoikeus”). In these compositions, the Gargettian encourages the veneration of “the divine nature” while upholding the validity of atomic physics and underscoring the emptiness of supernatural myths. Therein, the Sage of the Garden conducts a survey of religious history, provides an evaluation of the efficacy of rites and rituals, and reflects upon the genesis of the profound mental impressions that have inspired centuries of pious devotion. While some of these works have been lost, Epíkouros’ ideas have been preserved by Philódēmos in his similarly-named works “On Piety” and “On Gods”, as well as Metródōros’ Περ Μεταβολής (Perì Metabolês, “On Change”), and a work by Demḗtrios of Lakōnía entitled Περ το Θεο Μορφς (Perì toû Theoû Morphēs, “On the Form of a God”) within which “god” is deconstructed.

Epíkouros, Metródōros, Philódēmos, Dēmḗtrios, and other atomistic philosophers contextualize both spiritual activities like (piety and prayer) and religious notions (like blessedness and divinity) within the framework of an intelligible reality, existing as a continuum of moving bodies. Consequently, piety is presented as a function of neuropsychologyand theology is evaluated as a feature of anthropology. Human animals cultivate wisdom upon a κανών (kanṓn) or “standard” of knowledge, a philosophical foundation that grounds truth in nature. As Diogénēs records, the criteria of knowledge includes “the [αἰσθήσεις or aisthḗseis] sensations and [προλήψεις or prolḗpseis] preconceptions and that of [πάθη or pắthē] feeling” (Laértios 10.31). Sensation triggers feeling and gradually conditions preconceptions — each preconception is a “memory of the appearances” received “repeatedly from abroad”, impressed by “the imprint of the sensations” (Ibid. 10.33). Far from being a supernatural revelation, the preconception of “blessedness” that defines “god”, like “justice” has been informed by daily occurrences. The gods, themselves are conceptual representations conditioned by memory. “Piety” is a consequence of psychology and “prayer” is a psychiatric practice. The θεία φύσις (theía phýsis) “divine nature” is a common expression of παντελῆ εὐδαιμονίαν (pantelḗ eudaimonían) “absolute happiness” (10.116). “Heaven” exists in the form of the μετακόσμιος (metakósmios 10.89) a boundless void containing countless κόσμοι (kósmoi). The “heavenly” homes of the gods exist as inferences within the colorful confines of the human mind.

Epíkouros explains that the divine nature (of “the gods”) is conditioned by the mental προλήψις (prolēpsis) “impression” of μακαριότητα (makariótēta) “blessedness” described by Philódēmos as τελείαν εδαιμονίαν (teleían eùdaimonían) “perfect happiness” (On Piety, Col. 13.7-8, 353-354). “The gods” of Epíkouros are primarily θεωρητούς (theōrētoús 10.62, 10.135) “observed” or “contemplated” as φαντασίαν τ διανοί (phantasían tḗi dianoíai) “visualizations” or “appearances [in] the mind” (Laértios 10.50). Epíkouros affirms that the gods μὲν εἰσιν (mèn eísin 10.123) “truly exist” yet are only “seen” or “reached” through an act of λόγῳ (lógoi) “contemplation”, “consideration”, “reasoning”, “reckoning”, or “logical accounting” (10.62, 10.139). He observes that the mental φαντάσματα (phantásmata) or “appearances” of the gods arise κ τς συνεχος πιρρύσεως (èk ts synekhoús èpirrū́seōs) “from a continuous stream” τν μοίων εδώλων (tn homoíōn eidṓlōn) “of similar” or “compatible images” that physically impress upon the soul. The impressions coalesce together through a process of ὑπερβάσεως (hyperbáseōs) “transposition” (On Piety, Col. 12.9, 324-5). The transposed formations have been ποτετελεσμένωι (ápotetelesménōi) “rendered” to human souls in human forms, immortal projections of mortal intellects, visualizations of perfectly-happy, perpetually-healthy people.

Having reviewed the psychiatric evidence of memory against the criteria of knowledge (embodied by the natural kanṓn), Epíkouros explains that the functional “coherence” or “resemblance” between internal φαντάσματα (phantásmata) “appearances” and external οσί (ousí) “beings” (or τοῖς οὖσί “reality” 10.51) requires that an initial impulse complete a sequence of successive impacts, ultimately yielding a perception in the mind, “since we could not have sought the investigation if we had not first perceived it” (Ibid., 10.33). A sensible τύπος (týpos) “impression” initiates a perceptual relay through various pathways in the soul — the sense organs are stimulated by ἁφή (aphḗ, “touch”), acoustic ῥεύμᾰτᾰ (rheúmata, “currents”), olfactory ὄγκοι (ónkoi, “hooklets”), and visual είδωλα (eídōla, “images”), all “impinging [upon] us [as] a result of both the colorful realities” to produce “a harmonious magnitude of related morphologies”. The μαχυμερέστερον (makhymerésteron) “marching army of particles” (Dēmḗtrios, On the Form of a God 21) enter “the face or the mind” […] yielding an appearance and an [affective] sympathy as a result of the observing” (Laértios 10.49-50). Thus, the mortal appearances we see during the day inspire the divine icons we envision at night.

Epíkouros “alone first founded the idea of the existence of the Gods on the impression which nature herself hath made on the minds of all men” (Cicero, On the Nature of Gods 26). He asks, “what nation, what people are there, who have not, without any learning, a natural idea, or prenotion, of a Deity?” The realization that isolated peoples developed parallel, mythic complexes became noticeably evident after Aléxandros III of Makedonía connected the intellectual culture of the Mediterranean with the Indian subcontinent, triggering a cross-cultural dissemination of wisdom literature. According to the Gargettian, prior to the historical development of these mythic narratives and institutionalized rituals, prehistoric humans organically conceived of deities as sublime psychological icons encountered during dreams and contemplations (On Nature 12). The Pyrrhonian skeptic Séxtos Empeirikós preserves Epíkouros’ historical thesis: “The origin of the thought that god exists came from appearances in dreams” that were conditioned by “the phenomena of the world” (Against the Mathematicians 9.45-46). The earliest humans who conceived of these notions assumed “the object of thought as a thing perceived in relation to a solid body […] understanding perception that can be grasped by corporeal sensation, which they also knew to be derived from a physical entity [i.e. nature]” (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 15.8-18). Yet, far from being prophetic symbols θεόπεμπτος (theópemptos) sent by the gods” (Diogénēs of Oìnóanda, Fr. 9, Col. 6), “the gods”, themselves exist as symbolic representations, composed from reproducible “stream[s] of similar images” that have been apprehended from a variety of natural inspirations (Laértios 10.139).

Prehistoric peoples’ perception of “the divine nature” and their visualizations of “divine” beings created lasting impressions upon the history of human civilization. Human devotees created conventions to celebrate the symbols of their insights. Traditions were cultivated and pious practice flourished, as did dramatic myths and misunderstandings.Eventually, “self-important theologians” and deluded priests diluted beliefs about the divine and perverted piety with a fog of fear (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 86A 1-2). “God” himself was assigned disturbing duties and became enlisted in the service of religious autocrats. Contrary to the chilling myths championed by “self-important theologians”, the blessed and incorruptible nature has no need to direct the production of the human drama. Epíkouros teaches that “it is foolish to ask of the gods that which we can supply for ourselves” (Vatican Saying 65). The true benefits of worship are enjoyed by worshippers, not by the fantastic objects of human obeisance. People conceive of gods as being kind, confident, and self-reliant; in emulating these virtues, people perfect their own pleasure. “Anyone who has these things […] can rival the gods for happiness”, despite their inability to fulfill prayers, subdue nature, and prevent death (Vatican Saying 33). Philódēmos exhorts students to “imitate their blessedness insofar as mortals can” and “endeavor most of all to make themselves harmless to everyone as far as is within their power; and second to make themselves so noble” (On Piety Col. 71.16-19, 23-29). Functional knowledge of piety and theology is integral to cleansing oneself of the turmoil that is symptomatic of magical thinking.

The Epicurean presentation of divinity contextualizes “the gods” as fantastic, mental entities that can be inspired passively through the indiscriminate mechanism of sensation, either “from abroad” through the trigger of touch, as when one views an idol, or internally, “in respect of slumbers” when the mind dreams freely, least encumbered by daily disturbances, and organically repurposes memories of remarkable figures before then augmenting them into deathless idols. “Gods” can also be summoned intentionally, through a directed act of contemplation, involving τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας (tinàs épibolàs tḗs dianoías) “some applications of the intellect”, like μνήμην (mnḗmēn, “memory”). Dēmḗtrios of Lakōnía reiterates that the representations of “the gods” in the mind are triggered both as those memories manifest” through recollection, “and also” by the physical impulse of “pre-existing [bodies] that, upon [striking] the mind, produce constructive cognition”, as when one observes a icon (Dēmḗtrios, On the Form of a God 12). Because of this, mental representations of religious figures can be summoned through meditation as readily as when gazing upon the mass of a physical icon. In prayer, the supplicant manually retrieves an “apparent” image of blessedness, previously been stored in memory, having been initially sublimated in the imagination. Visual γνῶσις (gnṓsis, “knowledge”) of “the gods” has been ἐναργὴς (énargēs) “apparent”, “evident” or “manifest” (Laértios 10.123) for millennia — the fields of the Earth are filled with statues, votives, frescoes, mosaics, murals, metalwork, jewelry, pottery, and architecture that glorify “the divine nature”. Each civilization peppers its conception of divinity with fresh colors, shapes, and stories, just as each culture ritualizes a contemplative path to care for the health of the soul. In doing so, each group creates a cultural matrix into which subsequent generations are psychologically enmeshed — prior to the widespread proliferation of supernatural soap operas, the first peoples contemplated a raw form of divinity, unsullied by mythic adulterants.

To further isolate the genesis of the unadulterated notion of “god”, Epíkouros traces the crumbs of cognition to their sources in nature. In the case of divine entities, the Sage observes that divine representations have been conditioned by memories of the human animal combined with the congenital preconception of blessedness. When a supplicant prays, meditates, concentrates, reflects, or, generally applies directed focus toward the stored, mental expression of blessedness, they generate a internal image “as if” the practitioner were literally ἐν εἰκόνι (én eìkóni) “in the presence” of an external “representation”, “portrait”, or “icon”. As with the memories of “brightness”, “loudness”, “softness”, and “sweetness”, the characteristics of the gods have been conditioned by images and inspirations received from abroad — those images (like the form of a human body) and inspirations (like peak happiness) become amalgamated in the mind by an intellectual act of transfusion. As with other preconceptions, like χρόνος (khrónos) “time” and δίκαιος (díkaios) “justice”, the mental prototype of “god” functions as an organizing principle or “ruler” against which individual examples can be evaluated — any alleged divinity that punishes, terrorizes, rages, suffers, or fears neither meets the definitions of “blessed” nor “incorruptible”, and cannot by definition be identified as “god”. Epíkouros exhorts Menoikeus to “believe anything about” the image of god “that is able to preserve” that form’s conceptual “incorruptibility and blessedness” (Laértios 10.123). So long as an expression of divinity coheres with the preconception of blessedness, it can truly be called “a god”. Thus, an endless collection of divinities might be perceived, unique to each person, supported by the infinity of particles that constitute both the heavens and the heavenly forms of the mind.

The heavenly form of a “god” appears to the human mind as does any other, mundane formation, as τὸ ὄν (tò ón) “a being” or “an entity” (Philódēmos, On Piety Col. 66A, Line 11). According to Epíkouros, each “entity” can be conceived of as an individual ἑνότης (henótēs, Col. 13.12) “unity” or “union” composed of many other mental particles that coalesce together to form representational σύγκρισεις (sýnkriseis) “compounds” in the mind (Col. 12.11). As Metródōros writes, each νότητα διότροπον (henótēta idiótropon) “distinctive unity” also exists as a “compound made up of things that do not exist as numerically distinct” (On Change, preserved by Philódēmos in On Piety, Col. 4.13-15). Epíkouros further clarifies that “unified entities” in the mind can exhibit one of two constitutions — some “entities” of the mind “are perfected out of [1] the same elements and others are constituted from [2] similar elements” (On God, preserved by Philódēmos in On Piety Col. 8.14-17) The φύσεις (phýseis) “natures” or “constitutions” of all of these “unified entities” are therein grouped according to the origin of their birth, either from [1] a single source, or having coalesced from [2] multiple sources ἐξ ὑπερβάσεως τν (èx hyperbáseōs tôn) “as a result of transposition” during the traversal μεταξύ (metazù) “between” the source and the mind (Ibid., Col.12.8-9). If the mental form of an entity is composed of particles that only originate from [1] a single source, Epíkouros says that they are all αὐτή (autḗ) “the same” in constitution — “the same” form is one that reflects a numerically-singular entity in one’s environment. By contrast, Epíkouros says that appearances composed of particles coming from [2] multiple sources are only superficiallyὁμοία (homoía, Col. 12.6) “similar” because they are only related insofar as their composition as arrays of εἴδωλα (eídola). Besides their shared form as bundles of images, the conceptual amalgamations of “the gods” have been stitched together from a variety of environmental inspirations.

To demonstrate this constitution, one might visualize a dog. This visualized animal is a mental representation. It was previously impressed upon the mind when dog-particles travelled from a dog (or image of a dog) through the air. The visual impulse that impacts the eye triggers an internal cascade that yields the mental form of an animal. The resulting dog-form is a bundle of distinct particles that correspond κατ’ ἀριθμόν (kat’ arithmón, Col. 12.10) “in number” to the measurable proportions of [1] “that same”, furry creature in reality. This representation is composed of particles whose φύσεις (phýseis) “origins” are all αὐτή (autḗ) “the same” — the memory of this “dog” was apprehended “without contamination” from the particles of other, distinct objects (Philodemos, On Gods III, Col. 8). The generative flow of images reflects the activity of the original body, and a dog is not confused for another form (e.g. when dog-forms coalesce with human-forms in our imagination, we picture werewolves).

By contrast, one might visualize a god. Like the dog-form, the god-form is a mental image of an animal. Like the dog-form, the god-form is also apprehended by the intellect. Like the dog-form, the god-form, too was initially triggered by impulses “received from abroad”. However, unlike the mental aggregate that constitutes one’s impression of a “dog”, one’s impression of a “god” is a ὑπέρβασις (hypérbasis), a “superimposition” of at least two different bodies of εἴδωλα (eídola) that are only superficially ὁμοία (homoía) “similar” insofar as their material composition as pictures in the mind. Therein, the compound nature of these images enables their being φθαρτον “indestructible”. By comparison, after the death of a dog and the end of that dog’s eídola, the dog’s form can only be retrieved from memory — we are left with the impressions that a mortal creature gave us of itself during its limited lifespan. The forms of the gods, however, are not at risk of dissolution because they do not have a single source that is subject to death — the sources of the god-forms are unending, undying, and limitless, the infinite soup of particles that is constantly boiling before our very souls. In this regard, “the form of god” is neither [1] a simple body (like a particle), nor a regular compound (like a dog), but is a sort of [2] irregular compound. No compound is a simple body (i.e. a particle), and all compounds are combinations of simple bodies, but unlike the regular compound that is a dog-form, the god-form is not composed of particles that are κατ ριθμν (kat’ árithmòn) “numerically-identical” to their source. Rather, the form of “a god” is composed of particles that are καθ μοείδειαν (kath’ hòmoeídeian) “similar in consistency” such that they can become enlaced to imagine new forms. The image of “god” is formed when the image of a human is conjoined in the mind withthe concept of perfect happiness and the projection of deathlessness. As preserved by Diogénes, Epíkouros explains ος μν (oús mèn) “on one hand” the forms of the gods appear to be κατ ριθμν φεσττας (kat’ árithmòn hyphesttas) “subsisting by number”, as though each “unified entity” corresponds with a single, external body, “but” ος δ (oús mèn) “on the other hand” the gods” are formed καθ μοείδειαν (kath’ hòmoeídeian) from multiple, external sources due to their existence “as a similitude” of images that constitute “a common appearance” (10.139).

In the case of the specific characteristics of “the gods”, human minds tend to render the human visualization of perfection νθρωποειδς (anthrōpoeidṓs) “human-like” (Ibid.) or ἀνθρωπόμορφον (anthrōpómorphon) “human-shaped” (Dēmḗtrios, On the Form of a God 14-16). Granted, “the gods”, as mental projections of humanity, are not “to be considered as bodies of any solidity […] but as images, perceived by similitude and transition” (Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 28). “We do not find the calculation” so writes Demḗtrios, “that any other shape” besides that “of the human” could qualify as a blessed and incorruptible being.” He explains that the gods “are granted to be perfectly happy; and nobody can be happy without virtue, nor can virtue exist where reason is not; and reason can reside in none but the human form”. Philódēmos writes that “we have to infer” their behaviors “from the appearances” made “manifest” to the mind; thus, we visualize god “as a living being” (Philódēmos, On Gods III, Col. 10):

One must [imagine] with Hermarchus that the gods draw in breath and exhale it, for without this, again, we cannot conceive them as such living beings as we have already called them, as neither can one conceive of fish without need in addition of water, nor birds [without additional need] of wings for their flight through the air; for such [living beings] are not better conceived [without their environment] .

Philódēmos further reflects on the conceived environments of the gods:

[E]very nature has a different location suitable to it. To some it is water, to others air and earth. In one case for animals in another for plants and the like. But especially for the gods there has to (be a suitable location), due to the fact that, while all the others have their permanence for a certain time only, the gods have it for eternity. During this time they must not encounter even the slightest cause of nuisance… (On Gods III, Col. 8).

Apollódōros the scholarch infers that “the dwellings” of the fearless gods, unruffled by ferocious winds and falling stars “have to be far away from the forces in our world” (Ibid., Col. 9). He stipulates that the security of these “locations” may not be preserved as a result of “distance” so much as a result of physical disengagement “from the hindering factors that clash against each other”. Epíkouros concurs that “it is possible for their nature to exist even with many troubles surrounding it” (On Piety, Col. 3.3-7). For “even if the things which generate” divine images were “as far away as anyone could wish”, the mundane images of people stored in memory would still combine with the preconception of “blessedness” and form the image of gods who “appear” to “transcend” any amount of “intervening distance” (Philódēmos, On Gods III, Col. 9). Memory, itself “transcends” the perils of our perishable plasma through a perpetual replenishment of minute, mental motes, “having changed each time for producing a thought” (On the Form of a God 12). Dēmḗtrios explains that “the memories people retain of” visual impressions were first “received as children” (Ibid., 11), and despite decades of disruption, those representations can be reproduced continuously. Through contemplation, a supplicant summons a memory of blessedness and transforms the mind into a holy menagerie, capable of hosting a variety of divine forms. After extensive consideration, Apollódōros concludes that the “dwellings” of “the gods” must be constructed “from some of their” own, finely-grained “elements”, repurposed through an act of contemplation (On Gods III, Col. 10).

Philódēmos further supposes that beings who inhabit the sublime territory of the pure mind possess “perception and pleasure”, as well as “an excellent disposition of things which endure” (On Piety, Col. 5). Accordingly, these projections exhibit the same preferences as their human projectors, finding recognizable pleasure in the activity of being rational animals:

we must claim that the gods use both voice and conversation to one another; for we will not conceive them as the more happy or the more indissoluble, [Hermarchus] says, by their neither speaking, nor conversing with each other, but resembling human beings that cannot speak; for since we really do employ voice, all of us who are not disabled persons, it is even the height of foolishness that the gods should either be disabled, or not resemble us in this point, since neither men nor gods can create utterances in any other way. And particularly since for good men, the sharing of discourse with men like them showers down on them indescribably pleasure. And by Zeus one must suppose the gods possess the Hellenic language or one not far from it, and that their voices in expressing rationalist are clearest(Philódēmos, On Gods III, Col. 13)

Humans picture “the gods” to be perpetually-happy people, ceaselessly-savoring the pleasures of friendship, “for it is not possible for them to maintain their community as a species without any social intercourse” (Philódēmos, On Gods, Fr. 87). Unburdened by the undue responsibilities of celestial governance, astral adjudication, and cosmic corrections, the holy inhabitants of the mind seem wholly self-reliant. Perfectly prudent, they appear to privilege the preservation of their own peace above impractical obligations. As ζῷον (zōîon 10.123) living figures, they are expected to respirate; as social figures, they are imagined to converse; as rational figures, they are understood to reflect; as blessed figures, they are acclaimed to live without fear, imperishable paragons of human perfection. The human-shaped deities appear to sustain a peak state of pure pleasure, that which cannot be heightened by excess.

Demḗtrios cautions that, “when we say in fact the God is human-shaped” we should note that God is not actuallyhuman (On the Form of a God 15). In On the Nature of the Gods, Cicero’s character Velleius concurs that god “is not body, but something like body” nor “does it contain any blood, but something like blood” (28). Like the concepts of “justice” and “time”, the concept of “god” is not “attached” to an external body, “except [in the case] of calculation, wherefore we interweave” thoughts in the mill of the mind from subtle threads of memory (Laértios 10.72). Velleius admits, “these distinctions were more acutely devised and more artfully expressed by Epicurus than any common capacity can comprehend”. The gods are, nonetheless “real”, “unified entities” as reproducible appearances in the mind.

In an effort to “realize” his own spiritual “fulfillment”, Philódēmos further scrutinizes the images of these “beings surpassing [περβαλλουσν or hyperballousōn] in power [δυνμει or dynámei] and excellence [σπουδαιότητι or spoudaiótēti]”, who equally “excel [περέχον or hyperékhon] in sovereignty [γεμονίαν or hegemonían]” and infers the following:

that of all existing things, [the divine nature] is the best [ριστον or áriston] and most holy [σεμνότατον or semnótaton, “dignified” or “revered”], most worthy of emulation [ξιοζηλωτότατον or áxiozēlōtótaton, “enviable”], having dominion over all good things [πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν κυριευόντα or pántōn tōn agathṓn kurieúonta], unburdened by affairs [πραγμάτευτον or pragmáteuton], and exalted [ψηλόν or hypsēlon, “sublime” or “proud”] and great-minded [μεγαλόφρονα or megalóphrona, “noble” or “generous”] and great-spirited μεγαλόψυχον or megalópsykhon, “magnanimous”] and ritually pure [γιον or hágion, “sacred”] and purest [γιοτατον or àgiōtaton, “holiest”] and propitious[ῑ̔́λεων or hī́leōn, “blameless”]. Therefore they say that they alone strive after the greatest form of piety and that they hold […] the purest views as regards the ineffable [φραστον or áphraston, “inexpressible” or “marvelous”] pre-eminence [περοχήν or hyperokhēn, “superiority”] of the strength[σχύος or ìskhúos, “power”] and perfection [τελειότητος or teleiótētos, “completeness”] of the divine[toû theíou] […] [Epíkouros] advises not to think [God] bad-tempered (as he is thought), for example, by the poets. (On Piety, Col. 45.2-30).

Lucretius observes that CAELESTI SVMVS OMNES SEMINE ORIVNDI “we have all come from heavenly seed” (De Rerum Natura 2.991). The pieces of reality that comprise our bodies are the same pieces that comprise the stars and the memories in our minds. Cosmic firstlings fall from the “heavens” and amalgamate upon this world, contributing to the body of the terrestrial aggregate. Nature repurposes these elements for the benefit of evolution — many of the “heavenly” particles become recycled into the motes of the mind, which are then reconstituted into the “heavenly” forms of “the gods”. Summarily, all particles travel through the heavens and can become repurposed into the “heavenly” bodies of divine idols. So long as mortals exist to engage in the enterprise of story-telling, immortals can exist in perpetuity.

The Epicurean philosophers confidently affirm that no “god” attended the inauguration of the Earth — no supernatural supervisors were present to oversee the development of the early cosmos. The existence of a human god did not precede the existence of a human animal. Prior to the emergence of the human being, the human body had yet to exist — “the god” had yet to be conceived. It was only after humans evolved, formed friendships, shared memories, and suffered loss that prehistoric peoples internalized their experiences, dreamed of deathlessness, and projected their inspirations as sublime, psychological icons, providing guidance and inspiration to generations of people. So long as human beings continue to dream, human egos will continue to project their ideals upon the walls of the mind, constructing holy heroes and righteous role models that embody their ideals; so too will people continue to manufacture tragic myths. While these forms of blessedness can be continuously reproduced, many fall into disuse as the masses champion tragic heroes who contradict the basic definition of perfection that “god” implies.

The primary concern of Epicurean theology is to protect the conceptual blessedness and incorruptibility of the “divine nature” from “contamination […] lest they become mixed up with” terrestrial troubles “to the detriment of their imperishability” (On God III, Col. 9). For Epíkouros, any fearful “contamination” poured upon the form of blessedness mutates the pure notion into a chimera (like a centaur or gorgon), a tragic antagonist in dramatic fiction. Accordingly, as the conceit of a medusa sublimates the notions of “woman” and “snakes”, so, too does the notion of a demiurgesublimate “god” with “artist” — prior to the laborious ingenuity of creative hands, no “creator” could be contrived. Likewise, the notion of LORD conjoins “god” with “king” — here again, prior to the phenomenon of “kings” lordingover subjects, no conception of a LORD could have existed. Similarly, understanding “god” to be “The Father” requires the believer to have been born within a species that observes the “male parent” to play a role in child-rearing — without this context, “The Father” is meaningless.

Compared with the chimeric myths of the masses, the pure conception of “blessedness” or “complete happiness” (e.g. impassivity, tranquility, cheerfulness, and delight) corresponds precisely with the natural standard that the word “god” implies. As humans employ the preconception of “time” to evaluate the duration of events, and, similarly employ the preconception of “justice” to evaluate the commensurability of relationships, so too do humans employ the preconception of “god” to evaluate ethical priorities and set behavioral goals.

While many imagine “god” as a “real animal” with “common” features that subsists beyond the walls of the world, this assumption leads to contradictions (Dēmḗtrios 16). [ I ] First, extreme isolation from the nutritive “forces of the world that produce things subject to generation and dissolution” would inhibit any inhabitant’s access to natural necessities. It would severely challenge any entity “resembling a human being” from being able to sufficiently replenish its losses and preserve its perfections (Philódēmos, On Gods III, Col. 9). The “happiness” promised “beyond Zeus” is expressed as “the cry of the flesh [that] neither hungers, nor does it thirst, nor does it shiver” (Vatican Saying 33). Consequently, a “living being”, “breathing in and out” that is restricted from the “forces of generation” that supply air and shed light would suffer the same impairments as a “disabled person” whose disposition restricts their ability to acquire breath and behold the “the sight of sweet motions” (Laértios 10.6). Philódēmos cautions that it is “the height of foolishness” to suppose “that the gods should either be disabled, or not resemble us in this point” (On Gods III, Col. 13). [II] Secondly, the notion of a pre-human, human-shaped entity contradicts Epíkouros’ description of cosmic evolution. Naturally, the pig cannot precede the piglet, and the human form cannot precede the emergence of the human animal. The memory of a human body cannot precede the body of a human being remembered. “Thus, each name follows [what] is visible […]For one must perceive the [external] form before the preconception” (Laértios 10.33). [III] Thirdly, the bodies of external gods could not be “evident” if they were truly unobservable. Dēmḗtrios explains that “the thinnest-particles”, such as those which constitute the mind, are too fine to “truly constitute” visual “perception” (On the Form of a God21). He further affirms that “nothing diaphanous [is] sensible” (Ibid., 22). Therefore, if knowledge of external god-bodies has yet “to be confirmed or to be contradicted” through direct apprehension due to their imperceptibility, then external gods could never be “manifest” to the mind (Laértios 10.51). Yet Epíkouros affirms that “knowledge of them” is “evident” as internal projections of blessedness (Ep. Men. 10.123). [IV] Finally, the mode of subsistence of non-terrestrial entities, though “human-like” would present hazards to any terrestrial animals attempting to emulate their lifestyles. The στοιχειώμaτa (stoikheiṓmata, “elementary principles” 10.36) affirm that the compounds of the Earth have been conditioned by local forces — non-terrestrial entities lack exposure to those forces that condition which sensations are pleasurable and painful, and for which animals. Thus, human animals incur great risk in attempting to emulate the behavior of entities that only superficially resemble the human-form. By contrast, Philódēmos encourages us to “imitate” the “blessedness” of recognizable idols, not to ritualize the idiosyncratic lifestyle of an alien (On Piety, Col. 71.16-17).

Ultimately, these speculative examples of divinity, proposed to exist, independent of the human mind, are unnecessary to contextualize religious practice and to justify a defense of spirituality. In the continuum of the mind, prayer has phenomenal power and piety has purpose. Dēmḗtrios concludes “that even by means of contemplation”, as streams of superimposed images in the mind, each “deity” physically “possesses a substance” and wields influence (On the Form of a God 15). Though Philódēmos concedes that “no one has been prolific in finding convincing demonstrations for the existence of” independent “gods” with “human-shaped” bodies, he “nevertheless” recognizes “all humans, with the exception of some” to “worship them […] as do we” (On Piety, Col. 23.13-21). “Apparent indeed is this knowledge” (Laértios 10.123).

Works Cited

Armstrong, David. “Epicurean virtues, Epicurean friendship: Cicero vs the Herculaneum papyri” in Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, Cambridge University Press, 2011, 126-8.

Cicero, Marcus, et al. Cicero on the Nature of the Gods. Translated by C. D. Yonge, 1872.

Dēmḗtrios of Lakonía. “On the Form of a God.” Translated by N. H. Bartman, Twentiers, 5 Apr. 2025, https://twentiers.com/form-of-god/ (accessed 14 Nov. 2025).

Diogénēs of Oìnóanda and Smith, Martin Ferguson. Supplement to Diogenes of Oinoanda the Epicurean Inscription. Bibliopolis, 2003.

Empeirikós, Séxtos. Against the Physicists. Against the Ethicists. Translated by R. G. Bury, Harvard University Press, 1953.

Epíkouros, et al. The Hedonicon: The Holy Book of Epicurus. Translated by N. H. Bartman et al., 1st ed., Leaping Pig Publishing, 17 Nov. 2023.

Essler, Holger. “Space and Movement in Philodemus’ De Dis [On Gods] 3: an Anti-Aristotelian Account.” Critical Studies in Ancient Physics, 2014.

Laértios, Diogénēs. “Book 10.” Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Translated by Stephen White, Cambridge University Press, 2021, 411-462.

Laértios, Diogénēs. Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers: Book 10. Translated by Bartman, N. H. in “The Life of Epíkouros: A Translation for Twentiers”, Leaping Pig Publishing, 21 May 2025,www.academia.edu/129436319/The_Life_of_Ep%C3%ADkouros_A_Translation_for_Twentiers (accessed 17 Nov. 2025).

Logeion, University of Chicago, https://logeion.uchicago.edu/, (accessed 17 Nov. 2025).

Lucretius Carus, Titus. The Way Things Are. Translated by Rolfe Humphries, Indiana University Press, 1968, page 80.

Philódēmos of Gádara.On Gods”. Translated by Essler and Armstrong, Twentiers, Leaping Pig Publishing,https://twentiers.com/on-gods/ (accessed 16 Nov. 2025).

Philódēmos of Gádara. On Piety. Translated by Dirk Obbink, Oxford University Press, 1996.

Twentiers.com. Leaping Pig Publishing, https://www.twentiers.com/ (accessed 15 Nov. 2025).

Holy Shit: The Elements of Epicurean Psychedelia

Disclaimer: the ideas and opinions presented below are reflective of the author and may or may not be shared by other members of the Society of Friends of Epicurus.

PART I: THE ATOM PROPHET

Prior to ingesting psilocybin mushrooms at the age of 20, my theological positions were categorically Kyrēnaíc — as with “Theódōros, known as the atheist”, I “utterly rejected the current belief in the gods” whether they be Olympians, the Stars, or the Trinity (Laértios, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 2.86, 2.97). Like The Atheist, I, too “denied the very essence of a Deity” (Cicero, On the Nature of Gods 23). I was equally “great at cunning up anything with a jest”, happily reducing holy stories to hoary myths, lampooning the paradoxically pregnant virgin, teasing the tyranny of a childish creator, and “using vulgar names” for embarrassing social phenomena that appeared (to me) to be plagues upon the rational world, like hordes of superstitious rats, marching to the tune of their petty pipers (Laértios 4.52). I viewed the faithful as flocks of lost sheep following false shepherds. I rejected the religious experience as, at best, a benign delusion, and, at worse, untreated psychosis.

Then the blue meanies hit.

“Door of Perception” from an unpublished diary (June 2009).

I walked through the doors of perception ecstasis. My pulse increased and I felt warm, bursting with energy. Euphoria erupted with uninhibited joy, giddiness, and laughter. Outside, I felt as though I was walking on clouds and dissolving into the Earth. Back inside, my trip peaked. I saw trails behind moving objects. I had intense closed-eye visuals memories came to life; patterned lattices appeared. I began to see, eyes wide open, a warped reality, a curved, moving field of vision. I was overwhelmed by a sudden, intense sensation. I opened […] the unfiltered brain, raising the gates to flood my mind with sensation. (Unpublished Diary, June 2009)

The symptoms of the psychedelic experience, from the ancient Greek ψυχή (psykhḗ or “soul”) and δῆλος (dḗlos or “visible”), are exquisitely unique and reliably illuminating, if such insights can be apprehended — the flood of perceptual fluctuations that engulfs the ego often inundates the analytical faculties. Consequently, should one hope to return from the abyss triumphant, with the gift of bliss and the reward of wisdom, the intellect must stretch its reach, wielding an extended net of metaphor to capture the juicy insights swimming around it.

Half-aware, half-asleep, my sensation turned to insight. I was drifting through bubbles of different eyes altered states of consciousness. As I entered each bubble, I saw from a different mind possibilities of the unfiltered human mind. I saw from a different time as my own context hid with the realm of possibilities. The ordered chaos allowed me see as other people from other times and places. I even encountered that which I do not believe in or reject. I reveled at the windows open in my mind. I had the wonderment of a child. I loved everything that I witnessed, and those who were watching with me I loved as well. I heard my thoughts change, creatively toward the philosophical …

“The Realm of Psyches” from an unpublished diary (June 2009)

As sometimes happens, four grams of fungus triggered an existential deconstruction that challenged a host of perceptual certainties and inspired a journey to the edge of the soul.

I thought of the ancient Greek Sophists, and the egocentric predicament that evaded Descartes, Locke, and Kant. As I swept through more bubbles, I repeated a mantra, “It’s all relative; it’s all right; everything is in relation to everything else.” It is through an interface that we perceive the world, and we have faith that we perceive accurately. The world stimulates our bodies and then our thoughts; the external reveals itself to the internal. […] We cannot afford to limit ourselves to our own interface. We must transcend our own limitations. Falling asleep, I repeated the mantra, “All right, it is all right…”

The next morning, the tone of my theology transformed from the dismissive scorn of a faithless Kyrēnaíc to the confident assurance of a pious Epicurean, an “Atom-Prophet” observant of the material divinity within. While I was still unconvinced by popular expressions of faith, still suspicious of religious institutions, still scornful of magical thinking, dismissive of superstitious beliefs, and derisive of supernatural myths, I became convinced of a universal spirituality, a primal faith that conforms to physics, driven by chemical ecstasy, ritualized across innumerable cultures, each featuring the same symptoms of the psychedelic experience.

The impression of that event shines in my mind like a holy relic, a splinter from the true cross of ecstasy. I returned from the psychedelic realm with a gift of bliss and sacred testimony, having communed with the kaleidoscopic source of experience, liberated from vain, intellectual inflexibilities. Before that event, I reduced the religious experience to a mere neurological disturbance; but as an Epicurean, I elevate that experience to a neurological blessing. Far from being an empty construct the requires dismissal, the “divine nature” is palpable. The meanings of mythic metaphors become evident as the conditioned realm of assumptions and prejudices dissolves into void. The psychedelic sacrament cleansed my mind of toxic opinions and purged me of rage. I was kissed by blessed psilocybin, who left me with a lasting euphoria.

The founder of the Epicurean tradition defends this material form of ὁσιότητος (hosiótētos) “piety” while criticizing the misunderstandings of the masses and their misleading myths. He maintains that the “true” gods are “not the same sort the masses consider” who “continuously pray for cruel” punishments “against one another” (Epíkouros, Epicurea 388). It is not the godless Kyrēnaíc, “but the one who adheres to the masses’ doctrines about the deities” who is truly “impious” (Epistle to Menoikeus 123). “For pious is the person who preserves the […] consummate blessedness of God” versus those who ask “in prayer” for “things unworthy of the supposed indestructibility and complete blessedness” of the divine (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 40.9-13 and Col. 10.2-5). “Such a person we honour for his piety, whereas the other we despise as manifestly depraved” (Ibid., Col 41.1-5). Any other, incoherent “definition of piety […] gives a strange impression, partly of jealousy, and partly of hostility” (Ibid., Col. 65.7-11).

In essence, Epicurean theology affirms that “God” is neither employed as an administrator in cosmic government, nor appointed as a magistrate to establish metaphysical jurisprudence. “The gods” neither probe the universe for life like interstellar anthropologists, nor prey upon shapely bachelorettes, nor worry themselves with weather forecasts. True piety observes the divinity found in nature, in forming bonds, cultivating friendship, and securing tranquility through peaceful relations. “Piety appears to include not harming” (Ibid., Col 47.5-8). Indeed, “piety and justice appear to be almost the same thing” (Ibid., Col. 78.10-12). In the Epicurean tradition, piety is an acknowledgement that god does not direct the human drama. A true deity neither fulfills vain wishes like a genie, nor practices divination like a sorcerer, neither seeking power from a fear of death, nor seeking fickle approval to gain favor. They are neither omnipotent nor omniscient, neither causative nor administrative, but only exhilarative, inter-generational sources of inspiration from which the rituals of religion have been formed.

PART II: PARTY ANIMALS

And with regard to festivals and sacrifices and all such things generally, it must entirely be acknowledged that he acted in accordance with what he believed and taught and that he faithfully employed oaths and tokens of good faith and he kept them. (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 51.3-11)

While the Sage of the Garden is distinguished for his critical commentary against hypocritical beliefs and mythic deceit, he nevertheless contributes volumes of reflections on spiritual wisdom and religious practice, faithfully exhorting a friend to “consider the deity an incorruptible and blessed figure” (Laértios 10.123). Philódēmos records Epíkouros as having “loyally observed all forms of worship” since he “enjoined upon his friends to observe them, not only on account of the laws, but for physical reasons as well. For in On Lifecourses he says that to pray is natural…” (On Piety, Col. 26.5-14). Philódēmos later affirms:

He shared in all the festivals […] joining in celebrating the festival of the Choes and the […] Mysteries and the other festivals at a meagre dinner, and that it was necessary for him to celebrate this feast of the twentieth for distinguished revelers, while those in the house decorated it most piously, and after making invitations to host a feast for all of them. (Col. 28.18–Col. 29.10)

The public festivals that Philódēmos names include both “the festival of the Choes” or “the Pouring”, the second day of the three-day-long, flower-and-wine holiday of Anthestḗria, celebrated on the twelfth day of the eponymously-named month of Anthestēriōn (from ἄνθος or ánthos meaning “flower”), as well as τά Μυστήρια (tá Mystḗria) or “the Mysteries” — it is unclear whether Philódēmos means μυστήρια τ’άττικα (mystḗria t’áttika Col. 28.27-28) “the Attic” (perhaps Eleusían) Mysteries versus μυστήρια τ’άστικα (mystḗria t’asti “the Urban Mysteries” or “City Dionýsia” held during the month of Elaphēboliōn (mid-March-to-April), known for its theatrical competitions, reminiscent of contemporary fringe festivals. By extension, Epíkouros may also have observed the adjacent Dionysian festival of Λήναια (Lḗnaia) from ληνός (lēnós meaning “wine-press”) in honor of Dionýsios Lēnaíos (“of the wine-press”), celebrated in Epíkouros’ birth-month of Gamēliṓn, from γαμηλίᾰ (gamēlía) meaning “marriage” (mid-January-to-February). The Lesser Mysteries may also have been patronized by Epíkouros and his friends, which also transpire during the month of Anthestēriōn. These holidays share many of the same wedding, drinking, parading, and feasting features as Anthestḗria.

A number of contemporary scholars have attempted to reconstruct a portrait of the central rituals that defined these holidays including a wedding procession, a symbolic pageant, a symbolic marriage, performances, drinking games, dancing, an animal sacrifice, and the filling feast that followed. Among them, Henri Jeanmarie orchestrates the following scene:

[T]he procession was led by a flute player, followed by basket bearers in white dresses, with flowers in the baskets. Others carried the perfumed altar, then there followed the maritime cart containing the God. Next there came a flute player and participants carrying flower wreaths raised high, so that they formed a kind of arc or superstructure. Under this walked the sacrificial bull, decorated with white ribbons. The procession also included masked men dressed up as women, fertility demons and satyrs. […] Upon arrival at the sanctuary the procession met with the Basilinna or queen, and her fourteen priestesses who received Dionysos in the wagon. | Those participants who performed the secret rituals in the sanctuary dedicated to Dionysos in the Marshes, comprised a group of fourteen priestesses called gerarai (“the Venerable Ones”), the holy herald, and the Basilinna, who was the wife of the Archōn Basileus, the priest of Dionysos, who during his year of service was responsible for many of the older religious ceremonies […] during the ritual […] the animal sacrifice was also performed […] When the women’s rituals in the Marshes were finished, Dionysos then married the Basilinna, who, as already stated, was the wife of the Archōn Basileus. He presided over the festival, and played the role of the God in the hieros gamos […] After having fetched the bride, the colorful procession walked through the city […] Meanwhile women and men stood outside the doors and on the terraces of their houses, carrying lighted torches in their hands and watching the procession as it passed by. (Håland 406-409)

In a letter to his friend and co-founder Polýainos, Epíkouros insists that “Anthestḗria too must be celebrated”, beginning with [DAY 1] Πιθοίγια (Pithoígia) the “Casket-Opening” during which “libations were offered from the newly-opened jars to the god of wine” and “all the household, including servants or slaves [joined] in the festivity of the occasion” — so long as that person was “over three years of age…” (Encyclopædia Britannica 103). Pithoígia resembles in many ways the Celtic tradition of Samhain, as well as its Christian analogue, All Hallow’s Eve save that Pithoígia is set amidst the floral scenery of Anthestēriṓn (mid-February-to-March), just in time for the wine to have reached its intended perfection as the flowers of next year’s harvest begin to bloom. Participants, within fragrant “rooms […] adorned with spring flowers” would, expectantly, open their tall πίθοι (píthoi, “jars of wine”) anticipating the prize within — symbolically, the jars represent the “grave-jars” of the deceased: fumes from the the previous season’s vintage escape like the vapors of the departed, liberated from their dark tombs. The souls of the dead are mythologized to have escaped the underworld to torment the living. “To protect themselves from the spirits of the dead,” as was the Attic tradition, Athenians were seen “chewing ‘ramnon’, leaves of Hawthorn, or white thorn, and were anointing themselves and their doors with tar” (Psilopoulos, Goddess Mystery Cults and the Miracle… 268).

As noted by Philódēmos (On Piety), the following day of Anthestḗria was designated [DAY 2] Χοαί (Khoaí) or Choës meaning “The Pouring” — naturally, the “pouring of the cups” would follow the “opening of the jars”. Fortunately, for our survey, “literary testimony [of] the second day, the Choes” “is explicit” (Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion 39). The day is “dedicated to a hieros gamos, a wedding of the Gods”. It famously featured a “drinking contest, to celebrate the arrival of the God” (Greek Festivals, Modern and Ancient 406). Despite “the drinking contest, the flower-wreathed cups”, the family feasts, “and the wedding of Dionysos, all joyful elements of the service of the wine-god, the Choes was a dies nefastus, an unlucky day” that demanded pious observance (Prolegomena 39). “On the part of the state this day was the occasion of a peculiarly solemn and secret ceremony in one of the temples of Bacchus, which for the rest of the year was closed.” (“Anthesteria”, Encyclopedia Brittanica). It is within this context that the Hegemon affirms “it is necessary to make mention of the gods” (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 30.28-29). Epíkouros provides us with the following appeal:

Let us sacrifice to the gods […] devoutly and fittingly on the proper days, and let us fittingly perform all the acts of worship in accordance with the laws, in no way disturbing ourselves with opinions in matter concerning the most excellent and august of beings. Moreover, | let us sacrifice justly, on the view that I was giving. For in this way it is possible for mortal nature, by Zeús, to live like Zeús, as it seems. (Epistle to Polýainos)

One example of a “sacrifice” to which he alludes might be found in the libations offered during the final day of Anthestḗria [DAY 3] Χύτροι (Khýtroi), an ancient predecessor of Día de los Muertos, the Day of the Dead. “The third day was explicitly dedicated to the spirits of the dead” (Greek Festivals, Modern and Ancient 413). Practitioners would offer the contents of their χύτραι (khýtrai) or “[cooking] pots” to Hermes Chthónios, a deity of the ancient underworld — here, Hermes fulfills the role of a classical psychopomp whose function it is to guide departed souls through the unfamiliar terrain of the afterlife. The pots of pious devotees would contain a porridge called πανσπερμία (panspermía or “all-seeds”), a warm “meal of mixed grains” (A Companion to Greek Religion 336). Such a sacrifice, characterized by personal abstinence and modest renunciation, would have exemplified Epikouros’ conception of αὐταρκείας (autarkeías) or autarky, meaning “self-sufficiency”, “self-reliance”, or “independence” (a notable ἀρετή or aretḗ, meaning “virtue” or instrumental good). Epicurean autarky is further characterized as a freedom from vain desires. The Master writes that “we praise the [virtue of] self-sufficiency not so that one might be in want of things that are cheap and plain, but so we can have confidence with them” knowing that the best things in life, like friendship, are free (Epicurea U135b).

Beyond his participation in the traditional civic festivals and cults of the Athenian polis, Epíkouros established a number of sect-specific holidays for friends and future students. As recorded in his Last Will, the observances he recommends include:

…an offering to the dead thereupon for both my father and my mother and my brothers, and for us the practice having been accustomed to celebrate our [Epíkouros and Metródōros’] birthday of each year on the Twentieth of Gamēliṓn, and so long as an assembly comes into being each of the month celebrate on the Twentieth to philosophize for us in order to respect both our memory and Metródōros’. And then celebrate the day of my brothers for Poseideṓn, and then celebrate that of Polyainos for Metageitniṓn exactly as we have been doing. (Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 10.18)

The Epicurean practice of ritualizing the anniversary of one’s birthday will strike us as a familiar celebration, yet in ancient Greece, “birthdays” were unrecognized outside of Persia. The historian Hēródotos records that “of all the days in the year, the one which they” the Persians “celebrate most is their birthday. It is customary to have the board furnished on that day with an ampler supply than common” (Customs of the Persians 1.133). It was even traditional to prepare pastries or cakes, for they ate “little solid food but abundance of dessert, which is set on table, a few dishes at a time” (Ibid.). Birthdays for Epicureans signify “the blessedness of having come into existence, for having become part of Nature’s vast and awesome realities” (A Companion to Horace 329). Epíkouros writes that “the wise will have gratitude for friends both present and absent alike through both word and through deed” (Laértios 10.118). In treating our friends’ birthdays as holidays (“holy days”), we observe a classical expression of piety.

“Homoousian” from an unpublished diary entry (June 2009).

While birthdays provided celebrants with an opportunity to toast the living, days of remembrance provided celebrants with an opportunity to venerate the dead. Epíkouros reserves a number of days in memoriam — he sets aside funds to provide resources for memorials for his father, his mother, and commemorations for his brothers on a day in Poseideṓn (mid-December-to-January), as well as his two, deceased best-friends, Polýainos on the 6th of Metageitniṓn (mid-August-to-September) and Metródōros on his own birthday of Gamēliōn 20th (mid-January-to-February). Polýainos’ day likely overlapped the festival of Metageítnia (for which the month was named), a a feast commemorating the legendary migration of Apollo Metageitniṓn, holy patron of migrants (an analogue for the modern personification of Lady Liberty). Apollo Metageitniṓn may have been a sympathetic icon for members of the Athenian Garden, many of whom were migrants from Lámpsakos or refugees to Athens.

Memorial cults in the ancient world were usually observed on the death-days of the deceased (not the days of their birth), so it is possible that Polýainos died on the 6th of Metageitniṓn (P.Herc. 176). At the same time, hero cults celebrate the birthdays of the figures of their veneration annually, and the Hegemon presents his school as such. Epíkouros neither establishes a funerary cult to support the ghosts (in which he did not believe) of his fallen friends, nor a mortuary cult to ritualize their internment. Instead, he prescribes a hero cult for himself and his friends in the hope that future students might learn from their lives and benefit by emulating their examples. In addition to the obligatory feast that crowns each festival, days of remembrance provide devotees with opportunities to clean gravesites and decorate votives.

In addition to participating in civic festivals and private rites, Epíkouros formally establishes the celebration of Eikas (or “The Twentieth”) the so-called “Philosopher’s Sabbath”, the unifying Epicurean holiday, a symposium, open to friends, associates, and acquaintances, set on the 20th day of each month. Several ancient inscriptions, carved in stone preserve the name of an older cult known as οἱ Εἰκαδεῖς (oì Eìkadeîs), those bound by the mythic hero Εἰκαδεύς (Eìkadeús), worshipped as a manifestation of Apollo Parnessiós (a form of Apollo who resides on Mt. Parnassós, surrounded by muses and strumming a lyre). The Eìkadeîs, too, worshipped their patron on the 20th day of each month; indeed, a deity cult would observe its patron god monthly, whereas a hero cult would celebrate their heroes annually: a “monthly cult was reserved for divinities” (The Cambridge Encyclopedia to Epicureanism 24). Thus, in establishing a monthly practice for his tradition, Epíkouros was “moving as close to the gods as was humanly possible” (Diskin Clay, Paradosis and Survival: Three Chapters in the History of Epicurean Philosophy 97). Indeed, “the festival for which the Epicureans were best known [was] established on the Apollonian day”. “The date, the twentieth of the month, was an interesting choice by Epicurus. For that was a sacred day to the celebrants of Apollo at Delphi and it was also the day on which initiation rites were held at the Temple of Demeter in Eleusis” (Hibler, Happiness Through Tranquility: The School of Epicurus 18). In organizing monthly gatherings, Epíkouros was explicitly providing initiates with a non-supernatural alternative to the predominant cults that ritualized transcendence and resurrection. “In derision, the enemies of the Master named his cult Eikadistai which is from the Greek word for the twentieth” (Ibid. 18).

Epíkouros and his καθηγεμώνες (kathēgemṓnes) “co-guides” or “co-founders” established a school that moonlit as a naturalistic hero cult with religious undertones. They provided an alternative to the dominant superstitions that circulated among the masses and founded a tradition that welcomed the unwelcome. Ancient Epicureans expressed their piety by hosting feasts, participating in festivals, attending pageants, patronizing theatrical sanctuaries, venerating the living (i.e. anthropolatry), memorializing the dead, committing to a study of nature, exercising peaceful relations, honoring friendships, and meditating upon the visualizations of divinities, divinities like Ζεύς (Zeús), whose name is derived from a prehistoric word for the archetypal god of the day sky, Dyēus. (As an interesting historical sidenote, Zeus was frequently epitomized by the epithet Ζεύς Πατήρ or Zeús Patér, from which we inherit “Jupiter”, a continuation of the proto-Indo-European phrase “Dyēus Phtḗr” meaning “Sky Father”.)

PART III: BY ZEUS!

Epíkouros published a number of treatises on theology, including Περὶ Ὁσιότητος (Perì Hosiótētos or “On Piety”) and Περὶ Θεῶν (Perí Theôn or “On Gods”). In his texts, the Gargettian encourages worship of the gods while maintaining the validity of atomic physics and highlighting the emptiness of the supernatural. Elsewhere in his texts, the Sage of the Garden conducts a survey of religious history, provides an evaluation of the efficacy of rites and rituals, and he reflects upon the nature of the profound mental impressions that have inspired thousands of years of pious devotion. While these masterpieces have been lost, his ideas have been preserved by Philódēmos’ similarly-named works “On Piety” and “On Gods”, in addition to Metródōros’ Περὶ Μεταβολής (Perì Metabolês or “On Change”), and a work by Demḗtrios of Lakōnía entitled Περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ Μορφῆς (Perì toû Theoû Morphēs or “On the Form of a God”), within which the form and physics of the divine depictions are further deconstructed.

These texts preserve a variety of theological attitudes, characterized by flexibility and fluidity, compatibility and coherence. Casually, the authors shift between polytheism, henotheism, kathenotheism, qualified monotheism, monolatry, and thealogy. They observe infinite deities, patronizing some, revering others, preferring these, ignoring those, favoring the feminine, venerating the masculine, and honoring the conceptual unity that the multiplicity of gods compliment. Each of these theological positions exhibit coherence between the variations in our internal understandings of blessedness as they have been “manifest” (as Demḗtrios of Lakoniá suggests) to the mind’s eye. The deities are expressions for the divine nature, paragons of the divine nature, and participants in the divine nature. At times, their names are invoked reverently, as when Philódēmos offers a “drink in honor of Zeus the Savior(On Death 3.32) while at other times, their literary forms are employed as purely poetic devices, as when Philódēmos summons “Aphrodite” and “Andromeda”, or when Diogénēs of Oìnóanda patronizes “father Zeus” (153) and swears “in the name of the twelve” (128). Hermarkhos records the Hegemon as having exercised this same practice: “Concerning metaphor, he made use in human fashion of the connection with the (divine) entity” (Against Empedoklḗs). The Epicurean sages demonstrate themselves to be skillful rhetoricians who shift their tone appropriately, casually, creatively, technically, and frankly. As Epíkouros writes, “Only the wise will rightly hold dialogue about […] poetry” (Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 10.120).

When he isn’t dropping the names of gods as idioms (e.g. NH ΔIA, Nḗ Dία or “By Zeus!”) and expletives (e.g. ΠΑΙΑΝ ΑΝΑΞ, Paián Ánax meaning “Lord Paian!” compared with our swear “Jesus Christ!”), Epíkouros is describing a collective group of θεῶν (theṓn) “of [the] deities” in the genitive plural (Epistle to Menoikeus 124, 133, 134; Vatican Saying 65). Elsewhere we find the word “deities” as θεοὺς (theoùs) in the accusative plural (Ep. Men. 123, 139), θεοῖς (theoîs) in the dative plural (Ep. Men. 123), and θεοὶ (theoì) in the vocative plural (Ep. Men. 123). Epíkouros employs the singular word “deity” as θεὸς (theòs) in the nominative (135, U338), θεόν (theón 121, 123, 134) in the accusative, and θεῷ (theôi 134) in the dative, both with and without a definitive article (“the” deity versus simply “deity”). Three times in the Epistle to Menoikeus, Epíkouros employs the masculine pronoun “him” when referring to “the deity” in the accusative (αὐτὸν or aútòn), dative (αὐτῷ or autōî), and genitive declensions (αὐτοῦ or autoú 123). Concurrently, throughout his abridgment on meteoric phenomena, Epíkouros employs feminine expressions for “the divine nature”, found in the nominative (θεία φύσις or ḗ theía phýsis, Ep. Pyth. 97, 117) and accusative forms (τὴν θείαν φύσιν or tḗn theían phýsin 113).

Jesus Christ! I find myself refreshed by the flexible means with which Epíkouros expresses divinity. I am equally encouraged by the possibility of an inclusive, intelligible approach to spirituality, independent of incoherent myths and tyrannical clerics. Such a congenital expression of piety compliments my continued observation that religious establishments and mythic narratives have been artificially fabricated. The larger story of human history reflects a tale of animals who developed histories, cultivated civilizations, and generated religious icons over vast periods of time, all due to the simple swerve of tiny, cosmic threads.

“Poesis” from an unpublished diary (June 2009)

According to Cicero, Epíkouros “alone first founded the idea of the existence of the Gods on the impression which nature herself hath made on the minds of all men” (On the Nature of Gods 26). “For what nation, what people are there, who have not, without any learning, a natural idea, or prenotion, of a Deity?” According to the Gargettian, pre-historic humans first conceived of divinities as sublime psychological icons encountered during dreams and meditations (On Nature 12). The Pyrrhonian skeptic Sextus Empiricus preserves Epíkouros’ historical thesis: “The origin of the thought that god exists came from appearances in dreams” as well as godlike examples manifest among “the phenomena of the world” (Adversus Mathematicos 9.45-46). Far from being prophetic symbols θεόπεμπτος (theópemptos) “sent by the gods” (Diogénēs of Oìnóanda, fr. 9, col. 6), the delightful visions are, most immediately, mental representations apprehended from a “constant stream of” materially-bondable “images” (Laértios 10.139). Ancient humans’ internal encounters with these untroubled forms created deep impressions in their minds. The devotees developed conventions to celebrate the symbols of their insights. Traditions were cultivated and pious practice flourished, as did dramatic myths and misunderstandings. Eventually, “self-important theologians” and deluded priests diluted beliefs about the divine and perverted piety with a fog of fear (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 86A 1-2). God, himself, was assigned disturbing duties and became enlisted in the service of religious autocrats.

Contrary to the chilling myths championed by “self-important theologians”, the true nature of the divine knows no need to direct the production of the human drama. Epíkouros recognizes that “it is foolish to ask of the gods that which we can supply for ourselves” (Vatican Saying 65). The true benefits of worship are enjoyed by worshippers, not by the fantastic objects of our obeisance. Humans conceive of gods and goddesses as being kind, confident, and self-reliant; in practicing these virtues, we cultivate our own happiness: “Anyone who has these things […] can rival the gods for happiness” (Vatican Saying 33). Philódēmos exhorts us to “imitate their blessedness insofar as mortals can” and “endeavor most of all to make themselves harmless to everyone as far as is within their power; and second to make themselves so noble” (On Piety Col. 71.16-19, 23-29). Therefore, a correct understanding of theology and religious practice is integral to cleansing oneself of the turmoil that is symptomatic of magical thinking. Millennia later, the American diplomat Benjamin Franklin recycles this ancient aphorism in his publication Poor Richard’s Almanack, suggesting that “God helps them that helps themselves.”

PART IV: ALL PARTICLES GO TO HEAVEN

To rationally explore concepts like divinity and prayer, Epíkouros defines a standard of knowledge that is grounded in atomic interactions — “the criterion of truth [includes] the sensations and preconceptions and that of feeling” (Laértios 10.31). The Gargettian defines the divine nature (“the gods” or “God”) as being presented by the mental προλήψις (prolēpsis) “impression” of μακαριότητα (makariótēta) “blessedness”, also described as τελείαν εδαιμονίαν (teleían eùdaimonían) “perfect happiness”. The gods of Epíkouros are primarily θεωρητούς (theōrētoús 10.62, 135) “observed” or “contemplated” as φαντασίαν τ διανοί (phantasían tḗi dianoíai) “visualizations” or “appearances [in] the mind” (10.50). Epíkouros affirms that the gods μὲν εἰσιν (mèn eísin 123) “truly exist” yet are only “seen” or “reached” through an act of λόγῳ (lógoi 10.62, 135) “contemplation”, “consideration”, “reasoning”, “reckoning”, or “logical accounting” (10.62, 135). He observes that the mental φαντάσματα (phantásmata) or “appearances” of the gods arise κ τς συνεχος πιρρύσεως τν μοίων εδώλων (èk ts synekhoús èpirrū́seōs tn homoíōn eidṓlōn) “from a continuous stream of similar images” that leave impressions upon the mind. The divine impressions are generated from the coalescence of “similar images” through a process of ὑπέρβασις (hypérbasis) “sublimation”. The images the intellect apprehends have been ποτετελεσμένωι (ápotetelesménōi) “rendered” to human souls in human forms, inspiring, perpetually-healthy, perfectly-happy people.

Having reviewed the psychiatric evidence of memory against the criteria of knowledge (exemplified by the Epicurean canon), Epíkouros explains that the functional “coherence” or “resemblance” between internal φαντάσματα (phantásmata) “appearances” and external τος οσί (toís ousí) “reality” (or literally, “the beings”) requires an initial impulse to complete a sequence of successive impacts, ultimately yielding a perception in the mind, “since we could not have sought the investigation if we had not first perceived it” (Laértios 10.33). A sensible τύπος (týpos) “impression” initiates a perceptual relay through various pathways in the soul — the sense organs are stimulated by acoustic ῥεύμᾰτᾰ (rheúmata) or “currents”, olfactory ὄγκοι (ónkoi) or “hooklets”, and visual είδωλα (eídōla) or “images” “impinging [upon] us [as] a result of both the colorful realities and concerning a harmonious magnitude of like morphologies”. The μαχυμερέστερον (makhymerésteron) “marching army of particles” (Dēmḗtrios of Lakonía, On the Form of a God 21) enter “the face or the mind” […] yielding an appearance and an [affective] sympathy as a result of the observing” (10.49-50). The earliest people who experienced these visions assumed “the object of thought as a thing perceived in relation to a solid body […] understanding perception that can be grasped by corporeal sensation, which they also knew to be derived from a physical entity [i.e. nature].” (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 15.8-18). Thus, “the gods” were born, and forms of worship developed to venerate their appearance.

Mental phantasms can be instigated passively through the indiscriminate mechanism of sensation, either externally, through the trigger of touch, or internally, “in respect of slumbers” when the mind is least encumbered by daily disturbances. They can also be summoned intentionally, through a directed act of contemplation, involving τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας (tinàs épibolàs tḗs dianoías) “some applications of the intellect” like μνήμην (mnḗmēn) “memory”. Dēmḗtrios of Lakōnía elaborates that the representations in the mind are caused both as those memories manifest” through focus, “and also” by the physical impulse of “pre-existing [bodies] that, upon [striking] the mind produce constructive cognition” (On the Form of a God 12). Because of this, mental representations of religious figures can be summoned through meditation as readily as when gazing upon a the body of a physical icon. In prayer, the supplicant manually retrieves the mental impressions of blessed impulses from memory. Depictions of divinity have been “apparent” (and readily-available) to most people for millennia — the fields of the Earth are filled with statues, votives, frescoes, mosaics, murals, metalwork, jewelry, pottery, and architecture that glorify the divine. Each civilization peppers its conception of divinity with fresh colors, shapes, and stories just as each culture ritualizes a contemplative path to care for the health of the soul. In doing so, each group creates a cultural matrix into which subsequent generations are enmeshed. Concurrently, each tradition preserves its own, procedural means by which to make the contents of their psykhḗ become dḗlos.

When a supplicant prays, meditates, concentrates, reflects, or generally applies directed focus toward the memory of the “form” of “blessedness”, they generate a mental image “as if” practitioners were literally ἐν εἰκόνι (én eìkóni) “in the presence” of a physical “representation”, “portrait”, or “icon”. As with the memory of “brightness”, “loudness”, “softness”, and “sweetness”, the mental “appearance” of a divine form arises κ τς συνεχος πιρρύσεως τν μοίων εδώλων (èk ts synekhoús èpirrū́seōs tn homoíōn eidṓlōn) “from a continuous stream of similar impulses” received from abroad. To further isolate the genesis of our conceptions, we can trace the atomic crumbs of cognition to their energetic source. In the case of divine entities, we discover that our representations have been conditioned through our experiences with human nature combined with the congenital preconception of blessedness. As with the preconception of δίκαιος (díkaios) “justice”, the mental prototype of a “god” functions as an organizing principle and can act as a standard against which real-world examples can be evaluated — an alleged divinity who punishes and terrorizes neither meets the definition of “blessed” nor of “just”, and cannot, by definition, be “a god”. So long as a personal conception of divinity coheres with the definition of “blessedness”, it can be considered to be a god. Thus, an endless collection of divinities can be perceived, in a variety of forms, supported by the infinity of particles.

The intelligible form of a god appears to us, as does each, conceptual formation in the mind, as τὸ ὄν (tò ón) “a being” or “an entity” (Philódēmos, On Piety 1892, 66a 11). According to Epíkouros, each “entity” can be conceived of as an individual ἑνότης (henótēs) “unity” or “union” composed of many other particles that coalesce together to form representational σύγκρισεις (sýnkriseis) “compounds” in the mind. As Metródōros writes, each νότητα διότροπον (henótēta idiótropon) “distinctive unity” also exists as a “compound made up of things that do not exist as numerically distinct” (On Change; in Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 4.13-15). Epíkouros clarifies, “unified entities” in the mind exhibit one of two constitutions — some “are perfected out of the same elements and others from similar elements” (On God; in Philódēmos, On Piety Col. 8.14-17) The φύσεις (phýseis) “natures” or “constitutions” of all of these “unified entities” are therein grouped according to the origin of their birth, either from a single source, or having coalesced from multiple sources  ἐξ ὑπερβάσεως τν μεταξύ (èx hyperbáseōs tôn metazù Col.12.8-9) “as a result of transposition” during traversal “between” the source and its representative conception in the mind. If the mental form of an entity is composed of particles that only originate from a single source, Epíkouros says that they are all αὐτή (autḗ) “the same” in constitution — “the same” form is one that reflects a numerically-singular entity in one’s environment. By contrast, Epíkouros says that the appearances composed of particles coming from multiple sources are only superficially ὁμοία (homoía) “similar” because they are only related insofar as their composition as an array of εἴδωλα (eídola). Besides their shared form as bundles of images, they have different origins that combined during conception.

To demonstrate this constitution, visualize a dog. The appearance of this dog is a mental representation. It was previously impressed upon your mind when dog-particles travelled from a dog through spacetime and impacted your eyes. The resulting dog-form is a bundle of distinct particles that correspond κατ’ ἀριθμόν (kat’ arithmón) “in number” to the measurable proportions of “that same”, furry creature in reality. Your representation is composed of particles whose φύσεις (phýseis) “origins” are all αὐτή (autḗ) “the same” — your internal perception of a “dog” is uncontaminated from the particles of other, distinct objects. The generative flow of images reflects the activity of the original body, and a dog is not confused for another form (e.g. when dog-forms coalesce with human-forms in our imagination, we picture werewolves).

Next, visualize a god (any god. Take your pick. Any such forms will do.) Like the dog-form, your god-form is a mental image. Like the dog-form, the god-form is also apprehended by the intellect. Like the dog-form, the god-form too was initially triggered by impulses “received from abroad”. However, unlike the mental aggregate that constitutes your impression of a “dog”, your impression of a “god” is a ὑπέρβασις (hypérbasis), a “superimposition” of at least two different bodies of εἴδωλα (eídola) that are only superficially ὁμοία (homoía) “similar” insofar as their material composition as a picture in the mind. The compound nature of these images enables their being φθαρτον “indestructible”. By comparison, after the death of a dog (and the end of that dog’s eídola), that dog’s form can only be retrieved from memory — we are left with the impressions that a mortal creature gave us of itself during its limited lifespan. The forms of the gods, however, are not at risk of dissolution because they do not have a single source that is subject to death — the sources of the god-forms are unending, undying, and limitless, the infinite soup of particles that is constantly interlacing before our very souls. In this regard, “the form of god” is neither a simple body (like a particle), nor a regular compound (like a dog), but is a sort of irregular compound. Neither compound is a simple body (i.e. a particle), and both are combinations of simple bodies, but unlike the mental form of “a dog”, the mental form of “a god” is not composed of particles that are κατ ριθμν (kat’ árithmòn) “numerically-identical” to their source, but rather, the form of “a god” is composed of particles that are καθ μοείδειαν [kath’ hòmoeídeian] “similar in consistency” such that they can become enlaced to imagine new forms — the image of a human mixes in the mind with the concept of perfect happiness, as well as other notions, like agelessness to form the idea of “God”. Epíkouros explains ος μν κατ ριθμν φεσττας (oús mèn kat’ árithmòn hyphesttas) “on one hand” the forms of the gods appear to be “subsisting by number”, as though each on is a “unified entity”; “but on the other hand” ος δ καθμοείδειαν (oús mèn kath’ hòmoeídeian) it is also the case that the gods are formed from multiple sources due to their substantial existence “as a consistency” or “similarity” of images that produce “a common appearance”, or “likeness” (Laértios 10.139).

In the case of the specific characteristics of the form of a god, our mind seems to universally apprehend any given representation of the divine nature ἀνθρωποειδῶς (anthrōpoeidṓs) “as-a-human-idol” or “anthropomorphically” (Ibid. 139). Granted, they are not “to be considered as bodies of any solidity […] but as images, perceived by similitude and transition” (Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 28). “We do not find the calculation” so writes Demḗtrios, “that any other shape” besides that “of the human” could qualify as a blessed and incorruptible being.” Indeed, the gods “are granted to be perfectly happy; and nobody can be happy without virtue, nor can virtue exist where reason is not; and reason can reside in none but the human form” (Ibid.). Philódēmos writes that “we have to infer from the appearances” of their characteristics. Indeed, the form of a god is “conceived as a living being” (On Gods III, Col. 10):

One must believe with Hermarchus that the gods draw in breath and exhale it, for without this, again, we cannot conceive them as such living beings as we have already called them, as neither can one conceive of fish without need in addition of water, nor birds [without additional need] of wings for their flight through the air; for such [living beings] are not better conceived [without their environment] .

Philódēmos further reflects on the dwelling-place of the gods:

[E]very nature has a different location suitable to it. To some it is water, to others air and earth. In one case for animals in another for plants and the like. But especially for the gods there has to (be a suitable location), due to the fact that, while all the others have their permanence for a certain time only, the gods have it for eternity. During this time they must not encounter even the slightest cause of nuisance… (On Gods III, Col. 8).

The Epicurean scholarch Apollódōros, the “Tyrant of the Garden” infers that that “the dwellings” of the infinite gods “have to be far away from the forces in our world”, not necessarily by distance, but impalpability (On Gods III, Col. 9). The ghostly forms of the gods transcend the perils of our perishable plasma through a perpetual replenishment of spectral particles, motes, most minor and minute, as the most minuscule molecules of the human mind.

Philódēmos acknowledges that the deities possess perception and pleasure. Their behavior is recognizably human-like, finding delight in thought and conversation:

we must claim that the gods use both voice and conversation to one another; for we will not conceive them as the more happy or the more indissoluble, [Hermarchus] says, by their neither speaking, nor conversing with each other, but resembling human beings that cannot speak; for since we really do employ voice, all of us who are not disabled persons, it is even the height of foolishness that the gods should either be disabled, or not resemble us in this point, since neither men nor gods can create utterances in any other way. And particularly since for good men, the sharing of discourse with men like them showers down on them indescribably pleasure. And by Zeus one must suppose the gods possess the Hellenic language or one not far from it, and that their voices in expressing rationalist are clearest(Philódēmos, On Gods III, Col. 13)

The innumerable forms of the deities seem to be enjoying the greatest-possible happiness, a perfect happiness, that which cannot be heightened by excess. They seem ceaselessly-satisfied, savoring friendship and pleasure, “for it is not possible for them to maintain their community as a species without any social intercourse” (Philódēmos, On Gods, fr. 87). Unburdened by the undue responsibilities of celestial governance, astral adjudication, and cosmic corrections, the holy inhabitants of the mind are wholly self-reliant. Perfectly prudent, they privilege the preservation of their own peace above other obligations. As living figures, they seemingly breathe; as social figures, they seemingly converse; as intelligent figures, they seemingly reflect; as blessed figures, they live without fear, paragons of imperishability and models of ethical excellence.

Demḗtrios notes that, “when we say in fact the God is human-shaped” we should remember that God is not actually human (On the Form of a God 15). Velleius explains in On the Nature of the Gods that god “is not body, but something like body; nor does it contain any blood, but something like blood” (28). Though, he adds,“these distinctions were more acutely devised and more artfully expressed by Epicurus than any common capacity can comprehend”. They are, nonetheless, “real”, “unified entities”, even as appearances in the mind.

In order that he might “realize” his own “fulfillment”, scrutinizing the forms of these “beings surpassing [περβαλλουσν or hyperballousōn] in power [δυνμει or dynámei] and excellence [σπουδαιότητι or spoudaiótēti]”, who equally “excel [περέχον or hyperékhon] in sovereignty [γεμονίαν or hegemonían]”, Philódēmos infers that:

that of all existing things, [the divine nature] is the best [ριστον or áriston] and most holy [σεμνότατον or semnótaton, “dignified” or “revered”], most worthy of emulation [ξιοζηλωτότατον or áxiozēlōtótaton, “enviable”], having dominion over all good things [πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν κυριευόντα or pántōn tōn agathṓn kurieúonta], unburdened by affairs [πραγμάτευτον or pragmáteuton], and exalted [ψηλόν or hypsēlon, “sublime” or “proud”] and great-minded [μεγαλόφρονα or megalóphrona, “noble” or “generous”] and great-spirited μεγαλόψυχον or megalópsykhon, “magnanimous”] and ritually pure [γιον or hágion, “sacred”] and purest [γιοτατον or àgiōtaton, “holiest”] and propitious [ῑ̔́λεων or hī́leōn, “blameless”]. Therefore they say that they alone strive after the greatest form of piety and that they hold […] the purest views as regards the ineffable [φραστον or áphraston, “inexpressible” or “marvelous”] pre-eminence [περοχήν or hyperokhēn, “superiority”] of the strength [σχύος or ìskhúos, “power”] and perfection [τελειότητος or teleiótētos, “completeness”] of the divine [toû theíou] […] [Epíkouros] advises not to think [God] bad-tempered (as he is thought), for example, by the poets. (On Piety, Col 45.2-30).

PART V: THE MYSTERIES

It might seem counter-intuitive for an atomist to have embraced categorical mysticism, but history is unequivocal, “in Epíkouros’ case” his capacity to entertain mystical practices “is shown by his eagerness for sharing in των Ἀθήνησιν μυστηρίων (tōn Athḗnēsin mystḗríōn) the mysteries at Athens” (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 20.6-11). Both friends and opponents attest to this point, including Timokrátēs, the former Epicurean and estranged brother of Mētródōros, who implicates the Hegemon of having engaged in μυστικὴν ἐκείνην (mystikēn hekeínēn) “mystical fraternizations” at night (Laértios 10.6). Epíkouros rejects any inerrant interpretations of the mythic fictions, but still, he committed to attendance. From the attestations provided by Philódēmos, Epíkouros recognized the practical psychological (or spiritual) benefits from the induction of a mystical experience. Indeed, the “mind-manifesting” features of psychedelia provide a bridge to support an image-based conception of “the deities” as described by the Gargettian, otherwise only privately manifest to the mind’s eye. Epíkouros establishes this coherence with his theory of knowledge. His observations laid a framework with which to explain the dynamics of religious ecstasy, divine madness, and psychedelic mysticism.

We inherit the word “mystery” (μυστήριον or mystḗrion) from the verb μύω (mýō) meaning “close” or “shut”, as in “shutting [one’s eyes]”. Therein, the μύστης (mýstēs) “initiate” or “mystic” is one who seeks to minimize external disruptions and maximize the conscious absorption of internal phenomena (parenthetically, we also inherit the words “myopia” and “myopic” from μύω or mýō). The rituals in which the mýstēs participates are called μυστήρια (mystḗria) the “Mysteries”, and the qualities of the private ceremonies and the ecstatic visions for which mystics anticipated are described as μυστικός (mystikós) “mystical”.

Though the language of mysticism is Greek, the family of practices and altered states to which it refers are universal. Ecstasy can be elicited via trance, auto-hypnosis, contemplation, prayer, meditation, sex, fasting, dancing, music, focused breathing, and through chemical induction by means of an entheogen (Pahnke 1962). The analytical contents of these exercises might be further illuminated by concepts like “the Perennial Philosophy” of Aldous Huxley, the “religious experience” of William James, the “collective unconscious” of Carl Jung, and the “universal myths” of Joseph Campbell — these seem to me, in particular, to be reasonable attempts by devoted thinkers to map the territory of the human mind.

“Psyche-Soma” from an unpublished diary (June 2009).

Religious institutions also offer helpful analogues against which we can compare and contrast both ancient mystería as well as modern psychedelia. Consider the variety of rituals and beliefs that contribute to visionary experiences, such as the Orthodox practices of “théōsis” and “apothéōsis”, or the Roman Catholic process of “deification” or “divinization”, as well as the corresponding practice of ἡσυχασμός (hēsykhasmós) “inward stillness” established by the the Desert Monastics from which apothéōsis it received. Hesychasm corresponds with the contemplatio “contemplation” of the early Christian Fathers of the Church — incidentally, the word contemplatio is a translation of θεωρία or theōría, the same word that Epíkouros employs to refer to the traditional means by which the deities manifest — of those Church Fathers, several of them dually identified as Platonists or Neo-Platonists. Like the Christians whom they inspired, the Neo-Platonists developed the practice of Theoria as a means of engaging divinity. Whereas Christians sought “the presence of God”, so Neo-Platonists sought union through ἕνωσις (hénōsis) “two from one” with the “Monad”, “the One”, or “the Absolute”. Incidentally, Neo-Platonism, itself, is a partial, Academic re-branding of Hindu Vedanta by the founder of Neo-Platonism, Ammṓnios Sakkás, a possible, Indian mystic named from the ancient Śākya clan (from which the Brahmin family of Siddhartha Guatama hailed, eight centuries earlier).

The Neo-Platonic ἕνωσις (hénōsis) provides a direct conceptual link between visionary Greek and Indian wisdom traditions. A similar parallel exists between the Greek θεοφάνεια (theopháneia) “appearance of a deity” and the Dharmic दर्शन (darśana) “sight of a divinity”. Other constructs that presents similar (though not identical) examples, including the Hindu notions of प्रज्ञा (prajñā) “insight” and विद्या (vidya) “knowledge”, the Buddhist term बोधि (boddhi) “enlightenment”, which corresponds with the Chinese word 見性 (kenshō), and the Japanese word 悟り (satori). It may be further helpful to compare the “divine madness” of Plato (Phaedrus 244-245; 265a–b) with the “enlightenment” constructs of the Indian subcontinent, including समाधि (samādhi), मोक्ष (mokṣa), and निर्वाण (nirvana). We also find some correspondence with the Sufi practice of مراقبة (Murāqabah) “observance”, as well as the γνῶσις (gnōsis) from various Gnostic sects. Many of these traditions that achieved mystical states through psycho-physical exercises also incorporated entheogens (from ἔνθεος or éntheos, “possessed by a god”) that trigger chemognosis (from χυμεία or khymeía, “art of mixing alloys” or “alchemy” that leads to divine γνῶσις or gnôsis, “[secret] knowledge”).

While the aforementioned practices and states of consciousness are not at all identical, nor even completely translatable, they help exemplify some of the ways in which traditions have been shared and re-formulated since pre-history. In addition to the earlier-mentioned link between “Jupiter” and the proto-Indo-European god “Dyēus Ph₂tḗr” meaning “Sky Father”, we see ancient examples with the Pyrrhonists, who adopted the wisdom of the ancient Indian अज्ञान (Ajñana) mendicants and re-branded it to the ancient world as “Skepticism”. In return मध्यमक (Madhyamaka) Buddhists’ borrowed the epistemological methods of the Pyrrhonists. The late Academics’ synthesized the philosophy of Plátōn with Hindu Vedanta and sold the entire program as “Neo-Platonism”. Centuries earlier, it seems that Greek materialists borrowed atomism from their वैशेषिक (Vaiśeṣika) counterparts in India. (The dimensions of these historical traditions have been explored more thoroughly elsewhere, and readers are encouraged to expand on these ideas and properly delve into each tradition on its own accord.)

Each of these traditions shares levels of correspondence with τά Μυστήρια ( Mystḗria) or “the Mysteries” that help reconstruct the particularities of those religious experiences that would been contemporaneous with Epíkouros (of which, there were many). The Eleusían mysteries were the most popular (of which Plátōn was fond), followed closely by the Dionysian mysteries (mentioned earlier) — and Orphic cults (of which Pythagóras was fond). The Orphic cult later inherited the Dionysian tradition, and heavily influence the context in which the Christian resurrection deity emerged. The Mysteries in which Epíkouros participated would have exposed him to psychedelic phenomena — even if, hypothetically, he never induced the mind-bending experience within himself, he would have heard the testimony of others, either from their own experiences, or popular lore. The visions that would have become activated under the influence of an entheogen would have corresponded with symbolic pageantry ritualizing the creation of life, the passage of the soul, the changing of seasons, the inevitability of death, the transition of the self, and the resurrection of the soul from the underworld through a mystery, shared only with the τελεστής (telestēs) meaning “initiator” or “priest” (Col. 32.11-12).

Anthestḗria and the Urban Mysteries are dedicated to Dionýsios (or Bákkhos, celebrated by the Romans during Bacchalania), so the Dionysian Mysteries may have been Epíkouros’ preferred mystery. As he relates to mysticism, Dionýsios is a transformational deity whose metamorphic powers ferment cheap grapes into rich wine and transmute simple produce into palliative potions — simultaneously, the soul of the initiate undergoes a procedural, psychiatric process of transformation that subjectively mirrors the seasonal procession of death and rebirth, animated through the subjective sense of having been psychologically reborn. The Mysteries celebrate this primordial nature that echos from the depths of the soul.

The Orphic tradition can be examined at length elsewhere, but in summary, the cult of Orphism ritualized the creation of humanity from the bodies of the recently-annihilated Titans and the soul of the recently-deceased Dionysos, son of Zeus. “In the later classical period, the Dionysus cult was adopted and adapted into the Orphic mysteries of death and rebirth, where Dionysus symbolized the immortal soul, transcending death” (Metzner). Later writers equated Orphism with the Pythagorean school. Both traditions influenced Plátōn, as they share the common belief in μετεμψύχωσις (metempsýkhōsis), “the-process-after-incarnation” or “reincarnation.” This theme of rebirth is central to the Mysteries. The Orphic cult also shares significant topical consistency with the resurrection deity of early Christianity both deities are sons of a supreme God, both deities are killed by an ancient evil force, both deities are resurrected in spirit. 

The Eleusían Mysteries were the most popular in ancient Athens, and may well have been the tradition in which Epíkouros may have ingested a holy sacrament. Like its counterparts, the Eleusían Mysteries developed from much earlier cults likely corresponding with Minoan and Mycenaean civilizations. The cult may originally have patronized Demeter, envisioned as a poppy goddess: “For the Greeks Demeter was still a poppy goddess, | Bearing sheaves and poppies in both hands”, thus, reinforcing a connection between psychoactive substances, ecstasy, and the formalization of religious rituals (Thekirtos VII 157). In Eleusis: Archetypal Image of Mother and Daughter, “Karl” Kerényi interprets the Eleusían Mysteries as having featured a sort of “epiphany”, “not as a vision for common eyes” but “visible only to the blind man in the hour of his death” (85). According to his personal translation of Plátō’s Phaídros, “the beatific vision” of “a goddess” transports an initiate “into a state of eternal beatitude” (95). As he writes, “divine apparitions” could “be induced by magical ceremonies” (114). According to Karl, a sacramental “pharmaceutical” was ingested to trigger “a real seeing, not as a subjective illusion”. He further speculates that this “pharmaceutical” involved an initiate needing to “drink the kykeon” to “attain a state of epopteia, of ‘having seen,’ by his own inner resources” (113).

The Elysian Mysteries were of two — the Lesser Mysteries took place during Anthestēriōn under the direction of the ἄρχων βασιλεύς (árchōn basileús) “lord sovereign” who would initiate “mystics” into the cult. The Greater Mysteries took place in Boedromin (mid-September-to-October). Michael Cosmopoulos orchestrates the following scene:

On the first day [agrymós], the fifteenth of Boedromion, the Archon Basileus summoned the people in the Poikile Stoa. […] On the second day [élasis], the sixteenth […] the mystai proceed to either Piraeus or Phaleron, where they purified themselves by washing a piglet in the water of the sea […] On the third day, the seventeenth of Boedromion, there may have been sacrifices int eh Eleusionion under the supervision of the Archon-Basileus […] The fourth day and last day of [public] festivities in Athens was called Epidauria or Asklepieia […] it may have celebrated the introduction of the cult of Asklepios in Athens. […] On the fifth day, the nineteenth of Boedromion, a grandiose procession (pompe] took the hiera from Athens back to Eleusis. The procession started from the Eleusinion and proceeded through the Panathenaic Way and the Agora to the Dipylon Gates and from there followed the Sacred Way back to Eleusis. The mystai and their sponsors were dressed in festive clothes, crowned with myrtle wreaths, and held branches of myrtle tied with strands of wool (the “bacchos”). […] at the head of the procession were the priests and the Priestesses Panageis carrying the Hiera is the kistai […]Next in turn were the mystai and their sponsors. At the end of the procession were placed the pack animals with the supplies needed fo rhte long trip. The procession followed the modern highway from Kerameikos to the Sacred Way, up to the sanctuary of Aphrodite, where it turned toward the hill and the lakes of the Rheitoi before reaching the sea by the bridge. From that point the Sacred Way followed the modern highway once more. | During the procession two events took place: the krokosis would occur after the mystai crossed the bridge and consisted of tying a krokos, a ribbon of saffron color, around the right hand and the left leg of each mystes. This wen ton until the sunset, and then the pompe continued by torchlight. […] The second event took place on the bridge of the river Kephissos, where the initiates were harassed and insulted. […] Once the procession reached the sanctuary of Eleusis, Iakhos was received ceremoniously at the court. For the rest of the night the initiates sang and danced in honor fo the Goddess. The dances traditionally took place around the Kallichoron well and were meant to cheer the grieving goddess. […] Ont he following day (the twentieth of Boedromion) several sacrifices too place […] during the day the initiates fasted […] The fast came to an end with the drinking of the kykeon, the special potion of the Eleusinian Mysteries.” (18-19)

The Hegemon demonstrates that one need not suspend disbelief in atomic principles to enjoy the pleasure of the ritualism of the Mysteries. From textual fragments, Epíkouros enjoyed fellowship, celebration, procession, and self-reflection during these mystical ceremonies. Simultaneously, he rejected any literal interpretations of the mythic pageant. He may have appreciated the acknowledgement of change and the inevitability of death, while disregarding the proposition of the immortality of the human soul. Nonetheless, he participated in the rituals, including drinking kyken, an allegedly god-manifesting sacrament.

“Teonanacatl” from an unpublished diary (June 2009).

PART VI: THE SACRAMENT

Was Epíkouros tripping? Did his floor start rippling some 30 minutes after ingestion? Did tiny bits of light in the dark trigger complex, kaleidoscopic, visual geometric patterns?

Since the 1950s, a number of notable anthropologists, ethnobotanists, ethnomycologists, and chemists, including Albert Hoffman, who first synthesized the contemporary entheogen known as lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) have specifically presented the Greek sacrament of kykeōn used in Eleusian ceremonies as the chemical instigator that made the mind visible. ΚΥΚEΩΝ (κυκεών or kyken) comes from the ancient Greek verb κυκάω (kūkáō) meaning “[it] stirs” or “[it] mixes”—it also carries the connotation of a mixture that “confuses” and “confounds”. Kyken was thus employed when referring to a “potion”, “tonic”, “elixir”, or “mixed beverage”. We find a number of mentions of this substance in ancient texts.

In the Homeric Hymn to Dēmḗtēr, written between the 8th-and-7th-centuries BCE, the queen Metáneira “offered her [Demeter] a cup, having filled it with honey-sweet wine” (206):

Then she ordered her [Metáneira] to mix some barley and water
with delicate pennyroyal [mint], and to give her that potion to drink.
So she made the kukeôn and offered it to the goddess, just as she had ordered. (208-210)

The queen’s potion is accepted “for the sake of the ὅσια” or hósia, the “sacred” or “holy” rite whereupon a sacrifant initiates a “relationship” with the aforementioned deity wherein a supplication of χάρις (kháris) “thanks” or “grace” might be exchanged (211).

In The Iliad, “fair-tressed” Hekamḗdē mixes “a potion”. As further described:

Therein the woman, like to the goddesses, mixed a potion for them with
Pramnian wine, and on this she grated cheese of goat’s milk with
a brazen grater, and sprinkled thereover white barley meal;
and she bade them drink, when she had made ready the potion.

ἐν τῷ ῥά σφι κύκησε γυνὴ ἐϊκυῖα θεῇσιν
οἴνῳ Πραμνείῳ, ἐπὶ δ᾽ αἴγειον κνῆ τυρὸν
κνήστι χαλκείῃ, ἐπὶ δ᾽ ἄλφιτα λευκὰ πάλυνε,
πινέμεναι δ᾽ ἐκέλευσεν, ἐπεί ῥ᾽ ὥπλισσε κυκει. (Iliás 11.638–641)

In The Odyssey, Hómeros describes “all the baneful wiles” of the goddess Kírkē, a vengeful sorceress who “will mix thee a potion, and cast drugs into the food…” (Odýsseia 10.289-290; Murray 1919). Before spiking the punch, she:

made for them [a potion] of cheese and barley-meal and yellow honey
with Pramnian wine;

σφιν τυρόν τε καὶ ἄλφιτα καὶ μέλι χλωρὸν
οἴνῳ Πραμνείῳ ἐκύκα· (Odýsseia 10.234-235)

The various kykenes were composed “of mixtures” that usually included barley, cheese, and wine, but could also include, as is twice described by Hómeros in the foundational myths of the Hellenic people, an unknown adulterant. While the alcohol present in wine is known to produce mild states of euphoria and shades of bliss, it is utterly dissimilar to the intense, mystical dissolution that entheogens produce leading to visions of divine beings.

One compound to have been responsible for the psychedelic affects of kyken was an active alkaloid from the ergot fungus Claviceps purpurea that produced visions, speechlessness, and euphoria (symptoms otherwise with religious ecstasy). At the Mas Castellar site in Girona, Spain, “Ergot sclerotia fragments were found inside a vase along with remains of beer and yeast, and within the dental calculus in a jaw of a 25-year- old man, providing evidence of their being chewed” (Juan-Stresserra 70). However, outside of sterile conditions, ingestion of the ergot fungus risks ergotism, a debilitating conditions caused by toxic molds. Raw ergot may have been unreliable in inducing desired visionary experience. Still, given the frequency of ingestion and the length of time over which this tradition was practiced, it is possible that, on occasion, proper chemical conditions could be facilitated to induce a euphoric visionary experience to orchestrate the myths of the Mysteries through the mycodegradation of barley or rye.

If ergot presents too much instability, opium is another candidate for a possible mystery sacrament: “It seems probable that the Great Mother Goddess who bore the names Rhea and Demeter, brought the poppy with her from her Cretan cult to Eleusis and it is almost certain that in the Cretan cult sphere opium was prepared from poppies” (Kerenyi 25). As Taylor-Perry describes, “there is ample iconographic and literary evidence linking poppy capsules not only with Demeter but also specifically with Eleusis” (121). A the same time, the sedating effects of opiates may not necessarily reflect the vivid experiences of psychedelia. Nonetheless, both induce a sense of euphoria and are have been demonstrated to stimulate hallucinations.

Ethnomycologists Valentine Pavlovna and Robert Gordon Wasson began fieldwork in 1956 on Mesoamerican rituals involving psilocybin mushrooms (Psilocybe mexicana) or teonanácatl, from the Nahuatl teotl (“god”) + nanácatl (“fungus”) — note the linguistic correspondence between teonanácatl and βρῶμα θεόν (brṓma theón), an ancient Greek reference to mushrooms, being the “food of the gods”. Wasson’s research later fueled speculations that these chemicals were ingested during rituals to commemorate the Eleusían Mysteries. They co-authored a The Road to Eleusis: Unveiling the Secret of the Mysteries with Albert Hofmann, a Swiss chemist — widely known for being the first person to synthesize and ingest lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) as well as isolating and synthesizing the principal component in psychedelic mushrooms, psilocybin and psilocin — who further reinforces these claims. In Food for Centaurs (1960) and The Greek Myths (1964), Robert Graves suggests that Amanita muscaria, the “fly agaric” mushroom was an added ingredient to the sacramental beverage. Terence McKenna makes a similar claim in Food of the Gods (1992). “The original cult of Dionysus almost certainly had its origins in the mushroom cults of ancient Crete” (Russell 103). “Among the Greeks mushrooms were apparently called” ‘food of the gods’ (broma theon), while the neoplatonic philosophy porphyry (ca. 233-309 CE) called them ‘nurslings of the gods’ (theotrophos)” (Russell 82).

Coherent with Epikouros’ approach of providing multiple explanations for unusual phenomena, I would like to share the following proposition: whether ergot, or poppy, or mushrooms, or wine infused with psychoactive mints, the insistence of Epíkouros on participating in the Mysteries is a reflection of his recognizing the pleasurable feeling associated with ingesting psychedelics. One of the most identifiable symptoms of the psychedelic experience are complex visual forms, kaleidoscopic shapes, intricate geometric lattices, patterned space, multi-textured surfaces, shifting contours, oscillating color, and complex entities — these visual images are deeply impressive, and considering the results of Timothy Leary’s Marsh Chapel Experiment, the anticipation one possesses of communing with a deity, when under the influence of psychedelics, seems to reliably produce the internal perception that a deity or divine state is present.

We should keep in mind that Epíkouros recommends restraint and sobriety as the rule and cautions against indulgence. Epíkouros dismisses “Bacchant revelers” as those who “rave like lunatics”, indicating a balanced approach with respect to intoxicants, composed yet compelled, rational yet enthusiastic (Philodemus, On Piety, Col. 19.9-12). Given the sacrament that would have been featured in the Mysteries was psychoactive (at least with wine), it would be historically anomalous for an Athenian who participated in the Mysteries to have been unfamiliar with altered states. It would have been even stranger for a person to have found no correspondence between the sacrament, the cult, and the mystical experience. The ubiquity with which entheogens have been documented through the ancient world leads me to believe, quite simply, that ancient Epicureans liked tripping as much as the rest of us.

PART VII: FUN GUYS

You won’t see me at Sunday School, but I do share in most of the “traditional festivals and sacrifices” of our society. I practice remembrance on Memorial Day and exercise gratitude on Thanksgiving. I enjoy the festivities of St. Patrick’s Day and liberation on Cinco de Mayo. I find Día de los Muertos to be beautiful, and compelling, and I will never stop dressing-up for Halloween. I extend kindness and generosity in the name of patrons like Lady Liberty and Father Christmas. I support local Spring fringe festivals and the artists who host them, who explore the breadth of the human soul on-stage, and induce a communal catharsis. We further celebrate Thespis, ancient patron of theatre. You might even find me in a dark room, listening to Pink Floyd, having ingested fungus to induce the same state as did Greek mystics thousands of years ago.

None of these activities require our suspension of disbelief in mythical characters or genuine enthrallment with political propaganda. It’s a blessing to spend time with friends, regardless of the reason. I enjoy decorating a Christmas tree without indulging the nativity myth. I find the darkness and the candles of midnight mass to be beautiful, even if the rest of the program disgusts me. Springtime feels naturally rejuvenating, and I mean to celebrate it, but I feel no need to complicate that pleasure by mythologizing seasonal necromancy. Prayer, meditation, contemplation, and confession each provide practical utility in the form of psychological healing. That measurable healing that reliably occurs supersedes any superpowers supposed to be available. The true “secret” of “the secret of the Mysteries” is that mysticism itself is a totally-natural phenomena. It is repeatable, measurable, and, by-definition, literally manifest to the mind’s eye. The Mysteries represent a “fantastic mental application”, analogous to a waking dream, that can be used like a tool to induce the same visionary experiences that have been documented in nearly every wisdom tradition on the planet, both esoteric and institutional.

Like Epíkouros, I reject taking the myths of my own culture literally … otherwise, one could be lead to think that God is measurably weak, having failed to stop the escalation of authoritarian regimes … and every mass act of violence in my adult life. Like Epíkouros, I express particular frustration with any practices that target the finances of needy people, so astrology, in particular, is fraudulently detestable (nonetheless, the same, useless form that failed to provide meaningful answers 2,330 years ago). Whether it is 305 BCE or 2025 CE, history records the masses of human beings searching for answers in all of the wrong places. A robust, philosophical system is required to ground an individual against the confusion and turmoil of cultural insanity, and provide them with psychological tools to confront the universal fear of death. Even when immersed in a society defined by science and technology, the masses continue to revert to superstitious myths, even despite a dozen-or-so years of education.

For this reason, a material description of the religious experience is a requirement. Without a standard of knowledge, the difference between inspiration and delusion is relative. Without a standard based in nature, all propositions are merely temporary speculations. The symptoms of spirituality, used irresponsibly, can be exploited to reinforce false mythologies. When used properly, it unleashes the mind at large and allows one to interface with the full symphony of nature, overcoming the myths that are created by our misunderstandings.

Centuries of critics have been categorically wrong in charging against Epicureans that we deprive good and just men of the fine expectations which they have of the gods sincere and sonorous prayers” simply because we reject mythic expressions of religious faith that are incoherent, dangerous, emotionally-immature, and psychologically-irresponsible (On Piety Col. 49.19-25). We reject cosmic narcissists, holy puppeteers, ghostly voyeurs, and divine strategists. The existence of any of these mythic super-beings would imply that a supernatural force every day fails to prevent inexhaustible violence — or else, it means that our lives are so utterly meaningless that inexhaustible violence is insignificant on a theological scale — here lies the danger against which Epíkouros warned: the representation of “God” spread by many today is capricious, partisan, and despotic. In this regard, many popular conceptions of “God” do not meet the Epicurean qualification for a truly blessed being. When presented as a crusader, a chess master, a politician, or a monarch, “God” seems more like a monster, more like an ancient trickster of tragic poets than a divine icon of blessedness. Like those tragic poets, the authors who incite these conceptions combine multiple, unrelated preconceptions together to form paradoxical divinities who cause trouble and suffer pain — and they profit from it. The mythic texts of frauds are filled with examples of “gods” behaving badly. We do not hold these chimeras to be gods.

After my psychedelic experience, I am compelled to defend piety, especially against those who would pervert it into a political narrative or a pyramid scheme. “Spirituality” has been appropriated, and those who have appropriated it risk alienating many of us who wrestle with genuine turmoil, and have been disenchanted by myths: Belief in an ever-present spirit will not calm someone suffering from paranoia. Faith in an otherworld will not reassure someone suffering from suicidal ideation. In my state of psychedelic euphoria, the immediacy of life and death was manifest, and the importance of making the most of the only time I have became immanently clear. The significance of kindness and the value of friendship became central. The smallness of prejudice and the breadth of the universe was embodied. I became conspicuously aware of the uselessness of rage and the blessing of tranquility. That mystical experience triggered by a handful of mushrooms cleansed my mind and reaffirmed a commitment to pursue true happiness.

Doubt me if you will!

… but eat 4 grams of blue meanies, I promise … I promise, the obviousness of the relationship between entheogens and the prehistoric formation of religion will become immanently clear. (Use responsibly). Now, if I might make a final recommendation:

Turn onto philosophy, tune into nature, and drop out of myth.

Your Friend,
EIKADISTES
Keeper of Twentiers.com
Editor of the Hedonicon

“The Aquarium” from an unpublished diary (June 2009)

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Webster, Peter. “Mixing the Kykeon.” ELEUSIS: Journal of Psychoactive Plants. New Series 4, 2000, https://www.psychedelic-library.org/Mixing%20the%20Kykeon%20Final%20Draft.pdf

White, Stephen. Diogenes Laertius. Cambridge University Press, 2021.

Wiktionary, The Free Dictionary.” Wiktionary, en.wiktionary.org/. Accessed 13 Sept. 2025.

Epicurus’ Epistle to Herodotus

Teachers of Epicureanism have always encouraged students to write down summaries of the doctrines for easy memorization, and outlines (often in the form of letters) were used widely as memory aids. Beginning-level Epicureans used to carry a Little Epitome with them, which was believed to be Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus. Once they assimilated the teachings of this epistle, which may have been a very short summary of Epicurus’ 37 books “On Nature”, they moved on to the Big Epitome where they were able to learn the advanced teachings.

The Epistle to Herodotus is a seminal work of natural philosophy and an important window into the history of early Western and scientific thought. It contains the earliest extant conversations between ancient atomists, and documents the progression of their arguments from the doctrine of atoms and void to their natural cosmology. It was preserved as part of Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Book Ten. In this translation, we have preserved the paragraph numbers used by most scholars for ease of reference.

Epicurus’ Epistle to Herodotus

35

“Epicurus to Herodotus, greeting.

On the importance of outlines and summaries

“For those who are unable to study carefully all my physical writings or to go into the longer treatises at all, I have myself prepared an epitome of the whole system, Herodotus, to preserve in the memory enough of the principal doctrines, to the end that on every occasion they may be able to aid themselves on the most important points, so far as they take up the study of Physics. Those who have made some advance in the survey of the entire system ought to fix in their minds under the principal headings an elementary outline of the whole treatment of the subject. For a comprehensive view is often required, the details but seldom.

36

“To the former, then – the main heads – we must continually return, and must memorize them so far as to get a valid conception of the facts, as well as the means of discovering all the details exactly when once the general outlines are rightly understood and remembered; since it is the privilege of the mature student to make a ready use of his conceptions by referring every one of them to elementary facts and simple terms. For it is impossible to gather up the results of continuous diligent study of the entirety of things, unless we can embrace in short formulas and hold in mind all that might have been accurately expressed even to the minutest detail.

37

“Hence, since such a course is of service to all who take up natural science, I, who devote to the subject my continuous energy and reap the calm enjoyment of a life like this, have prepared for you just such an epitome and manual of the doctrines as a whole.

Using the canon: anticipations, sensations, feelings

“In the first place, Herodotus, you must understand what it is that words denote, in order that by reference to this we may be in a position to test opinions, inquiries, or problems, so that our proofs may not run on untested ad infinitum, nor the terms we use be empty of meaning.

38

For the primary meaning of every term employed must be clearly seen, and ought to need no proving this being necessary, if we are to have something to which the point at issue or the problem or the opinion before us can be referred.

“Next, we must by all means stick to our sensations, that is, simply to the present impressions whether of the mind or of any criterion whatever, and similarly to our actual feelings, in order that we may have the means of determining that which needs confirmation and that which is obscure.

Nothing comes from nothing

“When this is clearly understood, it is time to consider generally things which are obscure. To begin with, nothing comes into being out of what is non-existent. For in that case anything would have arisen out of anything, standing as it would in no need of its proper germs.

39

And if that which disappears had been destroyed and become non-existent, everything would have perished, that into which the things were dissolved being non-existent. Moreover, the sum total of things was always such as it is now, and such it will ever remain. For there is nothing into which it can change. For outside the sum of things there is nothing which could enter into it and bring about the change.

Particles in space

“Further, the whole of being consists of bodies and space. For the existence of bodies is everywhere attested by sense itself, and it is upon sensation that reason must rely when it attempts to infer the unknown from the known.

40

And if there were no space (which we call also void and place and intangible nature), bodies would have nothing in which to be and through which to move, as they are plainly seen to move. Beyond bodies and space there is nothing which by mental apprehension or on its analogy we can conceive to exist. When we speak of bodies and space, both are regarded as wholes or separate things, not as the properties or accidents of separate things.

Bodies are either elementary or composite

“Again, of bodies some are composite, others the elements of which these composite bodies are made.

41

These elements are indivisible and unchangeable, and necessarily so, if things are not all to be destroyed and pass into non-existence, but are to be strong enough to endure when the composite bodies are broken up, because they possess a solid nature and are incapable of being anywhere or anyhow dissolved. It follows that the first beginnings must be indivisible, corporeal entities.

Universe is infinite

“Again, the sum of things is infinite. For what is finite has an extremity, and the extremity of anything is discerned only by comparison with something else. (Now the sum of things is not discerned by comparison with anything else: hence, since it has no extremity, it has no limit; and, since it has no limit, it must be unlimited or infinite.

“Moreover, the sum of things is unlimited both by reason of the multitude of the atoms and the extent of the void.

42

For if the void were infinite and bodies finite, the bodies would not have stayed anywhere but would have been dispersed in their course through the infinite void, not having any supports or counter-checks to send them back on their upward rebound. Again, if the void were finite, the infinity of bodies would not have anywhere to be.

Particles and primary elements have a limited variety of properties (1)

“Furthermore, the atoms, which have no void in them – out of which composite bodies arise and into which they are dissolved – vary indefinitely in their shapes; for so many varieties of things as we see could never have arisen out of a recurrence of a definite number of the same shapes. The like atoms of each shape are absolutely infinite; but the variety of shapes, though indefinitely large, is not absolutely infinite. [For neither does the divisibility go on “ad infinitum,” he says below; but he adds, since the qualities change, unless one is prepared to keep enlarging their magnitudes also simply “ad infinitum.”] (2)

Particles are always moving

“The atoms are in continual motion through all eternity.

43

[Further, he says below, that the atoms move with equal speed, since the void makes way for the lightest and heaviest alike.] Some of them rebound to a considerable distance from each other, while others merely oscillate in one place when they chance to have got entangled or to be enclosed by a mass of other atoms shaped for entangling.

44

“This is because each atom is separated from the rest by void, which is incapable of offering any resistance to the rebound; while it is the solidity of the atom which makes it rebound after a collision, however short the distance to which it rebounds, when it finds itself imprisoned in a mass of entangling atoms. Of all this there is no beginning, since both atoms and void exist from everlasting. [He says below that atoms have no quality at all except shape, size, and weight. But that colour varies with the arrangement of the atoms he states in his “Twelve Rudiments”; further, that they are not of any and every size; at any rate no atom has ever been seen by our sense.]

“The repetition at such length of all that we are now recalling to mind furnishes an adequate outline for our conception of the nature of things.

45

The doctrine of innumerable worlds

“Moreover, there is an infinite number of worlds, some like this world, others unlike it. For the atoms being infinite in number, as has just been proved, are borne ever further in their course. For the atoms out of which a world might arise, or by which a world might be formed, have not all been expended on one world or a finite number of worlds, whether like or unlike this one. Hence there will be nothing to hinder an infinity of worlds.

46

The nature of photons (films) and the speed of light

“Again, there are outlines or films, which are of the same shape as solid bodies, but of a thinness far exceeding that of any object that we see. For it is not impossible that there should be found in the surrounding air combinations of this kind, materials adapted for expressing the hollowness and thinness of surfaces, and effluxes preserving the same relative position and motion which they had in the solid objects from which they come. To these films we give the name of ‘images’ or ‘idols.’ Furthermore, so long as nothing comes in the way to offer resistance, motion through the void accomplishes any imaginable distance in an inconceivably short time. For resistance encountered is the equivalent of slowness, its absence the equivalent of speed.

47

“Not that, if we consider the minute times perceptible by reason alone, the moving body itself arrives at more than one place simultaneously (for this too is inconceivable), although in time perceptible to sense it does arrive simultaneously, however different the point of departure from that conceived by us. For if it changed its direction, that would be equivalent to its meeting with resistance, even if up to that point we allow nothing to impede the rate of its flight. This is an elementary fact which in itself is well worth bearing in mind. In the next place the exceeding thinness of the images is contradicted by none of the facts under our observation. Hence also their velocities are enormous, since they always find a void passage to fit them. Besides, their incessant effluence meets with no resistance, or very little, although many atoms, not to say an unlimited number, do at once encounter resistance.

48

“Besides this, remember that the production of the images is as quick as thought. For particles are continually streaming off from the surface of bodies, though no diminution of the bodies is observed, because other particles take their place. And those given off for a long time retain the position and arrangement which their atoms had when they formed part of the solid bodies, although occasionally they are thrown into confusion. Sometimes such films are formed very rapidly in the air, because they need not have any solid content; and there are other modes in which they may be formed. For there is nothing in all this which is contradicted by sensation, if we in some sort look at the clear evidence of sense, to which we should also refer the continuity of particles in the objects external to ourselves.

49

The objects we perceive are hitting our sensory receptors with particles

“We must also consider that it is by the entrance of something coming from external objects that we see their shapes and think of them. For external things would not stamp on us their own nature of colour and form through the medium of the air which is between them and us, or by means of rays of light or currents of any sort going from us to them, so well as by the entrance into our eyes or minds, to whichever their size is suitable, of certain films coming from the things themselves, these films or outlines being of the same colour and shape as the external things themselves. They move with rapid motion;

50

and this again explains why they present the appearance of the single continuous object, and retain the mutual interconnexion which they had in the object, when they impinge upon the sense, such impact being due to the oscillation of the atoms in the interior of the solid object from which they come. And whatever presentation we derive by direct contact, whether it be with the mind or with the sense-organs, be it shape that is presented or other properties, this shape as presented is the shape of the solid thing, and it is due either to a close coherence of the image as a whole or to a mere remnant of its parts. Falsehood and error always depend upon the intrusion of opinion (when a fact awaits) confirmation or the absence of contradiction, which fact is afterwards frequently not confirmed (or even contradicted) [following a certain movement in ourselves connected with, but distinct from, the mental picture presented – which is the cause of error.]

51

Various apprehensions of the same attestation produce checks and balances

“For the presentations which, e.g., are received in a picture or arise in dreams, or from any other form of apprehension by the mind or by the other criteria of truth, would never have resembled what we call the real and true things, had it not been for certain actual things of the kind with which we come in contact. Error would not have occurred, if we had not experienced some other movement in ourselves, conjoined with, but distinct from, the perception of what is presented. And from this movement, if it be not confirmed or be contradicted, falsehood results; while, if it be confirmed or not contradicted, truth results.

52

“And to this view we must closely adhere, if we are not to repudiate the criteria founded on the clear evidence of the senses, nor again to throw all these things into confusion by maintaining falsehood as if it were truth.

The nature of sound

“Again, hearing takes place when a current passes from the object, whether person or thing, which emits voice or sound or noise, or produces the sensation of hearing in any way whatever. This current is broken up into homogeneous particles, which at the same time preserve a certain mutual connexion and a distinctive unity extending to the object which emitted them, and thus, for the most part, cause the perception in that case or, if not, merely indicate the presence of the external object.

53

For without the transmission from the object of a certain interconnexion of the parts no such sensation could arise. Therefore we must not suppose that the air itself is moulded into shape by the voice emitted or something similar; for it is very far from being the case that the air is acted upon by it in this way. The blow which is struck in us when we utter a sound causes such a displacement of the particles as serves to produce a current resembling breath, and this displacement gives rise to the sensation of hearing.

On the material nature of smells

“Again, we must believe that smelling, like hearing, would produce no sensation, were there not particles conveyed from the object which are of the proper sort for exciting the organ of smelling, some of one sort, some of another, some exciting it confusedly and strangely, others quietly and agreeably.

54

The properties of particles are different from those of the bodies they compose

“Moreover, we must hold that the atoms in fact possess none of the qualities belonging to things which come under our observation, except shape, weight, and size, and the properties necessarily conjoined with shape. For every quality changes, but the atoms do not change, since, when the composite bodies are dissolved, there must needs be a permanent something, solid and indissoluble, left behind, which makes change possible: not changes into or from the non-existent, but often through differences of arrangement, and sometimes through additions and subtractions of the atoms. Hence these somethings capable of being diversely arranged must be indestructible, exempt from change, but possessed each of its own distinctive mass and configuration. This must remain.

55

Some properties (3) are inherent, others accidental

“For in the case of changes of configuration within our experience the figure is supposed to be inherent when other qualities are stripped off, but the qualities are not supposed, like the shape which is left behind, to inhere in the subject of change, but to vanish altogether from the body. Thus, then, what is left behind is sufficient to account for the differences in composite bodies, since something at least must necessarily be left remaining and be immune from annihilation.

Particles vary in size

“Again, you should not suppose that the atoms have any and every size, lest you be contradicted by facts; but differences of size must be admitted; for this addition renders the facts of feeling and sensation easier of explanation.

56

But to attribute any and every magnitude to the atoms does not help to explain the differences of quality in things; moreover, in that case atoms large enough to be seen ought to have reached us, which is never observed to occur; nor can we conceive how its occurrence should be possible, i.e. that an atom should become visible.

Bodies can not be divided infinitely, or else they would be of infinite size

“Besides, you must not suppose that there are parts unlimited in number, be they ever so small, in any finite body. Hence not only must we reject as impossible subdivision ad infinitum into smaller and smaller parts, lest we make all things too weak and, in our conceptions of the aggregates, be driven to pulverize the things that exist, i.e. the atoms, and annihilate them; but in dealing with finite things we must also reject as impossible the progression ad infinitum by less and less increments.

57

“For when once we have said that an infinite number of particles, however small, are contained in anything, it is not possible to conceive how it could any longer be limited or finite in size. For clearly our infinite number of particles must have some size; and then, of whatever size they were, the aggregate they made would be infinite. And, in the next place, since what is finite has an extremity which is distinguishable, even if it is not by itself observable, it is not possible to avoid thinking of another such extremity next to this. Nor can we help thinking that in this way, by proceeding forward from one to the next in order, it is possible by such a progression to arrive in thought at infinity.

58

We may infer about the minimal particles by observing the bodies they compose

“We must consider the minimum perceptible by sense as not corresponding to that which is capable of being traversed, i.e. is extended, nor again as utterly unlike it, but as having something in common with the things capable of being traversed, though it is without distinction of parts. But when from the illusion created by this common property we think we shall distinguish something in the minimum, one part on one side and another part on the other side, it must be another minimum equal to the first which catches our eye. In fact, we see these minima one after another, beginning with the first, and not as occupying the same space; nor do we see them touch one another’s parts with their parts, but we see that by virtue of their own peculiar character (i.e. as being unit indivisibles) they afford a means of measuring magnitudes: there are more of them, if the magnitude measured is greater; fewer of them, if the magnitude measured is less.

59

“We must recognize that this analogy also holds of the minimum in the atom; it is only in minuteness that it differs from that which is observed by sense, but it follows the same analogy. On the analogy of things within our experience we have declared that the atom has magnitude; and this, small as it is, we have merely reproduced on a larger scale. And further, the least and simplest things must be regarded as extremities of lengths, furnishing from themselves as units the means of measuring lengths, whether greater or less, the mental vision being employed, since direct observation is impossible. For the community which exists between them and the unchangeable parts (i.e. the minimal parts of area or surface) is sufficient to justify the conclusion so far as this goes. But it is not possible that these minima of the atom should group themselves together through the possession of motion.

60

Doctrine of relativity: an infinite cosmos has no center, only an infinite number of points of reference

“Further, we must not assert ‘up’ or ‘down’ of that which is unlimited, as if there were a zenith or nadir. As to the space overhead, however, if it be possible to draw a line to infinity from the point where we stand, we know that never will this space – or, for that matter, the space below the supposed standpoint if produced to infinity – appear to us to be at the same time ‘up’ and ‘down’ with reference to the same point; for this is inconceivable. Hence it is possible to assume one direction of motion, which we conceive as extending upwards ad infinitum, and another downwards, even if it should happen ten thousand times that what moves from us to the spaces above our heads reaches the feet of those above us, or that which moves downwards from us the heads of those below us. None the less is it true that the whole of the motion in the respective cases is conceived as extending in opposite directions ad infinitum.

61

Particles in space travel at great speed unless they meet resistance

“When they are travelling through the void and meet with no resistance, the atoms must move with equal speed. Neither will heavy atoms travel more quickly than small and light ones, so long as nothing meets them, nor will small atoms travel more quickly than large ones, provided they always find a passage suitable to their size, and provided also that they meet with no obstruction. Nor will their upward or their lateral motion, which is due to collisions, nor again their downward motion, due to weight, affect their velocity. As long as either motion obtains, it must continue, quick as the speed of thought, provided there is no obstruction, whether due to external collision or to the atoms’ own weight counteracting the force of the blow.

62

We can not infer about particles an identical behavior as composite bodies

“Moreover, when we come to deal with composite bodies, one of them will travel faster than another, although their atoms have equal speed. This is because the atoms in the aggregates are travelling in one direction during the shortest continuous time, albeit they move in different directions in times so short as to be appreciable only by the reason, but frequently collide until the continuity of their motion is appreciated by sense. For the assumption that beyond the range of direct observation even the minute times conceivable by reason will present continuity of motion is not true in the case before us. Our canon is that direct observation by sense and direct apprehension by the mind are alone invariably true.

63

On the nature of the mortal soul

“Next, keeping in view our perceptions and feelings (for so shall we have the surest grounds for belief), we must recognize generally that the soul is a corporeal thing, composed of fine particles, dispersed all over the frame, most nearly resembling wind with an admixture of heat, in some respects like wind, in others like heat. But, again, there is the third part which exceeds the other two in the fineness of its particles and thereby keeps in closer touch with the rest of the frame. And this is shown by the mental faculties and feelings, by the ease with which the mind moves, and by thoughts, and by all those things the loss of which causes death. Further, we must keep in mind that soul has the greatest share in causing sensation.

64

Still, it would not have had sensation, had it not been somehow confined within the rest of the frame. But the rest of the frame, though it provides this indispensable condition for the soul, itself also has a share, derived from the soul, of the said quality; and yet does not possess all the qualities of soul. Hence on the departure of the soul it loses sentience. For it had not this power in itself; but something else, congenital with the body, supplied it to body: which other thing, through the potentiality actualized in it by means of motion, at once acquired for itself a quality of sentience, and, in virtue of the neighbourhood and interconnexion between them, imparted it (as I said) to the body also.

65

“Hence, so long as the soul is in the body, it never loses sentience through the removal of some other part. The containing sheath may be dislocated in whole or in part, and portions of the soul may thereby be lost; yet in spite of this the soul, if it manage to survive, will have sentience. But the rest of the frame, whether the whole of it survives or only a part, no longer has sensation, when once those atoms have departed, which, however few in number, are required to constitute the nature of soul. Moreover, when the whole frame is broken up, the soul is scattered and has no longer the same powers as before, nor the same motions; hence it does not possess sentience either.

66

“For we cannot think of it as sentient, except it be in this composite whole and moving with these movements; nor can we so think of it when the sheaths which enclose and surround it are not the same as those in which the soul is now located and in which it performs these movements.

67

“There is the further point to be considered, what the incorporeal can be, if, I mean, according to current usage the term is applied to what can be conceived as self-existent. But it is impossible to conceive anything that is incorporeal as self-existent except empty space. And empty space cannot itself either act or be acted upon, but simply allows a body to move through it. Hence those who call soul incorporeal speak foolishly. For if it were so, it could neither act nor be acted upon. But, as it is, both these properties, you see, plainly belong to soul.

68

“If, then, we bring all these arguments concerning soul to the criterion of our feelings and perceptions, and if we keep in mind the proposition stated at the outset, we shall see that the subject has been adequately comprehended in outline: which will enable us to determine the details with accuracy and confidence.

“Moreover, shapes and colours, magnitudes and weights, and in short all those qualities which are predicated of body, in so far as they are perpetual properties either of all bodies or of visible bodies, are knowable by sensation of these very properties: these, I say, must not be supposed to exist independently by themselves (for that is inconceivable),

69

nor yet to be non-existent, nor to be some other and incorporeal entities cleaving to body, nor again to be parts of body. We must consider the whole body in a general way to derive its permanent nature from all of them, though it is not, as it were, formed by grouping them together in the same way as when from the particles themselves a larger aggregate is made up, whether these particles be primary or any magnitudes whatsoever less than the particular whole. All these qualities, I repeat, merely give the body its own permanent nature. They all have their own characteristic modes of being perceived and distinguished, but always along with the whole body in which they inhere and never in separation from it; and it is in virtue of this complete conception of the body as a whole that it is so designated.

70

Accidental properties of bodies

“Again, qualities often attach to bodies without being permanent concomitants. They are not to be classed among invisible entities nor are they incorporeal. Hence, using the term ‘accidents’ in the commonest sense, we say plainly that ‘accidents’ have not the nature of the whole thing to which they belong, and to which, conceiving it as a whole, we give the name of body, nor that of the permanent properties without which body cannot be thought of. And in virtue of certain peculiar modes of apprehension into which the complete body always enters, each of them can be called an accident.

71

But only as often as they are seen actually to belong to it, since such accidents are not perpetual concomitants. There is no need to banish from reality this clear evidence that the accident has not the nature of that whole – by us called body – to which it belongs, nor of the permanent properties which accompany the whole. Nor, on the other hand, must we suppose the accident to have independent existence (for this is just as inconceivable in the case of accidents as in that of the permanent properties); but, as is manifest, they should all be regarded as accidents, not as permanent concomitants, of bodies, nor yet as having the rank of independent existence. Rather they are seen to be exactly as and what sensation itself makes them individually claim to be.

72

Time is relative and accidental

“There is another thing which we must consider carefully. We must not investigate time as we do the other accidents which we investigate in a subject, namely, by referring them to the preconceptions envisaged in our minds; but we must take into account the plain fact itself, in virtue of which we speak of time as long or short, linking to it in intimate connexion this attribute of duration. We need not adopt any fresh terms as preferable, but should employ the usual expressions about it. Nor need we predicate anything else of time, as if this something else contained the same essence as is contained in the proper meaning of the word ‘time’ (for this also is done by some). We must chiefly reflect upon that to which we attach this peculiar character of time, and by which we measure it.

73

No further proof is required: we have only to reflect that we attach the attribute of time to days and nights and their parts, and likewise to states of movement and states of rest, conceiving a peculiar accident of these to be this very characteristic which we express by the word ‘time.’

Bodies are ever emerging, changing, and dissolving

“After the foregoing we have next to consider that the worlds and every finite aggregate which bears a strong resemblance to things we commonly see have arisen out of the infinite. For all these, whether small or great, have been separated off from special conglomerations of atoms; and all things are again dissolved, some faster, some slower, some through the action of one set of causes, others through the action of another.

74

On the diversity of planets

“And further, we must not suppose that the worlds have necessarily one and the same shape. [On the contrary, in the twelfth book “On Nature” he himself says that the shapes of the worlds differ, some being spherical, some oval, others again of shapes different from these. They do not, however, admit of every shape. Nor are they living beings which have been separated from the infinite.] For nobody can prove that in one sort of world there might not be contained, whereas in another sort of world there could not possibly be, the seeds out of which animals and plants arise and all the rest of the things we see. [And the same holds good for their nurture in a world after they have arisen. And so too we must think it happens upon the earth also.]

75

Nature learns skills, reason and culture perfect them

“Again, we must suppose that nature too has been taught and forced to learn many various lessons by the facts themselves, that reason subsequently develops what it has thus received and makes fresh discoveries, among some tribes more quickly, among others more slowly, the progress thus made being at certain times and seasons greater, at others less.

Origin of language

“Hence even the names of things were not originally due to convention, but in the several tribes under the impulse of special feelings and special presentations of sense primitive man uttered special cries. The air thus emitted was moulded by their individual feelings or sense-presentations, and differently according to the difference of the regions which the tribes inhabited.

76

Subsequently whole tribes adopted their own special names, in order that their communications might be less ambiguous to each other and more briefly expressed. And as for things not visible, so far as those who were conscious of them tried to introduce any such notion, they put in circulation certain names for them, either sounds which they were instinctively compelled to utter or which they selected by reason on analogy according to the most general cause there can be for expressing oneself in such a way.

Planets or stars are not gods or moved by gods; they move by their own nature

“Nay more: we are bound to believe that in the sky revolutions, solstices, eclipses, risings and settings, and the like, take place without the ministration or command, either now or in the future, of any being who at the same time enjoys perfect bliss along with immortality.

77

For troubles and anxieties and feelings of anger and partiality do not accord with bliss, but always imply weakness and fear and dependence upon one’s neighbours. Nor, again, must we hold that things which are no more than globular masses of fire, being at the same time endowed with bliss, assume these motions at will. Nay, in every term we use we must hold fast to all the majesty which attaches to such notions as bliss and immortality, lest the terms should generate opinions inconsistent with this majesty. Otherwise such inconsistency will of itself suffice to produce the worst disturbance in our minds. Hence, where we find phenomena invariably recurring, the invariableness of the recurrence must be ascribed to the original interception and conglomeration of atoms whereby the world was formed.

78

Science protects us from superstition (4)

“Further, we must hold that to arrive at accurate knowledge of the cause of things of most moment is the business of natural science, and that happiness depends on this (viz. on the knowledge of celestial and atmospheric phenomena), and upon knowing what the heavenly bodies really are, and any kindred facts contributing to exact knowledge in this respect.

Polyvalent logic so long as superstitions are discarded

“Further, we must recognize on such points as this no plurality of causes or contingency, but must hold that nothing suggestive of conflict or disquiet is compatible with an immortal and blessed nature. And the mind can grasp the absolute truth of this.

79

On the limited usefulness of science for our happiness (5)

“But when we come to subjects for special inquiry, there is nothing in the knowledge of risings and settings and solstices and eclipses and all kindred subjects that contributes to our happiness; but those who are well-informed about such matters and yet are ignorant what the heavenly bodies really are, and what are the most important causes of phenomena, feel quite as much fear as those who have no such special information – nay, perhaps even greater fear, when the curiosity excited by this additional knowledge cannot find a solution or understand the subordination of these phenomena to the highest causes.

“Hence, if we discover more than one cause that may account for solstices, settings and risings, eclipses and the like, as we did also in particular matters of detail, we must not suppose that our treatment of these matters fails of accuracy, so far as it is needful to ensure our tranquillity and happiness.

80

Infer about the non-evident and heavenly phenomena based on the evident

When, therefore, we investigate the causes of celestial and atmospheric phenomena, as of all that is unknown, we must take into account the variety of ways in which analogous occurrences happen within our experience; while as for those who do not recognize the difference between what is or comes about from a single cause and that which may be the effect of any one of several causes, overlooking the fact that the objects are only seen at a distance, and are moreover ignorant of the conditions that render, or do not render, peace of mind impossible – all such persons we must treat with contempt. If then we think that an event could happen in one or other particular way out of several, we shall be as tranquil when we recognize that it actually comes about in more ways than one as if we knew that it happens in this particular way.

81

Heavenly bodies are not sentient

“There is yet one more point to seize, namely, that the greatest anxiety of the human mind arises through the belief that the heavenly bodies are blessed and indestructible, and that at the same time they have volitions and actions and causality inconsistent with this belief; and through expecting or apprehending some everlasting evil, either because of the myths, or because we are in dread of the mere insensibility of death, as if it had to do with us; and through being reduced to this state not by conviction but by a certain irrational perversity, so that, if men do not set bounds to their terror, they endure as much or even more intense anxiety than the man whose views on these matters are quite vague.

82

But mental tranquillity means being released from all these troubles and cherishing a continual remembrance of the highest and most important truths.

“Hence we must attend to present feelings and sense perceptions, whether those of mankind in general or those peculiar to the individual, and also attend to all the clear evidence available, as given by each of the standards of truth. For by studying them we shall rightly trace to its cause and banish the source of disturbance and dread, accounting for celestial phenomena and for all other things which from time to time befall us and cause the utmost alarm to the rest of mankind.

Conclusion

“Here then, Herodotus, you have the chief doctrines of Physics in the form of a summary. So that,

83

if this statement be accurately retained and take effect, a man will, I make no doubt, be incomparably better equipped than his fellows, even if he should never go into all the exact details. For he will clear up for himself many of the points which I have worked out in detail in my complete exposition; and the summary itself, if borne in mind, will be of constant service to him.

“It is of such a sort that those who are already tolerably, or even perfectly, well acquainted with the details can, by analysis of what they know into such elementary perceptions as these, best prosecute their researches in physical science as a whole; while those, on the other hand, who are not altogether entitled to rank as mature students can in silent fashion and as quick as thought run over the doctrines most important for their peace of mind.”

Such is his epistle on Physics.

Notes:

  1. We know that particles have a limited variety of properties because we observe in nature that different elements behave differently at different temperatures and in different circumstances, but this variety follows certain laws and never violates them.
  2. Diogenes Laertius left commentary as part of his report, based on his investigations.
  3. The ancient Greek word “atomos” means not-cuttable. The modern atomic theory does not neatly correspond with the original preconception of the atom. The modern English word for ancient Greek atoms is “particles”, sometimes rendered as “elementary particles”.
  4. Aphrodite Urania was the patroness Goddess of the Epicureans. Urania was also the name of the Muse of astronomy, which likely explains why Epicureans derived such great mental pleasure from the study of nature and from astronomy.
  5. Some enemies of Epicurus have accused him of being against learning and scholarship because he seems to limit the utility of science to how much pleasure it can add and how much pain, or superstitious fear, it can remove. But Epicurus had a clear understanding of the different goals of philosophy and of science. Raw scientific data can not replace or abolish the role of ethics. Ethics must coexist with scientific data, and guide its utility.

On “-Isms” and Pleasure Wisdom

On “-Isms” and Pleasure Wisdom

Epicureanismvs.Epicurean Philosophy

The Society of Friends of Epicurus has dedicated extensive dialogue to the suffix “ism” regarding its relevance to the Epicurean tradition. In the Epicurean spirit of  παρρησíα  (or “parrhēsíā) meaning frank speech” or “speaking candidly”, the ancient Greek language did NOT employ the “ism” when referring to the tradition of Epicurus (nor, for that matter, of any other ancient Greek philosophy). Thus, while the word can be employed for practical purposes, Epicureanism” does NOT quite compliment the nuance of “Epicurean Philosophy.

ISMs

The English suffix, “-ism” — according to BOTH common and academic usages — is employed to designate a distinctive “doctrine“, “theory“, “attitude“, “belief“, “practice“, “process“, “state“, “condition“, “religion“, “system“, or “philosophy“. According to this definition, it is NOT incorrect to add a simple “ism” at the end of the philosophy of Epicurus“; it should, appropriately and accurately, render the word “Epicureanism” (or even “Epicurism).

In more succinct terms, we can visualize “Epicureanismsimply as “Epicurean-philosophy“.

While this works for practical purposes, it may lead to several misconceptions:

  1. Bracketing the suffix “-ism” to a name often indicates devotional worship of an individual (consider the differences between the old, misleading usage of “Mohammedanism” versus the preferred, contemporary usage of “Islam). Epicureans do NOTworship Epicurus as a supernatural prophet, NOR as a manifestation of a transcendental ideal.
  2. Bracketing the suffix “-ism” can ALSO indicate contempt for an individual or system. Consider, for example, when “Marxism”, “Leninism”, “Stalinism”, and “Maoism” are used by critics and detractors of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and many others. Thus, the word “Epicureanism” can be employed by critics and detractors of Epicurean philosophy as an indictment of Epicurus.
  3. In the modern era, “-ism” is frequently used to identify political typologies. Terms like “Monarchism”, “Liberalism”, “Conservatism”, “Communism”and “Fascism” express ideological systems that — contrary to Epicurean philosophy — presuppose the existence of an ideal state or utopia, organized according to the dimensions of a perfect, timeless principle.
  4. The suffix “-ισμός” (or “-ismós“) was rarely employed in ancient Greek; few examples of “-ism” (or “-ismós“) exist prior to New Latin, and the linguistic conventions of the modern era. In giving preference to the term “Epicurean philosophy”, we acknowledge the importance of privileging ancient Greek historical sources to the reliance upon Latin translations.

ISMVS

Our tradition of adding “-ism” to the end of words — in which we recognize distinctive “ideologies” — begins in the post-Classical period, corresponding to the Renaissance. Coming from the Latin “re-” (meaning “again”) and “nasci” (meaning “to be born”), this “Rebirth” resurrected the innovations and observations of Antiquity. The revival allowed scholars to adapt translations through the Latin language, using the Romanalphabet, sheathing many ancient Greek observations. Scholars began to liberally apply the suffix –ISMVS during this period of New Latin.

(I’m going to call the tradition — in which modern English-speakers partake — the “Ismism“, or, in other words, “the systemic practice of adding ‘-ism‘ to idea-expressing words”, sometimes as a celebration, sometimes as a derogation, sometimes as a religion, and sometimes as a political system. Due to the profound influence of Latin, and the linguistic conventions of the modern era, we ALL — in one way or another — have become dedicated Ismists.)

From the perspective of the contemporary world, the suffix –ISMVS (or “-ismus“) was first borrowed from the Old Latin language of the Romans, and later appropriated by post-Classical peoples as New Latin and Contemporary Latin. We find an abundance of “-ism” and “-ismus” in both Romance and Germanic language families. As with the Latin ISMVS, our contemporary suffix “-ism” is used to indicate distinctive “doctrines“, “theories”, “attitudes”, “beliefs”, “practices“, “processes“, “states“, “conditions“, “religions“, “systems“, and “philosophies“.

Here, however, is where we note a difference that our Mediterranean friends have often recognized: while the Greek language — like (for example) Celtic and Indic languages — has evolved from a common Indo-European root, it did NOT adopt Latin conventions the same way that Romance and Germanic languages have. Ancient Greek philosophers — perhaps, especially Epicurus — would NOT have thought of a “philosophy” as an “-ism”.

ize | ίζω | ízō |

We receive the Latin –ISMVS or “-ismus” from the ancient Greek “-ισμός” (“-ismós“), which, itself, is a bracketing of two other ancient Greek words, those words being “-ίζω” (“ízō“) and “μός” (“mós“). We’ll start with the former word. The suffix “-ίζω” (“-ízō“) was added to nouns to form new verbs. Let’s look at (x3) examples:

  1. canonize | κανονίζω | kanonízō
    κανών or “kann literally referred to a “reed”, and carried the connotation of a “measuring rod” or “standard”.
    + “-ίζω (“-ízō or “-ize“) rendered “κανονίζω“, “kanonízō” or “canonize” meaning “to make standard“.
  2. Hellenize | ἑλληνίζω | Hellēnízō
    ἑλλην or llēn literally referred to that which is “Greek”.
    + “-ίζω (“-ízō or “-ize“) rendered “ἑλληνίζω“, “Hellēnízō“, or “Hellenize” meaning “to make Greek“.
  3. synchronize | συγχρονίζω | súnkhronosízō
    σύγχρονος
    or “súnkhronos literally referred to “synchronous
    + “-ίζω (“-ízō or “-ize“) rendered “συγχρονίζω“, “súnkhronosízō“, or “synchronize” meaning “to sync“.

The key point with “-ίζω” (“-ízō“) — and our Modern English suffix “-ize” — is that we can turn any concept into a verb, or, in more philosophically interesting terms, we can ACTIVATE it.

μός | mós

The second suffix from which the ancient Greek “-ισμός” (“-ismós“) was bracketed is “μός” (“mós“). Contrary to the convention of ACTIVATING a word that represents a concept, adding “μός” (“mós“) ABSTRACTS an action. We can demonstrate this convention through (x3) other examples that translate well into Modern English:

  1. cataclysm |κατακλυσμός | kataklusmós
    κατακλύζω (kataklúzō) – literally meant “to wash away”.
    + “μός” (“mós“) rendered “κατακλυσμός“, “kataklusmós” or “cataclysm“, meaning a “great flood“.
  2. sarcasm | σαρκασμός | sarkasmós
    σαρκάζω” or “sarkázō literally, and figuratively meant “tearing apart” or “to tear off the flesh”.
    + “μός” (“mós“) rendered “σαρκασμός“, “sarkasmós” or “sarcasm“, meaning “(figuratively) tearing apart“.
  3. syllogism | συλλογισμός | sullogismós
    συλλογίζομαι (sullogízomai) literally meant “to compute” or “to infer”.
    + “μός” (“mós“) rendered “συλλογισμός“, “sarkasmós”, or “syllogism“, meaning an “inference“.

The key point with “μός” (“mós“) is that the ancient Greeks could turn any verb into a word that expressed an abstract concept, or, in more philosophically interesting terms, it could systematize activity into an idea.

ism | ισμός | ismós

The re-bracketing of the suffix “μός” (“mós“) appended with “-ίζω” (“ízō“) presents us with “-ισμός” (or “-ismós“) or the suffix “-ism“, a convention which systematizes a verb that has been activated from a noun. Very few examples exist in ancient Greek. A suitable example for English mono-linguists can be demonstrated in the word “Sabbath”:

  1. σάββατον | sábbaton literally means “the Sabbath” (borrowed from the Hebrew שבת or “shabát”)
    + “ίζω” (“-ízō or “ize“) σαββατίζω | sabbatízō means “to make, observe, or keep the Sabbath
    + “ισμός” (“ismós“) σαββατισμός | sabbatismós means “the state of keeping the Sabbath

UNLIKE the ubiquitous –ISMVS of Latin, and the overused “-ism” of Modern English, the ancient Greekισμός (or “ismós“) is almost NEVERused. The ancient Greeks did NOT shared our zeal for Ismism. When faced with the need to express a NEW word with FRESH meaning, the ancient Greeks built words from either [1] the names of people and objects they directly knew or observed, and [2] active forces they felt or experienced, but NOT as [3] abstract systems.

So, why NOT “Epicureanism“?

The philosophy of Epicurus recognizes that we EXPERIENCE NATURE DIRECTLY and NOT indirectly as an abstract system. Epicurean philosophy and the instruments with which humanity can make informed and ethical decisions — the sensation of an atomic reality, theanticipation of natural patterns, and the feelings of pleasure and pain — neither depend upon allegiance to a single leader, nor initiation into a secret society, nor longing for a golden age.

Christ’s resurrection would NOT be known without the Gospels.
Muhammad’s revelations would NOT be known without the Qur’an.

Even without the historical personage of Epicurus, human beings would still have sensed an atomic reality, anticipated the patterns of nature, and felt pleasure and pain, still have made mutual agreements, and still have formed friendships.

Without Jesus of Nazareth, Christians would NOT know to recite the Lord’s Prayer.
Without Muhammad, Muslims would NOT know to perform Salah to Mecca five times a day.

NATURE, itself, is so much LARGER, more important, and more fundamental than any one personage or tradition. Even without Epicurean Philosophy, humans would still have developed scientific intellects to their own advantage.

Epicureanism” (or, also, “Epicurism) carries a connotation – albeit very slightly – that the philosophy of Epicurus is just another doctrinal institution that advertises immaterial truths from an untouchable dimension. It is not quite as authentic to recognize serious seekers of pleasure as “Epicureanists” who follow “Epicureanism” as opposed to “Epicureans” who study “Epicurean philosophy“. Our endeavor rests within our own bodies; NATURE, itself, is the greatest teacher.

All that being said …

for practical purposes, there most isn’t anything inherently incorrect about preferring the term “Epicureanism; the “-isminnocuously identifies a “philosophy“. In Modern English, this does correctly indicate the philosophy of Epicurus, apart from any oath to a mythic person or principle.

Nonetheless, the employment of “Epicurean philosophy” over “Epicureanism” serves to keep our anticipations FRESH, to indicate to others that our interactions are bigger than disembodied souls paddling ideas back and forth in a court of Mind. It acts as a reminder that the path to wisdom is NOT a map that has been given to us from an Eternal Place of Perfection, but that we each carry a well-calibrated compass within ourselves to know the world and guide us to happiness.

DON’T call [my belief system] an –ism!

While the preference toward the phrase “Epicurean philosophy” may better reflect its ancient Greek origin, it should NOT indicate that the suffix “-ism” should be reserved as a derogation for non-Epicurean ideas, nor exclusively employed as a polemic toward Idealism. Even Epicurean philosophy, itself, incorporates the “-isms” of atomism, hedonism, naturalism, and materialism; these are most certain NOT idealistic.

Even ancient Greek opponents to Epicurean philosophy did NOT employ the “-ism”. Members of Plato’s Academy were “Academics”; members of Aristotle’s Lyceum with “Peripatetics”; members of Zeno’s Stoa were “Stoics”. It was only later that scholars began to employ the terms “Platonism”, “Aristotelianism”, and “Stoicism”.

Furthermore, this same acknowledgment applies to religious traditions:

The earliest rendering of the religion we refer to as “Judaism” was  יהדות  or “Yahadút”, from the Hebrew word  יהודי  (or Yhudá”) meaning “the Jewish people” and the suffix  ־ות  (or “-ót) meaning “the tradition of”. The ismed word that we employ — Judaism — is found in Maccabees 2 in the Koine Greek language by Hellenistic Jews, written around 124 BCE (over a thousand years after the foundation of Hebrew monotheism), rendered as  ιουδαϊσμός  (or “Ioudaismós”).

The word “Zoroastrianism” is first attested from 1854 as an anglicization of the ancient Greek Ζωροάστρης (meaning Zōroástrēs” or “Zoroaster”) borrowed from the Avestan word     or “Zarathustra”. Ancient Iranians referred to their religion as   orMazdayasna” translating to “worship of Mazda” (also romanized as “Mazdaism”). The wor   orMazda” both identifies the name of the Iranian Creator deity, and also, translates to “wisdom”.

The isming of the religion of post-Classical Arabs has been noted for its inadequacy, and identified in the contemporary era as being largely offensive to the Islamic populations. Until the 20th century, the monotheistic religion of  ٱلْإِسْلَام‎  (or al-Islām”) was identified by Europeans as “Mohammedanism” (or “Muhammadanism), inappropriately implying that the prophet Muhammad was divine himself, in the same way that Christians think of Jesus of Nazareth as divine.

People from the Punjab region of India refer to their religious tradition as  ਸਿੱਖੀ  (or Sikhī) anglicized to the English-speaking world as “Sikhism”. The word comes from the Sanskrit root  शिक्षा  or “śikṣā” meaning “to learn” or “to study”. (This recognition of the religious practitioner as a “student” is also found in the “Confucian tradition).

The same is true of “Hinduism”, an anglicization of the Sanskrit  सनातन धर्म  or “Sanātana Dharma” meaning “Eternal Order“. In fact, the word “Hinduitself was used by non-Indians to refer to people living around the Indus river. Ancient Indo-Iranian populations would have referred to themselves as आर्य or “Arya” (from which we get the term “Aryan“).

Jainism” is first attested from 1858 as an anglicization of the Sanskrit adjectiveजैन Jaina” which comes from the Sanskrit name for the 6thcentury BCE tradition  जिन  (or “Jina”). The word “Jina” is related to the verb  जि  meaning “to conquer”, coming from  जय  (or jaya”) meaning “victory”. The word “Jain” indicates a spiritualconqueror”.

Our rendering of “Buddhism” is an anglicization of the original Pali बुद्ध धम्म  (or “Buddha Dhamma“) meaning approximatelyThe Awakened One’s Eternal Law. The first recorded use of “Buddhism was in 1801, after Europeans romanized the spelling of Indic vocabulary.

There is NO direct Chinese equivalent to the word “Confucianism” since it has never been organized as a formal institution. The word was coined in 1836 by Sir Francis Davis, a British sinologist, and second Governor of Hong Kong who reduced the vast collection of ancient Chinese practices into a title named after the philosopher Kǒng Fūzǐ ( or “Master Kong”). While no single Chinese word or logogram represents the collection of beliefs and practices that developed from the teachings of Master Kong (anglicized as “Confucius”), the word  儒  (or “”) roughly translates as a “Man receiving instruction from Heaven” (also, a “scholar”), and is used to describe a student of Master Kong’s body of works.

The Taoists of ancient China identified the universal principle as or “Dào”, meaning “road”, “path” or “Way”. In China, the religious tradition is written 道教 or “Dàojiào” pronounced /’daʊ.ʨaʊ/ (or, for English mono-linguists, roughly transliterated asdow-chyow”). It was anglicized asTaoism” in 1838.

Shintoism”— the anglicized name for the native religion of Japanprovides an interesting example of an ismized tradition. The word “Shinto” is of Chinese origin, constructed from the Kanji logograms for the words  神 Shén”, (meaning “God”) and    Dào” (meaning “Way”) rendering  神道  or “Shéndào. However, Shinto populations do not employ this phrase as often as they do the Japanese  かむながらのみち  or “kan’nagara no michi”, (written in the Hirgana writing system) loosely translated as way of the divine transmitted from time immemorial”. Consequently, the word “Shintoism is the anglicization of two syllables from Japanese Kanji, inherited from ancient China’s Hanji logograms.

Christianity has been the dominant tradition of the post-Classical, and modern worlds; thus, it has avoided being reductively ismed (since the people who accused false traditions of being mere isms tended to be Christian, themselves). The word “Christianism” is occasionally used to express contempt for Christian fundamentalism (much like “Islamism” is used to indicate contempt for Islamic fundamentalism.)

Even early Christians did NOT refer to their tradition using the same vocabulary as do modern Christians. Like Taoists, they used the metaphor of της οδου (or “tês hodoû”) meaning “The Way“. A non-Christian, community in Antioch first coined the term  Χριστιανός  (or christianós“) to described the followers of The Way. Within 70 years, the early Church Father Ignatius of Antioch employed the term of  Χριστιανισμός  (or “Christianismós“) to refer to the Christianity.

Pleasure Wisdom

Regardless of a preference to “
Epicurean philosophy” versus “Epicureanism”, the insight of Epicurus’ philosophy demystifies nature and deflates the superstition of common religion. Epicurus anticipated the sciences of particle physics, optics, meteorology, neurology, and psychiatry. His logic was NOT one of theoretical axioms, but of a demonstrable hedonic calculus. Epicurus knew Virtue as a guide post to happiness, but NOT as happiness, itself.

Here, you will do well to tarry; here our highest good is pleasure.

Cheers, friends!

Further Reading:
Hiram’s “On Ismshttp://societyofepicurus.com/on-isms/

 

Works Cited

Barnhart, Robert K., ed., Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology, H.W. Wilson Co., 1988.

Beekes, Robert, Etymological Dictionary of Greek, Leiden, Netherlands, Brill, 2010.

Buck, Carl Darling, A Dictionary of Selected Synonyms in the Principal Indo-European Languages, University of Chicago, 1949, reprinted 1988.

de Vaan, Michiel, Etymological Dictionary of Latin and the other Italic Languages, vol. 7, of Leiden Indo-European Etymological Dictionary Series, Alexander Lubotsky ed., Leiden: Brill, 2008.

Fowler, H.W., A Dictionary of Modern English Usage, Oxford University Press, 1926.

Grose, Francis, A Classical Dictionary of the Vulgar Tongue, London, 1785; 2nd ed., London, 1788; 3rd ed., London, 1796; expanded by others as Lexicon Balatronicum. A Dictionary of Buckish Slang, University Wit, and Pickpocket Eloquence, London, 1811.

Hall, J.R. Clark, A Concise Anglo-Saxon Dictionary, Cambridge University Press, 1894, reprint with supplement by Herbert D. Meritt, University of Toronto Press, 1984.

Johnson, Samuel, A Dictionary of the English Language, London, 1755.

Klein, Dr. Ernest, A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co., 1971.

Lewis, Charlton T., and Short, Charles, A New Latin Dictionary, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1891.

Liberman, Anatoly, Analytic Dictionary of English Etymology, University of Minnesota Press, 2008.

Liddell, Henry George, and Robert Scott, eds., Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford University Press, 1883.

McSparran, Frances, chief editor, The Middle English Compendium, University of Michigan, 2006.

Room, Adrian, Place Names of the World, 2nd ed., McFarland & Co., 2006.

The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., Clarendon Press, 1989.

Watkins, Calvert, ed., The American Heritage Dictionary of Indo-European Roots, 2nd ed., Houghton Mifflin Co., 2000.

Weekley, Ernest, An Etymological Dictionary of Modern English, John Murray, 1921; reprint 1967, Dover Publications.

Whitney, William Dwight, ed., The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia, New York: The Century Co., 1902

Epicurus’ On Nature – Books XI-XIV

Epicurus’ On Nature I-X

Book 11

This book rejects the idea that the Earth is the center of the cosmos, and discusses objects that float in the air. It says “certain people conceive Earth circled by walls … and suppose that Earth is in the center of everything“. Now, since Epicurus believed the universe was infinite, we know that he would have rejected the Earth-centered model because an infinite model of cosmos would not have a center and all things would be relative to each other. Instead, there would have to be innumerable “centers” or hubs. Epicurus had to use the language available to the ancients to explain what orbits are–and the organized dance between many orbiting bodies that acquires a certain balance of pushing and pulling and falling–without having the word “orbit” available.

Epicurus discusses where the sun rises and sets, and its distance from us; He offers various models to interpret this.

Les Epicuriens commentators categorize this book as a polemic against the ancient astronomers who were using certain tools or machines (alluded to in this book) to evaluate the movements of celestial objects, and against Eudoxus’ geocentric model. I found this article about Eudoxus of Cnidus, which says:

An astronomer named Eudoxus created the first model of a geocentric universe around 380 B.C. Eudoxus designed his model of the universe as a series of cosmic spheres containing the stars, the sun, and the moon all built around the Earth at its center. Unfortunately, as the Greeks continued to explore the motion of the sun, the moon, and the other planets, it became increasingly apparent that their geocentric models could not accurately nor easily predict the motion of the other planets.

The next section of the 11th book is on what sustains Earth from below and seeks to explain its stability. Epicurus argued that densities below and above provide counter-balance to each other, to maintain the “appropriate analogical model” for the immobility of Earth. He said that the Earth was “equidistant to all the sides”, and so it didn’t fall in any direction because it had similar pressure from all sides.

Here, from Epicurus’ mention of an “appropriate analogical model”–which he presumably was trying to create–it is clear that he was using the Epicurean method of looking at the things that can be observed and reasoning by analogy about the things that are beyond our observable horizon. This means that he appealed to how we can see that things of similar weight balance each other, and he’s applying that logic to the orbit of the Earth.

Book 12

This book addresses eclipses. Also, according to Philodemus, in book 12 (in a passage that did not survive) Epicurus said that humans had the idea of “certain imperishable natures”. This book appears to also address theology.

We see that in On Nature, Epicurus is addressing phenomena that caused superstitious fear and panic in the ancients, or that inspired mythical explanations. Obviously, the orbits of the sun and moon were a mystery and inspired mythical explanations. Epicurus’ lectures were meant to impress upon the students that, by applying their faculty of empirical reasoning to the study of nature, they would be able to come up with reasonable alternative theories.

We can surmise that some ancients, particularly those who rejected the myths and observed nature, would have observed that eclipses and phases of the moon apparently showed the shadow of the Earth against the moon, and would have reasoned that the Earth was round from the observation of its shadow against the moon. This is not mentioned in what remains of this book, but it would have been consistent with the Epicurean method (which relied on referring all investigations the study and observation of nature) to conclude from the phases of the moon that the Earth was round.

Book 13

This book seems to continue the conversations about gods in the previous book. Philodemus says that here, Epicurus addressed the “rapports of affinity, and also of hostility, that gods have with certain persons“.

Book 14

Based on the condensation of water (which can be seen turning into a gas/vapor, and also into solid ice), some ancient philosophers said that it can be inferred that all things come from a single substance, which changes due to condensation and rarefaction. Some philosophers believed the single primal substance was water (that is, all things could be broken down into water).

Epicurus’ refutation of this theory and his own alternate explanation is incomplete and unclear in the portions that remain of this book. We see him further down discussing the vaporization of water. Centuries later, Lucretius (in On the Nature of Things, Book IV) would describe in accurate detail the cycles of rain and condensation in one of the most brilliant passages of his epic poem. It is clear that these considerations furnished crucial inspiration for the early atomic theory.

The lecture in Book 14  was against monism–the above-cited doctrine that all things are ultimately made up of one single substance. Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia were monists who said the primal substance was “air”, not water.

Epicurus discusses fire, and criticizes Plato’s Timaeus, saying Plato’s and other theories are based on faulty deduction. Epicurus reduces Plato’s physical theory to its absurd contradictions. For instance, he seems to be arguing that if things are really made of Platonic forms (like triangles, etc.), rather than from the atomists’ primal elements (that is, particles), then why are there no physicists creating new chemical combinations out of these Platonic triangles and circles? Here, he was acting in the tradition of the laughing philosophers. In Swinish Herds and Pastafarians: Comedy as an Ideological Weapon, I wrote:

Democritus, the precursor of Epicurus … was known as the “Laughing Philosopher” for making cheerfulness his key virtue and for the way in which he mocked human behavior. The tradition of the laughing philosophers had to start with the first atomist: materialism liberates us from unfounded beliefs to such an extent that it renders absurd the beliefs and the credulity of the mobs.

This book concludes with a portion that studies the differences between a sage and a compiler, saying that they are quite different. Epicurus tackles the issue of borrowing from other thinkers and mixing up disparate theories that are not coherent with each other. He says that sages do not praise both theories when they cite two opposite opinions. He accuses those who mix incoherent doctrines of “doctrinal solecism“, and indirectly criticizes the rhetors who are fond of empty praise.

A Note on Striking Blows for Epicurus

On Nature makes it clear that Epicureanism was born, and evolved, as a series of polemics. The first Epicureans enjoyed polemics. They relished opportunities to tackle intellectual challenges using their philosophical methods. Almost all of Epicurus’ points in this series of lectures are polemics written against someone else’s theories which are found to be wrong, and we also see many of Philodemus’ works were as well. For instance, we see Theophrastus being cited in Peri Oikonomias (and other works) as a source that the Epicureans of the FIrst Century BCE wrote against and commented on. We must conclude that he was considered a worthy opponent and a philosopher worth reading by them.

Therefore, we can imagine that it’s difficult to understand these arguments clearly without understanding these other ideas that they are refuting. Students of Epicurus must understand his contemporary thinkers, whose works they were reading and commenting on.

Further Reading:

Epicurus’ Instructions On Innovation

Epicurus’ On Nature I-X

I am currently re-reading Epicurus’ Books On Nature in Les Epicuriens, which is based on lectures given by Epicurus. We know that they were given late in Epicurus’ philosophical career because, in some of the lectures, Epicurus refers back to discussions with Metrodorus that they had years prior “back in the day”, and recognizes previous doctrinal mistakes that had been rectified after years of conversations to clarify their philosophical investigations (particularly concerning their “change of names” practices).

All of this means that we must be careful to not attribute too much authority to any extant writings that may have come from the earlier period. It also means that these books are actually transcripts of advanced lectures given by Epicurus after many years of engaging in philosophical discourse with input from his friends. Let’s try to imagine or re-construct what these lectures or discussions consisted of, so that we can create modern dialogues to replace the literature that is missing.

Book 1

Book One establishes clearly that all things are made of particles and void (cites Against Colotes). Les Epicuriens commentators say that this book is summarized in the Epistle to Herodotus.

Book 2

Book II establishes the existence of particles of light (photons, in modern physics), and establishes clearly that the speed of light is the speed limit of the universe.

Much of the following discussion focuses on how it is that bodies emit these particles (called simulacra in the original text). It is clear that these simulacra are particles by the fact that when they encounter resistance they bounce back, like any other particle. The sun emits light, it reaches water and we see blue because the solar “rays” (photons) do not fully penetrate into the depth of waters. Instead, these photons bounce back and reach our eyes. The denser the water, the less photons penetrate. This is how some solid bodies allow some light through, because they are not as dense as other walls.

A light bulb emits light particles, they bounce against a wall, and our eyes receive the “color”. This color is an emergent property of the photons when they bounce against the particles of the bodies that they touch.

Book II concludes by saying that they have just proven that light is made of these particles and that nothing can move faster than photons, and says here that what follows after this book are the “subjects appropriate to treat after this (subject)”. However, Books 3-9 were never recovered.

The following video follows up on the contents of this book. It helps to connect the nature of light as particles that travel at a certain speed through the void, with interesting repercussions of this insight that include the relativity of time and of all things. If the universe is only 14 billion years old, how can it be 92 billion light years wide?

The video also helps to explain why the ancient Epicureans concluded that time was relative and an emergent property of bodies, which was a very advanced cosmological position for them to assume 2,300 years ago. Epicurus’ Epistle to Herodotus says that “we must not believe that time has any properties other than being an incident to bodies”.

Epicurean cosmology establishes that bodies are made up of particles and void, and their conventional existence and properties are established by the quantity and other properties of the particles that make up the bodies. However, in the process of acquiring increased complexity and interacting with each other, bodies also acquire secondary, relational properties which are no less real than their conventional properties. A magnet’s attraction of certain metals is real. The attraction between two lovers is real, and so is the gravity between a planet and its host star. The chemical interaction that causes an explosion is also real. We observe these phenomena and, although they are not conventionally made up of “particles and void”, they are secondary properties of bodies exhibit according to the observable and measurable laws of nature.

Although those relational / secondary qualities are not eternal, or even essential, the Epistle to Herodotus teaches that we must not banish them from our minds. Incidental qualities do not have a material existence (they are not “atoms and void”), nor do they exist independently in some reality that is beyond our comprehension (some Platonic ether, or heaven, etc.). We must, instead, consider the incidental qualities of bodies as having exactly the character that our sensations reveal them to possess. Today, we are able to measure magnetic forces or gravitational pull, and we know these forces to be emergent properties of the relevant bodies. The epistle then goes on to explain that Time is one such incidental property of nature, that it does not exist apart from bodies:

For example, it is important to grasp firmly that “time” neither has a material existence, nor does it exist independently, apart from bodies. Nor must we think of “time” as a general conception, such as those conceptions which are formed by reasoning in our minds. Instead, we must think of time by referring to our intuitions, our mental apprehensions formed by anticipations, and it is in this context that we speak of a “long time,” or a “short time,” applying our intuitions to time as we do to other incidental qualities.

In evaluating time as an incidental quality, we must not search for expressions that we may think are better than those which are in common use, and we must not believe that time has any properties other than being an incident to bodies. We must evaluate time only in accord with our intuitions or anticipations.

Let’s unpack what’s being said here. Epicureans were known for clear, concise speech and for their insistence on calling things by their proper name, and for names to reflect things as they are observed in nature. Poetically addressing Love as Eros (imagined as a baby with diapers throwing arrows) or Time as Chronos (a scary old man whose approach can’t be avoided and who will, in the end, inevitably swallow us) is good in the realm of poetry and myth, but not in the realm of the study of nature.

Time is also not Platonic (that is, unnatural and unreal, a mere idea). It is not a God (as the ancients believed). All things are conventionally made of atoms and void. So the question that the ancient atomists would have been discussing was something like “Does Time not exist, then? If it does, in what way does Time exist“? And it made sense that Time, as a natural phenomenon, must have been an emergent or relational property of bodies. Ancient Epicureans posited that Time is a natural phenomenon and sought diligently to evaluate the nature of Time based on the study of nature by the use of our natural faculties by which we synchronize to nature’s circadian rhythms. The Letter continues:

For indeed, we need no demonstration, but only to reflect, to see that we associate time with days and nights, and with our internal feelings, and with our state of rest. These perceptions of incidental qualities are the root of what we call “time.”

Interesting to note that Epicurus links time to our anticipation of and attunement with the circadian rhythms. Epicurus here was saying that our own organism has a faculty that apprehends time.

Scientists now know that the Moon used to be a planet the size of Mars that collided w Earth early on, and has slowly been moving a ay from Earth in its orbit. Because of this, our Moon used to be much bigger in our sky billions, and later millions of years ago, and will eventually leave our orbit and become a “ploonet”. Also because of this, and because Earth and Moon are still tidally locked, days and nights used to be much shorter in the past (one day used to be only a few hours long), and they will get progressively longer in the future. Our sense of time will continue to evolve with our local planet-moon dance.

I wish to accentuate that to say that Time is incidental / relational to bodies is to relativize it. One light year is the distance a photon travels between two points in a year. This means that the light that we see coming from the stars was emitted millions of years ago. These stellar photons are (together with time) emergent properties of bodies and, since the speed of light is the speed limit of the cosmos, the photons have been traveling through the void together with time from those stellar bodies to our planet, some of them for millions of years.

Time is an emergent, natural process. This is what is meant by the Epicurean doctrine that “we must not believe that time has any properties other than being an incident to bodies”: that Time is neither a God, nor an “absolute” Platonic idea, but a natural, emergent, relational property of bodies (of matter) in space. We can only measure Time in units which–because all things are moving constantly relative to each other–are tied to orbital movements of bodies in space.

Books 3-4

Les Epicuriens says that these books are summarized in paragraphs 49-53 of the Letter to Herodotus, and Book 4 included Epicurus’ theory of memory–about which we get glimpses in the Lucretian “neural pathways” passage, so we do know that such a theory must have existed.

Books 5-9

Les Epicuriens says that these books are summarized in paragraphs 54-73 of the Letter to Herodotus.

Book 10

Discusses a bit about the nature of time, how to measure it (mentions days and nights), on the importance of using conventional language for it, and the fact that time is real.

Further Reading:

Les Epicuriens [Bibliotheque de la Pleiade] (French Edition)

Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus

Book Review: Ontology and Ethics of Motion

Intro: On the Subject of Definitions

Ontology of Motion vs. Epistle to Herodotus

The Tao of Lucretius

Gravity Versus Freedom

On Relativity

Lucretius’ Venus

On Motion

Dialogues on Matter in Motion – Introduction

Dialogues on Matter in Motion – Part II

 

The Problem of Ataraxia in Nail

An Anarcho-Socialist Lucretius?

Epicurean Environmentalism

Conclusion: Ethics of Motion

Dialogues on the Epicurean Gods

Our tradition is firmly secular and most modern Epicureans would label themselves atheists, humanists, or agnostics, but in antiquity the founders of our School were all pious men, and the ancient atomists had a naturalist theology according to which the Gods were naturally evolved beings who lived in the space between the worlds (metakosmai), and whose bodies were–like all bodies–made up of atoms and void.

The two traditional interpretations of the Epicurean Gods are the older, realist view according to which Gods are natural, sentient beings who live in never-ending ataraxia as described by our Sages, and the newer, idealist view according to which Gods are mental constructs which are, perhaps, therapeutically, culturally and spiritually useful, but nonetheless imaginary. A third view has been proposed in our generation, according to which belief in Gods is neither necessary nor natural, and that their existence can not be justified using our Canon.

But we live in a world governed by fear and awe of Gods, and recently some of the members of Society of Epicurus have been engaged in discussions about the nature of the Epicurean Gods in order to answer questions posed by students of philosophy. Furthermore, we also live in an age where science fiction has begun to explore in detail the repercussions of the possibility of the existence of superior extraterrestrial beings, which is inherent in Epicurean speculation on the innumerable worlds. Portions of these discussions are being published here for the benefit of anyone new to the subject, and to encourage the study of alternative, naturalist views on the Gods as entities within a natural ecology and cosmology rather than as characters in fables and in people’s supernatural fancy.

Dialogues on the Epicurean Gods

First believe that a God is a living being immortal and blessed, according to the notion of a god indicated by the common sense of mankind; and so believing, you shall not affirm of him anything that is foreign to his immortality or that is repugnant to his blessedness. Believe about him whatever may uphold both his blessedness and his immortality. For there are gods, and the knowledge of them is manifest; but they are not such as the multitude believe, seeing that men do not steadfastly maintain the notions they form respecting them. Not the man who denies the gods worshipped by the multitude, but he who affirms of the gods what the multitude believes about them is truly impious. For the utterances of the multitude about the gods are not true preconceptions but false assumptions; hence it is that the greatest evils happen to the wicked and the greatest blessings happen to the good from the hand of the gods, seeing that they are always favorable to their own good qualities and take pleasure in men like themselves, but reject as alien whatever is not of their kind. – Epicurus, in his Epistle to Menoeceus

Alexander. A friend of mine, who is a biology student, has asked me why the Epicurean gods do not experience the emotion of gratitude. After giving an introduction to my view of the gods I ended with my speculation that natural selection has removed the never-invoked vestigial emotion. My answer was:

“Great question about gratitude by the gods. I was stuck there too. There is no single point in any ancient document at which the question is answered directly that I know of. My answer is derived and constructed, and not definitive. All the points I parrot and paraphrase below are found in Epicurus’ three letters, and in Lucretius’s poems, and perhaps some other public and free sources. Many translations exist, and each has their strength and weakness. I have studied them and continue to do so. I understand more upon each reading. I am still learning. Here goes. Its not all my words, but a mix.

When it comes to humans, gratitude is a pleasant feeling. A good feeling. A desirable feeling. A pleasurable feeling. It warms our hearts and puts smiles on our faces. We actively and wisely recall past pleasant moments and actively renew our happiness with such recollections. We humans are not gods, yet, even though we can live a life that can compare to theirs. The virtues of the gods are different from the virtues of humans. In both cases Nature give the animal its virtues. Natural selection gives each life form virtues that help it navigate its natural environment. The Epicurean gods are natural beings that are made of elementary particles just like you and me.

The universe is unbounded. The universe is composed of many cosmos (observable universes). Physics is the same everywhere. The universe is full of life and beings that compare to those animals we know on Earth and similar to beings we can imagine/intuit.

Everywhere on earth that we look, we conclude that human nature has given people the intuition that blessed beings exist. By blessed, we mean happy and able to preserve their nature against the diseases of old age. Hence there must exist beings that we would consider to be gods. Happy and able to preserve their nature against disease. They have all the resources they need to preserve their nature. They have no need to fear for their life, or for their health or for their happiness. They need nothing from us. They gain nothing from interacting with us. The demand nothing of us. They are not unhappy with us. Nature made our cosmos and them. The gods did not make our cosmos.

When our senses are extinguished, during sleep, or when they are unreliable, when we are sick, thirsty, hungry or injured we cannot rely on our mental impressions, which must always be tested via the senses because illusions of all kinds abound, and imagination is encouraged over careful judgement by most people. It is during these times that humans claim to have visions and dreams of the gods. These are never confirmed by a Canonic (scientifically reliable) approach to observation, analysis, testing and thinking.

At this point I tend to IMAGINE an advanced alien species that is self sufficient and happy, and has been for a while, and so natural selection has removed the never-invoked VESTIGIAL faculty of gratitude.

Once again, I have to admit that I am not satisfied with my answer because gratitude is an instrument of pleasure for humans and is invoked in us because natural selection made us that way. Finally you should know, that we do know that the study of the gods is a very advanced Epicurean topic, left for students who had mastered physics, even though having “the proper attitude” about the gods is a beginner topic.”

What do you guys think?

Cassius. Alexander I think THIS in what you said is the key: “They need nothing from us. They gain nothing from interacting with us”. Gratitude would be an emotion of pleasure arising from having a need fulfilled which was not previously fulfilled. If we are postulating a being who already has all needs filled, and needs nothing further, then there would never arise a situation in which gratitude would be displayed, because gratitude is a response to an unmet need being fulfilled. So I think that’s the heart of it. All the rest you said is true too, but I don’t see any way around this being the heart of it.

Ilkka. My answer would depend on the reason she’s asking this. Is this a practical question or is she interested in the minutiae of Epicurean Philosophy … If this is a practical question, my answer would be that they don’t experience gratitude because they don’t exist … This situation would indicate to me that the person is struggling with a lingering fear of the gods, and I’d work on THAT …

On the level of the philosophical theory, Epicurean gods cannot experience gratitude. They are wholly self-contained and self-maintained beings. Gratitude implies that a being has asked for or received help from an other being. An Epicurean god couldn’t be in either position, because it could help itself in any manner required (self-contained and self-maintained). They are Perfect-with-a-capital-P.

Hiram. I remember that the commentary on Philodemus said that gratitude and anger are related to each other, and both are related to their lack of need and their being self-sufficient.

Alexander. Ilkka, what do you mean when you say with a capital “P”?

Ilkka. Perfect in the strongest sense. Not just a garden variety perfect that is thrown around everywhere.

Alexander. That kind of “Perfect” sounds like “imaginary” to me.

Ilkka. Yes, they are 🙂 …

Alexander. The inquirer is definitely struggling with God belief, and is more comfortable sharing thoughts that would incur the wrath of her family and friends in a private space. Here is the initial inquiry:

I’ve been meaning to read this, finally started this morning, and already got stuck wrestling one of the first few lines: ‘Any perfect being has no trouble of its own, nor does it cause trouble to anyone else; and such a being has no emotions of anger or gratitude, as those emotions exist only in beings that are weak”. It says this is one of the principal doctrines, however, I can’t understand how or why gratitude would be frowned upon. Thoughts?

Further on, I appreciate this line “He who desires to live tranquilly without having anything to fear from other men ought to make them his friends. Those whom he cannot make friends he should at least avoid rendering enemies, and if that is not in his power, he should avoid all dealings with them as much as possible, and keep away from them as far as it is in his interest to do so.” (PD 39)

Ilkka. You could say to her that the first doctrine means that the gods (who don’t exist …) don’t repay worship with favours. Gratitude is only frowned upon when people say that gods have it towards those who pray. Humans can, and should, feel gratitude towards those who actually help them. Does she know that this doctrine is talking about the gods?

Alexander. I assume that she thinks that a “perfect being” is a god.

Ilkka. I would make sure of it by asking, because that might be the source of the confusion.

Alexander. Ilkka, I agree that the gods of popular religion, supernatural gods, do not exist. When you say that the Epicurean gods do not exist in practice, what do you mean? Is it that: being able to preserve their nature is impossible due to heat? Is it that: continuous happiness is impossible while at the same time being born beings that pass through a childhood? Is it that physics (Relativity) forbids causal contact between different cosmos? Is it that even if they could arrive in our solar system that they are immediately rendered unable to preserve their nature when they approach our star’s particle emissions? Is it that they are too smart to risk contact with us? Is it that they have better things to do and would avoid us?

Ilkka. Wow! Now that is a headache of questions, a group of questions, like a pride of lions … I’m joking … I mean that if we follow the rules of evidence (the Canon) and apply it to the gods as presented in the works of Epicurus, we see that such beings don’t exist. This is because we know so MUCH more about the universe than was possible for Epicurus. It’s possible that there are extraterrestrial intelligent beings and they could be vastly more powerful than us, but they would be beings LIKE us, not above us like the Epicurean gods. They would need to preserve themselves like us by eating, consuming energy or whatever. Continuous happiness is possible for humans, so it would be possible to ETs as well …

I have no idea what relativity says about contact between the universes of the multiverse … It would be awesome to see what kind of vehicle ETs would arrive in the Sol system. But I’m pretty sure that the vacuum of space would kill them, provided they hadn’t done some serious genetic engineering … Perhaps they are too smart for that. I would avoid most people if I could …

Alexander. Sorry for the barrage of questions. Especially on a topic that we have so little info about.

Yes, we have never met them, and never seen them. Yes, they would need to eat to preserve/remake their particle bonds against the always-existing fast collisions, that knock particles off their bodies, even if they lived in the cold inter-mundial spaces that disconnect the various cosmos, and have few fast particles. Yes they would be made of the same elementary particles as us and so their particle bond strengths would be the same as ours, and if they were in a warm environment like ours they would need to work harder to preserve their natures.

Not sure what you mean by “above us”? As far as I have read, only in happiness and in finding themselves located where they could preserve their nature–ie. in a cool enough place that their particle bonds could be repaired at a faster rate than they’re broken. I suspect we have different ideas about the advanced alien beings, but I also suspect that humans will never encounter them face to face.

Cassius. Alexander, I doubt it is needed for me to repeat what I’ve said in the past, but this is an area where Ilkka and I disagree, so just wanted to make note of that so my silence isn’t misinterpreted. I believe there is nothing in modern science which would render Epicurus’ logic on this point obsolete.

Alexander. Thanks for the reminder. I think my opinion has changed on this topic a bit. I now see the Epicurean “gods” as compatible with the idea of advanced alien beings that take action to be self sufficient, and avoid disease, but could be murdered in principle even if not in practice. They stay away from dangerous beings like us. 🙂

Cassius. That last comment Alexander harks back to (Norman) DeWitt, who makes the point that Epicurus himself never called them “immortal”. Another analogy to this god issue is the “life on other planets” issue. I suspect he considered the points closely related, and they are pretty equally objectionable to the religious types, who want to see men and their redeemer to be the center of the universe.

Alexander. Look at these guys. They live right here on Earth. Everywhere. They are so small we can barely see them and they can preserve their nature from all kinds of danger. I doubt they fear much. Is there any reason they should be excluded?

Alexander then shared a picture of microscopial tardigrades, who “can go without food and water for more than 10 years and can survive the vacuum of space. They can also withstand pressures around six times greater than those found in the deepest ocean trenches, and handle great doses of ionising radiation”.

Cassius. Good question. They may have the “immortality” part covered, but would our anticipation of a perfect being also require that it be intelligent? I gather that the Epicureans thought (or joked) that the gods must speak Greek, so that may be evidence that we’re talking “perfect” in many different aspects …

Alexander. Yes. Intelligence would seem to matter, but I can’t find anything that says that. All that I find is: happy and self sufficient. “Greek” as perfection in language seems to be a big mistake to me. Seems like Diogenes of Oenoanda would take exception to that too. The following tells me that gods are either not immortal or incapable of learning.

For it is fair to assume that every endeavor to transform the mind, and indeed every attempt to alter any other substance, entails the addition of parts or the transposition of the existing parts or the subtraction of at least some tittle from the sum. But an immortal substance does not allow its parts to be transposed, nor does it permit one jot to be added or to steal away. For every change that involves a thing outstepping its own limits means the instantaneous death of what previously existed.

– (Ferguson’s translation of) Lucretius “On the Nature of Things”

Cassius. I see; thanks. I don’t have much insight, other than to say that in regard to “gods”, the key passage to consider is the “on the nature of the gods” section from Cicero where we find the basis of the “waterfall” analogy…

“For the divine form we have the hints of nature supplemented by the teachings of reason. From nature all men of all races derive the notion of gods as having human shape and none other; for in what other shape do they ever appear to anyone, awake or asleep? But not to make primary concepts the sole test of all things, reason itself delivers the pronouncement. For it seems appropriate that a being who is the most exalted, whether by reason of his happiness or of his eternity, should also be the most beautiful; but what disposition of the limbs, what cast of features, what shape or outline can be more beautiful than the human form? You Stoics at least, Lucilius, (for my friend Cotta says one thing at one time and another at another) are wont to portray the skill of the divine creator by enlarging on beauty as well as the utility of design displayed in all parts of the human figure. But if the human figure surpasses the form of all other living beings, and god is a living being, god must possess the shape which is the most beautiful of all; and since it is agreed that the gods are supremely happy, and no one can be happy without virtue, and virtue cannot exist without reason, and reason is only found in the human shape, it follows that the gods possess the form of man. Yet their form is not corporeal, but only resembles bodily substance; it does not contain blood, but the semblance of blood.

These discoveries of Epicurus are so acute in themselves and so subtly expressed that not everyone would be capable of appreciating them. Still I may rely on your intelligence, and make my exposition briefer than the subject demands. Epicurus then, as he not merely discerns abstruse and recondite things with his mind’s eye, but handles them as tangible realities, teaches that the substance and nature of the gods is such that, in the first place, it is perceived not by the senses but by the mind, and not materially or individually, like the solid objects which Epicurus in virtue of their substantiality entitles steremnia; but by our perceiving images owing to their similarity and succession, because an endless train of precisely similar images arises from the innumerable atoms and streams towards the gods, our mind with the keenest feelings of pleasure fixes its gaze on these images, and so attains an understanding of the nature of a being both blessed and eternal.

Moreover there is the supremely potent principle of infinity, which claims the closest and most careful study; we must understand that it has in the sum of things everything has its exact match and counterpart. This property is termed by Epicurus isonomia, or the principle of uniform distribution. From this principle it follows that if the whole number of mortals be so many, there must exist no less a number of immortals, and if the causes of destruction are beyond count, the causes of conservation also are bound to be infinite.”

Alexander. Hmm. Cicero. Less than desirable. I don’t find any mention of waterfall in that. Some immediate reactions: Cicero’s beauty argument seems invalid if we spit on beauty when it does not bring pleasure. But noninteracting gods cannot bring pleasure except by unfortunate dreams and unreliable visions, and we’d rather fail than succeed by fortune.

Seeing with the mind is “imagination”. Right? Humans are not the only animals that reason. Natural selection gives virtues to all animals, to a lesser or greater degree.

I fail to understand Isonomia. It implies that gods reproduce, but that implies they reorganize their elementary particles and so that means they can be killed. Perhaps we are the gods. If only we could be happier!

Cassius. I think I am referring to DeWitt with the waterfall analogy, or the analogy of moving pictures and movies. As far as seeing with mind, I am not sure that means imagination, at least not if imagination means “making it up”.

Isonomia is very interesting. I am not sure that it implies reproduction but the implication is multiple gods because of the other observation that nature does not make only a single one of a kind. Also with isonomia I think there may be some relationship with anticipations or maybe just the standard way that the faculties interact, but it seems to me the core of it is some process or capacity by which we recognize or have the ability to order items into a series of “higher” and “lower”, in other words I think there is something here that helps us think up the series of characteristics that would come together to form a “perfect” being at the top versus a “primitive” being at the low end.

And there might perhaps be the kind of pleasure in contemplating or visualizing higher beings that perhaps it seems dogs have in interacting with people–as an example. They seem to instinctively be happy around humans beyond just a good source. I think that it is possible that such a reaction might be similar to what the ancient Epicureans were suggesting we would feel with the beneficent images from “gods”. Not sure, but something in that direction. Or maybe just the sense of admiration that a young tennis player might feel in personally interacting with Arthur Ashe or John McEnroe–my sports analogies are dated.

I suppose to comment on this point, it is very important for our confidence in the stability of the universe to consider that there is at some level some “smallest” particle which carries the basic characteristics which give the universe stability. I certainly don’t consider a particle a god, but Epicurus appears to have been looking in the isonomia concept at a sliding scale from most primitive to highest, and that just as an elemental particle is absolutely stable and needs/gives nothing, he was probably thinking that a “perfected” form of life would have the same characteristics. I think I do agree that Epicurus would probably say that he had never seen one himself nor expected to, but this kind of logical argument–or, should I say, arguing at this kind of basic theoretical level–is probably necessary for some people, who would otherwise worry that there is some possibility that Jehovah (or Allah, or Krishna) does exist. Remember the passage in Lucretius about arguments that win “coming and going” or something like that–cutting off the enemy’s retreat. I think this is that kind of argument.

… Now that I think further, wasn’t the reference “Greek or a language like Greek”? This phrasing “or an X like X” seems to have been an Epicurean pattern.

Ilkka. Cassius, you wrote above: “I believe there is nothing in modern science which would render Epicurus’ logic on this point obsolete“, in reference to the Epicurean gods.

My point is that it’s NOT his logic, but the evidence that he (could have) had at his disposal. I think that if Epicurus saw the evidence we have, he too would come to the conclusion that the Epicurean gods are not possible.

From particle physics we know that there are only so many possible combinations that material beings can be made out of, and none of them seem to produce gods. We know from looking into the universe in ever broadening range of wavelengths that there doesn’t seem to be intelligent life anywhere near us. And studies of human perception have shown that although many people THINK they have seen ‘gods’, they really haven’t. It’s not that the Epicurean gods are at odds with modern science–though they are–but that they are at odds with Epicurean epistemology. And the Canon of Knowledge trumps theology every time …

Cassius. In a universe that is infinite in size, which is not theology but deduced from the principles of atomism, it is impossible to say that we can ever see far enough to rule out all combinations that exist in the universe.

Elli. From Diogenes’ inscription:

Only a few men among hundreds are conscientious because they fear the gods rather than the laws. Not even these few are steadfast in acting righteously, for even these are not soundly persuaded about the will of the gods. Clear proof of the complete inability of religion to prevent wrong-doing is provided by the example of the Jews and the Egyptians. These nations, while being among the most religious and superstitious of men, are also the most vile.

So what kind of gods or religion will cause men to act righteously? Men are not righteous on ACCOUNT OF THE REAL GODS, nor on account of Plato’s and Socrates’ judges in Hades.

With your permission, my Epicurean friends: in the above paragraph I understand that Diogenes examines the consequences and he declares clearly that both of gods (REAL and FAKE) do not cause men to act righteously.

So, according to the above from Diogenes, we understand that he examines the matter of “gods” under the term of “benefit”. How beneficial are the gods for a human being to live a happy and pleasant life? As we have confirmed with our own senses and history, there is no benefit at all. From Epicurus’ Epistle to Menoeceus, we undestand that to live a pleasant life we have to connect it with wisdom (or prudence) as all virtues spring from it.

Wisdom is something more valuable even than philosophy itself, inasmuch as all the other virtues spring from it. Wisdom teaches us that it is not possible to live happily unless one also lives wisely, and honestly, and justly; and that one cannot live wisely and honestly and justly without also living happily. For these virtues are by nature bound up together with the happy life, and the happy life is inseparable from these virtues.

Another point of the letter is:

But, men do not understand that the gods have virtues that are different from their own.

Must we connect the virtues with prudence and pleasure? Yes! Question: which are those different virtues that the gods have to maintain for ever to live pleasantly? OR do the gods not live pleasantly? If gods do not have pleasure this means that they are against all of Nature. For this reason, in my opinion, Epicurus placed gods in metakosmia (intermundia).

Question: Did Epicurus declare whether the atoms and the void exist in the intermundia (the space between the kosmoi)? Our first principle is that the atoms and the void exist everywhere. So, the gods live in a place where Nature gives to those upper beings the same aim: “pleasure”.

Why, then, are gods such kinds of beings that have different virtues from us? Their different virtues based on the fact that they keep their energy and pleasure on the level of 100% constantly and they do not worry about food, water, and there is no entropy. The universe is not a closed system. If we have a confirmation of this, then we have to admit that the gods are obvious.

What is obvious and what has been confirmed? Particles and the void, and endless energy. In my view, when Epicurus spoke about “gods” who are obvious, he meant and described the particles, the void, and the endless energy. In my view, the “void” has the same meaning as the word intermudia. If it was not like this, then we have to call Epicurus “idealist” and not “materialist”.

Hiram. According to Philodemus’ scroll On Piety, Metrodorus proposed a theory whereby immortal gods might be viable, based on an unclear concept of something being numerically indistinct. This sounds like the way in which a beehive or some insect species constitute an autonomous super-being by virtue of being so numerous. It’s a fascinating concept, and I wish we had better and more complete sources on this.

Metrodorus … explained that if a compound is made of things that aren’t numerically distinct, these things may be imperishable and indestructible or divine.  In his work “On Holiness”, Epicurus is quoted as elaborating a doctrine about the physical Gods being eternal and indestructible, and saying that one who exists in this manner “in perfection as one and the same entity, is termed a unified entity“.

Alexander. I have similar, but not identical thoughts. I thought that perhaps the gods were elementary particles, but ruled that out, since such could not be happy. Then I thought maybe they were composites of one kind of elementary particles, but that could not be complex enough to experience happiness, or be able to preserve its nature. With regards to preserving their nature, the inter-mundial spaces provide good shelter.

The inter-mundial spaces must have some particles even if the density is much less and the particles are much slower. Kind of like intergalactic space is said to be cold (less particles and slower particles). But this means a lack of action, and so living longer adds no benefit, since it does not mean more pleasure.

No entropy? How can there be no entropy? No entropy, no change, no sensation, no pleasure, no virtue, no nature to preserve.

Elli. The universe not being a closed system, and having endless energy. And if we base ourselves on the atoms to prove the swerve (free will), we have to base ourselves on the atoms to prove the obvious nature of gods as Epicurus said.

Alexander. The Universe, not a closed system? Do you mean the cosmos? There are many cosmos, but only one Universe. Nothing can enter the Universe from outside it, and nothing can exit the Universe.

Elli. Yes many Cosmos and only one Universe.

Alexander. The Universe is closed by definition. Right?

Elli. Right! Cosmos is not a closed system. Right?

Alexander. The kosmoi are not closed systems. Modern science calls them “observable universe”. We know there are many but we can only observe our own. We only have evidence from our own. The kosmoi are born and die. We can see the evidence of our cosmos birth. Big Bang.

Cassius. There are all sorts of questions here but I think it is useful, because there will be clues to the train of thought by asking these questions. What attributes would a highest perfect being have. Consciousness would seem mandatory. But we know that consciousness comes from / through nonconscious particles. So even if we don’t worry about whether the term “God” is appropriate, we ought to be able to approximate their view by considering how men might “evolve” into deathless, fully self-sufficient organisms. And there’s no need to exclude the idea that this “evolution” comes from scientific genetic engineering. We are making fast progress ourselves, and the time we have to continue making improvements is essentially unlimited. And since the universe is infinitely old, and boundless in space, one would expect and presume that the process of perfection of life forms has occurred an innumerable number of times in the past.

Elli. But Cassius, as we said with Alex above, our Universe is a closed system and there is entropy. The energy one day will finish. How can those beings or gods maintain their energy forever in a closed system, as our Universe? For this reason, Epicurus placed them in metakosmia or intermundia. This means between the kosmoi.

Alexander. Hold on. There is entropy. What does that mean from a particle point of view? It means only that some particles are faster than the average speed transferred between them upon scattering events (collisions, absorptions, and emissions). Meaning change within our cosmos exists for now. Our cosmos will die–change in our cosmos will cease. We cannot conclude the same for the Universe. We can only observe our cosmos, hence we never observe anything that resides “between the (plural) cosmos”. Not that I even know what “between the cosmos” even means. Sounds like “imaginary” to me.

Cassius. I am not sure I am following the closed system implications, but Lucretius clearly states that in total, the forces of creation prevail over the forces of destruction, or the universe would have long ago ceased to exist. If “closed system” conflicts with this, then I would say it is not. Only in the verbal sense of defining universe as “all that there is” would I think the term could be used, and even there it would be necessary to stipulate that “closed” does not mean numerable. I do not claim expertise in this so correct me if I am wrong, but I do not think it is a good idea to talk in terms of observable universes because an infinite universe is going to be infinitely larger than that which is observable to us.

Hiram. Right, if the universe is really infinite, and if so is the number of atoms, then the question of exhaustion of particles and entropy can be in theory overruled because there is no end.

Alexander. The universe is closed, according to the Epistle to Herodotus. Nothing can enter or exit it, but that does not mean the universe will run out of motion or particles (energy). The cosmos we live in will die (reach particle equilibrium) and no further change will occur in it.

Cassius. As I reread what you wrote, Elli, I think we are together. There are innumerable kosmoi …

Elli. We read that this imperishable being has the feeling of pleasure, for it is happy! If this being had not the feeling of “pleasure”, that would be against the Nature. Wouldn’t it?

Principal Doctrine 1. Any being which is happy and imperishable neither has trouble itself, nor does it cause trouble to anything else. A perfect being does not have feelings either of anger or gratitude, for these feelings exist only in the weak.

Do you know, Cassius, that in ancient Greek language PD1 continues: Elsewhere he (Epicurus) says that the gods are perceived by the mind, that some were subjected by number (ie. as individualities), others as their likeness that was formed from the continuous (prosthetics) flow of identical images which end up in the same place, (and that they are) anthropomorphic … (?)

Cassius. Also we have to remember that Epicurus was always constructing plausible alternative explanations, and stating clearly that any number of alternatives consistent with our limited evidence, and not contradicted by our limited evidence, may be part or all of the truth. So by definition with our limited evidence it would be improper to assert that only one explanation can fit the bill where multiple explanations also fit the evidence.

Good point, Elli. He clearly was talking not just imperishable but also “happy”, and that surely implies consciousness …

Elli. Is it true that particles and the void exist all over the kosmoi? Why did Epicurus place the gods in “metacosmia”? This means between the kosmoi. If a sentient being lives between the kosmoi, and it is happy and pleased—as it maintains its energy internally–how can they communicate with other kosmoi and send identical images to us? That is, how does the mind perceive their images? My mind goes to the particles only. These can end up in the same place and be anthropomorphic too.

Alexander. Yes. If they are “between the kosmoi” then it is impossible to bidirectionally communicate to entities within the cosmos, but not impossible to have one way communication from the far past arrive into the future of a cosmos as long as the universe is expanding. Eventually it will be impossible. For example today we have evidence of the birth of our cosmos, but in half a million years, no living being will have access to that fact. The cosmos will look unborn to them.

In the same way, a god could have transmitted a broadcast 12 billion years ago and that could arrive here but the expanding cosmos prevents communicating back. Eventually the god is forever kept from interacting with us too. Even one way communication eventually fails to keep up to the expansion rate.

Elli. “Even one way communication fades”. Alexander, do you mean that they can’t send images and we can’t send our images back?

Alexander. Yes. Eventually the distance and the separation velocity is too large to be overcome even by the fastest particles. Even the unsurpassable particles. Photons.

Elli. Is there somewhere in the kosmoi any other velocity faster than light? In my opinion: yes, our mind, which can run anywhere faster than light. This means that we can imagine everything. So if the gods can perceived by the mind, and if we connect them with justice as Diogenes said … but now, as we know, “justice” is not something that can be perceived by the mind, only Plato said that. So, the perception of the gods is totally useless for human beings and provides no benefit to live a pleasant and untroubled life. Epicurus was right to place them in metacosmia! No communication, just images of our imagination. As Liantinis explained and said it: “GHOSTS are the gods for Epicurus”.

Alexander. I think I agree with your conclusion, but not the premise of faster than light minds. Mind is matter. Our brain neurons communicate by the exchange of ions. Ions are electrically charged chemical elements with significant mass and inertia, but the electrical charges they have are mediated by photons. These are the fastest and lightest elementary particles. Our imagination takes short cuts, and does not generate reliable complete images, and hence can “leap” to conclusions. The conclusions might be wrong.

Elli. Alexander can you tell me please, if the scientists managed to see and watch the particles? Because an Epicurean friend somewhere wrote that we did not see them yet, and we perceive them only by the mind as we perceive the gods!

For the record, there is this and this.

Alexander. Animal/human eyes see by photon collisions changing the shape of retinal molecules that transduce electrical charge. No eye or instrument is capable of seeing chemical elements by photon collisions, of the kind that eyes are sensitive too. It is impossible. Epicurus was right.

However we can collide electrons off of chemical molecules and large atoms. If we collide many many electrons off chemicals and observe their ricochet patterns we can deduce their shape and density. People say “we photographed” the chemical, but its not photography by photons. These instruments are called electron microscopes. “Electrography”.

We can also deduce the shape of some molecules by bombarding them with x-ray photons and observing the patterns of reflected photon on xray sensitive photographic paper.

Epicurus taught us that all sensation is by “touch”. That is why we collide particles with the target that we hope to learn about. The photons that human eyes can detect are not suitable for detecting chemicals. They are even less suitable for seeing elementary particles.

There are three types of “scattering events”. They are:

1. collision
2. emission
3. absorbtion

Epicurus knew this. Collision means that the projectile particle that has been emitted in the direction of a target body is repulsed when it comes near the target body under investigation. This is “touching”. If there is no repulsion, there is no “touching” and there cannot be sensation.

Regarding the forces of creation and destruction. On the Universal scale the creative forces exceed the destructive ones, but not on smaller scales.

I take this as self evident. I mean of the four known forces gravity is always attractive (creative) and the others have both attractive and repulsive actions that cancel, on average, when summed at long distances. At Universal scales gravity dominates despite the fact that at short scales it is the weakest.

Elli. How many things I learn from you, Alexander, and how happy you make me when you say that “Epicurus knew this”! We are “touching” his philosophy, and keeping in touch with each other. I am really so proud for my Epicurean friends all over the world.

I wish to finish my life in that moment when Epicurus’ philosophy helps and gives many people mental balance, as he gave to me. Next year I will start to write a book addressed to my unborn grandchildren. They have to learn everything that I did not know in my childhood, when darkness covered the light of pleasure and happiness. I will write down the punishments from my “teacher” of theology. I still remember his red face, how he goggled his eyes, and that steam in his ears when I asked him questions and I didn’t get the right answers.

And thus ends the record of our dialogues on the Epicurean Gods.

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