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Reasonings on Thus Spake Zarathustra

Zoroaster4

Nietzche’s Zoroaster, the Atheistic Prophet 

When Zarathustra was alone, however, he said to his heart: “Could it be possible! This old saint in the forest hath not yet heard of it, that God is dead! – Thus Spake Zarathustra

Why did Nietzche choose to appropriate the figure of the Persian prophet to achieve his most important philosophical and spiritual project?

The historical Zarathustra (aka Zoroaster) did not just invent the idea of the One God (Ahura Mazda, whose name meant Wise Lord) and write the first Bible (the Avesta), but also proposed the duality and eternal, cosmic confrontation between good and evil (monotheistic morality, with the Holy Spirit / Spenta Mainyu and the Evil Spirit / Angra Mainyu as equal in power), of the final judgement, of the Messiah or World Savior to come in a future Age (whom he called the Saoshyant), and almost all of the ideas that later became staples of Christianity.

As part of this cosmology of eternal battle between the forces of good and evil, the tradition of expelling spirits and exorcism is a major concern in Zoroastrian religion which takes up a significant portion of the Avesta, and we see a great concern with hygiene related to this that reminds us of the Old Testament.

For all these reasons, Nietzche chose Zoroaster instead of Abraham as the first monotheist and the inventor of God. Because Zoroaster created the original monotheistic morality, it should be Zoroaster’s responsibility to reform the philosophical foundations of our civilization now that they have crumbled. Therefore, Nietzche makes him undo what he did, revert the other-worldly cosmology that he created and produce a naturalist one for this world, to give meaning to the Earth.

I conjure you, my brethren, remain true to the earth, and believe not those who speak unto you of superearthly hopes! Poisoners are they, whether they know it or not. Despisers of life are they, decaying ones and poisoned ones themselves, of whom the earth is weary: so away with them!

Once blasphemy against God was the greatest blasphemy; but God died, and therewith also those blasphemers. To blaspheme the earth is now the dreadfulest sin, and to rate the heart of the unknowable higher than the meaning of the earth! – Thus Spake Zarathustra

An Epicurean Assessment

The concept of the meaning of the Earth is central to Nietzche. Like Lokayatas, atomists and others, Nietzche believed that there is no other world, that this is the only reality. In that sense, he was a naturalist. He’s properly classified as an existentialist who did not believe that things had inherent meaning. It’s within this framework that his mission then becomes to fashion new meaning, which he believed could be done through art, culture, music, literature, etc.

Our friend Cassius, of NewEpicurean.com, argues that Nietzche did not agree with our school on one important point, that is the issue of clarity of expression: he wrote often in parables, metaphors, and obscure language. It seems at times that he is speaking in code. The Nazi appropriation of his philosophy is the most concerning example of how this leads to misuse of people’s ideas. For the record, Nietzche was NOT a white supremacist.

However, we must appreciate Nietzche on his own terms: that his philosophy was clad in parable was consistent with his own proclaimed values.

In Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzche fashioned his own, personal new mythology and cosmology (here, myth is meant not as a lie but as a narrative that produces meaning in life), using the creative tools that he proposes people should use in their philosophical projects. In this way, he was just being authentic. His masterpiece is as much a work of philosophy as it is a piece of art that carries within it a cosmos, a worldview with its own aesthetic sensibilities.

The Despisers of the Body

If meaning of this world is the cure that Zoroaster brings to humankind, then what is the disease? It is the death cults, the worldviews that teach that there is an OTHERworld, and that we live in this world only for the sake of that OTHERworld for which there is absolutely no evidence. Since it is to the OTHERworld that people go when they leave this world, that OTHERworld is full of ghosts, it is full of death. If we live in this world for the sake of that world, we are living for the sake of death.

The existential repercussions, the misery, the evils that are birthed by this Earth-hating original sin are innumerable. In The Perils of Alienation I discussed some of these evils.

Everywhere resoundeth the voices of those who preach death; and the earth is full of those to whom death hath to be preached. Or “life eternal”; it is all the same to me. If only they pass away quickly!

The preachers of this OTHERworld-focused morality and worldview are evil parasites to the new prophet, but they also invite Zoroaster’s pity. They’re also mortals and seekers of meaning.

Here are priests: but although they are mine enemies, pass them quietly and with sleeping swords! Even among them there are heroes; many of them have suffered too much: so they want to make others suffer. Bad enemies are they: nothing is more revengeful than their meekness. And readily doth he soil himself who toucheth them. But my blood is related to theirs; and I want withal to see my blood honoured in theirs.

The Overman

Here is perhaps one of the most misinterpreted ideas in the Nietzchean wisdom tradition. The Overman (sometimes translated as Superman, in German Ubermansch) is an artist-philosopher, a self-creator who makes his own life and meaning. In a naturalist, evolving cosmos empty of Gods and of inherent meaning, mortals need an ideal to pull them forward and to build meaning with. Hence, Zoroaster teaches that man is a rope between the ape and the Overman, who then embodies our destiny and whatever narratives we build around the Overman are our self-chosen guiding visions for becoming and for the future.

One of the great misuses of Nietzche’s philosophy took place during the Nazi period. The Nazis also appropriated and distorted many other ideologies and fields of knowledge, from Christianity to Odinism to anthropology. The transcendental projects related to the Overman are not projects of eugenics, however this does not mean that these projects must be excluded from the Overman. This is not an either/or matter. The Overman must be fashioned independently by each individual. There’s at least one passage that calls for procreation as one way to transcend:

Not only to propagate yourselves onwards but upwards; thereto, O my brethren, may the garden of marriage help you!

But we know from other passages that the Overman derives his identity not from his lineage, his racial or national background, but from his self-chosen destiny. The identity of the Overman is anchored in the future, not in the past, which is why so many transhumanists identify with Nietzchean philosophy and why Nietzchean ideas feature prominently in so much of our science fiction.

In chapter 56, “The Old and New Tables”, Zoroaster calls for a new atheistic nobility that must rise to oppose the theistic populace and rulers. He is referring to our ongoing evolution from ape to Superman, our perpetual need to ever overcome ourselves, to the passing of the generations and how we are all bridges between the previous and the future generations. This nobility is not backward-looking and does not derive its identity from its roots, its race or familial lineage but from its self-chosen future:

O my brethren, I consecrate you and point you to a new nobility: ye shall become procreators and cultivators and sowers of the future.

Unto your children shall ye make amends for being the children of your fathers: all the past shall ye thus redeem!

It is precisely to make amends for the mistakes of our ancestors that this nobility must rise, to break with the past. And elsewhere he says:

Ye lonesome ones of today, ye seceding ones, ye shall one day be a people: out of you who have chosen yourselves, shall a chosen people arise: and out of it the Superman.

Zarathustra then talks about how the life-hating beliefs of the world-maligners are often given undeserved credit because they’re ancient. The false-honor of old, established beliefs is therefore understood as having a degrading and ignoble effect on the soul. It is within this content that Zoroaster calls for new projects of nation-building, community-building and people-building that are rooted in noble ideas, not noble lineage.

On Self-Overcoming

Epicurean therapeutic practices were used in antiquity as part of a process of constant self-betterment, and seem to be vindicated in Zoroaster’s doctrine on self-overcoming, which is related to the Overman. He argued that rather than judge envy as a sin, we should own our envy instead of judging ourselves for it, and that we should seek to cultivate the things we envy in others, as it is obvious that we find them desirable. In other words, the impulse towards the Overman can be found through sincere introspection.

There is one area of controversy here: the transhumanist movement believes that, as part of self-overcoming, people should seek to physically enhance themselves, even up to the point that they may be able to challenge death.

Epicurus, on the other hand, calls mortals to accept their natural limits and never to attempt to be more than humans and mortals. He was a naturalist who taught that by giving up our arrogant, unnecessary fantasies about immortality, we would find peace and ataraxia. Nietzche shared Epicurus’ anti-clerical message and criticized OTHERworldly promises and fantasies of an immortal life. But would Nietzche, as a naturalist, have agreed with some version of transhumanist immortality, if that ever materializes?

The other controversy here concerns the use of violence, which was advocated by the Nazis, in the implementation of transcendental projects related to the Overman. Our friend Cassius argues on this point:

So long as that is not interpreted as domination over other people, I think what Nietzshe was mosty saying is that the overcoming that we have to do is overcoming the limits placed by society!!!

That is why I think Nietzche and Epicurus are compatible on that point. That is a perfect example of how it is important to be careful with Nietzsche. If, as I indicate, he is saying to overcome the limits PLACED BY RELIGION AND SOCIETY AND MORALS, then he is correct. If he means “overcome the limits of nature”, then he would be wrong, but i do not believe that is what he meant or did say.

The Epicurean view on self-overcoming is that the acceptance of our natural limits confers tranquility, gratefulness, satisfaction, and imperturbability, and leads to the goal of a pleasant life established by nature itself. It is from cultural corruption that we acquire most of what must be overcome through philosophical hygiene, and the Overman can be a naturalist moral ideal in this regard. Here is Cassius’ opinion on this matter:

I agree with that, but the controversy arises in where those limits are. Yes we will die eventually, but should we strive to live as long as possible, if so how long, etc? I think Epicurus would say: Yes, the limits are there, but where they are EXACTLY is a matter of circumstance, and we should work to extend our lives of pleasure as long as possible.

Three Stages of Self-Overcoming

Like Sufi masters and teachers in other traditions, Zoroaster even maps out his followers’ stages of spiritual development for them along with the important tasks and states related to each stage. They are somewhat reminiscent of the three gunas, or qualities of material nature, in the Vedic tradition: tamas (ignorance), tamas (passion) and sattva (goodness).

In the first stage, man is compared to a camel, which is a beast of burden that lives in chains and must be docile and submissive. In this stage, man sees himself as worthy of mercy and lives on its knees, a slave of tradition.

When he realizes his degraded state of existence and seeks to emancipate himself from it, he becomes a lion. His previous state leaves him angered and indignant, and he begins smashing the old idols.

In the mature stage, he ironically becomes child-like because the third stage is creative: he forges his own morality and worldview. He has reached existential maturity and authenticity.

The Men of the Crowd

The criticism of the men of the crowd in our tradition is part of a larger trend among thelaughing philosophers, an assorted list of naturalists who mock and question traditional authorities and societal conventions, always based on philosophical insights into human nature and into the general study of the nature of things which oftentimes reveals the holes in the belief systems of the herd. Therefore, many of these philosophers profoundly distrust the views of the men of the crowd. Nietzche says:

Older is the pleasure in the herd than the pleasure in the ego: and as long as the good conscience is for the herd, the bad conscience only saith: ego.

Hence the need that philosophers have felt throughout the ages (this is seen in all cultures, from Indian sadhus, to Greek Cynics, to European intellectuals) to avoid the men of the crowd. Cassius Amicus adds:

One chapter I like in particular is chapter 51, “On Passing By”. I think that is a good application of the principle in PD39 that if you can’t be friends — just PASS BY – don’t force yourself into a confrontation.

He was here referring to Epicurus’ Principal Doctrine 39, which states: “The man who best knows how to meet external threats makes into one family all the creatures he can; and those he can not, he at any rate does not treat as aliens; and where he finds even this impossible, he avoids all dealings, and, so far as is advantageous, excludes them from his life“.

Note: Against the Men of the Crowd, a diatribe against anti-empiricists that calls adamantly for the development of evidence-based critical thinking skills, is included as part of the Elemental Epicureanism course and text. For more information, you may also visitElementalEpicureanism.com, a NewEpicurean.com project.

The Ungodliest Uttering

In many ways, Grandfather Nietzche is reminiscent of the sages of our own tradition, who were known for their use of powerful mantras or formulas as remedies for spiritual diseases. Thus Spake Zarathustra almost feels like an atheistic Qur’an or Bible when it boldly proclaims in chapter 52, which is titled The Apostates, the quintessential monotheistic declaration of faith to be “the ungodliest uttering”.

Zoroaster envisions the old gods as an ancient Epicurean would envision them: full of bliss, healthy, laughing, dancing, ecstatic. The old gods “laughed themselves to death”, he says. The jealousy of the monotheistic God is, to the innocence of an Epicurean heathen, a contradiction, an insult, a blasphemous projection of our own weaknesses and evils.

With the old Deities hath it long since come to an end: and verily, a good joyful Deity-end had they! They did not “begloom” themselves to death: that do people fabricate! On the contrary, they laughed themselves to death once on a time!

That took place when the ungodliest utterance came from a God himself: the utterance: “There is but one God! Thou shalt have no other gods before me!” An old grim-beard of a God, a jealous one, forgot himself in such wise: And all the gods then laughed, and shook upon their thrones, and exclaimed: “Is it not just divinity that there are gods, but no God?” He that hath an ear let him hear.

The Adrian Del Caro translation is clearer. It says: “Is godliness not precisely that there are gods but no God?”

This bizarre twisting of scriptural references constitutes, to all effects, liberation atheology. The death of God is as relevant an epiphany as any previous one, a true cosmological event that had its beginnings when the jealousy of the desert God revealed itself. This god would be the last to fall, but fall he would eventually.

Towards the end of Thus Spake Zarathustra, Zarathustra exhibits a prophet’s moral stamina and spiritual leadership in the Worship of the Ass scene. Here, he has surrounded himself with the higher men, which appear to be prototypes of the kinds of people for whom Nietzche is writing, as he does not have the herd as his intended audience. It appears that the higher men have concluded that it’s better to worship an ass than to worship nothing and to be atheistic. Zarathustra then confronts them, calling them wicked just as the ancient prophets did with the idolaters in the monotheistic scriptures.

The Worship of the Ass episode has the effect of being Zarathustra’s version of Moses coming down from the holy mount and finding his chosen people worshiping the calf. Under the new code, the new spirituality that he preaches, Zarathustra considers any and all act deification a transgression.

The Earthquake Discloseth New Fountains

Now, the process of doing away with the old, with the false morals and wrong views of those that came before us, is a destructive and disruptive process for sure, one that can be extremely disorienting for many. One passage says:

For the earthquake- it choketh up many wells, it causeth much languishing: but it bringeth also to light inner powers and secrets. The earthquake discloseth new fountains. In the earthquake of old peoples new fountains burst forth.

Notice, again, how Nietzche appropriates apocalyptic imagery straight from the Bible and Quran. He also compares the work of the philosopher to an earthquake, whose role is that of destroying worlds and rebuilding them, of re-creating the cosmos.

The Ugliest Human Being

In the narrative, the ugliest human is he who has killed god. The god-killer is despised because he has rejected that which gives meaning to the men of the crowd. This passage is at once a contemplation of the spiritual crisis that happens once religion is irrelevant, and a contemplation of the very real prejudice that atheists suffer. The ugliest man here takes refuge in Zarathustra:

They persecute me; now you are my last refuge. Not with their hatred, not with their bailiffs – oh such persecution I would mock and be proud and glad!

Zoroaster falls, and then finds the strength to stand up again after beholding the ugliest human, but that does not mean he isn’t terrified. The ugliest human does not mind the hatred of religious bigots, but Zoroaster’s terror worries him. The death of God is a great cultural precipice, and since man is a rope between ape and superman, it is only the beginning of a new transition to a great work, to a great awakening that will be difficult. There is a huge existential task before the god-killer. Zoroaster is overwhelmed with pityat the sight of the ugliest human, to which this human replies:

Thou hast divined, I know it well, how the man feeleth who killed him, the murderer of God. Stay! Sit down here beside me.

To whom would I go but unto thee? Stay, sit down! Do not however look at me! Honour thus mine ugliness!

They persecute me: now art thou my last refuge …. Their pity is it from which I flee away and flee to thee. O Zarathustra, protect me, thou, my last refuge, thou sole one who divinedst me: Thou hast divined how the man feeleth who killed him. Stay!

The ugliest man flees from pity, and prefers shame, deeming it appropriate. His eyes are wide open and his soul sober when he beholds the human condition, calling not for pity but for constant overcoming.

You are ashamed of the shame of the great sufferer.

In the text, a god that is all-seeing and all-pitying, who witnesses all of our failings, is deemed shameless (perhaps because, if such a hypothesis were to be accepted, this god yet chooses not to invervene). The killing of god is likened to revenge on a witness. In the end, Zarathustra then lets the ugliest human crawl into his own cave and live like the prophet did, in solitude, away from the men of the crowd.

Haunted by the Shadow 

Zarathustra later on encounters his shadow (his subconscious self), which has been with him in all of his wanderings and laments feeling aimless and not having a home. At first, he tries to run away from his shadow, but of course he can’t. He then confronts it, saying:

To such restless ones as you even a jail ends up looking like bliss. Have you ever seen how captured criminals sleep? They sleep peacefully, they enjoy their new security.

Beware that you are not captured in the end by a narrow belief, a harsh, severe delusion! Because now you are seduced and tempted by anything that is narrow and solid.

His encounter with the shadow reminds him of the dangers of wandering, perhaps a metaphor for the process of constant transition, self-betterment and self-overcoming. In the process of fashioning meaning, one is tempted to settle for creeds that constitute prisons for the soul.

Holy Laughter and the Devil of Gravity

The antidote for this danger becomes child-like laughter and dancing, Nietzchean sacraments which perhaps replace the Zoroastrian Spenta Mainyu (the Good, cheerful Spirit) and which oppose the evil influence of the Nietzchean devil of gravity, which here replaces the Zoroastrian Angra Mainyu (evil spirit).

I want to run alone, so that things clear up around me again. For that I’ll yet have to be long on my legs and like it. But this evening at my place – there will be dancing!

We must not forget that the historical Zoroaster falls within the tradition of stray-singers and drunken poets whose role it was to concoct ecstatic experiences; hence the ecstatic drink known as soma/haoma of the Vedic and Avestan traditions, and the kvasir of the poets in the Nordic tradition. There is a freedom-seeking shamanic and Dionysian aspect to this wanderer, and like all shamans, Zoroaster must be child-like, innocent, and he must never forget to dance. This is not the first or only reference to dancing as liberation. In a passage that should be deemed prophetic, if we consider the recent Charlie Hebdo events:

I should only believe in a God that would know how to dance. And when I saw my devil, I found him serious, thorough, profound, solemn: he was the spirit of gravity. Through him all things fall. Not by wrath, but by laughter, do we slay. Come, let us slay the spirit of gravity!

The historical Zoroaster was extremely concerned with how to banish and exorcise evil spirits that bring torment, dis-ease and sadness. Perhaps this influenced Nietzche in his choice of Zoroaster as the hero of his personal mythology. In Nietzche’s worldview, there’s a battle in this world between the forces of freedom/lightness and the forces of gravity. One laughs, dances and liberates, the other one pulls down and does not know how to laugh. He frequently speaks of the devil of gravity.

This day is a triumph; he is already retreating, he’s fleeing, the spirit of gravity, my old arch-enemy.

Anyone who thinks that atheists lack a deep spirituality that resonates deeply with the human soul, hasn’t read Thus Spake Zarathustra. Like the shamans of primal cultures, the Nietzchean Zoroaster is a facilitator of meaning for his people, the exorcizer of bad spirits, the conjurer of good spirits, and even has animal spirit assistants which seem to represent his spiritual strengths. Nietzche recognizes that these motifs are human, all too human, and so he uses them in his profoundly spiritual art.

Within the new, naturalist morality and cosmology of this world, the Holy Spirit of ancient Zoroastrianism has been replaced by new charms, the most powerful of which is laughter. Zoroaster teaches that the Higher Man wears the crown of laughter, and equates the good (as it is made tangible and real in this world) with pleasure and cheer:

Laughter is holy.

All good things laugh.

Laughter and dance represent the impulse that leads to spiritual freedom and that saves us from gravity. Elsewhere, he speaks of laughter as a charm, as a spiritual power related to courage.

I want to have goblins about me, for I am courageous. The courage which scareth away ghosts, createth for itself goblins- it wanteth to laugh.

The Honey

In the last part of the book, in the passages related to The Honey Sacrifice, Zarathustra argues that old age feels like being a ripened fruit: when one ages one gets sweeter and calmer, happier, more tolerant of others’ failings. It has frequently been noted that it is easier for older people to attain ataraxia.

In A Few Days in Athens, Frances Wright’s Epicurus explains:

In our ripened years, supposing our judgement to have ripened also, when all the insidious temptations that misguided him, and all the disadvantages that he has laboured under, perhaps from his birth, are apparent to us, it is then, and not till then, that our indignation at the crime is lost in our pity of the man. – A Few Days in Athens, Chapter 2

Nietzche’s maxim: “Human, all too human”, seems to be the reflection of one man of wisdom on this matter.

The Morning Sun

At the end of Thus Spake Zarathustra, the higher men all thank Zarathustra for teaching them to love this Earth. The novel closes by referring to them as the children of Zarathustra and to his rising like a new sun to give meaning to this world.

“Well then! The lion came, my children are near, Zarathustra became ripe, my hour came. This is my morning, my day is beginning: up now, up, you great noon!”

Thus spoke Zarathustra and he left his cave, glowing and strong, like a morning sun that emerges from dark mountains.

Further Reading:

Thomas Common translation of Thus Spake Zarathustra

Reasonings About Sam Harris’ The Moral Landscape

After reading Sam Harris’ The Moral Landscape, I’ve decided to finally articulate some of the praise and criticism that, for some time now, Harris and his work have inspired in me.

The goal of The Moral Landscape is to set the groundwork for the development of a science of morality that is objective and informed by empirical facts, and therefore cross-cultural. The immediate effect of this is an attack on post-modernism, cultural relativism and the political correctness of the men of the crowd that impedes an honest moral discourse. This is important work, and follows up on a key conclusion that Harris expressed some years back in his piece Killing the Buddha:

What the world most needs at this moment is a means of convincing human beings to embrace the whole of the species as their moral community. For this we need to develop an utterly nonsectarian way of talking about the full spectrum of human experience and human aspiration. We need a discourse on ethics and spirituality that is every bit as unconstrained by dogma and cultural prejudice as the discourse of science is. What we need, in fact, is a contemplative science, a modern approach to exploring the furthest reaches of psychological well-being.

Anyone familiar with Epicurus’ distinction between nature’s guidance and cultural corruption can appreciate that Harris is headed in the right direction. Prior to delving into Harris’ work, I think it is important to present some of the work that has already been done by those that came before us in our tradition along these lines.

Polystratus’ View on Morality 

Epicurean doctrine (in the pen of Polystratus, the third Scholarch of the Athenian Garden) declares war on cultural relativism, makes the case for moral realism and teaches that good and evil are objective realities that can be discerned in the study of nature, but that these are not conventional qualities. Instead, they are dispositional qualities of things.

… fair and foul are relational or dispositional properties. In other words, they are tendencies exhibited by things in relation to other things. A magnet may only attract metal and not cement, but it remains a magnet insofar as it attracts metal. Peanuts can be nourishing or deadly (to some who are allergic), but they’re not inherently deadly: this is a relational property, not a conventional property. Colors and flavors are relational properties: we only see the color of an object when light reflects against it.

Polystratus, in his On Irrational Contempt, even says that not understanding that nature requires us to seek pleasure and avoid pain is at the root of all evil; that this is the quintessential distortion of our moral compass and the reason why hedonism is so important: pleasure and aversion are intrinsic values.

… your inability to distinguish what goal our very nature requires and with what it is by nature satisfied … the non recognition of these is the architect of all evils.

Many scientists argue that we can not go from what is (descriptive science) to what ought to be (which is generally presumed to be the role of morality and ethics), but in our tradition the doctrine that nature has established pleasure as the end is the result of a very simple observation which can be seen even in newborn babies. We observe that living beings naturally shun pain and seek pleasure; ergo pleasure is the end established by nature. Epicurus merely explains how things are, and then proposes the more intelligent, more efficient ways to pursue plesure. The question of ethics, then, becomes not just whether something is intrinsically good or bad (which, to Epicurus and to nature, only pleasure and pain are), but also becomes a matter of efficiency in the pursuit of human happiness and wellbeing. It is from this imperative of efficient pursuit of maximizing long-term happiness that Epicurus derives his “oughts”.

Polystratus argues for an objective, real morality based on our experience of pleasure and pain, which are experienced directly through our natural faculties and not imagined. Notice, also, how the moral faculty requires no logical formulas. The Reasonings on Polystratus’ On Irrational Contempt conclude:

We may forgive these ideologies for their harm by taking into account that they never promised a pleasant life. If we do not set this goal from the onset, how can we expect it as an end result?

When we do not base our views firmly on the study of nature, and when we do not have clear insight into how the good is the pleasant and the bad is the unpleasant in our direct, real and immediate experience, we end up serving ends other than the ends that nature has established for us as natural beings.

Naturalist moral realism is simple: as natural beings we can directly discern, with our faculties, both good and evil.

Harris’ Introduction

Harris begins the book arguing for the development of a moral science: a morality that would be objective. He recognizes the difficulty and complexity of this task. Intellectuals both within the scientific and religious community have argued that science cannot answer ethical questions, that it can only state to us facts about the nature of things and not how we OUGHT to live our lives.

One of the tasks that stands before Harris is to demonstrate via arguments, like Polystratus did, that the relational or dispositional nature of moral qualities (good and evil, fair and foul) are no less objective than their conventional qualities (solid, liquid, hot, cold, etc.); that insofar as they are measurable, observable, they are objective, real, and scientific.

If this is demonstrable, there is therefore no real Christian morality, no real Muslim morality, and these are arbitrary constructs, the fruits of cultural corruption, in the same way that we can not speak of an Islamic alchemy or a Christian theory of gravity.

He practices the materialist technique of the doublet by presenting in lucid description the good life versus the bad life: imagery of a life of misery, hunger and poverty in a war-torn society versus imagery of a life of opulence, luxury, tranquility and satisfaction. This exercise serves to give tangible ideas of what good and evil mean; Harris then says that he has met people who argue that these differences only exist in language. He does not say it–and uses “well-being” instead of long-term pleasure as the end–, but here he is arguing against Platonic, idealist concepts of good and evil, and for hedonism.

The moment one begins thinking about morality in terms of well-being, it becomes remarkably easy to discern a moral hierarchy across human societies.

He later goes on to argue that moral truth can be concretely determined based on the effects of actions (we would add: by their being fair or foul, pleasant or unpleasant).

This is a frequent source of confusion: consequentialism is less a method of answering moral questions than it is a claim about the status of moral truth.

Religion and Dogmatism

Harris is known for arguing against religion, but here he immediately equates religion with dogmatism. It does not appear to occur to him that there are dogmatic secular philosophies, and that not all dogma is wrong or dangerous. If a view is established and based on inequivocal empirical data, it can (and, I would argue, should) safely be asserted dogmatically so that future knowledge can be built upon its foundations. Scientists do this all the time (calling their dogmas theories once they’re no longer hypothetical), and this is a necessity of the long-term enterprise of gathering empirical data. Well, in philosophy, we call these established theories, doctrines and dogmas.

This is one instance where Harris fails at having the stamina that his own self-proclaimed mission calls for, and one of the reasons why for many years now I’ve argued that Harris desperately needs to study Epicurus and that the work that he’s attempting to do has already been done. He says:

Similarly, anyone truly interested in morality—in the principles of behavior that allow people to flourish—should be open to new evidence and new arguments that bear upon questions of happiness and suffering. Clearly, the chief enemy of open conversation is dogmatism in all its forms.Dogmatism is a well-recognized obstacle to scientific reasoning; and yet, because scientists have been reluctant even to imagine that they might have something prescriptive to say about values, dogmatism is still granted remarkable scope on questions of both truth and goodness under the banner of religion.

This is where we disagree. Religion and dogmatism are not one and the same. He later goes on to say.

… given that there are facts-real facts-to be known about how conscious creatures can experience the worst possible misery and the greatest possible well-being, it is objectively true to say that there are right and wrong answers to moral questions …

Ergo, moral dogmas can be asserted. Moral truths and moral errors can be called by their proper name. In the first chapter of his book, Harris sets out to prove that there existmoral truths and decries cultural relativism, but commits it when he fails to articulate that, perhaps, scientific morality can be served by assertions no less dogmatic than religions’ assertions. Moral truths are moral dogmas. If we recognize that science can give us certainty, then what’s wrong with being certain and dogmatic of scientific truths?

I agree with Harris that we can and should make cross-cultural moral judgements, but dogmatism is only harmful if it asserts falsehoods as truths; if it labels misery as happiness or vice-versa. Instead, what we are doing here is establishing a firm, empirical foundation for the dogmas we hold to be true. This is the responsible, reasonable thing to do. And insofar as we achieve empirical certainties, we have achieved new dogmas.

Moral Blindness in the Name of Tolerance

Fanciers of Hume’s is/ought distinction never seem to realize what the stakes are, and they do not see how abject failures of compassion are enabled by this intellectual “tolerance” of moral difference. – Sam Harris

Harris argues that the result of post-modern, arbitrary, unrestricted tolerance for all moral systems as long as they’re considered within their cultural framework, no matter how degrading or mutually contradictory, by need culminates in a tolerance for intolerance. We see it, for instance, in how we in the West must allow Muslims to settle and build mosques and preach their faith to new converts, but if a Westerner moves to Arabia, builds churches or temples of non-Muslim religions and preaches Christianity or atheism to new converts, he will likely face death or torture. We also see it in the tax-exemptions enjoyed by churches who discriminate daily, and in many other examples of religious (and, sometimes, non-religious) privilege.

This issue of how arbitrary judgements based on supernatural claims can pass for morality (and can later be shown to be deeply immoral) raises another argument, which Harris brings up later in the book. Just as the majority of people can be wrong about the Earth being flat, about the laws of physics, and about evolution, and are later shown to be wrong: Can the same not be said about treatment of women, prohibition of gay marriage, the Hindu practice of widow-burning, and other demonstrably immoral choices?

Moral Realism and Assigning a Goal to Science

In moral realism (moral claims can be true or false) and consequentialism (rightness of an act depends on how it impacts the well-being of conscious creatures.

Some time ago, I attempted to write a piece on what moral guidance Epicureanism can give to science, framing the conversation in terms of the hedonic covenant (science should maximize everyone’s pleasure and minimize everyone’s pain). In the first chapter of his book, Harris illustrates just how science can contribute to morality in three ways:

  1. by finding scientific explanations for immoral and moral human behavior
  2. by discerning and affirming moral truth in scientific terms
  3. by convincing people to abandon immoral behaviors that have been considered moral for reasons of cultural corruption

Most scientists involved in moral issues have delved into the first example, which is the least controversial of the three. The third scientific project constitutes one of the goals of scientific morality, yet it’s incredibly difficult to accomplish without tackling the second mammoth task (Harris’ own task, and Polystratus’). Hence, moral realism becomes a pre-requisite for the third project.

In the first chapter, Harris exemplifies how the second task might be completed by the example of how we may be able to measure the levels of wellbeing in societies of honor, after a man either kills his wife or his wife’s suitor as a result of jealousy versus when a man, in a more civilized society, simply accepts with compassion the event (which, in his example, did not result in disloyalty) and moves on. Measurable levels of happiness and unhappiness can be discerned by neuroscientists in the brains of survivors of abuse or death of loved ones. We know that stress finds expression in the hormone cortisone, and wellbeing in serotonin levels. We know that higher blood pressure and other physical symptoms result from suffering and high stress. These are measurable results of choices and avoidances, and therefore moral choices can be judged by their repercussions.

A Critique of Moral Objectivism

We must accept at least one important challenge to moral objectivism, and insofar as we are able to accept and tackle this challenge, it may be able to serve credibly as a source of moral guidance for future generations.

The charge is that, under the pretensions and, some may say, the arrogance of scientific moral certainty, at some point in the future someone or some group may embrace eugenics programs designed to remove people with sociopathic genes from the gene pool. This may be done via genetic manipulation, via the manipulation of fertility, or via extermination.

Certainly, if we were to fully embrace scientism, the charge would be a legitimate concern. Harris denies the charge of scientism. As long as we operate within the realm of naturalist philosophy and see science merely as a means to nature’s end, I’m not sure that the charge would apply to us, but we must still adress this problem.

In other words, how the insights of scientific morality are applied is of huge importance and carries great responsibility. But this only argues for the view that assigning a noble goal to science and to her insights is a necessity.

If we stick to the Epicurean hedonic covenant, to how hedonic calculus can be applied at the societal level, then the dual role of science is to maximize the wellbeing and to minimize the suffering of all members of society. Any application of this principle must be addressed, when the time comes, within its context.

So long as we lack the power to predict future effects, this issue is not quite the same as the rhetorical question of whether we should go back in time and kill baby Hitler, if we could do that. Scientism is precisely the kind of ideological devise that would attempt to precociously predict baseless conclusions.

The potentially dehumanizing, hellish error implicit in the misapplication of these insights finds expression in much of science fiction, particularly the post-apocalyptic kind. I recently read Ruinland, which depicts a world that has been destroyed by religious warfare where people have entirely lost faith in God, and robotic monsters are carrying out the executions of all humans who lack a gene responsible for empathy.

Like the case of the Deuteronomy law which orders the stoning to death of one’s son if he is an insolent alcoholic, I can easily think of many, more intelligent and compassionate ways to deal with a mutant that lacks empathy, including job training that maximizes the useful skills that he does have and the development of gene therapy. Presumably, by the time we’ve learned to build human-like robots to kill us, we will have also spent money on gene therapy research.

We must recognize that, once we accept moral objectivism, ethical questions of this sort do not necessarily become less complex. But that does not mean that insights gained through legitimate empirical methods are any less valid or useful. The fantasies of an infant are comforting, but once grown, the individual can’t return to them and must deal with hard reality. It is what it is.

The (Irrational) Moral Faculty

Harris dedicates a huge portion of his book to making the case for moral realism, for how science can inform the truth-value of moral claims. The problem, here, is recognizably huge. Harris says that most scientists are skeptical of scientific morality because our moral judgements seem to be emotional acts, not logical formulas or equations. But here, let us first remember a warning posed by Jostein Gaarder in Sophie’s World:

… We cannot use reason as a yardstick for how we ought to act … You know that the Nazis murdered millions of Jews. Would you say that there was something wrong with the Nazis’ reason, or with their emotional life?

… Many of them were exceedingly clear-headed. It is not unusual to find ice-cold calculation behind the most callous decisions. Many of the Nazis were convicted after the war, but they were not convicted for being ‘unreasonable’. They were convicted for being gruesome murderers.

If reliance on logic and reason is not necessarily useful here, then can we discern morals from empirical evidence? Or is there something other, some faculty inbred through natural selection that we must somehow study?

“Man was destined for society. His morality, therefore, was to be formed to this object. He was endowed with a sense of right and wrong merely relative to this. This sense is as much a part of his nature, as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling; it is the true foundation of morality… The moral sense, or conscience, is as much a part of man as his leg or arm. It is given to all human beings in a stronger or weaker degree, as force of members is given them in a greater or less degree. It may be strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb of the body. This sense is submitted indeed in some degree to the guidance of reason; but it is a small stock which is required for this: even a less one than what we call Common sense. State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former will decide it as well, and often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by artificial rules.” –Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr, 1787.

This accusation by Thomas Jefferson, an Epicurean, that the moral faculty can be sometimes used best by someone undefiled by academia and that it is distinct from reason, at once argues how philosophy can be useful to everyone and not just the scholars, and yet leaves us confused as to where we can search for this moral faculty within the realm of empirical data.

The most we can say here is that, at least, scientists admit the difficulties of this task, of this responsibility, of articulating morals in scientific language. Because the moral faculty is such a complex matter that requires, at the very least, great advances in neuroscience, it seems more useful to put the moral faculty aside and focus on the true practicalities of moral questions.

The So-Called “Illusion of Free Will”

We are conscious of only a tiny fraction of the information that our brains process in each moment – Sam Harris

Harris argues that the fact that others seem to be frequently more conscious of our own thought processes than we are is an indication of lack of free will. He then argues that the fact that there is some kind of mechanism attached to volition (machines can scan conscious movements in the body milliseconds before they happen) indicates that people lack free will.

Harris at once acknowledges and dismisses the differences between voluntary action and involuntary action, and makes the mistake of non-sequitor by saying:

“Clearly, findings of this kind are difficult to reconcile with the sense that one is the conscious source of one’s actions.”

Now, in Epicurean therapy there is a recognition of something that we might today call the subconscious or the unconscious. Epicurus believed that certain behaviors and modes of thinking could “become stronger in the soul” through repetition and memorization. He believed that many of our habits have underlying dispositions that cause them, and that it was difficult or impossible to get rid of a habit without challenging the underlyingdisposition(s).

In my book, I use the example of the consumerist who tries to keep up with the Jones because he believes that having a house or car comparable to the neighbors’ will bring him happiness: it is only if and when he challenges these false notions about happiness, that he is free to pursue happiness based on new, true and healthy dispositions (subconscious views). This process of constant self-betterment is, in our tradition, the task of the ethical philosopher.

What this means is that Epicurus never rejected the existence of subconscious impulses for our behavior, and that free will operates within this context. In other words, by living the analysed life and becoming cognizant of our habitual patterns, we are then empowered to change them, if we so choose. We must be careful to question the premise that two views are mutually exclusive: they may both be true.

Is it possible that there will be people who live their lives more consciously than others, and that there will be people who are able to gain a greater level of conscious steering of their own life experience? I would say yes to both possibilities. Is it likely that some people who enjoy greater freedom, will not utilize it for reasons of culture or volition? That is also the case. There are many examples of wasted opportunities, as well as examples of addicts who recover and others who do not recover, for instance. A habit is not a death sentence.

Epicurean therapy pre-supposes a set of mutual expectations between philosophers. We have to trust each other as free moral agents in order to engage in the process of mutual correction. Therapy therefore becomes an opportunity and an incentive to live not just the analysed life, but a more fully conscious life.

It is not always necessary for two truths to be mutually exclusive: just as both tribal and universal tendencies can be moral forces in the world, similarly nature may pull the strings and human volition may interfere in that process. This is not at all unreasonable.

One Epicurean thinker, Cassius Amicus, argues that “it is outrageous that you have to say something that ought to be so clear. No one, least of all Epicurus, ever denied that there are pre-existing conditions and influences that affect our behavior. (Harris) is a smart guy – Why is he arguing against a straw man? Why does he not admit that we have SOME free will in some areas and not others? It is really too obvious to need much argument, and yet he is trying to be absolutist. Why?”

Which raises the possibility that he may not be writing in good will. I raised a similar accusation in the past against another philosopher that Harris bases his views on: Daniel Dennett. In his Prospect Magazine piece Are We Free?, he refers to Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura as a “Stoic masterpiece”. But Lucretius is not a Stoic, nor is his masterpiece a work of Stoicism.

Is it possible that Dennett, who is one of the most prominent philosophers of our generation, didn’t know that Lucretius was one of the great Epicurean thinkers in antiquity, that he was not a Stoic? There is a slim chance that might be the case, but there’s a greater chance that Dennett knew the difference between Epicurean and Stoic views on this matter and preferred to ignore the existence of the Epicurean  school and its teachings altogether. The question of free will is one of the great differences between the two schools, and it’s difficult to believe that a philosopher as immersed in the question of free will as he is was unaware of these distinctions. So the possibility of ill-will and of partiality to a certain set of views must be at least mentioned here.

Let’s look at the practical repercussions for society of free will being an illusion. Harris argues:

While viewing human beings as forces of nature does not prevent us from thinking in terms of moral responsibility, it does call the logic of retribution into question.

In other words, it is true that an instinctive murderer who suffers from a neurological disorder deserves more of our compassion than a murderer who plans and calculates for weeks an assassination and whose brain shows normal activity patterns. This is a valid point, but the logic of retribution may be questioned regardless of these facts. In other words, some of us would argue that the goal of the justice system should be, not retribution, but reform and recovery from sociopathic tendencies with the long-term goal of creating a pleasant life.

In the end the arguments of the determinists, like those of the Epicureans, seem to be calling for research that seeks to find cures instead of finding faults and declaring guilt. We are reminded of Frances Wright’s rhetorical question in A Few Days in Athens:

“When did Epicurus ever look at the vicious with anything other than compassion?”

Conclusion

It’s been said that those who ignore their history, are forced to repeat it. We are at a historical junction where fragments of an obscure scroll written by Polystratus, that were found among the ashes left behind in Herculaneum by the Mount Vesuvius eruption in the year 79 of Common Era, may hold vestiges of a conversation that we believe to be new and emerging. It’s not a new conversation: it’s at least as ancient as the second generation of Epicureans.

The Moral Landscape, in spite of its few imperfections, does a fairly good job of articulating the need for a moral realism. We’re happy that Harris has decided to join us in these ancient conversations.

Charlie Hebdo and the Terror of Free Expression

Armas

I woke up this morning to news of Islamic militants in France killing 12 people in order to avenge their prophet Muhammad for the imaginary crime of depicting the prophet. Immediately, thousands of secular activists took to social media to decry the demented incident and to express their solidarity with free expression.

The tradition of mocking false prophets goes back to 2nd Century Roman satirist Lucian, who authored “Alexander the Oracle-Monger“. In the concluding paragraph, Lucian stated:

My object, dear friend, in making this small selection from a great mass of material has been … to strike a blow for Epicurus, that great man whose holiness and divinity of nature were not shams, who alone had and imparted true insight into the good, and who brought deliverance to all that consorted with him. Yet I think causal readers too may find my essay not unserviceable, since it is not only destructive, but for men of sense, constructive also.

Alexander was a false prophet from what is now Turkey who claimed to have been sent by Apollo to give oracles and to confer healing upon the people. To impress people, he carried around a large snake-god known as Glaucon, some effigies of which still exist. Concerned about the Epicureans’ persistent attempts to expose him as a fraud, and about the potential loss of clients as a result of Lucian’s accusations, the prophet pretended to befriend and assist Lucian on a journey, and paid someone to have him murdered at sea, so that his body would never be found. However, the mercenary sent by the Oracle-Monger repented, confessed, and allowed Lucian to live, as a result of how affable and friendly Lucian had been to him, and Alexander’s strategy failed.

Lucian lived, but because (then as now) religion enjoys so much favor among the powerful, Lucian was unable to have Alexander prosecuted for attempting to kill him. So his act of vengence, in the end, was to write shit about him, to expose him once and for all, via one of the most enjoyable satires of religion ever written. Alexander the Oracle Monger is one of the earliest works of secularist comedy ever written, if not the earliest.

We are in the 21st Century. So much has happened since Lucian, yet so many things remain the same. Religious privilege remains, to a large extent, unchallenged. False prophets abound in every culture. We still hear reports of quackery and faith healing.

And mercenaries are still sent by false prophets, even dead ones, to kill comedians.

These mercenaries equate laughter, comedy, satire, with terror and avenge them in kind. They are terrified of this mystery of free expression, terrified of how the ink of a pen acts like blood, giving life to our ideas and making their ideas obsolete. The pen (or its modern version, the keyboard), today as in the days of Lucian, is a weapon of mass destruction and the words of comedians are bombs from which no shelter can protect them. Like radio waves, they expand in all directions, aren’t bound by gravity, and the entire world can be exposed to the dangerous radiation within seconds. This is the power that content creators today have, and the religious fascists are terrified of the irrevocable advance of this new power, unable to accept and understand that this is a new paradigm, that we’ve entered the age of information.

Please join me in striking a blow for Epicurus today by reading, enjoying and sharing Alexander the Oracle Monger in solidarity with #CharlieHebdo.

Originally written for The Autarkist.

Atheism 2.1: the Tension Between Atheist Politics and Ataraxia

I finally took the time to watch David Silverman’s firebrand atheism lecture. Silverman is the head of American Atheists. Upcoming atheist conventions in unlikely cities likeMemphis, Tennessee and San Juan, Puerto Rico have brought him into my radar, as I’ve recently created content for Ateístas de Puerto Rico and have been very concerned in recent years about the rise of religious privilege and intrusion in the public life in the island.

The inappropriate intrusion of religion in the lives of people in secular societies has had the side effect of birthing a militant atheist movement. Some of us argue that this is a moral necessity of our times, and that if religion had not become political there would be no need for a political secularism. For instance, Daniel Radcliffe recently said “I’m an atheist, and a militant atheist when religion starts impacting on legislation”. He also considers Richard Dawkins one of his personal heroes. Here, notice that he is not always militant: only when it comes to legislation, to politics, to significant societal changes that are backwards instead of progressive, does he feel a need to be militant.

Not Everyone Finds Advantage in Coming Out or Being Militant

The tensions arise when militancy becomes a source of conflict within our families and personal relations, and one must choose between the closet and one’s ataraxia. This is not an easy tension and we should not expect easy, clear-cut answers to ethical questions of this sort.

In one of my recent discussions with firebrand atheists on facebook, the one that frankly inspired this blog, the crux of the tension became evident. Their argument (which I fully understand) was that unless and until atheists begin to come out of the closet en masse, and proudly assume the atheist label, and until we see a normalization of atheism, there will be marginalization and exclusion. In spite of the rise of secularism in recent years, atheists are still one of the most hated groups in America.

But then my firebrand atheist friends called for obligating others to come out of the closet, to out them, to call them hypocrites, cowards, and other names if they don’t come out. This is where I reminded them that coming out can be costly for many people. Atheism (militant or not) can create heated discussions with family members and friends, and even the possibility of exile and alienation in communities and families that are deeply religious. Many ex-Mormons experience deep alienation and are entirely ostracized, becoming pariahs forever in their own communities, and former Muslims sometimes have to fear for their lives. Many Christian churches and families are no different.

Furthermore, some argue that recognizing the label atheist is not necessary at all and doesn’t even make sense. AC Grayling compares it to labeling oneself “a non-stamp-collector” and famously said “How can you be a militant atheist? It’s like sleeping furiously“.

When asked “Does God exist?”, the Dalai Lama smilingly said “I don’t know”. There are many kinds of atheists, from the militant to the very religious Buddhists, to the Epicurean philosopher who simply wants a life of ataraxia and tranquility, who just doesn’t want to be bothered with unnecessary conflict with strangers or loved ones. An atheist does not HAVE to be a militant. An atheist does not HAVE to be anything. Coming out must always be a personal choice based on one’s convictions, priorities and hedonic calculus.

Furthermore, there isn’t enough solidarity in the “atheist movement” to communally sustain the burden of people coming out. I say this because I worked in gay and lesbian non-profit organizations many years ago, and one of the communities that I served was homeless LGBT youth. To me, this is not just about statistics. I can put a face next to the LGBT homelessness problem because I was the one who had to call shelters in Chicago in the dead of winter and try to find some of my clients a place to spend the night.

If an atheist organization does not have the infrastructure needed to assist a homeless 17-year-old who has recently come out atheist in a very religious home, it is ABSOLUTELY IRRESPONSIBLE to invite, much worse to force, that youth to come out of the atheist closet. The atheist community does not have anything like the homeless shelters, non-profit organizations, community centers, hospitals, hotlines, job-search assistance, and many other resources that the gay and lesbian community has had to build over many decades to fight homophobia effectively, and these things took generations of struggle and strategy to build.

There is no need to create unnecessary statistics. Yet at the same time, having worked with LGBT youth, I know viscerally and personally the dangers and evils of religion and I have a firm commitment to fight religious tyranny and religious privilege, and to never deny that they exist.

Instead of outing people, the appropriate strategy should be educational. Many university campuses have an “Ask an Atheist a question” day and other opportunities for interfaith and ecumenical dialogue between secularists and religious people, which are not only chances to fight prejudice but also for closeted atheists to find each other. A militant atheist should, ideally, be a friendly and caring ally in the coming out process, not the asshole that forces a vulnerable youth into communal exile against his will. If a person does not feel safe coming out, then the right thing to do is to make it safer to come out. Organizations like openlysecular.org are doing much work in this regard.

I’m not against atheist preachers smashing idols and smiting people’s deeply held beliefs. Many of the concerns that Dawkins–whom I respect greatly–presents in his book The God Delusion should deeply worry us all. I recognize that there is a need today for firebrand atheism. It is a necessity of our times and a natural result of the dangers of religious privilege and tyranny. But militancy is a choice. Firebrand atheism is a personal choice, and only one way to be an atheist. There are many other ways to be an atheist.

Atheism 2.1 and Ataraxia as the End

Atheism 2.0 was introduced in a TED Speech by its main proponent, philosopher Alain de Botton. In his speech, he calls for a less militant, friendlier, more curious and affirming atheism; one that is also more inclusive of women and other ethnicities.

I generally agree with the ideas expressed in Atheism 2.0. However, I specifically use here the term Atheism 2.1 because a dialectical relationship is evolving between Epicurean philosophy and the new atheism where we oftentimes have to remind ourselves that the true goal of life is pleasure, tranquility, ataraxia. Some of us fear losing sight of the true goal established by nature in our heated political discussions, and end up distrusting militant atheism, even as we recognize the huge need for atheism in the public discourse.

Some argue that a true Epicurean must never be militant; they say “lathe biosas”, live unknown. Our compromise with our tranquility must always come first. But I do not agree with this. I do see the point that many firebrand atheists are making: that by coming out and assuming the label atheist, we do make a change in society, we do challenge religious privilege and misconceptions about atheists. And, most importantly, that any and all personal choice must involve hedonic calculus, and that in many instances the long-term profit that emerges from coming out is much greater than the losses. THAT is how it may be appropriate for a true Epicurean to be, at times, militant. Epicurus NEVER told anyone to be a hermit and always challenged people to not base their lives on fear. We must never misinterpret lathe biosas as a call to escape society, reality and life: that is the exact opposite of the realism of our predecessors.

A happy life is neither like a roaring torrent, nor a stagnant pool, but like a placid and crystal stream that flows gently and silently along.A Few Days in Athens

Atheism 2.1 can probably be labelled ataraxia atheism, to accentuate the cooling effects of a philosophy of abiding pleasure, versus the heated, controversial, conflict-seeking firebrand atheism of the militant secularists.

Perhaps attaching oneself to a particular label does not exactly fully solve the tensions that are inherent in this dialectical relationship between atheism as a moral necessity of our day (culture) and Epicureanism as an eternal ethical necessity of the human condition (nature); but it sets the tone for a different kind of conversation where we never lose track of nature’s end, at least for those of us who have chosen to be naturalist philosophers first and then, maybe, political activists.

So, please remember: @ is not just for atheism. @ also stands for ataraxia.

Originally written for The Autarkist.

The Rubáiyát of Titus Lucretius Carus

It is from the Roman poet Lucretius, who lived c. 99-55 BCE, that we have the most extensive treatment of Epicurean natural philosophy to come down to us from the ancient world. His De rerum natura, a title commonly translated as On the Nature of Things, sets forth the Epicurean view of a naturalistic universe. In so doing it goes into specifics on the science of the time, covering such areas as physics, astronomy, meteorology, earth science, human psychology, and social evolution. Along the way it seeks to dispel common fears of death and to counsel a life of simplicity.

But given the blizzard of technical detail throughout the work—much of it long outdated by modern science—and the fact that the poem runs some 7,400 lines, many readers have found Lucretius difficult to read all the way through and harder still to return to for moral inspiration. Moreover, the poet’s choice of rhythmic scheme—dactylic hexameter—hasn’t proved popular in English. Consider these opening lines of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s Evangeline.

This is the forest primeval. The murmuring pines and the hemlocks,
Bearded with moss, and in garments green, indistinct in the twilight,
Stand like Druids of eld, with voices sad and prophetic,
Stand like harpers hoar, with beards that rest on their bosoms.
Loud from its rocky caverns, the deep-voiced neighboring ocean
Speaks, and in accents disconsolate answers the wail of the forest.

Then compare that to the far more popular iambic pentameter used by Edward FitzGerald in The Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám.

The Worldly Hope men set their Hearts upon
Turns Ashes—or it prospers; and anon,
Like Snow upon the Desert’s dusty Face,
Lighting a little hour or two—is gone.

Think, in this batter’d Caravanserai
Whose Portals are alternate Night and Day,
How Sultán after Sultán with his Pomp
Abode his destined Hour, and went his way.

How would Lucretius sound if rendered this way? Well, he would sound like this.

Nothing abides. Thy seas in delicate haze
Go off; those moonéd sands forsake their place;
And where they are, shall other seas in turn
Mow with their scythes of whiteness other bays.

Lo, how the terraced towers, and monstrous round
Of league-long ramparts rise from out the ground,
With gardens in the clouds. Then all is gone,
And Babylon is a memory and a mound.

These latter are the poetic lines of William Hurrell Mallock from his Lucretius on Life and Death, a selective translation from De rerum natura that he initiated as a paper in the December 1899 Anglo-Saxon Review. The poem was subsequently expanded into book form in 1900 and given its final revision in 1910.

To appreciate the value of this effort, let’s compare how a specific passage—the first wherein Lucretius referenced Epicurus—reads in three versions. We find it in Book I, lines 63-68. Because De rerum natura is most commonly translated into English prose, due in large part to its technical exposition of natural philosophy, we’ll begin with the 1886 prose translation of H. A. J. Munro, which is considered a standard.

When human life to view lay foully prostrate upon earth crushed down under the weight of religion, who shewed her head from the quarters of heaven with hideous aspect lowering upon mortals, a man of Greece ventured first to lift up his mortal eyes to her face and first to withstand her to her face.

Now we’ll compare this to the very latest translation, that of David Slavitt, done in 2008 in a slow-paced English hexameter,

It was long the case that men would grovel
upon the earth,
crushed beneath the weight of Superstition
whose head
loomed in the heavens, glaring down with her
dreadful visage
until Epicurus of Greece dared to look up and
confront her,
taking a stand against the fables and myths of
the gods.

Now comes Mallock in iambic pentameter:

For this is he that dared the almighty foe,
Looked up, and struck the Olympian blow for blow,
And dragged the phantom from his fancied skies—
The Samian Sage—the first of those that know.

In his effort to restructure Lucretius’ lines “in the metre of Omar Khayyám,” Mallock used an approach similar to that of FitzGerald. In this regard, nineteenth century literary critic Charles Eliot Norton described FitzGerald’s Rubáiyát thus: “It is the work of a poet inspired by the work of a poet; not a copy, but a reproduction, not a translation, but the redelivery of a poetic inspiration.”

So Mallock created a short work, less than 500 lines, focusing on Lucretius’ moral teaching, which he found “scattered throughout his work in a variety of isolated passages.” Mallock declared, “There are very few of the stanzas which have not some equivalent in the original,” but he acknowledged that most of the lines he wrote “are summings up of the tendency of the thought of Lucretius, or echoes of his feelings, rather than reproductions of his words.”

The result is a work that gained the admiration of humanists and freethinkers of the twentieth century. For instance, shortly after the poet’s death, freethought publisher E. Haldeman Julius reprinted Lucretius on Life and Death in 1924 as Little Blue Book #581. In 1940 Corliss Lamont provided portions of Mallock’s third canto as an inspirational reading in A Humanist Funeral Service, a book that has remained in print ever since (now as A Humanist Funeral Service and Celebration, revised by Beth K. Lamont and J. Sierra Oliva).

Which brings us to the modern relevance of Mallock’s poem.

Present-day Epicureans, like people of other persuasions, may feel a need for ceremonies to mark life’s passages. For example, after we were brought into the world we might have been presented in some manner to family and community. Christianity accomplishes this ritualistically through baptism. Others have baby-naming or child welcoming ceremonies.

Coming of age is another time of celebration, recognized in Judaism with bar or bat mitzvahs, in many Christian denominations through confirmation ceremonies, and among the nonreligious in Iceland and Norway as secular confirmations. More common than all of these is the rite of marriage. And finally there are funerals and memorial services.

For all of these, evocative language is needed. And with so little of such language from the original Epicurean philosophers having survived the upheavals of history, we must turn to later authors who have breathed new life into the old concepts—such as the author before us.

Let’s do this with the birth of a child. We know, with Epicurus, that she or he is the latest rearrangement of cosmic particles that have, over eons of time, voyaged a long, long way. As Carl Sagan put it, “We are made of star stuff.” Or, as Mallock, inspired by Lucretius, phrased it:

Observe this dew-drenched rose of Tyrian grain—
A rose to-day. But you will ask in vain
To-morrow what it is; and yesterday
It was the dust, the sunshine and the rain.

This bowl of milk, the pitch on yonder jar,
Are strange and far-bound travellers come from far.
This is a snow-flake that was once a flame—
The flame was once the fragment of a star.

A loved one dies. Rather than honor that person’s memory with the traditional religious utterance from the Book of Common Prayer, “we commit his body to the ground; earth to earth; ashes to ashes, dust to dust,” we might prefer to draw from Book II of Lucretius.

The seeds that once were we take flight and fly,
Winnowed to earth, or whirled along the sky,
Not lost but disunited. Life lives on.
It is the lives, the lives, the lives, that die.

They go beyond recapture and recall,
Lost in the all-indissoluble All:—
Gone like the rainbow from the fountain’s foam,
Gone like the spindrift shuddering down the squall.

Flakes of the water, on the waters cease!
Soul of the body, melt and sleep like these.
Atoms to atoms—weariness to rest—
Ashes to ashes—hopes and fears to peace!

These are words of emotional power. Yet despite this, Mallock’s contribution has become all but forgotten in the twenty-first century. So, to remedy this, I have put together a special digital edition of Lucretius on Life and Death for Humanist Press. It is originally being introduced as a free accompaniment to Hiram Crespo’s Tending the Epicurean Garden.

It is my hope that this century-old book will find use again and, even more, stimulate new efforts to adapt Greco-Roman philosophical thought to today’s literary and artistic forms.

***

Fred Edwords has, since 1980, worked in such capacities as executive director of the American Humanist Association, editor of The Humanist magazine, president of Camp Quest, and national director of the United Coalition of Reason. In so doing he has lectured and debated internationally and written numerous articles, essays, and reviews.

Tending the Epicurean Garden

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An Epicurean Yearbook – in German

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“The Epicurean Yearbook“ invites the reader to experience 365 days with Epicurean philosophy. Each month contains content that plunges deeper into the cosmos of Epicureanism:

  • A quotation helps to memorize ancient wisdom.
  • An essay discusses questions of philosophy and matches them with everyday life.
  • A small exercise helps to understand philosophy within daily routine.
  • In contrast, a large exercise is an active approach to live philosophy.

Example: “The Good is Easy to Attain”. In September we realize that Nature gives everything we need for low cost. During harvest season staples are very cheap. We are invited to be mindful of this next time we walk through the fruit and vegetable section of our supermarket and be happy about Nature’s blessings. A large exercise is to cook a fresh dish and invite friends to the meal. Finally, the monthly entry includes passages from Epicurus, Lucretius and other authors.

In the last chapter of my book, I present an Epicurean symposium. This symposium consists of a ritual to experience “The four-part cure” (Tetrapharmakos), a presentation and a banquet. Rituals and symbols connect the world of thought with the natural world.

– Andreas Haf, author

Get Das epikureische Jahrbuch: 365 Tage philosophieren (German Edition) from amazon

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The Scholarchs, the Guides, and the Empress

The first companions of Epicurus were known as the kathegemones (those who led the way) and were considered members of Epicurus’ philosophical family, his philoi (affiliates or friends).

From this initial group, two sets of leaders emerged: we have the Four Men (hoi andrei) who are properly considered the founders of our tradition and whom Philodemus treats as ultimate authorities, frequently citing them to underline the legitimacy of his teachings. They are Epicurus, Metrodorus, Hermarchus and Polyaenus. We also have the lineage of Scholarchs who succeeded Epicurus at the head of the Athens school. This article concerns these diadochi (from diadokhoi, “Successors”).

Diogenes Laertius in his Lives of Eminent Philosophers, mentions by name only the first nine of these Scholarchs. From later sources, we have two more that are mentioned in the times of emperor Hadrian, and due to their recognized authority, I’m extending the term Scholarch to include all four founders. Also, in the spirit of honoring the sages, and although they do not fall within the lineage of the Scholarchs proper, there were other extraordinary teachers who contributed greatly to the spread and the preservation of Epicureanism (Philodemus of Gadara, Lucretius, Philonides of Laodicea, and Diogenes of Oenoanda). They are included here as a homage.

Our tradition preserved itself through direct transmission and succession. As we saw with Philodemus, later Epicureans were very interested in preserving the teachings of the original Four Masters. Claiming a place under the succession (in his case, through Zeno) was therefore of great importance to Philodemus.

HEGEMON
Epicurus of Samos

Later generations of philosophers would call him “the Herald who saved us”. Read D. Laertius’ account of his life here.

SCHOLARCH
Metrodorus of Lampsacus (the Younger)

Metrodorus was known as a great administrator, linguist and financier, and was recognized as a sophos (sage) by the Epicureans and as “almost another Epicurus” by Cicero.

He was born in 331/330 BC in Lampsachus, and died in 278/7 BC, seven or eight years before his master. He never left Epicurus except once for six months spent on a visit to his native land. He never acted as Scholarch but was among the Four Men.

SCHOLARCH
Polyaenus of Lampsacus

The son of Athenodorus, a citizen of Lampsacus and mathematician, was considered a kind man. He died prior to Epicurus in 286 BC. He never acted as Scholarch but was among the Four Men.

SCHOLARCH
Hermarcus of Mitylene

Hermarcus, a student of rhetoric, was the successor of Epicurus as second scholarch and the first convert to the teachings of Epicurus in the early days when Epicurus first began teaching. He was born in Mitylene, Lesbos in 340 BCE from a poor family and died around 250 BC of paralysis.

Hermarcus was the only one among the founders who was there both prior to Epicurus’ teaching mission, and at the time of his death when, according to Philodemus, he assisted the Hegemon, “wrapped him in a shroud, and kept vigil beside his remains“, perhaps a testimony of the tender love that existed among the first Friends of Epicurus who had grown old together in philosophy and were as family.

Some of the extant sayings in our tradition have been attributed to him, and it is believed that he was almost exclusively vegetarian and that he considered meat-eating an unnecessary desire because it contributes not to the maintenance of life but to a variation in pleasure.

SCHOLARCH
Polystratus

He had been a young pupil of aged Epicurus, later attained succession as Scholarch c. 250 BCE and died 219-8 BCE. His life-long best friend was Hippoclides. Two of his writings remain: there are broken fragments of On Philosophy, and an interesting work titled On Irrational Contempt, a diatribe against the Sceptics where he argues in favor of a naturalist moral realism.

Polystratus is the first Scholarch who had not been a founding member and it’s here that issues of inheritance begin to harm the school, apparently because some non-Epicurean children of scholarchs would claim inheritance. Over the long-term, this seems to have harmed the continuity of the Athenian Garden.

We also know that Rome introduced legislation requiring the successors in the provincial philosophical schools to be Roman citizens in order to avoid subversion, which would later greatly diminish the number of available successors. The law would not be abolished until the second century of Common Era.

SCHOLARCH
Dionysius of Lamptrai

He became the fourth succeessor of Epicurus in 219-8 BCE after contending for succession against Diotimos, as Polystratus had failed to designate the next Scholarch. It is most likely here that, according to Empress Plotina who wrote during the second century of Common Era, the pupils had to carry out an election to choose their next Hegemon.

SCHOLARCH
Basilides of Tyre

He was born in Syria c. 245 BCE, appointed successor in 205 BCE and died c. 175 BCE. He had been pupil of Artemon, and he taught Philonides of Laodicea. Philodemus’ writings on anger are likely based on his work.

SCHOLARCH
Philonides of Laodicea

Although not a Scholarch, he was an important missionary to Asia who spread Epicureanism in the East (Phoenicia, Syria).

SCHOLARCH
Apollodorus of Athens, the Kepotyrannos

The sixth Hegemon (190-110 BC) rose to the succession c. 147 BCE and had been known as the tyrant of the Garden due to the discipline he implemented. He wrote over four hundred books and is believed to have possibly restored the finances of the Athenian school, which may be how he got his nickname. We must remember that there were inheritance issues after the four founders passed away.

He is said to have written upwards of 400 books, none of which is extant and only two are mentioned by title: a Life of Epicurus and a Collection of Doctrines.

SCHOLARCH
Zeno of Sidon

The seventh Hegemon is believed to have been born in Sidon (modern Lebanon) c. 166 BCE and succeeded his teacher Apollodorus as the head of the school c. 100-75 BCE

Some Epicureans call the Scholarchs that came after Apollodorus sophists, a term which carries negative connotations, perhaps because of the innovations they introduced. Many of these innovations were the result of interaction and debate with other schools. Some believe they were attempts to reconcile the writings of the founders with new insights.

The school had relied on memorization of sayings for many generations. Zeno was a prolific writer of over 400 books who engaged in textual criticism of Epicurus and revitalized the intellectual life of the school by rebelling against what he perceived as an inability to adapt, which is probably part of what inspired the accusations of sophistry. Perhaps the discipline he endured under Apollodorus gave him a rebellious edge?

In any case, he seems to have gathered a huge circle around him and to have influenced many important thinkers of his day, including Cicero (who greatly admired his logical and noble thought), Atticus, Demetrius the Laconian, Lucretius, and Philodemus. If the greatness of a teacher can be judged by the greatness of his students, then Zeno must have been one of the great Epicurean Masters, an incredibly important figure.

Philodemus’ works On Frank Criticism and On Anger are part of the Epitome of Conduct and Character, which is based on the Lectures of Zeno.

GUIDE
Titus Lucretius Carus

Lucretius (95-52 BCE) was a poet and author of De Rerum Natura, a didactic work that gives a complete exposition of the Epicurean system. This manuscript was rediscovered in the 15th Century by Poggio Bracciolini, its influence trickled down to Pierre Gassendi (who tried to reconcile atomism with Christianity), Giordano Bruno and other naturalist thinkers. According to many (including the author of The Swerve: How the World Became Modern), Lucretius is the reason for the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. In other words, his words lifted humanity from the Dark Ages.

GUIDE
Philodemus of Gadara

Philodemus was not a Scholarch, but studied in Alexandria and later under Zeno in Athens, went on to teach philosophy to wealthy Romans, and preserved many of Zeno’s lectures in the library at Herculaneum. In spite of this, and unlike his master, he was orthodox in his views and often cited the original four founders in order to claim legitimacy. As a result of this, he is a hugely importance source.

The importance of his work cannot be underestimated. These scrolls were destroyed by the eruption of Mount Vesuvius, but later rediscovered and many of the fragments deciphered. The remains of Philodemus’ work inspired the Philodemus Series at societyofepicurus.com and will likely continue to inspire our teaching mission.

SCHOLARCH
Phaedrus

The eighth Hegemon, Phaedrus, was a wealthy Athenian who lived from 138 – 170/69 BCE, having sought political exile in Rome in 88 BCE and later returning to Athens to succeed Zeno as Scholarch c. 75-70 BCE. He was a great orator and was known for writing witty epigrams.

SCHOLARCH
Patro

He became the ninth Hegemon c . 70-50s BCE, and lived unfortunately during a time when the school in Athens, the house where Epicurus had lived, was in ruins. There is evidence of his efforts to save the building.

With him ends the supremacy of the Athenian school (around 51 BCE), which would no longer receive donations from the satellite schools in other cities. As Epicureanism expanded in Rome as it had done in the east, there was an increased division between the orthodox (gnesioi, or authentic) and the sophistic (sophistai) wings of the tradition.

By now, there were Epicurean communities in Lampsacus, Mitylene, Miletus, Thebes, Antiochia (which became a major center and even had an Epicurean library with smiling gods’ statues), Alexandria, Chalcis, Apameia, Gadara, Kos, Naples, Pergamom, Rhodes, Amastris, Oenoanda, and Herculaneum.

GUIDE
Diogenes of Oenoanda

Diogenes lived in a small town in what is now Turkey. He erected a wall with an Epicurean inscription in order to teach philosophy to the people of his town. There’s an abridged version of the contents of Diogenes’ Wall at epicurus.info, another one here, and newepicurean.com has a feature on it.

SIXTEENTH SCHOLARCH
Popilius Theotimus

During the 2nd Century of Common Era, Popilius Theotimus, scholarch of the Garden at Athens, turned to Plotina, the Epicurean empress who had raised Emperor Hadrian, with a request to abolish the law that required the successor to be a Roman citizen. She succeeded in utilizing her influence on the emperor to change the laws.

HONORARY MENTION: THE EPICUREAN EMPRESS PLOTINA

As a side note, we do not know how early Plotina chose to follow Epicurus, whom she called Savior, or whether she raised Hadrian as an Epicurean, but we do have reason to believe that Plotina’s philosophy greatly influenced the emperor. It must be noted that the following words were inscribed on Hadrian’s coins: Humanitas, Felicitas, Libertas (Humanity, Happiness, and Freedom).

SEVENTEENTH SCHOLARCH
Heliodorus

We know that Emperor Hadrian personally wrote to the Epicurean scholarch Heliodorus, the successor to Popilius Theotimus, conceding financial support to his school. Later in 178 Emperor Marcus Aurelius renewed interest in the Epicurean school in Athens by an endowment of ten thousand drachmas.

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Democritus, the First Laughing Philosopher

Democritus was born in Abdera, Thrace and lived during the years 460-370 BCE. His biography is related by Diogenes Laertius in his Lives of Eminent Philosophers (as was Epicurus’).  He came from a wealthy family and, after the death of his father, he travelled in search of wisdom to Egypt, Ethiopia, India, served Xerxes in Persia, was instructed there by the Magi in astrology, and finally he returned to Abdera where his brother, Damosis, took him in.  There, he gave lectures.

He is relevant to us for having been the instructor of Nausiphanes, who later taught atomism to Epicurus. Originally, he was a pupil of Leucippus, of whom little is known and who is credited with being the first atomist.

Democritus contributed so much to the original atomist theory that they’re both considered founders of the atomist school. In fact, he systematized it.

But Democritus’ stream of thought really goes back further than his master Leucippus: he was also reacting against Parmenides’s theory that there is no change or motion, only the all, and that all things are one and the same primal thing. This is obviously false: multiplicity is in evidence everywhere, and so is motion and change.

Parmenides was as much a mystic as he was a philosopher. Philosophy needed to be reconciled with observable facts: this is why the materialist and atomist school emerged. Democritus reasoned that it was obvious that all things were made of some primal thing, and that at some point particles could not be divisible any further (ergo, we would reach an a-tomo, or indivisible particle).

He also reasoned that, for there to be motion, there needed to be a void. If space was filled, nothing would be able to move into it.

By these simple insights, Democritus developed the theory that Epicurus inherited according to which reality is written in the binary language of atoms and the void.

Light-hearted Democritus was also known as the Laughing Philosopher and as the Mocker by his contemporaries because he was always laughing at human nature.

Later, his pupil Nausiphanes argued against the Sceptics, who dismissed the possibility or the need for scientific certainty, and in favor of materialist dogmatism. He reasoned that reality was, in fact, knowable, and that therefore naturalist philosophers needed concise criteria to determine with certainty whether a statement was true or not based on evidence that we can grasp with our natural faculties. For this process, Nausiphanes created the first canon, which Epicurus copied and which later inspired the scientific method.

In celebration of the intellectual grandfather of Epicurus, the 6th Episode of Cosmos includes references to Democritus, who is still today known as the father of modern science.

In Memory of a Laughing Philosopher

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Reasonings About Philodemus’ Rhetorica

Rhetoric is the prince of lies. –  Heraclitus

The following reasonings are based on the seven books that comprise Rhetorica by Philodemus, with translation and commentary by Dr. Harry M. Hubbell, which was published in 1920. Rhetorica is not a work of logic or rhetoric per se, but a series of arguments regarding the role and uses of rhetoric. The only reference to logic deals with how the relation between true and false is not the same as between two probabilities, and how it is false inference to apply laws of science to politics. There is also a reference to the canon in the declaration that “experience is our only guide to forecast the future“.

Book I contains an introduction and very general outline of the work, but only fragments of this book remain. It concludes saying:

Those Epicureans are to be censured who assume that sophistic is not an art, and thus run counter to the teachings of Epicurus, Metrodorus and Hermarchus, as we shall show later. Such Epicureans are almost guilty of parricide.

From the onset, we find Philodemus arguing in favor of what he perceived as orthodoxy and claiming legitimacy by tracing his ideas back to the four founders, and even saying that his opponents are nearly killing their parents. It was clear that love and respect for the sages who founded our tradition was deep-seated in the early communities of Epicureans.

Defining an Art

It was also clear that whether or not sophists were considered artists was a serious matter, and that we need to clarify the meaning of art (tekne) and of an artist.

Book II discusses whether rhetoric is an art. Epicureans argued that rhetoric was an art whose end was to persuade in a rhetorical speech, arguing that “in art anyone can excel over a trained person, but not in an exact science (or very rarely)“. An art, therefore, has an end, a purpose, it seeks an achievement.

The philosopher persuades by force of logic, Phyrne by her beauty.

If rhetoric has no method it is not an art … for the essence of art is to accomplish the result always.

Later in Section II, Philodemus defines art saying that it:

  • results from observation
  • accomplishes a result that can’t be attained if one has not studied it
  • is done regularly and not by conjecture (guess, speculation)

This applies to grammar and music. Philodemus argued vehemently that politics is not an art. Art (technique) requires transmission and is acquired through observation and experience.

As in music and grammar so in rhetoric there is a transmission of knowledge from teacher to pupil, and the training is not without method.

In the process of defining tekne, as opposed to our modern conception of art, we sought the help of our friend Brian, who says:

The word “art” is better translated “technique” (in Greek it is “techne”). It almost means “profession”. It was important for a few reasons: one is that the layman effort is sufficient for most tasks … Philodemus does not disparage “techne”, but in fact wishes to separate some jobs that he said really have no “techne” at all.

“SCIENCE/experience” is the “layman” or “amateur” effort, learned by actual contact whereas “ART/techne/profession” is the learned and schooled effort, learned by rules and technical training, not learned by actual contact. The idea is that “some arts can be accomplished partially and reasonably well by those who have not studied the principles of the art” should be read as “the practical exception that proves the rule.”

In the modern interpretation of art, we can observe that it’s distinct from science by being subjective (and concerned with aesthetics), whereas science is objective. Scientific facts may or may not have aesthetic value, they they work effectively and invariably. Rhetors may convince the majority of people of some truth (or lie), and still be considered great artists, or thought to have great technique. When doctors cure only the majority, but not all patients, they are not called great artists or technicians.

Epicurus divided rhetoric between two parts: sophistic (art of writing speeches and delivering orations) and practical. Forensic and deliberative oratory is a separate art, presumably because the techniques and aims are different.

According to Rhetorica, someone within the school was disputing Epicurus’ view that sophistic was an art. Philodemus’ interlocutors argue that rhetoric is not an art on the assumption that an art must have method and a transmission of definite knowledge; they also classify politics as an art, which Philodemus argues against.

To sum up: we call arts those that have a certain character possessed by grammar and sculpture; we deny that are art those that lack this character and are characterized by observation, ergo sophistic is an art and politics is not.

Sophistic rhetoric is an art of epideixis and of the arrangement of speeches, written and extemporaneous.

Notice that sophists have a method. Traditionally, a speech writer would compose a proemium (introduction), narration, demonstration, exception, and summary. There is also a process of learning and transmission by observation, a clear aim (either to convince others or to deliver a speech involving praise or indictment) and its effects must not be the result of conjecture. Therefore, it meets the above mentioned requirements for an art.

Against Obscurity

Book IV argues against obscurity and flowery language, and in favor of words always being used in their proper meaning. As far as style (which can be overused by rhetors), Epicurus argued in favor of only the natural style.

Obscurity is of two kinds: intentional and unintentional. It is intentional when one has nothing to say and conceals the poverty of his thought by obscure language that he may seem to say something useful. Connected with this is the use of many digressions, poetic images, recondite allusions and archaic language. Solecisms prevent the hearer from understanding many things. ONLY THE TRUE PHILOSOPHER IS FREE FROM THESE FAULTS.

Unintentional obscurity arises from not mastering the subject, but also from believing that words are in harmony with things. Along the same lines, we find elsewhere: “in a picture all is light and shadow; a painting cannot produce a living being.” The word or image is confused for the thing that is meant. Words are oftentimes not concise or do not refer clearly to things that are meant.

Obscurity can also arise from not knowing how to express ourselves (using improper grammar, etc.), from too frequent use of hyperbata, or from the use of too much rhyme while paying little attention to meaning.

One should use ordinary expressions appropriately, and not express oneself inaccurately, nor vaguely, nor use expressions with double meaning.

Rhetors are criticized for not having scientific or specific rules for use of metaphor, for using them more frequently than even poets, and for how they ridicule a metaphor without explaining why it’s faulty. It is said that sophistical training does not prevent faulty speech, and the first section ends saying that the “study of technical rhetoric has never advanced anyone“.

An overview of this portion reveals an insistence on clear, concise, simple and plain speech, which is highly valued. Language is expected to be scientific and precise so that it may serve as an effective tool for communication.

The Amorality and Other Limitations of Rhetoric

We shall next consider the statement that every art is invented for some useful purpose, but rhetoric tends to deceive.

Section II is said to be the most important part of On Rhetoric. The true value of rhetoric is put into perspective, the author insisting that it is not superior to philosophy. We learn that the difference between dialectic and grammar is that dialectic teaches how to argue, grammar teaches how to read. To the traditional field of rhetorics (forensic, deliberative, encomiastic), Demetrius adds a fourth: obtaining favor with all. The book then goes on to discuss the limitations of rhetoric.

They have a system for making themselves appear dignified and noble, and for misleading their audiences. This system is not needed by any other artist, certainly not by the philosopher. The fact is, each profession has its own peculiar delivery.

The argument here is that someone who knows about rhetoric may know little of the subject being discussed, even if he can weave a persuasive argument. Only the professionals and experts in any given field have true authority to speak on it. This includes politics, the field that was most likely to employ rhetors in antiquity. This is still true in our day, in fact. The vast majority of US politicians have a background in law, and in fact the legal professions are the contemporary version of the professions that used to employ rhetors in antiquity.

If rhetoric can discover the possible arguments in questions relating to medicine, music, etc. the rhetoricians are immediately put into rivalry with the experts in each of these professions … Each profession has its own facts and principles, and is alone competent to argue about them.

I assert that the sophists can, at least as far as their technical treatises are concerned, discover not the slightest argument pertaining to politics.

Even when the expertise of rhetoric is recognized, another limitation (this time, moral) is found in the art of praise: ‘the praise of brute beasts does no good’. The ability to praise things unworthy of praise is not praiseworthy, and doesn’t change their nature. A rhetor who does not know philosophy, can’t discern between good and bad, and ends up praising bad things and encouraging vice. Elsewhere in the text, it is said that rhetoric is “responsible for great mischief and does not bring success in actual law cases“.

Their claim that rhetoric is the mother of all the arts and sciences is a vain pretense … it is based on deceit, and therefore harmful.

Book V continues the diatribe against rhetors and on how rhetoric is harmful because it is based on deceit, arguing that it’s also useless in public life. Philodemus’ critique of rhetors reminds us of his critique of flatterers. He even asserts that “rhetors must flatter all their lives“. Rhetors are accused of saying there’s no morality except public opinion. On the other hand, philosophy provides everything necessary for a happy life; and philosophers gain the friendship of public men by helping them out of their troubles, not by flattering them.

Those who are troubled with the itch make it worse by scratching … so with those who suffer from sycophants (flatterers).

The accusation of flattery is tied to the audience that rhetors cater to. It is impossible to be loyal to everyone at once. Philodemus argues that “mobs change and repent quickly” and are fickle, whereas philosophers are content to assist a few people. These arguments are tied to the deep-seated belief among Epicureans that one can’t be happy by making others happy.

We see the frequent accusation that this art is amoral, ergo incomplete without philosophy. It becomes clear that one of the arguments put forth is that philosophy must help us to judge the ethical uses of rhetoric and of speech. The purpose or effect of the speech is of great importance in these consideration.

(Rhetoric) does not indicate what use is to be made of the powers it gives.

Speeches of this sort are no disgrace, if the object of forensic oratory be to set forth the facts, and not to show one’s power.

Aside from the ethical issues, Philodemus argues that one can’t enjoy the power and wealth that come with rhetoric because of the toils that come with them. For instance, he says philosophers “by their life and conversation, benefit their followers, however the mobs envy rhetors“.  He also cites the general distrust that exists within the culture against professional speakers in courts (lawyers, in modern language) and how judges are more likely to trust simple people.

Every good and honest man who confines his interest to philosophy alone, and disregards the nonsense of lawyers can face boldly all such troubles.

… It is worth our while to consider what sort of a life those have lived who have spent it all in prosecution and defense.

… Persuasion creates distrust in philosophy.

At times while reading Philodemus, one wants to ask whether he’s being too hard on rhetors. We must keep in perspective how important rhetoric was to the other schools of philosophy, and its corrupting effects. It seems that Philodemus’ intention was to contrast this use of rhetoric against the therapeutic and medicinal ethics proposed by the Epicurean school. Rhetoric does not bring happiness. On the other hand philosophy, he reminds us, shows us how to limit our desires, and it is better than rhetoric which helps us to satisfy them: in other words, people oftentimes use rhetoric not only for immoral purposes, but also to run after vain and empty desires like fame and a political career. True philosophy also encourages us to seek a profession that leads to happiness, whereas “rhetoric is unsuitable for one who aims at quiet happiness” and produces “strange reasons to study politics“.

Philosophers Must Obey the Law

Some laws (just and unjust) are natural and never change, others vary by locality and condition. Rhetorica argues that it is better to obey all the laws and adapt to society. Otherwise, if a philosopher doesn’t think he can live well under the conditions created by a particular regulation, he may vote with his feet and leave the country.

(We should obey the laws) with pleasure and not under compulsion; steadily and not in an uncertain fashion.

The ancients apparently didn’t have a word for activism, but clearly rhetoric would serve the purposes of a modern activist. It’s not that philosophy does not contribute to the work of activists, but for the sake of ataraxia we must make sure that we live lawful lives. Living under the rule of tyranny would likely impede ataraxia. Hence the two choices given to the philosopher.

On the Proper Use of Rhetoric

We agree that a good delivery lends dignity to the speaker, secures the attention of the audience and sways their emotions.

Rhetorica makes us ask ourselves questions about the most ethical use of words and of communication, not just the most effective. There are several ways in which words can be harmful: they can be either deceitful (hence the Epicurean insistence on parrhesia, or frankness) or they can be insulting, hurtful and demoralizing (hence the insistence on suavity, or mild and kind manners).

Book VII concludes that one must pursue that which produces a painless life. Epicurean therapy uses treatments that consist on reasonings and evidence-based, carefully-built arguments. Therefore, although rhetors are willing to sell false views to common people, we must assume that rhetoric can and should be employed in the service of philosophy and to heal the soul via true and wholesome arguments.

Further Reading:

Read Philodemus De Rhetorica, translation and commentary by Dr. Harry M Hubbell (PDF)

Reasonings About Philodemus’ On Frank Speech, Parts I, II and III

The Rhetorica Of Philodemus

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Detailed Review of “A Few Days in Athens”

Read the full text, audio version, and links to PDF versions at  archive.com.

A Few Days in Athens

The first thing I told myself after reading A Few Days in Athens is “Why did I wait so long to read this masterpiece?”. That was the same reaction I had to reading Lucian’s Alexander the Oracle-Monger, a work which I knew about for very long but had been too lazy to read, and I even felt the need to apologize to our predecessor by writing a piece in praise of Lucian. Let this be my piece in praise of Frances Wright, as this is perhaps the only extant work by a female Epicurean author advocating in no uncertain terms a return to the wisdom of Epicurus.

The work had been recommended to me by Cassius, who said the following:

It is an amazing piece of material … It probably qualifies as the real (Epicurean) “Atlas Shrugged” or ultimate English-language manifesto of Epicurean philosophy, and it also lends itself to almost being used–without any changes at all–for a modern movie or screenplay that could easily be staged … I believe the portrayal of doctrine to be 100% faithful … Almost all the minute episodes and references are from various books of Diogenes Laertius, but the material is combined and told in story-form in such a way as to be a work of genius.

In general, I find the book extremely faithful to the core texts on every core point. And virtually every aspect of the book is a helpful explanation of Epicurean doctrine, along with a comparison of how he differed from other philosophers.

Short of Epicurus’ own letters, and Lucretius, and Diogenes of Oinoada, this is probably THE undiscovered treasure of world Epicurean literature. I am not familiar with what has been published in other languages, but it really stands alone in the English world, at least.

Simply by reading this one, single, easy-and-fun-to-read book, any educated layman can have a better grasp of the core ideas of Epicurus than most college students have after four years and a degree in philosophy.

Cassius also expresses doubts as to whether a young Frances Wright wrote the work by herself or with the aid of her great-uncle James Mylne, a professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow College who mentored her during a period of her life, as she was an orphan and moved to live with him in Scotland when she was 21. We can’t make any definite claims of co-authorship by her uncle, but he would have had a reputation to uphold, and with this being a book written partly in defense of atheism, it’s fair to consider the possibility of co-authorship.

I personally do not doubt that she could have written the work entirely by herself. She was a brilliant, passionate woman with very progressive views who (according to the sources) was acquainted with French materialist philosophy from an early age (a tradition which originates, let us not forget, with Pierre Gassendi: an Epicurean) and later went on to become a secularist, feminist and abolitionist activist, as well as one of Susan B. Anthony’s personal heroes.

A Few Days in Athens was also personally recommended by Thomas Jefferson and Marquis de Lafayette.

A treat to me of the highest order. The matter and manner of the dialogue is strictly ancient … the scenery and portraiture of the interlocutors are of higher finish than anything in that line left us by the ancients; and like Ossian, if not ancient, it is equal to the best morsels of antiquity. – Thomas Jefferson

… which should lead us to consider the historical importance of this work and its author. Together with Lafayette, Wright is known to have spent some time in the company of Thomas Jefferson when she came to America, an event which led to her humanitarian plan to purchase, educate, and later emancipate slaves. She scandalously criticized racial segregation more than a century prior to its abolition and called for miscegenation: the cultural and sexual mixing of races. She also exchanged letters with Jefferson, and shared with him an outspoken, profound distrust of the central bank.

As an interesting side note, which is reminiscent of the suspicion aroused by Epicurus’ early and precocious treatment of women as intellectual equals: the relationship between Lafayette and Wright also attracted gossip, and she even suggested he legally adopt her in order to silence the dissenting voices. It seems that Lafayette considered her worthy of meeting the other great minds of her day. So rare were the instances of women being treated as intellectual equals. It’s a testament to Epicureanism’s progressive values that our tradition nurtured these egalitarian models (invariably enduring gossip as it did so) 2,400 years ago, and then again a couple of hundred years ago.

It’s possible that A Few Days in Athens (which was written at the insistence of her co-conspirator Lafayette) is the novel that converted the founding father to Epicureanism, and in fact Jefferson carried around a notebook with quotes from the book.

Cassius also attests as to how complete an education in Epicureanism just reading this book represents, which makes is therefore a must-read for everyone studying our tradition and wanting to get a grasp of it on its own terms.

One thing this book NAILS DOWN is that (Jefferson) was not just some generic deist who had vague anti-christian feelings. This books shows (because it contains) that he was fully conversant in the most intricate details of the debates between the ancient schools, so when he said “I too am an Epicurean” he was not just talking loosely — he would have had a full understanding of what that meant.

Overview of the Work

Enough drum-beating! Let us now turn to a discussion of the book itself. The work commences with a claim of being a translation of a manuscript found in Herculaneum, but this reference was fictional and meant as a literary device.

The only set of views that is a later development in Epicureanism is Frances’ apparent agnosticism, which contrasts with the piety of the original founders of our tradition. This sympathy with atheistic views even takes on a strident tone reminiscent of contemporaries like Richard Dawkins and (Epicurean author) Christopher Hitchens at the point towards the end of the novel where religion is even denominated the root of all evil.

I have found the first link in the chain of evil; I have found it–in all countries–among all tribes and tongues and nations; I have found it, Fellow-men, I have found it in RELIGION.

We have named the leading error of the human mind, the bane of human happiness, the perverter of human virtue! It is RELIGION, that dark coinage of trembling ignorance! That poisoner of human felicity! That blind guide of human reason! That dethroner of human virtue which lies at the root of all evil and all the misery that pervade the world! 

We must treat Wright as an independent mind with an independent history and interpretation of Epicureanism. Just as Simone de Beauvoir was the feminist counterpart to Sartre among the French existentialists, Wright may be seen as an insightful feminist who is much less forgiving of religion than men (who have always enjoyed–even if at times unaware–religion’s privileges) may be inclined to be. Frances Wright’s Epicureanism is not the Epicureanism of our founders. It is a much freer, contemporary version of our tradition, one that could have only flourished where dissent does not necessarily invite danger.

Yet, this Epicureanism retains its refined, polished quality, and even fills the heart with love of virtue. Sages are viewed as compassionate, playful and just; the innocence of the good is justly protected and insisted upon, as there can be no imperturbability without innocence; good manners and wholesome character are celebrated.

If I ever saw simple, unadorned goodness; If I ever heard simple, unadorned truth, it is in, it is from Epicurus.

The book A Few Days in Athens is itself an exercise in good association and leaves us with the accompanying after-glow. One can easily envision and experience the healthy effects of associating with the virtuous, and one ends up wishing to profit from the study at the feet of philosophy–who is personified and even speaks in the first person, as in other wisdom traditions, in a section of the book.

Proper Relation Between Master and Pupil

The Stoic master Zeno and our own, Epicurus, are seen throughout the book as Guru figures. In a manner somewhat reminiscent of the Eastern protocol for relations between guru (spiritual teacher) and chela (pupil), here the pupil must be ready and receptive to the instructor and to the teaching in order to profit from the relationship.

Teach me, guide me, make me what you will. My soul is in your hand.  – Theon, taking refuge in Epicurus in A Few Days in Athens

On the other hand, reciprocity is expected and the Guru must be worthy of the name and lead by example. It’s understood that Epicurus taught by example and that his life is his message.

I answer (Stoic lies) with my life. – Epicurus, in A Few Days in Athens

Epicureans in antiquity believed that true sages taught philosophy by embodying the virtues so thoroughly that their mere presence had an effect on pupils. A similar belief exists also in the East, where the vision of a saint (called darshan), either in dream or awakened state, is considered a huge blessing. Wright’s book contains a detailed description of the main woman philosopher from the original Garden, Leontion. She is depicted as being comparable to Athena in dignity, wisdom and demeanor.

Throughout the text Epicurus is depicted as mild and candid. The author places words of praise for Epicurus and his virtues on the lips of Metrodorus, again evocating a sense of darshan, thus:

The life of Epicurus is a lesson of wisdom. It is by example, even more than precept, that he guides his disciples. Without issuing commands, he rules despotically … We are a family of brothers, of which Epicurus is the father.

Many of us have had bad habits, many of us evil propensities, violent passions. That our habits are corrected, our propensities changed, our passions restrained, lies all with Epicurus … he has made me taste the sweets of innocence, and brought me into the calm of philosophy. It is thus, by rendering us happy, that he lays us at his feet.

He cannot but know his power, yet he exerts it in no other way, than to mend our lives, or to keep them innocent.

Candor, as you have already remarked, is prominent feature of his mind, the crown of his perfect character.

Beholding the wisdom and virtue of a sage is crucial. The ultimate authority, however, is always the canon: the natural faculties by which we directly apprehend reality. It is this canon that vindicates a true sage. Once Theon (a Stoic who stumbles into Epicurus and must confront his deep-seated and demoralizing prejudices against hedonist philosophy) has his false notions put in their right place, Epicurus encourages him to think for himself based on the immediacy of his direct experience.

Learn henceforth to form judgements upon knowledge, not report. Credulity is always a ridiculous, often a dangerous failing.

The Abstract Versus the Real

We see an attack on Stoic and Platonic tendencies to speak of abstractions instead of addressing reality as it is, in the following quote attributed to Epicurus in the text.

Zeno hath his eye on man, I mine on men: none but philosophers can be stoics; Epicureans all may be.

Man, as an abstract idea removed from material reality and context, is contrasted here with men as individuals that exist interwoven with reality and context. The effect that this is said to have is that only philosophers can be stoics, but all may be Epicureans. To paraphrase the book, Zeno sees man as he should be; Epicurus sees him as he is. This is an important insight, and one that Thomas Jefferson in his Epistle to Peter Carr elaborated:

He who made us would have been a pitiful bungler, if he had made the rules of our moral conduct a matter of science. For one man of science, there are thousands who are not. What would have become of them?

Man was destined for society. His morality, therefore, was to be formed to this object. He was endowed with a sense of right and wrong, merely relative to this. This sense is as much a part of his Nature, as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling; it is the true foundation of morality, and not the [beautiful], truth, etc., as fanciful writers have imagined.

The moral sense, or conscience, is as much a part of man as his leg or arm. It is given to all human beings in a stronger or weaker degree, as force of members is given them in a greater or less degree. It may be strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb of the body. This sense is submitted, indeed, in some degree, to the guidance of reason; but it is a small stock which is required for this: even a less one than what we call common sense. State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former will decide it as well, and often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by artificial rules.

In a similar vein, later in the text there is a reference to how words are to things what means are to the end. When it is explained that virtue is happiness, it is understood that men speak of virtue (which is the means) as the end (which is really happiness) because they haven’t been able to distinguish the abstract conception of the pleasant from the real experience of pleasure.

I feel myself virtuous because my soul is at rest. – Epicurus, in A Few Days in Athens

Virtue and happiness (abiding pleasure) can be said to be one and the same insofar as one is the means to the other.

Of all the thousands who have yielded homage to virtue, hardly one has thought of inspecting the pedestal she stands upon.

Just as good and virtue equals pleasure, similarly evil is the abstraction to refer to pain, which is concrete.

With evil passions I should be disturbed and uneasy; with uncontrolled apetites I should be disorded in body as well as mind.

This important issue of abstractions versus concrete things, and of how words must always have concrete, clear and concise meaning, appears again and again: we find it in Philodemus, and it must be traced back to the original founders of the tradition.

It’s even more important when we consider what other philosophers do with rhetoric, how they twist truths and bend them for the benefit of their clients or to demonstrate their ability to persuade, and when we consider the blatant disregard for truth among the rhetors, a matter which will be covered in future reasonings concerning Philodemus’ Rhetorica.

Therefore, when discussing philosophy with other schools, as well as with each other, it’s important that words are clearly defined in concrete and concise terms to avoid confusion. This subject is revisited later in the text, when Metrodorus critiques the pedantry of Aristotle and how his dark sayings entice the mobs.

The language of truth is too simple for inexperienced ears. We start in search of knowledge like the demi-gods of old in search of adventure, prepared to encounter giants, to scale mountains … to find none of these things, but in their stead, a smooth road through a pleasant country with a familiar guide to direct our curiosity and point out the beauties of the landscape, disappoints us of all exploit and all notoriety; and our vanity turns too often from the fair and open fields into error’s dark labyrinths, where we mistake mystery for wisdom, pedantry for knowledge, and prejudice for virtue.

By Their Fruits Ye Shall Know Them

The above quote is associated with Jesus in the Gospels, but Wright appropriated it and prophetically placed it on the lips of Epicurus during a discussion with Zeno on the future decay and the future reputations of their respective schools, both of which they anticipate will be calumniated by “ambitious bigots”.

From the flavor, we pronounce of the fruit; from the beauty and the fragrance of the flower; and in a system of morals, or of philosophy, or of whatever else, what tends to produce good we pronounce to be good, what to produce evil, we pronounce to be evil.

We are here invited to judge each philosophy by the good it does (the pleasure it confers) and the evil (suffering) it prevents. If by these simple criteria we were to judge religions and philosophies prominent today, this would help us to judge Islam, Christianity, Marxism and other worldviews in light of historical and contemporary events (including how much violence and suffering they have produced) with a lucid and sober mind. Unlike political correctness, bigotries and bias, the pain and pleasure principle are not subjective or relative. They are real, natural, observable, concrete experiences.

“I gently awaken their sleeping faculties …”

The above considerations regarding virtue and pleasure, and how (guided by nature) one must distinguish them as the means and the end, have specific repercussions on the way in which Zeno and Epicurus teach philosophy. Epicurus concedes that Stoics are virtuous as well, but the severity and gravity of Zeno is contrasted beautifully against the compassion and the sweet mellows Epicurean philosophy.

With all his weaknesses, all his errors, all his sins … I call from my Gardens to the thoughtless, the headstrong, and the idle. “Where do ye wander, and what do ye seek? Is it pleasure? Behold it here. Is it ease? Enter and repose.” Thus do I court them from the table of drunkenness and the bed of licentiousness: I gently awaken their sleeping faculties, and draw the veil from their understandings.

“My sons, do you seek pleasure? I seek her also. Let us make the search together. You have tried wine, you have tried love; you have sought amusement in revelling, and forgetfulness in indolence. You tell me you are disappointed: that your passions grew, even while you gratified them; your weariness increased even while you slept. Let us try again. Let us quiet our passions, not by gratifying but subduing them; let us conquer our weariness, not by rest, but by exertion.”

Thus do I win their ears and their confidence. Step by step I lead them on … Temperance presides at the repast; innocence, at the festival; disgust is changed to satisfaction; listlessness, to curiosity; brutality, to elegance; lust gives place to love; Bacchanalian hilarity to friendship.

The contrast here lies in Epicurean insistence of gently yielding to the good in our nature, rather than the authoritarian, repressive approach of the Stoics. This is consistent with the proper understanding of virtue as not arising from some arbitrary or authoritarian principle (such as duty) but rather as that which gives way to the most pleasant existence. Let’s call this the grassroots understanding of virtue, since it is not implemented from the top-down, but organically.

Part of how Epicurus plants the seeds of his Garden and of pleasure and virtue in the hearts of his followers is by inflaming them with love of wisdom and of philosophy, and with a sense of fraternity with each other. A Few Days in Athens describes the serene life of philosophy in the most sublime manner.

A happy life is like neither to a roaring torrent, nor a stagnant pool, but to a placid and crystal stream that flows gently and silently along.

The text goes on to list all the virtues and how they make life pleasant, and insightfully ends up recognizing the relationship that philosophy has to nature.

True, Philosophy cannot change the laws of nature; but she may teach us to accomodate to them. She cannot annul pain; but she can arm us to bear it.

This passage begins a wonderful litany in praise of philosophy and what she can do for our souls, and concludes thus:

This … is our interest and our hapiness: to seek our pleasures from the hands of the virtues, and for the pain which may befall us, to submit to it with patience, or bear up against it with fortutide. To walk … through life innocently and tranquilly: and to look on death as its gentle termination, which it becomes us to meet with ready minds, neither regretting the past, nor anxious for the future.

A Mind Free of Prejudice

It were a poor compliment to the truths I have hitherto worshipped, did I shrink from their investigation. – Theon

The final portion of the book is perhaps the most controversial and difficult part, as it contains a polemic against conventional beliefs about God and a defense of atheism. It calls for questioning religious beliefs and a blissful indifference to deity. This is the part of the book that is most reminiscent to contemporary militant atheist authors, except that here the polemic is contextualized within Epicurean discourse and it does not specifically constitute a call to atheism as much as a call to end prejudice against atheists and against atheism.

Wright’s Epicurus had to first break the ice and challenge Theon’s blind adherence to Stoic doctrines about the Gods. He begins by challenging how a belief can be considered a crime or a virtue, as this attaches merit to credulity, and furthermore attaches demerit to investigation.

If the doubt of any truth shall constitute a crime, then the belief of the same truth should constitute a virtue.

The conversation then focuses on whether the mind has the power to believe or disbelieve, at pleasure, any truths whatsoever, or whether it possesses the power of investigation. In other words, do we owe it to ourselves to investigate truth claims? Do we even hold truth in high regard? Do we arrogantly believe as we wish, regardless of facts, or of the cost to our safety or to our lives of the tenets we hold?

A prudent and fair person can here only agree that investigation is necessary and a matter of intellectual decency. Therefore, it is fair to investigate whether the Gods exist or not, and it is fair to refrain from reaching a conclusion until we can directly apprehend them. Doubt is not a crime and unjustified certainty is not a virtue.

You enquire if the doctrine we have essayed to establish, be not dangerous. I reply, not if it be true. Nothing is so dangerous as error, nothing so safe as truth.

When asked by Theon what is truth and what is the fixed basis for it, Wright’s Epicurus answers:

A truth I consider to be an ascertained fact; which truth would be changed into an error, the moment the fact on which it rested was disproved. (Truth) surely has the most fixed (basis) of all: the nature of things, and it is only an imperfect insight into that nature which occasions all our erroneous conclusions, whether in physics or morals.

This notion of how one truth leads to another truth in a chain of causation is then elaborated into a sermon on the importance of attaching ourselves to empirical evidence and to our senses and faculties, since if the senses are denied, we are “set on wrong path as false views lead to more false views”.

The point of the anti-theological sermon is that we must free our minds from prejudice and from cultural corruption. Unlike religion and cultural values, science and empirical accumulation of knowledge are free from bias.

Chapter XIV closes with the following conclusion concerning the supposed immorality of atheism, which was believed by Theon originally to be a thought-crime. After explaining that it is no crime to believe with certainty in gods, but that’s it’s unreasonnable, Wright’s Epicurus closes:

(Let) this truth remain with you: that an opinion, right or wrong, can never constitute a moral offence, nor be in itself a moral obligation. It may be mistaken; it may involve an absurdity, or a contradiction. It is a truth, or it is an error: it can never be a crime or a virtue.

Leontium then assumes the role of instructor and criticizes Plato’s ideas and how theologians and Platonists establish laws and doctrines with no input from the study of nature, leading people into error, upon which of course further error is built.

A theory is built, and all animate and inanimate nature is made to speak in its support; an hypothesis is advanced and all the mysteries of nature are treated as explained.

Here, she would be making a mockery of Mormon “archaeogists” who have journeyed in vain to the lands of the first nations in the Americas in search of proof of the people and places of the mythical Book of Mormon, just as many Christians “archaeologists” have done in the Middle East. In this manner, a mind filled with cultural corruption and prejudice will start off on false premises that are unproven, and make the findings and the evidence accomodate to their pre-established views without considering the possibility that they’re based on a fraudulent foundation.

The science of philosophy is simply a science of observation, both as regards the world without us, and the world within; and to advance in it, are requisite only sound senses, well developed and exercised faculties, and a mind free of prejudice.

In a later chapter, we find a related sermon against what we might call the god of the gaps: the filling in the spaces of our ignorance with supernatural claims, which are considered evil insofar as they are fear-based and disturb our souls with fears of hell, of death, or of wrathful and tyrannical deities, robbing us of our freedom and happiness. The questions about gods and their nature must be addressed, for they

either open our minds to knowledge of the wonders working in and around us, as our senses and faculties can attain, or close them forever with the bands of superstitions, leaving us a prey to fear, the slaves of our ungoverned imagination, wondering and trambling at every occurrence in nature, and making our existence and destiny sources of dread and mystery.

… It behooves us to see that we come with willing minds; that we say not “so far will we go and no farther; we will examine, but only so long as the result of our examination shall confirm our preconceived opinions.”

The First Cause

The didactic novel continues with Theon arguing the existence of God by citing a first cause. It is here that we find the same answer to that argument that has been used by the likes of Richard Dawkins, who asks what caused the first cause: if all things have a cause, we end up right where we started. This is an old argument.

Epicureans have always held that it has never been in evidence that something comes from nothing. All things, when they decompose, their atoms return to the elements and form new things so that although constant change is everywhere in evidence, nothing comes from nothing. The constituents of all things (the atoms) are therefore held to be eternal.

Metrodorus Calls for a Neuroscience

There is no mystery in nature … things being as they are, is no more wonderful, than it would be if they were different.

Another area where thinkers, both religious and philosophical, have frequently made spurrious claims is the nature of the mind and of consciousness. Wright’s Metrodorus bursts the bubble of mystery and awe that surrounds the human mind by proposing a materialist view and explaining that mind is a property of the living and has no existence independent of matter.

No real advances can be made in the philosophy of the mind, without a deep scrutiny into the operations of nature, or material existences. Mind being only a quality of matter, the study we call the philosophy of mind is necessarily only a branch of general physics (the study of nature).

Against Fear-Based Religion

The final portion constitutes a diatribe against religion. The argument that it’s useful and that we should consider its utilitarian benefits is refuted with the argument that the world is full of religion and full of misery and crime. The text then goes into a litany of reasons why religion is mischievous and laments the state of the men who practice fear-based religion.

His best faculties dormant; his judgment unawakened; his very senses misemployed; all his energies misdirected; trembling before the coinage of his own idle fancy; seeing over all creation a hand of tyranny extended; and instead of following virtue, worshipping power! Monstruous creation of ignorance! … Man, boasting of superior reason, of moral discrimination, imagines a being at once unjust, cruel, and inconsistent, then kissing the dust, calls himself its slave.

To fear a being on account of his power is degrading, to fear him as he be good, ridiculous.

It is here that we find a detailed elaboration of Epicurus’ Trilemma, which says:

(1) If God is unable to prevent evil, he is not omnipotent.
(2) If God is not willing to prevent evil, he is not good.
(3) If God is willing and able to prevent evil, then why is there evil?

—Epicurus Trilemma

The theologian is then invited to banish fear and doubt from his creed, for love alone can be claimed by gods or yielded by men. The problem of fear-based religion and of the vulgar notions that people have about wrathful gods who interfere in human affairs is tackled one last time on the grounds of how degrading these beliefs are to humans.

Theist! You make your god a being more weak, more silly than yourself.

The final portion closes with the argument that if a God exists, any being worthy of the name God would want us to be happy and would be concerned with its own happiness and pleasure, wishing us to focus on our own. Therefore, the conclusion of all these reasonings is that we should:

Enjoy, and be happy! Do you doubt the way? Let Epicurus be your guide. The source of every enjoyment is within yourselves. Good and evil lie before you. the good is all which can yield you pleasure; the evil, what must bring you pain. Here is no paradox, no dark saying, no moral hid in fables.

Further Reading:

Read the full text, audio version, and links to PDF versions at afewdaysinathens.com, at archive.com

A Few Days in Athens
Varios días en Atenas (Spanish Edition)

Get book and commentary by Cassius Amicus from amazon

Wright’s biography from Encyclopaedia Britannica and a revealing summary of the relationship between Wright, Lafayette, and Jefferson

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