Category Archives: Justice

Five contemplations on the gods: A path to community and friendship (part 2)

Continued from:
FIRST CONTEMPLATION: THE GODS

SECOND CONTEMPLATION: UTOPIA

Quote: Wall inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda, fragment 56[1]

So we shall not achieve wisdom universally, since not all are capable of it. But if we assume it to be possible, then truly the life of the gods will pass to men. For everything will be full of justice and mutual love, and there will come to be no need of fortifications or laws and all the things which we contrive on account of one another. As for the necessities derived from agriculture, since we shall have no slaves at that time for indeed we ourselves shall plough and dig and tend the plants and divert rivers and watch over the crops…, and such activities, in accordance with what is needful, will interrupt the continuity of the shared study of philosophy; for the farming operations will provide what our nature wants.

Commentary: Human Society

This passage is from the wall inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda, a 2nd century CE Epicurean philanthropist and philosopher from Anatolia (today called Turkey). It imagines a utopian society where humankind as a whole achieves Epicurean wisdom. Before we continue, keep in mind that this is yet another thought experiment, not a political project. While what we see here resembles a kind of libertarian socialist utopia, in reality Epicureans were very much in favor of institutions like the state with its laws, police, regulations, etc. This utopian vision of a society with “no need of fortifications or laws” could only exist if everyone became wise, but Diogenes of Oinoanda starts by specifying that “we shall not achieve wisdom universally”. So why imagine such a society at all? What is the point of this thought experiment?

Yet again, we see the reference to divinity when he says that such a utopian society would be the reflection on earth of the society of the gods that live outside of our world. This is what would happen if humanity imitated the peaceful dispositions of the gods. We would seek to achieve wisdom and happiness instead of constantly engaging in conflict and war for such vain desires such as greed, wealth, lust, fame and all the other vices. Instead we would be “full of justice and mutual love”. Since we lack the invulnerability of the gods, we would work together to achieve universal wellbeing with activities such as farming and irrigation. Also of notice is that this society has no slaves and a kind of work/life balance exists, alternating labor and philosophy.

Expressions such as “what is needful” and “what our nature wants” indicate that people would be focused on what is important in life, not what is superfluous. Gone are the expensive yachts, five star hotels and ostentatious mansions of billionaires. Humanity would live comfortably, but modestly. In short, we would be mostly self-sufficient, needing very little. This is another way to imitate the gods, who are entirely self-sufficient.

All of this seems like wishful thinking doesn’t it? And historically, attempts to create utopian societies such as these have led to disaster. And yet, when we think about what has been achieved, such as the existence of weekends, paid vacation, minimum wage, universal education, we realize that we are in a much better place than ever thought imaginable to an ancient philosopher. If you had mentioned a concept such as the abolition of slavery in ancient Greece and Rome, you would have been laughed out of the room. Many horrors still exist in today’s world and many more are to come. However, by imagining utopia, we imagine what our lives could be like, and we take steps to make them better.

Practice: Live Justly

First lesson: be harmless. Remember the function of the gods as role models. Philodemus, a 1st century BCE Epicurean philosopher says: “Those who believe our oracles about the gods will first wish to imitate their blessedness in so far as mortals can, so that, since it was seen to come from doing no harm to anyone, they will endeavor most of all to make themselves harmless to everyone as far as is within their power”[2]. Epicureans do not live isolated from society and adhere to the social contract. But also, we do not behave like tyrants, imposing our ways on other people who are different from us. This inevitably leads to the politics of tolerance, a policy of “live and let live”. Another associated principle would be: “my freedom ends where another person’s freedom begins”. While this all may seem like common sense, there are many influential and powerful political movements that oppose these very basic principles.

Second lesson: favor peace over war. Epicureans believed that war is only justified in self-defense. Keep in mind that more often than not, wars of aggression come with propaganda claiming that the act of aggression was in fact provoked and political leaders will not hesitate to lie to claim that an offensive war is in fact an act of defense. Epicureans are well aware of the dirty and corrupt nature of politics. We must always be skeptical and on our guard.

Third lesson: consider the wellbeing of your community. Epicureans are not selfish and believe in collective wellbeing. While part of this is based on enlightened self interest, Diogenes also uses the term “mutual love”. Other Epicurean sources insist on philanthropy. In fact, if we are to follow Diogenes, we must show concern not just for our tribe or nation, but to all humankind: “For, while the various segments of the earth give different people a different country, the whole compass of this world gives all people a single country, the entire earth, and a single home, the world”[3].

Forth lesson: decide how involved you want to be in political affairs. The expression lathe biosas (often translated as “live unnoticed”) is often attributed to Epicurus, who is reputed to have avoided getting involved in the political disputes of his time. The reality, as is often the case in Epicurean philosophy, is much more complex. There are many recorded Epicureans in history who were politically engaged in some form or another. Long story short, not getting involved in politics is what is preferred, but circumstances might lead one to act differently. It is important to keep in mind that there are different degrees of political participation. Some of us may be content to vote in elections, which involves minimal effort and trouble, to more active forms of participation, such as activism, running for office or occupying positions of power. In the face of tyranny, other forms of action can be considered, such as civil disobedience, or in extreme cases, armed struggle.

Notes:

[1] https://www.english.enoanda.cat/the_inscription.html
[2] Quote from The Polytheism of the Epicureans by Dr Paul Terence Matthias Jackson. To learn more about Epicureans theology: https://www.academia.edu/36564126/The_Polytheism_of_the_Epicureans
[3] https://www.english.enoanda.cat/the_inscription.html

Happy Twentieth! On the Nature of Rights

Eikas cheers to all our readers. This month, we discovered the video Lucretius the Epicurean Poet, a friendly and short introduction to Lucretius’ De rerum natura. We also published a book review of The Happiness Diet, and considered whether this means that the nutrients that are considered essential (that is, that our body cannot make on its own) for both health and happiness must be incorporated into our hedonic regimen.

The thought-provoking Psyche.co essay Don’t be Stoic argues that prominent ancient Stoics show Stoicism’s perniciousness as the “philosophy of collaborators”, and shares case-studies of how Stoicism encourages collaboration with tyranny and cruelty by convincing people to completely submit to fate. In my mind, this is only a little different from Catholic instructions to “bear your cross”.

The essay Classifying the Epicurean Goods, by Alex R Gillham was shared with us. It invites us into a discussion of the “immortal goods” that Epicurus mentions in his Epistle to Menoeceus, and into what other goods exist in our ethics. It’s beyond the scope of this Twentieth message to delve too deeply into the essay, but I will mention that one method that Epicureans may use to move from the abstract to the concrete is to refer to them in the plural. In this case, “The Good” (which is a Platonic idea) is transformed into something useful and concrete–“the goods”. Even better–the author mentions intrinsic goods versus instrumental goods, etc., with specific mention of which goods are being discussed. This specificity de-Platonizes the Good and/or naturalizes the goods.

Today I’d like to consider the case study of the Pallini Declaration, better known as the Declaration of the right of happiness in the European Union, in light of Epicurean doctrines on justice and on the canon. The Pallini Declaration was co-edited by a group of Epicureans from Greece in 2014, with the intention of requesting that the European Union recognize the right to happiness as a foundational European value. Here is the Declaration:

One of the main foundations of European civilization is philosophy. Aristotle and Epicurus realized that the purpose of philosophy is happiness (well-being). Epicurus taught that happiness corresponds to absence of mental and physical pain and may be attained though observation of nature, prudence, free will, virtue and friendship.

Many centuries later, in 1776, the main author of the American Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson, influenced by Epicurus’ teachings, included among basic human rights the right of pursuit of happiness. In 2012, the United Nations decided to recognize that the pursue of happiness is a fundamental human goal and right, designating the 20th of March of every year as International day of Happiness.

Given the fact that the right to pursue happiness is not included in the 54 articles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2010/C 83/02), we ask for the recognition of this right of happiness in the European Union, since it is self-evident that it is a fundamental human right and its non-recognition in any part of the world constitutes the violation of this natural right.

The Friends of Epicurean Philosophy “Garden” of Greece
4th Pan-Hellenic Symposium of Epicurean Philosophy
Pallini, Athens, Greece
February 15, 2014

The Pallini Declaration was unveiled during the Epicurean philosophy symposium in February 2014 at Gargettus, in the Municipality of Pallini, where Epicurus had his ancient Garden. The webpage for the Declaration contains some historical background, which ties back to the Greek Constitution and social contract, and reflects the Epicurean conception of agreed-upon law based on the principle of “not harming and not being harmed” (see Epicurus’ Principal Doctrine 31). There were 114 signatures on the Declaration, in honor of the 114 articles of the Greek Constitution.

The following is my meleta on the Pallini Declaration, which is a type of humanist and Epicurean manifesto.

The first paragraph contains three statements which are historical and not controversial, except that some people may have an issue with the statement that some philosophers have “realized” that happiness is the goal of life. This implies that the statement is a discovery and an insight or realization, not an invention. I do not take issue with this–in fact I affirm it–, but I realize that this is a doctrinal statement, framed within the larger tradition of humanist manifestos that includes the Declaration of Independence, the US and French Constitutions, and other documents that are meant to be treated as both social contract, as well as doctrinal (humanist) manifestos.

The second paragraph contains two additional historical statements, which are treated as precedents. It is here that Pallini Declaration appeals to Thomas Jefferson and the Enlightenment ideas that inspired him. In the third paragraph, the Declaration seeks to have a new statute added to what is seen as the social contract that applies to all Europeans.

The Declaration places the “right to happiness” within the context of European values, and ties these values to a shared heritage–which is claimed for all Europeans. Pallini is today where the ancient neighborhood of Gargettus was, where Epicurus founded his Garden around 2,300 years ago, and which for centuries was the seat of the Epicurean Mother Garden. By accentuating its place of origin, the Declaration is an acknowledgement of the deep Epicurean roots of Western civilization. It is a statement of our shared Western values, and claims some level of Epicurean identity or heritage for all Europeans.

Are Rights Self-Evident, or Fictional?

That people have a right to happiness is not exactly what Epicurus argued: he taught that pleasure is a faculty that is native to our organism (“congenital to our nature”) and necessary for our choices and rejections, and that it helps us to discern the natural and pragmatic goal of life. He made a claim about nature, not about rights. The Pallini Declaration is making a new claim, an evolution of that original claim. And it makes a policy recommendation to government.

This level and type of involvement in public affairs is perhaps an innovation, but I argue that this innovation is rooted in Epicurean philosophy. From the perspective of the Doxai, this form of activism in favor of the inclusion of a “right to happiness” as a statute within the official social contract for all Europeans is, among other things, a way of practicing the Doxai on justice (PDs 30-38).

The Pallini Declaration is silent on the nature of “rights”, which can be argued to be fictions written into our legal systems. But notice that it still affirms their utility! From the perspective of the Doxai, by making this particular policy recommendation, the Declaration says that we find it advantageous for mutual association (see PD’s 37-38) to include happiness among the named human rights in our social contract or legal code. In other words, rights (even if fictional) are treated as concrete tokens of Epicurean justice. They’re agreements: useful statutes, or contracts, agreed upon for the sake of mutual association.

This social contract is the means by which Epicureans define justice in concrete terms. By explicitly naming itself Epicurean, the Declaration further recognizes that the right to be happy, once enshrined formally into the social contract and into the cultural and civilizational identity of all Europeans, will help to set the foundation for an Epicurean sense of justice or righteousness in the societies that uphold it. In other words, the recognition of this right to happiness will be a matter of justice and of the social contract, the formally agreed-upon values of all Europeans, and–once enshrined as law–it will be considered unjust to violate this right.

But let us look at the ontological status of rights, since there seems to be an unresolved controversy here. Most humanists believe that rights do not exist conventionally. They are not god-given, as many have claimed, and in fact many of the rights we enjoy today required generations of struggle to attain. But while these rights may be fictions in some sense, they’re still agreed-upon values which, by virtue of the shared agreement among the members of a society, have political and social power. They serve as guidelines for policy and are useful for co-existence. They have utility.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. – United States’ Declaration of Independence (edited by Epicurean founding father Thomas Jefferson)

The framers of these humanist manifestos–from the founding fathers to the authors of the Pallini Declaration–are making claims about natural rights which invite a reassessment of the fictional nature of rights. They are taken to be “self-evident”, which is another Epicurean statement of doctrine, and in fact this can also be claimed about the nature of Epicurean justice: that justice can be observed with enargeia (clearly or self-evidently) based on its utility or benefit for mutual association. Since the authors of these manifestos are claiming enargeia (clarity, immediacy of experience) for these truth statements, I argue that they are making specifically Epicurean statements of doctrine that are based on our methods of studying nature. We saw in Principal Doctrine 22 that enargeia is part of the Epicurean toolkit, and that this particular Doctrine is found among the four canonical Doxai that act as a filter for truth claims.

While, to us, the Creator is nature, Jefferson was comfortable using the term “Creator” within the social contract to establish an ecumenical conversation between the various flavors of Christians and Humanists that deliberated on this particular social contract. Concerning life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, we observe that humans are often willing to die for these principles, that without them it’s impossible to live well and pleasantly, and that they make life worth-living. Happiness and life (together with health) are included in the three categories of natural and necessary desires that Epicurus mentions in his Epistle to Menoeceus. Therefore, Epicurus was making similar (though not identical) claims in this epistle as Jefferson was making in the Declaration of Independence.

We have reason to be undecided as to the nature of these natural rights. On the one hand, Epicurean philosophy teaches that these rights are self-evident, and therefore that they’re not entirely fictional: they are self-evident and exist in some way. On the other hand, rights are not conventionally real–that is, they are not made up of particles. They seem to be relational, social and cultural products born from our mutual agreement and based on our mutual benefit. I wish to note here how Epicurean justice imitates the tendency towards symbiosis in nature, a system by which living bodies show a tendency to develop mutually-beneficial relations. The bottom line is that the pragmatic necessity of justice makes things like laws and rights a needed feature in all human-centered philosophy.

These are some of our initial deliberations on this, not the final word. We will continue our meleta about the nature of human rights. I’m curious to know what others think.

Happy Twentieth! Moral Clarity in the Midst of Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine

Happy 20th of March to Epicureans everywhere. The UN has declared this date to be International Happiness Day, and I am happy to have Epicurean friends who contribute to the work of the Society of Epicurus. I wish to thank all my Patreon subscribers, and to give a special thanks this month to Alex and Anthony.

Last month we participated in the annual symposium of Epicurean philosophy in Athens, which held an English-language international session for the first time. Our Friend Christos (who sent us a full report of the symposium–here), one of three Kathegemones (Epicurean Guides) and Founder of the Epicurean Garden in Athens, and organizer of the annual symposium of Epicurean philosophy in Athens, argues that Epicureanism provides an ethical and philosophical answer to the problems that the world faces today, since it provides us with what he calls “a scientific humanism” with an ethics that leads to social utility and individual happiness.

This year, we submitted the video Society of Epicurus: a philosophical community, as our contribution to the symposium, and also in celebration of the 9-year anniversary of our founding. In the video, we list some of our achievements and history. Some literary updates:

The Loner’s Path | Philosophy for Non-Conformists covers some of the ideas that a few great thinkers have considered regarding the individual versus societal pressure. It includes mention of Camus, Nietzsche, and the essay Self-reliance by Ralph Waldo Emerson, which I had the pleasure of reading. My curiosity was spurred by the fact that autarchy (self-rule or self-reliance) was one of the qualities of Epicurus which (according to Epicurean Saying 36) made his life “myth-like”, or legendary. Emerson’s essay has many thought-provoking quotes that deserve meleta.

Austin McConnell has published a YouTube video titled The Absurd 2nd Century Space Opera You’ll Never Read (referring to the novel True Story). It celebrates the literary legacy and genius of Lucian of Samosata, a brilliant ancient author from Syria who also authored Alexander the Oracle Monger (a work in which he praises both Epicurus and his Principal Doctrines).

Be an Epicurean | Ancient Philosophy Rap is a rap song by a YouTuber which invites people to become Epicurean. He has almost 7,000 subscribers, and makes me wonder whether Epicureanism is becoming mainstream.

As Russia continues its attack on the people of Ukraine, a blogger known as Duplavis posted this (titled “Peace”) in solidarity with Ukraine. It draws from the scene in De rerum natura where Venus conquers Mars / pleasure conquers violence.

The events unfolding in Ukraine provide a unique case-study for many philosophical problems. In this Eikas message, I’ll bring into relief some of the issues that come up when I read the news.

Countries are Social Contracts

Natural justice is a pledge of reciprocal usefulness, neither to harm one another nor be harmed. – Principal Doctrine 31

Modern countries are convenient fictions: Platonic communities that legitimize themselves in legally-binding documents. Sometimes (as in the case of islands) the boundaries of a country are obvious. Sometimes the cultural identities of countries make them easily identifiable, but not always. Consider the arbitrary borders created by the European powers for the countries in Africa, with no regard for the cultural identities of the people who would be trapped in those borders.

Still, for as long as people agree to coexist together under a particular system of governance, their countries come into existence as social contracts. The Ukrainian people have a democratically elected president, and have for decades pushed their government to become more Westernized and to move away from the orbit of Russia. That is their social contract. In attempting to have Zelenskyy replaced by an unelected pro-Russia puppet, Putin has unjustly violated the Ukrainian people’s choice to be governed by a particular leader under a particular legal and political system, as they had agreed. This is what we at SoFE call the “problem of undue denial of consent” (where individuals or groups who are able and willing to choose or reject a social contract are denied the possibility of choice or rejection), and it renders the aggressor inherently unjust.

There was no justice or injustice with respect to all those animals which were unable to make pacts about neither harming one another nor being harmed. Similarly, [there was no justice or injustice] for all those nations which were unable or unwilling to make pacts about neither harming one another nor being harmed. – Principal Doctrine 32

In this case, the party that is inherently unjust (Putin) has chosen a “wild” / uncivilized / lawless state of existence, and we are now observing what this can look like.

Flattery and Authoritarianism

The Russian tyrant Putin is a case study for a problem diagnosed by the Epicurean Guide Philodemus of Gadara in his scroll “Peri Parrhesias” (On Frank Criticism): like many authoritarian leaders, he is surrounded by flatterers, not true friends.

We see that, while the Ukrainian president eats with his immediate advisors in a spirit of trust, Putin on the other hand sits at the extreme end of a long table so that his advisors may not have physical proximity with him. He appears to have no one he can trust, and he allows no one near him. Authoritarian leaders have a strong belief that they must rule by fear, so the element of trust is non-existent in their method of governance, and Putin clearly has no true friends–only flatterers, many of whom are scared of him and do not really consider him a friend.

Disinformation and Authoritarianism

Democracy functions best when the population is educated. If they’re not, a good argument can be made that it’s not prudent to trust people with the power of decision-making if people are ignorant about what is in their self-interest and in the interest of their communities.

On the other hand, disinformation and authoritarianism need each other. We observe in authoritarian regimes a strong insistence on control of all media by those in power, control over all information, and aggressive, relentless campaigns to keep the people ignorant or confused.

Since traditional religions have perfected the art of keeping the populations ignorant, we also see a strong alliance between authoritarian leaders and certain churches (in the case of Russia, the Orthodox Church), and a strong insistence on which religions are allowed and which religions are banned (as we see in the case of China).

No one has perfected the art of disinformation like the churches, and the war has in fact been categorized as a religious war by at least two pundits on Patheos and National Review. The war furnishes an opportunity to observe a case study in how the most insidious forms of authoritarian religion dress up in innocence things that are deeply worthy of objection, specifically using techniques like public prayer. While praying for “unity”, the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church meant the unity of Ukraine within Russia, as part of Russia, in fact denying their right to sovereignty and self-determination implicitly in his prayer in a way that suggests that he is pronouncing a blessing upon the genocide that is taking place (in his verbiage, for the sake of “unity” of Ukraine with Russia). He is also praying against “diabolical attacks” and external forces that “laugh at us”–here using public prayer to manufacture the consent that NATO is not only evil, but worse: a Satanic legion. Notice that when the patriarch prays against “the evil one” here, he is referring to Satan, not Putin. He is Platonizing and confusing the historical events.

He said all these things while soothing the members of his flock with the gentle tone of his prayer, and he was clearly dictating what the regime would like the faithful to pray for. Therefore, we cannot study this war as a case study in disinformation without taking a closer look at the role of religion, the narratives it sustains, and the devices it employs to support the Russian state’s authoritarianism (although, in frankness, we have many more examples of this much closer to home).

Vain and Empty Values

In Epicurean philosophy, we have a doctrine known as “the hierarchy of desires”, which includes:

  1. natural and necessary desires (which must be sought)
  2. natural and unnecessary desires (which are easy to dismiss if they’re hard to get or produce harm)
  3. neither natural nor necessary desires (which we do not actively pursue)

Putin’s war was initiated in pursuit of unnatural and unnecessary desires. He wants “glory”, “fame”, “immortality”, a place in history, which he will never be able to enjoy–since for most of eternity, he will not live to enjoy whatever notoriety he earns.

Putin has imperial ambitions. No human being needs his own country to govern, much less multiple foreign countries to claim as his own, and even much less countries that do not want him as a leader. No one needs an empire. Blind pursuit of power is unnecessary, vain, and empty, and in this case it generates a huge amount of unnecessary suffering, for which reason it’s clearly rejection-worthy from the perspective of Epicurean and natural hedonic calculus (since desires that create harm are easy to dismiss). Therefore, Putin is a good case study for the kinds of megalomaniacal arch-villains that blind pursuit of empty desires can create.

Putin is a Mortal

Our friend Anthony shared with us the essay Putin’s Attack on Ukraine Is an Attempt to Delay His Own Inevitable Demise–an insight which was also shared independently by Christos in the introduction to his report from the symposium. In the cited essay, Peter Pomerantsev argues that Putin has started this war because he is struggling with his impending death. In our last Eikas meeting (where we discussed coping with death), our Friend Marcus mentioned that the Epicureans treat death the same way that Freud treats sexuality: we argue that fears and apprehensions about death are at the root of much human behavior, particularly when they remain unacknowledged.

That mortals engage in evil acts out of a subconscious fear of and anger about their own mortality is one of the key ethical ideas that Lucretius expressed in Liber Tertivs (Book 3) of De rerum natura. This theory was elaborated further in modern times by anthropologist Ernest Becker in his work The Denial of Death.

Technique: View Tragedy as if from a Fortress

In De rerum natura, Lucretius gives us an example of a technique for awakening the pleasure faculty that I will call “shift in perspective”. In the Fortress of the Wise parable, Lucretius speaks frankly about the pleasure he gets from watching tragedies unfold elsewhere (or even a tragic play?), not because he’s happy about the pains of others, but because it reminds him of what he’s safe from and grateful for currently.

Lucretius specifically mentions that he is not applying this technique in a spirit that is callous or cruel (that is, the pleasure or medicine of the technique does not lie in sadism). His disposition is inspired by gratitude and relief. There is real suffering in Ukraine. But there are also hundreds of news media attempting to get everyone’s attention on this and to control the narrative (or rectify it, which is an unfortunate necessity), and it is sometimes easy to lose ourselves in the news cycle, or even embitter ourselves due to politics. Setting a healthy boundary between us and the news cycle is, perhaps, good for our happiness.

For this reason, Lucretius’ Fortress of the Wise “shift in perspective” technique (which is a version of the “view from above” technique popular among Stoics) serves as a way out of unhealthy paradigms of thought, a way to replace them with something that is conducive to our mental health and happiness. A shift in perspective is particularly useful if the tragic situation is outside our field of influence, as is the case with war in other lands.

PDs 32, 37 and 38 and the Moral Problem of Slavery

“But you only understanding the language of the sword” – Lyrics from Krigsgaldr (the Song of the Sword), by Heilung

Those animals which are incapable of making covenants with one another, to the end that they may neither inflict nor suffer harm, are without either justice or injustice. And those tribes which either could not or would not form mutual covenants to the same end are in like case. – Principal Doctrine 32

What does PD 32 mean, in practice? As regards to examples of people who have neither the power nor the desire of making a covenant to not harm or be harmed, we can think of warlike primitive humans, cannibals, or cognitively deficient humans who are incapable of communication and of understanding. These may fall within the category of those who are incapable of abiding by laws or rules. As for those who are unwilling, I think of the Vandals, Goths, and other Barbarian, “uncivilized” (lawless) tribes that sacked and invaded Roman lands. I also think of the Orcs from Lord of the Rings, terrorists, and anyone who is armed and unwilling to abide by laws against violence and against murder. If a person or group invades your home and is obviously unwilling to “agree to not harm”, then we have to do whatever we have to do for the sake of self-defense. It says there is no injustice (no contract or oath was violated), but there’s also no justice because this would have happened in a wild state of nature, in an uncivilized, lawless state of nature.

While Hobbes argued (in his Leviathan) that people in this lawless state can be “tamed” with a strong state and with strong laws, the Epicurean doctrines of justice create a category of wild, uncivilized humans, tribes, and animals that is separate from those that are domesticated or civilized–who are described as able to agree to not harm or be harmed. These contracts of mutual benefit and of non-violence are explained also by Lucretius in a passage (in Book V) on the origins of friendship and compassion for the weak. The bottom line is that civilized tribes and humans live by a legal code of some sort, whether a rudimentary one (an unwritten, tribal code of honor that may include an agreement not to kill or abuse members of one’s own tribe) or a complex system of laws (like those of modern countries). Wild animals and humans, on the other hand, do not have such a code and–since they live in a wild, lawless state and obey “the law of the jungle”–might make unreliable neighbors.

Laws are created not for the wise (who are naturally harmless to others), but for the unwise. But a code of laws is no guarantee that people will abide by them. We see in Diogenes’ Wall Inscription, that the Epicureans seem to have always expressed doubt as to whether many people (in particular, religious people) are able to abide by the laws out of fear of divine punishment. What does this mean? It means that the state (or the religion) and its laws are not enough to safeguard our security, since some people will not abide by the laws, and will live in a wild state even in places that offer the possibility of lawful coexistence. In these cases, there is neither justice nor injustice. In other words, we must engage in self-defense if we are attacked.

As history demonstrates, there are no gods who will come down and punish those who enslave others. There is no absolute or eternal justice. Humans invented the laws and humans must re-write them. Humans must figure out that a practice is disadvantageous or immoral, and reform themselves. Humans must also enforce whatever rules they set for their societies.

This doctrine tacitly accepts the possibility that some animals may be able to come to agreements with us. There are pods of dolphins in Brazil that have developed a habit of fishing together with human fishermen, with both species developing efficient communication techniques, and both groups enjoying the fruits of their work. In his sermon on moral development, Epicurus dedicated some time to discussing predators like sharks, and other beasts of whom we have the expectation that they will be wild (it must be added here that in that same sermon, Epicurus defends the idea of moral development–which is another important benefit of PD’s 37-38: they allow for laws and contracts to evolve with us). On the other hand, we have more noble expectations from humans and other domesticated animals because they are, well, domesticated–if not civilized. Recent years have seen a trend where certain species are being categorized as “non human persons” due to their high intelligence, and it is not entirely clear where they may fall in terms of justice and the ability to agree to not harm, although once trust is established (as we see in many research projects with apes), we observe that even humans can be accepted into the tribes of these higher animals. We likewise see in domestic animals an ability to abide by house rules, which we do not see in wild animals.

Other tacit teachings within this doctrine are that justice exists only for the civilized, and that it requires efficient communication (at least enough to have an agreement between two persons).

The PD’s and Slavery

The issue of slavery was brought up by Alan recently, as having moral clarity with regards to this issue is often seen as a litmus test for whether a moral system is useful and compatible with civilized life and with modern society.

There are various ways in which people in antiquity became slaves. The main way was debt-based slavery: less wealthy people signed a contract requiring to pay back money lent to them by wealthier people or institutions. If the debt remained unpaid by a certain date, then the person had to pay with their service or slavery for a period of time agreed upon, until the debt was entirely paid back.

There has never been a clear boundary between debt and slavery, even today. If a person today is in debt, that person must get involved in wage slavery or indented servitude, giving a bank or lender the fruits of their labor until the debt is paid.

This form of indented slavery (ancient or modern) is based on a mutual agreement, and the only way in which we can avoid debt-based slavery is by making these contracts illegal.

However, all or most Africans who were abducted unfairly and sold into slavery 400 years ago were, in all likelihood, not in debt.

Africans who were enslaved 400 years ago had the ability and the willingness to abide by laws or agreements of mutual benefit and of not harming or being harmed. They were taken against their will, which is unjust.

Slavery, and the Problem of Non-Consent

A black African person who was captured 400 years ago and enslaved, would have been able and willing to enter into covenants–at least as able as the black Africans who sold him. But they were denied consent.

Consent of the governed is found in the Declaration of Independence, and is a foundational political concept in the West. It gives moral legitimacy to a government and to a legal system. We could argue that today consent is given by voting into power a representative in government, in addition to the process of signing a contract.

Can Slavery Have Been Useful for Mutual Association?

So one Epicurean argument against slavery is that Principal Doctrine 32, when requiring that creatures be able and willing to abide by agreements and laws, contains a tacit taboo against non-consent. PD’s 37 and 38, on the other hand, make a definite value judgment and moral judgment in the cases where consent has been given. A person (the enslaver, in this case) who denies consent to another is attempting to recede back to the wild state of nature.

Among the things accounted just by conventional law, whatever in the needs of mutual association is attested to be useful, is thereby stamped as just, whether or not it be the same for all; and in case any law is made and does not prove suitable to the usefulness of mutual association, then this is no longer just. And should the usefulness which is expressed by the law vary and only for a time correspond with the prior conception, nevertheless for the time being it was just, so long as we do not trouble ourselves about empty words, but look simply at the facts. – Principal Doctrine 37

A fellow Epicurean asked me to interpret “whether or not it be the same for all”. My immediate thought was of instances where it is of mutual advantage for people with different skills to agree to do different things in the pursuit of a shared goal. This scenario is most often seen in work places. A great mathematician may agree to work as the accountant of the firm, a great manual laborer may agree to do the manual work and train others to do so, a good cook may prepare lunch for all workers, etc.

In the US and many countries, judges are considered prepared to judge among parties once they are sworn in. Other citizens are expected to abide by their judgments. Everyone can not be a judge, or a legislator, or a business owner. A society where everyone fulfills the same role is not a functional society. So justice is not about equal duties.

In PD 38, we are invited to judge laws by their consequences. This raises many other interesting moral questions concerning laws that have been recently abolished: we may think of the many detrimental consequences of the war on drugs (massive incarceration for victimless crimes, squandering of police resources, expenses of imprisonment for the tax-payer, inability to tax a huge industry, etc.) or of the illegality of gay marriage (closeted gay people marrying the opposite sex, and then being unhappy and unfaithful). Here, the disadvantages did not seem to justify the advantages of the legality of consuming cannabis and gay marriage.

Where without any change in circumstances the conventional laws, when judged by their consequences, were seen not to correspond with the notion of justice, such laws were not really just; but wherever the laws have ceased to be useful in consequence of a change in circumstances, in that case the laws were for the time being just when they were useful for the mutual association of the citizens, and subsequently ceased to be just when they ceased to be useful. – Principal Doctrine 38

Was slavery at one time useful for the mutual association of the citizens? Well, the institution of slavery (for instance, in the Americas) caused lives of misery for millions, huge security concerns, huge cruelty, a Civil War where thousands died, and its legacy created and perpetuated levels of inequality that are still today generating social unrest. Anyone who claims that slaves “would give them (or the enslavers) pleasure” and tries to justify slavery based on pure hedonism, is not expressing an Epicurean view–since we must walk with Pleasure, but also with Prudence and Justice. This is why some of us modern Epicureans take the liberty to criticize the hypocrisy of slavery in Jefferson and ancient Epicureans, even if we understand that those were different times.

Since–as we have seen–Blacks who were enslaved in the Americas were denied the opportunity to consent to the covenant into which they were inserted, it is impossible to argue for mutual advantage in slavery without considering how it was experienced in the bodies, minds, and realities of the Blacks. Due to the problem of non-consent, slavery in the Americas was carried out in a state of wilderness, of lawlessness, regardless of whether slavery was legal. It did not emerge out of contractual agreements or as a form of debt.

If 500 years ago, Africans had invaded and pillaged Europe (if they had been the original aggressors instead of being abducted into slavery), a different situation would have emerged, one where non-law-abiding humans would have inserted themselves into law-abiding societies with a clear unwillingness to agree not to harm others. This would have made imprisonment, enslavement, or violence a measure of self-defense for those invaded. But this was not the case.

I wish to accentuate, once again, that these PD’s give a definite moral judgment. They say “this is just / unjust”. While there is no absolute, de-contextualized or Platonic morality, the PD’s do not remain silent with regards to giving moral judgment. PD’s can be applied to modern legal codes, and to codes of honor, to certify whether they are just (even if for a time) based on utility for mutual association.

Let’s consider what it means to say that laws may change, depending on circumstances, in order to become just or to abolish injustice: this means that laws are man-made and what laws man has invented, man can abolish or change. There is no room for divine laws or superstition in any legal code certified by an Epicurean. It also creates the possibility of collective moral development, of self-betterment for individuals and their societies–for which the PD’s furnish guidelines based on mutual advantage, and for which we may apply public frank criticism, if this is advantageous.

Conclusion

And so, to summarize, the main Epicurean arguments against slavery as an institution are:

  1. Since there is no mutual benefit in slavery, laws that allowed for slavery by abduction were unjust. It’s not clear how Epicurus acquired his slaves, but it’s clear that Jefferson engaged in an unjust practice.
  2. The denial of consent problem presents a set of moral questions that have not been tackled effectively by later generations of Epicurean thinkers, and requires a deepening of our studies. My suggestion is that this is one of the implied requirements of contractarian justice, which is based on mutual agreements to not harm or be harmed.
  3. There is no absolute or divine, unchanging justice. We do not see evidence for divine enforcement of our laws in the study of nature. Humans invented the laws and contracts, and humans must re-write them when this is advantageous.
  4. The Principal Doctrines 37-38 do not shy away from giving moral judgment in cases where laws are not beneficial for mutual association. Epicurean philosophers may either draft our contracts, or issue opinions concerning the prevalent laws in our societies, based on these guidelines.
  5. Epicurean doctrines establish two categories of animals: those who are wild and uncivilized (incapable or unwilling to abide by laws and agreements), and those who are civilized (law-abiding and contract-abiding). Justice and injustice only exist for the civilized, while the former live like beasts.

On “-Isms” and Pleasure Wisdom

On “-Isms” and Pleasure Wisdom

Epicureanismvs.Epicurean Philosophy

The Society of Friends of Epicurus has dedicated extensive dialogue to the suffix “ism” regarding its relevance to the Epicurean tradition. In the Epicurean spirit of  παρρησíα  (or “parrhēsíā) meaning frank speech” or “speaking candidly”, the ancient Greek language did NOT employ the “ism” when referring to the tradition of Epicurus (nor, for that matter, of any other ancient Greek philosophy). Thus, while the word can be employed for practical purposes, Epicureanism” does NOT quite compliment the nuance of “Epicurean Philosophy.

ISMs

The English suffix, “-ism” — according to BOTH common and academic usages — is employed to designate a distinctive “doctrine“, “theory“, “attitude“, “belief“, “practice“, “process“, “state“, “condition“, “religion“, “system“, or “philosophy“. According to this definition, it is NOT incorrect to add a simple “ism” at the end of the philosophy of Epicurus“; it should, appropriately and accurately, render the word “Epicureanism” (or even “Epicurism).

In more succinct terms, we can visualize “Epicureanismsimply as “Epicurean-philosophy“.

While this works for practical purposes, it may lead to several misconceptions:

  1. Bracketing the suffix “-ism” to a name often indicates devotional worship of an individual (consider the differences between the old, misleading usage of “Mohammedanism” versus the preferred, contemporary usage of “Islam). Epicureans do NOTworship Epicurus as a supernatural prophet, NOR as a manifestation of a transcendental ideal.
  2. Bracketing the suffix “-ism” can ALSO indicate contempt for an individual or system. Consider, for example, when “Marxism”, “Leninism”, “Stalinism”, and “Maoism” are used by critics and detractors of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and many others. Thus, the word “Epicureanism” can be employed by critics and detractors of Epicurean philosophy as an indictment of Epicurus.
  3. In the modern era, “-ism” is frequently used to identify political typologies. Terms like “Monarchism”, “Liberalism”, “Conservatism”, “Communism”and “Fascism” express ideological systems that — contrary to Epicurean philosophy — presuppose the existence of an ideal state or utopia, organized according to the dimensions of a perfect, timeless principle.
  4. The suffix “-ισμός” (or “-ismós“) was rarely employed in ancient Greek; few examples of “-ism” (or “-ismós“) exist prior to New Latin, and the linguistic conventions of the modern era. In giving preference to the term “Epicurean philosophy”, we acknowledge the importance of privileging ancient Greek historical sources to the reliance upon Latin translations.

ISMVS

Our tradition of adding “-ism” to the end of words — in which we recognize distinctive “ideologies” — begins in the post-Classical period, corresponding to the Renaissance. Coming from the Latin “re-” (meaning “again”) and “nasci” (meaning “to be born”), this “Rebirth” resurrected the innovations and observations of Antiquity. The revival allowed scholars to adapt translations through the Latin language, using the Romanalphabet, sheathing many ancient Greek observations. Scholars began to liberally apply the suffix –ISMVS during this period of New Latin.

(I’m going to call the tradition — in which modern English-speakers partake — the “Ismism“, or, in other words, “the systemic practice of adding ‘-ism‘ to idea-expressing words”, sometimes as a celebration, sometimes as a derogation, sometimes as a religion, and sometimes as a political system. Due to the profound influence of Latin, and the linguistic conventions of the modern era, we ALL — in one way or another — have become dedicated Ismists.)

From the perspective of the contemporary world, the suffix –ISMVS (or “-ismus“) was first borrowed from the Old Latin language of the Romans, and later appropriated by post-Classical peoples as New Latin and Contemporary Latin. We find an abundance of “-ism” and “-ismus” in both Romance and Germanic language families. As with the Latin ISMVS, our contemporary suffix “-ism” is used to indicate distinctive “doctrines“, “theories”, “attitudes”, “beliefs”, “practices“, “processes“, “states“, “conditions“, “religions“, “systems“, and “philosophies“.

Here, however, is where we note a difference that our Mediterranean friends have often recognized: while the Greek language — like (for example) Celtic and Indic languages — has evolved from a common Indo-European root, it did NOT adopt Latin conventions the same way that Romance and Germanic languages have. Ancient Greek philosophers — perhaps, especially Epicurus — would NOT have thought of a “philosophy” as an “-ism”.

ize | ίζω | ízō |

We receive the Latin –ISMVS or “-ismus” from the ancient Greek “-ισμός” (“-ismós“), which, itself, is a bracketing of two other ancient Greek words, those words being “-ίζω” (“ízō“) and “μός” (“mós“). We’ll start with the former word. The suffix “-ίζω” (“-ízō“) was added to nouns to form new verbs. Let’s look at (x3) examples:

  1. canonize | κανονίζω | kanonízō
    κανών or “kann literally referred to a “reed”, and carried the connotation of a “measuring rod” or “standard”.
    + “-ίζω (“-ízō or “-ize“) rendered “κανονίζω“, “kanonízō” or “canonize” meaning “to make standard“.
  2. Hellenize | ἑλληνίζω | Hellēnízō
    ἑλλην or llēn literally referred to that which is “Greek”.
    + “-ίζω (“-ízō or “-ize“) rendered “ἑλληνίζω“, “Hellēnízō“, or “Hellenize” meaning “to make Greek“.
  3. synchronize | συγχρονίζω | súnkhronosízō
    σύγχρονος
    or “súnkhronos literally referred to “synchronous
    + “-ίζω (“-ízō or “-ize“) rendered “συγχρονίζω“, “súnkhronosízō“, or “synchronize” meaning “to sync“.

The key point with “-ίζω” (“-ízō“) — and our Modern English suffix “-ize” — is that we can turn any concept into a verb, or, in more philosophically interesting terms, we can ACTIVATE it.

μός | mós

The second suffix from which the ancient Greek “-ισμός” (“-ismós“) was bracketed is “μός” (“mós“). Contrary to the convention of ACTIVATING a word that represents a concept, adding “μός” (“mós“) ABSTRACTS an action. We can demonstrate this convention through (x3) other examples that translate well into Modern English:

  1. cataclysm |κατακλυσμός | kataklusmós
    κατακλύζω (kataklúzō) – literally meant “to wash away”.
    + “μός” (“mós“) rendered “κατακλυσμός“, “kataklusmós” or “cataclysm“, meaning a “great flood“.
  2. sarcasm | σαρκασμός | sarkasmós
    σαρκάζω” or “sarkázō literally, and figuratively meant “tearing apart” or “to tear off the flesh”.
    + “μός” (“mós“) rendered “σαρκασμός“, “sarkasmós” or “sarcasm“, meaning “(figuratively) tearing apart“.
  3. syllogism | συλλογισμός | sullogismós
    συλλογίζομαι (sullogízomai) literally meant “to compute” or “to infer”.
    + “μός” (“mós“) rendered “συλλογισμός“, “sarkasmós”, or “syllogism“, meaning an “inference“.

The key point with “μός” (“mós“) is that the ancient Greeks could turn any verb into a word that expressed an abstract concept, or, in more philosophically interesting terms, it could systematize activity into an idea.

ism | ισμός | ismós

The re-bracketing of the suffix “μός” (“mós“) appended with “-ίζω” (“ízō“) presents us with “-ισμός” (or “-ismós“) or the suffix “-ism“, a convention which systematizes a verb that has been activated from a noun. Very few examples exist in ancient Greek. A suitable example for English mono-linguists can be demonstrated in the word “Sabbath”:

  1. σάββατον | sábbaton literally means “the Sabbath” (borrowed from the Hebrew שבת or “shabát”)
    + “ίζω” (“-ízō or “ize“) σαββατίζω | sabbatízō means “to make, observe, or keep the Sabbath
    + “ισμός” (“ismós“) σαββατισμός | sabbatismós means “the state of keeping the Sabbath

UNLIKE the ubiquitous –ISMVS of Latin, and the overused “-ism” of Modern English, the ancient Greekισμός (or “ismós“) is almost NEVERused. The ancient Greeks did NOT shared our zeal for Ismism. When faced with the need to express a NEW word with FRESH meaning, the ancient Greeks built words from either [1] the names of people and objects they directly knew or observed, and [2] active forces they felt or experienced, but NOT as [3] abstract systems.

So, why NOT “Epicureanism“?

The philosophy of Epicurus recognizes that we EXPERIENCE NATURE DIRECTLY and NOT indirectly as an abstract system. Epicurean philosophy and the instruments with which humanity can make informed and ethical decisions — the sensation of an atomic reality, theanticipation of natural patterns, and the feelings of pleasure and pain — neither depend upon allegiance to a single leader, nor initiation into a secret society, nor longing for a golden age.

Christ’s resurrection would NOT be known without the Gospels.
Muhammad’s revelations would NOT be known without the Qur’an.

Even without the historical personage of Epicurus, human beings would still have sensed an atomic reality, anticipated the patterns of nature, and felt pleasure and pain, still have made mutual agreements, and still have formed friendships.

Without Jesus of Nazareth, Christians would NOT know to recite the Lord’s Prayer.
Without Muhammad, Muslims would NOT know to perform Salah to Mecca five times a day.

NATURE, itself, is so much LARGER, more important, and more fundamental than any one personage or tradition. Even without Epicurean Philosophy, humans would still have developed scientific intellects to their own advantage.

Epicureanism” (or, also, “Epicurism) carries a connotation – albeit very slightly – that the philosophy of Epicurus is just another doctrinal institution that advertises immaterial truths from an untouchable dimension. It is not quite as authentic to recognize serious seekers of pleasure as “Epicureanists” who follow “Epicureanism” as opposed to “Epicureans” who study “Epicurean philosophy“. Our endeavor rests within our own bodies; NATURE, itself, is the greatest teacher.

All that being said …

for practical purposes, there most isn’t anything inherently incorrect about preferring the term “Epicureanism; the “-isminnocuously identifies a “philosophy“. In Modern English, this does correctly indicate the philosophy of Epicurus, apart from any oath to a mythic person or principle.

Nonetheless, the employment of “Epicurean philosophy” over “Epicureanism” serves to keep our anticipations FRESH, to indicate to others that our interactions are bigger than disembodied souls paddling ideas back and forth in a court of Mind. It acts as a reminder that the path to wisdom is NOT a map that has been given to us from an Eternal Place of Perfection, but that we each carry a well-calibrated compass within ourselves to know the world and guide us to happiness.

DON’T call [my belief system] an –ism!

While the preference toward the phrase “Epicurean philosophy” may better reflect its ancient Greek origin, it should NOT indicate that the suffix “-ism” should be reserved as a derogation for non-Epicurean ideas, nor exclusively employed as a polemic toward Idealism. Even Epicurean philosophy, itself, incorporates the “-isms” of atomism, hedonism, naturalism, and materialism; these are most certain NOT idealistic.

Even ancient Greek opponents to Epicurean philosophy did NOT employ the “-ism”. Members of Plato’s Academy were “Academics”; members of Aristotle’s Lyceum with “Peripatetics”; members of Zeno’s Stoa were “Stoics”. It was only later that scholars began to employ the terms “Platonism”, “Aristotelianism”, and “Stoicism”.

Furthermore, this same acknowledgment applies to religious traditions:

The earliest rendering of the religion we refer to as “Judaism” was  יהדות  or “Yahadút”, from the Hebrew word  יהודי  (or Yhudá”) meaning “the Jewish people” and the suffix  ־ות  (or “-ót) meaning “the tradition of”. The ismed word that we employ — Judaism — is found in Maccabees 2 in the Koine Greek language by Hellenistic Jews, written around 124 BCE (over a thousand years after the foundation of Hebrew monotheism), rendered as  ιουδαϊσμός  (or “Ioudaismós”).

The word “Zoroastrianism” is first attested from 1854 as an anglicization of the ancient Greek Ζωροάστρης (meaning Zōroástrēs” or “Zoroaster”) borrowed from the Avestan word     or “Zarathustra”. Ancient Iranians referred to their religion as   orMazdayasna” translating to “worship of Mazda” (also romanized as “Mazdaism”). The wor   orMazda” both identifies the name of the Iranian Creator deity, and also, translates to “wisdom”.

The isming of the religion of post-Classical Arabs has been noted for its inadequacy, and identified in the contemporary era as being largely offensive to the Islamic populations. Until the 20th century, the monotheistic religion of  ٱلْإِسْلَام‎  (or al-Islām”) was identified by Europeans as “Mohammedanism” (or “Muhammadanism), inappropriately implying that the prophet Muhammad was divine himself, in the same way that Christians think of Jesus of Nazareth as divine.

People from the Punjab region of India refer to their religious tradition as  ਸਿੱਖੀ  (or Sikhī) anglicized to the English-speaking world as “Sikhism”. The word comes from the Sanskrit root  शिक्षा  or “śikṣā” meaning “to learn” or “to study”. (This recognition of the religious practitioner as a “student” is also found in the “Confucian tradition).

The same is true of “Hinduism”, an anglicization of the Sanskrit  सनातन धर्म  or “Sanātana Dharma” meaning “Eternal Order“. In fact, the word “Hinduitself was used by non-Indians to refer to people living around the Indus river. Ancient Indo-Iranian populations would have referred to themselves as आर्य or “Arya” (from which we get the term “Aryan“).

Jainism” is first attested from 1858 as an anglicization of the Sanskrit adjectiveजैन Jaina” which comes from the Sanskrit name for the 6thcentury BCE tradition  जिन  (or “Jina”). The word “Jina” is related to the verb  जि  meaning “to conquer”, coming from  जय  (or jaya”) meaning “victory”. The word “Jain” indicates a spiritualconqueror”.

Our rendering of “Buddhism” is an anglicization of the original Pali बुद्ध धम्म  (or “Buddha Dhamma“) meaning approximatelyThe Awakened One’s Eternal Law. The first recorded use of “Buddhism was in 1801, after Europeans romanized the spelling of Indic vocabulary.

There is NO direct Chinese equivalent to the word “Confucianism” since it has never been organized as a formal institution. The word was coined in 1836 by Sir Francis Davis, a British sinologist, and second Governor of Hong Kong who reduced the vast collection of ancient Chinese practices into a title named after the philosopher Kǒng Fūzǐ ( or “Master Kong”). While no single Chinese word or logogram represents the collection of beliefs and practices that developed from the teachings of Master Kong (anglicized as “Confucius”), the word  儒  (or “”) roughly translates as a “Man receiving instruction from Heaven” (also, a “scholar”), and is used to describe a student of Master Kong’s body of works.

The Taoists of ancient China identified the universal principle as or “Dào”, meaning “road”, “path” or “Way”. In China, the religious tradition is written 道教 or “Dàojiào” pronounced /’daʊ.ʨaʊ/ (or, for English mono-linguists, roughly transliterated asdow-chyow”). It was anglicized asTaoism” in 1838.

Shintoism”— the anglicized name for the native religion of Japanprovides an interesting example of an ismized tradition. The word “Shinto” is of Chinese origin, constructed from the Kanji logograms for the words  神 Shén”, (meaning “God”) and    Dào” (meaning “Way”) rendering  神道  or “Shéndào. However, Shinto populations do not employ this phrase as often as they do the Japanese  かむながらのみち  or “kan’nagara no michi”, (written in the Hirgana writing system) loosely translated as way of the divine transmitted from time immemorial”. Consequently, the word “Shintoism is the anglicization of two syllables from Japanese Kanji, inherited from ancient China’s Hanji logograms.

Christianity has been the dominant tradition of the post-Classical, and modern worlds; thus, it has avoided being reductively ismed (since the people who accused false traditions of being mere isms tended to be Christian, themselves). The word “Christianism” is occasionally used to express contempt for Christian fundamentalism (much like “Islamism” is used to indicate contempt for Islamic fundamentalism.)

Even early Christians did NOT refer to their tradition using the same vocabulary as do modern Christians. Like Taoists, they used the metaphor of της οδου (or “tês hodoû”) meaning “The Way“. A non-Christian, community in Antioch first coined the term  Χριστιανός  (or christianós“) to described the followers of The Way. Within 70 years, the early Church Father Ignatius of Antioch employed the term of  Χριστιανισμός  (or “Christianismós“) to refer to the Christianity.

Pleasure Wisdom

Regardless of a preference to “
Epicurean philosophy” versus “Epicureanism”, the insight of Epicurus’ philosophy demystifies nature and deflates the superstition of common religion. Epicurus anticipated the sciences of particle physics, optics, meteorology, neurology, and psychiatry. His logic was NOT one of theoretical axioms, but of a demonstrable hedonic calculus. Epicurus knew Virtue as a guide post to happiness, but NOT as happiness, itself.

Here, you will do well to tarry; here our highest good is pleasure.

Cheers, friends!

Further Reading:
Hiram’s “On Ismshttp://societyofepicurus.com/on-isms/

 

Works Cited

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Beekes, Robert, Etymological Dictionary of Greek, Leiden, Netherlands, Brill, 2010.

Buck, Carl Darling, A Dictionary of Selected Synonyms in the Principal Indo-European Languages, University of Chicago, 1949, reprinted 1988.

de Vaan, Michiel, Etymological Dictionary of Latin and the other Italic Languages, vol. 7, of Leiden Indo-European Etymological Dictionary Series, Alexander Lubotsky ed., Leiden: Brill, 2008.

Fowler, H.W., A Dictionary of Modern English Usage, Oxford University Press, 1926.

Grose, Francis, A Classical Dictionary of the Vulgar Tongue, London, 1785; 2nd ed., London, 1788; 3rd ed., London, 1796; expanded by others as Lexicon Balatronicum. A Dictionary of Buckish Slang, University Wit, and Pickpocket Eloquence, London, 1811.

Hall, J.R. Clark, A Concise Anglo-Saxon Dictionary, Cambridge University Press, 1894, reprint with supplement by Herbert D. Meritt, University of Toronto Press, 1984.

Johnson, Samuel, A Dictionary of the English Language, London, 1755.

Klein, Dr. Ernest, A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co., 1971.

Lewis, Charlton T., and Short, Charles, A New Latin Dictionary, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1891.

Liberman, Anatoly, Analytic Dictionary of English Etymology, University of Minnesota Press, 2008.

Liddell, Henry George, and Robert Scott, eds., Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford University Press, 1883.

McSparran, Frances, chief editor, The Middle English Compendium, University of Michigan, 2006.

Room, Adrian, Place Names of the World, 2nd ed., McFarland & Co., 2006.

The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., Clarendon Press, 1989.

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Weekley, Ernest, An Etymological Dictionary of Modern English, John Murray, 1921; reprint 1967, Dover Publications.

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The Evolution of Law in Epicurus and Nietzsche

I recently had the pleasure of reading the highly-recommended book by Nietzsche, The Antichrist. Many of its paragraphs merely served to add depth and detail to some of the things I had previously come to understand from reading his notes in Will to Power and other sources, like Zarathustra. Other paragraphs offered new insights either because of the way in which they were passionately and emphatically stated, or by virtue of their content. Paragraph 57 is one of the latter cases and caught my eye because usually, when Nietzsche discusses the origins of laws and mores, he employs a cynical tone and seeks the ulterior motives of the proponents. Here, he takes on the anthropologist’s tone that we find in Lucretius and Epicurus, and it might be interesting to compare how he views the primitive origins of moral and legal codes versus how the Epicureans viewed them.

In Nietzsche, the time when the laws are written down indicates a time when rules and contracts are standardized and experimentation is no longer encouraged as a result of certain legal precedents and practices becoming solidified in tradition. There are conservative and liberal interpretations of this process: to some–who are privileged by the existing laws–this creates a mythical “golden era” during which the population developed the best means to rule itself. To others, this imposes limits on how creative legislators allow themselves to be in adapting the legal code to new circumstances and keeping it relevant. Nietzsche, who is a staunch defendant of a type of aristocracy, supports the first interpretation, but nonetheless sympathizes with the second one.

A book of laws such as the Code of Manu has the same origin as every other good law-book: it epitomizes the experience, the sagacity and the ethical experimentation of long centuries; it brings things to a conclusion; it no longer creates. The prerequisite to a codification of this sort is recognition of the fact that the means which establish the authority of a slowly and painfully attained truth are fundamentally different from those which one would make use of to prove it.

A law-book never recites the utility, the grounds, the casuistical antecedents of a law: for if it did so it would lose the imperative tone, the “thou shall,” on which obedience is based. The problem lies exactly here.—At a certain point in the evolution of a people, the class within it of the greatest insight, which is to say, the greatest hindsight and foresight, declares that the series of experiences determining how all shall live—or can live—has come to an end. The object now is to reap as rich and as complete a harvest as possible from the days of experiment and hard experience.

So the creation of a code of laws is an act of power by which the law-givers say: these matters are no longer up for discussion. Nietzsche then explains how the ruling classes, having decided that the era of legal experimentation is over, create what Marx would have called “the superstructure”, the over-arching set of narratives that the ruling classes use to preserve their power.

In consequence, the thing that is to be avoided above everything is further experimentation—the continuation of the state in which values are fluent, and are tested, chosen and criticized ad infinitum. Against this a double wall is set up: on the one hand, revelation, which is the assumption that the reasons lying behind the laws are not of human origin, that they were not sought out and found by a slow process and after many errors, but that they are of divine ancestry, and came into being complete, perfect, without a history, as a free gift, a miracle…; and on the other hand, tradition, which is the assumption that the law has stood unchanged from time immemorial, and that it is impious and a crime against one’s forefathers to bring it into question.

The authority of the law is thus grounded on the thesis: God gave it, and the fathers lived it.—The higher motive of such procedure lies in the design to distract consciousness, step by step, from its concern with notions of right living (that is to say, those that have been proved to be right by wide and carefully considered experience), so that instinct attains to a perfect automatism—a primary necessity to every sort of mastery, to every sort of perfection in the art of life.

To draw up such a law-book as Manu’s means to lay before a people the possibility of future mastery, of attainable perfection—it permits them to aspire to the highest reaches of the art of life. To that end the thing must be made unconscious: that is the aim of every holy lie … – Nietzsche, The Antichrist

He then goes on to justify the caste system, which does not concern us for the purposes of this essay. I mainly wish to note that, against the conservative analysis we find in Nietzsche–who seeks to remind us of the original advantages that certified the ancient laws–we can posit the case for adaptability, progress and evolution of the legal code according to mutual advantage in the ancient Epicureans–who advocate for a fluid legal system that allows for perpetual processes of experimentation and adaptation.

Among the things held to be just by law, whatever is proved to be of advantage in men’s dealings has the stamp of justice, whether or not it be the same for all; but if a man makes a law and it does not prove to be mutually advantageous, then this is no longer just. And if what is mutually advantageous varies and only for a time corresponds to our concept of justice, nevertheless for that time it is just for those who do not trouble themselves about empty words, but look simply at the facts.

Where without any change in circumstances the things held to be just by law are seen not to correspond with the concept of justice in actual practice, such laws are not really just; but wherever the laws have ceased to be advantageous because of a change in circumstances, in that case the laws were for that time just when they were advantageous for the mutual dealings of the citizens, and subsequently ceased to be just when they were no longer advantageous.

Epicurus’ Principal Doctrines 37-38

Notice that, first and foremost, it is clear that men create the laws and that men have, at any point, the power to change them. Epicureans never allow for a “holy lie” to even plant its roots in the soil of philosophy. While Epicurean doctrines seem to allow for an aristocratic code (things of advantage may or may not be “the same for all”), we also find in the Epicurean sources a lack of emphasis on the priorities of the ruling class, and instead an egalitarian, anarchic, and–most importantly–pragmatic focus on mutual benefit.

In Book 5 of On the Nature of Things, Lucretius mentions how “neighbors began to form mutual alliances, wishing neither to do nor to suffer violence among themselves“, echoing again the indication that Epicureans believed contractarianism to be the earliest type of law.

Dialogue on the Extent to Which the Declaration of Independence is Consistent With Epicurean Philosophy

The following is an edited dialogue that took place on our Epicurean Friends forum.

Cassius. This is to pose a series of questions about one of the most famous passages of the American “Declaration of Independence.” As discussion develops on one or more of these in particular we can split the discussion into separate threads, but to start here is a list of questions:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, — That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

What do we know about whether this paragraph was written entirely by Thomas Jefferson, or contains modifications from others?

Hiram. According to this source,

Who wrote the Declaration of Independence?

Although we know Thomas Jefferson as the true author, the Second Continental Congress initially appointed five people to draw up a declaration. The committee included Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, Roger Sherman, Robert Livingston and Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson was then given the task of writing a draft for the Declaration of Independence, which from June 11 to June 28 he worked on. Before he presented the Declaration to the Continental Congress, he showed it to John Adams and Benjamin Franklin; they made revisions. He presented the draft to Congress on July 1, 1776 and more revisions were made. On the fourth of July the delegates met in what we know today as Independence Hall, but back then was known as the Pennsylvania State House, and approved the Declaration. John Hancock, the President of the Continental Congress signed the declaration along with Charles Thomson and it was sent to John Dunlap’s print shop for printing.

So it seems like this was a process not too different from how we have co-written together the narratives for videos on YouTube and some of our dialogues. Jefferson wrote it with feedback from four other men who were, presumably, steeped in the political philosophy of the day (Locke, Rousseau, and others).

Cassius. Yes that is exactly what would need to be analyzed in order to determine how much of the final result came about through Epicurean thinking, and how much was diluted/mutated by Christian or other ideas.

I am not aware that copies of the initial draft survive, but as we proceed with this investigation, if anyone has more detail on who added what, and when, that would be great.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.

Would an Epicurean agree that what follows in the paragraph after the first phrase are “self-evident?” What does “self-evident” mean?

Would an Epicurean agree that “all men are created equal.” It is absolutely clear that all men are NOT created equal in every respect (health, sex, race, capabilities, preferences, etc.) It is also clear to an Epicurean that men are not “created” if that term implies a supernatural god. In what respect, if any, would an Epicurean say that “all men are created equal.”

What does it mean to say “endowed by their Creator?” Would an Epicurean use this phrasing? If so, what would an Epicurean mean by “their Creator?”

What are “inalienable rights”? What is a “right”? How is a right “inalienable”?” It seems clear that this cannot be read superficially, as much of what we think of as “rights” are certainly taken from people all the time and thus are not “inalienable.” In what way, if any, can this phrase be reconciled with Epicurean philosophy?

What does the phrase “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” mean in Epicurean terms?

Hiram. I don’t think they are self-evident, or that Epicurus would agree that men were created (as there is no creator).

We know today that men evolved through natural selection, and that nature did not have an intention of creating men or any other particular species. Natural selection follows the path of least resistance, of greatest opportunity / advantage, if and when / insofar as species are able to adapt to their environment.

The document was written in the context of setting the grounds / seeds for a new country with a new law and a new constitutional framework. An Epicurean would consider these matters in terms of mutual benefit / mutual advantage. Within this context, I think “self-evident” implies that these are matters beyond reproach and that are not up for negotiation, that they constitute the minimum standard by which they were willing to found a new country and a new law, that the social contract would have to abide by these principles.

Men are not ‘created’. If we understand nature, metaphorically, as Creatrix, then we may concede this, but there is WAY too much religious baggage here to accept it in my view.

We are endowed by nature with certain instincts and faculties and tendencies, and (a very strong case can be made) with a sense of morality and justice, but not with rights, inalienable or not.

Rights are born from the laws or rules we create to facilitate co-existence. The only way in which we could say that they come from “the Creator” or “Nature” is if we ourselves are understood to be co-creators or part of nature, and you could make that case, but it’s best to speak clearly, and the original language seems to indicate a Creator in the deist sense, which is an error.

“Life, liberty, pursuit of happiness” – I want to go back to the idea of negotiating a new social contract for a new country, if I was Thomas Jefferson and if I had to negotiate the terms under which I, as an Epicurean, wanted to or was forced to co-exist with others OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTION, these ideas would definitely belong there. I would not care if others believe that these “inalienable rights” come from “the Creator” if, for the sake of mutual benefit, these rules are agreeable to me and others, even if I’d rather not word these principles as inalienable rights coming from a Creator.

In other words, this is a Charter for religious and non-religious people of various convictions and faiths to co-exist, and what pass for “inalienable rights” are acceptable to a non-religious person.

Life is safety; liberty is autarchy; and pursuit of happiness is self-explanatory and a natural extension of liberty; these are natural pleasures, and necessary to happiness and life in Epicurean terms.

That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

Cassius. This passage is perhaps easiest to reconcile given the Principle Doctrines on “justice.” How could we elaborate on this in Epicurean terms as to the meaning of “just powers” and “consent of the governed?

Hiram. As for “just powers”, PD 37 speaks of them in terms of mutual advantage, and these powers may change and evolve and apply differently in different situations and to different people:

Among the things held to be just by law, whatever is proved to be of advantage in men’s dealings has the stamp of justice, whether or not it be the same for all; but if a man makes a law and it does not prove to be mutually advantageous, then this is no longer just. And if what is mutually advantageous varies and only for a time corresponds to our concept of justice, nevertheless for that time it is just for those who do not trouble themselves about empty words, but look simply at the facts.

Concrete examples in our own constitutional framework is how states have their rights and their form of sovereignty, versus how the federal government has its own rights and form of sovereignty and its own jurisdiction, versus how the different Indian Nations and Reservations have their own rights and forms of sovereignty, their own schools, police, etc. all according to mutual benefit.

That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

Cassius. Again, this passage seems directly supported by the Principle Doctrines on justice. How would an Epicurean elaborate on the meaning of this passage?

Hiram. This is an application of PD 37-38:

Where without any change in circumstances the things held to be just by law are seen not to correspond with the concept of justice in actual practice, such laws are not really just; but wherever the laws have ceased to be advantageous because of a change in circumstances, in that case the laws were for that time just when they were advantageous for the mutual dealings of the citizens, and subsequently ceased to be just when they were no longer advantageous.

The Declaration only mentions “safety and happiness”, which is a good start, but in the Letter to Menoeceus we find mention among the things that are needful and natural also of health of the body and tranquility of mind, of avoiding bodily uneasiness (threats, plagues, exploitation or slavery), which seems to imply that an Epicurean system of government would also be invested in public health, including mental health:

And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live. He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a blessed life.

Are there any other Jefferson sources that may illuminate some of these questions?

Cassius. I especially think that this observation is of huge significance, and once we understand that our entire perspective on justice changes. It’s from Thomas Jefferson’s Epistle to James Madison, sent from Paris on Sept. 6, 1789:

I set out on this ground which I suppose to be self evident, “that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living;” that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it. The portion occupied by an individual ceases to be his when himself ceases to be, and reverts to the society. If the society has formed no rules for the appropriation of its lands in severalty, it will be taken by the first occupants. These will generally be the wife and children of the decedent. If they have formed rules of appropriation, those rules may give it to the wife and children, or to some one of them, or to the legatee of the deceased. So they may give it to his creditor. But the child, the legatee or creditor takes it, not by any natural right, but by a law of the society of which they are members, and to which they are subject.

Hiram. So the key here is that rights are not “natural”, or “nature-given”, or “God-given”. They are created by the people who form the societies. And these rights and regulations can be changed by the people who form the societies.

“Please always remember my doctrines!” – Epicurus’ last words