Category Archives: Epistemology

Modified from "Pericles's Funeral oration" by Philipp Foltz (1852)

We Got Beef: A Disembowelment of the Dialectic, Politics, and Other Organs of Bullshit


“Rhetoricians might flatter flies with honey,
but politicians feed flies bullshit.”


Modified from “The Butcher’s Shop” by Gabriele Passerotti (1580)

WE GOT BEEF

A DISEMBOWELMENT OF THE DIALECTIC,
POLITICS, AND OTHER ORGANS OF BULLSHIT

 

I have a bone to pick with rhetoric.

Here’s the heart of the issue: talk is cheap. People chew fat in political chats without purpose — no learning occurs, no truth is shared, no friendship is found. Everyone misses the meat of the matter. Opinions are skin-deep. Debate rarely disembowels delusion. Too often, rhetoricians and orators enlist themselves in the service of manipulation. After all, “the end of rhetoric is to persuade in a speech” and not to validate truth with evidence (Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, I, col. 3). Their art does not “depend on arguments from physical facts” because “their art is a power of persuasion” (Ibid., II, 12, col. XIX). For instance, it is agreeable to suppose that honey attracts more flies than vinegar — true, but as a student of nature and pupil of the Garden (so guided to treat politics with suspicion), I observe that nothing attracts so many flies as bullshit.

Those who study in the rhetorical schools are deceived. They are charmed by the tricks of style, and pay no attention to the thought, believing that if they can learn to speak in this style they will succeed in the assembly and court of law. But when they find that this style is wholly unfitted for practical speaking they realize that they have lost their money.
(Epíkouros, Against the Rhetoricians)

The rhetorical τέχνη (tékhnē, “technique”) of the sophists provides a technical method without practical application; at the same time many practical orators enjoy success, and wield influence without technically possessing any teachable skills, having mastered neither art nor science. Dialecticians may enjoy sagacious reputations, but may also lack receptivity, perspective, and may provide people with impractical, ineffective advice. Both educated rhetoricians and natural orators present dangers as agents of persuasion — dialecticians turn the practical benefits of philosophy into abstractions; rhetors misuse the art of prose for manipulation; orators’ aptitude for practical persuasion lacks a foundation in natural ethics.

Each of the rhetorical arts and practices fails to ground themselves in nature. As human agents of manipulation, professional persuaders fail to refer to the natural “goal” of “living blessedly” (Laértios 10.128). Each of these tools can be appropriated to service a political agenda. Only the true philosophy provides students with the tools they need to understand reality and pursue happiness. To quote the lead character from a favorite, adult cartoon, “Everyone wants people they like to be right. That’s why popular people are fucking dumb” (Rick and Morty, Season 3, Episode 4). As Epíkouros teaches, “the purest security is possible by means of the peace and the withdrawal from the masses”, never by chasing their satisfaction (Key Doctrine 14).

Modified from artwork by Kasten Searles for “The Queen’s Gambit” from the Arkansas Times, March 2024

THE PRISON OF POLITICS

Unlike other schools, the Garden rejects politics as a valid field of inquiry and remonstrates the rhetorical tools that support the political ambitions of professional persuaders. As φιλοσοφία (philosophía) is the “love of wisdom”, so politics is antithetical to friendship and wisdom. While Epíkouros does not dismiss civic engagement, he warns against pursuing a political career. Such a pursuit requires either subservience to wealthy interests, or else, submission to popular opinion, or engagement with senseless gossip. The most effective politicians are not those who are the most educated, for “some come out of the schools worse than when they went in” (On Rhetoric, I, 35, 1 ff.=Suppl. 19.13 ff.), but those who are best at “studying what pleases the crowd and practicing” (Ibid., I, 45, 13 ff.=Suppl. 23, 20 ff.) In this way, through pleasing speech, an otherwise unskilled narcissist “can become skilled in politics” (Ibid.).

Political narratives, in particular, are uniquely dubious. Self-promoting orators spoil healthy discourse by drawing people into pointless debates. Rhetoricians excel at erecting scarecrows. Argumentative puppets present themselves as prime cuts of intelligence, yet many are without substance. Popular speakers are incentivized to sell unpalatable policies for the sake of their own enrichment. Politicians dress the inedible entrails they cook with zest. They spice lies to hide their rancid flavor. They sew empty arguments from skin and bones. Debates are dressed for taste, and, as mentioned, rarely dissect the meat of the matter. Dialectical discourse is dangerous. Rhetoric and oratory are ineffective at verifying true statements and, more importantly, impractical at cultivating friendships. As Philódēmos acknowledges, “Politics is the worst foe of friendship; for it generates envy, ambition and discord.” (On Rhetoric, II, 158, fr. XIX).

In speaking of a “free life”, Epíkouros affirms that it

is not possible to be acquired by a lot of money [made] through an unscrupulous means [nor] is without servility to the mob or authority, rather [it] acquires everything [it needs] in continuous abundance; nevertheless if [one did procure] any money by chance, then the latter can be easily distributed to those nearby for goodwill. (Vatican Saying 58)

In this essay, I mean to review rhetoric, dissect dialectic, purge politics, and oust the aura of oratory. We will skim the fat from inference by demonstrating the dangers of logical induction. As Epíkouros teaches, we “must liberate ourselves, out of the prison [built] upon circular” proceedings, social programming, indoctrination, senseless gossip, “political” affairs”, and other practices that sacrifice the testimony of the senses for persuasive story-telling (Vatican Saying 58). “If you contest every single one of the sense perceptions, you can neither judge the outward appearance nor can you affirm which of the sensations you, yourself say are deceptive according to the way in which the criterion operates” (Key Doctrine 23).

“Relativity” by M. C. Escher (1953)

UNFOUNDED INFERENCE

Epicureans reject both philosophical “reasonings in the form of Aristotelian syllogisms or inductions” as well as “other dialectical procedure(s)”  (On Irrational Contempt 2). As Polýstratos writes, those persuaded by such procedures “are fools who construct their argument solely on the basis of the conviction of others” and not through empirical investigation (Ibid.). “[B]y the dialectical means mentioned, one cannot deliver the soul from fear and anxious suspicion” because the conclusions of the rhetor, the orator, and the dialectician are not founded on physics (Ibid.). The dialectic is rejected “for want of qualification” as a reliable criterion of knowledge, for the Epicureans “suppose the study of nature provides the proper space for the voices of the facts” (Laértios 10.31). The only valid testimony is from the senses — speculation, hearsay, assumption, induction, and conjecture are inferior practices to the process of confirming hypotheses with evidence. “We shall say that the one who infers thus fails because he has not gone through all appearances well, and indeed that he is corrected by the appearances themselves” of real things (On Signs). When “divorced [from] the real phenomena”, then reality gets “cast out of the whole study of nature and then flows from a myth” (Laértios 10.87).

By contrast, Epicureans employ “the method of analogy”, observing nature, inferring hypotheses, and substantiating with evidence. “For there is no other correct method of inference besides this” (Philódēmos, On Signs). Sophistic rhetoric further confounds the process of substantiating hypotheses with observation. By contrast, evidence justifies the demonstrable truth of statements. Otherwise, flawed methods lead to self-defeating conclusions. “For the arguments that they devise to refute the [Epicurean] method of analogy contribute to its confirmation. […] It is the same in other cases, so that as a result they refute themselves.” (Ibid.). As pertains to professional persuaders, rarely are politicians and scientists the same people.

Modified from “The School of Athens by Rafael (1509-11)

DIABOLECTICIANS

Unlike other philosophers, Epíkouros does not recognize the dialectic as a distinct branch of philosophy (Laértios 7.41). Rather, he recognizes the dialectic as a mere method, which, by itself, cannot arrive at the “truth” it seeks to find. Speaking of the Epicurean Garden, Diogénēs reports that “she has withdrawn the Dialectic [and] rejects it for want of qualification;” for the Epicureans “suppose the [study of] natural [phenomena] provides [the proper] space for the voices of the facts.” (Ibid., 10.31). Epíkouros called “the Dialecticians totally toxic” (Ibid., 10.8) and later refers to “dialectic” as being “pretentious” (Epistle to Hēródotos 10.72). Contemporaneously, “Metródōros wrote […] Against the Dialecticians” (Laértios 10.24). He was documented “ridiculing those who consider the dialectic method more accurate” (On Rhetoric, II, 45, col. XLV). Philódēmos positively identifies the position of “the dialectician” as “a position which we refute” (Ibid., I, 190, col. IX; I, 191, col. X). Polýstratos writes that dialectical reasoning is based purely upon the false premises of dialectician’s “own conviction” (On Irrational Contempt 2). Instead, “one must, for the sake of oneself” observe nature to determine the truth of statements (Epistle to Hēródotos 10.72). Otherwise, as Philódēmos notes, “those who use dialectical reasoning do not know that they are shamefully refuting themselves” (On Signs).

For a demonstration of the dialectic in action, consider the following exampe, courtesy of the American, two-party political system: Suppose the Pink Team asserts that ‘An asteroid is coming! We need funds to stop it!’ The Yellow Team responds: ‘There is no asteroid. You just want money.’ Fortunately, everyone is a respectable, patient, educated dialectician, and everyone agrees to the wise rules of their admirable methodology. They proudly reach a compromise: ‘After extensive consideration, we have determined that there is a chance that an object, perhaps, in this case, an asteroid, of indeterminate size, mind you, may enter a region of spa —’

SLAM. That was the sound of nature crushing their dialectic.

Modified from “Asteroid Crashing into a Primordial Earth” by Don Davis / NASA (1991).png

THE RACKET OF RHETORIC

“[T]o practice rhetoric is toilsome to body and soul, and we would not endure it. [Rhetoric] is most unsuitable for one who aims at quiet happiness, and compels one to meddle more or less with affairs, and provides no more right opinion or acquaintance with nature than one’s ordinary style of speaking, and draw the attention of young men from philosophy”
(Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 52, col. 38., II, 53, col. L).

Rhetoric is a technique, an art of prose. Therein, Epicureans “do not claim that rhetoric is bad in itself” (Ibid., II, 142, fr. XIII). Simply, that rhetoricians “are like pilots, who have a good training but may be bad men.” Rhetoric is a weapon that any trained person can learn to wield. Even “the perfect orator” need not “be also a good man and a good citizen” as “in the case of any other art;” for example “a good musician may be a villain” (Ibid., II, 127, fr. XIII=II, 75, fr. XIII.). The 19th-century, French author Flaubert cautions, “Il ne faut pas toucher aux idoles: la dorure en reste aux mains” or “You shouldn’t touch idols: a little gold always rubs off” (Madame Bovary 3.5) — we receive this phrase as “never meet your heroes“. Indeed, were “the greatest rhetors [to] accomplish all they wish […] then they would be tyrants.” (On Rhetoric, II, 151, fr. VIII).

“To tell the truth,” so writes Philódēmos, “the rhetors do a great deal of harm to many people”, by defending the art of manipulation (Ibid., II, 133, fr. IV). He documents that rhetoricians “were not in good repute at the very beginning” as far as “in Egypt and Rhodes and Italy” (Ibid., II, 105, fr. XII). Hermarkhos claims that “rhetors [do not] deserve admiration”. “Moreover the rhetors charge for the help they give, and so cannot be considered benefactors” (Ibid., II, 159, fr. XX). By contrast, “the philosophers give their instruction without cost” (Ibid.). “Metrodorus teaches in regard to rhetoric that it does not arise from a study of science” (Ibid., II, 193, fr. 2). “The end of rhetoric is to persuade in a speech”, designed to disregard nature as is convenient. “It is clearly proven that the art of the rhetor is of no assistance for a life of happiness” (Ibid., I, 250, XVIII).

Modified from “The Death of Socrates” by Jacques-Loius David (1787)

STUPID SOPHISTS

If he knew that he could not […] become a philosopher […] he might propose to teach grammar, music, or tactics. For we can find no reason why anyone with the last spark of nobility in his nature should become a sophist…” (Ibid., II, 54, col. 39., col, LI).

The Epicurean critique against rhetoric is dually applied to and principally exhibited by a method that they refer to as sophistic (also referred to as “panegyric” or “epideictic” rhetoric). In general, people “are led astray by sophists and pay them money merely to get the reputation for political ability” (Ibid., II, 46, col. 33). It has been grossly easy for rich orators to persuade poor laborers to fund their schemes. Philódēmos observes that “sophistical training does not prevent faulty speech” (Ibid., I.182, col. I—I, 186, col. V). In fact, “some do not care at all for what they say” so long as it accomplishes their rhetorical goal, regardless of the greater goal of life (Ibid., I, 244. col XIII). “And when they do praise a good man they praise him for qualities considered good by the crowd, and not truly good qualities” (Ibid., I, 216 col. XXXVa, 14).

“[I]t follows that”, as is the case with other forms of technical rhetoric “those who possess this ability [of sophistic rhetoric] have acquired it without the help of scientific principles” (Ibid., I, 136, 20=Suppl. 61, 19). “[R]hetorical sophists” are known “for wasting their time on investigation of useless subjects, such as […] the interpretation of obscure passages in the poets”, as when civic policy is guided by mythic texts (Ibid., I, 78, 19 ff.=Suppl. 39, 5 ff). Compared against the philosophers, “the instruction given by the sophists is not only stupid but shameless, and lacking in refinement and reason” since it does not take into account the goal of life, nor commit to a devoted study of nature (Ibid., I, 223, fr. III). Instead, sophistic rhetoric appeals to authority and tradition by means of equivocation, obfuscation, and exploitation of ignorance.

“Paul Preaching in the Areopagus” by James Thornhill (1729-31)

CULTIVATING IGNORANCE

Often, obfuscation “is intentional”, as is the case “when one has nothing to say, and conceals the poverty of his thought by obscure language that he may seem to say something useful” as with equivocation (Ibid., I, 156, col. XIII). Other times, we observe “unintentional obscurity [that] arises from not mastering the subject, or not observing the proper formation […] and in general from failure” (Ibid., I, 158, col. XVI). Obscurity in discourse also arises “from ignorance of the proper meanings of words, their connotation, and the principles on which one word is to be preferred to another” (Ibid., I. 159, col. XVII). In these cases, the success of an orator corresponds not with knowledge, nor coherence, but with a practical ability to persuade a mob. “Most, if not all [of] the arguments do not prove what they claim to prove even if the premises be granted.” (Ibid., I, col. 5). “The worst class of arguments are those which act as boomerangs and demolish the position of the disputant” (Ibid. I, 4, col. I=Suppl. 4, 17).

For example, suppose that a sophist means to convince a legislative body to support a piece of legislation, but they lack meaningful substance. It behooves them to appeal to their audience’s preferences — moderates appreciate an appeal to custom (e.g. it’s the way it is); traditionalists appreciate an appeal to myth (e.g. it’s the way it’s always been); legalists appreciate an appeal to authority (e.g. it’s the law); populists appreciate an appeal to popularity (e.g. it’s what we want); economists appreciate an appeal to wealth (e.g. it’s profitable); bleeding-hearts appreciate an appeal to empathy (e.g. have a heart); ignorant people appreciate an appeal to simplicity (e.g. they’re trying to confuse you). The most ignorant are the most gullible, easy prey for skilled sophists. (Intentional obfuscation is masterfully exemplified by the “Chewbacca Defense” from the October 7, 1998 episode of South Park. The “Chewbacca Defense” leads to an irrelevant conclusion based on non-sequitur speech and a red herring.)

Modified from a screenshot of “Chef Aid,” South Park, season 2, episode 14, Comedy Central, 1998

EMPTY ORATORY

Philódēmos spends the better part of On Rhetoric distinguishing rhetoric as a technical art versus legislative and judicial oratory, which he identifies as a practical skill. He writes:

The practical skill acquired by observation is not called an art by the Greeks except that sometimes in a loose use of language people call a clever woodchopper an artist. If we call observation and practice art we should include under the term all human activity.
(Ibid., I, 57, 23 ff.=Suppl. 29, 15 ff.)

There is a “division between the different parts of rhetoric (i. e. sophistic and practical rhetoric) which was made by Epicurus and his immediate successors (Ibid., I, 49, 14 ff.=Suppl. 25, 15 ff.). Unlike sophistic, Philódēmos suggests that one “could find reason for pursuing practical rhetoric”, even though this form of oratory does not qualify as a formal art (Ibid., II, 54, 41). Unlike sophistic methods of argumentation, practical oration (the ambassadorial oratory of diplomats, the deliberative oratory or legislators, the forensic oratory of lawyers) provides practical utility: “thousands of [Greeks] have been useful ambassadors, were prudent in their advice, were not the cause of disaster, did not speak with an eye to gain, and were not convicted of malfeasance in office.” (Ibid., II, 224, col. XIX). In these cases, “some do succeed by means of natural ability and experience without the aid of rhetoric” (Ibid., I, 47, I ff.=Suppl. 24, 10 ff.). They are less concerned with trying “to classify and describe metaphors” instead of trying to give “practical working instructions” (Ibid., I, 171, 2, col. XII).

Still, even without methodical manipulation, oratory does not guarantee happiness, and provides no moral direction. It allows fools without skill to run offices that benefit from skill. Popularity insulates celebrities from the consequences of their actions. Oratory is the favored tool of talentless politicians whose only object is the advancement of destructive pursuits.

By contrast against the empty promises, unhelpful eloquence, and practical lies of orators, Philódēmos argues for παρρησία (parrēsía, “frank” or “free speech”), explaining that it is truly καλή φράσις (kalḗ phrásis), “lovely phrasing” or “beautiful speech” (On Rhetoric, I, 149 IV). Epíkouros commits to using “ordinary expressions appropriately, and not express oneself inaccurately nor vaguely, nor use expressions with double meaning” (Ibid., I,161, Col XIX). Ornate oratory might promote popularity, but rarely does it reduce anxiety.

Modified from a screenshot from “They Live” by John Carpenter (1988)

POLITICAL PROGRAMMING

Rhetoricians might flatter flies with honey, but politicians feed flies bullshit.

Epicurus believed that there was no art of persuading large bodies of men; that those who are not rhetoricians sometimes are more persuasive than the rhetoricians; that those trained in panegyric are less able to face the tumult of the assembly than those who have no rhetorical training; that Epicurus spoke of arts, and said that those acquainted with them were benefited, but did not mean that this enabled them to attain the end; if anyone possesses the power of persuasion it is responsible for evil and not for good.
(On Rhetoric, I, 99, 5b=Suppl. 48, 15)

While the arts of persuasion are discouraged, even then, Epicureans evaluate the dialectic and rhetoric above political discourse. “[W]e declare [politics not] to be an art “ (Ibid., Section II-a). Politicians are famously dishonest because “a clever man without studying the technical works of the sophists can study some sophist’s speech and so learn to imitate them.” (Ibid., I, 130. col. XXIX). Command does not require comprehension. “They certainly leave no place for any science…” (Ibid., I, 49, 14 ff.=Suppl. 25, 15 ff.). Indeed, “Delivery depends, too, on natural endowment, beauty of voice, grace of body” (Ibid., Col. XV). The job of “the statesman” is only to “discover the inherent political arguments” corresponding to “what appears true to the crowd” and then to manipulate them to the best of their ability (On Rhetoric, I, 209. col. XXVIII). As conditions change, one politician can advance murderous schemes, while another need to only wear the wrong-colored outfit to incite widespread, public ridicule. “There is no method by which one can” reliably “persuade the multitude, either always or in the majority of cases”, so pursuing politics is akin to delaying your own happiness (Ibid., II, 120, fr. XIX). Usually, success in politics requires either “a lot of money made through unscrupulous means” or “servility to the mob or authority” (Vatican Saying 67). Neither of those conditions are conducive to happiness.

To sum up; by no means should the philosopher acquire political experience, or rhetoric of that sort. It is evident that it is the height of folly to say that a study of nature produces a ἕξις [“habit”] of political oratory, especially since they introduce into the scheme of philosophy example andenthymeme” (On Rhetoric, II, 35, col. 38).

Philódēmos identifies those arguments that appeal to prejudice, traditional paradigms, historical precedence, and common belief as being “vain” (Ibid., I, 286, col. VII). They are “mere padding [to] provoke applause”, all “because the multitude is foolish” (Ibid., II, 39, col. XLI, I. 14). It is equally foolish that those “in political speeches use syllogism and induction which the dialecticians pride themselves on using” (Ibid., I, 286, col. VII). Therefore:

“[The wise] will [not] meddle in politics […] nor will they tyrannize; nor will they bark like a Cynic, […] and they will serve jury duty, and they will leave behind writings, but will not make public endorsements, and they will take precautions for their possessions” (Laertios 10.119).

Modified from “Departure of Odysseus from the Land of the Phaeacians” by Claude Lorrain (1646)

THE HARBOR OF PHILOSOPHY

“But this does not apply any more to philosophy”, nor does it apply to “the Epicureans who refrain from such things” (Ibid., II, 144, fr. II). “Philosophy is more profitable than epideictic rhetoric, especially if one practices rhetoric in the fashion of the sophists (Ibid., I, 225, fr. I). “To tell the truth”, so Philódēmos boasts, “philosophers gain the friendship of public men by helping them out of their troubles.” (Ibid., II, 133, fr. IV). He explains, “they live in peace and justice and tried friendship; those whom they find opposed to them they quickly soften” (Ibid., II, 160, XXI-XXV. II, 162, fr. XXVII). As mentioned, the Epicureans pride themselves on παρρησία (parrēsía, “free speech”). “In speaking one should not resort to ignoble rhetorical tricks, these have less effect than a straight-forward character” (Ibid., II, 126, fr. VI). Since the public tends to prefer comfortable lies, “it is better not to receive public preferment” (Ibid., II, 154, fr. XII.). Philosophers “help their country” not by patronizing the public, but “by teaching the young […] to act justly even if there are no laws, and to shun injustice as they would fire.” (Ibid., II, 154, fr. XIII.).

The primary resource that preserves the Epicurean deconstruction of oratory comes from Philódēmos in his book On Rhetoric. In this book, Philódēmos distinguishes technical rhetoric from practical oratory. He provides a critique of political speech and reviews the dialectic against the Epicureans’ method by analogy that anticipates the modern, scientific method.

Of chief concern, Philódēmos contrasts arts (like dialectic and rhetoric) against practical oratory and political speech, which are not teachable arts. “An art”, he writes “cannot be attained by one who has not studied it, and doing this regularly and certainly and not by conjecture.” He further explains that “this definition applies both to […] grammar and music”. He later adds “architecture, ship-carpentry, navigation, painting”, which all “had methods in olden time” (Ibid., I, 137, col. 33I.21). He concludes, “On the basis of this definition we declare sophistic to be an art” (Ibid., Section II-a). Here again, “That statement ‘He is a good rhetor’ simply means that he is experienced and skilled in speaking”, not that he is a good person. “For as we say ‘good rhetor’ we say ‘good artist’ meaning ‘skillful’” (Ibid., II, 234, col. XXXV).

Modified from “Sappho and Alcaeus” by Sir Lawrence Alma-Tadema (1881)

VARIETIES OF DISCOURSE

“One cannot even say that all rhetors adopt one style”, since orators alter their deliveries to suit the disposition of their audience (Ibid., I.152, Col. VIII). In On Rhetoric, our friend Philódēmos provides an overview of the various types of rhetoric and oratory, in addition to reviewing the positions of the Peripatetics and Stoics. In The Art of Rhetoric, Aristotélēs distinguishes rhetoric by three domains of persuasion: [I] deliberative or symbouleutic (e.g legislative), [II] forensic (e.g. judicial), and [III] epideictic (e.g. charismatic speeches) types (Technē Rhētorikē). A later Peripatetic adds [IV] enteuctic (e.g. ingratiation) as a fourth category. Conversely, the Stoics refer to epideictic rhetoric as [V] enconmiastic (e.g. eulogistic). Philódēmos also identifies [VI] ambassadorial (e.g. diplomatic) oratory and [VII] eristic (e.g. controversial). While ambassadorial, deliberative, and forensic styles of oratory exemplify practical oratory, the precision of rhetoric qualifies it as a technical art. Unlike practical oratory, technical rhetoric is exemplified by epideictic, rhetoric, also called [VII] panegyric (e.g. pageantic) and/or [VII] sophistic (e.g. deceptive).

As regards dialectic, Philódēmos offers professional respect (especially when compared against the profession of politics, the practice of oratory, and the art of rhetoric). He elaborates:

For the method of question and answer is necessary not only in philosophy and education, but often in the ordinary intercourse of life. The method of joint inquiry frequently demands this style. Moreover this method is adopted by the rhetor in the assembly as well as in the court of justice. (On Rhetoric, I, 241, col. XI).

While Philódēmos rejects the dialectic as a criterion of knowledge for “lack of qualification”, he accepts the general procedure as a logical tool, and acknowledges its applications in both technical rhetoric and practical oratory. In this way, “the rhetor is like the dialectician” (Ibid., II, 42, col. 30, I. 12.). The varieties of discourse are defined further at the end of this essay.

Modified from “Trilogy of the Desert: Mirage” by Salvador Dalí (1946)

THE MIRAGE OF SUCCESS

False illusions of success encircle us. Salary is not a reflection of skill. Popularity is not a mirror of value. Wealth cannot enrich friendship. Power cannot procure safety. Usually, these things produce antithetical effects: success incentivizes corruption, popularity rewards dishonesty, wealth challenges friendship, and power instigates insecurity. In his Key Doctrines, Epíkouros warns, “If for every occurrence you do not constantly reference the goal of natural pleasure, but if you suppress both banishment of pain and pursuit of pleasure to operate for another purpose, your reasonings and practices will not be in accordance” (25).

Wishing to be worshipped and well-liked, people procured security from people so long as they can be pronounced popular. And if so then indeed they were safe since such a lifestyle inherits the natural benefit of the good. If, however, they procured no safety, then they did not receive that for which they initially strove. (Key Doctrine 7)

Philódēmos provides us with a further warning in On Rhetoric as well as an example of when politicians, wishing to be popular, failed to procure safety:

“[M]any statesmen have been rejected by their fellow citizens, and slaughtered like cattle. Nay they are worse off than cattle, for the butcher does not hate the cattle, but the tortures of the dying statesmen are made more poignant by hatred” (Ibid., I, 234, col. V).

Based on these factors, Hermarkhos calls those who willfully pursue a career in rhetoric “insane”. They rarely achieve the goal of nature that such wealth and popularity is meant to secure. He affirms that “’It is better to lose one’s property than to keep it by lawsuits which disturb the calm of the soul‘” (Ibid., I, 81, 3ff.=Suppl. 40, 23 ff). For “it is much better to lose one’s wealth if one can not keep it otherwise, than to spend one’s life in rhetoric” (Ibid., I, 235, col. VI). Epíkouros summarizes, “Better for you to have courage lying upon a bed of straw than to agonize with a gold bed and a costly table” (Usener, Epicurea 207).

Modified from “Landscape with Farmhouses and Palm Trees” by Camille Pissarro (1853)

LIVE UNKNOWN

“[L]et us be content”, writes Philódēmos, “to live the quiet life of a philosopher without claiming a share in the ability to manage a city by persuasion” (On Rhetoric, I, 234, col. IV). Nothing secures a pleasant life so much as friendship, and nothing guarantees a life of pain so much as politics. Philosophy is more valuable that rhetoric because the “philosophy that teaches us how to limit our desires is better than rhetoric which helps us to satisfy them.” (Ibid., II, 150, fr. VII)

Philosophy is more profitable than epideictic rhetoric, especially if one practices rhetoric in the fashion of the sophists […]. The philosopher has many τόποι [“topics” or “positions”] concerning practical justice and other virtues about which he is confident; the busybody (i. e. the rhetorician) is quite the opposite. Nor is one who does not appear before kings and popular assemblies forced to play second part to the rich, as do rhetors who are compelled to employ flattery all their lives. (Ibid., I, 225, fr. I).

Escape notice and live! So writes Philódēmos, every “good and honest [person] who confines [their] interest to philosophy alone, and disregards the nonsense of lawyers, can face boldly all such troubles, yea all powers and the whole world.” (Ibid., II, 140, fr. XII). He observes:

“inspired before the same loud clamor, some will strive with the effort of Apollophanes [the Stoic] to advance wonderfully to the podium, but others, having landed in [philosophy’s] harbor and with hopes offered them that ‘not even the venerable flame of Zeus would be able to prevent them taking from the highest point of the citadel’ a life that is happy, afterwards, in spite of opposing winds….” (P.Herc 463)

Modified still from Star Wars: Andor, “Rix Road” (Season 1, Episode 12, November 23, 2022).

A GALAXY CLOSE TO HOME

If you will humor me, and entertain the possibility that I might attempt to “rightly hold dialogue about both music and poetry” (Laertios 10.120), consider that many of these points have been artfully orchestrated by writer and director Tony Gilroy in the television series Star Wars: Andor. One character in the fiction, the galactic senator, Mon Mothma, highlights the perils of propaganda (and political office) by exposing a dangerous, manufactured narrative: her dissent in politics has made her a target, and her agency as an orator is being suppressed. She redresses the Senate one, final time before withdrawing to a base, hidden deep in a distant forest:

The distance between what is said and what is known to be true has become an abyss. Of all the things at risk, the loss of an objective reality is perhaps the most dangerous. The death of truth is the ultimate victory of evil. When truth leaves us, when we let it slip away, when it is ripped from our hands we become vulnerable to the appetite of whatever monster screams the loudest. (Season 2, Episode 9)

In this fiction, diplomatic puppets defend and regurgitate loaded propaganda, having been convinced that a small, non-violent protest was actually an uprising. Only the survivors of the massacre, who heard the screams and saw the bodies for themselves know the truth. Similarly, Epíkouros advises that there “is a need to take into account […] all of the self-evident facts, according to which we refer our opinions”. Otherwise, “if not everything will be full of foolishness and of confusion” (Key Doctrine 22). Otherwise, one might be mislead to excuse genocide in the name of “security”. Otherwise, one might be mislead by political pundits and influential personalities to defend an armed mob of triggered, masked agents, deputized by a corrupt system to act with impunity. In the drama, one stormtrooper even shoots a woman in the face.

Trust your physical feelings and the force of nature. Lies are impractical. Propaganda is self-destructive. Oratory can be sinister. Principally, they target those who dismiss evidence and embrace superstition. It is dangerously easy to compel gullible minds to commit acts of violence through persuasive speech. Indeed, the modern-French philosopher Voltaire (heavily influenced by the propositions of the Epicurean school) observed that “Certainement qui est en droit de vous rendre absurde est en droit de vous rendre injuste” (Questions sur la Miracles 412). “Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities.” Persuasion is dangerous, and we rightly treat the instruments by which it spreads with scorn.

No deceptive speeches, manipulative oratory, lofty dialectic, nor rhetorical bullshit will convince a wise person to doubt their own eyes, discard their own feelings, and abandon their own study of nature. I invite you to see with your own eyes. Your life likely depends on it.


INDEX

Modified from “The Butcher’s Shop” by Gabriele Passerotti (1580)

    • Technical rhetoric includes epideictic, encomiastic, and panegyric or sophistic types. Philódēmos teaches that these methods of rhetoric are true arts.
    • Practical oratory includes ambassadorial, deliberative (or symbouleutic), and forensic types. Statesmen employ these methods for practical functions.
    • Political discourse “in this respect […] may fittingly be compared to the art of prophecy” (Ibid., I, 31, 3 ff.=Suppl. 17, 20 ff.). It is sometimes practical.
    • The Dialectic is a systemic, but deeply flawed method of reasoning privileged by
    • Socratics, Megarians, Academics, Peripatetics, and Stoics.
    • The Method by Analogy refers to the empirical reasoning of the Epicureans, which draws inferences from observations that can then be tested.
    • Philódēmos mentions several other rhetoric types, including the entuectic and eristic types that are not explicitly categorized, and may be synonyms or subsets.

  • AMBASSADORIAL ORATORY – πρεσβευτικός (presbeytikós). This practical form of oratory is employed by dignitaries and diplomats. Ambassadorial oratory is the ability “to be able to persuade in diplomatic negotiations by speech, not by power or bribes or dignities or anything else an ambassador might possess” (Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, II, 217, col. XIII).

  • DELIBERATIVE ORATORY – συμβουλευτικά (symbouleutiká) is also known as “symbouleutic” oratory. This practical form of oratory is used by legislators. It “gives advice only on matters affecting the common welfare, and that this advice is not the product of the sophistic art, but of [something] quite a different…” (Ibid., I, 211. Col. XXX.19).

  • EPIDEICTIC RHETORIC – ἐπιδεικτικός (epideiktikós, “demonstrative”, “performative”). This is an art of study regarding “charming speeches” (Ibid., II, 244, col. XLII). It is also called “encomiastic” by Stoics (Laértios 7.142). It is far less profitable than philosophy “especially if one practices rhetoric in the fashion of the sophists” (Ibid., I, 225, fr. I.).

  • ENCOMIASTIC RHETORIC – ἐγκωμιαστικός (enkōmiastikós, “eulogistic” or “laudatory”) is rhetoric ἐπαίνους καὶ ψόγους (epaínous kai psógous) “of praise and blame”. “Furthermore, no one can believe encomiasts, because they praise bad men” (Ibid., 220, col. XXXIXa). Stoics called epideictic oratory “encomiastic” (Laértios 7.142)


  • ERISTIC SPEECH – ἐριστικός (eristikós, “eager for strife”). “Dialectic and eristic may be arts…” , however, the Epicurean school evaluates them as forms of persuasion, unconcerned with the validity of their statements as they correspond to reality (Ibid., I, 57, 23 ff=Suppl. 29, 15 ff.). Eristic speech is provocative and controversial.

  • FORENSIC ORATORY – δίκανικα (díkanika, “judicial”). Philódēmos compares the practicality of forensic oratory with “deliberative” and “ambassadorial” oratory (Ibid., I, 134, col. XXXI). Practically, forensic oratory is employed in courts of law in the form of criminal defense.

  • PANEGYRIC RHETORIC – πανηγυρικός (panēgyrikós, “assembly” speech). This form of rhetoric is synonymous with sophistic rhetoric. “Now we have already treated in a previous section the idea that sophistic or panegyric or whatever it may be called […] may be easily called rhetoric.” (Ibid., II, 234. col. XXXV.). Epíkouros writes that the wise “will not πανηγυριεῖν (panēgyrieîn)” or “make public speeches” (Laértios 10.120).

  • POLITICAL DISCOURSE – πολιτικός (politikós, “of the city”). Politics, by itself, is not an art. By itself, the “political faculty” is empty. It is not a technique, nor a method, but more like “prophecy”. “No man was able […] to impart to his contemporaries or to posterity [the principles of politics]” without the rhetorical arts of the philosophers (Ibid., I, 139, col. XXXIV). “[T]echnical treatises of rhetoricians […] are useless for producing the political faculty”, which does not require training (On Rhetoric, I, 64, II frr.=Supple. 32, 19 ff.).

  • PRACTICAL ORATORY – Practical forms of oratory (for example, speeches employed by dignitaries, deliberations employed by legislators, and defenses employed by lawyers) are distinguished from technical rhetoric (epideictic or enconmiatic, and panegyric or sophistic). Practical oratory is not considered an art that can be learned, only a practice that can be repeated, like civic speech, legislative debate, judicial defense, and diplomatic counsel. “Epicurean authorities hold that sophistic rhetoric does not perform the task of practical and political rhetoric” (Ibid., I, 119, 28 = Suppl. 59., 1e4. I, 120, 10= Suppl, 60, 6).

  • SOPHISTIC RHETORIC – σοφιστική (sophistikḗ). Sophistic is an art of epideixis, and of the arrangement of speeches, written and extemporaneous.” (Ibid., II-c). “Sophistic style is suited to epideictic oratory and written works, but not to actual practice in forum and ecclesia” (Ibid., III, 134. fr. V). Indeed, “the training given by the sophists does not prepare for forensic or deliberative oratory” (Ibid., II, 131, fr. I). “Sophistic can “persuade men to become villains. And when they do praise a good man they praise him for qualities considered good by the crowd, and not truly good qualities” (Ibid., I, 216 col. XXXVa, 14).

  • TECHNICAL RHETORIC – τεχνικός (tekhnikós, “technical”) refers to methods of oratory that properly fit the Epicurean definition of an “art” (or “technique”), including epideictic and sophistic methods. Technical rhetoric offers methods (as is the case with any true art) that can be taught, and reproduced to achieve the same result. “Two sciences produce the same result.” (Ibid., I, 4, co. I=Suppl. 4, 17.). However, compared against the study of nature, “technical rhetoric has never advanced anyone” (Ibid., I.192, col. XI).

  • THE DIALECTICδιαλεκτική (dialektikḗ). Before the idealistic Hegelians and materialistic Marxists, the “dialectic” was privileged by Socratics, Megarians, Academics, Peripatetics, and Stoics, who defined it as “the science of conversing correctly where the speeches involve question and answer — and hence they also define it as the science of what it true and false and neither” (Laértios 7.42). The Epicureans reject the dialect as being incapable of verifying “truth” because it assumes that “truth” is capable of being reasoned without reliance upon physical evidence. Most of the dialecticians encouraged political participation as a necessity to existential satisfaction; Epicureans outright reject political office.

  • THE METHOD BY ANALOGY καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα τρόποϛ (ho kath’ homoiotēta tropos, “method according to similarity”) anticipated the modern, scientific method by several millennia. Epíkouros accepted that inferences must comport with observation and abide by nature. We must “create an analogy that corresponds with what we see“ (On Nature, Book 11, III, b5-12).” [W]e shall not be prevented from making inferences, provided that we use the method of analogy properly” (On Signs). And “we say that the method of analogy is a sound method of inference, with this condition, that no other appearance or previously demonstrated fact conflicts with the inference” (Ibid.).

For additional commentary, please see “Reasonings About Philodemus’ Rhetoric

For more on deliberate misrepresentation, please see “On Bullshit” by Dr. Harry Frankfurt

Clipped version of “Saint Epicurus” by Genevra Catalano (2023)

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All Particles Go to Heaven: The Form and Formation of the (Epicurean) Gods

This paper was originally published on Academia.edu. The paper, itself has been adapted from a larger publication on ancient Epicurean piety. It has been edited and re-formatted for academic presentation. For additional commentary, see “Holy Shit: The Elements of Epicurean Psychedelia” published by the Society of Friends of Epicurus

Epíkouros advances a developed theology in his treatises Περὶ σιότητος (Perì Hosiótētos, “On Piety”), Περ Θεν (Perí Theôn, “On Gods”), Περὶ Φύσεως (Perì Phýseōs, “On Nature”), and his distinguished “Letter on Happiness” προς Μενοικεα (pròs Menoikéa, “to Menoikeus”). In these compositions, the Gargettian encourages the veneration of “the divine nature” while upholding the validity of atomic physics and underscoring the emptiness of supernatural myths. Therein, the Sage of the Garden conducts a survey of religious history, provides an evaluation of the efficacy of rites and rituals, and reflects upon the genesis of the profound mental impressions that have inspired centuries of pious devotion. While some of these works have been lost, Epíkouros’ ideas have been preserved by Philódēmos in his similarly-named works “On Piety” and “On Gods”, as well as Metródōros’ Περ Μεταβολής (Perì Metabolês, “On Change”), and a work by Demḗtrios of Lakōnía entitled Περ το Θεο Μορφς (Perì toû Theoû Morphēs, “On the Form of a God”) within which “god” is deconstructed.

Epíkouros, Metródōros, Philódēmos, Dēmḗtrios, and other atomistic philosophers contextualize both spiritual activities like (piety and prayer) and religious notions (like blessedness and divinity) within the framework of an intelligible reality, existing as a continuum of moving bodies. Consequently, piety is presented as a function of neuropsychologyand theology is evaluated as a feature of anthropology. Human animals cultivate wisdom upon a κανών (kanṓn) or “standard” of knowledge, a philosophical foundation that grounds truth in nature. As Diogénēs records, the criteria of knowledge includes “the [αἰσθήσεις or aisthḗseis] sensations and [προλήψεις or prolḗpseis] preconceptions and that of [πάθη or pắthē] feeling” (Laértios 10.31). Sensation triggers feeling and gradually conditions preconceptions — each preconception is a “memory of the appearances” received “repeatedly from abroad”, impressed by “the imprint of the sensations” (Ibid. 10.33). Far from being a supernatural revelation, the preconception of “blessedness” that defines “god”, like “justice” has been informed by daily occurrences. The gods, themselves are conceptual representations conditioned by memory. “Piety” is a consequence of psychology and “prayer” is a psychiatric practice. The θεία φύσις (theía phýsis) “divine nature” is a common expression of παντελῆ εὐδαιμονίαν (pantelḗ eudaimonían) “absolute happiness” (10.116). “Heaven” exists in the form of the μετακόσμιος (metakósmios 10.89) a boundless void containing countless κόσμοι (kósmoi). The “heavenly” homes of the gods exist as inferences within the colorful confines of the human mind.

Epíkouros explains that the divine nature (of “the gods”) is conditioned by the mental προλήψις (prolēpsis) “impression” of μακαριότητα (makariótēta) “blessedness” described by Philódēmos as τελείαν εδαιμονίαν (teleían eùdaimonían) “perfect happiness” (On Piety, Col. 13.7-8, 353-354). “The gods” of Epíkouros are primarily θεωρητούς (theōrētoús 10.62, 10.135) “observed” or “contemplated” as φαντασίαν τ διανοί (phantasían tḗi dianoíai) “visualizations” or “appearances [in] the mind” (Laértios 10.50). Epíkouros affirms that the gods μὲν εἰσιν (mèn eísin 10.123) “truly exist” yet are only “seen” or “reached” through an act of λόγῳ (lógoi) “contemplation”, “consideration”, “reasoning”, “reckoning”, or “logical accounting” (10.62, 10.139). He observes that the mental φαντάσματα (phantásmata) or “appearances” of the gods arise κ τς συνεχος πιρρύσεως (èk ts synekhoús èpirrū́seōs) “from a continuous stream” τν μοίων εδώλων (tn homoíōn eidṓlōn) “of similar” or “compatible images” that physically impress upon the soul. The impressions coalesce together through a process of ὑπερβάσεως (hyperbáseōs) “transposition” (On Piety, Col. 12.9, 324-5). The transposed formations have been ποτετελεσμένωι (ápotetelesménōi) “rendered” to human souls in human forms, immortal projections of mortal intellects, visualizations of perfectly-happy, perpetually-healthy people.

Having reviewed the psychiatric evidence of memory against the criteria of knowledge (embodied by the natural kanṓn), Epíkouros explains that the functional “coherence” or “resemblance” between internal φαντάσματα (phantásmata) “appearances” and external οσί (ousí) “beings” (or τοῖς οὖσί “reality” 10.51) requires that an initial impulse complete a sequence of successive impacts, ultimately yielding a perception in the mind, “since we could not have sought the investigation if we had not first perceived it” (Ibid., 10.33). A sensible τύπος (týpos) “impression” initiates a perceptual relay through various pathways in the soul — the sense organs are stimulated by ἁφή (aphḗ, “touch”), acoustic ῥεύμᾰτᾰ (rheúmata, “currents”), olfactory ὄγκοι (ónkoi, “hooklets”), and visual είδωλα (eídōla, “images”), all “impinging [upon] us [as] a result of both the colorful realities” to produce “a harmonious magnitude of related morphologies”. The μαχυμερέστερον (makhymerésteron) “marching army of particles” (Dēmḗtrios, On the Form of a God 21) enter “the face or the mind” […] yielding an appearance and an [affective] sympathy as a result of the observing” (Laértios 10.49-50). Thus, the mortal appearances we see during the day inspire the divine icons we envision at night.

Epíkouros “alone first founded the idea of the existence of the Gods on the impression which nature herself hath made on the minds of all men” (Cicero, On the Nature of Gods 26). He asks, “what nation, what people are there, who have not, without any learning, a natural idea, or prenotion, of a Deity?” The realization that isolated peoples developed parallel, mythic complexes became noticeably evident after Aléxandros III of Makedonía connected the intellectual culture of the Mediterranean with the Indian subcontinent, triggering a cross-cultural dissemination of wisdom literature. According to the Gargettian, prior to the historical development of these mythic narratives and institutionalized rituals, prehistoric humans organically conceived of deities as sublime psychological icons encountered during dreams and contemplations (On Nature 12). The Pyrrhonian skeptic Séxtos Empeirikós preserves Epíkouros’ historical thesis: “The origin of the thought that god exists came from appearances in dreams” that were conditioned by “the phenomena of the world” (Against the Mathematicians 9.45-46). The earliest humans who conceived of these notions assumed “the object of thought as a thing perceived in relation to a solid body […] understanding perception that can be grasped by corporeal sensation, which they also knew to be derived from a physical entity [i.e. nature]” (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 15.8-18). Yet, far from being prophetic symbols θεόπεμπτος (theópemptos) sent by the gods” (Diogénēs of Oìnóanda, Fr. 9, Col. 6), “the gods”, themselves exist as symbolic representations, composed from reproducible “stream[s] of similar images” that have been apprehended from a variety of natural inspirations (Laértios 10.139).

Prehistoric peoples’ perception of “the divine nature” and their visualizations of “divine” beings created lasting impressions upon the history of human civilization. Human devotees created conventions to celebrate the symbols of their insights. Traditions were cultivated and pious practice flourished, as did dramatic myths and misunderstandings.Eventually, “self-important theologians” and deluded priests diluted beliefs about the divine and perverted piety with a fog of fear (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 86A 1-2). “God” himself was assigned disturbing duties and became enlisted in the service of religious autocrats. Contrary to the chilling myths championed by “self-important theologians”, the blessed and incorruptible nature has no need to direct the production of the human drama. Epíkouros teaches that “it is foolish to ask of the gods that which we can supply for ourselves” (Vatican Saying 65). The true benefits of worship are enjoyed by worshippers, not by the fantastic objects of human obeisance. People conceive of gods as being kind, confident, and self-reliant; in emulating these virtues, people perfect their own pleasure. “Anyone who has these things […] can rival the gods for happiness”, despite their inability to fulfill prayers, subdue nature, and prevent death (Vatican Saying 33). Philódēmos exhorts students to “imitate their blessedness insofar as mortals can” and “endeavor most of all to make themselves harmless to everyone as far as is within their power; and second to make themselves so noble” (On Piety Col. 71.16-19, 23-29). Functional knowledge of piety and theology is integral to cleansing oneself of the turmoil that is symptomatic of magical thinking.

The Epicurean presentation of divinity contextualizes “the gods” as fantastic, mental entities that can be inspired passively through the indiscriminate mechanism of sensation, either “from abroad” through the trigger of touch, as when one views an idol, or internally, “in respect of slumbers” when the mind dreams freely, least encumbered by daily disturbances, and organically repurposes memories of remarkable figures before then augmenting them into deathless idols. “Gods” can also be summoned intentionally, through a directed act of contemplation, involving τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας (tinàs épibolàs tḗs dianoías) “some applications of the intellect”, like μνήμην (mnḗmēn, “memory”). Dēmḗtrios of Lakōnía reiterates that the representations of “the gods” in the mind are triggered both as those memories manifest” through recollection, “and also” by the physical impulse of “pre-existing [bodies] that, upon [striking] the mind, produce constructive cognition”, as when one observes a icon (Dēmḗtrios, On the Form of a God 12). Because of this, mental representations of religious figures can be summoned through meditation as readily as when gazing upon the mass of a physical icon. In prayer, the supplicant manually retrieves an “apparent” image of blessedness, previously been stored in memory, having been initially sublimated in the imagination. Visual γνῶσις (gnṓsis, “knowledge”) of “the gods” has been ἐναργὴς (énargēs) “apparent”, “evident” or “manifest” (Laértios 10.123) for millennia — the fields of the Earth are filled with statues, votives, frescoes, mosaics, murals, metalwork, jewelry, pottery, and architecture that glorify “the divine nature”. Each civilization peppers its conception of divinity with fresh colors, shapes, and stories, just as each culture ritualizes a contemplative path to care for the health of the soul. In doing so, each group creates a cultural matrix into which subsequent generations are psychologically enmeshed — prior to the widespread proliferation of supernatural soap operas, the first peoples contemplated a raw form of divinity, unsullied by mythic adulterants.

To further isolate the genesis of the unadulterated notion of “god”, Epíkouros traces the crumbs of cognition to their sources in nature. In the case of divine entities, the Sage observes that divine representations have been conditioned by memories of the human animal combined with the congenital preconception of blessedness. When a supplicant prays, meditates, concentrates, reflects, or, generally applies directed focus toward the stored, mental expression of blessedness, they generate a internal image “as if” the practitioner were literally ἐν εἰκόνι (én eìkóni) “in the presence” of an external “representation”, “portrait”, or “icon”. As with the memories of “brightness”, “loudness”, “softness”, and “sweetness”, the characteristics of the gods have been conditioned by images and inspirations received from abroad — those images (like the form of a human body) and inspirations (like peak happiness) become amalgamated in the mind by an intellectual act of transfusion. As with other preconceptions, like χρόνος (khrónos) “time” and δίκαιος (díkaios) “justice”, the mental prototype of “god” functions as an organizing principle or “ruler” against which individual examples can be evaluated — any alleged divinity that punishes, terrorizes, rages, suffers, or fears neither meets the definitions of “blessed” nor “incorruptible”, and cannot by definition be identified as “god”. Epíkouros exhorts Menoikeus to “believe anything about” the image of god “that is able to preserve” that form’s conceptual “incorruptibility and blessedness” (Laértios 10.123). So long as an expression of divinity coheres with the preconception of blessedness, it can truly be called “a god”. Thus, an endless collection of divinities might be perceived, unique to each person, supported by the infinity of particles that constitute both the heavens and the heavenly forms of the mind.

The heavenly form of a “god” appears to the human mind as does any other, mundane formation, as τὸ ὄν (tò ón) “a being” or “an entity” (Philódēmos, On Piety Col. 66A, Line 11). According to Epíkouros, each “entity” can be conceived of as an individual ἑνότης (henótēs, Col. 13.12) “unity” or “union” composed of many other mental particles that coalesce together to form representational σύγκρισεις (sýnkriseis) “compounds” in the mind (Col. 12.11). As Metródōros writes, each νότητα διότροπον (henótēta idiótropon) “distinctive unity” also exists as a “compound made up of things that do not exist as numerically distinct” (On Change, preserved by Philódēmos in On Piety, Col. 4.13-15). Epíkouros further clarifies that “unified entities” in the mind can exhibit one of two constitutions — some “entities” of the mind “are perfected out of [1] the same elements and others are constituted from [2] similar elements” (On God, preserved by Philódēmos in On Piety Col. 8.14-17) The φύσεις (phýseis) “natures” or “constitutions” of all of these “unified entities” are therein grouped according to the origin of their birth, either from [1] a single source, or having coalesced from [2] multiple sources ἐξ ὑπερβάσεως τν (èx hyperbáseōs tôn) “as a result of transposition” during the traversal μεταξύ (metazù) “between” the source and the mind (Ibid., Col.12.8-9). If the mental form of an entity is composed of particles that only originate from [1] a single source, Epíkouros says that they are all αὐτή (autḗ) “the same” in constitution — “the same” form is one that reflects a numerically-singular entity in one’s environment. By contrast, Epíkouros says that appearances composed of particles coming from [2] multiple sources are only superficiallyὁμοία (homoía, Col. 12.6) “similar” because they are only related insofar as their composition as arrays of εἴδωλα (eídola). Besides their shared form as bundles of images, the conceptual amalgamations of “the gods” have been stitched together from a variety of environmental inspirations.

To demonstrate this constitution, one might visualize a dog. This visualized animal is a mental representation. It was previously impressed upon the mind when dog-particles travelled from a dog (or image of a dog) through the air. The visual impulse that impacts the eye triggers an internal cascade that yields the mental form of an animal. The resulting dog-form is a bundle of distinct particles that correspond κατ’ ἀριθμόν (kat’ arithmón, Col. 12.10) “in number” to the measurable proportions of [1] “that same”, furry creature in reality. This representation is composed of particles whose φύσεις (phýseis) “origins” are all αὐτή (autḗ) “the same” — the memory of this “dog” was apprehended “without contamination” from the particles of other, distinct objects (Philodemos, On Gods III, Col. 8). The generative flow of images reflects the activity of the original body, and a dog is not confused for another form (e.g. when dog-forms coalesce with human-forms in our imagination, we picture werewolves).

By contrast, one might visualize a god. Like the dog-form, the god-form is a mental image of an animal. Like the dog-form, the god-form is also apprehended by the intellect. Like the dog-form, the god-form, too was initially triggered by impulses “received from abroad”. However, unlike the mental aggregate that constitutes one’s impression of a “dog”, one’s impression of a “god” is a ὑπέρβασις (hypérbasis), a “superimposition” of at least two different bodies of εἴδωλα (eídola) that are only superficially ὁμοία (homoía) “similar” insofar as their material composition as pictures in the mind. Therein, the compound nature of these images enables their being φθαρτον “indestructible”. By comparison, after the death of a dog and the end of that dog’s eídola, the dog’s form can only be retrieved from memory — we are left with the impressions that a mortal creature gave us of itself during its limited lifespan. The forms of the gods, however, are not at risk of dissolution because they do not have a single source that is subject to death — the sources of the god-forms are unending, undying, and limitless, the infinite soup of particles that is constantly boiling before our very souls. In this regard, “the form of god” is neither [1] a simple body (like a particle), nor a regular compound (like a dog), but is a sort of [2] irregular compound. No compound is a simple body (i.e. a particle), and all compounds are combinations of simple bodies, but unlike the regular compound that is a dog-form, the god-form is not composed of particles that are κατ ριθμν (kat’ árithmòn) “numerically-identical” to their source. Rather, the form of “a god” is composed of particles that are καθ μοείδειαν (kath’ hòmoeídeian) “similar in consistency” such that they can become enlaced to imagine new forms. The image of “god” is formed when the image of a human is conjoined in the mind withthe concept of perfect happiness and the projection of deathlessness. As preserved by Diogénes, Epíkouros explains ος μν (oús mèn) “on one hand” the forms of the gods appear to be κατ ριθμν φεσττας (kat’ árithmòn hyphesttas) “subsisting by number”, as though each “unified entity” corresponds with a single, external body, “but” ος δ (oús mèn) “on the other hand” the gods” are formed καθ μοείδειαν (kath’ hòmoeídeian) from multiple, external sources due to their existence “as a similitude” of images that constitute “a common appearance” (10.139).

In the case of the specific characteristics of “the gods”, human minds tend to render the human visualization of perfection νθρωποειδς (anthrōpoeidṓs) “human-like” (Ibid.) or ἀνθρωπόμορφον (anthrōpómorphon) “human-shaped” (Dēmḗtrios, On the Form of a God 14-16). Granted, “the gods”, as mental projections of humanity, are not “to be considered as bodies of any solidity […] but as images, perceived by similitude and transition” (Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 28). “We do not find the calculation” so writes Demḗtrios, “that any other shape” besides that “of the human” could qualify as a blessed and incorruptible being.” He explains that the gods “are granted to be perfectly happy; and nobody can be happy without virtue, nor can virtue exist where reason is not; and reason can reside in none but the human form”. Philódēmos writes that “we have to infer” their behaviors “from the appearances” made “manifest” to the mind; thus, we visualize god “as a living being” (Philódēmos, On Gods III, Col. 10):

One must [imagine] with Hermarchus that the gods draw in breath and exhale it, for without this, again, we cannot conceive them as such living beings as we have already called them, as neither can one conceive of fish without need in addition of water, nor birds [without additional need] of wings for their flight through the air; for such [living beings] are not better conceived [without their environment] .

Philódēmos further reflects on the conceived environments of the gods:

[E]very nature has a different location suitable to it. To some it is water, to others air and earth. In one case for animals in another for plants and the like. But especially for the gods there has to (be a suitable location), due to the fact that, while all the others have their permanence for a certain time only, the gods have it for eternity. During this time they must not encounter even the slightest cause of nuisance… (On Gods III, Col. 8).

Apollódōros the scholarch infers that “the dwellings” of the fearless gods, unruffled by ferocious winds and falling stars “have to be far away from the forces in our world” (Ibid., Col. 9). He stipulates that the security of these “locations” may not be preserved as a result of “distance” so much as a result of physical disengagement “from the hindering factors that clash against each other”. Epíkouros concurs that “it is possible for their nature to exist even with many troubles surrounding it” (On Piety, Col. 3.3-7). For “even if the things which generate” divine images were “as far away as anyone could wish”, the mundane images of people stored in memory would still combine with the preconception of “blessedness” and form the image of gods who “appear” to “transcend” any amount of “intervening distance” (Philódēmos, On Gods III, Col. 9). Memory, itself “transcends” the perils of our perishable plasma through a perpetual replenishment of minute, mental motes, “having changed each time for producing a thought” (On the Form of a God 12). Dēmḗtrios explains that “the memories people retain of” visual impressions were first “received as children” (Ibid., 11), and despite decades of disruption, those representations can be reproduced continuously. Through contemplation, a supplicant summons a memory of blessedness and transforms the mind into a holy menagerie, capable of hosting a variety of divine forms. After extensive consideration, Apollódōros concludes that the “dwellings” of “the gods” must be constructed “from some of their” own, finely-grained “elements”, repurposed through an act of contemplation (On Gods III, Col. 10).

Philódēmos further supposes that beings who inhabit the sublime territory of the pure mind possess “perception and pleasure”, as well as “an excellent disposition of things which endure” (On Piety, Col. 5). Accordingly, these projections exhibit the same preferences as their human projectors, finding recognizable pleasure in the activity of being rational animals:

we must claim that the gods use both voice and conversation to one another; for we will not conceive them as the more happy or the more indissoluble, [Hermarchus] says, by their neither speaking, nor conversing with each other, but resembling human beings that cannot speak; for since we really do employ voice, all of us who are not disabled persons, it is even the height of foolishness that the gods should either be disabled, or not resemble us in this point, since neither men nor gods can create utterances in any other way. And particularly since for good men, the sharing of discourse with men like them showers down on them indescribably pleasure. And by Zeus one must suppose the gods possess the Hellenic language or one not far from it, and that their voices in expressing rationalist are clearest(Philódēmos, On Gods III, Col. 13)

Humans picture “the gods” to be perpetually-happy people, ceaselessly-savoring the pleasures of friendship, “for it is not possible for them to maintain their community as a species without any social intercourse” (Philódēmos, On Gods, Fr. 87). Unburdened by the undue responsibilities of celestial governance, astral adjudication, and cosmic corrections, the holy inhabitants of the mind seem wholly self-reliant. Perfectly prudent, they appear to privilege the preservation of their own peace above impractical obligations. As ζῷον (zōîon 10.123) living figures, they are expected to respirate; as social figures, they are imagined to converse; as rational figures, they are understood to reflect; as blessed figures, they are acclaimed to live without fear, imperishable paragons of human perfection. The human-shaped deities appear to sustain a peak state of pure pleasure, that which cannot be heightened by excess.

Demḗtrios cautions that, “when we say in fact the God is human-shaped” we should note that God is not actuallyhuman (On the Form of a God 15). In On the Nature of the Gods, Cicero’s character Velleius concurs that god “is not body, but something like body” nor “does it contain any blood, but something like blood” (28). Like the concepts of “justice” and “time”, the concept of “god” is not “attached” to an external body, “except [in the case] of calculation, wherefore we interweave” thoughts in the mill of the mind from subtle threads of memory (Laértios 10.72). Velleius admits, “these distinctions were more acutely devised and more artfully expressed by Epicurus than any common capacity can comprehend”. The gods are, nonetheless “real”, “unified entities” as reproducible appearances in the mind.

In an effort to “realize” his own spiritual “fulfillment”, Philódēmos further scrutinizes the images of these “beings surpassing [περβαλλουσν or hyperballousōn] in power [δυνμει or dynámei] and excellence [σπουδαιότητι or spoudaiótēti]”, who equally “excel [περέχον or hyperékhon] in sovereignty [γεμονίαν or hegemonían]” and infers the following:

that of all existing things, [the divine nature] is the best [ριστον or áriston] and most holy [σεμνότατον or semnótaton, “dignified” or “revered”], most worthy of emulation [ξιοζηλωτότατον or áxiozēlōtótaton, “enviable”], having dominion over all good things [πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν κυριευόντα or pántōn tōn agathṓn kurieúonta], unburdened by affairs [πραγμάτευτον or pragmáteuton], and exalted [ψηλόν or hypsēlon, “sublime” or “proud”] and great-minded [μεγαλόφρονα or megalóphrona, “noble” or “generous”] and great-spirited μεγαλόψυχον or megalópsykhon, “magnanimous”] and ritually pure [γιον or hágion, “sacred”] and purest [γιοτατον or àgiōtaton, “holiest”] and propitious[ῑ̔́λεων or hī́leōn, “blameless”]. Therefore they say that they alone strive after the greatest form of piety and that they hold […] the purest views as regards the ineffable [φραστον or áphraston, “inexpressible” or “marvelous”] pre-eminence [περοχήν or hyperokhēn, “superiority”] of the strength[σχύος or ìskhúos, “power”] and perfection [τελειότητος or teleiótētos, “completeness”] of the divine[toû theíou] […] [Epíkouros] advises not to think [God] bad-tempered (as he is thought), for example, by the poets. (On Piety, Col. 45.2-30).

Lucretius observes that CAELESTI SVMVS OMNES SEMINE ORIVNDI “we have all come from heavenly seed” (De Rerum Natura 2.991). The pieces of reality that comprise our bodies are the same pieces that comprise the stars and the memories in our minds. Cosmic firstlings fall from the “heavens” and amalgamate upon this world, contributing to the body of the terrestrial aggregate. Nature repurposes these elements for the benefit of evolution — many of the “heavenly” particles become recycled into the motes of the mind, which are then reconstituted into the “heavenly” forms of “the gods”. Summarily, all particles travel through the heavens and can become repurposed into the “heavenly” bodies of divine idols. So long as mortals exist to engage in the enterprise of story-telling, immortals can exist in perpetuity.

The Epicurean philosophers confidently affirm that no “god” attended the inauguration of the Earth — no supernatural supervisors were present to oversee the development of the early cosmos. The existence of a human god did not precede the existence of a human animal. Prior to the emergence of the human being, the human body had yet to exist — “the god” had yet to be conceived. It was only after humans evolved, formed friendships, shared memories, and suffered loss that prehistoric peoples internalized their experiences, dreamed of deathlessness, and projected their inspirations as sublime, psychological icons, providing guidance and inspiration to generations of people. So long as human beings continue to dream, human egos will continue to project their ideals upon the walls of the mind, constructing holy heroes and righteous role models that embody their ideals; so too will people continue to manufacture tragic myths. While these forms of blessedness can be continuously reproduced, many fall into disuse as the masses champion tragic heroes who contradict the basic definition of perfection that “god” implies.

The primary concern of Epicurean theology is to protect the conceptual blessedness and incorruptibility of the “divine nature” from “contamination […] lest they become mixed up with” terrestrial troubles “to the detriment of their imperishability” (On God III, Col. 9). For Epíkouros, any fearful “contamination” poured upon the form of blessedness mutates the pure notion into a chimera (like a centaur or gorgon), a tragic antagonist in dramatic fiction. Accordingly, as the conceit of a medusa sublimates the notions of “woman” and “snakes”, so, too does the notion of a demiurgesublimate “god” with “artist” — prior to the laborious ingenuity of creative hands, no “creator” could be contrived. Likewise, the notion of LORD conjoins “god” with “king” — here again, prior to the phenomenon of “kings” lordingover subjects, no conception of a LORD could have existed. Similarly, understanding “god” to be “The Father” requires the believer to have been born within a species that observes the “male parent” to play a role in child-rearing — without this context, “The Father” is meaningless.

Compared with the chimeric myths of the masses, the pure conception of “blessedness” or “complete happiness” (e.g. impassivity, tranquility, cheerfulness, and delight) corresponds precisely with the natural standard that the word “god” implies. As humans employ the preconception of “time” to evaluate the duration of events, and, similarly employ the preconception of “justice” to evaluate the commensurability of relationships, so too do humans employ the preconception of “god” to evaluate ethical priorities and set behavioral goals.

While many imagine “god” as a “real animal” with “common” features that subsists beyond the walls of the world, this assumption leads to contradictions (Dēmḗtrios 16). [ I ] First, extreme isolation from the nutritive “forces of the world that produce things subject to generation and dissolution” would inhibit any inhabitant’s access to natural necessities. It would severely challenge any entity “resembling a human being” from being able to sufficiently replenish its losses and preserve its perfections (Philódēmos, On Gods III, Col. 9). The “happiness” promised “beyond Zeus” is expressed as “the cry of the flesh [that] neither hungers, nor does it thirst, nor does it shiver” (Vatican Saying 33). Consequently, a “living being”, “breathing in and out” that is restricted from the “forces of generation” that supply air and shed light would suffer the same impairments as a “disabled person” whose disposition restricts their ability to acquire breath and behold the “the sight of sweet motions” (Laértios 10.6). Philódēmos cautions that it is “the height of foolishness” to suppose “that the gods should either be disabled, or not resemble us in this point” (On Gods III, Col. 13). [II] Secondly, the notion of a pre-human, human-shaped entity contradicts Epíkouros’ description of cosmic evolution. Naturally, the pig cannot precede the piglet, and the human form cannot precede the emergence of the human animal. The memory of a human body cannot precede the body of a human being remembered. “Thus, each name follows [what] is visible […]For one must perceive the [external] form before the preconception” (Laértios 10.33). [III] Thirdly, the bodies of external gods could not be “evident” if they were truly unobservable. Dēmḗtrios explains that “the thinnest-particles”, such as those which constitute the mind, are too fine to “truly constitute” visual “perception” (On the Form of a God21). He further affirms that “nothing diaphanous [is] sensible” (Ibid., 22). Therefore, if knowledge of external god-bodies has yet “to be confirmed or to be contradicted” through direct apprehension due to their imperceptibility, then external gods could never be “manifest” to the mind (Laértios 10.51). Yet Epíkouros affirms that “knowledge of them” is “evident” as internal projections of blessedness (Ep. Men. 10.123). [IV] Finally, the mode of subsistence of non-terrestrial entities, though “human-like” would present hazards to any terrestrial animals attempting to emulate their lifestyles. The στοιχειώμaτa (stoikheiṓmata, “elementary principles” 10.36) affirm that the compounds of the Earth have been conditioned by local forces — non-terrestrial entities lack exposure to those forces that condition which sensations are pleasurable and painful, and for which animals. Thus, human animals incur great risk in attempting to emulate the behavior of entities that only superficially resemble the human-form. By contrast, Philódēmos encourages us to “imitate” the “blessedness” of recognizable idols, not to ritualize the idiosyncratic lifestyle of an alien (On Piety, Col. 71.16-17).

Ultimately, these speculative examples of divinity, proposed to exist, independent of the human mind, are unnecessary to contextualize religious practice and to justify a defense of spirituality. In the continuum of the mind, prayer has phenomenal power and piety has purpose. Dēmḗtrios concludes “that even by means of contemplation”, as streams of superimposed images in the mind, each “deity” physically “possesses a substance” and wields influence (On the Form of a God 15). Though Philódēmos concedes that “no one has been prolific in finding convincing demonstrations for the existence of” independent “gods” with “human-shaped” bodies, he “nevertheless” recognizes “all humans, with the exception of some” to “worship them […] as do we” (On Piety, Col. 23.13-21). “Apparent indeed is this knowledge” (Laértios 10.123).

Works Cited

Armstrong, David. “Epicurean virtues, Epicurean friendship: Cicero vs the Herculaneum papyri” in Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, Cambridge University Press, 2011, 126-8.

Cicero, Marcus, et al. Cicero on the Nature of the Gods. Translated by C. D. Yonge, 1872.

Dēmḗtrios of Lakonía. “On the Form of a God.” Translated by N. H. Bartman, Twentiers, 5 Apr. 2025, https://twentiers.com/form-of-god/ (accessed 14 Nov. 2025).

Diogénēs of Oìnóanda and Smith, Martin Ferguson. Supplement to Diogenes of Oinoanda the Epicurean Inscription. Bibliopolis, 2003.

Empeirikós, Séxtos. Against the Physicists. Against the Ethicists. Translated by R. G. Bury, Harvard University Press, 1953.

Epíkouros, et al. The Hedonicon: The Holy Book of Epicurus. Translated by N. H. Bartman et al., 1st ed., Leaping Pig Publishing, 17 Nov. 2023.

Essler, Holger. “Space and Movement in Philodemus’ De Dis [On Gods] 3: an Anti-Aristotelian Account.” Critical Studies in Ancient Physics, 2014.

Laértios, Diogénēs. “Book 10.” Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Translated by Stephen White, Cambridge University Press, 2021, 411-462.

Laértios, Diogénēs. Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers: Book 10. Translated by Bartman, N. H. in “The Life of Epíkouros: A Translation for Twentiers”, Leaping Pig Publishing, 21 May 2025,www.academia.edu/129436319/The_Life_of_Ep%C3%ADkouros_A_Translation_for_Twentiers (accessed 17 Nov. 2025).

Logeion, University of Chicago, https://logeion.uchicago.edu/, (accessed 17 Nov. 2025).

Lucretius Carus, Titus. The Way Things Are. Translated by Rolfe Humphries, Indiana University Press, 1968, page 80.

Philódēmos of Gádara.On Gods”. Translated by Essler and Armstrong, Twentiers, Leaping Pig Publishing,https://twentiers.com/on-gods/ (accessed 16 Nov. 2025).

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Twentiers.com. Leaping Pig Publishing, https://www.twentiers.com/ (accessed 15 Nov. 2025).

Holy Shit: The Elements of Epicurean Psychedelia

Disclaimer: the ideas and opinions presented below are reflective of the author and may or may not be shared by other members of the Society of Friends of Epicurus.

PART I: THE ATOM PROPHET

Prior to ingesting psilocybin mushrooms at the age of 20, my theological positions were categorically Kyrēnaíc — as with “Theódōros, known as the atheist”, I “utterly rejected the current belief in the gods” whether they be Olympians, the Stars, or the Trinity (Laértios, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 2.86, 2.97). Like The Atheist, I, too “denied the very essence of a Deity” (Cicero, On the Nature of Gods 23). I was equally “great at cunning up anything with a jest”, happily reducing holy stories to hoary myths, lampooning the paradoxically pregnant virgin, teasing the tyranny of a childish creator, and “using vulgar names” for embarrassing social phenomena that appeared (to me) to be plagues upon the rational world, like hordes of superstitious rats, marching to the tune of their petty pipers (Laértios 4.52). I viewed the faithful as flocks of lost sheep following false shepherds. I rejected the religious experience as, at best, a benign delusion, and, at worse, untreated psychosis.

Then the blue meanies hit.

“Door of Perception” from an unpublished diary (June 2009).

I walked through the doors of perception ecstasis. My pulse increased and I felt warm, bursting with energy. Euphoria erupted with uninhibited joy, giddiness, and laughter. Outside, I felt as though I was walking on clouds and dissolving into the Earth. Back inside, my trip peaked. I saw trails behind moving objects. I had intense closed-eye visuals memories came to life; patterned lattices appeared. I began to see, eyes wide open, a warped reality, a curved, moving field of vision. I was overwhelmed by a sudden, intense sensation. I opened […] the unfiltered brain, raising the gates to flood my mind with sensation. (Unpublished Diary, June 2009)

The symptoms of the psychedelic experience, from the ancient Greek ψυχή (psykhḗ or “soul”) and δῆλος (dḗlos or “visible”), are exquisitely unique and reliably illuminating, if such insights can be apprehended — the flood of perceptual fluctuations that engulfs the ego often inundates the analytical faculties. Consequently, should one hope to return from the abyss triumphant, with the gift of bliss and the reward of wisdom, the intellect must stretch its reach, wielding an extended net of metaphor to capture the juicy insights swimming around it.

Half-aware, half-asleep, my sensation turned to insight. I was drifting through bubbles of different eyes altered states of consciousness. As I entered each bubble, I saw from a different mind possibilities of the unfiltered human mind. I saw from a different time as my own context hid with the realm of possibilities. The ordered chaos allowed me see as other people from other times and places. I even encountered that which I do not believe in or reject. I reveled at the windows open in my mind. I had the wonderment of a child. I loved everything that I witnessed, and those who were watching with me I loved as well. I heard my thoughts change, creatively toward the philosophical …

“The Realm of Psyches” from an unpublished diary (June 2009)

As sometimes happens, four grams of fungus triggered an existential deconstruction that challenged a host of perceptual certainties and inspired a journey to the edge of the soul.

I thought of the ancient Greek Sophists, and the egocentric predicament that evaded Descartes, Locke, and Kant. As I swept through more bubbles, I repeated a mantra, “It’s all relative; it’s all right; everything is in relation to everything else.” It is through an interface that we perceive the world, and we have faith that we perceive accurately. The world stimulates our bodies and then our thoughts; the external reveals itself to the internal. […] We cannot afford to limit ourselves to our own interface. We must transcend our own limitations. Falling asleep, I repeated the mantra, “All right, it is all right…”

The next morning, the tone of my theology transformed from the dismissive scorn of a faithless Kyrēnaíc to the confident assurance of a pious Epicurean, an “Atom-Prophet” observant of the material divinity within. While I was still unconvinced by popular expressions of faith, still suspicious of religious institutions, still scornful of magical thinking, dismissive of superstitious beliefs, and derisive of supernatural myths, I became convinced of a universal spirituality, a primal faith that conforms to physics, driven by chemical ecstasy, ritualized across innumerable cultures, each featuring the same symptoms of the psychedelic experience.

The impression of that event shines in my mind like a holy relic, a splinter from the true cross of ecstasy. I returned from the psychedelic realm with a gift of bliss and sacred testimony, having communed with the kaleidoscopic source of experience, liberated from vain, intellectual inflexibilities. Before that event, I reduced the religious experience to a mere neurological disturbance; but as an Epicurean, I elevate that experience to a neurological blessing. Far from being an empty construct the requires dismissal, the “divine nature” is palpable. The meanings of mythic metaphors become evident as the conditioned realm of assumptions and prejudices dissolves into void. The psychedelic sacrament cleansed my mind of toxic opinions and purged me of rage. I was kissed by blessed psilocybin, who left me with a lasting euphoria.

The founder of the Epicurean tradition defends this material form of ὁσιότητος (hosiótētos) “piety” while criticizing the misunderstandings of the masses and their misleading myths. He maintains that the “true” gods are “not the same sort the masses consider” who “continuously pray for cruel” punishments “against one another” (Epíkouros, Epicurea 388). It is not the godless Kyrēnaíc, “but the one who adheres to the masses’ doctrines about the deities” who is truly “impious” (Epistle to Menoikeus 123). “For pious is the person who preserves the […] consummate blessedness of God” versus those who ask “in prayer” for “things unworthy of the supposed indestructibility and complete blessedness” of the divine (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 40.9-13 and Col. 10.2-5). “Such a person we honour for his piety, whereas the other we despise as manifestly depraved” (Ibid., Col 41.1-5). Any other, incoherent “definition of piety […] gives a strange impression, partly of jealousy, and partly of hostility” (Ibid., Col. 65.7-11).

In essence, Epicurean theology affirms that “God” is neither employed as an administrator in cosmic government, nor appointed as a magistrate to establish metaphysical jurisprudence. “The gods” neither probe the universe for life like interstellar anthropologists, nor prey upon shapely bachelorettes, nor worry themselves with weather forecasts. True piety observes the divinity found in nature, in forming bonds, cultivating friendship, and securing tranquility through peaceful relations. “Piety appears to include not harming” (Ibid., Col 47.5-8). Indeed, “piety and justice appear to be almost the same thing” (Ibid., Col. 78.10-12). In the Epicurean tradition, piety is an acknowledgement that god does not direct the human drama. A true deity neither fulfills vain wishes like a genie, nor practices divination like a sorcerer, neither seeking power from a fear of death, nor seeking fickle approval to gain favor. They are neither omnipotent nor omniscient, neither causative nor administrative, but only exhilarative, inter-generational sources of inspiration from which the rituals of religion have been formed.

PART II: PARTY ANIMALS

And with regard to festivals and sacrifices and all such things generally, it must entirely be acknowledged that he acted in accordance with what he believed and taught and that he faithfully employed oaths and tokens of good faith and he kept them. (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 51.3-11)

While the Sage of the Garden is distinguished for his critical commentary against hypocritical beliefs and mythic deceit, he nevertheless contributes volumes of reflections on spiritual wisdom and religious practice, faithfully exhorting a friend to “consider the deity an incorruptible and blessed figure” (Laértios 10.123). Philódēmos records Epíkouros as having “loyally observed all forms of worship” since he “enjoined upon his friends to observe them, not only on account of the laws, but for physical reasons as well. For in On Lifecourses he says that to pray is natural…” (On Piety, Col. 26.5-14). Philódēmos later affirms:

He shared in all the festivals […] joining in celebrating the festival of the Choes and the […] Mysteries and the other festivals at a meagre dinner, and that it was necessary for him to celebrate this feast of the twentieth for distinguished revelers, while those in the house decorated it most piously, and after making invitations to host a feast for all of them. (Col. 28.18–Col. 29.10)

The public festivals that Philódēmos names include both “the festival of the Choes” or “the Pouring”, the second day of the three-day-long, flower-and-wine holiday of Anthestḗria, celebrated on the twelfth day of the eponymously-named month of Anthestēriōn (from ἄνθος or ánthos meaning “flower”), as well as τά Μυστήρια (tá Mystḗria) or “the Mysteries” — it is unclear whether Philódēmos means μυστήρια τ’άττικα (mystḗria t’áttika Col. 28.27-28) “the Attic” (perhaps Eleusían) Mysteries versus μυστήρια τ’άστικα (mystḗria t’asti “the Urban Mysteries” or “City Dionýsia” held during the month of Elaphēboliōn (mid-March-to-April), known for its theatrical competitions, reminiscent of contemporary fringe festivals. By extension, Epíkouros may also have observed the adjacent Dionysian festival of Λήναια (Lḗnaia) from ληνός (lēnós meaning “wine-press”) in honor of Dionýsios Lēnaíos (“of the wine-press”), celebrated in Epíkouros’ birth-month of Gamēliṓn, from γαμηλίᾰ (gamēlía) meaning “marriage” (mid-January-to-February). The Lesser Mysteries may also have been patronized by Epíkouros and his friends, which also transpire during the month of Anthestēriōn. These holidays share many of the same wedding, drinking, parading, and feasting features as Anthestḗria.

A number of contemporary scholars have attempted to reconstruct a portrait of the central rituals that defined these holidays including a wedding procession, a symbolic pageant, a symbolic marriage, performances, drinking games, dancing, an animal sacrifice, and the filling feast that followed. Among them, Henri Jeanmarie orchestrates the following scene:

[T]he procession was led by a flute player, followed by basket bearers in white dresses, with flowers in the baskets. Others carried the perfumed altar, then there followed the maritime cart containing the God. Next there came a flute player and participants carrying flower wreaths raised high, so that they formed a kind of arc or superstructure. Under this walked the sacrificial bull, decorated with white ribbons. The procession also included masked men dressed up as women, fertility demons and satyrs. […] Upon arrival at the sanctuary the procession met with the Basilinna or queen, and her fourteen priestesses who received Dionysos in the wagon. | Those participants who performed the secret rituals in the sanctuary dedicated to Dionysos in the Marshes, comprised a group of fourteen priestesses called gerarai (“the Venerable Ones”), the holy herald, and the Basilinna, who was the wife of the Archōn Basileus, the priest of Dionysos, who during his year of service was responsible for many of the older religious ceremonies […] during the ritual […] the animal sacrifice was also performed […] When the women’s rituals in the Marshes were finished, Dionysos then married the Basilinna, who, as already stated, was the wife of the Archōn Basileus. He presided over the festival, and played the role of the God in the hieros gamos […] After having fetched the bride, the colorful procession walked through the city […] Meanwhile women and men stood outside the doors and on the terraces of their houses, carrying lighted torches in their hands and watching the procession as it passed by. (Håland 406-409)

In a letter to his friend and co-founder Polýainos, Epíkouros insists that “Anthestḗria too must be celebrated”, beginning with [DAY 1] Πιθοίγια (Pithoígia) the “Casket-Opening” during which “libations were offered from the newly-opened jars to the god of wine” and “all the household, including servants or slaves [joined] in the festivity of the occasion” — so long as that person was “over three years of age…” (Encyclopædia Britannica 103). Pithoígia resembles in many ways the Celtic tradition of Samhain, as well as its Christian analogue, All Hallow’s Eve save that Pithoígia is set amidst the floral scenery of Anthestēriṓn (mid-February-to-March), just in time for the wine to have reached its intended perfection as the flowers of next year’s harvest begin to bloom. Participants, within fragrant “rooms […] adorned with spring flowers” would, expectantly, open their tall πίθοι (píthoi, “jars of wine”) anticipating the prize within — symbolically, the jars represent the “grave-jars” of the deceased: fumes from the the previous season’s vintage escape like the vapors of the departed, liberated from their dark tombs. The souls of the dead are mythologized to have escaped the underworld to torment the living. “To protect themselves from the spirits of the dead,” as was the Attic tradition, Athenians were seen “chewing ‘ramnon’, leaves of Hawthorn, or white thorn, and were anointing themselves and their doors with tar” (Psilopoulos, Goddess Mystery Cults and the Miracle… 268).

As noted by Philódēmos (On Piety), the following day of Anthestḗria was designated [DAY 2] Χοαί (Khoaí) or Choës meaning “The Pouring” — naturally, the “pouring of the cups” would follow the “opening of the jars”. Fortunately, for our survey, “literary testimony [of] the second day, the Choes” “is explicit” (Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion 39). The day is “dedicated to a hieros gamos, a wedding of the Gods”. It famously featured a “drinking contest, to celebrate the arrival of the God” (Greek Festivals, Modern and Ancient 406). Despite “the drinking contest, the flower-wreathed cups”, the family feasts, “and the wedding of Dionysos, all joyful elements of the service of the wine-god, the Choes was a dies nefastus, an unlucky day” that demanded pious observance (Prolegomena 39). “On the part of the state this day was the occasion of a peculiarly solemn and secret ceremony in one of the temples of Bacchus, which for the rest of the year was closed.” (“Anthesteria”, Encyclopedia Brittanica). It is within this context that the Hegemon affirms “it is necessary to make mention of the gods” (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 30.28-29). Epíkouros provides us with the following appeal:

Let us sacrifice to the gods […] devoutly and fittingly on the proper days, and let us fittingly perform all the acts of worship in accordance with the laws, in no way disturbing ourselves with opinions in matter concerning the most excellent and august of beings. Moreover, | let us sacrifice justly, on the view that I was giving. For in this way it is possible for mortal nature, by Zeús, to live like Zeús, as it seems. (Epistle to Polýainos)

One example of a “sacrifice” to which he alludes might be found in the libations offered during the final day of Anthestḗria [DAY 3] Χύτροι (Khýtroi), an ancient predecessor of Día de los Muertos, the Day of the Dead. “The third day was explicitly dedicated to the spirits of the dead” (Greek Festivals, Modern and Ancient 413). Practitioners would offer the contents of their χύτραι (khýtrai) or “[cooking] pots” to Hermes Chthónios, a deity of the ancient underworld — here, Hermes fulfills the role of a classical psychopomp whose function it is to guide departed souls through the unfamiliar terrain of the afterlife. The pots of pious devotees would contain a porridge called πανσπερμία (panspermía or “all-seeds”), a warm “meal of mixed grains” (A Companion to Greek Religion 336). Such a sacrifice, characterized by personal abstinence and modest renunciation, would have exemplified Epikouros’ conception of αὐταρκείας (autarkeías) or autarky, meaning “self-sufficiency”, “self-reliance”, or “independence” (a notable ἀρετή or aretḗ, meaning “virtue” or instrumental good). Epicurean autarky is further characterized as a freedom from vain desires. The Master writes that “we praise the [virtue of] self-sufficiency not so that one might be in want of things that are cheap and plain, but so we can have confidence with them” knowing that the best things in life, like friendship, are free (Epicurea U135b).

Beyond his participation in the traditional civic festivals and cults of the Athenian polis, Epíkouros established a number of sect-specific holidays for friends and future students. As recorded in his Last Will, the observances he recommends include:

…an offering to the dead thereupon for both my father and my mother and my brothers, and for us the practice having been accustomed to celebrate our [Epíkouros and Metródōros’] birthday of each year on the Twentieth of Gamēliṓn, and so long as an assembly comes into being each of the month celebrate on the Twentieth to philosophize for us in order to respect both our memory and Metródōros’. And then celebrate the day of my brothers for Poseideṓn, and then celebrate that of Polyainos for Metageitniṓn exactly as we have been doing. (Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 10.18)

The Epicurean practice of ritualizing the anniversary of one’s birthday will strike us as a familiar celebration, yet in ancient Greece, “birthdays” were unrecognized outside of Persia. The historian Hēródotos records that “of all the days in the year, the one which they” the Persians “celebrate most is their birthday. It is customary to have the board furnished on that day with an ampler supply than common” (Customs of the Persians 1.133). It was even traditional to prepare pastries or cakes, for they ate “little solid food but abundance of dessert, which is set on table, a few dishes at a time” (Ibid.). Birthdays for Epicureans signify “the blessedness of having come into existence, for having become part of Nature’s vast and awesome realities” (A Companion to Horace 329). Epíkouros writes that “the wise will have gratitude for friends both present and absent alike through both word and through deed” (Laértios 10.118). In treating our friends’ birthdays as holidays (“holy days”), we observe a classical expression of piety.

“Homoousian” from an unpublished diary entry (June 2009).

While birthdays provided celebrants with an opportunity to toast the living, days of remembrance provided celebrants with an opportunity to venerate the dead. Epíkouros reserves a number of days in memoriam — he sets aside funds to provide resources for memorials for his father, his mother, and commemorations for his brothers on a day in Poseideṓn (mid-December-to-January), as well as his two, deceased best-friends, Polýainos on the 6th of Metageitniṓn (mid-August-to-September) and Metródōros on his own birthday of Gamēliōn 20th (mid-January-to-February). Polýainos’ day likely overlapped the festival of Metageítnia (for which the month was named), a a feast commemorating the legendary migration of Apollo Metageitniṓn, holy patron of migrants (an analogue for the modern personification of Lady Liberty). Apollo Metageitniṓn may have been a sympathetic icon for members of the Athenian Garden, many of whom were migrants from Lámpsakos or refugees to Athens.

Memorial cults in the ancient world were usually observed on the death-days of the deceased (not the days of their birth), so it is possible that Polýainos died on the 6th of Metageitniṓn (P.Herc. 176). At the same time, hero cults celebrate the birthdays of the figures of their veneration annually, and the Hegemon presents his school as such. Epíkouros neither establishes a funerary cult to support the ghosts (in which he did not believe) of his fallen friends, nor a mortuary cult to ritualize their internment. Instead, he prescribes a hero cult for himself and his friends in the hope that future students might learn from their lives and benefit by emulating their examples. In addition to the obligatory feast that crowns each festival, days of remembrance provide devotees with opportunities to clean gravesites and decorate votives.

In addition to participating in civic festivals and private rites, Epíkouros formally establishes the celebration of Eikas (or “The Twentieth”) the so-called “Philosopher’s Sabbath”, the unifying Epicurean holiday, a symposium, open to friends, associates, and acquaintances, set on the 20th day of each month. Several ancient inscriptions, carved in stone preserve the name of an older cult known as οἱ Εἰκαδεῖς (oì Eìkadeîs), those bound by the mythic hero Εἰκαδεύς (Eìkadeús), worshipped as a manifestation of Apollo Parnessiós (a form of Apollo who resides on Mt. Parnassós, surrounded by muses and strumming a lyre). The Eìkadeîs, too, worshipped their patron on the 20th day of each month; indeed, a deity cult would observe its patron god monthly, whereas a hero cult would celebrate their heroes annually: a “monthly cult was reserved for divinities” (The Cambridge Encyclopedia to Epicureanism 24). Thus, in establishing a monthly practice for his tradition, Epíkouros was “moving as close to the gods as was humanly possible” (Diskin Clay, Paradosis and Survival: Three Chapters in the History of Epicurean Philosophy 97). Indeed, “the festival for which the Epicureans were best known [was] established on the Apollonian day”. “The date, the twentieth of the month, was an interesting choice by Epicurus. For that was a sacred day to the celebrants of Apollo at Delphi and it was also the day on which initiation rites were held at the Temple of Demeter in Eleusis” (Hibler, Happiness Through Tranquility: The School of Epicurus 18). In organizing monthly gatherings, Epíkouros was explicitly providing initiates with a non-supernatural alternative to the predominant cults that ritualized transcendence and resurrection. “In derision, the enemies of the Master named his cult Eikadistai which is from the Greek word for the twentieth” (Ibid. 18).

Epíkouros and his καθηγεμώνες (kathēgemṓnes) “co-guides” or “co-founders” established a school that moonlit as a naturalistic hero cult with religious undertones. They provided an alternative to the dominant superstitions that circulated among the masses and founded a tradition that welcomed the unwelcome. Ancient Epicureans expressed their piety by hosting feasts, participating in festivals, attending pageants, patronizing theatrical sanctuaries, venerating the living (i.e. anthropolatry), memorializing the dead, committing to a study of nature, exercising peaceful relations, honoring friendships, and meditating upon the visualizations of divinities, divinities like Ζεύς (Zeús), whose name is derived from a prehistoric word for the archetypal god of the day sky, Dyēus. (As an interesting historical sidenote, Zeus was frequently epitomized by the epithet Ζεύς Πατήρ or Zeús Patér, from which we inherit “Jupiter”, a continuation of the proto-Indo-European phrase “Dyēus Phtḗr” meaning “Sky Father”.)

PART III: BY ZEUS!

Epíkouros published a number of treatises on theology, including Περὶ Ὁσιότητος (Perì Hosiótētos or “On Piety”) and Περὶ Θεῶν (Perí Theôn or “On Gods”). In his texts, the Gargettian encourages worship of the gods while maintaining the validity of atomic physics and highlighting the emptiness of the supernatural. Elsewhere in his texts, the Sage of the Garden conducts a survey of religious history, provides an evaluation of the efficacy of rites and rituals, and he reflects upon the nature of the profound mental impressions that have inspired thousands of years of pious devotion. While these masterpieces have been lost, his ideas have been preserved by Philódēmos’ similarly-named works “On Piety” and “On Gods”, in addition to Metródōros’ Περὶ Μεταβολής (Perì Metabolês or “On Change”), and a work by Demḗtrios of Lakōnía entitled Περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ Μορφῆς (Perì toû Theoû Morphēs or “On the Form of a God”), within which the form and physics of the divine depictions are further deconstructed.

These texts preserve a variety of theological attitudes, characterized by flexibility and fluidity, compatibility and coherence. Casually, the authors shift between polytheism, henotheism, kathenotheism, qualified monotheism, monolatry, and thealogy. They observe infinite deities, patronizing some, revering others, preferring these, ignoring those, favoring the feminine, venerating the masculine, and honoring the conceptual unity that the multiplicity of gods compliment. Each of these theological positions exhibit coherence between the variations in our internal understandings of blessedness as they have been “manifest” (as Demḗtrios of Lakoniá suggests) to the mind’s eye. The deities are expressions for the divine nature, paragons of the divine nature, and participants in the divine nature. At times, their names are invoked reverently, as when Philódēmos offers a “drink in honor of Zeus the Savior(On Death 3.32) while at other times, their literary forms are employed as purely poetic devices, as when Philódēmos summons “Aphrodite” and “Andromeda”, or when Diogénēs of Oìnóanda patronizes “father Zeus” (153) and swears “in the name of the twelve” (128). Hermarkhos records the Hegemon as having exercised this same practice: “Concerning metaphor, he made use in human fashion of the connection with the (divine) entity” (Against Empedoklḗs). The Epicurean sages demonstrate themselves to be skillful rhetoricians who shift their tone appropriately, casually, creatively, technically, and frankly. As Epíkouros writes, “Only the wise will rightly hold dialogue about […] poetry” (Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 10.120).

When he isn’t dropping the names of gods as idioms (e.g. NH ΔIA, Nḗ Dία or “By Zeus!”) and expletives (e.g. ΠΑΙΑΝ ΑΝΑΞ, Paián Ánax meaning “Lord Paian!” compared with our swear “Jesus Christ!”), Epíkouros is describing a collective group of θεῶν (theṓn) “of [the] deities” in the genitive plural (Epistle to Menoikeus 124, 133, 134; Vatican Saying 65). Elsewhere we find the word “deities” as θεοὺς (theoùs) in the accusative plural (Ep. Men. 123, 139), θεοῖς (theoîs) in the dative plural (Ep. Men. 123), and θεοὶ (theoì) in the vocative plural (Ep. Men. 123). Epíkouros employs the singular word “deity” as θεὸς (theòs) in the nominative (135, U338), θεόν (theón 121, 123, 134) in the accusative, and θεῷ (theôi 134) in the dative, both with and without a definitive article (“the” deity versus simply “deity”). Three times in the Epistle to Menoikeus, Epíkouros employs the masculine pronoun “him” when referring to “the deity” in the accusative (αὐτὸν or aútòn), dative (αὐτῷ or autōî), and genitive declensions (αὐτοῦ or autoú 123). Concurrently, throughout his abridgment on meteoric phenomena, Epíkouros employs feminine expressions for “the divine nature”, found in the nominative (θεία φύσις or ḗ theía phýsis, Ep. Pyth. 97, 117) and accusative forms (τὴν θείαν φύσιν or tḗn theían phýsin 113).

Jesus Christ! I find myself refreshed by the flexible means with which Epíkouros expresses divinity. I am equally encouraged by the possibility of an inclusive, intelligible approach to spirituality, independent of incoherent myths and tyrannical clerics. Such a congenital expression of piety compliments my continued observation that religious establishments and mythic narratives have been artificially fabricated. The larger story of human history reflects a tale of animals who developed histories, cultivated civilizations, and generated religious icons over vast periods of time, all due to the simple swerve of tiny, cosmic threads.

“Poesis” from an unpublished diary (June 2009)

According to Cicero, Epíkouros “alone first founded the idea of the existence of the Gods on the impression which nature herself hath made on the minds of all men” (On the Nature of Gods 26). “For what nation, what people are there, who have not, without any learning, a natural idea, or prenotion, of a Deity?” According to the Gargettian, pre-historic humans first conceived of divinities as sublime psychological icons encountered during dreams and meditations (On Nature 12). The Pyrrhonian skeptic Sextus Empiricus preserves Epíkouros’ historical thesis: “The origin of the thought that god exists came from appearances in dreams” as well as godlike examples manifest among “the phenomena of the world” (Adversus Mathematicos 9.45-46). Far from being prophetic symbols θεόπεμπτος (theópemptos) “sent by the gods” (Diogénēs of Oìnóanda, fr. 9, col. 6), the delightful visions are, most immediately, mental representations apprehended from a “constant stream of” materially-bondable “images” (Laértios 10.139). Ancient humans’ internal encounters with these untroubled forms created deep impressions in their minds. The devotees developed conventions to celebrate the symbols of their insights. Traditions were cultivated and pious practice flourished, as did dramatic myths and misunderstandings. Eventually, “self-important theologians” and deluded priests diluted beliefs about the divine and perverted piety with a fog of fear (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 86A 1-2). God, himself, was assigned disturbing duties and became enlisted in the service of religious autocrats.

Contrary to the chilling myths championed by “self-important theologians”, the true nature of the divine knows no need to direct the production of the human drama. Epíkouros recognizes that “it is foolish to ask of the gods that which we can supply for ourselves” (Vatican Saying 65). The true benefits of worship are enjoyed by worshippers, not by the fantastic objects of our obeisance. Humans conceive of gods and goddesses as being kind, confident, and self-reliant; in practicing these virtues, we cultivate our own happiness: “Anyone who has these things […] can rival the gods for happiness” (Vatican Saying 33). Philódēmos exhorts us to “imitate their blessedness insofar as mortals can” and “endeavor most of all to make themselves harmless to everyone as far as is within their power; and second to make themselves so noble” (On Piety Col. 71.16-19, 23-29). Therefore, a correct understanding of theology and religious practice is integral to cleansing oneself of the turmoil that is symptomatic of magical thinking. Millennia later, the American diplomat Benjamin Franklin recycles this ancient aphorism in his publication Poor Richard’s Almanack, suggesting that “God helps them that helps themselves.”

PART IV: ALL PARTICLES GO TO HEAVEN

To rationally explore concepts like divinity and prayer, Epíkouros defines a standard of knowledge that is grounded in atomic interactions — “the criterion of truth [includes] the sensations and preconceptions and that of feeling” (Laértios 10.31). The Gargettian defines the divine nature (“the gods” or “God”) as being presented by the mental προλήψις (prolēpsis) “impression” of μακαριότητα (makariótēta) “blessedness”, also described as τελείαν εδαιμονίαν (teleían eùdaimonían) “perfect happiness”. The gods of Epíkouros are primarily θεωρητούς (theōrētoús 10.62, 135) “observed” or “contemplated” as φαντασίαν τ διανοί (phantasían tḗi dianoíai) “visualizations” or “appearances [in] the mind” (10.50). Epíkouros affirms that the gods μὲν εἰσιν (mèn eísin 123) “truly exist” yet are only “seen” or “reached” through an act of λόγῳ (lógoi 10.62, 135) “contemplation”, “consideration”, “reasoning”, “reckoning”, or “logical accounting” (10.62, 135). He observes that the mental φαντάσματα (phantásmata) or “appearances” of the gods arise κ τς συνεχος πιρρύσεως τν μοίων εδώλων (èk ts synekhoús èpirrū́seōs tn homoíōn eidṓlōn) “from a continuous stream of similar images” that leave impressions upon the mind. The divine impressions are generated from the coalescence of “similar images” through a process of ὑπέρβασις (hypérbasis) “sublimation”. The images the intellect apprehends have been ποτετελεσμένωι (ápotetelesménōi) “rendered” to human souls in human forms, inspiring, perpetually-healthy, perfectly-happy people.

Having reviewed the psychiatric evidence of memory against the criteria of knowledge (exemplified by the Epicurean canon), Epíkouros explains that the functional “coherence” or “resemblance” between internal φαντάσματα (phantásmata) “appearances” and external τος οσί (toís ousí) “reality” (or literally, “the beings”) requires an initial impulse to complete a sequence of successive impacts, ultimately yielding a perception in the mind, “since we could not have sought the investigation if we had not first perceived it” (Laértios 10.33). A sensible τύπος (týpos) “impression” initiates a perceptual relay through various pathways in the soul — the sense organs are stimulated by acoustic ῥεύμᾰτᾰ (rheúmata) or “currents”, olfactory ὄγκοι (ónkoi) or “hooklets”, and visual είδωλα (eídōla) or “images” “impinging [upon] us [as] a result of both the colorful realities and concerning a harmonious magnitude of like morphologies”. The μαχυμερέστερον (makhymerésteron) “marching army of particles” (Dēmḗtrios of Lakonía, On the Form of a God 21) enter “the face or the mind” […] yielding an appearance and an [affective] sympathy as a result of the observing” (10.49-50). The earliest people who experienced these visions assumed “the object of thought as a thing perceived in relation to a solid body […] understanding perception that can be grasped by corporeal sensation, which they also knew to be derived from a physical entity [i.e. nature].” (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 15.8-18). Thus, “the gods” were born, and forms of worship developed to venerate their appearance.

Mental phantasms can be instigated passively through the indiscriminate mechanism of sensation, either externally, through the trigger of touch, or internally, “in respect of slumbers” when the mind is least encumbered by daily disturbances. They can also be summoned intentionally, through a directed act of contemplation, involving τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας (tinàs épibolàs tḗs dianoías) “some applications of the intellect” like μνήμην (mnḗmēn) “memory”. Dēmḗtrios of Lakōnía elaborates that the representations in the mind are caused both as those memories manifest” through focus, “and also” by the physical impulse of “pre-existing [bodies] that, upon [striking] the mind produce constructive cognition” (On the Form of a God 12). Because of this, mental representations of religious figures can be summoned through meditation as readily as when gazing upon a the body of a physical icon. In prayer, the supplicant manually retrieves the mental impressions of blessed impulses from memory. Depictions of divinity have been “apparent” (and readily-available) to most people for millennia — the fields of the Earth are filled with statues, votives, frescoes, mosaics, murals, metalwork, jewelry, pottery, and architecture that glorify the divine. Each civilization peppers its conception of divinity with fresh colors, shapes, and stories just as each culture ritualizes a contemplative path to care for the health of the soul. In doing so, each group creates a cultural matrix into which subsequent generations are enmeshed. Concurrently, each tradition preserves its own, procedural means by which to make the contents of their psykhḗ become dḗlos.

When a supplicant prays, meditates, concentrates, reflects, or generally applies directed focus toward the memory of the “form” of “blessedness”, they generate a mental image “as if” practitioners were literally ἐν εἰκόνι (én eìkóni) “in the presence” of a physical “representation”, “portrait”, or “icon”. As with the memory of “brightness”, “loudness”, “softness”, and “sweetness”, the mental “appearance” of a divine form arises κ τς συνεχος πιρρύσεως τν μοίων εδώλων (èk ts synekhoús èpirrū́seōs tn homoíōn eidṓlōn) “from a continuous stream of similar impulses” received from abroad. To further isolate the genesis of our conceptions, we can trace the atomic crumbs of cognition to their energetic source. In the case of divine entities, we discover that our representations have been conditioned through our experiences with human nature combined with the congenital preconception of blessedness. As with the preconception of δίκαιος (díkaios) “justice”, the mental prototype of a “god” functions as an organizing principle and can act as a standard against which real-world examples can be evaluated — an alleged divinity who punishes and terrorizes neither meets the definition of “blessed” nor of “just”, and cannot, by definition, be “a god”. So long as a personal conception of divinity coheres with the definition of “blessedness”, it can be considered to be a god. Thus, an endless collection of divinities can be perceived, in a variety of forms, supported by the infinity of particles.

The intelligible form of a god appears to us, as does each, conceptual formation in the mind, as τὸ ὄν (tò ón) “a being” or “an entity” (Philódēmos, On Piety 1892, 66a 11). According to Epíkouros, each “entity” can be conceived of as an individual ἑνότης (henótēs) “unity” or “union” composed of many other particles that coalesce together to form representational σύγκρισεις (sýnkriseis) “compounds” in the mind. As Metródōros writes, each νότητα διότροπον (henótēta idiótropon) “distinctive unity” also exists as a “compound made up of things that do not exist as numerically distinct” (On Change; in Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 4.13-15). Epíkouros clarifies, “unified entities” in the mind exhibit one of two constitutions — some “are perfected out of the same elements and others from similar elements” (On God; in Philódēmos, On Piety Col. 8.14-17) The φύσεις (phýseis) “natures” or “constitutions” of all of these “unified entities” are therein grouped according to the origin of their birth, either from a single source, or having coalesced from multiple sources  ἐξ ὑπερβάσεως τν μεταξύ (èx hyperbáseōs tôn metazù Col.12.8-9) “as a result of transposition” during traversal “between” the source and its representative conception in the mind. If the mental form of an entity is composed of particles that only originate from a single source, Epíkouros says that they are all αὐτή (autḗ) “the same” in constitution — “the same” form is one that reflects a numerically-singular entity in one’s environment. By contrast, Epíkouros says that the appearances composed of particles coming from multiple sources are only superficially ὁμοία (homoía) “similar” because they are only related insofar as their composition as an array of εἴδωλα (eídola). Besides their shared form as bundles of images, they have different origins that combined during conception.

To demonstrate this constitution, visualize a dog. The appearance of this dog is a mental representation. It was previously impressed upon your mind when dog-particles travelled from a dog through spacetime and impacted your eyes. The resulting dog-form is a bundle of distinct particles that correspond κατ’ ἀριθμόν (kat’ arithmón) “in number” to the measurable proportions of “that same”, furry creature in reality. Your representation is composed of particles whose φύσεις (phýseis) “origins” are all αὐτή (autḗ) “the same” — your internal perception of a “dog” is uncontaminated from the particles of other, distinct objects. The generative flow of images reflects the activity of the original body, and a dog is not confused for another form (e.g. when dog-forms coalesce with human-forms in our imagination, we picture werewolves).

Next, visualize a god (any god. Take your pick. Any such forms will do.) Like the dog-form, your god-form is a mental image. Like the dog-form, the god-form is also apprehended by the intellect. Like the dog-form, the god-form too was initially triggered by impulses “received from abroad”. However, unlike the mental aggregate that constitutes your impression of a “dog”, your impression of a “god” is a ὑπέρβασις (hypérbasis), a “superimposition” of at least two different bodies of εἴδωλα (eídola) that are only superficially ὁμοία (homoía) “similar” insofar as their material composition as a picture in the mind. The compound nature of these images enables their being φθαρτον “indestructible”. By comparison, after the death of a dog (and the end of that dog’s eídola), that dog’s form can only be retrieved from memory — we are left with the impressions that a mortal creature gave us of itself during its limited lifespan. The forms of the gods, however, are not at risk of dissolution because they do not have a single source that is subject to death — the sources of the god-forms are unending, undying, and limitless, the infinite soup of particles that is constantly interlacing before our very souls. In this regard, “the form of god” is neither a simple body (like a particle), nor a regular compound (like a dog), but is a sort of irregular compound. Neither compound is a simple body (i.e. a particle), and both are combinations of simple bodies, but unlike the mental form of “a dog”, the mental form of “a god” is not composed of particles that are κατ ριθμν (kat’ árithmòn) “numerically-identical” to their source, but rather, the form of “a god” is composed of particles that are καθ μοείδειαν [kath’ hòmoeídeian] “similar in consistency” such that they can become enlaced to imagine new forms — the image of a human mixes in the mind with the concept of perfect happiness, as well as other notions, like agelessness to form the idea of “God”. Epíkouros explains ος μν κατ ριθμν φεσττας (oús mèn kat’ árithmòn hyphesttas) “on one hand” the forms of the gods appear to be “subsisting by number”, as though each on is a “unified entity”; “but on the other hand” ος δ καθμοείδειαν (oús mèn kath’ hòmoeídeian) it is also the case that the gods are formed from multiple sources due to their substantial existence “as a consistency” or “similarity” of images that produce “a common appearance”, or “likeness” (Laértios 10.139).

In the case of the specific characteristics of the form of a god, our mind seems to universally apprehend any given representation of the divine nature ἀνθρωποειδῶς (anthrōpoeidṓs) “as-a-human-idol” or “anthropomorphically” (Ibid. 139). Granted, they are not “to be considered as bodies of any solidity […] but as images, perceived by similitude and transition” (Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 28). “We do not find the calculation” so writes Demḗtrios, “that any other shape” besides that “of the human” could qualify as a blessed and incorruptible being.” Indeed, the gods “are granted to be perfectly happy; and nobody can be happy without virtue, nor can virtue exist where reason is not; and reason can reside in none but the human form” (Ibid.). Philódēmos writes that “we have to infer from the appearances” of their characteristics. Indeed, the form of a god is “conceived as a living being” (On Gods III, Col. 10):

One must believe with Hermarchus that the gods draw in breath and exhale it, for without this, again, we cannot conceive them as such living beings as we have already called them, as neither can one conceive of fish without need in addition of water, nor birds [without additional need] of wings for their flight through the air; for such [living beings] are not better conceived [without their environment] .

Philódēmos further reflects on the dwelling-place of the gods:

[E]very nature has a different location suitable to it. To some it is water, to others air and earth. In one case for animals in another for plants and the like. But especially for the gods there has to (be a suitable location), due to the fact that, while all the others have their permanence for a certain time only, the gods have it for eternity. During this time they must not encounter even the slightest cause of nuisance… (On Gods III, Col. 8).

The Epicurean scholarch Apollódōros, the “Tyrant of the Garden” infers that that “the dwellings” of the infinite gods “have to be far away from the forces in our world”, not necessarily by distance, but impalpability (On Gods III, Col. 9). The ghostly forms of the gods transcend the perils of our perishable plasma through a perpetual replenishment of spectral particles, motes, most minor and minute, as the most minuscule molecules of the human mind.

Philódēmos acknowledges that the deities possess perception and pleasure. Their behavior is recognizably human-like, finding delight in thought and conversation:

we must claim that the gods use both voice and conversation to one another; for we will not conceive them as the more happy or the more indissoluble, [Hermarchus] says, by their neither speaking, nor conversing with each other, but resembling human beings that cannot speak; for since we really do employ voice, all of us who are not disabled persons, it is even the height of foolishness that the gods should either be disabled, or not resemble us in this point, since neither men nor gods can create utterances in any other way. And particularly since for good men, the sharing of discourse with men like them showers down on them indescribably pleasure. And by Zeus one must suppose the gods possess the Hellenic language or one not far from it, and that their voices in expressing rationalist are clearest(Philódēmos, On Gods III, Col. 13)

The innumerable forms of the deities seem to be enjoying the greatest-possible happiness, a perfect happiness, that which cannot be heightened by excess. They seem ceaselessly-satisfied, savoring friendship and pleasure, “for it is not possible for them to maintain their community as a species without any social intercourse” (Philódēmos, On Gods, fr. 87). Unburdened by the undue responsibilities of celestial governance, astral adjudication, and cosmic corrections, the holy inhabitants of the mind are wholly self-reliant. Perfectly prudent, they privilege the preservation of their own peace above other obligations. As living figures, they seemingly breathe; as social figures, they seemingly converse; as intelligent figures, they seemingly reflect; as blessed figures, they live without fear, paragons of imperishability and models of ethical excellence.

Demḗtrios notes that, “when we say in fact the God is human-shaped” we should remember that God is not actually human (On the Form of a God 15). Velleius explains in On the Nature of the Gods that god “is not body, but something like body; nor does it contain any blood, but something like blood” (28). Though, he adds,“these distinctions were more acutely devised and more artfully expressed by Epicurus than any common capacity can comprehend”. They are, nonetheless, “real”, “unified entities”, even as appearances in the mind.

In order that he might “realize” his own “fulfillment”, scrutinizing the forms of these “beings surpassing [περβαλλουσν or hyperballousōn] in power [δυνμει or dynámei] and excellence [σπουδαιότητι or spoudaiótēti]”, who equally “excel [περέχον or hyperékhon] in sovereignty [γεμονίαν or hegemonían]”, Philódēmos infers that:

that of all existing things, [the divine nature] is the best [ριστον or áriston] and most holy [σεμνότατον or semnótaton, “dignified” or “revered”], most worthy of emulation [ξιοζηλωτότατον or áxiozēlōtótaton, “enviable”], having dominion over all good things [πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν κυριευόντα or pántōn tōn agathṓn kurieúonta], unburdened by affairs [πραγμάτευτον or pragmáteuton], and exalted [ψηλόν or hypsēlon, “sublime” or “proud”] and great-minded [μεγαλόφρονα or megalóphrona, “noble” or “generous”] and great-spirited μεγαλόψυχον or megalópsykhon, “magnanimous”] and ritually pure [γιον or hágion, “sacred”] and purest [γιοτατον or àgiōtaton, “holiest”] and propitious [ῑ̔́λεων or hī́leōn, “blameless”]. Therefore they say that they alone strive after the greatest form of piety and that they hold […] the purest views as regards the ineffable [φραστον or áphraston, “inexpressible” or “marvelous”] pre-eminence [περοχήν or hyperokhēn, “superiority”] of the strength [σχύος or ìskhúos, “power”] and perfection [τελειότητος or teleiótētos, “completeness”] of the divine [toû theíou] […] [Epíkouros] advises not to think [God] bad-tempered (as he is thought), for example, by the poets. (On Piety, Col 45.2-30).

PART V: THE MYSTERIES

It might seem counter-intuitive for an atomist to have embraced categorical mysticism, but history is unequivocal, “in Epíkouros’ case” his capacity to entertain mystical practices “is shown by his eagerness for sharing in των Ἀθήνησιν μυστηρίων (tōn Athḗnēsin mystḗríōn) the mysteries at Athens” (Philódēmos, On Piety, Col. 20.6-11). Both friends and opponents attest to this point, including Timokrátēs, the former Epicurean and estranged brother of Mētródōros, who implicates the Hegemon of having engaged in μυστικὴν ἐκείνην (mystikēn hekeínēn) “mystical fraternizations” at night (Laértios 10.6). Epíkouros rejects any inerrant interpretations of the mythic fictions, but still, he committed to attendance. From the attestations provided by Philódēmos, Epíkouros recognized the practical psychological (or spiritual) benefits from the induction of a mystical experience. Indeed, the “mind-manifesting” features of psychedelia provide a bridge to support an image-based conception of “the deities” as described by the Gargettian, otherwise only privately manifest to the mind’s eye. Epíkouros establishes this coherence with his theory of knowledge. His observations laid a framework with which to explain the dynamics of religious ecstasy, divine madness, and psychedelic mysticism.

We inherit the word “mystery” (μυστήριον or mystḗrion) from the verb μύω (mýō) meaning “close” or “shut”, as in “shutting [one’s eyes]”. Therein, the μύστης (mýstēs) “initiate” or “mystic” is one who seeks to minimize external disruptions and maximize the conscious absorption of internal phenomena (parenthetically, we also inherit the words “myopia” and “myopic” from μύω or mýō). The rituals in which the mýstēs participates are called μυστήρια (mystḗria) the “Mysteries”, and the qualities of the private ceremonies and the ecstatic visions for which mystics anticipated are described as μυστικός (mystikós) “mystical”.

Though the language of mysticism is Greek, the family of practices and altered states to which it refers are universal. Ecstasy can be elicited via trance, auto-hypnosis, contemplation, prayer, meditation, sex, fasting, dancing, music, focused breathing, and through chemical induction by means of an entheogen (Pahnke 1962). The analytical contents of these exercises might be further illuminated by concepts like “the Perennial Philosophy” of Aldous Huxley, the “religious experience” of William James, the “collective unconscious” of Carl Jung, and the “universal myths” of Joseph Campbell — these seem to me, in particular, to be reasonable attempts by devoted thinkers to map the territory of the human mind.

“Psyche-Soma” from an unpublished diary (June 2009).

Religious institutions also offer helpful analogues against which we can compare and contrast both ancient mystería as well as modern psychedelia. Consider the variety of rituals and beliefs that contribute to visionary experiences, such as the Orthodox practices of “théōsis” and “apothéōsis”, or the Roman Catholic process of “deification” or “divinization”, as well as the corresponding practice of ἡσυχασμός (hēsykhasmós) “inward stillness” established by the the Desert Monastics from which apothéōsis it received. Hesychasm corresponds with the contemplatio “contemplation” of the early Christian Fathers of the Church — incidentally, the word contemplatio is a translation of θεωρία or theōría, the same word that Epíkouros employs to refer to the traditional means by which the deities manifest — of those Church Fathers, several of them dually identified as Platonists or Neo-Platonists. Like the Christians whom they inspired, the Neo-Platonists developed the practice of Theoria as a means of engaging divinity. Whereas Christians sought “the presence of God”, so Neo-Platonists sought union through ἕνωσις (hénōsis) “two from one” with the “Monad”, “the One”, or “the Absolute”. Incidentally, Neo-Platonism, itself, is a partial, Academic re-branding of Hindu Vedanta by the founder of Neo-Platonism, Ammṓnios Sakkás, a possible, Indian mystic named from the ancient Śākya clan (from which the Brahmin family of Siddhartha Guatama hailed, eight centuries earlier).

The Neo-Platonic ἕνωσις (hénōsis) provides a direct conceptual link between visionary Greek and Indian wisdom traditions. A similar parallel exists between the Greek θεοφάνεια (theopháneia) “appearance of a deity” and the Dharmic दर्शन (darśana) “sight of a divinity”. Other constructs that presents similar (though not identical) examples, including the Hindu notions of प्रज्ञा (prajñā) “insight” and विद्या (vidya) “knowledge”, the Buddhist term बोधि (boddhi) “enlightenment”, which corresponds with the Chinese word 見性 (kenshō), and the Japanese word 悟り (satori). It may be further helpful to compare the “divine madness” of Plato (Phaedrus 244-245; 265a–b) with the “enlightenment” constructs of the Indian subcontinent, including समाधि (samādhi), मोक्ष (mokṣa), and निर्वाण (nirvana). We also find some correspondence with the Sufi practice of مراقبة (Murāqabah) “observance”, as well as the γνῶσις (gnōsis) from various Gnostic sects. Many of these traditions that achieved mystical states through psycho-physical exercises also incorporated entheogens (from ἔνθεος or éntheos, “possessed by a god”) that trigger chemognosis (from χυμεία or khymeía, “art of mixing alloys” or “alchemy” that leads to divine γνῶσις or gnôsis, “[secret] knowledge”).

While the aforementioned practices and states of consciousness are not at all identical, nor even completely translatable, they help exemplify some of the ways in which traditions have been shared and re-formulated since pre-history. In addition to the earlier-mentioned link between “Jupiter” and the proto-Indo-European god “Dyēus Ph₂tḗr” meaning “Sky Father”, we see ancient examples with the Pyrrhonists, who adopted the wisdom of the ancient Indian अज्ञान (Ajñana) mendicants and re-branded it to the ancient world as “Skepticism”. In return मध्यमक (Madhyamaka) Buddhists’ borrowed the epistemological methods of the Pyrrhonists. The late Academics’ synthesized the philosophy of Plátōn with Hindu Vedanta and sold the entire program as “Neo-Platonism”. Centuries earlier, it seems that Greek materialists borrowed atomism from their वैशेषिक (Vaiśeṣika) counterparts in India. (The dimensions of these historical traditions have been explored more thoroughly elsewhere, and readers are encouraged to expand on these ideas and properly delve into each tradition on its own accord.)

Each of these traditions shares levels of correspondence with τά Μυστήρια ( Mystḗria) or “the Mysteries” that help reconstruct the particularities of those religious experiences that would been contemporaneous with Epíkouros (of which, there were many). The Eleusían mysteries were the most popular (of which Plátōn was fond), followed closely by the Dionysian mysteries (mentioned earlier) — and Orphic cults (of which Pythagóras was fond). The Orphic cult later inherited the Dionysian tradition, and heavily influence the context in which the Christian resurrection deity emerged. The Mysteries in which Epíkouros participated would have exposed him to psychedelic phenomena — even if, hypothetically, he never induced the mind-bending experience within himself, he would have heard the testimony of others, either from their own experiences, or popular lore. The visions that would have become activated under the influence of an entheogen would have corresponded with symbolic pageantry ritualizing the creation of life, the passage of the soul, the changing of seasons, the inevitability of death, the transition of the self, and the resurrection of the soul from the underworld through a mystery, shared only with the τελεστής (telestēs) meaning “initiator” or “priest” (Col. 32.11-12).

Anthestḗria and the Urban Mysteries are dedicated to Dionýsios (or Bákkhos, celebrated by the Romans during Bacchalania), so the Dionysian Mysteries may have been Epíkouros’ preferred mystery. As he relates to mysticism, Dionýsios is a transformational deity whose metamorphic powers ferment cheap grapes into rich wine and transmute simple produce into palliative potions — simultaneously, the soul of the initiate undergoes a procedural, psychiatric process of transformation that subjectively mirrors the seasonal procession of death and rebirth, animated through the subjective sense of having been psychologically reborn. The Mysteries celebrate this primordial nature that echos from the depths of the soul.

The Orphic tradition can be examined at length elsewhere, but in summary, the cult of Orphism ritualized the creation of humanity from the bodies of the recently-annihilated Titans and the soul of the recently-deceased Dionysos, son of Zeus. “In the later classical period, the Dionysus cult was adopted and adapted into the Orphic mysteries of death and rebirth, where Dionysus symbolized the immortal soul, transcending death” (Metzner). Later writers equated Orphism with the Pythagorean school. Both traditions influenced Plátōn, as they share the common belief in μετεμψύχωσις (metempsýkhōsis), “the-process-after-incarnation” or “reincarnation.” This theme of rebirth is central to the Mysteries. The Orphic cult also shares significant topical consistency with the resurrection deity of early Christianity both deities are sons of a supreme God, both deities are killed by an ancient evil force, both deities are resurrected in spirit. 

The Eleusían Mysteries were the most popular in ancient Athens, and may well have been the tradition in which Epíkouros may have ingested a holy sacrament. Like its counterparts, the Eleusían Mysteries developed from much earlier cults likely corresponding with Minoan and Mycenaean civilizations. The cult may originally have patronized Demeter, envisioned as a poppy goddess: “For the Greeks Demeter was still a poppy goddess, | Bearing sheaves and poppies in both hands”, thus, reinforcing a connection between psychoactive substances, ecstasy, and the formalization of religious rituals (Thekirtos VII 157). In Eleusis: Archetypal Image of Mother and Daughter, “Karl” Kerényi interprets the Eleusían Mysteries as having featured a sort of “epiphany”, “not as a vision for common eyes” but “visible only to the blind man in the hour of his death” (85). According to his personal translation of Plátō’s Phaídros, “the beatific vision” of “a goddess” transports an initiate “into a state of eternal beatitude” (95). As he writes, “divine apparitions” could “be induced by magical ceremonies” (114). According to Karl, a sacramental “pharmaceutical” was ingested to trigger “a real seeing, not as a subjective illusion”. He further speculates that this “pharmaceutical” involved an initiate needing to “drink the kykeon” to “attain a state of epopteia, of ‘having seen,’ by his own inner resources” (113).

The Elysian Mysteries were of two — the Lesser Mysteries took place during Anthestēriōn under the direction of the ἄρχων βασιλεύς (árchōn basileús) “lord sovereign” who would initiate “mystics” into the cult. The Greater Mysteries took place in Boedromin (mid-September-to-October). Michael Cosmopoulos orchestrates the following scene:

On the first day [agrymós], the fifteenth of Boedromion, the Archon Basileus summoned the people in the Poikile Stoa. […] On the second day [élasis], the sixteenth […] the mystai proceed to either Piraeus or Phaleron, where they purified themselves by washing a piglet in the water of the sea […] On the third day, the seventeenth of Boedromion, there may have been sacrifices int eh Eleusionion under the supervision of the Archon-Basileus […] The fourth day and last day of [public] festivities in Athens was called Epidauria or Asklepieia […] it may have celebrated the introduction of the cult of Asklepios in Athens. […] On the fifth day, the nineteenth of Boedromion, a grandiose procession (pompe] took the hiera from Athens back to Eleusis. The procession started from the Eleusinion and proceeded through the Panathenaic Way and the Agora to the Dipylon Gates and from there followed the Sacred Way back to Eleusis. The mystai and their sponsors were dressed in festive clothes, crowned with myrtle wreaths, and held branches of myrtle tied with strands of wool (the “bacchos”). […] at the head of the procession were the priests and the Priestesses Panageis carrying the Hiera is the kistai […]Next in turn were the mystai and their sponsors. At the end of the procession were placed the pack animals with the supplies needed fo rhte long trip. The procession followed the modern highway from Kerameikos to the Sacred Way, up to the sanctuary of Aphrodite, where it turned toward the hill and the lakes of the Rheitoi before reaching the sea by the bridge. From that point the Sacred Way followed the modern highway once more. | During the procession two events took place: the krokosis would occur after the mystai crossed the bridge and consisted of tying a krokos, a ribbon of saffron color, around the right hand and the left leg of each mystes. This wen ton until the sunset, and then the pompe continued by torchlight. […] The second event took place on the bridge of the river Kephissos, where the initiates were harassed and insulted. […] Once the procession reached the sanctuary of Eleusis, Iakhos was received ceremoniously at the court. For the rest of the night the initiates sang and danced in honor fo the Goddess. The dances traditionally took place around the Kallichoron well and were meant to cheer the grieving goddess. […] Ont he following day (the twentieth of Boedromion) several sacrifices too place […] during the day the initiates fasted […] The fast came to an end with the drinking of the kykeon, the special potion of the Eleusinian Mysteries.” (18-19)

The Hegemon demonstrates that one need not suspend disbelief in atomic principles to enjoy the pleasure of the ritualism of the Mysteries. From textual fragments, Epíkouros enjoyed fellowship, celebration, procession, and self-reflection during these mystical ceremonies. Simultaneously, he rejected any literal interpretations of the mythic pageant. He may have appreciated the acknowledgement of change and the inevitability of death, while disregarding the proposition of the immortality of the human soul. Nonetheless, he participated in the rituals, including drinking kyken, an allegedly god-manifesting sacrament.

“Teonanacatl” from an unpublished diary (June 2009).

PART VI: THE SACRAMENT

Was Epíkouros tripping? Did his floor start rippling some 30 minutes after ingestion? Did tiny bits of light in the dark trigger complex, kaleidoscopic, visual geometric patterns?

Since the 1950s, a number of notable anthropologists, ethnobotanists, ethnomycologists, and chemists, including Albert Hoffman, who first synthesized the contemporary entheogen known as lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) have specifically presented the Greek sacrament of kykeōn used in Eleusian ceremonies as the chemical instigator that made the mind visible. ΚΥΚEΩΝ (κυκεών or kyken) comes from the ancient Greek verb κυκάω (kūkáō) meaning “[it] stirs” or “[it] mixes”—it also carries the connotation of a mixture that “confuses” and “confounds”. Kyken was thus employed when referring to a “potion”, “tonic”, “elixir”, or “mixed beverage”. We find a number of mentions of this substance in ancient texts.

In the Homeric Hymn to Dēmḗtēr, written between the 8th-and-7th-centuries BCE, the queen Metáneira “offered her [Demeter] a cup, having filled it with honey-sweet wine” (206):

Then she ordered her [Metáneira] to mix some barley and water
with delicate pennyroyal [mint], and to give her that potion to drink.
So she made the kukeôn and offered it to the goddess, just as she had ordered. (208-210)

The queen’s potion is accepted “for the sake of the ὅσια” or hósia, the “sacred” or “holy” rite whereupon a sacrifant initiates a “relationship” with the aforementioned deity wherein a supplication of χάρις (kháris) “thanks” or “grace” might be exchanged (211).

In The Iliad, “fair-tressed” Hekamḗdē mixes “a potion”. As further described:

Therein the woman, like to the goddesses, mixed a potion for them with
Pramnian wine, and on this she grated cheese of goat’s milk with
a brazen grater, and sprinkled thereover white barley meal;
and she bade them drink, when she had made ready the potion.

ἐν τῷ ῥά σφι κύκησε γυνὴ ἐϊκυῖα θεῇσιν
οἴνῳ Πραμνείῳ, ἐπὶ δ᾽ αἴγειον κνῆ τυρὸν
κνήστι χαλκείῃ, ἐπὶ δ᾽ ἄλφιτα λευκὰ πάλυνε,
πινέμεναι δ᾽ ἐκέλευσεν, ἐπεί ῥ᾽ ὥπλισσε κυκει. (Iliás 11.638–641)

In The Odyssey, Hómeros describes “all the baneful wiles” of the goddess Kírkē, a vengeful sorceress who “will mix thee a potion, and cast drugs into the food…” (Odýsseia 10.289-290; Murray 1919). Before spiking the punch, she:

made for them [a potion] of cheese and barley-meal and yellow honey
with Pramnian wine;

σφιν τυρόν τε καὶ ἄλφιτα καὶ μέλι χλωρὸν
οἴνῳ Πραμνείῳ ἐκύκα· (Odýsseia 10.234-235)

The various kykenes were composed “of mixtures” that usually included barley, cheese, and wine, but could also include, as is twice described by Hómeros in the foundational myths of the Hellenic people, an unknown adulterant. While the alcohol present in wine is known to produce mild states of euphoria and shades of bliss, it is utterly dissimilar to the intense, mystical dissolution that entheogens produce leading to visions of divine beings.

One compound to have been responsible for the psychedelic affects of kyken was an active alkaloid from the ergot fungus Claviceps purpurea that produced visions, speechlessness, and euphoria (symptoms otherwise with religious ecstasy). At the Mas Castellar site in Girona, Spain, “Ergot sclerotia fragments were found inside a vase along with remains of beer and yeast, and within the dental calculus in a jaw of a 25-year- old man, providing evidence of their being chewed” (Juan-Stresserra 70). However, outside of sterile conditions, ingestion of the ergot fungus risks ergotism, a debilitating conditions caused by toxic molds. Raw ergot may have been unreliable in inducing desired visionary experience. Still, given the frequency of ingestion and the length of time over which this tradition was practiced, it is possible that, on occasion, proper chemical conditions could be facilitated to induce a euphoric visionary experience to orchestrate the myths of the Mysteries through the mycodegradation of barley or rye.

If ergot presents too much instability, opium is another candidate for a possible mystery sacrament: “It seems probable that the Great Mother Goddess who bore the names Rhea and Demeter, brought the poppy with her from her Cretan cult to Eleusis and it is almost certain that in the Cretan cult sphere opium was prepared from poppies” (Kerenyi 25). As Taylor-Perry describes, “there is ample iconographic and literary evidence linking poppy capsules not only with Demeter but also specifically with Eleusis” (121). A the same time, the sedating effects of opiates may not necessarily reflect the vivid experiences of psychedelia. Nonetheless, both induce a sense of euphoria and are have been demonstrated to stimulate hallucinations.

Ethnomycologists Valentine Pavlovna and Robert Gordon Wasson began fieldwork in 1956 on Mesoamerican rituals involving psilocybin mushrooms (Psilocybe mexicana) or teonanácatl, from the Nahuatl teotl (“god”) + nanácatl (“fungus”) — note the linguistic correspondence between teonanácatl and βρῶμα θεόν (brṓma theón), an ancient Greek reference to mushrooms, being the “food of the gods”. Wasson’s research later fueled speculations that these chemicals were ingested during rituals to commemorate the Eleusían Mysteries. They co-authored a The Road to Eleusis: Unveiling the Secret of the Mysteries with Albert Hofmann, a Swiss chemist — widely known for being the first person to synthesize and ingest lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) as well as isolating and synthesizing the principal component in psychedelic mushrooms, psilocybin and psilocin — who further reinforces these claims. In Food for Centaurs (1960) and The Greek Myths (1964), Robert Graves suggests that Amanita muscaria, the “fly agaric” mushroom was an added ingredient to the sacramental beverage. Terence McKenna makes a similar claim in Food of the Gods (1992). “The original cult of Dionysus almost certainly had its origins in the mushroom cults of ancient Crete” (Russell 103). “Among the Greeks mushrooms were apparently called” ‘food of the gods’ (broma theon), while the neoplatonic philosophy porphyry (ca. 233-309 CE) called them ‘nurslings of the gods’ (theotrophos)” (Russell 82).

Coherent with Epikouros’ approach of providing multiple explanations for unusual phenomena, I would like to share the following proposition: whether ergot, or poppy, or mushrooms, or wine infused with psychoactive mints, the insistence of Epíkouros on participating in the Mysteries is a reflection of his recognizing the pleasurable feeling associated with ingesting psychedelics. One of the most identifiable symptoms of the psychedelic experience are complex visual forms, kaleidoscopic shapes, intricate geometric lattices, patterned space, multi-textured surfaces, shifting contours, oscillating color, and complex entities — these visual images are deeply impressive, and considering the results of Timothy Leary’s Marsh Chapel Experiment, the anticipation one possesses of communing with a deity, when under the influence of psychedelics, seems to reliably produce the internal perception that a deity or divine state is present.

We should keep in mind that Epíkouros recommends restraint and sobriety as the rule and cautions against indulgence. Epíkouros dismisses “Bacchant revelers” as those who “rave like lunatics”, indicating a balanced approach with respect to intoxicants, composed yet compelled, rational yet enthusiastic (Philodemus, On Piety, Col. 19.9-12). Given the sacrament that would have been featured in the Mysteries was psychoactive (at least with wine), it would be historically anomalous for an Athenian who participated in the Mysteries to have been unfamiliar with altered states. It would have been even stranger for a person to have found no correspondence between the sacrament, the cult, and the mystical experience. The ubiquity with which entheogens have been documented through the ancient world leads me to believe, quite simply, that ancient Epicureans liked tripping as much as the rest of us.

PART VII: FUN GUYS

You won’t see me at Sunday School, but I do share in most of the “traditional festivals and sacrifices” of our society. I practice remembrance on Memorial Day and exercise gratitude on Thanksgiving. I enjoy the festivities of St. Patrick’s Day and liberation on Cinco de Mayo. I find Día de los Muertos to be beautiful, and compelling, and I will never stop dressing-up for Halloween. I extend kindness and generosity in the name of patrons like Lady Liberty and Father Christmas. I support local Spring fringe festivals and the artists who host them, who explore the breadth of the human soul on-stage, and induce a communal catharsis. We further celebrate Thespis, ancient patron of theatre. You might even find me in a dark room, listening to Pink Floyd, having ingested fungus to induce the same state as did Greek mystics thousands of years ago.

None of these activities require our suspension of disbelief in mythical characters or genuine enthrallment with political propaganda. It’s a blessing to spend time with friends, regardless of the reason. I enjoy decorating a Christmas tree without indulging the nativity myth. I find the darkness and the candles of midnight mass to be beautiful, even if the rest of the program disgusts me. Springtime feels naturally rejuvenating, and I mean to celebrate it, but I feel no need to complicate that pleasure by mythologizing seasonal necromancy. Prayer, meditation, contemplation, and confession each provide practical utility in the form of psychological healing. That measurable healing that reliably occurs supersedes any superpowers supposed to be available. The true “secret” of “the secret of the Mysteries” is that mysticism itself is a totally-natural phenomena. It is repeatable, measurable, and, by-definition, literally manifest to the mind’s eye. The Mysteries represent a “fantastic mental application”, analogous to a waking dream, that can be used like a tool to induce the same visionary experiences that have been documented in nearly every wisdom tradition on the planet, both esoteric and institutional.

Like Epíkouros, I reject taking the myths of my own culture literally … otherwise, one could be lead to think that God is measurably weak, having failed to stop the escalation of authoritarian regimes … and every mass act of violence in my adult life. Like Epíkouros, I express particular frustration with any practices that target the finances of needy people, so astrology, in particular, is fraudulently detestable (nonetheless, the same, useless form that failed to provide meaningful answers 2,330 years ago). Whether it is 305 BCE or 2025 CE, history records the masses of human beings searching for answers in all of the wrong places. A robust, philosophical system is required to ground an individual against the confusion and turmoil of cultural insanity, and provide them with psychological tools to confront the universal fear of death. Even when immersed in a society defined by science and technology, the masses continue to revert to superstitious myths, even despite a dozen-or-so years of education.

For this reason, a material description of the religious experience is a requirement. Without a standard of knowledge, the difference between inspiration and delusion is relative. Without a standard based in nature, all propositions are merely temporary speculations. The symptoms of spirituality, used irresponsibly, can be exploited to reinforce false mythologies. When used properly, it unleashes the mind at large and allows one to interface with the full symphony of nature, overcoming the myths that are created by our misunderstandings.

Centuries of critics have been categorically wrong in charging against Epicureans that we deprive good and just men of the fine expectations which they have of the gods sincere and sonorous prayers” simply because we reject mythic expressions of religious faith that are incoherent, dangerous, emotionally-immature, and psychologically-irresponsible (On Piety Col. 49.19-25). We reject cosmic narcissists, holy puppeteers, ghostly voyeurs, and divine strategists. The existence of any of these mythic super-beings would imply that a supernatural force every day fails to prevent inexhaustible violence — or else, it means that our lives are so utterly meaningless that inexhaustible violence is insignificant on a theological scale — here lies the danger against which Epíkouros warned: the representation of “God” spread by many today is capricious, partisan, and despotic. In this regard, many popular conceptions of “God” do not meet the Epicurean qualification for a truly blessed being. When presented as a crusader, a chess master, a politician, or a monarch, “God” seems more like a monster, more like an ancient trickster of tragic poets than a divine icon of blessedness. Like those tragic poets, the authors who incite these conceptions combine multiple, unrelated preconceptions together to form paradoxical divinities who cause trouble and suffer pain — and they profit from it. The mythic texts of frauds are filled with examples of “gods” behaving badly. We do not hold these chimeras to be gods.

After my psychedelic experience, I am compelled to defend piety, especially against those who would pervert it into a political narrative or a pyramid scheme. “Spirituality” has been appropriated, and those who have appropriated it risk alienating many of us who wrestle with genuine turmoil, and have been disenchanted by myths: Belief in an ever-present spirit will not calm someone suffering from paranoia. Faith in an otherworld will not reassure someone suffering from suicidal ideation. In my state of psychedelic euphoria, the immediacy of life and death was manifest, and the importance of making the most of the only time I have became immanently clear. The significance of kindness and the value of friendship became central. The smallness of prejudice and the breadth of the universe was embodied. I became conspicuously aware of the uselessness of rage and the blessing of tranquility. That mystical experience triggered by a handful of mushrooms cleansed my mind and reaffirmed a commitment to pursue true happiness.

Doubt me if you will!

… but eat 4 grams of blue meanies, I promise … I promise, the obviousness of the relationship between entheogens and the prehistoric formation of religion will become immanently clear. (Use responsibly). Now, if I might make a final recommendation:

Turn onto philosophy, tune into nature, and drop out of myth.

Your Friend,
EIKADISTES
Keeper of Twentiers.com
Editor of the Hedonicon

“The Aquarium” from an unpublished diary (June 2009)

Works Cited

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Davis, Gregson. A Companion to Horace. Blackwell, 2010.

Chilton, C. W. Diogenes of Oenoanda: The Fragments. A Translation and Commentary. Published for the University of Hull by Oxford University Press, 1971.

Clay, Diskin. Paradosis and Survival: Three Chapters in the History of Epicurean Philosophy. University of Michigan Press, 2001.

Cicero, Marcus Tullius, et al. Cicero on the Nature of the Gods. 1872.

Cosmopoulos, Michael B. Bronze Age Eleusis and the Origins of the Eleusinian Mysteries. Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Dēmḗtrios of Lakonía. “On the Form of God.” Translated by N. H. Bartman, Twentiers, 5 Apr. 2025, twentiers.com/form-of-god/.

Diogénēs, and Martin Ferguson Smith. Supplement to Diogenes of Oinoanda the Epicurean Inscription. Bibliopolis, 2003.

Empiricus, Sextus. Against the Physicists. Against the Ethicists. Translated by Robert Gregg Bury, Heinemann : Harvard University Press, 1953.

Empiricus, Sextus. Outline of Pyrrhonism. Translated by Robert Gregg Bury, Harvard University Press, 1990,

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Epíkouros, et al. The Hedonicon: The Holy Book of Epicurus. Translated by N. H. Bartman et al., 1st ed., Leaping Pig Publishing, 2023.

Festugière, A. J. Epicurus and His Gods (Épicure et Ses Dieux). Translated by C.W. Chilton. Harvard University Press, 1970.

Fish, Jeffrey, and Kirk R. Sanders. Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition. Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Franklin, Benjamin. Poor Richard’s Almanack. 1731.

Graves, Robert. Food for Centaurs: Stories, Talks, Critical Studies, Poems. Doubleday, 1960.

Graves, Robert. The Greek Myths. Penguin Books, 1955.

Håland, Evy Johanne. Greek Festivals, Modern and Ancient: A Comparison of Female and Male Values. Volume 2. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017.

Harrison, Jane Ellen. Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion. 1908.

Herodotus. “Customs of the Persians.” Herodotus: 1.131-140, www.thelatinlibrary.com/historians/herod/herodotus3.html. Accessed 14 Sept. 2025.

Hibler, Richard W. Happiness Through Tranquility: The School of Epicurus. University Press of America, 1984.

Homer, and Murray, A. T. The Illiad. Harvard University Press, 1928.

Homer, and Murray, A. T. The Odyssey. Harvard University Press, 1919.

Homeric Hymn to Demeter, uh.edu/~cldue/texts/demeter.html. Accessed 13 Sept. 2025.

Huxley, Aldous. The Doors of Perception. Liese, Andreas. OUTSIDE THE BOX, 2025.

Karl Kerenyi. Dionysos: Archetypal image of Indestructible life, Part I. The Cretan core of Dionysos myth. Princeton University Press, 1976,

Kerényi, Karl. Eleusis: Archetypal Image of Mother and Daughter. Transl. from the German by Ralph Manheim. Pantheon Books Div. of Random House, 1967.

Leary, Timothy. The Psychedelic Experience. Citadel Press, 2024.

Lee, Earl. From Bodies of the Gods: Psychoactive Plants and the Cults of the Dead. Park Street Press, 2012.

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McKenna, Terence. Food of the Gods: The Search for the Original Tree of Knowledge: a Radical history of plants, Drugs, and Human Evolution. Bantam Books, 1992.

Metzner, Ralph. Green Psychology: Transforming Our Relationship to the Earth. Inner Traditions/Bear, 1999.

Miedaner, Thomas, and Hartwig Geiger. “Biology, genetics, and management of ergot (Claviceps spp.) in Rye, sorghum, and Pearl Millet.” Toxins, vol. 7, no. 3, 25 Feb. 2015, pp. 659–678, https://doi.org/10.3390/toxins7030659.

Ogden, Daniel. A Companion to Greek Religion. Wiley, 2010.

Pahnke, Walter N. Drugs and Mysticism: An Analysis of the Relationship between Psychedelic Drugs and the Mystical Consciousness. 1963. Harvard University, PhD dissertation.

Philodemus, and Dirk Obbink. Philodemus on Piety. Clarendon Press : Oxford University Press, 1996.

Plato. “Phaedrus.” Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing, 1997.

Psilopoulos, Dionysious. Goddess Mystery Cults and the Miracle of Minyan Prehistoric Greece. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2023.

Rinella, Michael A. Pharmakon: Plato, Drug Culture, and Identity in Ancient Athens. Bloomsbury Academic, 2010.

Ruck, Carl, et. al. Mushrooms, Myth and Mithras: The Drug Cult That Civilized Europe. City Lights Publishers, 2021.

Samorini, Giorgio, “The Oldest Archeological Data Evidencing the Relationship of Homo Sapiens with Psychoactive Plants: A Worldwide Overview”. Journal of Psychedelic Studies, vol. 3, issue 2, 2019.

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Happy Twentieth! On Philosophy as an Antidote to Disinformation

Happy Twentieth! We see the harms of willful ignorance everywhere these days. It’s easier for some philosophically-lazy souls to make truth a filthy thing than to embrace candor. Truths are seen as inconvenient, and honesty is not their main virtue. Truth requires a bit of discipline. Standards must be set, faculties must be used. To believe that our will is more mighty than nature is the thinking of sorcerers and wizards. This is an ancient problem. It’s not new. Against this backdrop, Epicurus taught that we should navigate these waters with the help of the canon of nature: an empirical, pragmatic standard of truth.

The problem of willful ignorance is exacerbated by the opportunism of those who stand to benefit from it. The events in Russia continue to shed light on the societal problems created by propaganda and misinformation. We have seen how public health has been greatly affected by misinformation in recent years. During the pandemic, we naturally wanted to educate people (particularly those we care about) in the hopes of maximizing their survival chances. The medicine for what I will call post-truth syndrome lies in the healing words of philosophy. The ancient Epicurean Guides wrote this into their social contract:

If you fight against all your sensations, you will have no standard to which to refer, and thus no means of judging even those judgments which you pronounce false. – Principal Doctrine 23

The video Aleksandr Dugin: ‘We have our special Russian truth’ caught my attention as I was educating myself about Russian propaganda, and trying to figure out the reasons why Russia continues to fall into extreme levels of authoritarianism. Putin’s Russia today is not too different from the Tsar’s regime from over 100 years ago, which inspired the most notorious revolution of the 20th Century. Yet today, Russia has little to show for all the sacrifices of its previous revolutions. I believe this has to do with the population’s propensity to fall for propaganda, and with the lack of free speech and the lack of a variety of narratives.

Dugin is one of Putin’s “philosophers”, a post-modern post-truth charlatan, and a great case study for identifying pseudo-philosophers. For the purposes of educating ourselves as Epicureans, Dugin is useful for understanding the importance of the canon–the Epicurean name for the pragmatic, empirical standard of truth which helps us to separate that which is clear and evident from that which is not, as instructed in Principal Doctrine 24. To us, this standard includes the faculties of pleasure-aversion, and the five senses.

Dugin is a post-modern extremist who argues that all “truths” are relative, and therefore the lies of Russian propaganda are dignified as “special Russian truths”. If this was a legitimate philosophical claim, it would be the case that water is NOT in fact made up of oxygen and hydrogen molecules (at least not in Russia, because they have “special” truths there). If all relative truths deserved the label “truth”, this would imply that there are no falsehoods, or that there is no possibility of falsehood and error, which is obviously a mistaken conclusion.

Those making this declaration that all truths are relative and, therefore, valid (even if mutually contradictory), have given up on any kind of standard of truth, and so have no filter by which to discern truth from untruth, and no way to protect themselves from error. We are not the first Epicureans to note the problems that come with the systemic denial of truth, when it presents itself as true philosophy. Diogenes of Oenoanda, in the 2nd Century CE, wrote this on his Wall Inscription:

Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. 

We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing is at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed, in no way would the upholders of the view under discussion have been able to say and this is just what they do maintain that at one time this is white and this black, while at another time neither this is white nor that black, if they had not had previous knowledge of the nature of both white and black.

Again, elsewhere in his Wall Inscription, Diogenes of Oenoanda says:

The Socratics say that pursuing natural science and busying oneself with investigation of celestial phenomena is superfluous and unprofitable, and they do not even deign to concern themselves with such matters. Others do not explicitly stigmatise natural science as unnecessary, being ashamed to acknowledge this, but use another means of discarding it. For, when they assert that things are inapprehensible, what else are they saying than that there is no need for us to pursue natural science? After all, who will choose to seek what he can never find?

Out method of multiple explanations does allow for a variety of interpretations of the evidence of nature, but it does not allow for infinite varieties of “truth”. To dignify all claims as “truths” (even if relative ones) and to engage in this extremist (ideologically-inspired, propaganda-inspired) form of relativism–with no anchor whatsoever in the study of nature–is no different from saying that there are no truths. The word truth has lost all value and utility. “Truths” in this scheme are, in actuality, the opposite of truth claims. It’s a cynical and radically-skeptical outlook in life. It’s also impractical, except for the power-hungry.

What does this do to science, which is predicated on building knowledge on top of previously established and clear knowledge? If there are no empirical or pragmatic standards to call something a “truth”, can anything at all be established scientifically, as a working theory with concrete pragmatic repercussions? Dugin’s cynicism, if sincere, is impractical. If insincere (which is the most likely case, in my opinion), then it’s cynical and nihilistic at its core, in addition to impractical.

Modern attempts to (sincerely or not) uphold this post-modern epistemology in the service of authoritarian ideology result, as we see, in the idiotic and fanatical defense of propaganda, and we are seeing how profoundly dangerous this is to democracy and to the rule of law. It also empowers evil and corrupt leaders (like Putin) in their inability to discern the limits of nature and other important Truths, so that their megalomania and their harmful demagoguery is never checked.

In contrast, Epicurus wants us to awaken our faculties. When we learn to use the canonical faculties that nature bestowed us with, we become emancipated from the need for propaganda, for priests, for demagogues, for logicians, for peddlers of false truths and pseudo-philosophies, and we learn to reason for ourselves, using our eyes, our ears, our touch, our pleasure faculty, and always diligently inferring about the non-evident based on that which is evident in order to avoid error.

If you’d like to learn more about the Epicurean canon, I would recommend you read the middle portion of Liber Qvartvs (the Fourth Book) of Lucretius’ De rerum natura.

Further Reading:
The Epicurean Canon in La Mettrie

Victor Frankl and the Search for Meaning

False Dichotomies

We recently read the essay There Are Two Kinds of Happy People, which compares Stoic and Epicurean philosophies. The essay makes some good points (we can borrow from each other yet remain grounded in our own traditions), but essays like this create false dichotomies: you almost never hear people saying “Buddhists meditate and Christians pray, and maybe they should try each other’s techniques“. In reality, Buddhists also pray and Christians sometimes also meditate. The essay assumes that Epicureans do not seek meaning, or create meaning, and it perhaps even assumes that meaning and pleasure are mutually contradictory, but there is no reason whatsoever to think this is the case.

I want to resist the tendency to antagonize Stoics because that produces a situation where it seems like Epicureanism frustrates the search for meaning or the ability for resilience, and that is not at all true. Epicurean philosophy provides various different pathways to meaning and resilience.

He who has a why to live for can bear almost any how. – Nietzsche

I finally recently finished reading Victor Frankl’s book Man’s Search for Meaning, which is highly recommended among proponents of philosophy as therapy for the soul. It argues that human beings require meaning in their lives, and that the best way to deal with boredom, existential ennui, depression, or suffering, is to make it meaningful. He particularly favors three ways of doing this: through work (doing something significant), through loving someone, or through courage during difficulties.

As a psychoanalyst, Frankl proposes “logotherapy” (a therapy of meaning). Our Friend Nathan says:

It’s a powerful story of someone who survives grotesque circumstances. His themes seem to me to be within the existentialist genre, primarily, defining value and meaning in a violent and unforgiving world. He largely demonstrates how having an appropriate mental disposition can help people manage seemingly-hopeless circumstances.

Meaning-making is contrasted with nihilism and a depressing sense of defeat in life. This is from page 72

Regarding our “provisional existence” as unreal was in itself an important factor in causing the prisoners to lose their hold on life: everything in a way became pointless. Some people forgot that often it is just such an exceptionally difficult external situation which gives man the opportunity to grow spiritually beyond himself. Instead of taking the camp’s difficulties as a test of their inner strength, they did not take their life seriously and despised it as something of no consequence. They preferred to close their eyes and to live in the past. Life for such people became meaningless.

This other quote, from the following page (73), reminds us of our past meleta concerning Epimetheus (who only looks to the past) and his brother Prometheus (who looks to the future). To Frankl, redemption is found in the Promethean approach.

It is a peculiarity of man that he can only live by looking to the future. And this is his salvation in the most difficult moments of his existence, although he sometimes has to force his mind to the task.

… which remind me of Epicurean Saying 48:

While you are on the road, try to make the later part better than the earlier part; and be equally happy when you reach the end.

Frankl mentions laughter as a technique, and as a sign that one is healed. In Tending the Epicurean Garden, I mentioned that the Epicureans follow the lineage of the laughing philosophers, and that laughter helps us to feel superior to the thing we are laughing at / about. Frankl says this differently: being able to laugh at yourself and your situation is a sign that you have already begun to overcome.

At one point in page 130, Frankl seems to accuse materialist reductionism of producing nihilism. In Epicurean philosophy we see that that is not necessarily the case. Other materialists may be nihilists, but in our tradition we have methods of drawing values and meaning from the study of nature. Here, he attacks:

the danger inherent in the teaching that man is nothing but the result of the biological, psychological, and sociological conditions, or the product of heredity and environment … This neurotic fatalism is fostered and strengthened by a psychotherapy which denies that man is free.

I applaud that Frankl is drawing a connection between nihilism and materialism, as this is one of the main knots by which people who are suffering entangle themselves into harmful patterns of powerless thinking. To me, this accentuates the need for rejecting scientism (=the “excessive belief in the power of scientific knowledge and techniques“), and for studying philosophy as a separate and equally important field of knowledge alongside science.

“Embracing the Exile”: a Case Study

In my college years when I confided in a University social worker and mentor (whom I greatly respected and loved) concerning my struggles to reconcile my Christian upbringing with my gay sexuality, he kindly lent me the book Embracing the Exile – Healing Journeys of Gay Christians. Back then, this book had a great impact on me, since the religious and psychological abuse of homophobia were strongly imprinted in my mind and affected me in very real ways.

Embracing the Exile is my most familiar case study for logotherapy. It argued that as Christians, gay people should embrace their exile, and carry their particular cross, with acceptance. It also taught that we should love our enemies anyway, regardless of what they do to us or say about us, and it even treats Queer identities as a form of “chosenness” where we are left to make sense of our way of being different. The book meant to soften the passions of a bruised soul, and it succeeded, but in the end, Christianity was definitely not for me. Many LGBT Christians feel that they are able to lovingly engage in LGBT activism, and at the same time confront other Christians with the evil that is done in the name of their religion from inside their churches. I’m torn between my solidarity and support for the struggle of LGBT people who choose to remain Christian, and the need to address the profound epistemological errors (and cruelties) of Christianity.

Embracing the Exile might be particularly helpful for people who might be struggling with suicide ideation, or who have recently come out and who come from a Christian background and are still attached to it, or for LGBT people who wish to return to Christianity. It provides a few “technologies of the soul” for that specific population.

But the book is not without its potential dangers, even if it came from a place of love and sincerity. Church leaders are experts at softening the blows of their emotional and psychological acts of aggression and dressing things that are deeply worthy of objection in the disguise of innocence and sanctity. Furthermore, if we decide that our policy towards our abusers is to “love them anyway”, does this not risk neglecting the possibility of moral development for our abusers? It can be a difficult balance to maintain, particularly when those who are most likely to harm LGBT youth in a church are also the same people who find themselves most entangled in their ideological errors and are least likely to think they might be wrong. The idea of gays embracing Christianity reminds me of a commentary about the colorful cow in Nietzsche’s Zarathustra that I came across recently:

In the town called the Pied Cow, the people are extremely content. They exemplify the concept of decadence. As Nietzsche says in Thus Spake Zarathustra to a citizen of the town of Pied Cow: “thy cow, affliction, milkedst thou—now drinketh thou the sweet milk of her udder.” His language shows that the cow’s milk is pleasurable and sweet, but it is an affliction that causes us to forget our real purpose. It is analogous to soma in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, an orgasmically pleasurable drug that causes the citizens of a fascist regime to forget their suffering and keep working.

One of the main dangers of the logotherapy approach is that, by choosing a false refuge or a false sense of meaning, we may end up harming ourselves and wasting opportunities for moral reform, freedom, creativity, and true happiness. Meaning must therefore be secondary to our impulse towards truth and towards the sober pleasure that Epicurus mentions in his Epistle to Menoeceus.

Some Epicurean Ideas

Life is not obligated to make sense to us. We are the ones who seek to make sense of it willfully, using our creativity and resources, our art of living (techne biou), and with the help of the study of nature. In this, Lucretius, Epicurus, and others are role models to us.

We are able to create meaning through the process of hedonic calculus: by choosing and rejecting in a manner consistent with our values, our pains or sufferings are redeemed and made valuable by the greater pleasures that they gain.

When I recently shared 3 Brain Systems That Control Your Behavior: Reptilian, Limbic, Neo Cortex, by Robert Sapolsky, our Friend Nathan commented that these three parts of the brain reminded him of “sensations, feelings, and preconceptions”–the three sets of faculties that exist within the Epicurean canon, which are our connection with nature.

The video makes the argument that the most primitive part of the brain (the reptilian part) involves the most basic instincts. This includes the senses, but also the sense of time, the circadian rhythm–a set of faculties that require that animals attune themselves to the day and night cycles, and require cold-blooded animals to regulate their body temperature by various means. Then, our ancestors evolved the mammalian brain, which involved complex fight-or-flight mechanisms, panic instincts, and other powers that Nathan associates with the canonical faculties involved in feelings. The final evolutionary stage is where animals evolved the cortex of the brain that facilitates complex thinking and language. Of all the highest animals (mostly the primates), the humans are the ones who have evolved the most complex “prolepsis” cortex. The parallels noted between the canonical faculties and the layers of brain cortex are interesting, and it had never occurred to me to think of it this way.

I am particularly interested in this third set of faculties in our discussion of meaning because the prolepsis faculty facilitates language, and it seems to me that our discussion of meaning is a discussion of language, and that the creation of meaning is therefore mainly a function of the prolepsis faculty. We are perhaps translating our experiences into something that our rational brains may apprehend, and doing so helps us to process our ideas and emotions.

Seen this way, the thirst for meaning becomes an impulse toward naming our own narratives, our lives, our selves, our relations, our life cycles, the projects that “give” our lives “meaning”, our technologies of the soul, etc. How else do we create meaning? Nietzsche suggested (and I agree) that we may do this through art, poetry, dance, ritual. The technique of relabeling (as we’ve discussed before) is another method for this.

In the search for meaning, it often seems like self-expression has been frustrated and seeks an outlet. The prolepsis of self-expression (Self-Ex-Pression) reminds me of a process of pressing-out parts of the self into some external form. The faculty of prolepsis allows us to clearly conceive an idea, which is necessary in the first place if we are to “press it out” of our psyche. Prolepsis helps us to conceive, which reminds us of seeds, of germination. Conceiving an idea carries creative potential.

Conclusion

Some people say Frankl’s Man’s Search of Meaning is a Stoic book, but it’s more nuanced than that. Yes, Man’s Search for Meaning has a strong Stoic influence. It teaches that the “only” thing that others can’t take away is how we respond to a situation, and focuses on the realm of possible therapies available to someone who is powerless to change their fate. But it also elsewhere criticizes key aspects of Stoicism. In page 56, we find:

The camp inmate was frightened of making decisions and of taking any sort of initiative whatsoever. This was the result of a strong feeling that fate was one’s master, and that one must not try to influence it in any way, but instead let it take its own course. In addition, there was a great apathy, which contributed in no small part to the feelings of the prisoner.

The book is a bit depressing, but this is not necessarily a bad thing, as suffering does have the power to make us better people. My recent anecdote on this has to do with a particular co-worker who for many months did not greet me, or smile at me, or acknowledge me at all at work. Some people (particularly people who have money or power) can afford to be quite stand-offish; others are simply introverted by nature. This co-worker was a cancer survivor and, upon getting a second diagnosis of cancer, he changed. Perhaps he realized that life is short and shifted his conception of the things that matter. He began to greet me with a smile. He became more personal. I think his suffering as a result of his health, and his sense of vulnerability, is what made him a better, gentler, more caring person.

This anecdote confirms, to me, the power of suffering to purify our character–even if we rebel against the idealization and sacralizing of suffering that we see, for instance, in Catholicism.

Frakl says “man is ultimately self determining”, meaning that we are subjects, not objects or machines. One of the main virtues of this book is that Frankl humanizes his patients. He at all times refuses to diminish or humiliate or mistreat his patients. His years of suffering during World War II make Frankl a wounded healer: he had been through hell, and could now help others in a similar situation. For this reason, many people who are experiencing great suffering and who are truly powerless in their situation would benefit from critically engaging the insights of this book.

Further Reading:

Man’s Search for Meaning

 

Happy Eikas: the Method of Multiple Explanations

Happy Twentieth to all! This month, news came out that a skeleton recovered at Herculaneum “reveals secrets of ancient Roman town obliterated by volcanic eruption“. This month, I also found the video 4 Ways To Practice Epicureanism.

The Cārvaka Darshana is a discussion by the Charvaka YouTube channel. The host identifies as Neo-Charvaka and claims that this lineage is as legitimately a part of Hinduism as any other philosophical school, and that if they go to the Indian government with the desire to get organized as a philosophical School, the state should acknowledge their existence as a sect. The Charvakas are a somewhat parallel tradition to Epicureanism which evolved in the context of India. Only fragments of their ancient scriptures survive, and only thanks to the reports of their enemies. Modern Charvaka discourse is greatly influenced by the new atheism, but distinct from it, as it is not an activist philosophy, but rather one of pleasure (kama).

The SNS essay On Immersive Storytelling contributes to the push to decouple myths, art, and ceremony from superstitious trappings and to channel them into ethically useful purposes. It cites Eikas, and also Lucretian passages as examples of how this can be done. Curiously, it seems like our second Scholarch Hermarchus may have initiated the tradition of telling the story of Epicurus as if it was a “legend”:

Epicurus’ life when compared to other men’s in respect of gentleness and self-sufficiency might be thought a mere legend. – Vatican Saying 36, attributed to Hermarchus

That storytelling was part of the education that took place in the Garden is demonstrated by the many anecdotes that Philodemus of Gadara told 200 years later about the lives of the founders. He must have spend many hours listening to these stories.

Multiple Explanations and Hedonic Calculus

For a number of things, it’s not enough to state one cause, but many, of which one would be true. – Lucretius, De rervm natvra, Liber Sextvs, 703-4

Our last Eikas zoom was facilitated by Alan and was titled “On the method of multiple explanations” (an ancestor to modern multi-valued logic). This method was used by Epicurus in his Epistle to Pythocles, where he explained astronomical phenomena.

The idea here is that, in a universe complex enough to have infinite particles and infinite space, it is possible that there are multiple explanations to phenomena and that, so long as these explanations do not contradict each other or the evidence of nature, they can all be true. For instance, weather systems are caused by pressure patterns in the atmosphere, but they’re also part of annual seasonal cycles, and are affected by patterns of rain condensation and by global temperatures. All these things are true and observable simultaneously. Here is how Diogenes of Oenoanda explains the method of multiple explanations in his Epicurean Wall Inscription:

Let us now discuss risings and settings and related matters after making this preliminary point: if one is investigating things that are not directly perceptible, and if one sees that several explanations are possible, it is reckless to make a dogmatic pronouncement concerning any single one; such a procedure is characteristic of a seer rather than a wise man. It is correct, however, to say that, while all explanations are possible, this one is more plausible (πιθανώτερον) than that. – Diogenes’ Wall

During our discussion of the method of multiple explanations, we agreed that this method was mainly a way of gathering and considering plausible hypotheses, without necessarily settling on only one of them as the only explanation. It would be interesting to consider the intersection between the preoccupations that led to the development of the method of multiple explanations and the post-modern rejection of any one single meta-narrative as inherently authoritarian.

One additional note on the method of multiple explanations: it allows for the existence of many fields of knowledge, each with their own rules, methods, interpretations, and ways of understanding nature.

I consider myself privileged in having wise Epicurean friends who contribute to help me gain depth in Epicurus’ teachings. One of those friends is Jason, who during our second dialogue on the Epicurean gods said this:

The Epicurean method of multiple explanations lands squarely on pleasure as the end and aim. It pleases me more to think that humanity is not alone in the universe. It pleases me more to say that the supernaturalists are hurting themselves in their confusion and the only creature worthy of adoration is that which is actually possible, material beings who have shucked off their vices and live like sages. A race of people whose choices and avoidances have led them to perpetual bliss.

This is because Pleasure is the Guide of Life in all our choices and avoidances, including our choice of what to do, what to say, and even what to think. Jason’s reading of the method of multiple explanations as requiring our choice, for which we must use the faculty of pleasure (and dwell on the most pleasant views), aligns with what we’ve discussed before in our meleta on PD 28 and has great potential benefits in the context of a belief system that is advantageous for our happiness. For me, Jason’s words also constituted the very definition of what Zen Buddhists call “satori”: instant enlightenment concerning a key philosophical concept. This is one of the great benefits of practicing “meleta with others of like mind” with our friends for a long time.

Basically, Jason was saying that if many explanations are equally plausible according to our method and based on how far empirical data can take us, then we must be content to make a choice concerning what theory is most plausible to us, which of the theories pleases us the most and adds the most to the removal of our fears and other hindrances to happiness, and this choice of a hypothesis is not without a component of FEELING. If there are several “worlds” we can imagine ourselves living in that are equally plausible, then let us choose the most pleasant one. Let us unhypocritically make the choice to assent to the truths that add the most to our happiness.

This, of course, does not mean that we suspend the importance of empirically based reasoning, as per our canon. Our views must also be based on the study of nature. But we have a limited time and attention span, and not all knowledge adds the same value to us, so we must choose. In a private message, I later told Jason what this brought up for me:

Our choice to follow scientific truth / study of nature, and our choice to follow pleasure, are not mutually contradictory … they’re mutually inclusive in true philosophy according to our Scholarchs. So your way of thinking about multiple plausible explanations, and our eventual choice of the most pleasant, deserves a deeper look.

They say ignorance is bliss. We disagree.

So the key take-away here is that there is blissful knowledge, or at least knowledge that is both correct and worth-choosing, and that the method of multiple explanations can be an efficient means to greater pleasure.

To say that multiple explanations for a phenomenon are all plausible, is perhaps also to say that, within the range of what is naturally possible, some explanations produce greater pleasure than others, or are more important for our happiness than others. So then, pleasure being the Guide of Life, we tend to take refuge in the most pleasant of the plausible explanations as a matter of choice. This is because the goal of our choices and rejections is the pleasures.

If we diverge from either pleasure or scientific truth, we are not practicing what our Scholarchs considered true philosophy. In this way, philosophy to us can be both true and advantageous for our happiness. The point at which the choices of truth and pleasure converge is where we must sculpt our hedonic regimen, our lifestyle, and our beliefs.

The Epicurean Canon in La Mettrie

The following is part of a book review of Histoire Naturelle de l’Ame by Julien Offray de La Mettrie.

In his Letter to Herodotus, Epicurus establishes the criteria of truth. This criteria are the faculties that nature gave us as a contact with reality: the anticipations (which form as we encounter and memorize sense objects), the five senses, and the pleasure-pain faculty.

It is essential that the first mental image associated with each word should be regarded, and that there should be no need of explanation, if we are really to have a standard to which to refer a problem of investigation or reflection or a mental inference. And besides we must keep all our investigations in accord with our sensations, and in particular with the immediate apprehensions whether of the mind or of any one of the instruments of judgment, and likewise in accord with the feelings existing in us, in order that we may have indications whereby we may judge both the problem of sense perception and the unseen. – Epicurus, in his Epistle to Herodotus

In this essay I will evaluate passages from Natural History of the Soul that discuss how the canon is to be used. We will once again see that his system and method are essentially Epicurean.

But, first of all, why is this subject important? In the first pages of the book, La Mettrie explains that not knowing the nature of the soul makes us submit to ignorance and faith, and that one can’t conceive the soul as abstraction, separate from the body. Body and soul were made at once together; to know the properties of the soul one must research those of the body, of which the soul is the animating principle. Since all properties that we observe suppose a subject they’re based on, idealists posit the soul exists by itself without the body, that it is unnatural or immaterial. In setting up a doctrine of unity of body and soul, La Mettrie answers to the idealists:

Yes, BUT why do you want me to imagine this subject to be of a nature absolutely distinct from the body?

The key premise of Natural History of the Soul is that the soul is physical, part of the body, and that it’s born with and dies with the body. Like Epicurus explains in his Epistle to Herodotus, the body is the passive component and the soul is the active component of the self; and furthermore, he says that there are no surer guides than the senses in our inquiry into the nature of the soul.

Reason: a Mechanism that Can Go Wrong

La Mettrie is, among other things, a defender of pleasure and highly skeptical of the value of reason. He also argues that happiness is not found in thoughts or in reason, but is born of the body.

Happiness depends on bodily causes, such as certain dispositions of the body, natural or acquired–that is, procured by the action of foreigner bodies over ours. – La Mettrie, in Histoire naturelle de l’ame, page 135-136

He argues that some people are by birth happier than others. He also argues that proud reason is a mechanism which can go wrong, and in paragraph 79 of his Système d’Epicure he speaks of how cold reason “disconcerts, freezes the imagination and makes pleasures flee“.

The Senses

It’s difficult to know to what extent La Mettrie based his Natural History of the Soul on Lucretius.

To speak the truth, the senses never fail us, except when we judge their reports with too much precipitation, for otherwise they are loyal ministers. The soul may surely count on being averted by them of pitfalls thrown its way. The senses are ever alert, and are always ready to correct each other’s errors. –  Histoire Naturelle de l’Ame, p. 69

Elsewhere he seems to concede that the senses aren’t fully reliable because perceptions can change. Sweet fruit becomes sour, even colors change with lighting. To all this, Epicurus would answer that even if we concede that the senses can err (and they do), still they are our best and only criteria that connect us with reality.

Towards the end of the book, we are raptured into a fascinating world of real-life Tarzans from European history when the author shares several stories that confirm that all ideas come from the senses. He narrates one story about a deaf man from Chartres who, upon hearing bells, started recovering his hearing. When he later started talking and was questioned by theologians, he didn’t understand the meaning of the concept of god or ideas related to the afterlife, etc. Another story had to do with a blind man who had to use touch to get an idea of things. Finally, he narrates the story of Amman, who taught the deaf to speak with touch and sight. He would have them touch their throat to feel the vibration of sound there, and read lips and use mirrors to practice using sight. (Interestingly, the It’s Okay to be Smart YouTube channel has a video on how blind people see with sound) At the closing of the book, the author says:

From all that has been said up to the present, it is easy to conclude with evidence that we don’t have a single innate idea, and that they’re all the products of the senses

He goes on to offer the formula:

No education, no ideas.
No senses, no ideas.
Less senses, less ideas.

Anticipations: a Constant Law

While La Mettrie doesn’t directly mention anticipations (the third canonic faculty), he does describe this faculty when he discusses speech and memory. I will make an attempt to offer a clear translation from the French, which is made difficult by the fact that the author uses long sentences.

The cause of memory is, in fact, mechanic–as memory itself is. It seems to depend on that which is nearby the bodily impressions of the brain, which trace ideas that follow it. The soul can not discover a trace, or an idea, without reminding the others which customarily went together. – La Mettrie, speaking of the “bodily impressions of the brain in p. 88-89 of “Natural history of the soul”

Since in order for a new movement (for instance, the beginning of a verse or a sound that hits the ears) to communicate on the field its impression to the part of the brain that is analogous to where one finds the first vestige of what one searches (that is, this other part of the brain (see note) where memory hides, or the trace of the following verses, and represents to the soul the follow-up to the first idea, or to the first words, it is necessary that new ideas be carried by a CONSTANT LAW to the same place to where the other ideas of the same nature as these were carried. – La Mettrie, speaking of the “constant law” by which memory functions in p. 89-90 of “Natural history of the soul”

(note: he uses the word moelle, which translates as “bone morrow”, but he must be referring to brian tissue or brain lobe of some sort)

Now, we know that much of La Mettrie’s writing was inspired on or based on Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura, and this passage in particular is related to the passage where Lucretius mentions neural pathways in the brain. Notice that La Mettrie also refers to ideas tracing a path inside the brain.

Notice also that this is remarkably scientific, considering when it was written. To La Mettrie, ideas are “bodily impressions” in the brain. Ideas are material: they are physical and are lodged in (or happen to) the brain. Today we know that ideas are, concretely, electric signals shared by neurons according to established connections in the nodes between them, which are formed as a result of habitual and instinctive behavior by the animal.

Furthermore–and this is another feature of the canon as it is understood by most modern Epicureans: in p. 93 La Mettrie argues that the fact that we remember or recognize ideas with or without the consent of the will is seen as proof that they are pre-rational. The anticipations are sub-conscious, and obey what La Mettrie calls an “internal cause”.

Some Conclusions

The author seems intimately familiar with many details of the Epicurean canon. It seems that much of what he wrote were commentaries on Lucretian ideas, and that he was unfamiliar with Epicurus as a direct source. His familiarity was with Lucretius, which was a popular document in the intellectual life of anti-religious intellectuals of his day.

He does not use the same words as Lucretius (or Epicurus) used. He is employing clear speech in his native language to name things that we know as anticipations, canon, dogmatism, etc. He used “système” for dogmatic systems of philosophy, and referred to anticipations functionally as they related to memory and speech.

La Mettrie regards reason and the canonic faculties similarly to how the orthodox Epicurean does. He says of reason that it’s a “mechanism which often fails”. He frequently uses the term “internal causes” here (as opposed to “external”), perhaps admitting some acknowledgement of the existence of the unconscious or subconscious mind. That he goes to such lengths to argue that these faculties are pre-rational is very interesting.​​

Next, we will be focusing on controversies against the creationists and theologians.

Further Reading:

A Concrete Self

La Mettrie: an Epicurean System

The following essay (first in a series) is a review of Système d’Épicure (published in 1750), subtitled Philosophical reflections on the origins of animals, by French materialist philosopher Julien Offray de La Mettrie. The book is unfortunately not available (as far as I know) in English.

Other blogs: The Canon in LM, Against Creationism, and Anti-Seneca.

Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709-1751) was a physician who treated venereal dis-eases. He seems to have seen himself as a philosophical functionary of Venus, perhaps (metaphorically) a priest or healer. We have to imagine that La Mettrie had to discuss with his patients very intimate details of their sexual lives and tendencies with frankness, and in a spirit of trust, and that this job would have required of him a willingness to not judge or shame his patients. From all this, and also from his body of literature, we may deduce his progressive sexual and social values–particularly progressive for his time.

In the essay A happiness fit for organic bodies: La Mettrie’s medical Epicureanism, Charles T. Wolfe reports that La Mettrie himself (in an anonymous work) referred to his philosophy as an Epicuro-Cartesian System, although in some of his writings he was critical of Descartes. His intellectual legacy involved the re-joining of the soul and the body by describing the soul as material and as part of the body, in this way materializing Cartesianism and healing the Platonic split between body and soul. Wolfe also claims that La Mettrie is an Epicuro-Spinozan, and says that he created a

new and perhaps unique form of Epicureanism in and for the Enlightenment: neither a mere hedonism nor a strict materialist speculation on the nature of living bodies, but a ‘medical Epicureanism’.

Wolfe also cites La Mettrie as saying “The physician is the only philosopher worthy of his country“, and explains that what he means is that the physician defines truth according to matter and nature, rather than as defined by religion or convention. La Mettrie also said: “The best philosophy is that of the physicians“.

La Mettrie, the physician, sees the body as a machine–a machine that produces pleasure (and pain). He firmly roots the search for happiness in the body and in matter. In Man, a Machine, he says: “Nature created us all to be happy“.

An Epicurean System

The Système consists on numbered paragraphs with philosophical contemplations on nature, and appears to have been written as a prose commentary on some of the ideas expressed by Lucretius in De Rerum Natura. La Mettrie seemed unfamiliar with Epicurus as a primary, direct source, but he knew of Lucretius and cited him often, as noted by André Comte-Sponville in the essay La Mettrie et le «Système d’Épicure».

In paragraph 49, he labels the latter part of the book “a project for life and death worthy of crowning an Epicurean system“. Considering that the author is elsewhere critical of philosophers who create systems, we have to evaluate this. Epicureanism is a coherent dogmatic philosophy whose ideas are all inter-connected, and here La Mettrie knows and begrudgingly acknowledges that he has birthed a system, and even confers a crown upon it. I say he did so bregudgingly, because he recognized that all these ideas flowed from his first principles, and were connected to each other in such a way, that it was impossible to deny that they made up a philosophical system, and one nearly identical to Epicurus’ own, so that he labeled it “an Epicurean system“.

In The Natural History of the Soul (review upcoming), La Mettrie severely criticizes the “systematizers” of philosophy, but in this book, we see him choosing the words “AN Epicurean system”–which implies that there are OTHER Epicurean systems, and many ways of being Epicurean–, and here we do not see his anti-système rhetoric.

So what does this critique of the systematizers consist of?

A Mass of Prejudices

He says the systematizers are full of bias and prejudice, which impedes the development of true wisdom because they have made up their mind prior to addressing the questions. In paragraph 64 of his Système, La Mettrie says his own “mass of prejudices” of education “disappeared early on in the divine brilliance of philosophy“–which further indicates that he observed how these prejudices were acquired through his society’s education system. We will revisit this when we discuss Anti-Seneca.

Elsewhere in his Natural History of the Soul, he makes frequent appeals to reason without bias or prejudice, saying that pre-judging is not the same as true wisdom. In our present book, he further links true judgement with seeing the relation between two or more ideas with an unbiased mind.

Systems and Presumption

So many philosophers have supported the opinion of Epicurus, that I dared to mix my voice with theirs; Like they did, what I am creating is nothing more than a system; Which shows us what an abyss we are immersed in when, wanting to break through the mists of time, we want to take presumptuous glances at what offers us no grip: because–admit creation (by God) or reject it–it is everywhere the same mystery, everywhere the same incomprehensibility. How did this Earth I live in form? … This is what the greatest geniuses will never do; they will battle in the philosophical field, as I have; they will sound the alarm to devotees, and will not teach us anything. – La Mettrie, Paragraph 41 of Système d’Epicure

We will address creationism at a later point. This is just one of several instances where the author connects systematization with the arrogance and presumption of philosophers. Later, in paragraph 44, he says:

It seems pleasant for (the philosopher) to live, pleasant to be the toy of himself, to play such a funny role, and to believe himself an important character.

This is, on its face, a legitimate critique of the philosopher. Perhaps we are the center of our own worlds in our own lives and experiences, but no individual or species is at the center of THE universe.

But this critique does deserve at least one reply: I disagree that the philosophers “will not teach us anything“. I mean, as opposed to whom? Do the theologians teach us SOMETHING? Aren’t theologians even more presumptuous when–unlike us materialists–we know that their hypotheses are not based on the study of nature?

Castles in the Air

In his Natural History of the Soul (and you will see that counter-references from his other works will often be useful when studying La Mettrie), in the instances where he is most critical of the systematizing philosophers, we see that he specifically is addressing the idealists–mentioning Malebranche, Leibniz and Descartes by name. He says these idealists built “castles in the air” (châteaux dans l’air). He elsewhere says that these “ambitious metaphysicians” have a “presumptuous imagination“.

Therefore, his critique against systems is specifically a critique of idealists, some of whom he mentions by name, and his accusation of building castles in the air relates to the problem of idealism and lack of empirical, material base in these systems. His reference to having created something “WORTHY OF crowning an Epicurean system” is therefore understood as following on this critique. He is saying that anything worthy of being called a system must first abandon idealism in favor of materialism.

And so, his anti-système rhetoric is a critique of the idealists in particular. When we discuss his argument that we get all our ideas from the senses at the end of this book, this critique will come into relief and focus, but for now it should be noted that the novel A Few Days in Athens–which was also produced by intellectuals from the Enlightenment generation–has parallel sayings where the author charges that the “pedantry of Aristotle” makes people confuse “prejudice for wisdom“. Both the accusation of presumption and the bias argument are made against the other philosophers.

An Epicurean Sceptic?

“The primary springs of all bodies, as well as of our own, are hidden from us and will probably always be.”

It is clear that La Mettrie follows the Epicurean tradition of philosophy, and even at times falls in the lineage of the laughing philosophers (if we consider his “advise to an old lady” who has lost her youth and sexual attraction). Towards the end of his Système, he says:

“… these “projects for life and death”: a voluptuous Epicurean in the course of life until my last breath, and a steady Stoic at the approach of death” … have left in my soul a feeling of voluptuousness which does not prevent me from laughing at the first.”

He is referring to all the paragraphs from the first part of the Système prior to the 49th, which is where he announces his Epicurean “system”. However, he claims, even insists that he is a sceptic and only begrudgingly admits that he is a dogmatist (a “systematizer”, to use his own term). In his Natural History of the Soul, he says “the true philosophy” doesn’t exist.

This raises questions concerning the extent to which it’s prudent to accept truths for which we have no evidence based on analogy with the available evidence, before we must adopt the label “sceptic” about this or that type of truth. To what extent are we being truly humble, and not imprudent or lacking in ability to infer truths, when we admit we do now know something that is considered a dark, unclear mystery? As the Epistle to Herodotus puts it:

We must by all means stick to our sensations, that is, simply to the present impressions whether of the mind or of any criterion whatever, and similarly to our actual feelings, in order that we may have the means of determining that which needs confirmation and that which is obscure.

One final note concerning how, in my view, La Mettrie’s epistemological approach is essentially Epicurean despite his hesitation to call himself a dogmatist: to him, knowledge that does not bring pleasure is rejected–and it is rejected BECAUSE it does not bring pleasure! In paragraph 26 he contrasts the pleasure of being in nature with trying to understand everything rationally, which is more an act of power over nature rather than blissful immersion in it:

Let us take things for what they seem to be. Let us look all around us: this circumspection is not devoid of pleasure and the sight is enchanting. Let us watch it admiringly, but without that useless itch to understand everything and without being tortured by curiosity, which is always superfluous when our senses do not share it with our minds.

On Religion and Politics

While others have related the Epicurean advise to remain apolitical and irreligious to the distinction between imagined community and natural communities, La Mettrie gives us this curious insight in paragraph 76:

Religion is only necessary for those who are incapable of feeling humanity. It is certain that it is useless to the intercourse of honest people. But only superior souls can feel this great truth. For whom then is the wonderful construction of politics made? For minds who would perhaps have found other checks insufficient, a species which unfortunately constitutes the greatest number.

In the next entry, we will see how La Mettrie treats the subject of the Epicurean canon.

Further Reading:

 Système d’Épicure (French Edition)

On “-Isms” and Pleasure Wisdom

On “-Isms” and Pleasure Wisdom

Epicureanismvs.Epicurean Philosophy

The Society of Friends of Epicurus has dedicated extensive dialogue to the suffix “ism” regarding its relevance to the Epicurean tradition. In the Epicurean spirit of  παρρησíα  (or “parrhēsíā) meaning frank speech” or “speaking candidly”, the ancient Greek language did NOT employ the “ism” when referring to the tradition of Epicurus (nor, for that matter, of any other ancient Greek philosophy). Thus, while the word can be employed for practical purposes, Epicureanism” does NOT quite compliment the nuance of “Epicurean Philosophy.

ISMs

The English suffix, “-ism” — according to BOTH common and academic usages — is employed to designate a distinctive “doctrine“, “theory“, “attitude“, “belief“, “practice“, “process“, “state“, “condition“, “religion“, “system“, or “philosophy“. According to this definition, it is NOT incorrect to add a simple “ism” at the end of the philosophy of Epicurus“; it should, appropriately and accurately, render the word “Epicureanism” (or even “Epicurism).

In more succinct terms, we can visualize “Epicureanismsimply as “Epicurean-philosophy“.

While this works for practical purposes, it may lead to several misconceptions:

  1. Bracketing the suffix “-ism” to a name often indicates devotional worship of an individual (consider the differences between the old, misleading usage of “Mohammedanism” versus the preferred, contemporary usage of “Islam). Epicureans do NOTworship Epicurus as a supernatural prophet, NOR as a manifestation of a transcendental ideal.
  2. Bracketing the suffix “-ism” can ALSO indicate contempt for an individual or system. Consider, for example, when “Marxism”, “Leninism”, “Stalinism”, and “Maoism” are used by critics and detractors of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and many others. Thus, the word “Epicureanism” can be employed by critics and detractors of Epicurean philosophy as an indictment of Epicurus.
  3. In the modern era, “-ism” is frequently used to identify political typologies. Terms like “Monarchism”, “Liberalism”, “Conservatism”, “Communism”and “Fascism” express ideological systems that — contrary to Epicurean philosophy — presuppose the existence of an ideal state or utopia, organized according to the dimensions of a perfect, timeless principle.
  4. The suffix “-ισμός” (or “-ismós“) was rarely employed in ancient Greek; few examples of “-ism” (or “-ismós“) exist prior to New Latin, and the linguistic conventions of the modern era. In giving preference to the term “Epicurean philosophy”, we acknowledge the importance of privileging ancient Greek historical sources to the reliance upon Latin translations.

ISMVS

Our tradition of adding “-ism” to the end of words — in which we recognize distinctive “ideologies” — begins in the post-Classical period, corresponding to the Renaissance. Coming from the Latin “re-” (meaning “again”) and “nasci” (meaning “to be born”), this “Rebirth” resurrected the innovations and observations of Antiquity. The revival allowed scholars to adapt translations through the Latin language, using the Romanalphabet, sheathing many ancient Greek observations. Scholars began to liberally apply the suffix –ISMVS during this period of New Latin.

(I’m going to call the tradition — in which modern English-speakers partake — the “Ismism“, or, in other words, “the systemic practice of adding ‘-ism‘ to idea-expressing words”, sometimes as a celebration, sometimes as a derogation, sometimes as a religion, and sometimes as a political system. Due to the profound influence of Latin, and the linguistic conventions of the modern era, we ALL — in one way or another — have become dedicated Ismists.)

From the perspective of the contemporary world, the suffix –ISMVS (or “-ismus“) was first borrowed from the Old Latin language of the Romans, and later appropriated by post-Classical peoples as New Latin and Contemporary Latin. We find an abundance of “-ism” and “-ismus” in both Romance and Germanic language families. As with the Latin ISMVS, our contemporary suffix “-ism” is used to indicate distinctive “doctrines“, “theories”, “attitudes”, “beliefs”, “practices“, “processes“, “states“, “conditions“, “religions“, “systems“, and “philosophies“.

Here, however, is where we note a difference that our Mediterranean friends have often recognized: while the Greek language — like (for example) Celtic and Indic languages — has evolved from a common Indo-European root, it did NOT adopt Latin conventions the same way that Romance and Germanic languages have. Ancient Greek philosophers — perhaps, especially Epicurus — would NOT have thought of a “philosophy” as an “-ism”.

ize | ίζω | ízō |

We receive the Latin –ISMVS or “-ismus” from the ancient Greek “-ισμός” (“-ismós“), which, itself, is a bracketing of two other ancient Greek words, those words being “-ίζω” (“ízō“) and “μός” (“mós“). We’ll start with the former word. The suffix “-ίζω” (“-ízō“) was added to nouns to form new verbs. Let’s look at (x3) examples:

  1. canonize | κανονίζω | kanonízō
    κανών or “kann literally referred to a “reed”, and carried the connotation of a “measuring rod” or “standard”.
    + “-ίζω (“-ízō or “-ize“) rendered “κανονίζω“, “kanonízō” or “canonize” meaning “to make standard“.
  2. Hellenize | ἑλληνίζω | Hellēnízō
    ἑλλην or llēn literally referred to that which is “Greek”.
    + “-ίζω (“-ízō or “-ize“) rendered “ἑλληνίζω“, “Hellēnízō“, or “Hellenize” meaning “to make Greek“.
  3. synchronize | συγχρονίζω | súnkhronosízō
    σύγχρονος
    or “súnkhronos literally referred to “synchronous
    + “-ίζω (“-ízō or “-ize“) rendered “συγχρονίζω“, “súnkhronosízō“, or “synchronize” meaning “to sync“.

The key point with “-ίζω” (“-ízō“) — and our Modern English suffix “-ize” — is that we can turn any concept into a verb, or, in more philosophically interesting terms, we can ACTIVATE it.

μός | mós

The second suffix from which the ancient Greek “-ισμός” (“-ismós“) was bracketed is “μός” (“mós“). Contrary to the convention of ACTIVATING a word that represents a concept, adding “μός” (“mós“) ABSTRACTS an action. We can demonstrate this convention through (x3) other examples that translate well into Modern English:

  1. cataclysm |κατακλυσμός | kataklusmós
    κατακλύζω (kataklúzō) – literally meant “to wash away”.
    + “μός” (“mós“) rendered “κατακλυσμός“, “kataklusmós” or “cataclysm“, meaning a “great flood“.
  2. sarcasm | σαρκασμός | sarkasmós
    σαρκάζω” or “sarkázō literally, and figuratively meant “tearing apart” or “to tear off the flesh”.
    + “μός” (“mós“) rendered “σαρκασμός“, “sarkasmós” or “sarcasm“, meaning “(figuratively) tearing apart“.
  3. syllogism | συλλογισμός | sullogismós
    συλλογίζομαι (sullogízomai) literally meant “to compute” or “to infer”.
    + “μός” (“mós“) rendered “συλλογισμός“, “sarkasmós”, or “syllogism“, meaning an “inference“.

The key point with “μός” (“mós“) is that the ancient Greeks could turn any verb into a word that expressed an abstract concept, or, in more philosophically interesting terms, it could systematize activity into an idea.

ism | ισμός | ismós

The re-bracketing of the suffix “μός” (“mós“) appended with “-ίζω” (“ízō“) presents us with “-ισμός” (or “-ismós“) or the suffix “-ism“, a convention which systematizes a verb that has been activated from a noun. Very few examples exist in ancient Greek. A suitable example for English mono-linguists can be demonstrated in the word “Sabbath”:

  1. σάββατον | sábbaton literally means “the Sabbath” (borrowed from the Hebrew שבת or “shabát”)
    + “ίζω” (“-ízō or “ize“) σαββατίζω | sabbatízō means “to make, observe, or keep the Sabbath
    + “ισμός” (“ismós“) σαββατισμός | sabbatismós means “the state of keeping the Sabbath

UNLIKE the ubiquitous –ISMVS of Latin, and the overused “-ism” of Modern English, the ancient Greekισμός (or “ismós“) is almost NEVERused. The ancient Greeks did NOT shared our zeal for Ismism. When faced with the need to express a NEW word with FRESH meaning, the ancient Greeks built words from either [1] the names of people and objects they directly knew or observed, and [2] active forces they felt or experienced, but NOT as [3] abstract systems.

So, why NOT “Epicureanism“?

The philosophy of Epicurus recognizes that we EXPERIENCE NATURE DIRECTLY and NOT indirectly as an abstract system. Epicurean philosophy and the instruments with which humanity can make informed and ethical decisions — the sensation of an atomic reality, theanticipation of natural patterns, and the feelings of pleasure and pain — neither depend upon allegiance to a single leader, nor initiation into a secret society, nor longing for a golden age.

Christ’s resurrection would NOT be known without the Gospels.
Muhammad’s revelations would NOT be known without the Qur’an.

Even without the historical personage of Epicurus, human beings would still have sensed an atomic reality, anticipated the patterns of nature, and felt pleasure and pain, still have made mutual agreements, and still have formed friendships.

Without Jesus of Nazareth, Christians would NOT know to recite the Lord’s Prayer.
Without Muhammad, Muslims would NOT know to perform Salah to Mecca five times a day.

NATURE, itself, is so much LARGER, more important, and more fundamental than any one personage or tradition. Even without Epicurean Philosophy, humans would still have developed scientific intellects to their own advantage.

Epicureanism” (or, also, “Epicurism) carries a connotation – albeit very slightly – that the philosophy of Epicurus is just another doctrinal institution that advertises immaterial truths from an untouchable dimension. It is not quite as authentic to recognize serious seekers of pleasure as “Epicureanists” who follow “Epicureanism” as opposed to “Epicureans” who study “Epicurean philosophy“. Our endeavor rests within our own bodies; NATURE, itself, is the greatest teacher.

All that being said …

for practical purposes, there most isn’t anything inherently incorrect about preferring the term “Epicureanism; the “-isminnocuously identifies a “philosophy“. In Modern English, this does correctly indicate the philosophy of Epicurus, apart from any oath to a mythic person or principle.

Nonetheless, the employment of “Epicurean philosophy” over “Epicureanism” serves to keep our anticipations FRESH, to indicate to others that our interactions are bigger than disembodied souls paddling ideas back and forth in a court of Mind. It acts as a reminder that the path to wisdom is NOT a map that has been given to us from an Eternal Place of Perfection, but that we each carry a well-calibrated compass within ourselves to know the world and guide us to happiness.

DON’T call [my belief system] an –ism!

While the preference toward the phrase “Epicurean philosophy” may better reflect its ancient Greek origin, it should NOT indicate that the suffix “-ism” should be reserved as a derogation for non-Epicurean ideas, nor exclusively employed as a polemic toward Idealism. Even Epicurean philosophy, itself, incorporates the “-isms” of atomism, hedonism, naturalism, and materialism; these are most certain NOT idealistic.

Even ancient Greek opponents to Epicurean philosophy did NOT employ the “-ism”. Members of Plato’s Academy were “Academics”; members of Aristotle’s Lyceum with “Peripatetics”; members of Zeno’s Stoa were “Stoics”. It was only later that scholars began to employ the terms “Platonism”, “Aristotelianism”, and “Stoicism”.

Furthermore, this same acknowledgment applies to religious traditions:

The earliest rendering of the religion we refer to as “Judaism” was  יהדות  or “Yahadút”, from the Hebrew word  יהודי  (or Yhudá”) meaning “the Jewish people” and the suffix  ־ות  (or “-ót) meaning “the tradition of”. The ismed word that we employ — Judaism — is found in Maccabees 2 in the Koine Greek language by Hellenistic Jews, written around 124 BCE (over a thousand years after the foundation of Hebrew monotheism), rendered as  ιουδαϊσμός  (or “Ioudaismós”).

The word “Zoroastrianism” is first attested from 1854 as an anglicization of the ancient Greek Ζωροάστρης (meaning Zōroástrēs” or “Zoroaster”) borrowed from the Avestan word     or “Zarathustra”. Ancient Iranians referred to their religion as   orMazdayasna” translating to “worship of Mazda” (also romanized as “Mazdaism”). The wor   orMazda” both identifies the name of the Iranian Creator deity, and also, translates to “wisdom”.

The isming of the religion of post-Classical Arabs has been noted for its inadequacy, and identified in the contemporary era as being largely offensive to the Islamic populations. Until the 20th century, the monotheistic religion of  ٱلْإِسْلَام‎  (or al-Islām”) was identified by Europeans as “Mohammedanism” (or “Muhammadanism), inappropriately implying that the prophet Muhammad was divine himself, in the same way that Christians think of Jesus of Nazareth as divine.

People from the Punjab region of India refer to their religious tradition as  ਸਿੱਖੀ  (or Sikhī) anglicized to the English-speaking world as “Sikhism”. The word comes from the Sanskrit root  शिक्षा  or “śikṣā” meaning “to learn” or “to study”. (This recognition of the religious practitioner as a “student” is also found in the “Confucian tradition).

The same is true of “Hinduism”, an anglicization of the Sanskrit  सनातन धर्म  or “Sanātana Dharma” meaning “Eternal Order“. In fact, the word “Hinduitself was used by non-Indians to refer to people living around the Indus river. Ancient Indo-Iranian populations would have referred to themselves as आर्य or “Arya” (from which we get the term “Aryan“).

Jainism” is first attested from 1858 as an anglicization of the Sanskrit adjectiveजैन Jaina” which comes from the Sanskrit name for the 6thcentury BCE tradition  जिन  (or “Jina”). The word “Jina” is related to the verb  जि  meaning “to conquer”, coming from  जय  (or jaya”) meaning “victory”. The word “Jain” indicates a spiritualconqueror”.

Our rendering of “Buddhism” is an anglicization of the original Pali बुद्ध धम्म  (or “Buddha Dhamma“) meaning approximatelyThe Awakened One’s Eternal Law. The first recorded use of “Buddhism was in 1801, after Europeans romanized the spelling of Indic vocabulary.

There is NO direct Chinese equivalent to the word “Confucianism” since it has never been organized as a formal institution. The word was coined in 1836 by Sir Francis Davis, a British sinologist, and second Governor of Hong Kong who reduced the vast collection of ancient Chinese practices into a title named after the philosopher Kǒng Fūzǐ ( or “Master Kong”). While no single Chinese word or logogram represents the collection of beliefs and practices that developed from the teachings of Master Kong (anglicized as “Confucius”), the word  儒  (or “”) roughly translates as a “Man receiving instruction from Heaven” (also, a “scholar”), and is used to describe a student of Master Kong’s body of works.

The Taoists of ancient China identified the universal principle as or “Dào”, meaning “road”, “path” or “Way”. In China, the religious tradition is written 道教 or “Dàojiào” pronounced /’daʊ.ʨaʊ/ (or, for English mono-linguists, roughly transliterated asdow-chyow”). It was anglicized asTaoism” in 1838.

Shintoism”— the anglicized name for the native religion of Japanprovides an interesting example of an ismized tradition. The word “Shinto” is of Chinese origin, constructed from the Kanji logograms for the words  神 Shén”, (meaning “God”) and    Dào” (meaning “Way”) rendering  神道  or “Shéndào. However, Shinto populations do not employ this phrase as often as they do the Japanese  かむながらのみち  or “kan’nagara no michi”, (written in the Hirgana writing system) loosely translated as way of the divine transmitted from time immemorial”. Consequently, the word “Shintoism is the anglicization of two syllables from Japanese Kanji, inherited from ancient China’s Hanji logograms.

Christianity has been the dominant tradition of the post-Classical, and modern worlds; thus, it has avoided being reductively ismed (since the people who accused false traditions of being mere isms tended to be Christian, themselves). The word “Christianism” is occasionally used to express contempt for Christian fundamentalism (much like “Islamism” is used to indicate contempt for Islamic fundamentalism.)

Even early Christians did NOT refer to their tradition using the same vocabulary as do modern Christians. Like Taoists, they used the metaphor of της οδου (or “tês hodoû”) meaning “The Way“. A non-Christian, community in Antioch first coined the term  Χριστιανός  (or christianós“) to described the followers of The Way. Within 70 years, the early Church Father Ignatius of Antioch employed the term of  Χριστιανισμός  (or “Christianismós“) to refer to the Christianity.

Pleasure Wisdom

Regardless of a preference to “
Epicurean philosophy” versus “Epicureanism”, the insight of Epicurus’ philosophy demystifies nature and deflates the superstition of common religion. Epicurus anticipated the sciences of particle physics, optics, meteorology, neurology, and psychiatry. His logic was NOT one of theoretical axioms, but of a demonstrable hedonic calculus. Epicurus knew Virtue as a guide post to happiness, but NOT as happiness, itself.

Here, you will do well to tarry; here our highest good is pleasure.

Cheers, friends!

Further Reading:
Hiram’s “On Ismshttp://societyofepicurus.com/on-isms/

 

Works Cited

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Beekes, Robert, Etymological Dictionary of Greek, Leiden, Netherlands, Brill, 2010.

Buck, Carl Darling, A Dictionary of Selected Synonyms in the Principal Indo-European Languages, University of Chicago, 1949, reprinted 1988.

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Fowler, H.W., A Dictionary of Modern English Usage, Oxford University Press, 1926.

Grose, Francis, A Classical Dictionary of the Vulgar Tongue, London, 1785; 2nd ed., London, 1788; 3rd ed., London, 1796; expanded by others as Lexicon Balatronicum. A Dictionary of Buckish Slang, University Wit, and Pickpocket Eloquence, London, 1811.

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Johnson, Samuel, A Dictionary of the English Language, London, 1755.

Klein, Dr. Ernest, A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co., 1971.

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Liddell, Henry George, and Robert Scott, eds., Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford University Press, 1883.

McSparran, Frances, chief editor, The Middle English Compendium, University of Michigan, 2006.

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Book Review: Ontology and Ethics of Motion

Intro: On the Subject of Definitions

Ontology of Motion vs. Epistle to Herodotus

The Tao of Lucretius

Gravity Versus Freedom

On Relativity

Lucretius’ Venus

On Motion

Dialogues on Matter in Motion – Introduction

Dialogues on Matter in Motion – Part II

 

The Problem of Ataraxia in Nail

An Anarcho-Socialist Lucretius?

Epicurean Environmentalism

Conclusion: Ethics of Motion