Category Archives: epicurus

The Parable of the Hunter

“There are many scenarios that we can think about where either justice or prudence is lacking, and so the life of pleasure is not complete and cannot be labeled Epicurean. These exercises of putting before our eyes various hypothetical scenarios, or thinking back to real ones we’ve encountered, may help to demonstrate what the founders were thinking about and discussing when they established Principal Doctrine 5.”

In a previous article, Hiram discussed action theory within Epicureanism and offered the training tool of the ‘Four Sisters’ of pleasure, prudence, nobility, and justice. Let us put the following hypothetical scenario under the scrutiny of our eyes to understand better how the ‘Four Sisters’ tradition shapes our actions and inform the decisions we make within the Epicurean framework.

The Parable of the Hunter

A long time ago, the world was cold and life was harsh. Deep in the Ice Age of Europe, there existed a hunter-gatherer tribe, a band of early humans. One member of the tribe was designated as the Hunter, whereas other members of the tribe filled different roles in the community. They naturally developed amongst themselves a proto-economy of bartering – the Hunter provides meat, and in return receives other gathered foods, crafted goods, and services in exchange.

Normally, all the members of the tribe would wait out the winter, relying on the food supply they had built up over the warm seasons. However, it has been a particularly harsh winter and the food is running out. With careful rationing, it looks like there is only enough food for the tribe to last a month or so before starvation sets in.

In a measure of desperation, the community decides to set aside a large share of its remaining food for the Hunter’s personal needs on the promise that the Hunter will go off into the wilderness for a period of time and return with an animal to alleviate the coming hunger. After sharing, the tribe has less than two weeks’ worth of food remaining, whereas the Hunter’s food is enough for him to survive the frigid landscape without help for about as long as the tribe would while waiting for him, not longer. He will need to keep his energy up if he is to be successful in the hunt, and carrying back an animal will also be very tiring. So, he will be consuming more food than his friends and family back home. The Hunter gives his word, SWEARING AN OATH that he will return before what little they have left runs out.

After the Hunter has left and wandered far enough away from the tribe to not be observed, he sits down by a fire to collect his thoughts and develop a plan of action. A number of options are present to choose from.

He feels a PAIN in his stomach and so eats some of the berries from his pouch, mildly addressing his hunger. He also reduces the pain of thirst with a swig of water from his leather waterskin. After doing so, he reflects on the PLEASURE of consumption and realizes that he can continue to indulge these pleasures because of the large amount of food in his bag. He could abandon his mission and keep the food for himself, continuing to eat and drink until he is beyond satisfied. However, he quickly realizes that this would cause him to run out of food much faster than he had planned, and hunger would quickly set in again before he has the means to ensure his long-term satisfaction. Recognizing this, he decides to continue the hunt and re-evaluate his situation when closer to his prey.

Due to seasonal migration, the herds of elk have ventured far from the tribe’s village. After a trek of about a week, the perilous Hunter tracks the herd to a semi-barren woodland, with barely enough morsels of foliage left for their graze. As an accomplished Hunter does, he stalks his prey until the most opportune time to strike. It would be worse for him to miss with his bow and arrow and have to give chase to the herd once it has started to run off, so he bides his time.

While he waits for the sun to rise on the last night before his planned final rendezvous with his quarry, he contemplates the future. The winter should be ending soon and the snows will melt in three weeks or so. He notes that with the food he has been given, he could just about make it to that time if he exerts himself less from now onwards and forgets about the idea of bringing back any animal he manages to find tomorrow. What’s more, with any animal at all he would actually be in a state of abundance, relying on the elk meat primarily and saving his packed food as a backup.

These ideas are all pleasant to him at first, until his mind focuses back to the condition of his friends and family that he would have to leave behind. It pains him to think about them all dying of starvation, and what is more, he would feel a pang of guilt when they realize that he betrayed his word and won’t be coming back.

Additionally, if by some chance a few of them did manage to survive to the springtime, he would live in perpetual FEAR of being hunted, for he knows that some of the elders and youths of the tribe also have some knowledge of tracking. Such a violation could not go unpunished and they would pursue his trail until they found him and exacted JUSTICE. Taking all of these possible future scenarios in mind, he knows what the best thing to do is.

The dawn arrives and the Hunter comes upon the herd, which had not traveled much further. The elk are loosely dispersed among trees, searching for hardy berries and other edible leaves. They aren’t too picky and options are scarce. One of the animals nearest to him munches away blissfully and unknowingly. Being very skilled, the Hunter carefully sights his bow, waiting for the exact moment. He looses his stone-tipped arrow and it finds its mark. He whispers lowly a solemn word of thankfulness to the animal. After some time, he prepares a makeshift sled and loads his handiwork on it to ease his return to his tribe and his people.

After some two weeks of absence, the Hunter returns to his village to find the people just barely holding on. Hunger had set in, but not yet death. Upon seeing him, they rush over and form a cheerful parade. He greets them one by one, exchanging glances, smiles, and intimate embraces. They REJOICE to see that his journey was a success and that he has brought with him the means for all to survive to the next season. They express a deep and sincere GRATITUDE for what symbolizes to them the guarantee of the continuation of life, in spite of all the DIFFICULTIES that it may come with. The Hunter rejoices tearfully with his friends and family and derives PLEASURE not just from the RECOGNITION of familiar faces who were eager to greet him or the quenching of thirst and satiation of hunger at the subsequent feast, but also from the NOBILITY of his own personal character, which GUIDED him to CHOOSE the most pleasant possible outcome, in conformity with PRUDENCE and JUSTICE.

Dewdrops glisten in the leaves of the trees and on the blades of grass. Spring has arrived and the tribe lives on to see another day. Though all these events happened a very long time ago and all of our characters have long since departed, the BLESSEDNESS of the memories of their time spent together and the friendships they enjoyed live on as IMMORTAL GOODS.

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Review of the ethical considerations of this Parable:

1) Course of action solely guided by pleasure but lacking prudence and justice:

The hunter continues to pursue the pleasure of consumption without regard for his inventory or the future.

Projected Result: Short-term pleasure but long-term pain. Pleasure not at its limit.

2) Course of action guided by pleasure and some prudence but lacking justice:

The hunter considers keeping his kill for himself and not returning to the tribe, instead waiting out the winter on his own with his supply and kill.

Projected Result: A longer-term pleasure than previous, but the nagging anxiety of being hunted is inescapable. Pleasure not at its limit.

3) Course of action guided by pleasure and justice and prudence:

The hunter honors his oath and returns with the food for the tribe. He keeps faith with the tribe and in return receives the pleasure of gratitude, of seeing their faces again, of sharing meals, of recognizing his own personal character, and of being accepted into a community of loved ones providing friendship and protection from the hardships of the state of nature.

Result: Longest-term pleasure of all. Pleasure at its limit.

Prudence and the recognition of the pact of natural justice has helped our hunter to ascertain that without these, all would lead to outcomes deficient in pleasures and with significant accompanying pains in the long term. Pleasure is still the sovereign guide, but it needs the counsel and advice of practical wisdom and just action to ensure the most complete life.

This article was composed by Friend Harmonious.

PD 6: On Methods of Exegesis

Over the last few weeks, I have been publishing essays expounding the Principal Doctrines. It has been a very enjoyable intellectual exercise. I’ve learned that it’s an error to take the PD’s for granted and to think that we know everything there is to know about them. In the process of writing these essays, I have been considering the various methods of exegesis that are available to us, and what method(s) might be the most useful for each PD.

The Contextual Method

My main method has been to try to reconstruct or discern (based on the text) what discussions or conversations took place among the founders, that led to these statements being established as authoritative conclusions of the Garden. I’m calling this the method of contextualization.

Clearly, the founders meant for the 40 Principal Doctrines to stand separate from the rest of the textual evidence we have. They are meant to be the forty most important ideas that a student must either revere or study (or both). By what line of thinking, by what arguments, did these 40 conclusions attain their superior status? I began to evaluate this in my study of PDs 24 and 28, on the utility of dogmatism.

The Literal Method

Another method of exegesis (that is, interpretation) is to stick to the literal translation of the text. If we know the original Greek language, we may focus on the anticipation–the initial empirical attestation and conception of each word–in order to deconstruct each PD word-for-word, and glean clarity. These two methods are not mutually exclusive, and are both useful and necessary.

We know from sermons given by Epicurus–like the one Against empty words–that the founders were very adamant on using clear, concise language. They went as far as coining new terms when conventional language failed, as attested again by their own theory of the evolution of language. So there was no frivolous expression in the PD’s … but then there’s PD 6.

This is a case where the literal reconstruction and the anticipation of each word is necessary because the choice of words in the original was apparently so awkward, so specific, and attempted to be so clear, that most modern readers get lost in translation. So I had to contact a member of the Society of Friends of Epicurus who knows Greek, Panos, who helped me to get a grasp of what the words actually mean. Here is the original:

ἕνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ανθρώπων ἦν κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας ἀγαθόν, ἐξ ὧν ἄν ποτε τοῦτο οἷός τʼᾖ παρασκευάζεσθαι.

This was translated by Hicks as:

In order to obtain security from other people any means whatever of procuring this was a natural good.

It’s not clear to me why he used the past tense (“was a natural good”). If that’s in the original, it may mean that the original doctrine was meant to justify some event or action taken in the past. The Church of Epicurus translation says:

The natural good of public office and kingship is for the sake of getting confidence from [other] men, [at least] from those from whom one is able to provide this.

In this translation, we can appreciate the common interpretation of the PD as justifying ANY form of government that procures security. We could also interpret it as meaning that security is one of (but not the only) the reasons or purposes for setting up a form of government. And the Peter St. Andre translation says:

It is a natural benefit of leadership and kingship to take courage from other men (or at least from the sort of men who can give one courage).

Security, confidence, and courage all mean different things in English. The Epicuros site in modern Greek language has a version of the PD’s, the sixth of which Panos translates from modern Greek as:

With the goal of acquiring security against people, there was (always) the natural good of dominance and of kingship, through which (someone) could sometimes achieve this.

According to Panos,

I get a kinda opposite meaning of what I see in other translations. But it’s a pretty hard sentence to accurately translate …

Because of being afraid of people is right by the nature of authority and dominion, from which things (authority and dominion) if ever be able to prepare (against).

So basically the idea I get is:

It’s right to be prepared against people, just in case, because of oppression and authority.

… It does not say “it’s ok to use oppression and authority” as some translations I saw.

So the PD does not justify violence (which would go against the doctrines on justice based on avoiding mutual harm and seeking mutual benefit), or the overthrow of government (which would be out of line with the non-political nature of our ethics). Here is how Panos breaks down the words:

ἕνεκα: on account of (/regarding // because of)

τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ανθρώπων: the (tharrein)* from people
–*Tharrein: this word can mean either (a) to be afraid of, or (b) to take courage from!

ἦν κατὰ φύσιν: it was by nature (/quality)

ἀρχῆς: of authority

καὶ βασιλείας: and of dominion (/kingship)

ἀγαθόν, : good (morally good)

ἐξ ὧν : from which (genitive plural)

ἄν ποτε : at some time (/if ever)

τοῦτο: that thing (accusative sing.)

οἷός τʼᾖ : he is able (γʹ ενικ. υποτ. Ενεργ. ενεστ. | 3rd sing. subjunctive active present )

παρασκευάζεσθαι. : to be ready (/prepared)

And again:

ἕνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ανθρώπων
because of the (tharrein) from people

ἦν κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας ἀγαθόν
it was morally good by nature of authority and dominion

ἐξ ὧν
from which (plural which: so the which must refer to: “authority and dominion”)

ἄν ποτε τοῦτο
if ever that thing (which thing? τουτο is neutral accusative singular, so it is talking about a singular neutral object. From the words above, the only candidates are αγαθόν, and θαρρείν (tharrein). I think the only word that makes sense is tharrein…)

οἷός τʼᾖ παρασκευάζεσθαι
he is able (to be) prepare(d)
(so this is subjunctive active which is something like: I expect you prepare. It’s really hard to translate exactly but it’s not that important.)

With Panos finally concluding:

So the way I am seeing this:

Because of being afraid of people is right by the nature of authority and dominion, from which things (authority and dominion) if ever be able to prepare (against).

From all that I’ve read, it seems clear to me that the Hicks translation is flawed. It says

In order to obtain security from other people any means whatever of procuring this was a natural good.

Hicks makes an absolute claim that seems out of place in Epicurean philosophy, where all choices and avoidances must be subjected to hedonic calculus. I do not see mention of “any means necessary” in the original, and I suspect this translation may appeal to people with certain military ideas.

I wish to thank Panos for his assistance. The process we see above is the literal method, which seeks to know the initial pre-conception that belongs to each word chosen for this PD, and which assumes and trusts that the founders chose their words very carefully.

PD 6 in Light of Other Surviving Passages

The idea of the PD is that security is a natural and necessary pleasure. This idea is also expressed in the Epistle to Menoeceus, so it seems indigenous and accurate within an Epicurean list of key opinions.

PD 6 appears to justify (limited) (service to a) political power or civic engagement for the sake of safety. Vatican Saying 39 associates friendship with “help in the future”, and links true friendship with safety. Vatican Saying 67 criticizes “servility to mobs and monarchs“, and seems to imply that we get more safety from friends than from politics. Finally, VS 80 posits a (partly) attitudinal definition of security, one that is in the soul and not in the realm of society or politics:

The first measure of security is to watch over one’s youth and to guard against what makes havoc of all by means of maddening desires.

A young man’s share in deliverance comes from watching over the prime of his life and warding off what will ruin everything through frenzied desires. (Monadnock translation)

VS 80 is a salvific passage. It uses the word “soterías” in the original. Soter means Savior. Epicurus was seen as a Savior by later generations because of his salvific doctrine. PD’s 10-13 also discuss a form of attitudinal safety: by learning a scientific account of the nature of things, we protect ourselves from superstition. PD 14 concludes this discussion:

Although some measure of safety from other people is based in the power to fight them off and in abundant wealth, the purest security comes from solitude and breaking away from the herd.

In light of context, PD 6 does not refer to this attitudinal sense of safety in the soul (as PDs 10-14 do), or being safe from limitless desires. It also does not refer to weapons or warfare, or constitute a call to violence. The later Lucretian jeremiad (in Book V) against the propagation of weapons after metal working was discovered, and Philodemus’ advice in On Property Management against taking up a military career, appear to confirm a general lack of affinity for warfare among the ancient Epicureans.

Based on the textual evidence we have seen, we may conclude that the necessary measure of safety for an Epicurean is mainly attained by association with friends and by avoiding certain people (PD 39). I will close with Panos’ suggested translation, and with an invitation to all sincere students to study these texts on their own.

It’s right to be prepared against people, just in case, because of oppression and authority.

PD 8: The Doctrine of Deferred Gratification

The practice of calculating hedons and dolons (units of pleasure and pain) in order to arrive at a path of action that leads to net pleasure was invented by the Cyrenaic pleasure philosopher known as Anniceris, who is sometimes called a “proto-Epicurean”. In Epicurean writings, hedonic calculus is also spoken of in terms of measuring advantages versus disadvantages. PD 8 is a simple observation that justifies hedonic calculus. It calls for occasional deferred gratification. It says:

No pleasure is bad in itself; but the means of paying for some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.

In his Epistle to Menoeceus, Epicurus elaborated the process of hedonic calculus:

And because this is the primary and inborn good, we do not choose every pleasure. Instead, we pass up many pleasures when we will gain more of what we need from doing so. And we consider many pains to be better than pleasures, if we experience a greater pleasure for a long time from having endured those pains. So every pleasure is a good thing because its nature is favorable to us, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen — just as every pain is a bad thing, yet not every pain is always to be shunned. It is proper to make all these decisions through measuring things side by side and looking at both the advantages and disadvantages, for sometimes we treat a good thing as bad and a bad thing as good.

The easiest examples of this doctrine are found in our natural limits to drugs or alcohol, and to food. For instance, I can generally drink one beer and enjoy it, but by the second or third beer, I typically do not like how I feel, so I avoid drinking the second beer. I also remember the dehydration and other symptoms of a hangover, which keep me from being productive the following day. As for food, both gaining weight and the feeling of having eaten too much are unpleasant. One feels lethargic and tired, and one can’t think clearly when one overeats.

Another example of deferred gratification for me was when I decided to finish my college education. I had no social life, was very poor, ate Ramen noodles frequently, and had to work temp jobs on the side to make ends sort-of meet. It was a difficult time at the tail-end of a period of under-employment, but I had set a goal: I wanted to finish what I started years ago. With great pride, I graduated Magna Cum Laude (one of the highest honors). I had chosen a minor in Communication, which led to my book Tending the Epicurean Garden being published. I also started publishing essays in various outlets, all of which had been part of my goal.

Metrodorus of Lampsacus, the co-founder of Epicureanism, often reminded his companions that for the sake of certain goods we have to take certain risks and go through certain difficulties. He was always referring all moral problems to the process of hedonic calculus and to the related process of deferred gratification. He accentuated health and friendship as two goods for the sake of which we go to great lengths and make many sacrifices, because without them we suffer greatly. If we lose a friend or loved one, we suffer, so we may put up with discomforts to help them from time to time. If we lose our health, we suffer, so we may make dietary changes or exercise in order to preserve our health.

Hedonic calculus is the reason why Epicureanism is a hedonism with an asterisk, a qualified hedonism. It’s confusing to call it a hedonist ethics without elaborating on the concept of hedonic calculus and deferred gratification. So if someone ever asks you for a short introduction to Epicurean ethics, do not say it’s “just hedonism”: say it’s a pleasure ethics that calls for a calculated, rational pursuit of pleasure, using hedonic calculus and deferred gratification whenever prudent. If asked about hedonic calculus, you may cite PD 8 and the relevant portion of the Epistle to Menoeceus, or simply explain that it’s a calculation of pleasures versus pains, and/or of advantages versus disadvantages in order to carry out our choices and avoidances successfully (=producing net pleasure).

On Thomas Jefferson’s Epicureanism and Slavery

“The greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom.” – Vatican Sayings, 77

Epicurus’ philosophy is not only a philosophy of happiness, but it is also a philosophy of liberty. Epicurus emancipates the mind from the primeval horrors that seek to enslave it. Just as Helios casts out the shadows of the world, Epicurus illuminates the darkness of ignorance, and provides the foundation for living a life of freedom from fear and uncertainty.

That being said, I have recently returned from my travels to Monticello, where I reflected on what it means to be an Epicurean and on the many ways Thomas Jefferson fell short of what I had hoped and anticipated the more I learned about his life. After collecting my thoughts and synthesizing information across multiple sources, here is my attempt to evaluate the history of slavery within Epicureanism and to make sense of the contradictory life of Thomas Jefferson.

(The following was written by contributor Harmonious and reflects the opinions of the author.)

On Thomas Jefferson’s Epicureanism and Slavery

Epicurus’ Epistle to Herodotus

Teachers of Epicureanism have always encouraged students to write down summaries of the doctrines for easy memorization, and outlines (often in the form of letters) were used widely as memory aids. Beginning-level Epicureans used to carry a Little Epitome with them, which was believed to be Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus. Once they assimilated the teachings of this epistle, which may have been a very short summary of Epicurus’ 37 books “On Nature”, they moved on to the Big Epitome where they were able to learn the advanced teachings.

The Epistle to Herodotus is a seminal work of natural philosophy and an important window into the history of early Western and scientific thought. It contains the earliest extant conversations between ancient atomists, and documents the progression of their arguments from the doctrine of atoms and void to their natural cosmology. It was preserved as part of Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Book Ten. In this translation, we have preserved the paragraph numbers used by most scholars for ease of reference.

Epicurus’ Epistle to Herodotus

“Epicurus to Herodotus, greeting.

On the importance of outlines and summaries

“For those who are unable to study carefully all my physical writings or to go into the longer treatises at all, I have myself prepared an epitome of the whole system, Herodotus, to preserve in the memory enough of the principal doctrines, to the end that on every occasion they may be able to aid themselves on the most important points, so far as they take up the study of Physics. Those who have made some advance in the survey of the entire system ought to fix in their minds under the principal headings an elementary outline of the whole treatment of the subject. For a comprehensive view is often required, the details but seldom.

“To the former, then – the main heads – we must continually return, and must memorize them so far as to get a valid conception of the facts, as well as the means of discovering all the details exactly when once the general outlines are rightly understood and remembered; since it is the privilege of the mature student to make a ready use of his conceptions by referring every one of them to elementary facts and simple terms. For it is impossible to gather up the results of continuous diligent study of the entirety of things, unless we can embrace in short formulas and hold in mind all that might have been accurately expressed even to the minutest detail.

“Hence, since such a course is of service to all who take up natural science, I, who devote to the subject my continuous energy and reap the calm enjoyment of a life like this, have prepared for you just such an epitome and manual of the doctrines as a whole.

Using the canon: anticipations, sensations, feelings

“In the first place, Herodotus, you must understand what it is that words denote, in order that by reference to this we may be in a position to test opinions, inquiries, or problems, so that our proofs may not run on untested ad infinitum, nor the terms we use be empty of meaning.

For the primary meaning of every term employed must be clearly seen, and ought to need no proving this being necessary, if we are to have something to which the point at issue or the problem or the opinion before us can be referred.

“Next, we must by all means stick to our sensations, that is, simply to the present impressions whether of the mind or of any criterion whatever, and similarly to our actual feelings, in order that we may have the means of determining that which needs confirmation and that which is obscure.

Nothing comes from nothing

“When this is clearly understood, it is time to consider generally things which are obscure. To begin with, nothing comes into being out of what is non-existent. For in that case anything would have arisen out of anything, standing as it would in no need of its proper germs.

And if that which disappears had been destroyed and become non-existent, everything would have perished, that into which the things were dissolved being non-existent. Moreover, the sum total of things was always such as it is now, and such it will ever remain. For there is nothing into which it can change. For outside the sum of things there is nothing which could enter into it and bring about the change.

Particles in space

“Further, the whole of being consists of bodies and space. For the existence of bodies is everywhere attested by sense itself, and it is upon sensation that reason must rely when it attempts to infer the unknown from the known.

And if there were no space (which we call also void and place and intangible nature), bodies would have nothing in which to be and through which to move, as they are plainly seen to move. Beyond bodies and space there is nothing which by mental apprehension or on its analogy we can conceive to exist. When we speak of bodies and space, both are regarded as wholes or separate things, not as the properties or accidents of separate things.

Bodies are either elementary or composite

“Again, of bodies some are composite, others the elements of which these composite bodies are made.

These elements are indivisible and unchangeable, and necessarily so, if things are not all to be destroyed and pass into non-existence, but are to be strong enough to endure when the composite bodies are broken up, because they possess a solid nature and are incapable of being anywhere or anyhow dissolved. It follows that the first beginnings must be indivisible, corporeal entities.

Universe is infinite

“Again, the sum of things is infinite. For what is finite has an extremity, and the extremity of anything is discerned only by comparison with something else. (Now the sum of things is not discerned by comparison with anything else: hence, since it has no extremity, it has no limit; and, since it has no limit, it must be unlimited or infinite.

“Moreover, the sum of things is unlimited both by reason of the multitude of the atoms and the extent of the void.

For if the void were infinite and bodies finite, the bodies would not have stayed anywhere but would have been dispersed in their course through the infinite void, not having any supports or counter-checks to send them back on their upward rebound. Again, if the void were finite, the infinity of bodies would not have anywhere to be.

Particles and primary elements have a limited variety of properties (1)

“Furthermore, the atoms, which have no void in them – out of which composite bodies arise and into which they are dissolved – vary indefinitely in their shapes; for so many varieties of things as we see could never have arisen out of a recurrence of a definite number of the same shapes. The like atoms of each shape are absolutely infinite; but the variety of shapes, though indefinitely large, is not absolutely infinite. [For neither does the divisibility go on “ad infinitum,” he says below; but he adds, since the qualities change, unless one is prepared to keep enlarging their magnitudes also simply “ad infinitum.”] (2)

Particles are always moving

“The atoms are in continual motion through all eternity.

[Further, he says below, that the atoms move with equal speed, since the void makes way for the lightest and heaviest alike.] Some of them rebound to a considerable distance from each other, while others merely oscillate in one place when they chance to have got entangled or to be enclosed by a mass of other atoms shaped for entangling.

“This is because each atom is separated from the rest by void, which is incapable of offering any resistance to the rebound; while it is the solidity of the atom which makes it rebound after a collision, however short the distance to which it rebounds, when it finds itself imprisoned in a mass of entangling atoms. Of all this there is no beginning, since both atoms and void exist from everlasting. [He says below that atoms have no quality at all except shape, size, and weight. But that colour varies with the arrangement of the atoms he states in his “Twelve Rudiments”; further, that they are not of any and every size; at any rate no atom has ever been seen by our sense.]

“The repetition at such length of all that we are now recalling to mind furnishes an adequate outline for our conception of the nature of things.

The doctrine of innumerable worlds

“Moreover, there is an infinite number of worlds, some like this world, others unlike it. For the atoms being infinite in number, as has just been proved, are borne ever further in their course. For the atoms out of which a world might arise, or by which a world might be formed, have not all been expended on one world or a finite number of worlds, whether like or unlike this one. Hence there will be nothing to hinder an infinity of worlds.

The nature of photons (films) and the speed of light

“Again, there are outlines or films, which are of the same shape as solid bodies, but of a thinness far exceeding that of any object that we see. For it is not impossible that there should be found in the surrounding air combinations of this kind, materials adapted for expressing the hollowness and thinness of surfaces, and effluxes preserving the same relative position and motion which they had in the solid objects from which they come. To these films we give the name of ‘images’ or ‘idols.’ Furthermore, so long as nothing comes in the way to offer resistance, motion through the void accomplishes any imaginable distance in an inconceivably short time. For resistance encountered is the equivalent of slowness, its absence the equivalent of speed.

“Not that, if we consider the minute times perceptible by reason alone, the moving body itself arrives at more than one place simultaneously (for this too is inconceivable), although in time perceptible to sense it does arrive simultaneously, however different the point of departure from that conceived by us. For if it changed its direction, that would be equivalent to its meeting with resistance, even if up to that point we allow nothing to impede the rate of its flight. This is an elementary fact which in itself is well worth bearing in mind. In the next place the exceeding thinness of the images is contradicted by none of the facts under our observation. Hence also their velocities are enormous, since they always find a void passage to fit them. Besides, their incessant effluence meets with no resistance, or very little, although many atoms, not to say an unlimited number, do at once encounter resistance.

“Besides this, remember that the production of the images is as quick as thought. For particles are continually streaming off from the surface of bodies, though no diminution of the bodies is observed, because other particles take their place. And those given off for a long time retain the position and arrangement which their atoms had when they formed part of the solid bodies, although occasionally they are thrown into confusion. Sometimes such films are formed very rapidly in the air, because they need not have any solid content; and there are other modes in which they may be formed. For there is nothing in all this which is contradicted by sensation, if we in some sort look at the clear evidence of sense, to which we should also refer the continuity of particles in the objects external to ourselves.

The objects we perceive are hitting our sensory receptors with particles

“We must also consider that it is by the entrance of something coming from external objects that we see their shapes and think of them. For external things would not stamp on us their own nature of colour and form through the medium of the air which is between them and us, or by means of rays of light or currents of any sort going from us to them, so well as by the entrance into our eyes or minds, to whichever their size is suitable, of certain films coming from the things themselves, these films or outlines being of the same colour and shape as the external things themselves. They move with rapid motion;

and this again explains why they present the appearance of the single continuous object, and retain the mutual interconnexion which they had in the object, when they impinge upon the sense, such impact being due to the oscillation of the atoms in the interior of the solid object from which they come. And whatever presentation we derive by direct contact, whether it be with the mind or with the sense-organs, be it shape that is presented or other properties, this shape as presented is the shape of the solid thing, and it is due either to a close coherence of the image as a whole or to a mere remnant of its parts. Falsehood and error always depend upon the intrusion of opinion (when a fact awaits) confirmation or the absence of contradiction, which fact is afterwards frequently not confirmed (or even contradicted) [following a certain movement in ourselves connected with, but distinct from, the mental picture presented – which is the cause of error.]

Various apprehensions of the same attestation produce checks and balances

“For the presentations which, e.g., are received in a picture or arise in dreams, or from any other form of apprehension by the mind or by the other criteria of truth, would never have resembled what we call the real and true things, had it not been for certain actual things of the kind with which we come in contact. Error would not have occurred, if we had not experienced some other movement in ourselves, conjoined with, but distinct from, the perception of what is presented. And from this movement, if it be not confirmed or be contradicted, falsehood results; while, if it be confirmed or not contradicted, truth results.

“And to this view we must closely adhere, if we are not to repudiate the criteria founded on the clear evidence of the senses, nor again to throw all these things into confusion by maintaining falsehood as if it were truth.

The nature of sound

“Again, hearing takes place when a current passes from the object, whether person or thing, which emits voice or sound or noise, or produces the sensation of hearing in any way whatever. This current is broken up into homogeneous particles, which at the same time preserve a certain mutual connexion and a distinctive unity extending to the object which emitted them, and thus, for the most part, cause the perception in that case or, if not, merely indicate the presence of the external object.

For without the transmission from the object of a certain interconnexion of the parts no such sensation could arise. Therefore we must not suppose that the air itself is moulded into shape by the voice emitted or something similar; for it is very far from being the case that the air is acted upon by it in this way. The blow which is struck in us when we utter a sound causes such a displacement of the particles as serves to produce a current resembling breath, and this displacement gives rise to the sensation of hearing.

On the material nature of smells

“Again, we must believe that smelling, like hearing, would produce no sensation, were there not particles conveyed from the object which are of the proper sort for exciting the organ of smelling, some of one sort, some of another, some exciting it confusedly and strangely, others quietly and agreeably.

The properties of particles are different from those of the bodies they compose

“Moreover, we must hold that the atoms in fact possess none of the qualities belonging to things which come under our observation, except shape, weight, and size, and the properties necessarily conjoined with shape. For every quality changes, but the atoms do not change, since, when the composite bodies are dissolved, there must needs be a permanent something, solid and indissoluble, left behind, which makes change possible: not changes into or from the non-existent, but often through differences of arrangement, and sometimes through additions and subtractions of the atoms. Hence these somethings capable of being diversely arranged must be indestructible, exempt from change, but possessed each of its own distinctive mass and configuration. This must remain.

Some properties (3) are inherent, others accidental

“For in the case of changes of configuration within our experience the figure is supposed to be inherent when other qualities are stripped off, but the qualities are not supposed, like the shape which is left behind, to inhere in the subject of change, but to vanish altogether from the body. Thus, then, what is left behind is sufficient to account for the differences in composite bodies, since something at least must necessarily be left remaining and be immune from annihilation.

Particles vary in size

“Again, you should not suppose that the atoms have any and every size, lest you be contradicted by facts; but differences of size must be admitted; for this addition renders the facts of feeling and sensation easier of explanation.

But to attribute any and every magnitude to the atoms does not help to explain the differences of quality in things; moreover, in that case atoms large enough to be seen ought to have reached us, which is never observed to occur; nor can we conceive how its occurrence should be possible, i.e. that an atom should become visible.

Bodies can not be divided infinitely, or else they would be of infinite size

“Besides, you must not suppose that there are parts unlimited in number, be they ever so small, in any finite body. Hence not only must we reject as impossible subdivision ad infinitum into smaller and smaller parts, lest we make all things too weak and, in our conceptions of the aggregates, be driven to pulverize the things that exist, i.e. the atoms, and annihilate them; but in dealing with finite things we must also reject as impossible the progression ad infinitum by less and less increments.

“For when once we have said that an infinite number of particles, however small, are contained in anything, it is not possible to conceive how it could any longer be limited or finite in size. For clearly our infinite number of particles must have some size; and then, of whatever size they were, the aggregate they made would be infinite. And, in the next place, since what is finite has an extremity which is distinguishable, even if it is not by itself observable, it is not possible to avoid thinking of another such extremity next to this. Nor can we help thinking that in this way, by proceeding forward from one to the next in order, it is possible by such a progression to arrive in thought at infinity.

We may infer about the minimal particles by observing the bodies they compose

“We must consider the minimum perceptible by sense as not corresponding to that which is capable of being traversed, i.e. is extended, nor again as utterly unlike it, but as having something in common with the things capable of being traversed, though it is without distinction of parts. But when from the illusion created by this common property we think we shall distinguish something in the minimum, one part on one side and another part on the other side, it must be another minimum equal to the first which catches our eye. In fact, we see these minima one after another, beginning with the first, and not as occupying the same space; nor do we see them touch one another’s parts with their parts, but we see that by virtue of their own peculiar character (i.e. as being unit indivisibles) they afford a means of measuring magnitudes: there are more of them, if the magnitude measured is greater; fewer of them, if the magnitude measured is less.

“We must recognize that this analogy also holds of the minimum in the atom; it is only in minuteness that it differs from that which is observed by sense, but it follows the same analogy. On the analogy of things within our experience we have declared that the atom has magnitude; and this, small as it is, we have merely reproduced on a larger scale. And further, the least and simplest things must be regarded as extremities of lengths, furnishing from themselves as units the means of measuring lengths, whether greater or less, the mental vision being employed, since direct observation is impossible. For the community which exists between them and the unchangeable parts (i.e. the minimal parts of area or surface) is sufficient to justify the conclusion so far as this goes. But it is not possible that these minima of the atom should group themselves together through the possession of motion.

Doctrine of relativity: an infinite cosmos has no center, only an infinite number of points of reference

“Further, we must not assert ‘up’ or ‘down’ of that which is unlimited, as if there were a zenith or nadir. As to the space overhead, however, if it be possible to draw a line to infinity from the point where we stand, we know that never will this space – or, for that matter, the space below the supposed standpoint if produced to infinity – appear to us to be at the same time ‘up’ and ‘down’ with reference to the same point; for this is inconceivable. Hence it is possible to assume one direction of motion, which we conceive as extending upwards ad infinitum, and another downwards, even if it should happen ten thousand times that what moves from us to the spaces above our heads reaches the feet of those above us, or that which moves downwards from us the heads of those below us. None the less is it true that the whole of the motion in the respective cases is conceived as extending in opposite directions ad infinitum.

Particles in space travel at great speed unless they meet resistance

“When they are travelling through the void and meet with no resistance, the atoms must move with equal speed. Neither will heavy atoms travel more quickly than small and light ones, so long as nothing meets them, nor will small atoms travel more quickly than large ones, provided they always find a passage suitable to their size, and provided also that they meet with no obstruction. Nor will their upward or their lateral motion, which is due to collisions, nor again their downward motion, due to weight, affect their velocity. As long as either motion obtains, it must continue, quick as the speed of thought, provided there is no obstruction, whether due to external collision or to the atoms’ own weight counteracting the force of the blow.

We can not infer about particles an identical behavior as composite bodies

“Moreover, when we come to deal with composite bodies, one of them will travel faster than another, although their atoms have equal speed. This is because the atoms in the aggregates are travelling in one direction during the shortest continuous time, albeit they move in different directions in times so short as to be appreciable only by the reason, but frequently collide until the continuity of their motion is appreciated by sense. For the assumption that beyond the range of direct observation even the minute times conceivable by reason will present continuity of motion is not true in the case before us. Our canon is that direct observation by sense and direct apprehension by the mind are alone invariably true.

On the nature of the mortal soul

“Next, keeping in view our perceptions and feelings (for so shall we have the surest grounds for belief), we must recognize generally that the soul is a corporeal thing, composed of fine particles, dispersed all over the frame, most nearly resembling wind with an admixture of heat, in some respects like wind, in others like heat. But, again, there is the third part which exceeds the other two in the fineness of its particles and thereby keeps in closer touch with the rest of the frame. And this is shown by the mental faculties and feelings, by the ease with which the mind moves, and by thoughts, and by all those things the loss of which causes death. Further, we must keep in mind that soul has the greatest share in causing sensation.

Still, it would not have had sensation, had it not been somehow confined within the rest of the frame. But the rest of the frame, though it provides this indispensable condition for the soul, itself also has a share, derived from the soul, of the said quality; and yet does not possess all the qualities of soul. Hence on the departure of the soul it loses sentience. For it had not this power in itself; but something else, congenital with the body, supplied it to body: which other thing, through the potentiality actualized in it by means of motion, at once acquired for itself a quality of sentience, and, in virtue of the neighbourhood and interconnexion between them, imparted it (as I said) to the body also.

“Hence, so long as the soul is in the body, it never loses sentience through the removal of some other part. The containing sheath may be dislocated in whole or in part, and portions of the soul may thereby be lost; yet in spite of this the soul, if it manage to survive, will have sentience. But the rest of the frame, whether the whole of it survives or only a part, no longer has sensation, when once those atoms have departed, which, however few in number, are required to constitute the nature of soul. Moreover, when the whole frame is broken up, the soul is scattered and has no longer the same powers as before, nor the same motions; hence it does not possess sentience either.

“For we cannot think of it as sentient, except it be in this composite whole and moving with these movements; nor can we so think of it when the sheaths which enclose and surround it are not the same as those in which the soul is now located and in which it performs these movements.

“There is the further point to be considered, what the incorporeal can be, if, I mean, according to current usage the term is applied to what can be conceived as self-existent. But it is impossible to conceive anything that is incorporeal as self-existent except empty space. And empty space cannot itself either act or be acted upon, but simply allows a body to move through it. Hence those who call soul incorporeal speak foolishly. For if it were so, it could neither act nor be acted upon. But, as it is, both these properties, you see, plainly belong to soul.

“If, then, we bring all these arguments concerning soul to the criterion of our feelings and perceptions, and if we keep in mind the proposition stated at the outset, we shall see that the subject has been adequately comprehended in outline: which will enable us to determine the details with accuracy and confidence.

“Moreover, shapes and colours, magnitudes and weights, and in short all those qualities which are predicated of body, in so far as they are perpetual properties either of all bodies or of visible bodies, are knowable by sensation of these very properties: these, I say, must not be supposed to exist independently by themselves (for that is inconceivable),

nor yet to be non-existent, nor to be some other and incorporeal entities cleaving to body, nor again to be parts of body. We must consider the whole body in a general way to derive its permanent nature from all of them, though it is not, as it were, formed by grouping them together in the same way as when from the particles themselves a larger aggregate is made up, whether these particles be primary or any magnitudes whatsoever less than the particular whole. All these qualities, I repeat, merely give the body its own permanent nature. They all have their own characteristic modes of being perceived and distinguished, but always along with the whole body in which they inhere and never in separation from it; and it is in virtue of this complete conception of the body as a whole that it is so designated.

Accidental properties of bodies

“Again, qualities often attach to bodies without being permanent concomitants. They are not to be classed among invisible entities nor are they incorporeal. Hence, using the term ‘accidents’ in the commonest sense, we say plainly that ‘accidents’ have not the nature of the whole thing to which they belong, and to which, conceiving it as a whole, we give the name of body, nor that of the permanent properties without which body cannot be thought of. And in virtue of certain peculiar modes of apprehension into which the complete body always enters, each of them can be called an accident.

But only as often as they are seen actually to belong to it, since such accidents are not perpetual concomitants. There is no need to banish from reality this clear evidence that the accident has not the nature of that whole – by us called body – to which it belongs, nor of the permanent properties which accompany the whole. Nor, on the other hand, must we suppose the accident to have independent existence (for this is just as inconceivable in the case of accidents as in that of the permanent properties); but, as is manifest, they should all be regarded as accidents, not as permanent concomitants, of bodies, nor yet as having the rank of independent existence. Rather they are seen to be exactly as and what sensation itself makes them individually claim to be.

Time is relative and accidental

“There is another thing which we must consider carefully. We must not investigate time as we do the other accidents which we investigate in a subject, namely, by referring them to the preconceptions envisaged in our minds; but we must take into account the plain fact itself, in virtue of which we speak of time as long or short, linking to it in intimate connexion this attribute of duration. We need not adopt any fresh terms as preferable, but should employ the usual expressions about it. Nor need we predicate anything else of time, as if this something else contained the same essence as is contained in the proper meaning of the word ‘time’ (for this also is done by some). We must chiefly reflect upon that to which we attach this peculiar character of time, and by which we measure it.

No further proof is required: we have only to reflect that we attach the attribute of time to days and nights and their parts, and likewise to states of movement and states of rest, conceiving a peculiar accident of these to be this very characteristic which we express by the word ‘time.’

Bodies are ever emerging, changing, and dissolving

“After the foregoing we have next to consider that the worlds and every finite aggregate which bears a strong resemblance to things we commonly see have arisen out of the infinite. For all these, whether small or great, have been separated off from special conglomerations of atoms; and all things are again dissolved, some faster, some slower, some through the action of one set of causes, others through the action of another.

On the diversity of planets

“And further, we must not suppose that the worlds have necessarily one and the same shape. [On the contrary, in the twelfth book “On Nature” he himself says that the shapes of the worlds differ, some being spherical, some oval, others again of shapes different from these. They do not, however, admit of every shape. Nor are they living beings which have been separated from the infinite.] For nobody can prove that in one sort of world there might not be contained, whereas in another sort of world there could not possibly be, the seeds out of which animals and plants arise and all the rest of the things we see. [And the same holds good for their nurture in a world after they have arisen. And so too we must think it happens upon the earth also.]

Nature learns skills, reason and culture perfect them

“Again, we must suppose that nature too has been taught and forced to learn many various lessons by the facts themselves, that reason subsequently develops what it has thus received and makes fresh discoveries, among some tribes more quickly, among others more slowly, the progress thus made being at certain times and seasons greater, at others less.

Origin of language

“Hence even the names of things were not originally due to convention, but in the several tribes under the impulse of special feelings and special presentations of sense primitive man uttered special cries. The air thus emitted was moulded by their individual feelings or sense-presentations, and differently according to the difference of the regions which the tribes inhabited.

Subsequently whole tribes adopted their own special names, in order that their communications might be less ambiguous to each other and more briefly expressed. And as for things not visible, so far as those who were conscious of them tried to introduce any such notion, they put in circulation certain names for them, either sounds which they were instinctively compelled to utter or which they selected by reason on analogy according to the most general cause there can be for expressing oneself in such a way.

Planets or stars are not gods or moved by gods; they move by their own nature

“Nay more: we are bound to believe that in the sky revolutions, solstices, eclipses, risings and settings, and the like, take place without the ministration or command, either now or in the future, of any being who at the same time enjoys perfect bliss along with immortality.

For troubles and anxieties and feelings of anger and partiality do not accord with bliss, but always imply weakness and fear and dependence upon one’s neighbours. Nor, again, must we hold that things which are no more than globular masses of fire, being at the same time endowed with bliss, assume these motions at will. Nay, in every term we use we must hold fast to all the majesty which attaches to such notions as bliss and immortality, lest the terms should generate opinions inconsistent with this majesty. Otherwise such inconsistency will of itself suffice to produce the worst disturbance in our minds. Hence, where we find phenomena invariably recurring, the invariableness of the recurrence must be ascribed to the original interception and conglomeration of atoms whereby the world was formed.

Science protects us from superstition (4)

“Further, we must hold that to arrive at accurate knowledge of the cause of things of most moment is the business of natural science, and that happiness depends on this (viz. on the knowledge of celestial and atmospheric phenomena), and upon knowing what the heavenly bodies really are, and any kindred facts contributing to exact knowledge in this respect.

Polyvalent logic so long as superstitions are discarded

“Further, we must recognize on such points as this no plurality of causes or contingency, but must hold that nothing suggestive of conflict or disquiet is compatible with an immortal and blessed nature. And the mind can grasp the absolute truth of this.

On the limited usefulness of science for our happiness (5)

“But when we come to subjects for special inquiry, there is nothing in the knowledge of risings and settings and solstices and eclipses and all kindred subjects that contributes to our happiness; but those who are well-informed about such matters and yet are ignorant what the heavenly bodies really are, and what are the most important causes of phenomena, feel quite as much fear as those who have no such special information – nay, perhaps even greater fear, when the curiosity excited by this additional knowledge cannot find a solution or understand the subordination of these phenomena to the highest causes.

“Hence, if we discover more than one cause that may account for solstices, settings and risings, eclipses and the like, as we did also in particular matters of detail, we must not suppose that our treatment of these matters fails of accuracy, so far as it is needful to ensure our tranquillity and happiness.

Infer about the non-evident and heavenly phenomena based on the evident

When, therefore, we investigate the causes of celestial and atmospheric phenomena, as of all that is unknown, we must take into account the variety of ways in which analogous occurrences happen within our experience; while as for those who do not recognize the difference between what is or comes about from a single cause and that which may be the effect of any one of several causes, overlooking the fact that the objects are only seen at a distance, and are moreover ignorant of the conditions that render, or do not render, peace of mind impossible – all such persons we must treat with contempt. If then we think that an event could happen in one or other particular way out of several, we shall be as tranquil when we recognize that it actually comes about in more ways than one as if we knew that it happens in this particular way.

Heavenly bodies are not sentient

“There is yet one more point to seize, namely, that the greatest anxiety of the human mind arises through the belief that the heavenly bodies are blessed and indestructible, and that at the same time they have volitions and actions and causality inconsistent with this belief; and through expecting or apprehending some everlasting evil, either because of the myths, or because we are in dread of the mere insensibility of death, as if it had to do with us; and through being reduced to this state not by conviction but by a certain irrational perversity, so that, if men do not set bounds to their terror, they endure as much or even more intense anxiety than the man whose views on these matters are quite vague.

But mental tranquillity means being released from all these troubles and cherishing a continual remembrance of the highest and most important truths.

“Hence we must attend to present feelings and sense perceptions, whether those of mankind in general or those peculiar to the individual, and also attend to all the clear evidence available, as given by each of the standards of truth. For by studying them we shall rightly trace to its cause and banish the source of disturbance and dread, accounting for celestial phenomena and for all other things which from time to time befall us and cause the utmost alarm to the rest of mankind.

Conclusion

“Here then, Herodotus, you have the chief doctrines of Physics in the form of a summary. So that,

if this statement be accurately retained and take effect, a man will, I make no doubt, be incomparably better equipped than his fellows, even if he should never go into all the exact details. For he will clear up for himself many of the points which I have worked out in detail in my complete exposition; and the summary itself, if borne in mind, will be of constant service to him.

“It is of such a sort that those who are already tolerably, or even perfectly, well acquainted with the details can, by analysis of what they know into such elementary perceptions as these, best prosecute their researches in physical science as a whole; while those, on the other hand, who are not altogether entitled to rank as mature students can in silent fashion and as quick as thought run over the doctrines most important for their peace of mind.”

Such is his epistle on Physics.

Notes:

We know that particles have a limited variety of properties because we observe in nature that different elements behave differently at different temperatures and in different circumstances, but this variety follows certain laws and never violates them.
Diogenes Laertius left commentary as part of his report, based on his investigations.
The ancient Greek word “atomos” means not-cuttable. The modern atomic theory does not neatly correspond with the original preconception of the atom. The modern English word for ancient Greek atoms is “particles”, sometimes rendered as “elementary particles”.
Aphrodite Urania was the patroness Goddess of the Epicureans. Urania was also the name of the Muse of astronomy, which likely explains why Epicureans derived such great mental pleasure from the study of nature and from astronomy.
Some enemies of Epicurus have accused him of being against learning and scholarship because he seems to limit the utility of science to how much pleasure it can add and how much pain, or superstitious fear, it can remove. But Epicurus had a clear understanding of the different goals of philosophy and of science. Raw scientific data can not replace or abolish the role of ethics. Ethics must coexist with scientific data, and guide its utility.

The following essay was written by Fernanda Diab, from the Faculty of Humanities and Educational Sciences – Udelar, in Uruguay. Her views are her own. It was translated by Hiram Crespo and shared here with her permission. Please note that the idea of asceticism is here treated in terms of exercises in self-care, rather than self-denial, and also please compare Foucault’s ideas about ethics as self-care with Epicurus’ sermon on moral development.

The complexity of Michel Foucault’s work is such that it is very difficult to make a full assessment of it. The trajectory of his thought has different stages, on which the author himself has made reflections, explained the foundations, and given diagnoses. They can be found in interviews and prologues. The complexity increases if we consider the variety of topics that he has addressed throughout his career, which may even lead us to think, as Couzens maintains, that “there may not be a single Foucault” (1).

Beyond some nuances, there is an agreement to divide Foucault’s work into three stages. The first is that of methodological works, among which the main one is “Words and things”; the second includes the works on power, where another of his main works stands out: “Surveillance and punishment”; and the third is dedicated to works on morality, distinguishing the three volumes of “History of sexuality” that constitute a truncated series since Foucault died before completing the fourth volume he had planned.

Foucault himself has also reflected on the development of his work and made some self-criticisms. As an example of this in “History of Madness” refers to three levels, which every historian should address, which could correspond to three periods of the development of his work. (2) These three levels would be: first, an area of knowledge made up of concepts, theories and disciplines; second, a set of normative rules, such as those that distinguish between normal and pathological; and third, the way of relating to oneself. Despite being these three levels well marked in each of the three stages mentioned above, they can appear together in any of their works.

Another conventional way of ordering Foucault’s work is around certain central questions that he tries to answer. A first stage would be centered on the question of knowledge and it is recognized with the name of archaeology. It is located between 1961 and 1969 and the central works are “History of Madness” and “The Archaeology of Knowledge”. The second stage is known as genealogy and revolves around the question of power. The paradigmatic works of this stage are “Watch and punish” and the first volume of “History of sexuality”. And the third stage addresses the question about subjectivity or the technologies of subjectivity, with volumes II and III of “History of sexuality” being its most characteristic feature.

In Miguel Morey’s introduction to “Technologies of the self”, the author argues that the conventional divisions of Foucault’s work can lead to conceptual errors. For example, accepting the division according to the methodological aspects (archaeology, genealogy, techniques of subjectivity), may lead one to believe that each of the methodological procedures that were used by Foucault would substitute each other. According to Morey this is wrong. Instead he claims that these procedures “are encompassed in ever wider circles, but are not replaced at all.” (3)

According to Foucault’s own writings, a new ordering of his work can be proposed, in terms of ontology: “historical ontology of ourselves in relation to the truth that constitutes us as subjects of knowledge”, “historical ontology of ourselves in relation to the field of power through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others ”,“ historical ontology in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents ”. (4)

It is also possible to divide Foucault’s work into three axes of analysis: archaeology, genealogy, and ethics. In agreement with Morey, Arnold Davidson maintains that ethics is not a substitute for archaeology or genealogy, but adds that ethics modifies certain final methodological implications of those two. (5)

In any case, whether one talks about “works of morality”, “way of relating to oneself”, “technologies of subjectivity”, “historical ontology of ourselves” or “ethics”, reference is always being made to the the last stage of Foucault’s work, and it is in it that the text to be analyzed in this work is found, contained in Volume II of “History of sexuality”.

In the introduction to Volume II, under the title Moral and self-practice, Foucault analyzes four fundamental aspects of ethics, understanding it as the way in which the individual relates to himself and thus constitutes himself as a moral subject. This work aims to carry out an analysis of these aspects and their identification in Epicurus’ ethics.

Sexuality and self-care

Sexuality is approached by Foucault as a historically singular experience in which the individual is objectified for himself and for others. This not only occurs through an external discipline process that is exerted on the individual, but the individual self-disciplines. It is on this last point that he will emphasize the last volumes of The history of sexuality. Foucault pays attention to this aspect of human life and not to another because “unlike most other major interdiction systems, the one concerning sexuality has been paired with the obligation of a certain deciphering of one same”. (6)

In previous works where he analyzes the problem of power–for example in “Surveillance and Punishment”–he emphasizes how people exercise power over others. But in The history of sexuality, he studies how people exercise power over themselves, that is, how they constrain themselves. This self-control or self-discipline occurs with the more or less implicit purpose of becoming a certain kind of person. Hence, the history of sexuality has as its general framework a history of morals, insofar as it is conceived as one of the clearest ways through which individuals become moral subjects.

In making this shift from the analysis of the methods of discipline that are exerted on the subject to the forms of self-discipline, and in particular when finding sexuality a central element in the self-construction of the subject, Foucault had to abandon the study of sources of modernity and look back on the Greeks. For them sexuality was part of the moral, political, economic customs and became self-care. Foucault’s works are characterized by beginning with a point of difference, a strange phenomenon for modern sensibility. In his history of sexuality, this phenomenon is sexual practice among free adult and young men in the Greco-Roman tradition. It is also different with respect to modernity that above all for the Greeks what was important was not sexuality but the practice of freedom.

In Volumes II and III of “History of Sexuality”, he focuses on the history of subjectivity, that is, in which the subject is built but not as a result of external forces exerted on him, but as a result of his self-representation and therefore the self-control he exercises over himself. The central question is how the constitution of the self occurs through the various discourses about sex. In Volume II “The Use of Pleasures” he discusses how pleasure and desire constitute an element of tension in Greek society even though it is part of it. Tension is given by the relationship between “superior” and “inferior”: ruler and ruled, free man and slave, young and adult. Obtaining pleasure is then linked to a social position, it is not a transgression. But this conflicts with the relationship between the domain of pleasure and the practice of freedom. “Self-care has been, in the Greco-Roman world, the way by which individual freedom – or civic freedom to a certain extent – has been thought of as ethics.” (7)

Sexuality becomes problematic when love for young people threatens the way of life of the Greeks. A morally good life can only be conceived for those who have dominion over themselves and others, that is, for free adult men. This domain is achieved through an active posture. But love for young people could lead young people to a passive life which is incompatible with the practice of freedom for which young people should prepare. In this way sexuality becomes a moral problem for the Greeks. In Dreyfus and Rabinow’s interview, Foucault puts it this way: “The problem was that it could not be accepted that a boy who supposedly should become a free citizen could be dominated and used for someone’s pleasure.”

In Volume II, “The use of pleasures”, Foucault denies the possibility of writing a history of regulative moral codes since these constitute neither the only or the most important element of morality. It gives more attention to the subjectivity techniques by which the individual is constituted as a moral subject. It is not the codes that vary from the Greeks to Christianity but the modes of self-knowledge of the subjects and their self-construction as moral subjects.

Another point of interest of Foucault in the last two volumes of the history of sexuality is to trace how self-care in Greco-Roman culture became a renunciation of itself in Christianity. He finds that both Greeks and Christians valued ascetics, that is, they regarded as a virtuous practice the restriction of pleasures. However, that assessment is not the same. According to what Foucault tries to demonstrate in Volume III, for the Greeks asceticism is not a resignation but the souci de soi, that is, the care of the self. In L’Usage des plaisirs insists on the problematic nature of sexuality for the Greeks, who regarded physical excess not as perversion but as aesthetic ugliness. Instead paradoxically for Christianity, self-care implies a renunciation of oneself.

Morality and self-care

In the introduction of Volume II of “History of Sexuality” Foucault raises his primary interest, which is to trace how sexuality became a fundamental element of the self-constitution of the individual as a moral subject. Or more specifically it claims to “show how, in ancient times, sexual activity and pleasures were made problematic through self-care practices, by creating criteria for an aesthetic of existence”. (8) Ascetic austerity and the measuring of pleasures are not conceived as prohibitions but as lifestyle, as a luxury within a society. However Foucault adds that austerity practices cannot be considered as a simple refinement. “On the contrary, it is easy to see that each of the great figures of sexual austerity relates to an axis of experience and a beam of concrete relationships…” (9) such as the relationship with health or with their own sex. It is about determining “under what forms sexual behavior was problematized, becoming the object of restlessness, element of reflection, matter of stylization.” (10)

Under the title Moral and Practice of the Self, he asks what aspect of morality will be analyzed. He seeks to clarify the object of his history of sexuality, and for this he analyses the ambiguity of the term “moral”. First, morality means “a set of values and rules of action that are proposed to individuals and groups through various prescriptive devices, such as family, educational institutions, churches, etc.” (11) These values are explicitly transmitted, but it is also the case that they become diffuse and thus morality is a more complex game. So the term “moral” is basically associated with a moral code. But it can also be understood as “moral” as “the real behavior of individuals, in their relationship to the rules and values that are proposed to them”. (12) Here “moral” is linked to the way individuals relate to the aforementioned code. It would consist of the actual conduct of individuals in respecting or rejecting the code. This other meaning of the term “moral”, Foucault calls it “morality of behavior”. There is then in the field of morality on the one hand the standard of conduct, and on the other the conduct itself.

There is another constituent aspect of morality that will be emphasized. It is not how the subject relates to the norm but how the subject relates to himself. That is, how the subject self-understands and self-constructs as a moral subject. Even if the moral code is the same, there are several ways to conduct yourself in front of it, several ways in which the subject conducts itself in front of that code. In this diverse way of acting the individual is not only a moral agent, but also a moral subject.

Ethics is in Foucault’s writings understood as the study of the relationship of self to self. He understood that ethics is only part of the study of morality. Without wanting to deny the importance of the moral code or the actual conduct of the people (the other aspects of morality), he intends to shift the analysis towards the ways in which the individual self-constructs himself as a moral subject of his actions. The relationship with oneself, which Foucault calls “ethics”, has four aspects: the ethical substance, the mode of subjection, self-forming activity or asceticism, and the teleology of the moral subject.

The ethical substance or aphrodisia is that part of the individual that is taken as a “raw material” of his moral conduct. It can be the body, sexuality, pleasures; that will be transformed, shaped in such a way that they constitute the way through which the subject in turn is self-transformed as a moral subject. It is the part of the individual that will become the central point of self-care, that which the individual will “work on” to self-control. The ethical substance is not always the same, it was acquiring different forms and is one of the points that Foucault wants to demonstrate when comparing Greek ethics with Christianity.

Foucault calls “determination of the ethical substance”, “the way in which the individual should shape such or that part of himself as the main matter of his moral conduct.” (13) This aspect of ethics would be the one that answers the following question: “What part of myself or my conduct concerns moral conduct?” (14)

The second aspect of ethics is the mode of subjection, it is the one that establishes the link between the moral code and the self. It determines how the code has power over the self. In L’Usage del Plaisirs he defines it as follows: “it is the way in which the individual establishes his relationship with this moral code and recognizes an obligation to put it into play.” (15) And in the interview of Dreyfus and Rabinow: “it is the way people are invited or incited to recognize their moral obligations.” By saying “invited or incited”, it would appear that Foucault is referring to external elements acting on the subject inciting him to obey the law, and then we would no longer be in the field of ethics. But such incitement is exercised by the subject on himself and has to do with the way in which the law is presented to him as obligatory. The way of subjection to the law may be given as a divine law, by belonging to a community of which the individual feels a part or by being the means to attain a more beautiful existence.

The self-training activity is the medium or the whole of them, through which the individual changes, transforming to become an ethical subject. It is the activity “that we perform in ourselves–not only to make our behavior according to a given rule, but to try to transform ourselves into a moral subject of our conduct”. (16) We can see that the work that the individual does on himself is not solely intended to behave according to the law, to abide by it, but that the goal is the construction of the self and to become a moral subject.

This third aspect of ethics is the one that answers the question: “What are the means by which we can transform ourselves into ethical subjects?” (17) The concept of self-sculpting or asceticism in the broad sense can be equated with what Foucault called “technologies of the self”, which he defines as those operations that the individual performs on his body and his soul, his thoughts, or any form of his being. It’s about “… thoughtful and voluntary practices by which men not only set rules of conduct, but seek to transform themselves, modify themselves in their singular being, and make their lives a masterpiece.” (18)

With such operations, the transformation of oneself is achieved with the aim of achieving a certain state which may be of happiness, purity, wisdom or immortality. In “The Subject’s Hermeneutics”, when analyzing Hellenic philosophy, he refers to self-concern, a concept to which the Greek term epimeleia heautou corresponds. It is the ways in which the subjects unfold and constitute at the same time the object of their own action, shaping, building themselves, in a process of refinement to transform into a certain type of subject. Self-care is both a set of self-transformation practices and a duty, that is, a principle that is prescribed as a model of good life.

Finally Foucault defines the teleology of the moral subject that represents the kind of being to which the individual aspires when he behaves morally. The purpose of moral action is not only the adequacy of certain values and norms, but also aims at the constitution of the individual as a moral subject. The telos with which they tend to fulfill moral actions is also changing; thus the individual will aim to transform himself into a pure, immortal being free from his passions.

Volumes II and III of “History of Sexuality” can be understood as a study of the relationships between these four aspects of ethics in Greek and Roman society. In L’Usage des Plaisirs, Foucault discusses these four aspects of ethics through the following topics: health, women and wives, and boys. It emphasizes the importance that Foucault attaches to the relationship with himself in morality:

It is true that any moral action implies a relationship with the reality in which it takes place and a relationship with the code to which it refers, but it also implies a certain relationship with itself; this is not simply “self-awareness”, but a self-constitution as a “moral subject”, in which the individual circumscribes the part of himself that constitutes the object of this moral practice, defines his position in relation to the precept that he follows, sets a certain way of being that will be worth moral fulfillment of himself, and for this he acts on himself , seeks to know each other, is controlled, tested, perfected, transformed. (…) There is no particular moral action that does not refer to the unity of moral conduct; nor moral conduct that does not claim the constitution of itself as a moral subject, nor the constitution of the moral subject without “modes of subjectivity” and without an “ascetic” or “self-practice” that supports them. (19)

An Example from Epicurean Ethics

What I intend to do here is to track and identify in the ethics proposed by Epicurus, the aspects of ethics defined by Foucault and discussed above. I will try to identify the ethical substance, i.e. part of the individual that is considered as a relevant element of ethical judgment for the Epicureans. It will also attempt to determine the individual’s manner of subjection with respect to the law, how the Epicurean conceives the law as obligatory and abides by it. The same will be done with self-forming activity and with teleology. To do this, each of these aspects will be analyzed separately and supplemented with quotes from the garden philosopher.

1. Ethical substance

Let us utterly drive from us our bad habits as if they were evil men who have long done us great harm. – Epicurean Saying 46

As a philosophical doctrine typical of the Hellenistic period, Epicureanism retains certain characteristics of the Greek tradition. For the Greeks, acts linked to pleasure and desire were the point of support for ethical assessment. The point of interest that was considered relevant in moral actions was desires and pleasures. We can say then that in Epicureanism the ethical substance was acts linked to pleasure and desire. Pierre Hadot argues that the “experience of the flesh” forms the basis of Epicureanism–“flesh” not in the physical sense but as the subject of pain and pleasure. (20) In fact this doctrine has been known as a hedonistic doctrine because of its emphasis on pleasures, although as Epicurus himself clarifies this was misunderstood, as it sought the denial of pain (as will be seen below).

Epicurus preached: “It is not the drinks, nor the enjoyment of women, nor the sumptuous banquets that make life pleasant, but the sober thought that discovers the causes of all desire and all aversion and takes away the opinions that trouble souls.” (21) The teachings of Epicurus led to self-care through the measuring of desires. He can only own himself who is not a slave to his desires. Whoever suffers for what he does not have and desires, can never be free or happy, so it is necessary to evaluate the pleasures in order to know which are necessary and which are not. “For none among the foolish are content with what they possess, but they grief for what they do not have.” (22)

2. Modes of subjection

Epicureanism is peculiar in that Epicurus constituted for his followers a kind of god or divine man (theios aner); this characterization having been given to him by having been the only one to be able to attain wisdom on his own. (23) His authority over his disciples was very great–so much so, that association with the teacher was supremely important for the formation of the disciples. So after his death, the fundamental precept of his school was this: “Act always as if Epicurus was watching you.” This means that one of the most important elements by which Epicurus’s followers felt compelled to abide by their precepts was by their master’s own influential figure.

With the exception of Epicurus himself, the rest of the members of the Garden School needed, to attain wisdom, a tutor (Hegemon) with whom they had to maintain a strong bond of friendship. Community life for the Epicureans was very important. Since the founding of the Garden School, rather than the study of books, the essential thing was community life; and the best form of learning was that based on personal contact and dialogue. It was not about coercing men, but persuading them, which did not exclude authority. In that community only Epicurus was considered and called wise, the remaining members were aspiring sages. Presumably, this aspiration would act as a means of subjection to the precepts of Epicurus in order to attain the wisdom of the master.

The mode of subjection of the Epicureans is then linked to their loyalty to Epicurus. Upon entering the community, one gave an oath: “I will be loyal to Epicurus, according to whom I have chosen to live.” That loyalty was identified with friendship, as his followers were called “friends.”

If the disciples were impelled by the teacher’s image to obey the law or the precepts he gave them, one might wonder what subjected Epicurus himself to the obedience of certain moral standards. At this point there could be an overlap between the aspects identified by Foucault, and the mode of subjection is the telos itself. The way in which the individual conceives the standard as obligatory is closely linked to the sense of duty towards the model of being that he wants to achieve.

3. Self-forming activity

The fundamental means by which the individual must self-transform to become a moral subject is reflection. Philosophy turns out to be a “four-fold drug” meant to help us have the right attitude towards the gods, death, pleasure and pain. Epicurus’s considerations on these points are found in the Letter to Menoeceus, which is an invitation to the philosophical attitude. Philosophy is for Epicurus a fundamental element in self-care, because only through it can the individual lose those fears that do not allow him to achieve the true state of happiness that consists in the tranquility of the soul (ataraxia).

Philosophy has a therapeutic character (therapeutike). Its practice itself has a healing, liberating function. It helps us to discern which pleasures are necessary and which are not, while giving us elements (e.g. the physics) to eliminate the fears that afflict individuals. This type of philosophy is able to free the individual from annoying desires. The individual can only be saved from a disturbed life if he practices philosophy and, for this purpose, Epicurus understands that there is no age:

Let no one put off the love and practice of wisdom when young, nor grow tired of it when old. For it is never too early or too late for the health of the soul. Someone who says that the time to love and practice wisdom has not yet come or has passed is like someone who says that the time for happiness has not yet come or has passed. – Epicurus’ Epistle to Menoeceus

True freedom for Epicurus can only be achieved through philosophy because it frees man from that which disturbs him, and in this lies the liberating value of all knowledge since knowledge of cosmology and physics are also fundamental to making man a free and therefore happy subject.

If we were not troubled by the thought of heavenly things and that death means something to us and not knowing the limits of pains and desires, we would have no need for the science of nature. – Epicurus’ Principal Doctrine 11

The theoretical value that Aristotle attributed to philosophy, the value of knowledge for its own sake, changes with Epicurus and it becomes practical value. Prudence, the measuring of passions and desires, and the end of disturbances are the ultimate end of philosophical reflection.

The search for knowledge has the liberating function of being a “four-fold medicine”. Man, in order to be happy, must be freed from certain errors that disturb him: fear of the gods, fear of death, seeking excessive goods, and the limit of evil. As for the gods, he argues that as long as they are incorruptible and blessed, they cannot be attributed anything that goes against these characteristics. Man should not fear the actions of the gods upon him, as the gods have no worries and there’s no reason why man should be a worry to them. The gods live in pure ataraxia (tranquil pleasure). As for not fearing death, the explanation is based on his atomistic physical theory (which I will not develop here).

Second, train yourself to hold that death is nothing to us, because good and evil consist in sensation, and death is the removal of sensation … So death, the most terrifying of evils, is nothing to us, because as long as we exist death is not present, whereas when death is present we do not exist … It is nothing to those who live (since to them it does not exist) and it is nothing to those who have died (since they no longer exist). – Epicurus’ Epistle to Menoeceus

With regard to the pursuit of goods, he argues that it is easy to achieve and seek the limit of goods. Pleasures are sought if pain is avoided, so the magnitude of pleasures will depend on the greater or lesser distance from the pain. And this would build on the practices that Epicurus followers should carry out to achieve happiness. As for the evils he argues that these are limited in duration. Epicurus identifies evil with pain and says:

Continuous pain does not last long in the body; on the contrary, pain, if extreme, is present a short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the body does not last for many days together. Illnesses of long duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the body. – Epicurus’ Principal Doctrine 4

Another fundamental element in the self-forming activity prescribed by Epicureanism is the cultivation of friendship. In Vatican Saying XXIII, he writes: “Of all the means that wisdom procures for our complete happiness, the possession of friendship is by far the most important thing.” The bonds that were established in the Garden School between men, women and children were basically given by friendship. In his will he prescribed that the house be preserved and that the philosophers would all live together. He also prescribed annual commemorations in his honor and of the disciples who had already passed.

The Epicurean conception of friendship is problematic because while exalted as a value, it is reduced to utility. In his Vatican Saying he says: “Every friendship is desirable in itself; however, it had its beginning in utility.” However, he then states: “He is not a friend who always seeks usefulness, nor he who never binds utility to friendship: since the former, transacts with favors what is given in exchange, and the other cuts off great hopes for the future.” This tension is resolved for Foucault in the idea that the existence of friends is a condition not of real help, but of hope and security to know that friends will be available to help us in the future. That’s why friendship is one of the forms of self-care. “Any man who is uneasy about himself should make friends”, says Foucault.

Meditation and calculation of pleasures are also self-care practices. In the Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus argues “one must meditate on these things night and day, and one will live as a god among men“. Since this inclination induces man to pleasure, one must reflect and calculate the consequences of each pleasure. In this way, one will be able to abandon those pleasures that cause many disgusts and endure those pains that generate greater pleasure. Reflection lets us know that the highest pleasure is the suppression of pain. It also allows us to determine several categories of desires: natural and necessary (e.g. desire to eat and drink); natural and unnecessary (e.g. desire to eat a delicacy); and others that are neither natural nor necessary (e.g. desire for a crown). According to this classification, the measuring of pleasures is prescribed, and then the wise will be able to achieve the greatest degree of pleasure giving satisfaction to the first kind of desires, and as Epicurus himself sustains “with a little bread and water, one rivals even Jupiter in happiness“.

The exercises prescribed by the wisdom teachers are of particular importance for self-care. Theory is not enough. Knowledge of the doctrine of Epicurus is not enough to reach wisdom. Permanent exercise is required. “First of all we must meditate, that is, assimilate intimately, become intensely aware of the fundamental dogmas.” (29) Epicurus prescribes in the Letter to Menoeceus: “All these teachings consider them, therefore, day and night, by yourself alone, and also with a companion like you. Thus you will not experience disturbance in sleep or vigil, but you will live as a god among men.” (30) One such exercise was a variant of praemeditatio malorum. This mental exercise consisted of meditating on future evils, but for the epicureans this was useless and they preferred to evoke past pleasures as a shelter from today’s evils. (31) In this regard, judgments, summaries, and dialogues with friends were considered to be the privileged means of exercising themselves on the road to wisdom.

4. Teleology of the Moral Subject

Epicurus identifies the end of man as happiness. Every man and woman should attain happiness. Happiness consists in the pursuit of pleasure. Pleasure is obtained by avoiding pain. The model that guides the moral actions of the Epicureans is that of the one who has achieved both ataraxia (absence of mental perturbation, which is experienced as tranquil pleasure) and aponia (absence of bodily pain). The first consists of the tranquility of the soul that is distant from disturbances, and the second is the absence of pain. Whoever is in this situation will have found happiness. But these two states are subordinate to the pleasure that is the end that every man must pursue, and ataraxia and aponia are desirable because of the pleasure they bring.

Wise then is the one who achieves ataraxia, tranquility, peace of the soul, and he who does not allow himself to be disturbed by that which disturbs the vulgar: the fear of the gods, of death, of the future. Without such fears, and by limiting desires, happiness is attained.

The model pursued by the Epicureans is that of the gods who enjoy full tranquility and imperturbability. This is the telos they pursue, and in pursuit of which the prescriptions of the garden master are followed.

In short, Epicurean ethics is characterized by: taking pleasures as an object of transformation (ethical substance); basing obedience (to laws and conventions) in loyalty to Epicurus himself and in community, mainly based on the bonds of friendship (means of subjection); practicing self-care through philosophy, cultivation of friendship, meditation, and the calculation of pleasures (self-transforming activity); and by pursuing happiness–understood mainly as ataraxia (moral subject’s teleology).

What is the interest of this kind of morality for the contemporary subject? It is important to note that it does not seem to be Foucault’s intention to present such forms of self-compliance as alternatives to contemporary ones. He does not even intend to value them as better or worse, even though his work is presented as a critique of the society in which he lives. He, however, insists on the impossibility of returning to those earlier forms of understanding. As Couzens argues:

Although he does not build a totally different ideal than we can aspire to, his story makes us more aware of the inconveniences of our self-understanding and our practices. The imperative to change must come from within us, if it comes. Foucault can only hope that his historiography will help subvert what he believes are our self-deceiving tendencies to deny any such imperative. (32)

Or as Mark Poster (who considers Foucault’s “History of Sexuality” as a genealogical work) argues, the author’s intention is to “reveal the difference in a phenomenon in such a way that it undermines the certainty of the present without presenting the past as an alternative.” (33) This work denies all teleology and progressivism. At the same time it undermines the purported universality of the contemporary model of sexuality with its implications with respect to morality. This opens the way for the task of developing strategies to modify it.

However, I believe that what’s being proposed isn’t merely a negative path, which ends only in the acceptance of the impossibility of basing a morality on universalism. Beyond Foucault’s intention to resurrect morality as self-care, the model of self-transformation, of taking oneself as a center of concern and occupation, of making each person better, and in that way making us freer, can be a model of inspiration for contemporary man. As Paul Vayne argues: “Greek morality is dead, and Foucault considered it as undesirable as impossible to resurrect it; but an aspect of this morality, namely the idea of a working on oneself, seemed likely to return to a present meaning, in the manner of one of these columns of pagan temples that we sometimes see located in more recent buildings.” (34) The subject as an artist of his own life seems a very interesting normative principle in the context of massification, marginalization and lack of citizen participation, which are aspects of our societies that contrast with the modern ideal of autonomy.

Notes:

1 Couzens, D., Foucault. Introduction, p.8.
2 Ibid., p.9
3 Morey, M., Introduction: The Question of method, in Technologies of the Self, p. 16.
4 Dreyfus, H., Rabinow, P., On the Genealogy of Ethics. Tell M.Foucault, p. 199.
5 Davidson, A., Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics, in Foucault, p.246.
6 Foucault, M., Three Lectures at the University of Toronto, 1982; quoted by Morey, ibid., p.35
7 Foucault, M., Subject Hermeneutics, Annex, p.111.
8 Foucault, M., Hist.de sex., II. The use of pleasures, p. 15.
9 Ibid., p. 25.
10 Ibid
11 Ibid., p.26.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., p.27.
14 Foucault, M., On the Genealogy of Ethics, Dreyfus-Rabinow interview, p.200.
15 Foucault, M., Hist. of sex., II. The use of pleasures, ibid.
16 Ibid., p.28.
17 Foucault, M.; On the genealogy of ethics, interview by Dreyfus-Rabinow, p.202.
18 Foucault, M.; Subject’s hermeneutics, p.59 quote 5.
19 Foucault, M., Hist. of sex., II. The use of pleasures, p. 29.
20 Hadot, P. What is Ancient Philosophy?, p.129
21 Usener, 64, 12 and sigs., quoted by Brehier, History of Philosophy, p.485.
22 Ibid. Frag. 471, quoted by Mondolfo, Ancient Thought, p.105.
23 Foucault, M.; Ibid., p.141
24 Epicurus, Letter to Meneceus, 122, quoted by Mondolfo, Ancient Thought, p. 94.
25 Epicurus, Sent.princ., 11, quoted by Mondolfo, Ibid., p. 95.
26 Epicurus, Letter to Meneceo, 124-5, quoted by Mondolfo, Ibid.
27 Epicurus, Sent. Princ., 4, quoted by Mondolfo, Ibid.
28 Foucault, M.; Subject’s Hermeneutics, pp. 193-194
29 Hadot, P.; What is ancient philosophy?, p.138
30 Quoted in Ibid.
31 Foucault, M.; Subject’s hermeneutics, p.475
32 Couzens, D., ibid., p. 27.
33 Poster, M., ibid., p. 229.
34 Veyne, P.; The last Foucault and his morals, p.55.

Further Reading:

Epicurus’ sermon on moral development

The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction

The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure

The Foucault Reader

Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison

Ethics of Philodemus: Philodemus’ Economics

I wish to conclude my book review of The Ethics of Philodemus with a critical look at Philodemus. He and his teacher Zeno of Sidon, and their group, argued frequently against other schools, and against Epicureans who held different views from their own. There were several Epicurean factions. The sources mention at least two factions: the rhetors (who elaborated on the doctrine, mainly inspired by their discussions with other Schools) and the orthodox (who stuck to memorizing the sources). Philodemus claimed orthodoxy by making frequent appeals to the authority of the four founders, but also engaged in these debates.

Since Zeno of Sidon was a Scholarch of Athens of direct lineage to Epicurus and Hermarchus, he is likely to have preserved the most loyal interpretation of Epicureanism … but this is not to say that other Epicurean groups didn’t have legitimate arguments to offer which did not survive in the sources, or indirectly by being criticized in the Herculaneum scrolls. It’s also true that Zeno of Sidon was the successor of Apollodoros, the “Tyrant of the Garden”, and that much of Zeno’s work involved rebelling against the excessive authoritarianism of his predecessor (which may have been necessary in order to protect the Garden and its finances). We know that Zeno was tolerant, friendly, greatly admired, and welcomed Stoics and other non-Epicureans into the Garden to study philosophy together–this may be part of his effort to reject the authoritarianism of Apollodoros.

The subject of economics is the best place for a critical view of Philodemus.

The first criticism of Philodemus has to do with his categorical statement in his scroll On the art of property management, that “the philosopher does not toil“–which seems impractical, except in the case of the very wealthy Romans whom he was teaching. Few people have this privilege to not toil. This odd statement depicts Epicureanism as an exclusive sect for the elite, which it most certainly wasn’t at its inception.

It’s impossible to abstain from toils. In fact, Philodemus himself cites Metrodorus’ arguments concerning how hedonic calculus must be applied (and sometimes we must go through certain disadvantages for the sake of greater advantages). Here, Metrodorus (the co-founder of Epicureanism) contradicts Philodemus’ statement that the philosopher does not toil. He says that wealth, health, and friendship involve toil, but that this toil is worth pursuing because we will suffer greatly without these goods. The philosopher will toil for the sake of greater pleasures, or to avoid great disadvantages.

One other small critique of Philodemus that I must accept, as someone who has been promoting and writing books on Epicureanism for many years, is that he says that making money from teaching philosophy is the ideal way to make a living … but how many people can really do this? I know of no one who can do this, at least in our day.

While we all agree that the best life is free from toil, the question is HOW can we achieve this? This is a great, and interesting, moral challenge.

One additional note concerning the study of Philodemus’ scroll on the art of property management comes from one of the newest members of SoFE: Marcus reminds us that it’s important to keep in mind that Philodemus’ target audience was the aristocracy of the late Roman Republic. He says:

I found this short video about the Roman patronage system which is good background to understanding Philodemus’ on wealth and property management.

Concerning the utility of wealth, Philodemus says we shouldn’t reject whatever wealth we may get as useless. A natural measure of wealth is clearly preferable to poverty–but the superiority of wealth is practical, not moral. He argues that the Epicurean philosopher does not need to be an expert in management or economics, however personal sovereignty requires that we learn this skill to some extent. Philodemus adds an ethical dimension to it. He worries about our disposition (diathesis) and about issues of hedonic calculus as they relate to the management of our estate: How do you manage your property and home while living ethically and without sacrificing your happiness?

One final critique that we must accept about Philodemus of Gadara is that he seems, to an extent greater than most people do today, okay with the selfish exploitation of others (slavery was normal in his society). However, I’ve always appreciated that Epicurean economics posits a sustainable capitalism that emphasizes the limits of our desires, and therefore it’s a capitalism that is somewhat self-critical, and against excess. This is a necessary antidote to what we see today, particularly in the US. I believe Epicurean philosophy, in this manner, represents a very healthy defense of classical liberal Western values.

This essay concludes my five-part review of The Ethics of Philodemus, by Voula Tsouna. If you’ve enjoyed this content, please consider supporting me on patreon either once or monthly. Content creation is time-consuming, so I do not yet offer any special perks to my patreon subscribers, but it boosts my morale, and it helps support both this website and the teaching mission of the Epicurean Gardens.

Further Reading:

The Ethics of Philodemus

The Epicurean Doctrines on Wealth

Ethics of Philodemus: Against Maximalism

Epicurean sources make frequent mention of the natural limits of desires. This teaching is meant to help us cultivate a mind that has an accurate understanding of how much is enough, and is therefore satisfied, content and grateful. ‪Both minimalism (see Vatican Saying 63) and maximalism (see Principal Doctrine 15, and Vatican Sayings 22, 25, 59, 67-69) are problematic in Epicurean philosophy. ‬

‪Maximalist thinking leads to the search for unattainable objects of desire and to the inability to feel any pleasure at all. – Voula Tsouna

In page 235, note 114 of The Ethics of Philodemus, we find the following:

Philodemus ad hominem argument may indicate that his opponents are maximalists: self indulgence like theirs could justify anything.

Principal Doctrine 21 mentions the idea of “a complete life” (βίον παντελῆ), which Tsouna relates to the problem of maximalism.

He who understands the limits of life knows how easy it is to procure enough to remove the pain of want and make the whole of life complete and perfect. Hence he has no longer any need of things which are not to be won save by labor and conflict.

What does this “complete and perfect life” consist of? This is where philosophers will consider the impact of length of life in one’s happiness, and how important it may be to achieve one’s plans before dying. People who look to a long life or to the future in order to pursue new goods constantly are never able to achieve and enjoy the greatest pleasure because they are never content or satisfied. Furthermore, they think that happiness means a greater number of accumulated pleasures. Vatican Saying 14 advises against postponing our happiness, and Principal Doctrine 9 argues against the view that we can condense pleasures in time or space. The idea is to be present to the pleasures that nature makes easily available: here and now, somewhere in our minds and bodies, we are able to experience some form of pleasure.

Perhaps the worst case of maximalism today can be seen in the transhumanists who desire immortality. PD 21 says that we must understand the limits set by nature in order to secure the complete life. The author of The Ethics of Philodemus does make one concession in page 262, in honor of this idea of “the complete life”, which still requires a clear definition.

One might wonder whether the attitude of Philodemus and, generally, of the Epicureans towards will-writing may not indicate some concern after all for the narrative model of the complete life.

Both Epicurus and Diogenes of Oenoanda expressed concern about their legacy towards the end of their lives. This may be indicative that some measure of leaving a legacy is a natural part of a complete life and (insofar as it’s not difficult to acquire) a natural pleasure, and does not exceed into maximalist terrain.

Further Reading:

The Ethics of Philodemus

Ethics of Philodemus: Moral Portraiture and Seeing Before the Eyes

In short, whom do you consider better than someone who holds pious opinions about the gods, who is always fearless in the face of death, who has reasoned out the natural goal of life, and who has understood that the limit of good things is easy to fulfill and easy to achieve, whereas the limit of bad things is either short-lived or causes little pain? Someone who laughs at destiny, which is asserted by some to be the master of all things? – Epicurus, in his Epistle to Menoeceus

The practice of depicting the sage in detail–his attitudes, his demeanor, his opinions–is a positive version of the therapeutic practice of “placing before the eyes”, which Philodemus uses for the treatment of vices like arrogance and anger. In those cases, he confronts the patient with visuals of the negative repercussions of continuing his behavior in order to discourage his bad behavior and encourage him on his path to moral development. In the case of depicting the sage, he is presenting him with a role model that he may emulate. In at least one of the surviving sayings, we learn that this practice of contemplating and praising the sage helps us to construct our own character and produces pleasure and other benefits in our souls.

The veneration of the wise man is a great blessing to those who venerate him. Vatican Saying 32

One way to consider this is to remember that everyone admires and praises others according to their own qualities. Frivolous people admire and praise frivolous role models. Evil or authoritarian people admire and praise evil and authoritarian leaders. Similarly, people who aspire to cultivate wisdom and pleasure, should admire and praise sages who embody those qualities. Whom we admire says a lot about our values and our character.

According to the book The Sculpted Word, the depiction of the sage in sculpture was used in the passive model of recruitment of new students. Not much has been written about Epicurean aesthetics, but we know that the patroness of the Epicurean Garden, the goddess Venus Urania, is the patroness of the arts, in addition to being the embodiment of Pleasure. If we follow the theory of recruitment found in The Sculpted Word, we find that art may at times have an important place and a therapeutic use in Epicurean philosophy. This resonates with Michel Onfray’s arguments against nihilistic art, where he calls instead for art that creates values.

In The Ethics of Philodemus, Tsouna makes an important clarification regarding the practice of seeing before the eyes. As we saw earlier in our book review, our emotions have a cognitive component, and our beliefs have causal relation with our feelings. For instance, in Principal Doctrine 29, we see that Epicurus classifies desires as natural or empty based on the kinds of beliefs they are based on: unnatural and unnecessary desires are said to be vain and empty, and to arise from groundless opinion.

For this reason, Philodemus argued that both the emotional and cognitive components of our vices need treatment, if we are to successfully overcome our vices and cultivate instead excellence of character. We need to challenge our false beliefs with arguments, but we need to also arouse the emotions. If we only attack the belief component that underlies our behavior without provoking the emotions, the learning may not be very strong in our souls, and the character may not be fully reformed. There’s also the danger that our “reform” may be insincere if we only talk the talk but don’t walk the walk. For instance, Philodemus criticizes those who censure but do little else about their bad habits.

While searching through the early Epicurean sources, I found this example of the founders encouraging us to bring forth indignation out of our emotional reserve as part of our arsenal of weapons against the vices:

Let us utterly drive from us our bad habits as if they were evil men who have long done us great harm. – Vatican Saying 46

It is clear that this is meant to encourage us not just to reform our beliefs, but also to be more fully and emotionally engaged in the project of moral reform. Like evil men who have abused us for a long time, our vices deserve our animosity and anger. They are enemies inside the gates. Therefore, this source appears to side with Philodemus (and also with Sextus Empiricus), who argued that philosophy heals and secures the happy life by means of reasoning and arguments–but that we also need to employ our feelings in the therapeutic process in order to treat both the cognitive and the emotional component.

“Seeing before the eyes” is meant to awaken and recruit our feelings against our vices and in favor of the excellences. In his scroll On anger, XXVIII, 5-40), Philodemus uses this technique to demonstrate how harmful the vice of irascibility (chronic rage) can be:

(Chronic ire compels you to) strive for victory, give pain, disparage people, and do many other unpleasant things. And when it escalates, it also becomes a cause of misanthropy and sometimes even of injustice, since neither juryman nor council member nor … any human being can every be just if governed by angry feelings. Moreover, for reasons that are easy to see, people who have it must also become despotic, suspicious of evil, liars, illiberal, sneaky, underhanded, ungrateful, and self-centered … They get no taste of goods throughout their lives, that is, the goods that derive from taking things easy in acceptable ways, as well as from mildness of manner and deep understanding.

Here, Philodemus reminds the patient who suffers from chronic ire of both the evils he may cause and of the goods he may be evading. By confronting the patient with these dangers, the technique means to incite a sincere reform of character.

Notice a few things: this exercise helps us to move from abstract theory to concrete reality. It’s also a great example of how a secular philosophy can help us in character development and virtue for sake of a life of pleasure, and not for the sake of virtue or to appease a supernatural being. This practice is also pragmatic in that it aids us in carrying out hedonic calculus. The philosopher who is imparting the medicine is saying: “Do you REALLY think you will get more pleasure if you keep acting this way?“

In page 206 of The Ethics of Philodemus, Philodemus catalogues what images should be part of the “placing before the eyes” practice:

Philodemus describes them as “things that the patient is totally ignorant of, others that he has come to forget, others that he has not calculated at least in respect of their magnitude if not in respect of anything else, yet others that he has never contemplated altogether. The good philosophers depict all these evils even if with moderation emphasize that it is within the patient’s power to avoid them, and sketch the way in which we might least experience angry feelings”.

Further Reading:

The Sculpted Word: Epicureanism and Philosophical Recruitment in Ancient Greece

The Ethics of Philodemus

Ethics of Philodemus Book Review: On Frankness and On Conversation

Frank Criticism as a Virtue

Since Epicureanism is a philosophy of friendship, frank criticism (parrhesia) is a crucial excellence. It is one of the defining features of Epicurean friendship, and stands opposed to the practice of flattering / wanting to please others mindlessly, and of lying–which often betrays a lack of commitment with the happiness and character development of our friends.

It’s also of great importance for hedonic calculus and to have our grievances heard in all our relations, and for conflict resolution, properly understood. If we are too reserved or shy to voice our grievances, a true and mature form of friendship will not flourish.

Philodemus taught that philosophy heals the character through frank criticism, so there are medicinal powers tied to frankness.

The Histories

In page 101 of The Ethics of Philodemus, we find mention of a book or series of books, lost to us, titled istoria (The Histories). The original source for this is Philodemus’ scroll On Frank Criticism (Peri Parrhesias), fragment Vb 8-9. Here, we gain knowledge about reports that were gathered by the previous Epicureans, beginning with the founders (Metrodorus is mentioned), on their techniques used to heal the vices of philosophy students. It seems like these “Histories” detailed the symptoms and diagnoses, and the types of therapeutic techniques that were used in each case.

That these Histories were preserved must be interpreted to mean that they were meant for posterity, so that future generations of Epicureans would have a deposit of information about character development, what often works and what doesn’t, etc.

In note 56 of page 116 of The Ethics of Philodemus, we find this from Voula Tsouna:

It seems that Cleanthes and Metrodorus are figures whom professors with a tougher disposition strive to emulate. ‘Regarding their teaching both in the present and in the past, they shall not differ [in any way] from Cleanthes and Metrodorus–for it is obvious that the one in authority will use more abundant frankness. Besides, [after some more] time, when they have gained knowledge of more cases than others who haven’t, they will use more parrhesia regarding these types of cases than those other teachers’ (On frank criticism, Fragment Vb. 1-12)

Here, Philodemus says that those in authority use more frankness, and that in this they learn from Metrodorus and Cleanthes (we must surmise that this is because they are inspired in these Histories which recorded the previous treatments offered by the School).

On Conversation

The Ethics of Philodemus mentions a scroll that I have not seen elsewhere and have not had access to. It’s titled Peri Omilias (On conversations), and also known as PHerc 873.

This scroll asks: “What is inappropriate speech, and what is appropriate speech“? Right speech is found mainly among Epicurean friends, promotes Epicurean ideals, includes parrhesia (frankness), the study of nature, and acts of sight and intellect (by which I assume is meant the feast of the 20th, the enjoyment of friendship and other pleasant activities). Philodemus says that a sage’s speech is pleasant and his conversations reflect his happy and tranquil state of mind.

Bad speech occurs in bad society and cultivates vice.

Interestingly, just as with wealth, with community, and with desires, we learn that there’s a limit to conversation (omilias peras, The Ethics of Philodemus, page 122). Philodemus teaches various tactics of speech, and praises selective silence: we must know when to speak and when not to. The “silent treatment” was a thing. Silent was an efficient tool in parrhesia and friendship. We don’t have enough in our sources to know every detail of the entire context behind this, but we can imagine that silence can be a great virtue if applied in cases where gossip or empty desires are being indulged in, or when a student asks an imprudent question.

The Epicureans paid great importance to clear and concise, unadorned communication, as this is important both in philosophy and in friendship. The following are some additional sources on the subject.

Further Reading:
The Ethics of Philodemus
Reasonings About Philodemus’ Rhetorica
Philodemus: On Frank Criticism (Discussion here)
As the Ancient Greeks knew, frankness is an essential virtue